Invasion of Pennsylvania--Campaign and Battle of Gettysburg--Lee's
Retreat Across the Potomac, and Losses in Both Armies
At Harper's Ferry, June 16th, I was assigned to command a brigade
under General W. H. French, a regular officer. General Joseph
Hooker, in command of the Army of the Potomac, June 25th, ordered
French to be ready to march at a moment's notice. French took
position on Maryland Heights, where, June 27th, Hooker visited him
and gave him orders to prepare to evacuate both the Heights and
Harper's Ferry. French had under him there about 10,000 effective
men. Halleck, on being notified of Hooker's purpose to evacuate
these places and to unite French's command with the Army of the
Potomac for the impending battle, countermanded Hooker's order;
thereupon the latter, by telegram from Sandy Hook, requested to be
relieved from the command of that army. His request being persisted
in, he was, on June 28th, relieved, and Major-General George G.
Meade was, by the President, assigned to succeed him. Meade, also
feeling in need of reinforcements, on the same day asked permission
to order French, with his forces, to join him. Halleck, though
placing French under Meade's command, did not consent to this.
French, however, with all his troops (save my brigade), under orders
from Washington, abandoned Harper's Ferry and Maryland Heights,
and became a corps of observation to operate in the vicinity of
Frederick, Maryland, in the rear of the Army of the Potomac. And
though no enemy was threatening, nor likely to do so soon, I was
ordered to dismantle the fortified heights, load the guns and stores
on Chesapeake and Ohio Canal boats, and escort them to Washington,
repairing the canal and locks on the way. This work was done
thoroughly, and we arrived with a fleet of twenty-six boats in
Washington shortly after midnight, July 4, 1863. It was my first
visit to that city.
Under orders from Halleck, I started on the 6th, by rail, to reoccupy
Harper's Ferry, but was stopped by Meade at Frederick, and there
again reported to French. French had been assigned to command the
Third Army Corps (to succeed General Daniel E. Sickles, wounded at
Gettysburg), and his late command became the Third Division of that
corps, under Elliott; my brigade, consisting of the 110th and 122d
Ohio, 6th Maryland, and 138th Pennsylvania Infantry regiments,
became the Second Brigade of this division. This brigade (with,
later, three regiments added) was not broken up during the war,
and was generally known as "_Keifer's Brigade_."
It is not my purpose to attempt to write the full story of the
battle of Gettysburg, the greatest, measured by the results, of
the many great battles of the war. Gettysburg marks the high tide
of the Rebellion. From it dates the certain downfall of the
Confederacy, though nearly two years of war followed, and more
blood was spilled after Lee sullenly commenced his retreat from
the heights of Gettysburg than before.
About this stage of the war, President Lincoln took an active
interest in the movements of the armies, although he generally
refrained from absolutely directing them in the field. It was not
unusual for army commanders to appeal to him for opinions as to
military movements, and he was free in making suggestions, volunteering
to take the responsibility if they were adopted and his plans
miscarried. Hooker, in an elaborate dispatch (June 15th) relating
to the anticipated movements of Lee's army from the Rappahannock
to the northward, said:
"I am of opinion that it is my duty to pitch into his rear, although
in so doing the head of his column may reach Warrenton before I
can return."
The President, answering, said:
"I have but one idea which I think worth suggesting to you, and
that is, in case you find Lee coming to the north of the Rappahannock,
I would by no means cross to the south of it. If he should leave
a rear force at Fredericksburg, tempting you to fall upon it, it
would fight in intrenchments and have you at disadvantage, and so,
man for man, worst you at that point, while his main force would
in some way be getting the advantage of you northward. In one
word, I would not take any risk of being entangled upon the river,
_like an ox jumped half over the fence and liable to be torn by
dogs front and rear, without a fair chance to gore one way or kick
the other_."( 1)
The President, answering another dispatch from Hooker, June 10th,
said:
"I think Lee's army, and not Richmond, is your objective point.
If he comes towards the upper Potomac, follow him on his flank and
on his inside track, shortening your lines while he lengthens him.
