CHAPTER II.

Meeting of congress.... President's speech.... His message

on the foreign relations of the United States.... Report of

the Secretary of State on the commerce of the United

States.... He resigns.... Is succeeded by Mr. Randolph....

Mr. Madison's resolutions founded on the above report....

Debate thereon.... Debates on the subject of a navy.... An

embargo law.... Mission of Mr. Jay to Great Britain....

Inquiry into the conduct of the Secretary of the Treasury,

terminates honourably to him.... Internal taxes.... Congress

adjourns.

{1793}

[Sidenote: Meeting of Congress.]

A malignant fever, believed to be infectious, had, through part of the

summer and autumn, severely afflicted the city of Philadelphia, and

dispersed the officers of the executive government. Although the fear

of contagion was not entirely dispelled when the time for the meeting

of congress arrived, yet, such was the active zeal of parties, and

such the universal expectation that important executive communications

would be made, and that legislative measures not less important would

be founded on them, that both houses were full on the first day, and a

joint committee waited on the President with the usual information

that they were ready to receive his communications.

On the fourth of December, at twelve, the President met both houses in

the senate chamber. His speech was moderate, firm, dignified, and

interesting. It commenced with his own re-election, his feelings at

which were thus expressed--

[Sidenote: President's speech.]

"Since the commencement of the term for which I have been again called

into office, no fit occasion has arisen for expressing to my

fellow-citizens at large, the deep and respectful sense which I feel

of the renewed testimony of public approbation. While on the one hand,

it awakened my gratitude for all those instances of affectionate

partiality with which I have been honoured by my country; on the

other, it could not prevent an earnest wish for that retirement, from

which no private consideration could ever have torn me. But,

influenced by the belief that my conduct would be estimated according

to its real motives, and that the people, and the authorities derived

from them, would support exertions having nothing personal for their

object, I have obeyed the suffrage which commanded me to resume the

executive power; and I humbly implore that Being on whose will the

fate of nations depends, to crown with success our mutual endeavours

for the general happiness."

Passing to those measures which had been adopted by the executive for

the regulation of its conduct towards the belligerent nations, he

observed, "as soon as the war in Europe had embraced those powers with

whom the United States have the most extensive relations, there was

reason to apprehend that our intercourse with them might be

interrupted, and our disposition for peace drawn into question by

suspicions too often entertained by belligerent nations. It seemed

therefore to be my duty to admonish our citizens of the consequence of

a contraband trade, and of hostile acts to any of the parties; and to

obtain, by a declaration of the existing state of things, an easier

admission of our rights to the immunities belonging to our situation.

Under these impressions the proclamation which will be laid before you

was issued.

"In this posture of affairs, both new and delicate, I resolved to

adopt general rules which should conform to the treaties, and assert

the privileges of the United States. These were reduced into a system,

which shall be communicated to you."

After suggesting those legislative provisions on this subject, the

necessity of which had been pointed out by experience, he proceeded to

say,

"I can not recommend to your notice measures for the fulfilment of

_our_ duties to the rest of the world, without again pressing upon you

the necessity of placing ourselves in a condition of complete defence,

and of exacting from _them_ the fulfilment of their duties towards us.

The United States ought not to indulge a persuasion that, contrary to

the order of human events, they will forever keep at a distance those

painful appeals to arms with which the history of every nation

abounds. There is a rank due to the United States among nations which

will be withheld, if not absolutely lost, by the reputation of

weakness. If we desire to avoid insult, we must be able to repel it;

if we desire to secure peace--one of the most powerful instruments of

our prosperity--it must be known that we are, at all times, ready for

war."

These observations were followed by a recommendation to augment the

supply of arms and ammunition in the magazines, and to improve the

militia establishment.

After referring to a communication to be subsequently made for

occurrences relative to the connexion of the United States with

Europe, which had, he said, become extremely interesting; and after

reviewing Indian affairs, he particularly addressed the house of

representatives. Having presented to them in detail some subjects of

which it was proper they should be informed, he added;--"no pecuniary

consideration is more urgent than the regular redemption and discharge

of the public debt; on none can delay be more injurious, or an economy

of time more valuable.

"The productiveness of the public revenues hitherto has continued to

be equal to the anticipations which were formed of it; but it is not

expected to prove commensurate with all the objects which have been

suggested. Some auxiliary provisions will therefore, it is presumed,

be requisite; and it is hoped that these may be made consistently with

a due regard to the convenience of our citizens, who can not but be

sensible of the true wisdom of encountering a small present addition

to their contributions, to obviate a future accumulation of burdens."

The speech was concluded with the following impressive exhortation:

"The several subjects to which I have now referred, open a wide range

to your deliberations, and involve some of the choicest interests of

our common country. Permit me to bring to your remembrance the

magnitude of your task. Without an unprejudiced coolness, the welfare

of the government may be hazarded; without harmony, as far as consists

with freedom of sentiment, its dignity may be lost. But, as the

legislative proceedings of the United States will never, I trust, be

reproached for the want of temper, or of candour, so shall not the

public happiness languish from the want of my strenuous and warmest

co-operation."

[Sidenote: His message on the subject of the foreign relations of the

United States.]

The day succeeding that on which this speech was delivered, a special

message was sent to both houses, containing some of the promised

communications relative to the connexion of the United States with

foreign powers.

After suggesting as a motive for this communication that it not only

disclosed "matter of interesting inquiry to the legislature," but,

"might indeed give rise to deliberations to which they alone were

competent;" the President added--"the representative and executive

bodies of France have manifested generally a friendly attachment to

this country; have given advantages to our commerce and navigation;

and have made overtures for placing these advantages on permanent

ground. A decree, however, of the national assembly, subjecting

vessels laden with provisions to be carried into their ports, and

making enemy goods lawful prize in the vessel of a friend, contrary to

our treaty, though revoked at one time as to the United States, has

been since extended to their vessels also, as has been recently stated

to us. Representations on the subject will be immediately given in

charge to our minister there, and the result shall be communicated to

the legislature.

"It is with extreme concern I have to inform you that the person whom

they have unfortunately appointed their minister plenipotentiary here,

has breathed nothing of the friendly spirit of the nation which sent

him. Their tendency on the contrary has been to involve us in a war

abroad and discord and anarchy at home. So far as his acts, or those

of his agents, have threatened an immediate commitment in the war, or

flagrant insult to the authority of the laws, their effect has been

counteracted by the ordinary cognizance of the laws, and by an

exertion of the powers confided to me. Where their danger was not

imminent, they have been borne with, from sentiments of regard to his

nation, from a sense of their friendship towards us, from a conviction

that they would not suffer us to remain long exposed to the actions of

a person who has so little respected our mutual dispositions, and, I

will add, from a reliance on the firmness of my fellow-citizens in

their principles of peace and order. In the mean time I have respected

and pursued the stipulations of our treaties, according to what I

judged their true sense; and have withheld no act of friendship which

their affairs have called for from us, and which justice to others

left us free to perform. I have gone further. Rather than employ force

for the restitution of certain vessels which I deemed the United

States bound to restore, I thought it more adviseable to satisfy the

parties by avowing it to be my opinion, that, if restitution were not

made, it would be incumbent on the United States to make

compensation."

The message next proceeded to state that inquiries had been instituted

respecting the vexations and spoliations committed on the commerce of

the United States, the result of which when received would be

communicated.

The order issued by the British government on the 8th of June, and the

measures taken by the executive of the United States in consequence

thereof, were briefly noticed; and the discussions which had taken

place in relation to the non-execution of the treaty of peace were

also mentioned. The message was then concluded with a reference to the

negotiations with Spain. "The public good," it was said, "requiring

that the present state of these should be made known to the

legislature in confidence only, they would be the subject of a

separate and subsequent communication."

This message was accompanied with copies of the correspondence between

the secretary of state and the French minister, on the points of

difference which subsisted between the two governments, together with

several documents necessary for the establishment of particular facts;

and with the letter written by Mr. Jefferson to Mr. Morris, which

justified the conduct of the United States by arguments too clear to

be misunderstood, and too strong ever to be encountered.

The extensive discussions which had taken place relative to the

non-execution of the treaty of peace, and the correspondence produced

by the objectionable measures which had been adopted by the British

government during the existing war, were also laid before the

legislature.

In a popular government, the representatives of the people may

generally be considered as a mirror, reflecting truly the passions and

feelings which govern their constituents. In the late elections, the

strength of parties had been tried; and the opposition had derived so

much aid from associating the cause of France with its own principles,

as to furnish much reason to suspect that, in one branch of the

legislature at least, it had become the majority. The first act of the

house of representatives served to strengthen this suspicion. By each

party a candidate for the chair was brought forward; and Mr.

Muhlenberg, who was supported by the opposition, was elected by a

majority of ten votes, against Mr. Sedgewick, whom the federalists

supported.

The answer, however, to the speech of the President, wore no tinge of

that malignant and furious spirit which had infused itself into the

publications of the day. Breathing the same affectionate attachment to

his person and character which had been professed in other times, and

being approved by every part of the house, it indicated that the

leaders, at least, still venerated their chief magistrate, and that no

general intention as yet existed, to involve him in the obloquy

directed against his measures.

Noticing that unanimous suffrage by which he had been again called to

his present station, "it was," they said, "with equal sincerity and

promptitude they embraced the occasion for expressing to him their

congratulations on so distinguished a testimony of public approbation,

and their entire confidence in the purity and patriotism of the

motives which had produced this obedience to the voice of his country.

It is," proceeded the address, "to virtues which have commanded long

and universal reverence, and services from which have flowed great and

lasting benefits that the tribute of praise may be paid without the

reproach of flattery; and it is from the same sources that the fairest

anticipations may be derived in favour of the public happiness."

The proclamation of neutrality was approved in guarded terms, and the

topics of the speech were noticed in a manner which indicated

dispositions cordially to co-operate with the executive.

On the part of the senate also, the answer to the speech was

unfeignedly affectionate. In warm terms they expressed the pleasure

which the re-election of the President gave them. "In the unanimity,"

they added, "which a second time marks this important national act, we

trace with particular satisfaction, besides the distinguished tribute

paid to the virtues and abilities which it recognizes, another proof

of that discernment, and constancy of sentiments and views, which have

hitherto characterized the citizens of the United States." Speaking of

the proclamation, they declared it to be "a measure well timed and

wise, manifesting a watchful solicitude for the welfare of the nation,

and calculated to promote it."

In a few days, a confidential message was delivered, communicating the

critical situation of affairs with Spain. The negotiations attempted

with that power in regard to the interesting objects of boundary,

navigation, and commerce, had been exposed to much delay and

embarrassment, in consequence of the changes which the French

revolution had effected in the political state of Europe. Meanwhile,

the neighborhood of the Spanish colonies to the United States had

given rise to various other subjects of discussion, one of which had

assumed a very serious aspect.

