"In whatever situation I shall be, I shall recollect your confidence

and kindness with all the fervour and purity of affection, of which a

grateful heart is susceptible."

In the letter accepting his resignation, the President expressed the

regret it occasioned, and added:

"I can not suffer you, however, to close your public service, without

uniting to the satisfaction which must arise in your own mind from

conscious rectitude, assurances of my most perfect persuasion that you

have deserved well of your country.

"My personal knowledge of your exertions, while it authorizes me to

hold this language, justifies the sincere friendship which I have

borne you, and which will accompany you in every situation of life."

[Sidenote: Is succeeded by Colonel Pickering.]

Colonel Pickering, a gentleman who had filled many important offices

through the war of the revolution; who had discharged several trusts

of considerable confidence under the present government; and who at

the time was postmaster general, was appointed to succeed him.

On the seventh of March, the treaty of amity, commerce, and

navigation, between the United States and Great Britain, which had

been signed by the ministers of the two nations, on the 19th of the

preceding November, was received at the office of state.

[Sidenote: Treaty between the United States and Great Britain.]

From his arrival in London on the 15th of June, Mr. Jay had been

assiduously and unremittingly employed on the arduous duties of his

mission. By a deportment respectful, yet firm, mingling a decent

deference for the government to which he was deputed, with a proper

regard for the dignity of his own, this minister avoided those little

asperities which frequently embarrass measures of great concern, and

smoothed the way to the adoption of those which were suggested by the

real interests of both nations. Many and intricate were the points to

be discussed. On some of them an agreement was found to be

impracticable; but, at length, a treaty was concluded, which Mr. Jay

declared to be the best that was attainable, and which he believed it

for the interests of the United States to accept.[32] Indeed it was

scarcely possible to contemplate the evidences of extreme exasperation

which were given in America, and the nature of the differences which

subsisted between the two countries, without feeling a conviction that

war was inevitable, should this attempt to adjust those differences

prove unsuccessful.

[Footnote 32: In a private letter to the President, of the

same date with the signature of the treaty, Mr. Jay said "to

do more was impossible. I ought not to conceal from you,

that the confidence reposed in your personal character was

visible and useful throughout the negotiation.

"If there is not a good disposition in the far greater part

of the cabinet and nation towards us, I am exceedingly

mistaken. I do not mean an ostensible and temporizing, but a

real good disposition.--I wish it may have a fair trial."]

On Monday, the 8th of June, the senate, in conformity with the summons

of the President, convened in the senate chamber, and the treaty, with

the documents connected with it, were submitted to their

consideration.

On the 24th of June, after a minute and laborious investigation, the

senate, by precisely a constitutional majority, advised and consented

to its conditional ratification.

An insuperable objection existed to an article regulating the

intercourse with the British West Indies, founded on a fact which is

understood to have been unknown to Mr. Jay. The intention of the

contracting parties was to admit the direct intercourse between the

United States and those islands, but not to permit the productions of

the latter to be carried to Europe in the vessels of the former. To

give effect to this intention, the exportation from the United States

of those articles which were the principal productions of the islands

was to be relinquished. Among these was cotton. This article, which a

few years before was scarcely raised in sufficient quantity for

domestic consumption, was becoming one of the richest staples of the

southern states. The senate being informed of this fact, advised and

consented that the treaty should be ratified on condition that an

article be added thereto, suspending that part of the twelfth article

which related to the intercourse with the West Indies.

Although, in the mind of the President, several objections to the

treaty had occurred, they were overbalanced by its advantages; and

before transmitting it to the senate, he had resolved to ratify it, if

approved by that body. The resolution of the senate presented

difficulties which required consideration. Whether they could advise

and consent to an article which had not been laid before them; and

whether their resolution was to be considered as the final exercise of

their power, were questions not entirely free from difficulty. Nor was

it absolutely clear that the executive could ratify the treaty, under

the advice of the senate, until the suspending article should be

introduced into it. A few days were employed in the removal of these

doubts, at the expiration of which, intelligence was received from

Europe which suspended the resolution which the President had formed.

The English papers contained an account, which, though not official,

was deemed worthy of credit, that the order of the 8th of June, 1793,

for the seizure of provisions going to French ports, was renewed. In

the apprehension that this order might be construed and intended as a

practical construction of that article in the treaty which seemed to

favour the idea that provisions, though not generally contraband,

might occasionally become so, a construction in which he had

determined not to acquiesce, the President thought it wise to

reconsider his decision. Of the result of this reconsideration, there

is no conclusive testimony. A strong memorial against this

objectionable order was directed; and the propositions to withhold the

ratifications of the treaty until the order should be repealed; to

make the exchange of ratifications dependent upon that event; and to

adhere to his original purpose of pursuing the advice of the senate,

connecting with that measure the memorial which had been mentioned, as

an act explanatory of the sense in which his ratification was made,

were severally reviewed by him. In conformity with his practice of

withholding his opinion on controverted points until it should become

necessary to decide them, he suspended his determination on these

propositions until the memorial should be prepared and laid before

him. In the meantime, his private affairs required that he should

visit Mount Vernon.

So restless and uneasy was the temper respecting foreign nations, that

no surprise ought to be excited at the anxiety which was felt on the

negotiation of a treaty with Great Britain, nor at the means which

were used, before its contents were known, to extend the prejudices

against it.

Great umbrage was taken at the mysterious secrecy in which the

negotiation had been involved. That the instrument itself was not

immediately communicated to the public, and that the senate

deliberated upon it with closed doors, were considered as additional

evidences of the contempt in which their rulers held the feelings and

understandings of the people, and of the monarchical tendencies of the

government. Crowned heads, it was loudly repeated, who were

machinating designs subversive of the rights of man, and the happiness

of nations, might well cover with an impenetrable veil, their dark

transactions; but republics ought to have no secrets. In republics,

those to whom power was delegated, being the servants of the people,

acting solely for their benefit, ought to transact all national

affairs in open day. This doctrine was not too absurd for the

extravagance of the moment.

The predetermined hostility to the treaty increased in activity, as

the period for deciding its fate approached. On its particular merits,

no opinion could be formed, because they were unknown; but on the

general question of reconciliation between the two countries, a

decisive judgment was extensively made up. The sentiments called forth

by the occasion demonstrated, that no possible adjustment of

differences with Great Britain, no possible arrangement which might

promise a future friendly intercourse with that nation, could be

satisfactory. The President was openly attacked; his whole system

strongly condemned; and the mission of Mr. Jay, particularly, was

reprobated in terms of peculiar harshness. That a treaty of amity and

commerce should have been formed, whatever might be its principles,

was a degrading insult to the American people; a pusillanimous

surrender of their honour; and an insidious injury to France. Between

such a compact, and an alliance, no distinction was taken. It was an

abandonment of the ancient ally of the United States, whose friendship

had given them independence, and whose splendid victories still

protected them, for a close connexion with her natural enemy, and with

the enemy of human liberty.

The pretended object of the mission, it was said, was a reparation for

wrongs, not a contaminating connexion with the most faithless and

corrupt court in the world. The return of the envoy without that

reparation, was a virtual surrender of the claim. The honour of the

United States required a peremptory demand of the immediate surrender

of the western posts, and of compensation for the piratical

depredations committed on their commerce; not a disgraceful and

humiliating negotiation. The surrender, and the compensation, ought to

have been made instantly; for no reliance could be placed in promises

to be performed in future.