Fight him, too, when opportunity offers. If he stays where he is,
_fret him and fret him_."( 2)
When deeply concerned about the fate of Winchester (June 14th),
this dispatch was sent:
"Major General Hooker:
"So far as we can make out here, the enemy have Milroy surrounded
at Winchester and Tyler at Martinsburg. If they could hold out a
few days, could you help them? _If the head of Lee's army is at
Martinsburg, and the tail of it on the plank road between Fredericksburg
and Chancellorsville, the animal must be very slim somewhere.
Could you not break him?_"
"A. Lincoln."( 2)
Hooker did not cross the river and attack the rear of Lee's army,
nor did he "_fret_" Lee's army, nor "_break_" it, however "_slim_"
"_the animal_" must have been, and hence Milroy was sacrificed,
and the rich towns, cities, and districts of Maryland and Pennsylvania
were overrun by a hungry and devastating foe; but Gettysburg came;
the Union hosts there being successfully led by another commander
--Meade!
George Gordon Meade came to the command of the Army of the Potomac
under the most trying circumstances. The situation of that army
and the country was critical. He had been distinguished as a
brigade, division, and corps commander under McClellan, Burnside,
and Hooker; in brief, he had won laurels on many fields, especially
at Fredericksburg, where he broke through the enemy's right and
reached his reserves, yet he never had held an independent command.
He was of Revolutionary stock (Pennsylvania), though born in Cadiz,
Spain, December 31, 1815, where his parents then resided, his father
being a merchant and shipowner there. He was graduated at West
Point; was a modest, truthful, industrious, studious man, with the
instincts of a soldier. He was wounded at New Market, or Glendale,
in the Peninsula campaign (1862). He was commanding in person,
and ambitious to succeed, prudent, yet obstinate, and when aroused
showed a fierce temper; yet he was, in general, just. On the third
day after he assumed command of the army its advance corps opened
the battle of Gettysburg. What great soldier ever before took an
army and moved it into battle against a formidable adversary in so
short a time? It must also be remembered that the troops composing
his army were not used to material success. They had never been
led to a decisive victory. Some of them had been defeated at Bull
Run; some of them on the Peninsula; some of them at the Second Bull
Run; some of them were in the drawn battle of Antietam; some of
them had suffered repulse at Fredericksburg, and defeat at
Chancellorsville, and the army in general had experienced more of
defeat than success, although composed of officers and soldiers
equal to the best ever called to battle. When Meade assumed command,
Lee's army was, in the main, far up the Cumberland Valley, and
pressing on; Ewell had orders to take Harrisburg, and was then,
with most of his corps, at Carlisle, Pennsylvania. York and
Wrightsville, Pa., were taken on the 28th by Gordon of Early's
division. On the 29th Ewell ordered his engineer, with Jenkins'
cavalry, to reconnoitre the defences of Harrisburg, and he was
starting for that place himself on the same day when Lee recalled
him and his corps to join the main army at Cashtown, or Gettysburg.( 3)
Longstreet's corps marched from Fredericksburg, June 3d, _via_
Culpeper Court-House, thence up the Rappahannock and along the
eastern slope of the Blue Ridge; on the 19th occupied Ashby's and
Snicker's Gaps, leading to the Valley; on the 23d marched _via_
Martinsburg and Williamsport into Maryland, reaching Chambersburg
on the 27th; thence marched on the 30th to Greenwood, and the next
day to Marsh Creek, four miles from Gettysburg, Pickett's division
and Hood's brigade being left, respectively, at Chambersburg and
New Guilford.( 4)
A. P. Hill's corps did not leave Fredericksburg until the 14th of
June, just after Hooker put the Army of the Potomac in motion to
the northward. Hill marched into the Valley and joined Longstreet
at Berryville, and from there preceded him to Chambersburg, and by
one day to Cashtown and Gettysburg.( 5)
General J. E. B. Stuart, in command of the Confederate cavalry,
crossed the upper Rappahannock, June 16th, and moved east of the
Blue Ridge on Longstreet's right flank, leaving only a small body
of cavalry on the Rappahannock, in observation, with instructions
to follow on the right flank of Hill's corps. Severe cavalry
engagements took place at Aldie, the 17th, and at Middleburg,
Uppeville, and Snicker's Gap, without decisive results, both sides
claiming victories. On the 24th Stuart, with the main body of his