Having the best reason to suppose that the hostility of the southern

Indians was excited by the agents of Spain, the President had directed

the American commissioners at Madrid to make the proper

representations on the subject, and to propose that each nation

should, with good faith, promote the peace of the other with their

savage neighbours.

About the same time, the Spanish government entertained, or affected

to entertain, corresponding suspicions of like hostile excitements by

the agents of the United States, to disturb their peace with the same

nations. The representations which were induced by these real or

affected suspicions, were accompanied with pretensions, and made in a

style, to which the American executive could not be inattentive. His

Catholic Majesty asserted these claims as a patron and protector of

those Indians. He assumed a right to mediate between them and the

United States, and to interfere in the establishment of their

boundaries. At length, in the very moment when those savages were

committing daily inroads on the American frontier, at the instigation

of Spain, as was believed, the representatives of that power,

complaining of the aggressions of American citizens on the Indians,

declared "that the continuation of the peace, good harmony, and

perfect friendship of the two nations, was very problematical for the

future, unless the United States should take more convenient measures,

and of greater energy than those adopted for a long time past."

Notwithstanding the zeal and enthusiasm with which the pretensions of

the French republic, as asserted by their minister, continued to be

supported out of doors, they found no open advocate in either branch

of the legislature. That this circumstance is, in a great measure, to

be ascribed to the temperate conduct of the executive, and to the

convincing arguments with which its decisions were supported, ought

not to be doubted. But when it is recollected that the odium which

these decisions excited, sustained no diminution; that the accusation

of hostility to France and to liberty, which originated in them, was

not retracted; that, when afterwards many of the controverted claims

were renewed by France, her former advocates still adhered to her; it

is not unreasonable to suppose that other considerations mingled

themselves with the conviction which the correspondence laid before

the legislature was calculated to produce.

An attack on the administration could be placed on no ground more

disadvantageous than on its controversy with Mr. Genet. The conduct

and language of that minister were offensive to reflecting men of all

parties. The President had himself taken so decisive a part in favour

of the measures which had been adopted, that they must be ascribed to

him, not to his cabinet; and, of consequence, the whole weight of his

personal character must be directly encountered, in an attempt to

censure those measures. From this censure it would have been difficult

to extricate the person who was contemplated by the party in

opposition as its chief; for the secretary of state had urged the

arguments of the administration with a degree of ability and

earnestness, which ought to have silenced the suspicion that he might

not feel their force.

The expression of a legislative opinion, in favour of the points

insisted on by the French minister, would probably have involved the

nation in a calamitous war, the whole responsibility for which would

rest on them.

To these considerations was added another which could not be

disregarded. The party in France, to which Mr. Genet owed his

appointment, had lost its power; and his fall was the inevitable

consequence of the fall of his patrons. That he would probably be

recalled was known in America; and that his conduct had been

disapproved by his government was generally believed. The future

system of the French republic, with regard to the United States, could

not be foreseen; and it would be committing something to hazard, not

to wait its development.

These objections did not exist to an indulgence of the partialities

and prejudices of the nation towards the belligerent powers, in

measures suggested by its resentment against Great Britain. But,

independent of these considerations, it is scarcely possible to doubt

that congress really approved the conduct of the executive with regard

to France, and was also convinced that a course of hostility had been

pursued by Great Britain, which the national interest and the national

honour required them to repel. In the irritable state of the public

temper, it was not difficult to produce this opinion.

In addition to the causes of dissatisfaction with Great Britain which

have already been suggested, others soon occurred. Under her auspices,

a truce for one year had been lately negotiated between Portugal and

the Regency of Algiers, which, by withdrawing a small squadron

stationed during the war, by the former power, in the Streights,

opened a passage into the Atlantic to the cruisers of the latter. The

capture of American merchantmen, which was the immediate consequence

of this measure, was believed, in the United States, to have been its

motive. Not admitting the possibility that a desire to extricate

Portugal from a war unproductive of any advantages, and to leave her

maritime force free to act elsewhere, could have induced this

interposition of England, the Americans ascribed it, exclusively, to

that enmity to their commerce, and to that jealousy of its prosperity,

which had, as they conceived, long marked the conduct of those who

administered the affairs of that nation.

This transaction was afterwards explained by England, and was ascribed

to her desire to serve an ally, and to enable that ally to act more

efficaciously in a common cause.

[Illustration: George Washington

_From the painting by Charles Willson Peale._

_In June, 1783, Washington spent some time in Princeton, New Jersey,

whither the Continental Congress had adjourned from Philadelphia in

consequence of a mutiny among the unpaid troops stationed there. On

leaving Princeton the American Commander-in-Chief donated 50 guineas

to the College of New Jersey, now Princeton University. The trustees

spent the money on this portrait and had it put in the frame formerly

occupied by a picture of King George III, which was destroyed by a

cannon ball in the Battle of Princeton. This canvas still hangs in the

Princeton Faculty room._

By Courtesy of Princeton University]

From governments accustomed to trust rather to artifice, than to force

or to reason, and influenced by vindictive passions which they have

not strength or courage to gratify, hostility may be expected to exert

itself in a cruel insidious policy, which unfeelingly dooms

individuals to chains, and involves them in ruin, without having a

tendency to effect any national object. But the British character

rather wounds by its pride, and offends by its haughtiness, and open

violence, than injures by the secret indulgence of a malignant, but a

paltry and unprofitable revenge: and, certainly, such unworthy motives

ought not lightly to be imputed to a great and magnanimous nation,

which dares to encounter a world, and risk its existence, for the

preservation of its station in the scale of empires, of its real

independence, and of its liberty.

But, in believing the views of the British cabinet to be unfriendly to

the United States, America was perhaps not entirely mistaken. Indeed,

dispositions of a different nature could not reasonably have been

expected. It may be denied, but can not be disguised, that the

sentiments openly expressed by a great majority of the American

people, warranted the opinion that, notwithstanding the exertions of

the administration, they were about to arrange themselves, in the war,

on the side of France. In a government like that of the United States,

no firmness on the part of the chief magistrate can long resist the

current of popular opinion; and that opinion, without professing it,

unquestionably led to war.

If the character of the British minister at Philadelphia is to be

collected from his intercourse with the executive of the country to

which he was deputed, there is reason to suppose that his

communications to his own government did not diminish the impression

which the evidence furnished on this subject, by the American people

themselves, was calculated to make. It is therefore not improbable,

whatever may be the permanent views of England respecting the

commercial prosperity of the United States, that the measures of the

British cabinet, about this time, were taken in the belief that war

between the two nations was a probable event.

[Sidenote: Report of the secretary of state in relation to the

commerce of the United States.]

Early in the session a report was made by the secretary of state, in

pursuance of a resolution of the house of representatives passed on

the 23d of February, 1791, requiring him "to report to congress the

nature and extent of the privileges and restrictions of the commercial

intercourse of the United States with foreign nations, and the

measures which he should think proper to be adopted for the

improvement of the commerce and navigation of the same."

This report stated the exports of the United States in articles of

their own produce and manufacture at nineteen millions, five hundred

and eighty-seven thousand, and fifty-five dollars; and the imports at

nineteen millions, eight hundred and twenty-three thousand, and sixty

dollars.

Of the exports, nearly one-half was carried to the kingdom of Great

Britain and its dominions; of the imports, about four-fifths were

brought from the same countries. The American shipping amounted to two

hundred and seventy-seven thousand, five hundred and nineteen tons, of

which not quite one-sixth was employed in the trade with Great Britain

and its dominions.

In all the nations of Europe, most of the articles produced in the

United States were subjected to heavy duties, and some of them were

prohibited. In England, the trade of the United States was in the

general on as good a footing as the trade of other countries; and

several articles were more favoured than the same articles of the

growth of other countries.

The statements and arguments of this report tended to enforce the

policy of making discriminations which might favour the commerce of

the United States with France, and discourage that with England; and

which might promote the increase of American navigation as a branch of

industry, and a resource of defence.

This was the last official act of the secretary of state. Early in the

preceding summer, he had signified to the President his intention to

retire in September from the public service; and had, with some

reluctance, consented to postpone the execution of this intention to

the close of the year. Retaining his purpose, he resigned his office

on the last day of December.

[Sidenote: He resigns.]

This gentleman withdrew from political station at a moment when he

stood particularly high in the esteem of his countrymen. His

determined opposition to the financial schemes which had been proposed

by the secretary of the treasury, and approved by the legislative and

executive departments of the government; his ardent and undisguised

attachment to the revolutionary party in France; the dispositions

which he was declared to possess in regard to Great Britain; and the

popularity of his opinions respecting the constitution of the United

States; had devoted to him that immense party whose sentiments were

supposed to comport with his, on most, or all of these interesting

subjects. To the opposite party he had, of course, become particularly

unacceptable. But the publication of his correspondence with Mr. Genet

dissipated much of the prejudice which had been excited against him.

He had, in that correspondence, maintained with great ability the

opinions embraced by the federalists on those points of difference

which had arisen between the two republics; and which, having become

universally the subjects of discussion, had in some measure displaced

those topics on which parties were previously divided. The partiality

for France that was conspicuous through the whole of it, detracted

nothing from its merit in the opinion of the friends of the

administration, because, however decided their determination to

support their own government in a controversy with any nation

whatever, they felt all the partialities for that republic which the

correspondence expressed. The hostility of his enemies therefore was,

for a time, considerably lessened, without a corresponding diminution

of the attachment of his friends. It would have been impracticable, in

office, long to preserve these dispositions. And it would have been

difficult to maintain that ascendency which he held over the minds of

those who had supported, and probably would continue to support, every

pretension of the French republic, without departing from principles

and measures which he had openly and ably defended.

[Sidenote: Is succeeded by Mr. Randolph.]

He was immediately succeeded by Mr. Edmund Randolph; and the office of

attorney general was filled by Mr. William Bradford, a gentleman of

considerable eminence in Pennsylvania.

{1794}

On the fourth of January, the house resolved itself into a committee

of the whole, on the report of the secretary of state, relative to the

privileges and restrictions of the commerce of the United States; when

Mr. Madison, after some prefatory observations, laid on the table a

series of resolutions[13] for the consideration of the members.

[Footnote 13: See note No. VII. at the end of the volume.]

[Sidenote: Mr. Madison's resolutions founded on the above report.]

These memorable resolutions embraced almost completely the idea of the

report. They imposed an additional duty on the manufactures, and on

the tonnage of vessels, of nations having no commercial treaty with

the United States; while they reduced the duties already imposed by

law, on the tonnage of vessels belonging to nations having such

commercial treaty: and they reciprocated the restrictions which were

imposed on American navigation.

[Sidenote: Debate thereon.]

On the 13th of January they were taken into consideration, when the

debate was opened by Mr. Smith of South Carolina.