That the disinclination formerly manifested by Great Britain, to give

the stability and certainty of compact to the principles regulating

the commercial intercourse between the two countries, had constituted

an important item in the catalogue of complaints against that power:

that the existence, or non-existence of commercial treaties had been

selected as the criterion by which to regulate the discriminations

proposed to be made in the trade of foreign nations; that, in the

discussion on this subject, the favourers of commercial hostility had

uniformly supported the policy of giving value to treaties with the

United States; these opinions were instantly relinquished by the party

which had strenuously asserted them while urged by their leaders in

congress; and it was imputed as a crime to the government, and to its

negotiator, that he had proceeded further than to demand immediate and

unconditional reparation of the wrongs sustained by the United States.

The most strenuous and unremitting exertions to give increased energy

to the love which was openly avowed for France, and to the detestation

which was not less openly avowed for England,[33] were connected with

this course of passionate declamation.

[Footnote 33: See note No. XI. at the end of the volume.]

Such was the state of parties when the senate advised the ratification

of the treaty. Although common usage, and a decent respect for the

executive, and for a foreign nation, not less than a positive

resolution, required that the seal of secrecy should not be broken by

the senate, an abstract of this instrument, not very faithfully taken,

was given to the public; and on the 29th of June, a senator of the

United States transmitted a copy of it to the most distinguished

editor of the opposition party in Philadelphia, to be communicated to

the public through the medium of the press.

If the negotiation itself had been acrimoniously censured; if amicable

arrangements, whatever might be their character, had been passionately

condemned; it was not to be expected that the treaty would assuage

these pre-existing irritations.

In fact, public opinion did receive a considerable shock, and men

uninfested by the spirit of faction felt some disappointment on its

first appearance. In national contests, unless there be an undue

attachment to the adversary country, few men, even among the

intelligent, are sensible of the weakness which may exist in their own

pretensions, or can allow their full force to the claims of the other

party. If the people at large enter keenly into the points of

controversy with a foreign power, they can never be satisfied with any

equal adjustment of those points, unless other considerations,

stronger than abstract reason, afford that satisfaction; nor will it

ever be difficult to prove to them, in a case unassisted by the

passions, that in any practicable commercial contract, they give too

much, and receive too little.

On no subject whatever have considerations, such as these, possessed

more influence than in that which was now brought before the American

people. Their operation was not confined to those whose passions urged

them to take part in the war, nor to the open enemies of the

executive. The friends of peace, and of the administration, had

generally received impressions unfavourable to the fair exercise of

judgment in the case, which it required time and reflection to efface.

Even among them, strong prejudices had been imbibed in favour of

France, which the open attempts on the sovereignty of the United

States had only weakened; and the matters of controversy with Great

Britain had been contemplated with all that partiality which men

generally feel for their own interests. With respect to commerce also,

strong opinions had been preconceived. The desire to gain admission

into the British West India islands, especially, had excited great

hostility to that colonial system which had been adopted by every

country in Europe; and sufficient allowances were not made for the

prejudices by which that system was supported.

The treaty, therefore, when exposed to the public view, found one

party prepared for a bold and intrepid attack, but the other, not

ready in its defence. An appeal to the passions, the prejudices, and

the feelings of the nation, might confidently be made by those whose

only object was its condemnation; which reflection, information, and

consequently time, were required by men whose first impressions were

not in its favour, but who were not inclined to yield absolutely to

those impressions.

That a treaty involving a great variety of complicated national

interests, and adjusting differences of long standing, which had

excited strong reciprocal prejudices, would require a patient and

laborious investigation, both of the instrument itself, and of the

circumstances under which it was negotiated, before even those who are

most conversant in diplomatic transactions could form a just estimate

of its merits, would be conceded by all reflecting men. But an immense

party in America, not in the habit of considering national compacts,

without examining the circumstances under which that with Great

Britain had been formed, or weighing the reasons which induced it;

without understanding the instrument, and in many instances without

reading it, rushed impetuously to its condemnation; and, confident

that public opinion would be surprised by the suddenness, or stormed

by the fury of the assault, expected that the President would be

compelled to yield to its violence.

In the populous cities, meetings of the people were immediately

summoned, in order to take into their consideration, and to express

their opinions respecting an instrument, to comprehend the full extent

of which, a statesman would need deep reflection in the quiet of his

closet, aided by considerable inquiry. It may well be supposed that

persons feeling some distrust of their capacity to form, intuitively,

a correct judgment on a subject so complex, and disposed only to act

knowingly, would be unwilling to make so hasty a decision, and

consequently be disinclined to attend such meetings. Many intelligent

men, therefore, stood aloof, while the most intemperate assumed, as

usual, the name of the people; pronounced a definitive and unqualified

condemnation of every article in the treaty; and, with the utmost

confidence, assigned reasons for their opinions, which, in many

instances, had only an imaginary existence; and in some, were

obviously founded on the strong prejudices which were entertained with

respect to foreign powers. It is difficult to review the various

resolutions and addresses to which the occasion gave birth, without

feeling some degree of astonishment, mingled with humiliation, at

perceiving such proofs of the deplorable fallibility of human reason.

The first meeting was held in Boston. The example of that city was

soon followed by New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Charleston;

and, as if their addresses were designed at least as much for their

fellow citizens as for their President, while one copy was transmitted

to him, another was committed to the press. The precedent set by these

large cities was followed, with wonderful rapidity, throughout the

union; and the spirit in which this system of opposition originated

sustained no diminution of violence in its progress.

On the 18th of July, at Baltimore, on his way to Mount Vernon, the

President received the resolutions passed by the meeting at Boston,

which were enclosed to him in a letter from the select men of that

town. The answer to this letter and to these resolutions evinced the

firmness with which he had resolved to meet the effort that was

obviously making, to control the exercise of his constitutional

functions, by giving a promptness and vigour to the expression of the

sentiments of a party, which might impose it upon the world as the

deliberate judgment of the public.

Addresses to the chief magistrate, and resolutions of town and country

meetings, were not the only means which were employed to enlist the

American people against the measure which had been advised by the

senate. In an immense number of essays, the treaty was critically

examined, and every argument which might operate on the judgment or

prejudice of the public, was urged in the warm and glowing language of

passion. To meet these efforts by counter efforts, was deemed

indispensably necessary by the friends of that instrument; and the

gazettes of the day are replete with appeals to the passions, and to

the reason, of those who are the ultimate arbiters of every political

question. That the treaty affected the interests of France not less

than those of the United States, was, in this memorable controversy,

asserted by the one party, with as much zeal as it was denied by the

other. These agitations furnished matter to the President for deep

reflection, and for serious regret; but they appear not to have shaken

the decision he had formed, or to have affected his conduct otherwise

than to induce a still greater degree of circumspection in the mode of

transacting the delicate business before him. On their first

appearance, therefore, he resolved to hasten his return to

Philadelphia, for the purpose of considering, at that place rather

than at Mount Vernon, the memorial against the provision order, and

the conditional ratification of the treaty. In a private letter to the

secretary of state, of the 29th of July, accompanying the official

communication of this determination, he stated more at large the

motives which induced it. These were, the violent and extraordinary

proceedings which were taking place, and might be expected, throughout

the union; and his opinion that the memorial, the ratification, and

the instructions which were framing, were of such vast magnitude as

not only to require great individual consideration, but a solemn

conjunct revision.