cavalry, succeeded in eluding the Union cavalry and Hooker's army
(then feeling its way north), and passed east of Centreville, thence
_via_ Fairfax Court-House and Dranesville, and crossed, July 27th,
the Potomac at Rowser's Ford, and captured a large supply train
between Washington and Rockville. Stuart's cavalry caused some
damage in the rear and east of the Army of the Potomac, but, on
the whole, this bold movement contributed little, if any, towards
success in Lee's campaign. Stuart's advance reached the Confederate
left _via_ Dover and Carlisle, Pennsylvania, late on the afternoon
of the second day of the battle, his troopers and horses in a
somewhat exhausted condition. The consensus of opinion among
military critics was then, and since is, that Lee committed a great
strategic error in authorizing his main cavalry force to be separated
from close contact with the right of his moving army. General Lee
seems to have come to this conclusion himself, as frequently, in
his official reports of the campaign, he deplores the absence of
his cavalry and his consequent inability to obtain reliable
information of the movements of the Army of the Potomac.( 6)
Longstreet severely criticises Stuart's raid, and attributes to
the absence of the cavalry, in large part, the failure of the
Gettysburg campaign.( 7) Cavalry, under an energetic commander,
are the _eyes and ears_ of a large army, especially when it is on
an active campaign against a vigilant enemy.
Having with some particularity traced the main bodies composing
Lee's army, as to time and routes, to the vicinity of Gettysburg,
it remains to briefly follow the Army of the Potomac to the same
place. While some of its corps moved earlier, the headquarters of
that army did not leave Falmouth until the 14th of June, when it
was established at Dumfries; on the next day at Fairfax Station,
on the 18th at Fairfax Court-House, on the 26th at Poolesville,
Maryland, and the next day at Frederick, Maryland, where Meade
succeeded Hooker. Before the Army of the Potomac left Falmouth a
division of the Sixth Corps had been thrown across the river to
observe the enemy, but it did not attack him, and was withdrawn on
the 13th.
Meade found his army, mainly, in the vicinity of Frederick, though
some of his corps had passed northward and others were moving up
by converging lines, the Sixth Corps having just arrived at
Poolesville from Virginia. June 29th, Meade moved his headquarters
from Frederick to Middleburg, the next day to Taneytown, Maryland,
about fifteen miles south of Gettysburg.
The movements of the Army of the Potomac were such as to cover
Washington and Baltimore, and at the same time bring, as soon as
possible, the invading army to battle.
The First, Eleventh, and Third Corps, under Major-General John F.
Reynolds, were in the advance on Gettysburg on July 1st, the First
Corps leading, and preceded only by General John Buford's division
of cavalry. Lee was then rapidly concentrating his army at
Gettysburg. Reynolds found Buford fiercely engaging infantry of
Hill's corps as they were debouching through the mountains on the
Cashtown road. He promptly moved the First Corps to Buford's
support, and it soon became hotly engaged. The Eleventh Corps,
commanded by General Oliver O. Howard, was ordered to hasten to
join in the battle. Howard arrived about 11.30 A.M., just as
Reynolds fell mortally wounded, and the command of the field devolved
on Howard. He pushed forward two divisions of the Eleventh to the
support of the First Corps, then engaged on Seminary Hill, northeast
of Gettysburg, and posted a third division on Cemetery Ridge, south
of the town. The battle continued with great fierceness on the
Cashtown road. For a time the Union success was considerable, and
the Confederates were forced back, and numerous prisoners, including
General Archer, were captured; but reinforcements from Cashtown
and the unexpected arrival, at 1.30 P.M., over the York and Harrisburg
roads, of Ewell's corps on Howard's right left him outnumbered and
outflanked. He maintained the unequal contest until about 4 P.M.,
then ordered a withdrawal to Cemetery Ridge, which was accomplished
with considerable loss, chiefly in prisoners taken in the streets
of Gettysburg. Meade, learning of Reynolds' death, dispatched
General W. S. Hancock to represent him on the field. Hancock
arrived in time to aid Howard in posting the troops advantageously
on the Ridge, where they handsomely repulsed an attack on the right
flank. Slocum and Sickles' corps arrived about 7 P.M., and were
posted on the right and left, respectively, of those in position.
