THE NIAGARA FRONTIER
1814-1821
United States’ plans--Attempt on Mackinaw--La Colle--State
of affairs on Niagara frontier--Drummond’s raid on
Oswego--Dover--Advance of U.S. force--Capture of Fort
Erie--Battle of Chippewa--Critical position of British
force--Battle of Lundy’s Lane--Retreat of U.S. forces--Fort Erie
invested--Assault on Fort Erie--Sergeant Powell--Conclusion of
operations on Niagara frontier--Prevost’s abortive attack on
Plattsburgh--Defeat of British squadron on Lake Champlain--Other
operations--Bladensberg--Capture of Washington--General Ross
killed--Victory at Baltimore--Expedition against New Orleans--Its
defeat--Fort Bowyer captured--Treaty of Ghent--Sir William
Payne--Sir John Vandeleur--Badge “Niagara” granted--Regiment
returns to England--Equipped as Lancers--Embark for
Ireland--Disbanded.
The plans of the United States’ government for the campaign of 1814
varied considerably from those of the preceding years. They realised
the mistake they had made in advancing on Montreal without first
getting possession of Kingston, and they recognized the delusion on
which they had acted, in believing that the Canadians would welcome
their troops wherever they appeared on Canadian soil. It was, indeed,
the unflinching loyalty of the Canadians to the British flag that
had so far preserved Canada, as the troops England had been able to
spare, would, by themselves, have been inadequate for the purpose.
The United States’ plans for 1814 were therefore directed to the
following objects. To retake the island of Mackinaw; to renew the
invasion of the Niagara frontier; and, after getting possession of
Forts George and Niagara, to proceed against Kingston. The United
States’ officers on the Niagara frontier, had also learned that
enthusiasm without discipline was of little value, when opposed
in the open field to a disciplined enemy; the winter and spring
therefore were utilised by them in enforcing a higher degree of drill
and discipline than had hitherto been aimed at. This resulted in a
marked improvement in the fighting qualities of their troops during
the remainder of the war.
In the middle of April, a reinforcement of 100 men, conveying a
quantity of much-needed supplies and stores, under Colonel McDouall,
was sent from Toronto to Mackinaw, which was reached after a most
difficult journey on 18th May. A great number of Indians then
flocked into the post, which prompted McDouall to fit out a small
expedition of 150 men with 500 Indians against a small post that had
been lately established at Prairie du Chien on the Mississippi, 200
miles north-west of the present town of Chicago. Moving by water, the
expedition, under Colonel M‘Kay, was completely successful, and the
post was captured with two guns, and 61 prisoners, on 19th July, at
a cost of only three Indians wounded.
On 26th July, a U.S. expedition from Detroit, consisting of five
armed vessels and about 750 troops, arrived off Mackinaw, and landed
on 4th August, when they were completely repulsed in an attack on
McDouall’s position, regaining their ships with loss and confusion.
No further attempt was made, but part of the expedition uselessly
remained in the vicinity for some time, losing two armed vessels,
which were taken, on 3rd and 6th September, by a small party of
seamen and militia under Lieutenants Bulger and Worseley. No further
fighting took place in this quarter, and Mackinaw remained in the
hands of the British till the end of the war.
On the 30th March, General Wilkinson at the head of 4000 U.S. troops
advanced from Plattsburgh, crossed Lake Champlain on the ice, and
attacked a small British force, in a stone mill at La Colle, under
Major Handcock. Wilkinson was repulsed with some loss, and returned
to Plattsburgh.
The position of the British troops on the Niagara frontier early in
the year was very discouraging. The hardships they had undergone
during the operations in December had caused great sickness, so that
the abandonment of Fort Niagara was at one time seriously entertained.
“The region between Chippewa and Erie had been so completely
laid waste that it remained almost uninhabited. In addition
to his troops, Drummond had several thousand non-combatants
to feed, and, in the destitute condition of the country, this
seemed an almost hopeless task. Most of the western Indians that
had survived General Proctor’s defeat, as well as the whole
Six Nations from the Grand River, three thousand persons in
all, of whom two-thirds were helpless women and children, had
sought refuge near the British cantonments at Burlington. Their
depredations so harassed and alarmed many of the inhabitants in
the vicinity, that they abandoned their farms, and took shelter
in the soldiers’ quarters. The homeless fugitives from the
Niagara were also dependent upon the over-taxed commissariat.
Thus, while his armed force numbered less than two thousand,
between seven and eight thousand rations were issued daily....