He viewed the opposition which the treaty was receiving from the

meetings in different parts of the union, in a very serious

light;--not because there was more weight in any of the objections

than was foreseen at first,--for in some of them there was none, and

in others, there were gross misrepresentations; nor as it respected

himself personally, for that he declared should have no influence on

his conduct. He plainly perceived, and was accordingly preparing his

mind for, the obloquy which disappointment and malice were collecting

to heap upon him. But he was alarmed on account of the effect it might

have on France, and the advantage which the government of that country

might be disposed to make of the spirit which was at work, to cherish

a belief, that the treaty was calculated to favour Great Britain at

her expense. Whether she believed or disbelieved these tales, their

effect, he said, would be nearly the same.

"To sum up the whole," he added, "in a few words, I have never, since

I have been in the administration of the government, seen a crisis

which, in my opinion, has been so pregnant with interesting events,

nor one from which more is to be apprehended, whether viewed on one

side or the other. From New York there is, and I am told will further

be, a counter current;[34] but how formidable it may appear I know

not. If the same does not take place at Boston and other towns, it

will afford but too strong evidence that the opposition is in a manner

universal, and would make the ratification a very serious business

indeed. But as it respects the French, even counter resolutions would,

for the reasons I have already mentioned, do little more than weaken,

in a small degree, the effect the other side would have."

[Footnote 34: The chamber of commerce in New York had voted

resolutions expressing their approbation of the treaty.]

In a private letter of the 31st of July to the same gentleman, after

repeating his determination to return to Philadelphia, and his

impression of the wisdom, the temperateness, and the firmness for

which the crisis most eminently called; he added, "for there is too

much reason to believe, from the pains that have been taken before,

at, and since the advice of the senate respecting the treaty, that the

prejudices against it are more extensive than is generally imagined.

How should it be otherwise? When no stone has been left unturned that

could impress on the minds of the people the most arrant

misrepresentation of facts: that their rights have not only been

neglected, but absolutely sold; that there are no reciprocal

advantages in the treaty: that the benefits are all on the side of

Great Britain: and, what seems to have had more weight with them than

all the rest, and has been most pressed, that the treaty is made with

the design to oppress the French republic, in open violation of our

treaty with that nation, and contrary too to every principal of

gratitude and sound policy. In time, when passion shall have yielded

to sober reason, the current may possibly turn; but, in the mean

while, this government, in relation to France and England, may be

compared to a ship between Scylla and Charybdis. If the treaty is

ratified, the partisans of the French (or rather of war and confusion)

will excite them to hostile measures, or at least to unfriendly

sentiments;--if it is not, there is no foreseeing all the consequences

that may follow as it respects Great Britain.

"It is not to be inferred from hence that I am or shall be disposed to

quit the ground I have taken, unless circumstances more imperious than

have yet come to my knowledge, should compel it; for there is but one

straight course, and that is to seek truth, and to pursue it steadily.

But these things are mentioned to show that a close investigation of

the subject is more than ever necessary; and that there are strong

evidences of the necessity of the most circumspect conduct in carrying

the determination of government into effect, with prudence as it

respects our own people, and with every exertion to produce a change

for the better with Great Britain."

In a letter of the third of August, written to the same gentleman, in

which he stated the increasing extent of hostility to the treaty, the

President added:

"All these things do not shake my determination with respect to the

proposed ratification, nor will they, unless something more imperious

and unknown to me, should, in the opinion of yourself and the

gentlemen with you, make it adviseable for me to pause."

[Sidenote: Conditionally ratified by the president.]

In the afternoon of the 11th of August the President arrived in

Philadelphia; and on the next day, the question respecting the

immediate ratification of the treaty was brought before the cabinet.

The secretary of state maintained, singly, the opinion, that, during

the existence of the provision order,[35] and during the war between

Britain and France, this step ought not to be taken. This opinion did

not prevail. The resolution was adopted to ratify the treaty

immediately, and to accompany the ratification with a strong memorial

against the provision order, which should convey, in explicit terms,

the sense of the American government on that subject. By this course,

the views of the executive were happily accomplished. The order was

revoked, and the ratifications of the treaty were exchanged.

[Footnote 35: Previous to the reception of the account of

this order, the opinion of the secretary had been in favour

of ratifying the treaty.]

[Sidenote: The treaty unpopular in the United States.]

The President was most probably determined to adopt this course by the

extreme intemperance with which the treaty was opposed, and the rapid

progress which this violence was apparently making. It was obvious

that, unless this temper could be checked, it would soon become so

extensive, and would arrive at such a point of fury, as to threaten

dangerous consequences. It was obviously necessary either to attempt a

diminution of its action by rendering its exertions hopeless, and by

giving to the treaty the weight of his character and influence, or to

determine ultimately to yield to it. A species of necessity therefore

seems to have been created for abandoning the idea, if it was ever

taken up, of making the ratification of the treaty dependent on the

revocation of the provision order.

The soundness of the policy which urged this decisive measure was

proved by the event. The confidence which was felt in the judgment and

virtue of the chief magistrate, induced many, who, swept away by the

popular current, had yielded to the common prejudices, to re-examine,

and discard opinions which had been too hastily embraced; and many

were called forth by a desire to support the administration in

measures actually adopted, to take a more active part in the general

contest than they would otherwise have pursued. The consequence was,

that more moderate opinions respecting the treaty began to prevail.

In a letter from Mount Vernon of the 20th of September, addressed to

General Knox, who had communicated to him the change of opinion which

was appearing in the eastern states, the President expressed in warm

terms the pleasure derived from that circumstance, and added: "Next to

a conscientious discharge of my public duties, to carry along with me

the approbation of my constituents, would be the highest gratification

of which my mind is susceptible. But the latter being secondary, I can

not make the former yield to it, unless some criterion more infallible

than partial (if they are not party) meetings can be discovered as the

touchstone of public sentiment. If any person on earth could, or the

great power above would, erect the standard of infallibility in

political opinions, no being that inhabits this terrestrial globe

would resort to it with more eagerness than myself, so long as I

remain a servant of the public. But as I have hitherto found no better

guide than upright intentions, and close investigation, I shall adhere

to them while I keep the watch, leaving it to those who will come

after me, to explore new ways, if they like, or think them better."

[Sidenote: Charge against the president rejected.]

If the ratification of the treaty increased the number of its open

advocates, it seemed also to give increased acrimony to the

opposition. Such hold had the President taken of the affections of the

people, that even his enemies had deemed it generally necessary to

preserve, with regard to him, external marks of decency and respect.

Previous to the mission of Mr. Jay, charges against the chief

magistrate, though frequently insinuated, had seldom been directly

made; and the cover under which the attacks upon his character were

conducted, evidenced the caution with which it was deemed necessary to

proceed. That mission visibly affected the decorum which had been

usually observed towards him; and the ratification of the treaty

brought sensations into open view, which had long been ill concealed.

His military and political character was attacked with equal violence,

and it was averred that he was totally destitute of merit, either as a

soldier, or a statesman. The calumnies with which he was assailed were

not confined to his public conduct; even his qualities as a man were

the subjects of detraction. That he had violated the constitution in

negotiating a treaty without the previous advice of the senate, and in

embracing within that treaty subjects belonging exclusively to the

legislature, was openly maintained, for which an impeachment was

publicly suggested; and that he had drawn from the treasury for his

private use, more than the salary annexed to his office, was asserted

without a blush.[36] This last allegation was said to be supported by

extracts from the treasury accounts which had been laid before the

legislature, and was maintained with the most persevering effrontery.

[Footnote 36: See the Aurora from August to December, 1795.

See, in particular, a series of essays, signed "A Calm

Observer," published from the 23d of October to the 5th of

November, 1795.]