Hancock reported to Meade the position held was a strong one, and
advised that the army be concentrated there for battle. At 10 P.M.
Meade left Taneytown and reached the battle-field at 1 A.M. of the
2d of July, having, on the reports received, decided to stand and
give general battle there.( 8) The Second and Fifth Corps and the
rest of the Third arrived early on the 2nd. The Second and Third
Corps went into position on the Union left on a continuation of
the ridge towards Little Round Top Mountain. The Fifth was held
in reserve until the arrival of the Sixth at 2 P.M., when it was
moved to the extreme left, the Sixth taking its place in reserve
owing to the exhaustion of its troops, they having just accomplished
a thirty-two mile march from 9 P.M. of the day previous. The Third,
under Sickles, was moved by him to a peach orchard about one half
mile in advance, and out of line with the corps on its right and
left. Here it received the shock of battle, precipitated about 3
P.M. by Longstreet's corps from the Confederate right. The Second
and Fifth Corps were hastened to cover the flanks of the Third.
The battle raged furiously for some hours and until night put an
end to it. The Third was forced, after a desperate conflict, to
retire on its proper line. Sickles was severely wounded, losing
a leg. The Fifth, after a most heroic conflict, succeeded in
gaining and holding Round Top (big) Mountain, the key to the position
on the Union left, as were Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill, on its
right. Longstreet, at nightfall, after suffering great loss, was
forced to retire, having gained no substantial advantage. The
Sixth and part of the First Corps, having been ordered to the left,
participated in this battle and aided in Longstreet's repulse.
Geary's division of the Twelfth, moving from the extreme right,
had also reinforced the left. It was this withdrawal from the
right which enabled Ewell's corps to capture and occupy a part of
the Union line in the vicinity of Culp's Hill. An assault was made
about 8 P.M. on the Eleventh Corps at Cemetery Hill, where the
enemy penetrated to a battery, over which a _melée_ took place,
the Confederates, after a hand-to-hand fight, being driven from
the hill and forced to retreat. Thus the second day's fighting at
Gettysburg ended, neither side having gained any decisive advantage.
Most of the Union Army had been, however, more or less engaged,
while Longstreet's corps (save Pickett's division), and only portions
of Ewell's corps of the Confederate Army, had been seriously in
battle. There had been some spirited artillery duels, but these
rarely contribute materially to important results.
The third day opened, at early dawn, by Geary's division (returned
from the left) attacking, and after a lively battle retaking its
former position on the right. A spirited contest also raged on
the right at Culp's Hill and along Rock Creek all the morning, in
which Wheaton's brigade of the Sixth Corps participated. With this
exception, quiet reigned along the lines of the two great armies
during the forenoon of the 3d.
Lee, flushed with some appearance of success on the first and second
days, and over-confident of the fighting qualities of his splendid
army, born of its defeats of the Army of the Potomac on the
Rappahannock, decided to deliver offensive battle, though far from
his natural base. Orders were accordingly given to Longstreet to
mass a column of not less than 15,000 men for an assault, under
cover of artillery, on the Union left centre, to be supported by
simultaneous real or pretended attacks by other portions of the
Confederate Army.
Longstreet did not believe in the success of the attack, and hence
offered many objections to it, and predicted its failure. He
advised swinging the Confederate Army by its right around the Union
left, and thus compel Meade to withdraw from his naturally strong
position.( 9) Lee would not listen to his great Lieutenant.
Pickett's division of three brigades was assigned to the right of
the column, and it became the division of direction. Kemper's
division of four brigades from Hill's corps was formed on the left
of Pickett, and Wilcox's brigade of Hill's corps was placed in
echelon in support on Pickett's right, and the brigades of Scales
and Lane of Hill's corps, under Trimble, were to move in support
of Kemper's left. The whole column of ten brigades, composed of
forty-six regiments, numbered about 20,000 men.