The Indians daily consumed twice as much flour as the whole
of the troops. In the garrison of Fort Erie alone, not much
exceeding one hundred persons, no less than sixty-nine cases of
ague were reported in a single week.”[62]
A great number of Indians on the United States’ side were forced
to take up arms. Marauding parties from Detroit made frequent
incursions, carrying off loyal inhabitants, and destroying Delaware
and Point aux Pins. By the end of January, Black Rock was re-occupied
by United States’ troops, whence they annoyed Fort Erie by artillery
fire. It was in the midst of these difficulties that Drummond was
obliged to send the re-inforcements under McDouall to Mackinaw, as
already mentioned, and to further weaken his available forces by
withdrawing a regiment from Toronto to strengthen Kingston.
By great exertions and the employment of soldiers in the shipyards,
the British naval forces on Ontario had established a superiority.
Drummond wished to attack Sackett’s Harbour, and destroy the enemy’s
vessels there; but Sir George Prevost refused to provide the
necessary troops. On the 5th May, Drummond made a successful dash
from Kingston, with a force of about 1000 troops, upon Oswego. They
landed on the 6th, captured the fort, destroyed all military stores
that could not be carried off, and re-embarked. This successful
attack delayed the United States’ operations on the Niagara frontier
for several weeks, and enabled a strict blockade of Sackett’s Harbour
to be established.
Early in March, Major Lisle, with a troop of the 19th Light Dragoons
and a few militia, was placed in the little village of Dover, near
Long Point on Lake Erie, to watch any attempt of the enemy from that
side against Burlington. On the 15th May, eight hundred U.S. infantry
crossed the lake in armed vessels, and landed. Major Lisle withdrew
his men, and Dover was burned to the ground; after which the invading
force re-embarked.
By the end of June, the United States’ troops on the Niagara frontier
had gathered in great numbers, and it was evident that an invasion
was imminent. Drummond had vainly urged on Sir George Prevost
the necessity of reinforcing the troops on the frontier; but Sir
George was convinced that the principal attack would come from Lake
Champlain, and withheld the much-needed troops. From Toronto to
Long Point on Lake Erie, Drummond’s force did not much exceed 4000
men. A number of important points had to be guarded, and the force
under General Riall on the actual frontier was only about 2200 men,
including Indians, distributed on a length of thirty-six miles, and
including the garrison in Niagara. Only about seven hundred men were
available for field operations. At the end of June, the strength of
Major Lisle’s squadron was six officers, eleven sergeants, and one
hundred and eighteen rank and file, in five different detachments, at
Fort George, Queenston, Chippewa, Fort Erie, and Long Point.
On the morning of the 3rd July, the United States’ force, 4000
strong, under General Brown, was ferried across in two divisions
above and below Fort Erie, under cover of a fog. A picquet of the
19th Light Dragoons narrowly escaped being cut off, and the fort
was at once invested. It was occupied at that time by a garrison of
170 men, and, though in no condition to make a proper defence, it
was expected to maintain itself for a short time. It was however
surrendered after the exchange of a few cannon shots. Riall, with
his inferior numbers, contented himself by maintaining a small corps
of observation in his front, while he himself remained encamped on
the left bank of the Chippewa. On the 4th, Brown advanced, driving
before him the corps of observation which destroyed the bridges as it
fell back. A detachment of the 19th Light Dragoons under Lieutenant
Horton, covering the rear, became involved in a skirmish in which
they drove a party of the enemy into a house, which would probably
have been captured had not assistance come to them. Four men and
eight horses of the 19th were wounded in the skirmish. Brown encamped
that night within sight of Riall’s position.