Though the secretary of the treasury denied that the appropriations

made by the legislature had ever been exceeded, the atrocious charge

was still confidently repeated; and the few who could triumph in any

spot which might tarnish the lustre of Washington's fame, felicitated

themselves on the prospect of obtaining a victory over the reputation

of a patriot, to whose single influence, they ascribed the failure of

their political plans. With the real public, the confidence felt in

the integrity of the chief magistrate remained unshaken; but so

imposing was the appearance of the documents adduced, as to excite an

apprehension that the transaction might be placed in a light to show

that some indiscretion, in which he had not participated, had been

inadvertently committed.

This state of anxious suspense was of short duration. The late

secretary of the treasury, during whose administration of the finances

this peculation was said to have taken place, came forward with a full

explanation of the fact. It appeared that the President himself had

never touched any part of the compensation annexed to his office, but

that the whole was received, and disbursed, by the gentleman who

superintended the expenses of his household. That it was the practice

of the treasury, when a sum had been appropriated for the current

year, to pay it to that gentleman occasionally, as the situation of

the family might require. The expenses at some periods of the year

exceeded, and at others fell short of the allowance for the quarter;

so that at some times money was paid in advance on account of the

ensuing quarter, and at others, that which was due at the end of the

quarter was not completely drawn out. The secretary entered into an

examination of the constitution and laws to show that this practice

was justifiable, and illustrated his arguments by many examples in

which an advance on account of money appropriated to a particular

object, before the service was completed, would be absolutely

necessary. However this might be, it was a transaction in which the

President personally was unconcerned.[37]

[Footnote 37: Gazette of the United States, 16th November,

1795.]

When possessed of the entire fact, the public viewed, with just

indignation, this attempt to defame a character which was the nation's

pride. Americans felt themselves involved in this atrocious calumny on

their most illustrious citizen; and its propagators were frowned into

silence.

[Sidenote: Mr. Randolph resigns. Is succeeded by Colonel Pickering.]

[Sidenote: Colonel McHenry appointed secretary of war.]

On the 19th of August, the secretary of state had resigned[38] his

place in the administration, and some time elapsed before a successor

was appointed.[39] At length, Colonel Pickering was removed to the

department of state, and Mr. M'Henry, a gentleman who had served in

the family of General Washington, and in the congress prior to the

establishment of the existing constitution, was appointed to the

department of war. By the death of Mr. Bradford, a vacancy was also

produced in the office of attorney general, which was filled by Mr.

Lee, a gentleman of considerable eminence at the bar, and in the

legislature of Virginia.

[Footnote 38: See note No. XII. at the end of the volume.]

[Footnote 39: See note No. XIII. at the end of the volume.]

Many of those embarrassments in which the government, from its

institution, had been involved, were now ended, or approaching their

termination.

The opposition to the laws, which had so long been made in the western

counties of Pennsylvania, existed no longer.

[Sidenote: Treaty with the Indians north-west of the Ohio.]

On the third of August, a definitive treaty was concluded by General

Wayne with the hostile Indians north-west of the Ohio, by which the

destructive and expensive war which had long desolated that frontier,

was ended in a manner perfectly agreeable to the United States. An

accommodation had taken place with the powerful tribes of the south

also; and to preserve peace in that quarter, it was only necessary to

invest the executive with the means of restraining the incursions

which the disorderly inhabitants of the southern frontier frequently

made into the Indian territory; incursions, of which murder was often

the consequence.

Few subjects had excited more feeling among the people, or in the

government of the United States, than the captivity of their fellow

citizens in Algiers. Even this calamity had been seized as a weapon

which might be wielded with some effect against the President.

Overlooking the exertions he had made for the attainment of peace, and

the liberation of the American captives; and regardless of his

inability to aid negotiation by the exhibition of force, the

discontented ascribed the long and painful imprisonment of their

unfortunate brethren to a carelessness in the administration

respecting their sufferings, and to that inexhaustible source of

accusation,--its policy with regard to France and Britain.

[Sidenote: Treaty with Algiers.]

After the failure of several attempts to obtain a peace with the

regency of Algiers, a treaty was, at length, negotiated on terms

which, though disadvantageous, were the best that could be obtained.

The exertions of the executive to settle the controversy with Spain

respecting boundary, and to obtain the free use of the Mississippi,

had been unavailing. A negotiation in which Mr. Short and Mr.

Carmichael were employed at Madrid, had been protracted by artificial

delays on the part of the Spanish cabinet, until those ministers had

themselves requested that the commission should be terminated.

[Sidenote: Treaty with Spain.]

At length, Spain, embarrassed by the war in which she was engaged,

discovered symptoms of a temper more inclined to conciliation, and

intimated to the secretary of state, through her commissioners at

Philadelphia, that a minister, deputed on the special occasion, of

higher rank than Mr. Short, who was a resident, would be able to

expedite the negotiation. On receiving this intimation, the President,

though retaining a high and just confidence in Mr. Short, nominated

Mr. Pinckney, in November, 1794, as envoy extraordinary to his

Catholic Majesty. Mr. Pinckney repaired in the following summer to

Madrid, and a treaty was concluded on the 20th of October, in which

the claims of the United States, on the important points of boundary,

and the Mississippi, were fully conceded.

Thus were adjusted, so far as depended on the executive, all those

external difficulties with which the United States had long struggled;

most of which had originated before the establishment of the existing

government, and some of which portended calamities that no common

share of prudence could have averted.

[Sidenote: Meeting of Congress.]

Although the signature of the treaties with Spain and Algiers had not

been officially announced at the meeting of congress, the state of the

negotiations with both powers was sufficiently well understood to

enable the President with confidence to assure the legislature, in his

speech at the opening of the session, that those negotiations were in

a train which promised a happy issue.

[Sidenote: President's speech.]

After expressing his gratification at the prosperous state of American

affairs, the various favourable events which have been already

enumerated were detailed in a succinct statement, at the close of

which he mentioned the British treaty, which, though publicly known,

had not before been communicated officially to the house of

representatives.

"This interesting summary of our affairs," continued the speech, "with

regard to the powers between whom and the United States controversies

have subsisted; and with regard also to our Indian neighbours with

whom we have been in a state of enmity or misunderstanding, opens a

wide field for consoling and gratifying reflections. If by prudence

and moderation on every side, the extinguishment of all the causes of

external discord which have heretofore menaced our tranquillity, on

terms compatible with our national faith and honour, shall be the

happy results,--how firm and how precious a foundation will have been

laid for accelerating, maturing, and establishing the prosperity of

our country."

After presenting an animated picture of the situation of the United

States, and recommending several objects to the attention of the

legislature, the President concluded with observing: "Temperate

discussion of the important subjects that may arise in the course of

the session, and mutual forbearance where there is a difference in

opinion, are too obvious and necessary for the peace, happiness, and

welfare of our country, to need any recommendation of mine."

In the senate, an address was reported which echoed back the

sentiments of the speech.

In this house of representatives, as in the last, the party in

opposition to the administration had obtained a majority. This party

was unanimously hostile to the treaty with Great Britain; and it was

expected that their answer to the speech of the President would

indicate their sentiments on a subject which continued to agitate the

whole American people. The answer reported by the committee contained

a declaration, that the confidence of his fellow citizens in the chief

magistrate remained undiminished.

On a motion, to strike out the words importing this sentiment, it was

averred, that the clause asserted an untruth. It was not true that the

confidence of the people in the President was undiminished. By a

recent transaction it had been considerably impaired; and some

gentlemen declared that their own confidence in him was lessened.

By the friends of the administration, the motion was opposed with

great zeal, and the opinion that the confidence of the people in their

chief magistrate remained unshaken, was maintained with ardour. But

they were outnumbered.

