Having glanced at the situation from French's standpoint, let us step over
to the other side, as we may safely do at this lapse of time, and see how
it actually fared with the beleaguered garrison which we left in momentary
expectation of attack; and since General French has been heard, it is no
more than fair to quote from the graphic reports of the federal commander.
After narrating his preliminary movements, and the stations of the troops,
he proceeds:
"I directed Col. Rowett to hold the spur on which the 39th Iowa and
7th Illinois were formed, * * * and taking two companies of the 93rd
Illinois down a spur parallel with the railroad and along the bank of
the cut, so disposed them as to hold the north side as long as
possible. Three companies of the 93rd, which had been driven from the
west end of the ridge, were distributed in the ditch South of the
Redoubt, with instructions to keep the town well covered by their
fire, and to watch the depot where the rations were stored. The
remaining battalion of the 93rd, under Major Fisher, lay between the
Redoubt and Rowett's line, ready to reinforce wherever most needed.
"I had barely issued the orders when the storm broke in all its fury
on the 39th Iowa and 7th Illinois. Young's Brigade of Texans had
gained the west end of the ridge and moved with great impetuosity
along its crest till they struck Rowett's command, when they received
a severe check, but undaunted came again and again. Rowett,
reinforced by the gallant Redfield, encouraged me to hope we were
safe here, when I observed General Sears' brigade moving from the
North, its left extending across the railroad (opposite
Tourtellotte). I rushed to the two companies of the 93rd Illinois,
which were on the brink of the cut running north from the Redoubt,
they having been reinforced by the retreating pickets, and urged them
to hold on to the spur; but it was of no avail; the enemy's line of
battle swept us back like so much chaff, and struck the 39th Iowa in
flank, threatening to engulf our little band without further ado.
Fortunately for us, Col. Tourtellotte's fire caught Sears in flank,
and broke him so badly as to enable me to get a staff officer over
the cut with orders to bring the 50th Illinois over to reinforce
Rowett, who had lost very heavily. However, before the regiment sent
for could arrive, Sears and Young both rallied, and made their
assaults in front and on the flank with so much vigor and in such
force as to break Rowett's line, and had not the 39th Iowa fought
with the desperation it did, I never would have been able to get a
man back inside the Redoubt; as it was, their hand-to-hand conflict
and stubborn stand broke the enemy to that extent that he must stop
and reform before undertaking the assault on the fort. Under cover of
the blows they gave the enemy, the 7th and 93rd Illinois, and what
remained of the 39th Iowa, fell back into the fort.
"The fighting up to this time--about 11 a. m.--was of the most
extraordinary character. Attacked from the north, from the west and
from the south, these three regiments--39th Iowa and 7th and 93rd
Illinois--held Young's and a portion of Sears' and Cockerell's
brigades at bay for nearly two hours and a half. The gallant Col.
Redfield, of the 39th Iowa, fell, shot in four places, and the
extraordinary valor of the men and officers of this regiment, and of
the 7th Illinois, saved to us Allatoona.
"So completely disorganized were the enemy, that no regular assault
could be made on the fort till I had the trenches all filled and the
parapets lined with men. The 12th and 50th Illinois arriving from the
east hill, enabled us to occupy every foot of trench, and keep up a
line of fire that, as long as our ammunition lasted, would render our
little fort impregnable. The broken pieces of the enemy enabled them
to fill every hollow and take every advantage of the rough ground
surrounding the fort, filling every hole and trench, seeking shelter
behind every stump and log that lay within musket range of the fort.
We received their fire from the north, south and west of the Redoubt,
completely enfilading our ditches, and rendering it almost
impracticable for a man to expose his person above the parapet. An
effort was made to carry our works by assault, but the battery (12th
Wisconsin) was so ably manned and so gallantly fought as to render it
impossible for a column to live within one hundred yards of the work.
Officers labored constantly to stimulate the men to exertions, and
almost all that were killed or wounded in the fort met their fate
while trying to get the men to expose themselves above the parapet
and nobly setting them the example.
"The enemy kept up a constant and intense fire, gradually closing
around us and rapidly filling our little fort with the dead or dying.
About 1 p. m. I was wounded by a rifle ball that rendered me
insensible for some thirty or forty minutes, but managed to rally on
hearing some persons cry, 'Cease firing,' which conveyed to me the
impression that they were trying to surrender the fort.
"Again I urged my staff, the few officers left unhurt, and the men
around me, to renewed exertions, assuring them that Sherman would
soon be there with reinforcements. The gallant fellows struggled to
keep their heads above the ditch and parapet in face of the murderous
fire of the enemy, now concentrated upon us. The artillery was
silent, and a brave fellow, whose name I regret having forgotten,
volunteered to cross the railway cut which was under fire of the
enemy and go to the fort on the east hill to procure ammunition.
Having executed his mission successfully, he returned in a short time
with an arm load of canister and case shot. About 2:30 p. m. the
enemy were observed massing a force behind a small house and the
ridge on which the house was located distant northwest from the fort
about 150 yards. The dead and wounded were moved aside so as to
enable us to move a piece of artillery to an embrasure commanding the
house and ridge. A few shots from the gun threw the enemy's column
into great confusion, which being observed by our men, caused them to
rush to the parapet and open such a heavy and continuous musketry
fire that it was impossible for the enemy to rally. From this time
until near 4 p. m. we had the advantage of the enemy, and maintained
it with such success that they were driven from every position and
finally fled in confusion, leaving their dead and wounded, and our
little garrison in possession of the field.
"The hill east of the cut was gallantly and successfully defended by
Col. Tourtellotte, with the 4th Minnesota and a portion of the 18th
Wisconsin (which was drawn from outpost duty towards the south about
10:30). * * * Col. Tourtellotte, though wounded in the early part of
the action, remained with his men until the close, and rendered
valuable aid in protecting my north front from the repeated attacks
by Sears' brigade."
A notable struggle truly and stirringly told, even though the limitations
of an official report forbid that amplification of incident that would
make as thrilling a tale as tongue could utter. From start to finish,
seven solid hours of as desperate fighting as ever was done under the sky
of heaven, and with multiplied acts of individual heroism that would tax
the pen of Homer to narrate.
With the exception of about 250 rounds, the supply of ammunition brought
from Rome for the entire Division, had been expended by a portion of a
single brigade.
Every one of the subordinate commanders' reports on both sides bears
testimony to the unparalleled fierceness and concentration of the
struggle, and the closeness and duration of the action, and the terrific
slaughter; and these reports, it may be noted, are made by the ruggedest
of Sherman's and French's veterans--men inured to war in every aspect, and
as familiar with bloody battle-fields as we of to-day with the street we
daily tread. In reading these scant records, one scarce knows whether to
admire the more the daring vigor and persistence of the attack, or the
spirit, valor and heroic determination of the defence. With both it was
"To do or die," and each can feel that none, save his rival, can challenge
supremacy in war-like exploit.
Corse's signal dispatch to Sherman after the fight can therefore well be
excused, "I am short a cheek-bone and an ear, but able to whip all h--l
yet."