After noticing the importance of the subject to the best interests of

the United States, he observed that, being purely commercial in its

nature, he would exclude from the view he should take of it, those

political considerations which some might think connected with it. He

imagined it would be right to dismiss, for the present, all questions

respecting the Indians, Algerines, and western posts. There would be a

time for these questions; and then he should give his opinion upon

them with firmness, and according to what he conceived to be the true

interests of his country. The regulation of commerce gave of itself

sufficient scope for argument, without mixing it with extraneous

matter.

After some general observations on the delicacy of the crisis, and on

the claims of the resolutions to dispassionate investigation, he

proceeded to consider the report on which they were founded.

The great object of that report being to establish a contrast between

France and Britain, he would request the attention of the committee to

an accurate statement of facts, which, being compared with the report,

would enable them to decide on the justness of its inferences.

In the opinion that any late relaxations of the French republic were

produced by interests too momentary and fluctuating to be taken as the

basis of calculations for a permanent system, he should present a

comparative view of the commerce of the United States to those

countries, as it stood anterior to the revolution of France. For this

purpose, he produced a table which had been formed by a person whose

commercial information was highly respectable, from which he said it

would appear, notwithstanding the plaudits so generally bestowed on

the justice and liberality of the one nation, and the reproaches

uttered against the other, that, with the exception of the trifling

article of fish oil, the commerce of the United States was not more

favoured in France than in Great Britain, and was, in many important

articles, more favoured by the latter power, than that of other

nations.

Mr. Smith then reviewed, in detail, the advantages and disadvantages

attending the sale of the great products of America in the ports of

each nation, which, he conceived, were more encouraged by the British

than by the French market.

A comparative statement, he added, of the value of the exports of the

two countries, would assist in confirming this opinion.

The value of the exports to Great Britain, at the close of the year

ending with September, 1789, was nearly double those made to France in

the same period: and even the average of the years 1790, 1791 and

1792, gave an annual excess to the exports to Great Britain of three

millions, seven hundred and fifty-two thousand, seven hundred and

sixty dollars.

The great amount of merchandise imported from Britain, instead of

being a grievance, demonstrated, in the opinion of Mr. Smith, the

utility of the trade with that country. For the extent of the

intercourse between the two nations, several obvious reasons might be

assigned. Britain was the first manufacturing country in the world,

and was more able, than any other, to supply an assortment of those

articles which were required in the United States. She entitled

herself, too, to the preference which was given her, by the extensive

credit she afforded. To a young country wanting capital, credit was of

immense advantage. It enabled them to flourish by the aid of foreign

capital, the use of which had, more than any other circumstance,

nourished the industry of America.

By the advocates for forcing a trade with France, it was asserted that

she could supply the wants of America on better terms than Great

Britain. To do this, she must not only sell cheaper, but give credit,

which, it was known her merchants either could not, or would not give.

The very necessity of laying a duty on British manufactures, in order

to find a sale for those of other countries, was a proof that the

first could be purchased on better terms, or were better adapted to

the market.

If the object of the resolutions were the encouragement of domestic

manufactures, there might be some semblance of argument in their

favour. But this is not contemplated. Their avowed object is to turn

the course of trade from one nation to another, by means which would

subject the citizens of the United States to great inconvenience.

Mr. Smith next proceeded to consider the subject with a view to

navigation.

The trade of the United States to Great Britain, for the

transportation of their own produce, was as free in American as in

British bottoms, a few trifling port charges excepted. In France, they

enjoyed the advantages granted to the most favoured nation. Thus far

the comparison was in favour of Great Britain. In the West Indies, he

admitted the existence of a different state of things. All American

bottoms were excluded from the British islands, with the exception of

Turks island. In the French islands, vessels under sixty tons were

admitted, but this advantage was common to all other nations.

The effect of the difference in the regulations of the two rival

nations in respect of navigation, was not so considerable as the

secretary of state had supposed. He had stated the tonnage employed in

the intercourse with France and her colonies, at 116,410 tons; and

that employed in the commerce with Great Britain at 43,580 tons. The

secretary was led into this miscalculation by taking for his guide,

the actual entries of American bottoms from the dominions of each

country in the year. As four voyages are made to the West Indies,

while only two are made to Europe, the vessels employed in the former

traffic will be counted four times in the year, and those employed in

the latter will be counted only twice in the same period. The

deceptiveness of the calculations made from these data had induced a

call on the secretary of the treasury for an account of the actual

tonnage employed in trade with foreign nations for one year. This

account shows that France employs 82,510 tons, and Great Britain

66,582 tons, of American shipping; leaving in favour of France, an

excess of 15,928, instead of 72,830 tons, as reported by the secretary

of state.

From this comparative view taken of the regulations of the two

nations, Mr. Smith conceived himself justified in saying, that the

commercial system of Great Britain towards the United States, far from

being hostile, was friendly; and that she made many discriminations in

their favour. France, on the contrary, placed them on a better

situation than her rival, only in one solitary instance, the

unimportant article of fish oil.

If this be a true picture of the existing state of things, and he

could not perceive in what it was defective, was it not time, he

asked, that the deceptions practised on the people by the eulogists of

France and the revilers of Great Britain, should be removed?

The resolutions were supported by Mr. Madison, Mr. Findley, Mr.

Nicholas, Mr. Clarke, Mr. Smiley, Mr. Moore, and Mr. Giles.

They admitted the subject before the committee to be of a commercial

nature, but conceived it to be impracticable to do justice to the

interests of the United States, without some allusions to politics.

The question was in some measure general. They were to inquire how far

it was the interest of this country by commercial regulations to vary

the state of commerce now existing. They were of opinion that most of

the injuries proceeding from Great Britain were inflicted for the

promotion of her commercial objects, and were to be remedied by

commercial resistance. The Indian war, and the Algerine attack,

originated both in commercial views, or Great Britain must stand

without excuse for instigating the most horrid cruelties. The

propositions before the committee were the strongest weapon America

possessed, and would, more probably than any other, restore her to all

her political and commercial rights. They professed themselves the

friends of free trade, and declared the opinion that it would be to

the general advantage, if all commerce was free. But this rule was not

without its exceptions. The navigation act of Great Britain was a

proof of the effect of one exception on the prosperity of national

commerce. The effect produced by that act was equally rapid and

extensive.

There is another exception to the advantages of a free trade, where

the situation of a country is such with respect to another, that by

duties on the commodities of that other, it shall not only invigorate

its own means of rivalship, but draw from that other the hands

employed in the production of those commodities. When such an effect

can be produced, it is so much clear gain, and is consistent with the

general theory of national rights.

The effect of leaving commerce to regulate itself is to submit it to

the regulation of other nations. If the United States had a commercial

intercourse with one nation only, and should permit a free trade,

while that nation proceeded on a monopolizing system, would not the

carrying trade be transferred to that nation, and with it, the

maritime strength it confers be heaped upon a rival? Then, in the same

proportion to the freedom granted to the vessels of other nations in

the United States, and to the burdens other nations impose on American

vessels, will be the transfer of those maritime resources.

The propositions before the committee should be examined as they

concern navigation, manufactures, and the just principles of

discrimination that ought to prevail in their policy to nations having

treaties with them.

With respect to navigation, it was conceded that they were not placed

upon the same footing by the two nations with whom they had the

greatest commercial intercourse. British vessels could bring the

produce of all countries into any port of the United States; while

American vessels could carry to the ports of Britain only their own

commodities, and those only to a part of her dominions. From her ports

in the West Indies they were entirely excluded.

To exhibit at a glance the effect of the British navigation act, it

was sufficient to compare the quantity of American and British tonnage

employed in their intercourse with each other. The former in 1790

amounted to 43,000 tons, and the latter to 240,000 tons. The effect of

British policy would be further shown by showing the proportion of

domestic tonnage employed at the same time in the intercourse with

other European nations. With Spain the American was to the Spanish as

five to one, with Portugal six to one, Netherlands fifteen to one,

Denmark twelve to one, France five to one, Great Britain one to five.

This ratio had by particular circumstances been somewhat changed. From

calculations founded on the documents last introduced into the house,

it appeared that, at present, the proportion of American to foreign

tonnage employed in the American trade was, with Spain as sixteen to

one, Portugal seventeen to one, Netherlands twenty-six to one, Denmark

fifteen to one, Russia fourteen to one, France between four and five

to one, and Great Britain one to three.

The situation of American commerce was the more mortifying when the

nature and amount of their exports came to be considered. They were

not only necessaries of life, or necessaries for manufactures, and

therefore of life to the manufacturer, but their bulkiness gave them

an advantage over the exports of every other country. If America, to

increase her maritime strength, should secure to herself the

transportation of her own commodities, leaving to other nations the

transportation of theirs, it would greatly augment the proportion of

her shipping and of her sailors.

In relation to manufactures, the regulations existing between the

United States and Great Britain were not more equal. Out of the whole

amount of manufactured articles imported into this country, which was

stated in round numbers at fifteen millions, two hundred and ninety

thousand dollars, Great Britain furnished thirteen millions, nine

hundred and sixty thousand. In the same period, in the year 1789-90,

the articles which the United States received from France, a country

which actually consumed more of their produce, amounted only to one

hundred and fifty-five thousand dollars. The balance of trade, at the

same epoch, was greatly in favour of the United States with every

other nation, and greatly against them with Britain. Although it might

happen in some cases, that other advantages might be derived from an

intercourse with a particular nation, which might compensate for an

unfavourable balance of trade, it was impossible that this could

happen in the intercourse with Great Britain. Other nations, however,

viewed a balance of trade against them as a real evil; and Great

Britain, in particular, was careful to prevent it. What then must be

the feelings of a nation, between whom and the United States the most

friendly relations existed, when she saw, not only the balance of

trade against her, but that what was thus obtained from her, flowed in

the same manner into the coffers of one of her most jealous rivals,

and inveterate enemies?

The propriety of discriminating between nations having treaties with

the United States, and those having none, was admitted in some states

before the establishment of the present government, and was sanctioned

by that house during their sittings in New York. It was the practice

of nations to make such a discrimination. It was necessary to give

value to treaties.

The disadvantages of depending on a single nation for articles of

necessary consumption was strongly pressed; and it was added as an

evil of most serious magnitude, more truly alarming than any other of

its features, that this commercial dependence produced an influence in

their councils which enabled it, the more inconvenient it became by

its constant growth, to throw the more obstacles in the way of a

necessary remedy.

They entertained no apprehensions of injurious consequences from

adopting the proposed resolutions. The interests of Great Britain

would not suffer her to retaliate: and the intercourse between the two

countries would not be interrupted further than was required by the

convenience and the interests of the United States. But if Great

Britain should retaliate, the effects of a commercial conflict would

be felt by her, much more sensibly, than by the United States. Its

effects would be felt in the shipping business, by the merchants, and

above all by the manufacturer.