To avoid a direct vote on the proposition, it was moved, that the

address should be recommitted. This motion succeeded, and, two members

being added to the committee, an answer was reported in which the

clause objected to was so modified as to be free from exception.

That part of the speech which mentioned the treaty with Great Britain

was alluded to in terms which, though not directly expressive of

disapprobation, were sufficiently indicative of the prevailing

sentiment.

Early in the month of January the President transmitted to both houses

of congress a message, accompanying certain communications from the

French government which were well calculated to cherish those ardent

feelings that prevailed in the legislature.

It was the fortune of Mr. Monroe to reach Paris, soon after the death

of Robespierre, and the fall of the Jacobins. On his reception as the

minister of the United States, which was public, and in the

convention, he gave free scope to the genuine feelings of his heart;

and, at the same time, delivered to the President of that body, with

his credentials, two letters addressed by the secretary of state to

the committee of public safety. These letters were answers to one

written by the committee of safety to the congress of the United

States. The executive department being the organ through which all

foreign intercourse was to be conducted, each branch of the

legislature had passed a resolution directing this letter to be

transmitted to the President, with a request, that he would cause it

to be answered in terms expressive of their friendly dispositions

towards the French republic.

So fervent were the sentiments expressed on this occasion, that the

convention decreed that the flag of the American and French republics

should be united together, and suspended in its own hall, in testimony

of eternal union and friendship between the two people. To evince the

impression made on his mind by this act, and the grateful sense of his

constituents, Mr. Monroe presented to the convention the flag of the

United States, which he prayed them to accept as a proof of the

sensibility with which his country received every act of friendship

from its ally, and of the pleasure with which it cherished every

incident which tended to cement and consolidate the union between the

two nations.

[Sidenote: Mr. Adet succeeds Mr. Fauchet.]

The committee of safety, disregarding the provisions of the American

constitution, although their attention must have been particularly

directed to them by the circumstance that the letter to congress was

referred by that body to the executive, again addressed the

legislature in terms adapted to that department of government which

superintends its foreign intercourse, and expressive, among other

sentiments, of the sensibility with which the French nation had

perceived those sympathetic emotions with which the American people

had viewed the vicissitudes of her fortune. Mr. Adet, who was to

succeed Mr. Fauchet at Philadelphia, and who was the bearer of this

letter, also brought with him the colours of France, which he was

directed to present to the United States. He arrived in the summer;

but probably in the idea that these communications were to be made by

him directly to congress, did not announce them to the executive until

late in December.

{1796}

The first day of the new year was named for their reception; when the

colours were delivered to the President, and the letter to congress

also was placed in his hands.

In executing this duty, Mr. Adet addressed a speech to the President,

which, in the glowing language of his country, represented France as

struggling, not only for her own liberty, but for that of the human

race. "Assimilated to, or rather identified with free people by the

form of her government, she saw in them," he said, "only friends and

brothers. Long accustomed to regard the American people as her most

faithful allies, she sought to draw closer the ties already formed in

the fields of America, under the auspices of victory, over the ruins

of tyranny."

To answer this speech was a task of some delicacy. It was necessary to

express feelings adapted to the occasion, without implying sentiments

with respect to the belligerent powers, which might be improper to be

used by the chief magistrate of a neutral country. With a view to both

these objects, the President made the following reply:

"Born, sir, in a land of liberty; having early learned its value;

having engaged in a perilous conflict to defend it; having, in a word,

devoted the best years of my life to secure its permanent

establishment in my own country; my anxious recollections, my

sympathetic feelings, and my best wishes, are irresistibly attracted,

whensoever, in any country, I see an oppressed nation unfurl the

banners of freedom. But above all, the events of the French revolution

have produced the deepest solicitude, as well as the highest

admiration. To call your nation brave, were to pronounce but common

praise. Wonderful people! Ages to come will read with astonishment the

history of your brilliant exploits. I rejoice that the period of your

toils, and of your immense sacrifices is approaching. I rejoice that

the interesting revolutionary movements of so many years have issued

in the formation of a constitution,[40] designed to give permanency to

the great object for which you have contended. I rejoice that liberty,

which you have so long embraced with enthusiasm,--liberty, of which

you have been the invincible defenders, now finds an asylum in the

bosom of a regularly organized government;--a government which, being

formed to secure the happiness of the French people, corresponds with

the ardent wishes of my heart, while it gratifies the pride of every

citizen of the United States by its resemblance to their own. On these

glorious events, accept, sir, my sincere congratulations.

[Footnote 40: Subsequent to the mission of Mr. Adet, but

previous to this time, the revolutionary government which

succeeded the abolition of monarchy had yielded to the

constitution of the republican form.]

"In delivering to you these sentiments, I express not my own feelings

only, but those of my fellow citizens in relation to the commencement,

the progress, and the issue of the French revolution: and they will

certainly join with me in purest wishes to the Supreme Being, that the

citizens of our sister republic, our magnanimous allies, may soon

enjoy in peace, that liberty which they have purchased at so great a

price, and all the happiness that liberty can bestow.

"I receive, sir, with lively sensibility, the symbol of the triumphs,

and of the infranchisements of your nation, the colours of France,

which you have now presented to the United States. The transaction

will be announced to congress, and the colours will be deposited with

the archives of the United States, which are at once the evidence and

the memorials of their freedom and independence; may these be

perpetual! and may the friendship of the two republics be commensurate

with their existence."

The address of Mr. Adet, the answer of the President, and the colours

of France, were transmitted to congress with the letter from the

committee of safety.

In the house of representatives a resolution was moved, requesting the

President to make known to the representatives of the French republic,

the sincere and lively sensations which were excited by this

honourable testimony of the existing sympathy and affections of the

two republics; that the house rejoiced in an opportunity of

congratulating the French republic on the brilliant and glorious

achievements accomplished during the present afflictive war; and hoped

that those achievements would be attended with a perfect attainment of

their object, the permanent establishment of the liberty and happiness

of that great and magnanimous people.

The letter to congress having come from the committee of safety,

which, under the revolutionary system, was the department that was

charged with foreign intercourse; and a constitution having been

afterwards adopted in France, by which an executive directory was

established, to which all the foreign relations of the government were

confided, an attempt was made to amend this resolution, by

substituting the directory for the representatives of the people. But

this attempt failed; after which the resolution passed unanimously.

In the senate also a resolution was offered, expressive of the

sensations of that house, and requesting the President to communicate

them to the proper organ of the French republic. An amendment was

moved to vary this resolution so as to express the sentiment to the

President, and omit the request that it should be communicated to the

French republic. The complimentary correspondence between the two

nations, had, it was said, reached a point, when, if ever, it ought to

close. This amendment, though strenuously combated by the opposition,

was adopted.

In February, the treaty with Great Britain was returned, in the form

advised by the senate, ratified by his Britannic Majesty. The

constitution declaring a treaty, when made, the supreme law of the

land, the President announced it officially to the people in a

proclamation, requiring from all persons its observance and execution;

a copy of which was transmitted to each house on the 1st of March.

The party which had obtained the majority in one branch of the

legislature, having openly denied the right of the President to

negotiate a treaty of commerce, was not a little dissatisfied at his

venturing to issue this proclamation before the sense of the house of

representatives had been declared on the obligation of the instrument.

[Sidenote: The house of representatives call upon the president for

papers relating to the treaty with Great Britain.]

This dissatisfaction was not concealed. On the 2d of March, Mr.