Riall was reinforced on the 5th by the arrival of the 8th regiment
from Toronto, and, greatly under-estimating Brown’s force, which now
amounted to about 5000 men with nine guns, he resolved on leaving
his field works, and attacking. At three in the afternoon, Riall,
whose force now amounted to about 1900 men, threw forward a body
of militia and Indians on his right flank. After some desultory
skirmishing they were driven back by increasing numbers, and fell
back on the three light infantry companies, who received their
assailants under U.S. General Porter with a terrific volley, driving
them back in complete disorder, till they themselves were in turn
forced to fall back by superior numbers. Riall, meanwhile, had passed
the Chippewa, and drawn up his whole force in order of battle with
three guns. After some cannonading, he formed six companies of the
Royal Scots, and five companies of the 100th in two columns, and led
them against the enemy’s centre. They were received with a tremendous
fire against which they were unable to advance: almost every field
officer, excepting Riall himself, was struck down, and the columns,
suffering heavy losses, were obliged to withdraw, leaving their dead
and many of their wounded on the field. The 8th regiment covered the
retreat, which was not pressed, and the force recrossed the Chippewa
to its former position. “The guns were removed only by the gallant
exertions of some troopers of the 19th Dragoons, who attached their
own horses to the carriages, and rode off with them in the teeth of
the enemy.”[63] The British loss amounted to 515 killed, wounded, and
missing, which fell principally on the Royal Scots and 100th, who
lost 422 officers and men out of a total of 950 engaged. The 19th
Light Dragoons had one sergeant and five men wounded. General Riall,
in his dispatch after the battle, says:--
“I am particularly obliged to Major Lisle of the 19th Light
Dragoons for the manner in which he covered and protected one
of the 24-pounders which had been disabled. Lieutenant Colonel
Pearson has reported to me, in the most favourable terms, the
excellent manner in which Lieutenant Horton, with a party of the
19th Light Dragoons observed the motions of the enemy, while he
occupied the position he took on his first landing (on 3rd July),
and during his advance to this place.”
In consequence of this repulse, nearly the whole of his Indians
and many of the militia left Riall, in order to look after their
families. On the 8th, Brown threw a bridge across the Chippewa, three
miles up the stream, thus turning Riall’s right. Riall thereupon
broke up his camp, and withdrew to Fort George. Brown continued
his advance, occupied Queenston Heights, and took up a position,
investing Fort George, with his right resting on the Niagara river,
and his left on the lake. Riall, after strengthening the garrisons
in the forts, withdrew in the direction of Burlington Heights. To
do this, he executed a remarkable night march, to avoid the enemy
by whom he was hemmed in. At midnight, his force entered the lake,
which is very shallow for a hundred yards from the shore, and, wading
through the water for two miles and a half, he marched round the
left wing of the investing army, without being detected by their
vedettes. For ten days Brown lay inactive, looking for the arrival of
the U.S. Ontario squadron to enable him to strike a decisive blow.
But the squadron had been blockaded in Sackett’s Harbour ever since
the capture of Oswego, and was unable to render him any assistance.
Frequent skirmishes took place, in which the United States’ troops
suffered losses, often at the hands of the Canadians who were roused
to fury by the outrages committed on them. On one occasion the U.S.
General Swift was killed by a patrol of the 8th regiment; a wagon
train was destroyed, and the picquet guard at Erie cut off to a man.
In retaliation for these losses, the United States’ troops burned the
village of St David’s, and destroyed every dwelling-house between
Queenston and Niagara Falls; under circumstances of such barbarity
that the Colonel in command was dismissed from the army.
Meanwhile, Riall received some reinforcements from Toronto, and
a great number of militia again joined him, badly armed and
undisciplined, but exasperated beyond measure at the brigand-like
acts of the invaders. This enabled him to advance, and threatened
Brown’s communications. On the 20th, Brown advanced to Fort George,
and commenced preparations for a siege, in the hopes that Riall would
again hazard an engagement with inferior forces to relieve the Fort.
Two days later, Riall with 1700 regular troops, 700 militia, and
some Indians, took post in front of Twelve Mile Creek, in readiness
to fall upon Brown if he should commence active operations against
Fort George. On the 23rd, Brown received intelligence that the U.S.
squadron was closely blockaded in Sackett’s Harbour, and was in no
position to render him assistance. He at once broke up his camp,
and withdrew to the right bank of the Chippewa, with the intention
of depositing all unnecessary baggage and stores at Erie, and then
making a rapid advance on Burlington and Toronto. On the same day,
General Drummond reached Toronto, from Kingston, with the 89th
regiment. These were at once sent forward, under Lieutenant Colonel
Tucker, to Fort Niagara, with instructions to take drafts from the
garrisons of the different forts, and to march, on the 25th, to
Lewiston, where Brown had established a base of supplies. Riall was,
at the same time, ordered to advance towards the Chippewa. Drummond
himself embarked for Niagara, on the afternoon of the 24th, leaving
Toronto with only a few invalids as a garrison.