Calculations were offered, by comparing the total amount of British

exports with those to the United States, to prove, that three hundred

thousand British manufacturers would be suddenly thrown out of

employment, by withdrawing the trade carried on between America and

that country. In the complication of distress to which such a measure

would reduce them, they would consider the United States as a natural

asylum from wretchedness. But whether they remained in discontent at

home, or sought their fortune abroad, the evil would be considered and

felt by the British government as equally great, and they would surely

beware of taking any step that might provoke it.

On the advantages of America in such a contest with a populous and

manufacturing country, they dwelt with peculiar earnestness. She

produced all the necessaries of life within herself, and could

dispense with the articles received from others. But Great Britain,

not producing them in sufficient abundance, was dependent on the

United States for the supply of her most essential wants. Again, the

manufacturer of that country was dependent on this for the sale of his

merchandise which was to purchase his bread. Thus was produced a

double dependence of Great Britain on the United States. She was also

dependent on them for the raw materials which formed the basis of her

manufactures. Her West Indies were almost completely dependent. This

country furnished the best market for their productions, and was

almost the only one which could supply them with the necessaries of

life. The regulation excluding the provisions of other foreign

countries was entitled to no consideration. It was of ancient date,

and had remained untouched because there was no other foreign country

by which provisions could be supplied.

That the commercial regulations of Great Britain were as favourable to

the United States as to other nations, ought not to satisfy America.

If other nations were willing to bear impositions, or were unable to

retaliate, their examples were not worthy of imitation. America was in

a condition to insist, and ought to insist, on perfect commercial

equality.

It was denied that any real advantage was derived from the extensive

credit given by the merchants of Great Britain. On the contrary, the

use made of British capital was pronounced a great political evil. It

increased the unfavourable balance of trade, discouraged domestic

manufactures, and promoted luxury. But its greatest mischief was, that

it favoured a system of British influence, which was dangerous to

their political security.

As the debate advanced, the expressions of exasperation against

Britain became stronger; and occasionally allusions were made to those

party questions which had long agitated the public mind, with a

bitterness which marked their intimate connexion with the conduct of

the United States to foreign countries.

It was said to be proper in deciding the question under debate, to

take into view political, as well as commercial considerations. Ill

will and jealousy had at all times been the predominant features of

the conduct of England to the United States. That government had

grossly violated the treaty of peace, had declined a commercial

treaty, had instigated the Indians to raise the tomahawk and scalping

knife against American citizens, had let loose the Algerines upon

their unprotected commerce, and had insulted their flag, and pillaged

their trade in every quarter of the world. These facts being

notorious, it was astonishing to hear gentlemen ask how had Britain

injured their commerce?

The conduct of France, on the contrary, had been warm and friendly.

That nation respected American rights, and had offered to enter into

commercial arrangements on the liberal basis of perfect reciprocity.

The period which Mr. Smith had taken as that at which the systems of

the two nations should be compared with each other, was reprobated

with peculiar severity. It was insinuated to proceed from a wish that

the United States should directly countenance the restoration of

despotism; and much regret was expressed that a distrust of the

permanency of the French revolution should be avowed. It was hoped and

believed that the present was the settled state of things; and that

the old order of things was unsettled for ever: that the French

revolution was as much more permanent than had been the French

despotism, as was the great fabric of nature, than the petty plastic

productions of art. To exclude the period since the revolution, would

be to exclude some of the strongest evidences of the friendship of one

nation, and the enmity of the other.

The animadversions which had been made on the report of the secretary

of state were retorted with acrimony. It was declared that he would

not suffer by a comparison in point of intelligence, accuracy, and

patriotism, either with the laborious compiler of the table produced

by Mr. Smith, or with the gentleman who had been judiciously selected

for its interpreter. Some explanations were given of the inaccuracies

which had been alleged; and the facts omitted were declared to be

immaterial circumstances, which, if inserted, would have swelled the

report, without adding to the information it communicated.

In reply to the argument which stated that Great Britain did not, in

common years, raise a sufficient quantity of grain for her own

consumption, and would consequently afford an increasing market for

American wheat and flour, it was remarked that this not only

established the all important position of the dependence of that

country on this, but suggested a very interesting reflection. It was

that the continual increase of debt and paper machinery, will not

produce a correspondent increase of ability in the nation to feed

itself. That an infinity of paper will not produce an infinity of

food.

In contrasting the ability of the two nations to support a commercial

conflict, it was said, "Great Britain, tottering under the weight of a

king, a court, a nobility, a priesthood, armies, navies, debts, and

all the complicated machinery of oppression which serves to increase

the number of unproductive, and lessen the number of productive hands;

at this moment engaged in a foreign war; taxation already carried to

the ultimatum of financial device; the ability of the people already

displayed in the payment of taxes, constituting a political

phenomenon; all prove the debility of the system, and the decreptitude

of old age. On the other hand, the United States, in the flower of

youth; increasing in hands; increasing in wealth; and, although an

imitative policy had unfortunately prevailed in the erection of a

funded debt, in the establishment of an army, the anticipation of a

navy,[14] and all the paper machinery for increasing the number of

unproductive, and lessening the number of productive hands; yet the

operation of natural causes has, as yet, in some degree, countervailed

their influence, and still furnish a great superiority in comparison

with Great Britain."

An attempt was made to liken the present situation of America to that

in which she stood at the commencement of her revolutionary war; and

the arguments drawn from the inconvenience to which a privation of

British manufactures would expose the people at large were answered by

observing--"This was not the language of America at the time of the

non-importation association; this was not her language at the time of

the declaration of independence. Whence then this change of American

sentiment? Has America less ability than she then had? Is she less

prepared for a national trial than she then was? This can not be

pretended. There is, it is true, one great change in her political

situation. America has now a funded debt: she had no funded debt at

those glorious epochs. May not this change of sentiment, therefore, be

looked for in her change of situation in this respect? May it not be

looked for in the imitative sympathetic organization of our funds with

the British funds? May it not be looked for in the indiscriminate

participation of citizens and foreigners in the emoluments of the

funds? May it not be looked for in the wishes of some to assimilate

the government of the United States to that of Great Britain? or at

least, in wishes for a more intimate connexion?

[Footnote 14: Resolutions had been offered for the creation

of a small navy to be employed in the Mediterranean.]

"If these causes exist, it is not difficult to find the source of the

national debility. It is not difficult to see that the interests of

the few, who receive and disburse the public contributions, are more

respected than the interest of the great majority of the society, who

furnish the contributions. It is not difficult to see that the

government, instead of legislating for a few millions, is legislating

for a few thousands; and that the sacredness of their rights is the

great obstacle to a great national exertion."

In addition to Mr. Smith, of South Carolina, the resolutions were

opposed by Mr. Smith, of Maryland, Mr. Goodhue, Mr. Lea, Mr. Dexter,

Mr. Ames, Mr. Dayton, Mr. Hartley, Mr. Tracy, Mr. Hillhouse, Mr.

Forest, Mr. Fitzsimmons, and Mr. Foster.

If, it was said, the United States had sustained political wrongs from

Great Britain, they should feel as keenly as any persons for the

prostrated honour of their country; but this was not the mode of

redressing them. When that subject should be brought before congress,

they would not be slow in taking such measures as the actual state of

things might require. But they did not approve of retaliating injuries

under the cloak of commercial regulations. Independent of other

objections, it would derogate from the dignity of the American

character.

The resolutions, it was said, ought to be contemplated commercially;

and the influence they would probably have on the United States,

deliberately weighed. If they were adopted, it ought to be because

they would promote the interests of America, not because they would

benefit one foreign nation, and injure another. It was an old adage

that there was no friendship in trade. Neither ought there to be any

hatred. These maxims should not be forgotten in forming a judgment on

the propositions before the committee. Their avowed objects were to

favour the navigation and the manufactures of the United States, and

their probable operation on these objects ought to be considered.

It had been said that the American tonnage ought to bear the same

proportion to the foreign tonnage employed in her trade, as exists

between the bulk of her exports and imports. But the correctness of

this principle was not admitted. The fact was otherwise, and it was

not believed to be an evil.

Great Britain carries for other nations from necessity. Her situation

is calculated for navigation. Her country is fully peopled, so full

that the ground is not sufficient to furnish bread for the whole.

Instead, therefore, of ploughing the earth for subsistence, her

subjects are obliged to plough the ocean. The defence of their coasts

has been another cause which obliges them to abandon the more

lucrative pursuits of agriculture, to provide for their defence. They

have been compelled to sacrifice profit to safety.

The United States possessed a fertile, extensive, and unsettled

country; and it might well be questioned how far their real interests

would be promoted by forcing a further acceleration of the growth of

their marine, by impelling their citizens from the cultivation of the

soil to the navigation of the ocean. The measures already adopted had

been very operative; and it was by no means certain that an additional

stimulus would be advantageous. The increased duty on foreign tonnage,

and on goods imported in foreign bottoms, had already been attended

with sensible effects. In 1790, the American tonnage was one-half the

whole tonnage employed in their trade: in 1791, it was three-fifths:

in 1792, it had increased to two-thirds. This growth was believed to

be sufficiently rapid. It was more rapid than the growth of British

tonnage had ever been under the fostering care of their celebrated

navigation act. Let the existing system be left to its natural

operation, and it was believed that it would give to the United States

that share in the carriage of their commodities, which it was their

interest to take.

But if a different opinion prevailed, and it was conceived that

additional encouragement ought to be given to navigation, then let the

duty on all foreign bottoms be increased, and let the particular

disabilities to which American vessels are subjected in any country,

be precisely retaliated. The discriminations proposed, instead of

increasing American navigation, were calculated to encourage the

navigation of one foreign nation at the expense of another.

The United States did not yet possess shipping sufficient for the

exportation of their produce. The residue must reach a market in

foreign bottoms, or rot upon their hands. They were advancing to a

different state of things; but, in the mean time, they ought to pursue

their interest, and employ those vessels which would best answer their

purpose. The attempt to make it their interest to employ the vessels

of France rather than those of Britain, by discriminating duties which

must enhance the price of freight, was a premium to the vessels of the

favourite nation, paid by American agriculture.

The navigation act of Great Britain had been made a subject of heavy

complaint. But that act was not particularly directed against the

United States. It had been brought into operation while they were yet

colonies, and was not more unfavourable to them than to others. To its

regulations, Great Britain was strongly attached; and it was not

probable that America could compel her to relinquish them.

Calculations were made on the proportion of British manufactures

consumed in America, from which it was inferred that her trade, though

important, was not sufficiently important to force that nation to

abandon a system which she considered as the basis of her grandeur. In

the contest, considerable injury would be unquestionably sustained;

and nothing was perceived in the situation of the United States, which

should induce them to stand forth the champions of the whole

commercial world, in order to compel the change of a system, in which

all other nations had acquiesced. But if they were to engage in such a

contest, it was by a similar act, by opposing disabilities to

disabilities, that it ought to be carried on. Upon this point, several

members who were opposed to the resolutions, avowed an opinion

favourable to an American navigation act, and expressed their

willingness to concur in framing regulations which meet the

prohibitions imposed on their vessels with corresponding prohibitions.