Generals Pendleton and Alexander, chiefs of artillery of the Army
of Northern Virginia and of Longstreet's corps, respectively, massed
150 guns on a ridge extending generally parallel to the left of
the Union Army and about one mile therefrom, and so as to be able
to pour a converging fire on its left centre.(10) While this
preparation for decisive battle went on in the Confederate lines,
the Union Army stood at bay, in readiness for the battle-storm
foreboded by the long lull and the active preparations observed in
its front. At 1 P.M. Longstreet's batteries opened, and the superior
guns of the Union Army, though not in position in such great number,
promptly responded. This terrific duel lasted about two hours.
Meade, recognizing the futility of his artillery fire, and in
anticipation of the assault soon to come, ordered a large portion
of his artillery withdrawn under cover, to give the guns time to
cool and to be resupplied with ammunition. This led the enemy to
believe he had silenced them effectively, and the assaulting column
went forward.(11) The Union artillery, with fresh batteries added,
was again quickly put in position for its real work. The close
massed column of assault, well led, gallantly moved to the charge
down the slope and across the open ground, directed against a
portion of the Union line partially on Cemetery Ridge. The supporting
Confederate batteries now almost ceased firing. As the assaulting
column went forward the Union guns turned on it, cutting gaps in
it at each discharge. These were generally closed from the support,
but when the head of the column got well up to, and in one place
into, the Union breastworks, the fire of the Union infantry became
irresistible. Longstreet ordered the divisions of McLaws and Hood,
holding his line on the right of the assaulting column, to advance
to battle. Union forces moved out and attacked Pickett's supporting
brigade on the right. Under the fierce fire of infantry and
artillery the head of the great Confederate column fast melted
away. Generals Garnett, Pender, Semmes, Armistead, and Barksdale
were killed, Generals Kemper, Trimble, Pettigrew, and many other
officers fell wounded, and many Confederate colors were shot down.
The Confederates who penetrated the Union line were killed or
captured. When success was demonstrated to be impossible, Pickett
ordered a retreat, and such of his men as were not cut off by the
fire that continued to sweep the field escaped to cover behind the
batteries, leaving the broad track of the assaulting column strewn
with dead, dying, and wounded. The great battle was now substantially
ended. Meade did not draw out his army and pursue the broken
Confederates, as their leaders expected him to do. Lee, while
personally aiding in restoring the lines of his shattered troops,
recognized the fearful consequences of Pickett's assault, and
magnanimously said to an officer, "_It is all my fault_."
Generals Hancock and Gibbon and many important Union officers were
wounded. This, together with other causes, prevented Meade from
assuming the offensive. Two-thirds of the Confederate Army had
not been engaged actively in the last struggle, and the day was
too far spent for Meade to make the combinations indispensable to
the success of an immediate attack.
Longstreet withdrew McLaws and Hood from their advance position.
Kilpatrick moved his cavalry division to attack the Confederate
right, and Farnsworth's cavalry brigade made a gallant charge on
the rear of Longstreet's infantry, riding over detachments until
the dashing leader lost his life and his command was cut to pieces
by the terrific fire of the enemy's artillery and infantry. A
great fight also ensued on the Union right near Rock Creek, between
the Confederate cavalry under Stuart and the main body of the Union
cavalry under General Alfred Pleasanton, in which our cavalry held
the field and drove back Stuart from an attempt to penetrate behind
the Union right. The infantry corps of the two armies were not
again engaged at Gettysburg. Lee drew in his left to compact his
army, holding his cavalry still on his left.
At nightfall, July 4th, Lee, having previously sent in advance his
trains and ambulances filled with sick and wounded, commenced a
retreat by the Fairfield and Emmittsburg roads through Hagerstown
to the Potomac at Williamsport and Falling Waters, his cavalry
covering his rear. The Sixth Corps and our cavalry followed in
close pursuit on the morning of the 5th, but the main body of the
Army of the Potomac marched on the Confederate flank, directed on
Middletown, Maryland. French (left at Frederick) had pushed a
column to Williamsport and Falling Waters, and destroyed a pontoon
bridge and captured its guard and a wagon train. Buford's cavalry
was sent by Meade to Williamsport, where it encountered Lee's
advance, destroyed trains, and made many captures of guns and
prisoners. Recent heavy rains had swollen the Potomac so that it
could not be forded. Most of the Confederate sick and wounded
were, with great effort, ferried over the swollen river in improvised
boats, but not without several days' delay. Lee's army reached
the Potomac on the 11th, having suffered considerable loss during
its retreat in prisoners, arms, and trains. It took up a strong
position, covering Williamsport and Falling Waters, and intrenched.