At midnight of the 24th, Riall detached about 900 men under
Lieutenant Colonel Pearson, with whom was a troop of the 19th Light
Dragoons under Major Lisle, to advance and occupy the high ground
near the Niagara Falls. By seven o’clock the next morning, after
a fourteen-mile march, Pearson occupied a hill by Lundy’s Lane,
within three miles of the United States’ camp, and one mile from
the Niagara Falls. At the same time, Drummond landed and commenced
his march along the left bank of the Niagara river, while Tucker,
in accordance with previous orders, marched along the right bank on
Lewiston. Lewiston was captured at noon, and the two parties reunited
at Queenston. Sending back part of the force, Drummond, with 815 men
and two guns, held on his way to Lundy’s Lane. Brown, on receiving
intelligence of Tucker’s advance on Lewiston, believing that his
more considerable stores at Fort Schlosser were threatened, and that
Pearson’s party at Lundy’s Lane was only a strong patrol, resolved to
make a countermove on Queenston and Fort George. Riall’s remaining
brigades at Twelve Mile Creek were under arms at daybreak to support
Pearson. Their advance was then countermanded, and they remained in
camp till noon, when a force, numbering 1230 rank and file, with four
guns, under Colonel Scott, was ordered to march at once for Lundy’s
Lane. On neither side was there any immediate expectation of a battle.
A little before five in the afternoon Brown detached a force of about
1800 men and two guns under General Scott to advance on Queenston. On
coming in contact with Pearson’s outposts, Scott became aware that
the force in front of him was stronger than he had supposed, and
delayed his attack, while he sent back to Brown for more troops.
Riall, who had ridden on to join Pearson, took Scott’s brigade for
the advance of Brown’s whole force. He at once sent back word to the
force advancing from Twelve Mile Creek, which was still three miles
away, to retire on the heights near Queenston, and ordered Pearson to
retreat on that point. After retiring half a mile, Riall and Pearson
met Drummond advancing. Drummond at once took the command, ordered
the position at Lundy’s Lane to be re-occupied, and sent word to
countermand Riall’s last order to Colonel Scott, whom he directed to
press on and join him.
Scott (U.S.), fearing an ambush, advanced with great caution, which
just allowed time for the British force to regain the hill before
it could be occupied by the enemy. Drummond’s force now amounted to
about 1700 men, thus disposed. On the summit of the hill were two
guns: a little behind them were five companies of the Royal Scots,
a detachment of the 41st, the 89th, with their left resting on the
road running parallel with the river from Queenston to Niagara Falls.
The line was prolonged towards the river by some of the 8th and some
militia. On the road, somewhat retired, was Major Lisle’s troop of
the 19th Light Dragoons. Both flanks were thrown forward, the woods
on the right of the line being occupied by the Glengarry regiment, a
corps of the Macdonald clan raised in Canada, that fought all through
the war with great distinction. By a curious coincidence, Drummond
had under his command three regiments, in which he had served as a
regimental officer; the Royal Scots, the 8th, and the 41st.
Scott commenced his attack about half past six, along the entire
front. On Drummond’s right and centre, the attack was not pushed
home, and the British guns on the hill, from their advantageous
position, had a decided superiority over the attacking artillery.
But on Drummond’s left, the attack was successful. A battalion,
ordered by Scott to make a wide turning movement through the dense
forest between the road and the river, suddenly attacked the Canadian
militia in flank, threw them into disorder, and captured some
prisoners, occupied the road, and forced back Lisle’s troop of the
19th for over a mile. At this juncture, General Riall was severely
wounded, and, being taken to the road, was conducted by mistake, in
the growing darkness, into a party of the enemy, by whom he was at
once made prisoner. The Canadian militia, however, quickly recovered
themselves, and formed up in rear of the 89th, at right angles to
them, covering the flank and rear of the British position. They also
cleared the road to the rear, and the enemy made no further headway
on this flank during the remainder of the battle.
Scott now made a determined attack, with the rest of his troops,
on the British centre. It was repulsed after some severe fighting,
in which both sides suffered heavily. A lull in the action then
occurred, during which the artillery on both sides maintained their
fire. Scott, while reforming his ranks, was joined by Brown and
the rest of the United States’ troops; at the same time, Drummond
was joined by the rear division of Riall’s troops, which had been
marching and counter-marching, under conflicting orders, since they
left Twelve Mile Creek. With them came the second troop of the 19th.
“For a few minutes firing almost ceased, and this interval was
employed by the United States’ artillerymen in bringing forward
fresh supplies of ammunition, and a daring officer, Captain
Brooke, stealthily crept up the hillside until within a few yards
of the British battery, with a dark lantern, which he suspended
in a thicket, as a guide for his gunners to take aim by; for
although the moon had risen, its light was rendered faint and
uncertain by drifting clouds of smoke and dust, and the position
of either line of battle was simply indicated at intervals, by
the flash of their guns.”[64]
Drummond employed part of his reinforcement to strengthen his right,
while the remainder formed a second line in rear of the first. A
field gun was also brought up in line with the two guns on the hill.