Thus far they were ready to go; but they were not ready to engage in a

contest injurious to themselves, for the benefit of a foreign nation.

Another avowed object of the resolutions was to favour the

manufactures of the United States. But certainly it was not by

discriminating duties, by endeavouring to shift commerce from one

channel to another, that American manufactures were to be promoted.

This was to be done by pursuing the course already adopted, by laying

protecting duties on selected articles, in the manufacture of which

America had made some progress; and by a prohibitory duty on others,

of which a sufficient domestic supply could be afforded. But the

proposed measure only went to the imposition of a tax on their own

citizens, for the benefit of a foreign nation.

If the British market afforded an assortment of goods best suited to

their consumption, and could give them cheaper, a prohibitory duty

imposed upon those goods would only drive their citizens to seek them

in another market, less able to supply their wants, and at a dearer

rate. There was nothing in this tending to encourage manufactures.

If the United States were prepared to manufacture to the whole amount

of their wants, the importation of all rival articles might be

prohibited. But this they were not prepared to do. Their manufactures

must advance by slow degrees; and they were not to enter into a

measure of this kind, for the purpose of retaliating on a nation which

had not commercially injured them.

The resolutions then were adapted to the encouragement neither of the

navigation, nor the manufactures of the United States, but of a

foreign nation. Their effect would obviously be to force trade to

change its natural course, by discriminations against a nation which

had in no instance discriminated against the United States, but had

favoured them in many points of real importance. By what commercial

considerations could such a system be recommended?

That it would be attended with great immediate inconveniences must be

admitted; but for these, ample compensation, it had been said, was to

be found in its remote advantages. These were, a diminution of

American commerce with one nation, by its proportional augmentation

with another; and a repeal of the navigation act, and of the colonial

system of Great Britain.

On the subject of forcing trade from one nation to another, which is,

of necessity, so complicated in principle, so various and invisible in

consequence, the legislature should never act but with the utmost

caution. They should constantly keep in view, that trade will seek its

own markets, find its own level, and regulate itself much better than

it could be regulated by law. Although the government might embarrass

it, and injure their own citizens, and even foreign nations, for a

while, it would eventually rise above all the regulations they could

make. Merchants, if left to themselves, would always find the best

markets. They would buy as cheap and sell as dear as possible. Why

drive them from those markets into others which were less

advantageous? If trade with Britain was less free, or less profitable,

than with France, the employment of coercive means to force it into

French channels would be unnecessary. It would voluntarily run in

them. That violence must be used in order to change its course,

demonstrated that it was in its natural course.

It was extraordinary to hear gentlemen complaining of British

restrictions on American commerce, and at the same time stating her

proportion of that commerce as a national grievance, and that the

trade was so free as to become an injury. The very circumstance that

she retained so large a share of it, was evidence that it did not

experience in her ports unusual burdens. Whenever greater advantages

were offered by other countries, there would be no need of legislative

interference to induce the merchants to embrace them. That portion of

trade would go to each country, for which the circumstances of each

were calculated. If Great Britain purchased more American produce than

she consumed, it was because, all circumstances considered, it was the

interest of America to sell her more than she consumed. While this

interest continued, no mischief could result from the fact; when the

cause should cease, the effect would cease also, without the

intervention of the legislature.

It was very improbable that the resolutions under consideration would

effect their other avowed object, a repeal of the British navigation

act.

The season, it was said, was peculiarly unfavourable to such

experiments. The internal convulsions of France had laid her

manufactures in ruins. She was not in a condition to supply her own

wants, much less those of the United States. The superb column erected

at Lyons could furnish no stimulus to the industry of her

manufacturers.

But the attempt to stop the natural intercourse between the United

States and Great Britain, though incapable of producing on the latter

the full effect which was desired, might inflict deep and lasting

wounds on the most essential interests of the former. The injuries

which their agriculture would sustain from the measure, might be long

and severely felt.

It had been proudly stated, that while America received articles which

might be dispensed with, she furnished in return the absolute

necessaries of life; she furnished bread, and raw materials for

manufactures. "One would think," said Mr. Tracy, "to hear the

declarations in this house, that all men were fed at the opening of

our hand; and, if we shut that hand, the nations starve, and if we but

shake the fist after it is shut, they die." And yet one great

objection to the conduct of Britain was, her prohibitory duty on the

importation of bread stuff while it was under a certain price.

Nothing could be more deceptive than the argument founded on the

nature of American exports. What, it was asked, would be done with the

surplus produce of the United States? Was it to remain in the country,

and rot upon the hands of those who raised it? If not, if it was to be

exported, it would find its way to the place of demand. Food would

search out those who needed it; and the raw material would be carried

to the manufacturer whose labour could give it value.

But there was a much more serious aspect in which this subject ought

to be placed. The products of America grew in other soils than hers.

The demands for them might be supplied by other countries. Indeed, in

some instances, articles usually obtained from the United States would

be excluded by a fair competition with the same articles furnished by

other countries. The discriminations made in their favour enabled them

to obtain a preference in the British market. By withholding those

which were of the growth of the United States, Great Britain would not

lose the article, but America would lose the market; and a formidable

rival would be raised up, who would last much longer than the

resolutions under consideration. It is easy by commercial regulations

to do much mischief, and difficult to retrieve losses. It is

impossible to foresee all evils which may arise out of such measures;

and their effects may last after the cause is removed.

The opponents of the resolutions persisted to consider the credit

given by British merchants, as a solid advantage to any country which,

like the United States, was defective in commercial capital; but they

denied that, from that source, any political influence had arisen.

"If," said Mr. Tracy, "we may argue from a great state, Virginia, to

the union, this is not true; for although that state owes immense

debts, her representatives come forward with great spirit to bring

Great Britain to her feet. The people to the eastward do not owe the

English merchants, and are very generally opposed to these

regulations. These facts must convince us that the credit given by

Great Britain, does not operate to produce a fear, and a dependence,

which can be alarming to government."

"If," said Mr. Dexter, "I have a predilection for any country besides

my own, that bias is in favour of France, the place of my father's

sepulture. No one, more than myself, laments the spasm of patriotism

which convulses that nation, and hazards the cause of freedom; but I

shall not suffer the torrent of love or hatred to sweep me from my

post. I am sent neither to plead the cause of France nor England, but

am delegated as a guardian of the rights and interests of America."

The speakers against the resolutions universally laboured to exclude

from all weight in the decision on them, considerations which were

foreign to the interests of the United States. "The discussion of this

subject," said Mr. Tracy, "has assumed an appearance which must be

surprising to a stranger, and painful in the extreme to ourselves. The

supreme legislature of the United States is seriously deliberating,

not upon the welfare of our own citizens, but upon the relative

circumstances of two European nations; and this deliberation has not

for its object, the relative benefits of their markets to us, but

which form of government is best and most like our own, which people

feel the greatest affection for us, and what measures we can adopt

which will best humble one and exalt the other.

"The primary motive of these resolutions, as acknowledged by their

defenders, is, not the increase of our agriculture, manufactures, or

navigation, but to humble Great Britain and build up France; and

although it is said our manufactures and navigation may receive some

advantage, it is only mentioned as a substitute in case of failure as

to the great object.

"The discussion in favour of these resolutions has breathed nothing

but hostility and revenge against the English; and yet _they_ put on

the mild garb of commercial regulations. Legislatures, always cautious

of attempting to force trade from its own channels and habits, should

certainly be peculiarly cautious, when they do undertake such

business, to set about it with temperance and coolness; but in this

debate, we are told of the inexecution of a former treaty, withholding

western posts, insults and dominations of a haughty people, that

through the agency of Great Britain the savages are upon us on one

side, and the Algerines on the other. The mind is roused by a group of

evils, and then called upon to consider a statement of duties on goods

imported from foreign countries. If the subject is commercial, why not

treat it commercially, and attend to it with coolness? if it is a

question of political hostility, or of war, a firmer tone may be

adopted."

On this side of the question, the conduct of Great Britain, if as

hostile as it was represented to be, was spoken of with high

indignation. "If," said Mr. Tracy, "these statements are founded in

fact, I can not justify myself to my constituents, or my conscience,

in saying the adoption of the regulations of commerce, a navigation

act, or the whole parade of shutting ports, and freeing trade from its

shackles, is in any degree calculated to meet or remedy the evil.

"Although I deprecate war as the worst of calamities for my country,

yet I would inquire seriously whether we had on our part, fulfilled

the treaty with Great Britain, and would do complete justice to them

first. I would negotiate as long and as far as patience ought to go;

and, if I found an obstinate denial of justice, I would then lay the

hand of force upon the western posts, and would teach the world that

the United States were no less prompt in commanding justice to be done

them, than they had been patient and industrious in attempting to

obtain it by fair and peaceable means. In this view of the subject I

should be led to say, away with your milk and water regulations; they

are too trifling to effect objects of such importance. Are the

Algerines to be frightened with paper resolves, or the Indians to be

subdued, or the western posts taken, by commercial regulations? when

we consider the subject merely as a commercial one, it goes too far,

and attempts too much; but when considered as a war establishment, it

falls infinitely short of the mark, and does too little."

This earnest and interesting debate was protracted to a great length,

and was conducted on both sides with great spirit and eloquence. At

length, on the third of February, the question was taken on the first

resolution, which was carried by a majority of five. The further

consideration of the resolutions was then postponed until the first

Monday in March.

This animated debate was succeeded by another, on a question which

also brought into full view, the systems that were embraced by the

opposite parties, on some of those great national subjects which give

a character to an administration.

On the second of January, a resolution was agreed to in the house of

representatives declaring "that a naval force adequate to the

protection of the commerce of the United States against the Algerine

corsairs, ought to be provided." The force proposed was to consist of

six frigates; four of forty-four, and two of thirty-six guns.

This measure was founded on the communications of the President,

representing the improbability of being able to negotiate a peace with

the dey of Algiers; and on undoubted information that the corsairs of

that regency had, during their first short cruise in the Atlantic,

captured eleven American merchantmen, and made upwards of one hundred

prisoners; and were preparing to renew their attack on the unprotected

vessels of the United States.

In every stage of its progress this bill was most strenuously opposed.

[Sidenote: Debates on the subject of a navy.]

The measure was viewed simply as a present protection to commerce, and

then as the commencement of a permanent naval establishment. In both

characters it was reprobated with extreme severity.

As a measure of protection, it was declared to be altogether

incompetent to the attainment of its object, because the force

contemplated was insufficient, and because it could not be brought

into immediate use. The measure, therefore, would be totally

inefficacious.