Livingston laid upon the table a resolution, requesting the President

"to lay before the house a copy of the instructions to the minister of

the United States, who negotiated the treaty with the king of Great

Britain, communicated by his message of the 1st of March, together

with the correspondence and other documents relative to the said

treaty."

On the 7th of March, he amended this resolution by adding the words,

"excepting such of the said papers as any existing negotiation may

render improper to be disclosed."

After some debate, Mr. Madison proposed to modify the amendment of Mr.

Livingston, so as to except such papers, as in the judgment of the

President, it might be inconsistent with the interest of the United

States at this time to disclose. This proposition was rejected by a

majority of ten voices, and the discussion of the original resolution

was resumed. The debate soon glided into an argument on the nature and

extent of the treaty making power.

The friends of the administration maintained, that a treaty was a

contract between two nations, which, under the constitution, the

President, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, had a

right to make; and that it was made when, by and with such advice and

consent, it had received his final act. Its obligations then became

complete on the United States; and to refuse to comply with its

stipulations, was to break the treaty, and to violate the faith of the

nation.

The opposition contended, that the power to make treaties, if

applicable to every object, conflicted with powers which were vested

exclusively in congress. That either the treaty making power must be

limited in its operation, so as not to touch objects committed by the

constitution to congress, or the assent and co-operation of the house

of representatives must be required to give validity to any compact,

so far as it might comprehend those objects. A treaty, therefore,

which required an appropriation of money, or any act of congress to

carry it into effect, had not acquired its obligatory force until the

house of representatives had exercised its powers in the case. They

were at full liberty to make, or to withhold, such appropriation, or

other law, without incurring the imputation of violating any existing

obligation, or of breaking the faith of the nation.

The debate on this question was animated, vehement, and argumentative;

all the party passions were enlisted in it; and it was protracted

until the 24th of March, when the resolution was carried in the

affirmative by sixty-two to thirty-seven voices. The next day, the

committee appointed to present it to the chief magistrate reported his

answer, which was, "that he would take the resolution into

consideration."

The situation in which this vote placed the President was peculiarly

delicate. In an elective government, the difficulty of resisting the

popular branch of the legislature is at all times great, but is

particularly so when the passions of the public have been strongly and

generally excited. The popularity of a demand for information, the

large majority by which that demand was supported, the additional

force which a refusal to comply with it would give to suspicions

already insinuated, that circumstances had occurred in the negotiation

which the administration dared not expose, and that the President was

separating himself from the representatives of the people, furnished

motives, not lightly to be over-ruled, for yielding to the request

which had been made.

[Illustration: George Washington

_From the profile portrait by James Sharples_

_Sharples painted two pictures of Washington--this portrait showing

him in the costume of a country gentleman, distinguished as being the

only profile of the First President ever painted, and a full face

presentation of him in military dress, reproduced in Volume IV of this

work._

_Sharples, an English painter by birth, was recommended by the great

George Romney as being equipped to produce a work "worthy of the

greatest of Americans." His success is attested by the praise of

Washington's adopted son, who declared the Sharples portraits to be

"the truest likenesses ever made," and by Ralph Waldo Emerson, who saw

the pictures later in England and wrote: "I would willingly have

crossed the Atlantic, if only to look on these portraits."_

Courtesy Herbert L. Pratt]

But these considerations were opposed by others which, though less

operative with men who fear to deserve the public favour by hazarding

its loss, possess an irresistible influence over a mind resolved to

pursue steadily the path of duty, however it may abound with thorns.

That the future diplomatic transactions of the government might be

seriously and permanently affected by establishing the principle that

the house of representatives could demand as a right, the instructions

given to a foreign minister, and all the papers connected with a

negotiation, was too apparent to be unobserved. Nor was it less

obvious that a compliance with the request now made, would go far in

establishing this principle. The form of the request, and the motives

which induced it, equally led to this conclusion. It left nothing to

the discretion of the President with regard to the public interests;

and the information was asked for the avowed purpose of determining

whether the house of representatives would give effect to a public

treaty.

It was also a subject for serious reflection, that in a debate

unusually elaborate, the house of representatives had claimed a right

of interference in the formation of treaties, which, in the judgment

of the President, the constitution had denied them. Duties the most

sacred requiring that he should resist this encroachment on the

department which was particularly confided to him, he could not

hesitate respecting the course it became him to take; and on the 30th

of March he returned the following answer to the resolution which had

been presented to him.

"Gentlemen of the house of representatives,

"With the utmost attention I have considered your resolution of the

24th instant, requesting me to lay before your house, a copy of the

instructions to the minister of the United States, who negotiated the

treaty with the king of Great Britain, together with the

correspondence and other documents relative to that treaty, excepting

such of the said papers, as any existing negotiation may render

improper to be disclosed.

"In deliberating upon this subject, it was impossible for me to lose

sight of the principle which some have avowed in its discussion, or to

avoid extending my views to the consequences which must flow from the

admission of that principle.

"I trust that no part of my conduct has ever indicated a disposition

to withhold any information which the constitution has enjoined it

upon the President as a duty to give, or which could be required of

him by either house of congress as a right; and with truth I affirm,

that it has been, as it will continue to be, while I have the honour

to preside in the government, my constant endeavour to harmonize with

the other branches thereof, so far as the trust delegated to me by the

people of the United States, and my sense of the obligation it

imposes, to preserve, protect and defend the constitution[41] will

permit.

[Footnote 41: The words of the oath of office prescribed for

the chief magistrate.]

"The nature of foreign negotiations require caution, and their success

must often depend on secrecy: and even when brought to a conclusion, a

full disclosure of all the measures, demands, or eventual concessions

which may have been proposed or contemplated would be extremely

impolitic; for this might have a pernicious influence on future

negotiations, or produce immediate inconveniences, perhaps danger and

mischief to other persons. The necessity of such caution and secrecy

was one cogent reason for vesting the power of making treaties in the

President, with the advice and consent of the senate, the principle on

which that body was formed confining it to a small number of members.

"To admit then a right in the house of representatives to demand, and

to have as a matter of course, all the papers respecting a negotiation

with a foreign power, would be to establish a dangerous precedent.

"It does not occur that the inspection of the papers asked for, can be

relative to any purpose under the cognizance of the house of

representatives, except that of an impeachment, which the resolution

has not expressed. I repeat that I have no disposition to withhold any

information which the duty of my station will permit, or the public

good shall require to be disclosed; and in fact, all the papers

affecting the negotiation with Great Britain were laid before the

senate, when the treaty itself was communicated for their

consideration and advice.

"The course which the debate has taken on the resolution of the house,

leads to some observations on the mode of making treaties under the

constitution of the United States.

"Having been a member of the general convention, and knowing the

principles on which the constitution was formed, I have ever

entertained but one opinion upon this subject; and from the first

establishment of the government to this moment, my conduct has

exemplified that opinion. That the power of making treaties is

exclusively vested in the President, by and with the advice and

consent of the senate, provided two-thirds of the senators present

concur; and that every treaty so made and promulgated, thenceforward

becomes the law of the land. It is thus that the treaty making power

has been understood by foreign nations: and in all the treaties made

with them, _we_ have declared, and _they_ have believed, that when

ratified by the President with the advice and consent of the senate,

they became obligatory. In this construction of the constitution,

every house of representatives has heretofore acquiesced; and until

the present time, not a doubt or suspicion has appeared to my

knowledge, that this construction was not a true one. Nay, they have

more than acquiesced; for until now, without controverting the

obligation of such treaties, they have made all the requisite

provisions for carrying them into effect.