The United States’ commander was now convinced that the capture
of the hill and the guns on it was necessary to success. Forming
a brigade, 1400 strong, in the hollow of the hill, he sent them
straight against the guns. Part of them recoiled under the heavy
fire, but one battalion was able to approach under a screen of dense
thickets, and gained a position behind a log fence within twenty
yards of the guns without being observed. Pouring in a volley, they
rushed on the gunners with the bayonet, and were at once masters of
the guns, which were turned upon the British line. A large body of
United States’ infantry were then brought up on to the hill, and
their artillery ascended the slope at a gallop. In doing this, one
gun, of which the drivers were killed by a sudden volley, was taken
by the horses into the British ranks, and secured.
“The remainder of the British artillery was at the same time
brought forward, until the muzzles of the (opposing) guns were
only a few yards asunder, and the battle thenceforward became a
confused, ferocious and sanguinary struggle, waged frequently
at the bayonet’s point, or with clubbed muskets, the British
striving desperately to regain the ground they had lost, and
their opponents to thrust them down into the hollow beyond, and
drive them from the field. Regiments, companies, and sections
were broken up and mingled together. They retired, rallied, and
were led to the charge again.”[64]
[Illustration: BATTLE OF LUNDY’S LANE
9 p.m. 25th. July, 1814.
From L.L.H.S. Publications.
_Walker & Boutall sc._]
For over two hours this desperate struggle in the dark continued,
with varying fortunes. At one moment, the 103rd, a young regiment,
was forced back in disorder; at another the U.S. guns were captured,
and two of them spiked. Neither side could make headway, in spite of
frequent attacks and counter-attacks. Drummond was severely wounded
but kept the field: nearly one-third of the British force were killed
and wounded. The U.S. forces were in equally bad case. Three of their
generals were wounded, while the rank and file had lost heavily. In
the confusion and darkness the whole force had become disorganized;
Scott’s brigade, that had commenced the fight, had dwindled to a few
companies: there were an enormous number of stragglers. Closing their
ranks for a last attack the wearied British troops, headed by the
light company of the 41st, regained possession of the hill and of
the guns, just as Brown had decided on withdrawing. Desultory firing
continued for a few minutes: it was not till near midnight that the
British troops, wearied by prolonged marching and fighting, remained
in undisturbed possession of the field. Two of the enemy’s guns
remained in their possession, while one British gun was carried off.
Thus ended the battle of Lundy’s Lane, the most severely contested
action of the war. On the British side both generals were severely
wounded, one of them being taken prisoner. Out of a total strength
of somewhat less than 3000, the total British loss amounted to 5
officers and 76 men killed, 30 officers and 532 men wounded, 14
officers and 219 men missing and prisoners. The disproportion of
wounded to killed, in this and other actions, was mainly due to the
frequent use of buckshot by the enemy. The heaviest losses fell on
the Royal Scots and 89th, who, out of a total of about 900 present,
suffered a loss of 426. The 19th Light Dragoons had two wounded and
one missing, together with three horses killed, ten wounded, and one
missing. The United States’ loss was never correctly stated. Of the
four generals engaged, three were wounded, while the disorganization
of their force of about 4500 men engaged, and the loss of 16 officers
killed and 56 wounded, makes it probable that their loss in killed
and wounded was not less than 1200. Several hundred prisoners
remained in the hands of the British. In his dispatch, General
Drummond writes, “In reviewing the action from its commencement, the
first object which presents itself as deserving of notice, is the
steadiness and good countenance of the squadron of the 19th Light
Dragoons, under Major Lisle, and the very creditable and excellent
defence made by the incorporated militia-battalion &c.” This refers
to the first period of the action when the left of the line was
forced back.
The following day, General Ripley, who had succeeded to the command
of the United States’ troops, advanced across the Chippewa to see
to his dead and wounded; finding the field in occupation of the
British, he immediately retired, broke down the bridge, destroyed a
quantity of camp equipage and stores, and retired precipitately to
Erie, which he reached on 27th. The light troops, cavalry and Indians
were sent in pursuit, and made a few prisoners. On reaching Erie,
Ripley at once set to work to enlarge and strengthen the defences, in
anticipation of attack.