But the object might be effected by other means, more eligible, and

less expensive. By proper management, and a due attention to time and

circumstances, a peace might be procured with money.

Nations possessing a naval force greatly superior to the proposed

armament, had found it to their advantage to purchase the friendship

of the Algerines. That mode of procuring peace was recommended both by

its efficacy, and its economy. Unless the object was obtained, the

money would not be expended.

Another mode of giving security to their commerce, preferable to the

plan in the bill, was to purchase the protection of foreign powers.

This might be acquired at a less expense than would be incurred in

fitting out the proposed armament, and its utility would be immediate.

But the measure was also to be considered as the commencement of a

permanent navy. The question which this view of it presented, was one

of the most important that could engage the consideration of the

house. The adoption of the principle would involve a complete

dereliction of the policy of discharging the public debt. History

afforded no instance of a nation which continued to increase its navy,

and at the same time to decrease its debt.

To the expensiveness of the navy system were ascribed the oppression

under which the people of England groaned, the overthrow of the French

monarchy, and the dangers which threatened that of Great Britain. The

expensiveness of the government was the true ground of the oppression

of the people. The king, the nobility, the priesthood, the _army_, and

above all, the navy. All this machinery lessens the number of

productive, and increases the number of unproductive hands in the

nation.

The United States had already advanced full far enough in this system.

In addition to the civil list, they had funded a debt on the

principles of duration, had raised an army at an immense expense, and

now a proposition was made for a navy.

The system of governing by debts, was the most refined system of

tyranny. It seemed to be a contrivance devised by politicians to

succeed the old system of feudal tenures. Both were tyrannical, but

the objects of their tyranny were different. The one operated on the

person, the other operates on the pockets of the individual. The

feudal lord was satisfied with the acknowledgment of the tenant that

he was a slave, and the rendition of a pepper corn as an evidence of

it; the product of his labour was left for his own support. The system

of debts affords no such indulgence. Its true policy is to devise

objects of expense, and to draw the greatest possible sum from the

people in the least visible mode. No device can facilitate the system

of debts and expense so much as a navy; and they should hold the

liberty of the American people at a lower rate, should this policy be

adopted.

Another great objection to the establishment of a navy was, that until

the United States should be able to contend with the great maritime

powers on the ocean, it would be a hostage, to its full value, for

their good behaviour. It would increase rather than lessen their

dependence.

In reply, it was said that if it had been the intention of the house

to incur a vast expense in the establishment of a navy for vain

parade, there might be force in some of the objections which had been

made. But this was not the case. It was a measure, not of choice, but

of necessity. It was extorted by the pressure of unavoidable events.

It being universally admitted that their commerce required protection

against the Algerine corsairs, the question was, simply, whether the

plan proposed in the bill was the best mode of affording that

protection.

To decide this question, it would be proper to consider the

substitutes which had been offered; and then to review the objections

which had been made to the measure.

The substitutes were, first, to purchase a peace; and secondly, to

subsidize other nations to protect commerce.

On the first substitute, it was said that the late communications must

satisfy every person who had attended to them, that all hope of

purchasing a peace must be abandoned, unless there was a manifestation

of some force which might give effect to negotiation. So long as the

vessels of the United States remained an easy and tempting prey to the

cupidity of those corsairs, it would be vain to expect that they would

sell a peace for the price the government would be willing to give, or

that a peace would be of any duration. If the executive had

experienced such difficulties while the Algerine cruisers had captured

only one or two vessels, and were confined to the Mediterranean by a

Portuguese squadron, how much less prospect was there of success after

they had captured a considerable number of ships, were likely to

capture many more, and were at liberty to cruise on the Atlantic to

the very coasts of the United States? Even that little prospect of

success would be diminished, when the dey of Algiers should understand

that the United States would take no measures to protect their trade,

and were afraid of the expense of a small armament.

It was to be understood that they did not rely solely on the

operations of the armament. They still looked forward to negotiation,

and were willing to provide the means for purchasing a peace. But the

former measure was necessary to give success to the latter, and the

armament might be employed to advantage should negotiation fail.

The other substitute was to subsidize foreign powers. The national

dishonour of depending upon others for that protection which the

United States were able to afford themselves, was strongly urged. But

there were additional objections to this project. Either the nations

in contemplation were at peace or at war with the regency of Algiers.

If the former, it was not to be expected that they would relinquish

that peace for any indemnification the United States could make them.

If the latter, they had sufficient inducements to check the

depredations of their enemies without subsidies. Such a protection

would be hazardous, as it would be, at any time, in the power of the

nation that should be employed, to conclude a truce with Algiers, and

leave the trade of the United States at the mercy of her corsairs.

While the expense of protection was perpetually to be incurred, it

would never furnish the strength which that expense ought to give.

With a navy of her own, America might co-operate to advantage with any

power at war with Algiers, but it would be risking too much to depend

altogether on any foreign nation.

To the argument that the force was incompetent to the object, it was

answered, that, from the documents before them, and from the diligent

inquiries of a large committee, the number and strength of the

Algerine corsairs had been ascertained, and the armament contemplated

in the bill was believed to be sufficient. If gentlemen thought

differently, it was surprising that they did not move to augment it.

The expense of the frigates had been strongly urged. But the saving in

insurance, in ships and cargoes, and in the ransom of seamen, was more

than equivalent to this item. "But are not the slavery of our fellow

citizens, and the national disgrace resulting from it, to be taken

into the account? these are considerations beyond all calculation. Who

can, after reading the affecting narratives of the unfortunate, sit

down contented with cold calculations and syllogisms? their narratives

ought to excite every possible exertion, not only to procure the

release of the captured, but to prevent the increase of the number of

these unhappy victims."

That a bill providing six frigates, to exist during the war with the

Algerines, should excite apprehensions of a large permanent navy, and

of an immense debt, was truly astonishing. But even if the bill had

not contained a clause enabling the President to discontinue the

armament provided peace should be concluded with the regency of

Algiers, the weight of the objection was denied. America was

peculiarly fitted for a navy; she abounded in all kinds of naval

resources, and had within herself, those means which other nations

were obliged to obtain from abroad. Her situation, and the

dispositions of a considerable proportion of her citizens, evinced

still more the propriety of a naval establishment. Perhaps the country

was not yet mature for such an establishment to any great extent. But

the period was not far distant when it would be. The United States had

an increasing population, much individual wealth, and considerable

national resources. It was not believed that the expense of equipping

a small naval armament for the protection of their commerce, would be

insupportable.

It was, however, matter of surprise, that gentlemen who had deemed the

improvement of American navigation, as a source of defence, an object

of so much importance as to be anxious to wage an immediate commercial

war with Great Britain for that purpose, should avow such a fixed

determination against resorting to that resource in any degree

whatever, under circumstances the most urgent.

The original resolution was carried only by a majority of two voices;

but as the bill advanced, several members who were accustomed to vote

in the opposition gave it their support; and, on the final question, a

majority of eleven appeared in its favour. The other branch of the

legislature concurred, and it received the cordial assent of the

President.

Pending these discussions, the irritations in which they commenced

were greatly aggravated by accounts, that captures of American vessels

by British cruisers were made to an extent altogether unprecedented;

and early in March, an authentic paper was received which proved that

those captures were not unauthorized.

On the sixth of November, 1793, additional instructions had been

issued to the ships of war and privateers of Great Britain, requiring

them to stop and detain all ships, laden with goods the produce of any

colony belonging to France, or carrying provisions or other supplies

to any such colony, and to bring the same, with their cargoes, to

legal adjudication, in the British courts of admiralty.

These instructions made a serious impression on the most reflecting

and moderate men in the United States. It was believed that they

originated in a spirit of hostility which must lead to war; and that

it had now become the part of prudence to prepare for that event.

On the 12th of March, Mr. Sedgewick moved several resolutions, the

objects of which were to raise a military force, and to authorize the

President to lay an embargo. The armament was to consist of fifteen

thousand men, who should be brought into actual service in case of war

with any European power, but not until war should break out. In the

mean time, they were to receive pay while assembled for the purpose of

discipline, which was not to exceed twenty-four days in each year.

After stating the motives which led to the introduction of these

resolutions, they were laid on the table for the consideration of the

members. Two days afterwards, a motion was made to take up that which

related to an embargo; but this motion was negatived for the purpose

of resuming the consideration of the commercial regulations which had

been offered by Mr. Madison. On the motion of Mr. Nicholas, those

resolutions were amended so as to subject the manufactures of Great

Britain alone, instead of those of all nations having no commercial

treaties with the United States, to the proposed augmentation of

duties. They were again debated with great earnestness, but no

decision on them was made.

In addition to the objections urged against them as forming a

commercial system in time of peace, they were said to be particularly

inapplicable to the present moment. If, as was believed, the United

States were about to be forced into a war, the public counsels ought

to be directed to measures of defence. In that event, the resolutions

would, at best, be useless. But the greater the danger of war, the

more incumbent was it on the government to unite public opinion in

support of it; and this would best be effected by observing a line of

conduct which would furnish no just cause of hostility. The commercial

discriminations proposed were of a hostile and irritating nature,

might render war certain, would be considered by many as unnecessary,

and might impair that unanimity in which the great strength of the

country consisted. It was submitted to the gentlemen to decide whether

it was wise to press their system through, with so small a majority as

was in its favour.

The resolutions were defended on the principle, that though not in

themselves contributing to the national defence, they would not

prevent the adoption of such other measures as the state of things

might render necessary. If war should take place, they could do no

harm. But war must at some time be succeeded by peace: and they would

form a valuable basis for negotiation.[15]

[Footnote 15: In the course of this debate the resolutions

were still considered as calculated to promote the

interests, not of the United States, but of France. Mr. Ames

said they had _French_ stamped upon the very face of them.

This expression produced a warm retort from Colonel Parker.

He wished there was a stamp on the forehead of every person

to designate whether he was for France or Britain. For

himself he would not be silent and hear that nation abused

to whom America was indebted for her rank as a nation. He

was firmly persuaded that but for the aid of France in the

last war, those gentlemen now on the floor who prided

themselves in abusing her, would not have had an opportunity

in that place of doing it. This sentiment produced a clap in

the galleries. This indecorum was severely reprobated, and a

motion was made to clear the galleries. Although the debate

shows that the degree of sensibility excited by this

disorder was extremely different in the different parties,

it was justified by none, and the galleries were cleared.]

[Sidenote: An embargo law.]

On the 21st of March, Mr. Sedgewick's motion authorizing the President

to lay an embargo was negatived by a majority of two voices; but in a

few days, the consideration of that subject was resumed, and a

resolution passed, prohibiting all trade from the United States to any

foreign port or place for the space of thirty days, and empowering the

President to carry the resolution into effect.

This resolution was accompanied with vigorous provisional measures for

defence, respecting the adoption of which, no considerable division of

sentiment was avowed.