"There is also reason to believe that this construction agrees with

the opinions entertained by the state conventions when they were

deliberating on the constitution; especially by those who objected to

it, because there was not required in commercial treaties, the consent

of two-thirds of the whole number of the members of the senate,

instead of two-thirds of the senators present; and because in treaties

respecting territorial and certain other rights and claims, the

concurrence of three-fourths of the whole number of the members of

both houses respectively was not made necessary.

"It is a fact declared by the general convention and universally

understood, that the constitution of the United States was the result

of a spirit of amity and mutual concession. And it is well known, that

under this influence, the smaller states were admitted to an equal

representation in the senate with the larger states; and that this

branch of the government was invested with great powers; for on the

equal participation of those powers, the sovereignty and political

safety of the smaller states were deemed essentially to depend.

"If other proofs than these and the plain letter of the constitution

itself be necessary to ascertain the point under consideration, they

may be found in the journals of the general convention which I have

deposited in the office of the department of state. In these journals

it will appear, that a proposition was made 'that no treaty should be

binding on the United States which was not ratified by a law,' and

that the proposition was explicitly rejected.

[Sidenote: He declines sending them.]

"As therefore it is perfectly clear to my understanding that the

assent of the house of representatives is not necessary to the

validity of a treaty; as the treaty with Great Britain exhibits in

itself all the objects requiring legislative provision; and on these

the papers called for can throw no light; and as it is essential to

the due administration of the government that the boundaries fixed by

the constitution between the different departments should be

preserved; a just regard to the constitution, and to the duty of my

office, under all the circumstances of this case, forbid a compliance

with your request."

The terms in which this decided, and, it would seem, unexpected

negative to the call for papers was conveyed, appeared to break the

last cord of that attachment which had theretofore bound some of the

active leaders of the opposition to the person of the President.

Amidst all the agitations and irritations of party, a sincere respect,

and real affection for the chief magistrate, the remnant of former

friendship, had still lingered in the bosoms of some who had engaged

with ardour in the political contests of the day. But, if the last

spark of this affection was not now extinguished, it was at least

concealed under the more active passions of the moment.

[Sidenote: Debates upon the treaty making power.]

A motion to refer the message of the President to a committee of the

whole house, was carried by a large majority. In committee,

resolutions were moved by Mr. Blount of North Carolina, declaratory of

the sense of the house respecting its own power on the subject of

treaties. These resolutions take a position less untenable than had

been maintained in argument, and rather inexplicit on an essential

part of the question. Disclaiming a power to interfere in making

treaties, they assert the right of the house of representatives,

whenever stipulations are made on subjects committed by the

constitution to congress, to deliberate on the expediency of carrying

them into effect, without deciding what degree of obligation the

treaty possesses on the nation, so far as respects those points,

previous to such deliberation. After a debate in which the message was

freely criticised, the resolutions were carried, fifty-seven voting in

the affirmative, and thirty-five in the negative.

In the course of the month of March, the treaties with his Catholic

majesty, and with the Dey of Algiers, had been ratified by the

President, and were laid before congress. On the 13th of April, in a

committee of the whole house on the state of the union, the instant

the chairman was seated, Mr. Sedgewick moved "that provision ought to

be made by law for carrying into effect with good faith the treaties

lately concluded with the Dey and Regency of Algiers, the King of

Great Britain, the King of Spain, and certain Indian tribes north-west

of the Ohio."

This motion produced a warm altercation. The members of the majority

complained loudly of the celerity with which it had been made, and

resented the attempt to blend together four treaties in the same

resolution, after the solemn vote entered upon their journals,

declaratory of their right to exercise a free discretion over the

subject, as an indignity to the opinions and feelings of the house.

After a discussion manifesting the irritation which existed, the

resolution was amended, by changing the word "treaties" from the

plural to the singular number, and by striking out the words "Dey and

Regency of Algiers, the King of Great Britain, and certain Indian

tribes north-west of the river Ohio," so that only the treaty with the

King of Spain remained to be considered.

Mr. Gallatin then objected to the words "provision ought to be made by

law," as the expression seemed to imply a negative of the principle

laid down in their resolution, that the house was at perfect liberty

to pass, or not to pass, any law for giving effect to a treaty. In

lieu of them, he wished to introduce words declaring the expediency of

passing the necessary laws. This amendment was objected to as an

innovation on the forms which had been invariably observed; but it was

carried; after which, the words "with good faith," were also

discarded.

The resolution thus amended was agreed to without a dissenting voice;

and then, similar resolutions were passed respecting the treaties with

Algiers, and with the Indians north-west of the Ohio.

[Sidenote: Upon the bill for making appropriations to carry into

execution the treaty with Great Britain.]

This business being despatched, the treaty with Great Britain was

brought before the house. The friends of that instrument urged an

immediate decision of the question. On a subject which had so long

agitated the whole community, the judgment of every member, they

believed, was completely formed; and the hope to make converts by

argument was desperate. In fact, they appeared to have entertained the

opinion that the majority would not dare to encounter the immense

responsibility of breaking that treaty, without previously

ascertaining that the great body of the people were willing to meet

the consequences of the measure. But the members of the opposition,

though confident of their power to reject the resolution, called for

its discussion. The expectation might not unreasonably have been

entertained, that the passions belonging to the subject would be so

inflamed by debate, as to produce the expression of a public sentiment

favourable to their wishes; and, if in this they should be

disappointed, it would be certainly unwise, either as a party, or as a

branch of the legislature, to plunge the nation into embarrassments in

which it was not disposed to entangle itself, and from which the means

of extricating it could not be distinctly perceived.

The minority soon desisted from urging an immediate decision of the

question; and the spacious field which was opened by the propositions

before the house, seemed to be entered with equal avidity and

confidence by both parties.

At no time perhaps have the members of the national legislature been

stimulated to great exertions by stronger feelings than impelled them

on this occasion. Never has a greater display been made of argument,

of eloquence, and of passion; and never has a subject been discussed

in which all classes of their fellow citizens took a deeper interest.

To those motives which a doubtful contest for power, and for victory,

can not fail to furnish, were added others of vast influence on the

human mind. Those who supported the resolution, declaring the

expediency of carrying the treaty into effect, firmly believed that

the faith of the nation was pledged, and that its honour, its

character, and its constitution, depended on the vote about to be

given. They also believed that the best interests of the United States

required an observance of the compact as formed. In itself, it was

thought as favourable as the situation of the contracting parties, and

of the world, entitled them to expect; but its chief merit consisted

in the adjustment of ancient differences, and in its tendency to

produce future amicable dispositions, and friendly intercourse. If

congress should refuse to perform this treaty on the part of the

United States, a compliance on the part of Great Britain could not be

expected. The posts on the great lakes would still be occupied by

their garrisons; no compensation would be made for American vessels

illegally captured; the hostile dispositions which had been excited

would be restored with increased aggravation; and that these

dispositions must lead infallibly to war, was implicitly believed.

They also believed that the political subjugation of their country

would be the inevitable consequence of a war with Britain, during the

existing impassioned devotion of the United States to France.

The opposite party was undoubtedly of opinion that the treaty

contained stipulations really injurious to the United States. Several

favourite principles to which they attached much importance, were

relinquished by it; and some of the articles relative to commerce,

were believed to be unequal in their operation. Nor ought the

sincerity with which their opinion on the constitutional powers of the

house had been advanced, to be questioned. In the fervour of political

discussion, that construction which, without incurring the imputation

of violating the national faith, would enable the popular branch of

the legislature to control the President and senate in making

treaties, may have been thought the safe and the correct construction.