Drummond, after repairing the bridge, and receiving some
reinforcements that brought his effective strength up to 3150 men,
followed in Ripley’s footsteps, and appeared before Erie, which he
invested on 3rd August. Ripley’s position was now very strong, with
new earthworks and batteries extending from the fort to the edge of
the lake. On the river side he was covered by the batteries at Black
Rock: while from the lake, his defences were flanked by the fire of
three gunboats. On the night of the 3rd, Drummond threw a small party
of about 450 men across the river to capture the batteries at Black
Rock. Failing to effect a surprise, they recrossed, with the loss
of 25 men k.w.m. Two days later, the spirits of the besieged were
raised by the arrival of General Gaines to supersede Ripley. On the
night of the 12th, a daring exploit was performed by Captain Dobbs
of the Royal Navy. With 75 seamen from Lake Ontario, he attacked
and captured, in open boats transported overland, two of the three
gunboats on Lake Erie: the third gunboat cut its cable, and escaped.
On the 13th, Drummond’s batteries opened fire on the enemy’s works,
and continued the cannonade on the following day, preparatory to a
grand assault. At 2 A.M. on the 15th, the assault was delivered in
three columns. The right column, headed by Sergeant Powell of the
19th Light Dragoons, “who was perfectly acquainted with the ground,
volunteered to act as guide, and preceded the leading subdivision in
the most intrepid style,” was to attack a work called Snake Hill at
the border of the lake. The picquet of cavalry under Captain Eustace,
19th Light Dragoons was detailed to act with the right column. The
rest of the squadron was drawn up in the rear of the most advanced
battery, in readiness to receive prisoners, and conduct them to
the rear. The centre and left columns were to assault the fort at
different points. The scaling ladders with the right attack were
too short; after prolonged efforts, and suffering great losses,
the column was obliged to retire without gaining a footing. The
left column also was beaten back, losing its leader and many men.
The centre column, which was the weakest of the three, led by Lt.
Colonel Drummond, the general’s nephew, alone effected a lodgment,
and maintained its position till daylight, in spite of the most
desperate efforts of the garrison. Lt. Colonel Drummond fell; but
his men, reinforced from the left column, continued to resist all
attacks made to dislodge them, till a tremendous explosion of stored
ammunition took place, killing many, and forcing the remainder to
retire. Almost every officer with the centre and left columns was
killed or wounded. This disastrous repulse cost the British force a
loss of 905 of all ranks, killed, wounded and missing; great part of
the loss being ascribed to the explosion.
Drummond continued the blockade, and his troops now began to suffer
greatly from sickness. On the 2nd September, General Brown, who
had recovered from his wound received at Lundy’s Lane, resumed
command of the U.S. forces at Erie, in place of Gaines who had
been severely wounded. On the morning of the 7th, a United States’
picquet, consisting of an officer and 21 men, was surprised and
cut off to a man, by a small party of infantry and a detachment of
the 19th Light Dragoons under Captain Eustace, the whole commanded
by Captain Powell, D.A.Q.M.G. The General Order of the same day
says: “Sergeant Powell, 19th Light Dragoons, has been named to the
Lieutenant General as having again distinguished himself on this
occasion.” This brave soldier was subsequently taken prisoner, and
is believed to have died before he could be exchanged. On the 17th
September, favoured by a heavy fall of rain, Brown made a sortie
in three strong divisions. The battery guards were surprised, and
the whole line of entrenchments was for a time in the assailants’
hands; till Drummond, bringing up troops from the camp, drove out the
enemy, and recovered possession of his batteries. The sortie cost
the British troops 609 killed, wounded and prisoners, in addition
to three of their few heavy guns destroyed, and other damage. This,
together with continuous bad weather and increasing sickness among
his troops, caused Drummond to give up the blockade, on the 21st, and
withdraw his Head Quarters across the Chippewa on the 24th, which was
done without molestation. A strong body of troops was maintained in
advance of the Chippewa, occupying the line of the Black Creek. In
his dispatch of 2nd October to Sir George Prevost, Drummond reports
the capture by the enemy of a patrol of a corporal and six men of
the 19th Light Dragoons. “The Dragoons must have been most culpably
careless and confident, or the circumstance could not have happened.”
About the 8th October, General Izard, with a large body of U.S.
troops, arrived by land at Lewiston, from Sackett’s Harbour. Instead
of crossing the river to Drummond’s rear, as he should have done, he
continued along the river to Black Rock, and assumed the command at
Erie. Izard’s force now amounted to over 8000 men, from whom some
decisive action was to be expected. Izard advanced to Black Creek,
and offered battle, which Drummond was not strong enough to accept.