While the measures of congress indicated that expectation of war, a

public document made its appearance which seemed to demonstrate that

Great Britain also was preparing for that event. This was the answer

of Lord Dorchester, on the 10th of February, to a speech delivered by

the deputies of a great number of Indian tribes assembled at Quebec.

In this answer, his lordship had openly avowed the opinion, founded,

as he said, on the conduct of the American people, that a war between

Great Britain and the United States, during the present year, was

probable, and that a new line between the two nations must then be

drawn by the sword.

This document was not authentic; but it obtained general belief, and

contributed to confirm the opinion that war was scarcely to be

avoided.

On the 27th of March, Mr. Dayton moved a resolution for sequestering

all debts due to British subjects, and for taking means to secure

their payment into the treasury, as a fund out of which to indemnify

the citizens of the United States for depredations committed on their

commerce by British cruisers, in violation of the laws of nations.

The debate on this resolution was such as was to be expected from the

irritable state of the public mind. The invectives against the British

nation were uttered with peculiar vehemence, and were mingled with

allusions to the exertions of the government for the preservation of

neutrality, censuring strongly the system which had been pursued.

Before any question was taken on the proposition for sequestering

British debts, and without a decision on those proposed by Mr.

Madison, Mr. Clarke moved a resolution, which in some degree suspended

the commercial regulations that had been so earnestly debated. This

was to prohibit all intercourse with Great Britain until her

government should make full compensation for all injuries done to the

citizens of the United States by armed vessels, or by any person or

persons acting under the authority of the British king; and until the

western posts should be delivered up.[16]

[Footnote 16: A few days before the motions of Mr. Dayton

and Mr. Clarke, a report was made by the secretary of state

relative to the vexations of American commerce committed by

the officers and cruisers of the belligerent powers. It was

made from materials collected in an inquiry which had been

instituted by the President before the meeting of congress.

In this report, after detailing the numerous complaints

which were made against Great Britain, the secretary

proceeded to notice those which were brought against other

nations. Against France, he said, it was urged that her

privateers harassed the American trade no less than those of

the British. That their courts of admiralty were guilty of

equal oppression. That they had violated the treaty between

the two nations. That a very detrimental embargo had

detained a number of American vessels in her ports, and that

the government had discharged a specie contract with

assignats. The effect of this report seems to have been to

excite a suspicion that the secretary of state was not

sufficiently attached to liberty and to France.]

On the fourth of April, before any decision was made on the several

propositions which have been stated, the President laid before

congress a letter just received from Mr. Pinckney, the minister of the

United States at London, communicating additional instructions to the

commanders of British armed ships, which were dated the eighth of

January. These instructions revoked those of the sixth of November;

and, instead of bringing in for adjudication all neutral vessels

trading with the French islands, British cruisers were directed to

bring in those only which were laden with cargoes the produce of the

French islands, and were on a direct voyage from those islands to

Europe.

The letter detailed a conversation with Lord Grenville on this

subject, in which his lordship explained the motives which had

originally occasioned the order of the sixth of November, and gave to

it a less extensive signification than it had received in the courts

of vice admiralty.

It was intended, he said, to be temporary, and was calculated to

answer two purposes. One was, to prevent the abuses which might take

place in consequence of the whole of the St. Domingo fleet having gone

to the United States; the other was, on account of the attack designed

upon the French West India islands by the armament under Sir John

Jarvis and Sir Charles Grey; but it was now no longer necessary to

continue the regulations for those purposes. His lordship added, that

the order of the sixth of November did not direct the confiscation of

all vessels trading with the French islands, but only that they should

be brought in for legal adjudication; and he conceived that no vessel

would be condemned under it, which would not have been previously

liable to the same sentence.

The influence of this communication on the party in the legislature

which was denominated federal, was very considerable. Believing that

the existing differences between the two nations still admitted of

explanation and adjustment, they strenuously opposed all measures

which were irritating in their tendency, or which might be construed

into a dereliction of the neutral character they were desirous of

maintaining; but they gave all their weight to those which, by putting

the nation in a posture of defence, prepared it for war, should

negotiation fail.

On the opposite party, no change of sentiment or of views appears to

have been produced. Their system seems to have been matured, and not

to have originated in the feelings of the moment. They adhered to it

therefore with inflexible perseverance; but seemed not anxious to

press an immediate determination of the propositions which had been

made. These propositions were discussed with great animation; but,

notwithstanding an ascertained majority in their favour, were

permitted to remain undecided, as if their fate depended on some

extrinsic circumstance.

Meanwhile, great exertions were made to increase the public agitation,

and to stimulate the resentments which were felt against Great

Britain. The artillery of the press was played with unceasing fury on

the minority of the house of representatives; and the democratic

societies brought their whole force into operation. Language will

scarcely afford terms of greater outrage than were employed against

those who sought to stem the torrent of public opinion, and to

moderate the rage of the moment. They were denounced as a British

faction, seeking to impose chains on their countrymen. Even the

majority was declared to be but half roused; and to show little of

that energy and decision which the crisis required.

Unequivocal evidence, it was said, had been obtained of the

liberticide intentions of Great Britain; and only the successes of

freedom against tyranny, the triumphs of their magnanimous French

brethren over slaves, had been the means of once more guaranteeing the

independence of this country. The glorious example of France ought to

animate the American people to every exertion to raise their prostrate

character; and every tie of gratitude and interest should lead them to

cement their connexion with that great republic. The proclamation of

neutrality, though admitted to have originated in the best motives on

the part of the President, was declared to be not only questionable in

a constitutional point of view, but eventually to have proved

impolitic. Being falsely construed by Great Britain into a

manifestation of a pusillanimous disposition, it served to explain the

aggressions of that nation. Experience now urged the abandonment of a

line of conduct, which had fed the pride and provoked the insults of

their unprincipled and implacable enemy; and was derogatory to the

honour, inconsistent with the interest, and hostile to the liberties

of their country.

Their tameness under British aggressions was declared to furnish just

cause of offence to France; since every infringement of right

submitted to by a neutral, inflicted a correspondent injury on the

nation at war with the offending power.

The proceedings of the legislature continued to manifest a fixed

purpose to pursue the system which had been commenced; and the public

sentiment seemed to accord with that system. That the nation was

advancing rapidly to a state of war, was firmly believed by many

intelligent men, who doubted the necessity, and denied the policy of

abandoning the neutral position which had been thus long maintained.

In addition to the extensive calamities which must, in any state of

things, result to the United States from a rupture with a nation which

was the mistress of the ocean, and which furnished the best market for

the sale of their produce, and the purchase of manufactures of

indispensable necessity, there were considerations belonging

exclusively to the moment, which, though operating only in a narrow

circle, were certainly entitled to great respect.

That war with Britain, during the continuance of the passionate and

almost idolatrous devotion of a great majority of the people to the

French republic, would throw America so completely into the arms of

France as to leave her no longer mistress of her own conduct, was not

the only fear which the temper of the day suggested. That the spirit

which triumphed in that nation, and deluged it with the blood of its

revolutionary champions, might cross the Atlantic, and desolate the

hitherto safe and peaceful dwellings of the American people, was an

apprehension not so entirely unsupported by appearances, as to be

pronounced chimerical. With a blind infatuation, which treated reason

as a criminal, immense numbers applauded a furious despotism,

trampling on every right, and sporting with life, as the essence of

liberty; and the few who conceived freedom to be a plant which did not

flourish the better for being nourished with human blood, and who

ventured to disapprove the ravages of the guillotine, were execrated

as the tools of the coalesced despots, and as persons who, to weaken

the affection of America for France, became the calumniators of that

republic. Already had an imitative spirit, captivated with the

splendour, but copying the errors of a great nation, reared up in

every part of the continent self created corresponding societies, who,

claiming to be the people, assumed a control over the government, and

were loosening its bands. Already were the mountain,[17] and a

revolutionary tribunal, favourite toasts; and already were principles

familiarly proclaimed which, in France, had been the precursors of

that tremendous and savage despotism, which, in the name of the

people, and by the instrumentality of affiliated societies, had spread

its terrific sway over that fine country, and had threatened to

extirpate all that was wise and virtuous. That a great majority of

those statesmen who conducted the opposition would deprecate such a

result, furnished no security against it. When the physical force of a

nation usurps the place of its wisdom, those who have produced such a

state of things no longer control it.

[Footnote 17: A well known term designating the most violent

party in France.]

These apprehensions, whether well or ill founded, produced in those

who felt them, an increased solicitude for the preservation of peace.

Their aid was not requisite to confirm the judgment of the President

on this interesting subject. Fixed in his purpose of maintaining the

neutrality of the United States, until the aggressions of a foreign

power should clearly render neutrality incompatible with honour; and

conceiving, from the last advices received from England, that the

differences between the two nations had not yet attained that point,

he determined to make one decisive effort, which should either remove

the ostensible causes of quarrel, or demonstrate the indisposition of

Great Britain to remove them. This determination was executed by the

nomination of an envoy extraordinary to his Britannic majesty, which

was announced to the senate on the 16th of April in the following

terms:

"The communications which I have made to you during your present

session, from the despatches of our minister in London, contain a

serious aspect of our affairs with Great Britain. But as peace ought

to be pursued with unremitted zeal, before the last resource which has

so often been the scourge of nations, and can not fail to check the

advanced prosperity of the United States, is contemplated, I have

thought proper to nominate, and do hereby nominate John Jay, as envoy

extraordinary of the United States, to his Britannic majesty.

[Sidenote: Mr. Jay appointed envoy extraordinary to Great Britain.]

"My confidence in our minister plenipotentiary in London continues

undiminished. But a mission like this, while it corresponds with the

solemnity of the occasion, will announce to the world a solicitude for

the friendly adjustment of our complaints, and a reluctance to

hostility. Going immediately from the United States, such an envoy

will carry with him a full knowledge of the existing temper and

sensibility of our country; and will thus be taught to vindicate our

rights with firmness, and to cultivate peace with sincerity."

To those who believed the interests of the nation to require a rupture

with England, and a still closer connexion with France, nothing could

be more unlooked for, or more unwelcome, than this decisive measure.

That it would influence the proceedings of congress could not be

doubted; and it would materially affect the public mind was probable.

Evincing the opinion of the executive that negotiation, not

legislative hostility, was still the proper medium for accommodating

differences with Great Britain, it threw on the legislature a great

responsibility, if they should persist in a system calculated to

defeat that negotiation. By showing to the people that their President

did not yet believe war to be necessary, it turned the attention of

many to peace; and, by suggesting the probability, rekindled the

almost extinguished desire, of preserving that blessing.

Scarcely has any public act of the President drawn upon his

administration a greater degree of censure than this. That such would

be its effect, could not be doubted by a person who had observed the

ardour with which opinions that it thwarted were embraced, or the

extremity to which the passions and contests of the moment had carried

all orders of men. But it is the province of real patriotism to

consult the utility, more than the popularity of a measure; and to

pursue the path of duty, although it may be rugged.