But no consideration appears to have had more influence than the

apprehension that the amicable arrangements made with Great Britain,

would seriously affect the future relations of the United States with

France.

Might a conjecture on this subject be hazarded, it would be that, in

the opinion of many intelligent men, the preservation of that honest

and real neutrality between the belligerent powers, at which the

executive had aimed, was impracticable; that America would probably be

forced into the war; and that the possibility of a rupture with France

was a calamity too tremendous not to be avoided at every hazard.

As had been foreseen, this animated debate was on a subject too deeply

and immediately interesting to the people, not to draw forth their

real sentiments. The whole country was agitated; meetings were again

held throughout the United States; and the strength of parties was

once more tried.

The fallacy of many of the objections to the treaty had been exposed,

the odium originally excited against it had been diminished, the

belief that its violation would infallibly precipitate the nation into

a war, if not universal, was extensive. These considerations brought

reflecting men into action; and the voice of the nation was pronounced

unequivocally with the minority in the house of representatives.

This manifestation of the public sentiment was decisive with congress.

On the 29th of April the question was taken in the committee of the

whole, and was determined, by the casting vote of the chairman, in

favour of the expediency of making the necessary laws. The resolution

was finally carried, fifty-one voting in the affirmative, and

forty-eight in the negative.

That necessity to which a part of the majority in the house of

representatives had reluctantly yielded, operated on no other subject;

nor did it affect the strength of parties. Their opinion respecting

that system of policy which ought to be observed in their external

relations, remained the same; and their partialities and prejudices

for and against foreign nations, sustained no diminution.

With regard to internal affairs also, the same spirit was retained.

So excessive had been the jealousy entertained by the opposition

against a military force of any kind, that, even under the pressure of

the Algerine war, the bill providing a naval armament could not be

carried through the house without the insertion of a section

suspending all proceedings under the act, should that war be

terminated. The event which was to arrest the executive in the

prosecution of this work having occurred, not a single frigate could

be completed, without further authority from the legislature. This

circumstance was the more important, as a peace had not been concluded

with Tunis, or Tripoli; and, of consequence, the Mediterranean could

not yet be safely navigated by the vessels of the United States. The

President called the attention of congress to this subject; and stated

the loss which would accrue from the sudden interruption of the work,

and dispersion of the workmen. A bill to enable him to complete three,

instead of six frigates, was with difficulty carried through the

house.

But, except the treaty with Great Britain, no subject was brought

forward in which parties felt a deeper interest, than on those

questions which related to the revenue.

Notwithstanding the increasing productiveness of the duties on

external commerce, this resource had not yet become entirely adequate

to the exigencies of the nation. To secure the complete execution of

the system for gradually redeeming the public debt, without

disregarding those casualties to which all nations are exposed, it was

believed that some additional aids to the treasury would be required.

Upon the nature of these aids, much contrariety of opinion prevailed.

The friends of the administration were in favour of extending the

system of indirect internal taxation: but, constituting the minority

in one branch of the legislature, they could carry no proposition on

which the opposition was united; and the party which had become the

majority in the house of representatives, had been generally hostile

to that mode of obtaining revenue. From an opinion that direct taxes

were recommended by intrinsic advantages, or that the people would

become more attentive to the charges against the administration,

should their money be drawn from them by visible means, those who

wished power to change hands, had generally manifested a disposition

to oblige those who exercised it, to resort to a system of revenue, by

which a great degree of sensibility will always be excited. The

indirect taxes proposed in the committee of ways and means were

strongly resisted; and only that which proposed an augmentation of the

duty on carriages for pleasure was passed into a law.

[Sidenote: Congress adjourns.]

On the first day of June, this long and interesting session was

terminated. No preceding legislature had been engaged in discussions

by which their own passions, or those of their constituents were more

strongly excited; nor on subjects more vitally important to the United

States.

From this view of the angry contests of party, it may not be

unacceptable to turn aside for a moment, and to look back to a

transaction in which the movements of a feeling heart discover

themselves, not the less visibly, for being engaged in a struggle with

the stern duties of a public station.

[Sidenote: The president endeavors to procure the liberation of

Lafayette.]

No one of those foreigners who, during the war of the revolution, had

engaged in the service of the United States, had embraced their cause

with so much enthusiasm, or had held so distinguished a place in the

affections of General Washington, as the Marquis de Lafayette. The

attachment of these illustrious personages to each other had been

openly expressed, and had yielded neither to time, nor to the

remarkable vicissitude of fortune with which the destinies of one of

them had been chequered. For his friend, while guiding the course of a

revolution which fixed the anxious attention of the world, or while a

prisoner in Prussia, or in the dungeon of Olmutz, the President

manifested the same esteem, and felt the same solicitude. The extreme

jealousy, however, with which the persons who administered the

government of France, as well as a large party in America, watched his

deportment towards all those whom the ferocious despotism of the

Jacobins had exiled from their country, imposed upon him the painful

necessity of observing great circumspection in his official conduct,

on this delicate subject. A formal interposition in favour of the

virtuous and unfortunate victim of their furious passions, would have

been unavailing. Without benefiting the person whom it would be

designed to aid, it might produce serious political mischief. But the

American ministers employed at foreign courts were instructed to seize

every fair occasion to express, unofficially, the interest taken by

the President in the fate of Lafayette; and to employ the most

eligible means in their power to obtain his liberty, or to meliorate

his situation. A confidential person[42] had been sent to Berlin to

solicit his discharge: but before this messenger had reached his

destination, the King of Prussia had delivered over his illustrious

prisoner to the Emperor of Germany. Mr. Pinckney had been instructed

not only to indicate the wishes of the President to the Austrian

minister at London, but to endeavour, unofficially, to obtain the

powerful mediation of Britain; and had at one time flattered himself

that the cabinet of St. James would take an interest in the case; but

this hope was soon dissipated.

[Footnote 42: Mr. James Marshall.]

After being disappointed in obtaining the mediation of the British

cabinet, the President addressed the following letter to the Emperor

of Germany.

"It will readily occur to your majesty that occasions may sometimes

exist, on which official considerations would constrain the chief of a

nation to be silent and passive in relation even to objects which

affect his sensibility and claim his interposition as a man. Finding

myself precisely in this situation at present, I take the liberty of

writing this private letter to your majesty, being persuaded that my

motives will also be my apology for it.

"In common with the people of this country, I retain a strong and

cordial sense of the services rendered to them by the Marquis de

Lafayette; and my friendship for him has been constant and sincere. It

is natural, therefore, that I should sympathize with him and his

family in their misfortunes, and endeavour to mitigate the calamities

they experience, among which his present confinement is not the least

distressing.

"I forbear to enlarge on this delicate subject. Permit me only to

submit to your majesty's consideration, whether his long imprisonment,

and the confiscation of his estate, and the indigence and dispersion

of his family, and the painful anxieties incident to all these

circumstances, do not form an assemblage of sufferings which recommend

him to the mediation of humanity? allow me, sir, on this occasion, to

be its organ; and to entreat that he may be permitted to come to this

country, on such conditions, and under such restrictions, as your

majesty may think it expedient to prescribe.

"As it is a maxim with me not to ask what, under similar

circumstances, I would not grant, your majesty will do me the justice

to believe that this request appears to me to correspond with those

great principles of magnanimity and wisdom, which form the basis of

sound policy, and durable glory."

This letter was transmitted to Mr. Pinckney to be conveyed to the

Emperor through his minister at London. How far it operated in

mitigating immediately the rigour of Lafayette's confinement, or in

obtaining his liberation, remains unascertained.