Beyond some skirmishing, Izard made no further use of his superiority
of force, awaiting co-operation from the lake. But the U.S. squadron
on Ontario was held fast in Sackett’s Harbour by Sir James Yeo. Izard
remained inactive till 20th October, when he fell back, and carried
his force across the river to Black Rock and Buffalo. On the 5th
November, he blew up Fort Erie and evacuated the place. Drummond at
once disposed the men in winter quarters. Major Lisle’s squadron was
ordered to hold itself in readiness to proceed to Lower Canada, and
one troop under Captain Eustace was sent to Ancaster.
Several times during the summer marauding parties from the United
States, taking advantage of the undefended state of the Detroit
frontier, had crossed the border, plundering and burning, and
carrying off peaceable inhabitants. Drummond was unable to spare any
force to meet this evil, and the province suffered cruelly. Towards
the end of October, a mounted force of 1500 undisciplined men, under
General McArthur, crossed the border by Lake St Clair, and marched
to Moravian town on the Thames river, continuing eastwards in the
direction of Burlington Heights, where only a few militia and some
300 of the 103rd, under Lt. Colonel Smelt, were stationed. Smelt at
once moved forward to Grand River with about 170 men of the 103rd,
27 of the 19th Light Dragoons, 150 militia and some Indians. After
making a demonstration of crossing, McArthur turned back and regained
Detroit, on the 17th November, without having effected anything
beyond the destruction of a great quantity of property. “Both in
their advance and in their retreat their progress was marked by
plunder and devastation.” Captain Eustace and his party marched to
Dover.
A return, dated 8th November, shows that out of 7552 men on the
frontier between Toronto and Long Point, 1327 were in hospital at
that date. The total strength of the 19th Light Dragoons’ squadron
was 123, of whom 34 were sick.
The operations for the year were at an end on this part of the
frontier. Fort Niagara still remained in British hands, and the
projected attack on Kingston had not been made. The only results
of the strenuous efforts made by the United States’ government, at
this point, had been to show the improvement of their troops, both
in generalship and fighting power, since the beginning of the war.
Beyond this, there was nothing to show for the offensive operations
undertaken by the United States during the year.
The abdication of Napoleon, and the peace concluded in Paris at
the end of May, set free for service in America the troops serving
under Wellington in the south of France. A number of regiments
were embarked at once for Quebec, so that, by the end of August,
Sir George Prevost had upwards of 16,000 British troops in Lower
Canada. With them came instructions to attack Plattsburgh, which,
to observers at a distance, appeared to be the point from which
the most formidable attack might be directed against Montreal. The
strategy was at fault, as the experience of the preceding year had
shown that, while Kingston continued to be held in force, no attack
from Plattsburgh was likely to be successful. On the other hand, a
British success at Plattsburgh could lead to no decisive result.
The true point of attack was Sackett’s Harbour, on Lake Ontario.
The occupation and retention of this point would have destroyed the
U.S. naval power on the lake; Montreal and Kingston would have been
secured from attack; and Sir Gordon Drummond would have been master
of the situation on the Niagara frontier. The U.S. government gauged
the situation more correctly, and denuded Plattsburgh of troops to
reinforce Sackett’s Harbour. The event showed that Plattsburgh was
only of secondary importance.
For the expedition against Plattsburgh Sir George Prevost formed
three brigades on the frontier extending from the Richelieu river
to the St Lawrence commanded by Major Generals Power, Robinson and
Brisbane. The whole division was under command of Major General de
Rottenburg, and amounted to 11,000 men. With it was the rest of the
19th Light Dragoons not engaged on the Niagara frontier.
On the 3rd of September, Sir George Prevost, advancing by Chateaugay
from the St Lawrence, crossed the frontier to Chazy, and, on the 5th,
reached, without opposition, a point eight miles from Plattsburgh.
The U.S. troops about Plattsburgh, at the time, amounted to about
1500 men, of inferior quality, under General Macomb. This force was
augmented by about 3000 militia from the surrounding neighbourhood
during the operations, but neither in quality or numbers was it
fit to stand before the troops under Prevost. On the 6th, the army
advanced on Plattsburgh, driving in the U.S. pickets and outposts.