The Union Army, after reaching Middletown and being reinforced by
French's command and somewhat reorganized, deployed on the 11th
for battle, and on the 12th moved close up to the front of the
Confederate Army. Orders were issued looking to an attack on the
morning of the 13th, but the day was spent in reconnoissances and
further preparations. On the following morning the enemy had
succeeded in crossing the river, and only a rear-guard was taken.
Great disappointment was felt that Meade did not again force Lee
to battle north of the Potomac. Certain it is that Lee's army was
deficient in ammunition for all arms, and rations were scarce.
Lee, in dispatches to Jefferson Davis, dated July 7th, 8th, and
10th, showed great apprehension as to the result of a battle if
attacked in his then situation.(12)
Meade's army was also greatly impeded by circumstances beyond human
control. When, on the 13th of July, a general attack was contemplated,
rain fell in torrents, and the cultivated fields were so soft as
to render the movement of artillery and troops almost impossible.
The wheels of the gun-carriages sunk so deep in the soft earth as
to forbid the guns being fired safely. Meade was urged, by dispatches
from Halleck, and by one from President Lincoln, to attack Lee
before he crossed the Potomac.(13) Meade was fully alive to the
importance of doing this, but he displayed some timidity peculiar
to his nature, and sought to have all the conditions in his favor
before risking another battle. His combinations were made with
too much precision for the time he had to do it in.
A less cautious commander might, during the first few days, have
assailed Lee precipitately on his front or flank, or both
simultaneously, relying on his not being able to concentrate his
army to resist it. But after Lee had concentrated his forces and
intrenched in a well selected position, covering Williamsport and
Falling Waters, the result of an attack would have been doubtful,
yet, in the light of what was later known, one should have been
made. Meade, however, had done well under the circumstances at
Gettysburg, and a two-weeks'-old independent commander, not yet
accustomed to fighting a large army in aggressive battle, is entitled
to considerate judgment.
The revised lists of losses in the battle and campaign of Gettysburg
in the Army of the Potomac show 246 officers and 2909 enlisted men
killed, 1145 officers and 13,384 enlisted men wounded, total 17,684;
also 183 officers and 5182 enlisted men captured, grand total
23,049. The First and Eleventh Corps lost, chiefly on the first
day, in captured, 3527.(14)
The imperfect lists of losses in the Army of Northern Virginia do
not show the number of killed and wounded officers separately from
enlisted men, and from some of the commands no reports are found,
yet, so far as made, they show 2592 killed and 12,709 wounded,
total 15,301, and 5150 captured, grand total 20,541.(15) The
records of prisoners of war in the Adjutant-General's Office,
U.S.A., give the names of 12,227 wounded and unwounded Confederates
captured at Gettysburg, July 1st to 5th, inclusive.(15)
When the Gettysburg campaign ended I was fairly in the Army of the
Potomac, destined to be with it and of it and to share its fortunes
for two years and to the end of the war.
( 1) _War Records_, vol. xxvii., Part I., pp. 30-1.
( 2) _Ibid_., pp. 35, 39.
( 3) Ewell's Report, _War Records_, vol. xxvii., Part II., p. 443.
( 4) Longstreet's Report, _Ibid_., 358.
( 5) Lee's Report, _Ibid_., 317.
( 6) _War Records_, vol. xxvii., Part II., pp. 316, 321-2.
( 7) _Manassas to Appomattox_, pp. 342-3, 351-9, 362.
( 8) Meade's Report, _War Records_, vol. xxvii., Part I., p. 115.
( 9) _Manassas to Appomattox_, pp. 386-7.
(10) Pendleton's Report, _War Records_., vol. xxvii., Part II.,
p. 352.
(11) _Manassas to Appomattox_, p. 392.
(12) _War Records_, vol. xxvii., Part II., pp. 299-302.
(13) _Ibid_., p. 82-3.
(14) _Ibid_., p. 187.
(15) _War Records_, vol. xxvii., Part II., 346.