(_From personal inspection, by a Contributor to the United Service
Journal._)
This spot, on which the eye of all Europe is at present concentrated,
lies at the southern extremity of Antwerp, and forms one continued
line with its defences along the banks of the Scheldt. It is a regular
pentagon in shape, protected by bastions ranging at progressive
elevations, and connecting themselves with curtains of proportionate
height. In advance of these defences are a further series of spacious
bastions, immediately connected with the preceding, but of later
construction. The one were erected by Paciotti and Cerbolini, two
Italian engineers, by order of the tyrant Alba, 1568, and the others
according to Vauban's principles in 1701. Every side of this citadel is
equally formidable for its strength; that towards the town is furnished
with a raveline; and this is also the case with the front which faces
the river, and opens upon a paved line of road, from which all
communication with Antwerp itself has latterly been cut off. Two of
the sides of this fastness front towards the adjacent country, and are
likewise supplied with ravelines; the centre bastion in this direction
bears Paciotto's name, which has been denaturalized in that of Paniotto
in the French elevations. The defences of the town terminate in the
centre of the fifth side, which circumstance has left it unprovided with
a raveline. On the summit (or capital) of the two bastions on the land
side, two large lunettes have been thrown forward, one being called Fort
Kiel, from the adjacent suburb, and the other, which stands more away
from the town, Fort St. Laurent. Internally the citadel of Antwerp
contains every provision for the safe housing of its defenders, and
possesses more than the requisite accommodation under ground for its
supplies. All the barracks, exposed to the enemy's fire, are so placed,
that the strength of the garrison may be readily collected at the point
endangered; the kind of defence to be brought into action is plain and
obvious; and the _matériel_ for standing a siege has been as
liberally provided as the means of subsistence for preserving the
_morale_ of the besieged from being deteriorated. The garrison
consists of picked troops, who place unlimited confidence in their
commandant. The citadel is encompassed by a ditch, which has eighteen
feet of water in every part of its circuit, and is protected by ramparts
of adequate elevation, and strength in proportion. With such elements of
defence as these its capture cannot be effected without a sacrifice of
human lives, which none but the flint-hearted can contemplate or foresee
without deprecation and horror.
In the year 1792, when it was carried by the revolutionary forces
of France, they took the direction of the city walls as their line of
attack, and mounted the bastion which bears Paciotto's name; this,
at that time of day, formed indisputably the most advantageous point
of assault; but its increased strength in this quarter would, at the
present moment, render any attack an act of temerity. An esplanade
of the average width of four hundred paces, which was laid out as a
handsome promenade, before the bombardment in 1830, separates the
citadel from the town: but the effect of that bombardment has been to
throw a wide area of fifteen hundred paces open to the very marge of
the Scheldt; and to disconnect the fortress still more completely from
the inhabited portion of Antwerp. Lamentable as may be the prospect,
Antwerp, the mistress of the finest naval station and commercial port in
Europe, is doomed to destruction, if a single gun be directed against
its citadel. It is not possible for its commandant, as a soldier and
a subject, to avoid any and every means of annoying a besieger; and
amongst these, none so ready and effectual, present themselves, as that
of preventing the town from becoming the covert for an assailant. We have
witnessed the deplorable havoc which a few mortars brought upon it in
1830; but how frightful will be the issue when rockets and red-hot shot
come to be poured upon the devoted city. Nay, more,--by opening the
dykes along the Scheldt, a large portion of the western provinces of
Belgium is capable of being inundated; and if this fresh calamity ensue,
as a second resource on the part of the besieged, from the adoption
of which the recognised laws of warfare cannot absolve them, not only
Antwerp will have ceased to exist, but her citadel will rear its head,
a frowning islet, amidst a waste of waters. As to the blockade of the
Scheldt, it will be impotent with regard to distressing the citadel; for
the windings of that stream, as well as of the Maas, at their mouths,
preclude the possibility of effectually staying the Dutch from
communication with it.
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