In the senate, the nomination was approved by a majority of ten

voices; and, in the house of representatives, it was urged as an

argument against persevering in the system which had been commenced.

On the 18th of April, a motion for taking up the report of the

committee of the whole house on the resolution for cutting off all

commercial intercourse with Great Britain, was opposed, chiefly on the

ground that, as an envoy had been nominated to the court of that

country, no obstacle ought to be thrown in his way. The adoption of

the resolution would be a bar to negotiation, because it used the

language of menace, and manifested a partiality to one of the

belligerents which was incompatible with neutrality. It was also an

objection to the resolution that it prescribed the terms on which

alone a treaty should be made, and was consequently an infringement of

the right of the executive to negotiate, and an indelicacy to that

department.

In support of the motion, it was said, that the measure was strictly

within the duty of the legislature, they having solely the right to

regulate commerce. That, if there was any indelicacy in the clashing

of the proceedings of the legislature and executive, it was to the

latter, not to the former, that this indelicacy was to be imputed. The

resolution which was the subject of debate had been several days

depending in the house, before the nomination of an envoy

extraordinary had been made. America having a right, as an independent

nation, to regulate her own commerce, the resolution could not lead to

war; on the contrary, it was the best means of bringing the

negotiation to a happy issue.

The motion for taking up the report was carried in the affirmative.

Some embarrassment was produced by an amendment offered by Mr. Smith

of South Carolina, who proposed to add another condition to the

restoration of intercourse between the two countries. This was,

compensation for the negroes carried away in violation of the treaty

of peace. The house avoided this proposition by modifying the

resolutions so as to expunge all that part of it which prescribed the

conditions on which the intercourse might be restored. A bill was

brought in conforming to this resolution, and carried by a

considerable majority. In the senate, it was lost by the casting vote

of the Vice President. The system which had been taken up in the house

of representatives was pressed no further.

The altercations between the executive and the minister of the French

republic, had given birth to many questions which had been warmly

agitated in the United States, and on which a great diversity of

sentiment prevailed.

The opinion of the administration that the relations produced by

existing treaties, and indeed by a state of peace independent of

treaty, imposed certain obligations on the United States, an

observance of which it was the duty of the executive to enforce, had

been reprobated with extreme severity. It was contended, certainly by

the most active, perhaps by the most numerous part of the community,

not only that the treaties had been grossly misconstrued, but also

that, under any construction of them, the interference of the

executive acquired the sanction of legislative authority; that, until

the legislature should interpose and annex certain punishments to

infractions of neutrality, the natural right possessed by every

individual to do any act not forbidden by express law, would furnish a

secure protection against those prosecutions which a tyrannical

executive might direct for the crime of disregarding its illegal

mandates. The right of the President to call out the militia for the

detention of privateers about to violate the rules he had established,

was, in some instances, denied; attempts to punish those who had

engaged, within the United States, to carry on expeditions against

foreign nations, were unsuccessful; and a grand jury had refused to

find a bill of indictment against Mr. Duplaine, for having rescued,

with an armed force, a vessel which had been taken into custody by an

officer of justice. Of consequence, however decided the opinion of the

executive might be with respect to its constitutional powers and

duties, it was desirable to diminish the difficulties to be

encountered in performing those duties, by obtaining the sanction of

the legislature to the rules which had been established for the

preservation of neutrality. The propriety of legislative provision for

the case was suggested by the President at the commencement of the

session, and a bill was brought into the senate, "in addition to the

act for punishing certain crimes against the United States." This bill

prohibited the exercise, within the American territory, of those

various rights of sovereignty which had been claimed by Mr. Genet, and

subjected any citizen of the United States who should be convicted of

committing any of the offences therein enumerated, to fine and

imprisonment. It also prohibited the condemnation and sale within the

United States, of prizes made from the citizens or subjects of nations

with whom they were at peace.

Necessary as this measure was, the whole strength of the opposition in

the senate was exerted to defeat it. Motions to strike out the most

essential clause were successively repeated, and each motion was

negatived by the casting vote of the Vice President. It was only by

his voice that the bill finally passed.[18]

[Footnote 18: Previous to taking the question on this bill,

a petition had been received against Mr. Gallatin, a senator

from the state of Pennsylvania, who was determined not to

have been a citizen a sufficient time to qualify him under

the constitution for a seat in the senate. This casual

circumstance divided the senate, or the bill would probably

have been lost.]

In the house of representatives also, this bill encountered a serious

opposition. The sections which prohibited the sale of prizes in the

United States, and that which declared it to be a misdemeanour to

accept a commission from a foreign power within the territory of the

United States, to serve against a nation with whom they were at peace,

were struck out; but that which respected the acceptance of

commissions was afterwards reinstated.

In the course of the session, several other party questions were

brought forward, which demonstrated, at the same time, the strength,

and the zeal of the opposition. The subject of amending the

constitution was revived; and a resolution was agreed to in both

houses for altering that instrument, so far as to exempt states from

the suits of individuals. While this resolution was before the senate,

it was also proposed to render the officers of the bank, and the

holders of stock, ineligible to either branch of the legislature; and

this proposition, so far as respected officers in the bank, was

negatived by a majority of only one vote.[19] A bill to sell the

shares of the United States in the bank was negatived by the same

majority.

[Footnote 19: A clause in the resolution as proposed, which

was understood to imply that the act for incorporating the

bank was unconstitutional, was previously struck out by the

same majority.]

[Sidenote: Inquiry into the conduct of the secretary of the treasury

terminates honourably to him.]

In both houses inquiries were set on foot respecting the treasury

department, which obviously originated in the hope of finding some

foundation for censuring that officer, but which failed entirely. In a

similar hope, as respected the minister of the United States at Paris,

the senate passed a vote requesting the President to lay before that

body, his correspondence with the French republic, and also with the

department of state.[20]

[Footnote 20: See note No. VIII. at the end of the volume.]

The preparations for an eventual war, which the aspect of public

affairs rendered it imprudent to omit, and a heavy appropriation of a

million, which, under the title of foreign intercourse, was made for

the purpose of purchasing peace from Algiers, and liberating the

Americans who were in captivity, created demands upon the treasury

which the ordinary revenues were insufficient to satisfy.

That the imposition of additional taxes had become indispensable, was

a truth too obvious to be controverted with the semblance of reason;

but the subjects of taxation afforded at all times an ample field for

discussion.

The committee of ways and means reported several resolutions for

extending the internal duties to various objects which were supposed

capable of bearing them, and also proposed an augmentation of the

impost on foreign goods imported into the United States, and a direct

tax. It was proposed to lay a tax on licenses to sell wines and

spirituous liquors, on sales at auction, on pleasure carriages, on

snuff manufactured, and on sugar refined in the United States, and

also to lay a stamp duty.

[Sidenote: Internal taxes laid.]

The direct tax was not even supported by the committee. Only thirteen

members voted in its favour. The augmentation of the duty on imposts

met with no opposition. The internal duties were introduced in

separate bills, that each might encounter only those objections which

could be made to itself; and that the loss of one might not involve

the loss of others. The resolution in favour of stamps was rejected:

the others were carried, after repeated and obstinate debates. The

members of the opposition were in favour of raising the whole sum

required by additional burdens on trade, and by direct taxes.

While these measures were depending before congress, memorials and

resolutions against them were presented by the manufacturers, which

were expressed in terms of disrespect that evidenced the sense in

which numbers understood the doctrine, _that the people were

sovereign, and those who administered the government, their servants_.

This opportunity for charging the government with tyranny and

oppression, with partiality and injustice, was too favourable not to

be embraced by the democratic societies, those self proclaimed

watchful sentinels over the rights of the people. A person

unacquainted with those motives which, in the struggle of party, too

often influence the conduct of men, would have supposed a direct tax

to be not only in itself more eligible, but to be more acceptable to

the community than those which were proposed. To the more judicious

observers of the springs of human action, the reverse was known to be

the fact.

[Illustration: George Washington's Bedroom at Mount Vernon

_It was in this room that Washington expired, December 14, 1799. Two

days previously he was exposed in the saddle, for several hours, to

cold and snow, and contracted acute laryngitis for which he was

ineffectually treated in the primitive manner of the period. A short

time before ceasing to breathe, he said: "I die hard; but I am not

afraid to go. I believed from my first attack that I should not

survive it. My breath cannot last long." A little later he murmured:

"I feel myself going. I thank you for your attentions; but I pray you

to take no more trouble about me. Let me go off quietly. I cannot last

long." After giving some instructions about his burial he became

easier, felt his own pulse, and died without a struggle._]

The friends of the administration supported the proposed system

against every objection to it, because they believed it to be more

productive, and less unpopular, than a direct tax. It is not

impossible that what recommended the system to one party, might

constitute a real objection to it with those who believed that the

public interest required a change[21] in the public councils.

[Footnote 21: The declaration was not unfrequently made that

the people could only be roused to a proper attention to the

violation of their rights, and to the prodigal waste of

their money, by perceiving the weight of their taxes. This

was concealed from them by the indirect, and would be

disclosed to them by the direct, system of taxation.]

On the ninth of June, this active and stormy session was closed by an

adjournment to the first Monday in the succeeding November.

[Sidenote: Congress adjourns.]

The public was not less agitated than the legislature had been, by

those interesting questions which had occasioned some of the most

animated and eloquent discussions that had ever taken place on the

floor of the house of representatives. Mr. Madison's resolutions

especially, continued to be the theme of general conversation; and,

for a long time, divided parties throughout the United States. The

struggle for public opinion was ardent; and each party supported its

pretensions, not only with those arguments which each deemed

conclusive, but also by those reciprocal criminations which, perhaps,

each, in part, believed.

The opposition declared that the friends of the administration were an

aristocratic and corrupt faction, who, from a desire to introduce

monarchy, were hostile to France, and under the influence of Britain;

that they sought every occasion to increase expense, to augment debt,

to multiply the public burdens, to create armies and navies, and, by

the instrumentality of all this machinery, to govern and enslave the

people: that they were a paper nobility, whose extreme sensibility at

every measure which threatened the funds, induced a tame submission to

injuries and insults, which the interests and honour of the nation

required them to resist.

The friends of the administration retorted, that the opposition was

prepared to sacrifice the best interests of their country on the altar

of the French revolution. That they were willing to go to war for

French, not for American objects: that while they urged war they

withheld the means of supporting it, in order the more effectually to

humble and disgrace the government: that they were so blinded by their

passion for France as to confound crimes with meritorious deeds, and

to abolish the natural distinction between virtue and vice: that the

principles which they propagated, and with which they sought to

intoxicate the people, were, in practice, incompatible with the

existence of government. That they were the apostles of anarchy, not

of freedom; and were consequently not the friends of real and rational

liberty.