So feeble was the resistance made that General Macomb mentions in
his dispatch that the British troops pressed on in column, not even
deigning to fire, except by their flankers and advanced patrols, on
the militia that they brushed out of their way. In the advance, the
19th Light Dragoons had one man and two horses wounded, two men and
six horses missing. Plattsburgh stands on the Saranac creek which
runs at right angles into Lake Champlain. The high ground on the
south side of the Saranac was occupied by Macomb with some hastily
constructed redoubts. The houses on the north of the Saranac were
occupied by British troops, on the 6th. On the lake lay the U.S.
squadron, consisting of four vessels and ten gunboats. The British
squadron, consisting of four vessels and twelve gunboats, was still
at the north end of Lake Champlain, awaiting the completion of the
flag-ship which had only been launched ten days previously, and whose
crew had hardly joined her from Quebec. Sir George Prevost had only
to advance on the 7th to make himself master of the feeble defences
opposed to him, when he suddenly conceived the idea that he must
await the co-operation of his lake squadron. For four days Prevost
lay inactive, while he urged Captain Downie with his ill-prepared
ships to join him, and engage the enemy’s squadron: the time was
utilised by Macomb in strengthening his defences and collecting
reinforcements. On the 11th, the British squadron appeared in sight,
and engaged the U.S. ships, while Prevost put his troops tardily in
motion. They forded the Saranac, and ascended the opposing heights,
when, with victory in their grasp, they suddenly received the order
to withdraw to their former positions. The British lake squadron,
after a most deadly contest of over two hours, had been completely
defeated, and Sir George Prevost at once threw up the sponge. The
same night, leaving his sick and wounded, together with a quantity
of stores, he commenced a retreat, which much resembled a flight,
to the Canadian frontier. In the many wars in which the British army
has fought, it would be hard to find a parallel instance in which
British troops have been so mishandled. The co-operation of the fleet
was unnecessary, as the enemy’s squadron could not have maintained
its position with the whole of Plattsburgh in British hands. Nine
thousand of Wellington’s veterans, who had defeated Napoleon’s
choicest troops again and again, were made to retreat from an
inferior force that could not have withstood them for an hour, with a
loss of less than 40 killed since they had crossed the frontier. No
wonder that the enemy first took the retreat for a _ruse de guerre_,
and that a British General broke his sword, vowing he would never
serve again. In the whole of the operations against Plattsburgh,
the land forces under Prevost’s immediate command suffered a total
loss of 37 killed, 150 wounded and 55 missing. In their anger at the
fiasco, an immense number of men deserted during the retreat, causing
a greater loss than a successful prosecution of the enterprise could
possibly have entailed. The 19th Light Dragoons while covering the
retirement, lost five men and horses taken prisoners.
Only brief mention need be made of land operations elsewhere, as
they do not come within the scope of operations in which the 19th
Light Dragoons were concerned. In the middle of August, a combined
military and naval expedition fitted out from Bermuda, under Major
General Ross and Vice Admiral Cockburn, landed at Benedict in the
Potomac river, 50 miles from Washington, and marched on that town. At
Bladensberg, on the 24th, Ross encountered a U.S. army of about 8000
men under General Winder, and gained a complete and easy victory,
taking 10 guns.[65] Washington was occupied the same evening. On
the following evening, after burning the most important public
buildings, in retaliation for the outrages committed on the Canadian
non-combatants, the force retired, and re-embarked on the 29th,
without molestation.
At daylight on the 12th September, the same force landed 13 miles
from Baltimore, and advanced on that place. On first coming in touch
with the enemy, Ross was killed by a chance shot. Colonel Brook
assumed the command, and at about five miles from Baltimore a United
States’ force of about 7000 men was encountered and overthrown in
less than half an hour. Two field pieces and many prisoners were
captured. Preparations were then made for a combined attack on the
city, when it was discovered that the harbour was so effectually
closed by sunken vessels, that naval co-operation was impossible.
It being considered that, under these circumstances, the loss that
must be incurred in taking the place by storm would be out of
proportion to any benefit to be gained, the troops were withdrawn,
and re-embarked without the slightest molestation, on the 15th. The
troopships, after hovering on the coast, rather aimlessly for another
month, then set sail for Jamaica, where an expedition was preparing
against New Orleans.
The mistake that had been made by the United States government
in the early part of the war, in under-rating the difficulty of
conquering Canada, and in believing that the inhabitants would join
the invaders, was now to be repeated by the British government.
British Ministers had been brought to believe that the inhabitants of
Louisiana were disaffected to the U.S. government, and that the State
could easily be taken possession of. With this object, an expedition
against New Orleans had been planned in England; and, it was in order
to save the troops for this purpose, that the attack on Baltimore had
been abandoned. New Orleans, though a great commercial centre, was
devoid of any military importance, and the expedition was destined to
furnish another example of the faulty strategy that was exhibited on
both sides during the war.
On the 8th December, the expedition under Major General Sir
Edward Pakenham, appeared off the coast, and, on the night of the
12th, captured the enemy’s squadron of gunboats. On the 16th, the
landing of the troops commenced, at the mouth of the Pearl river.
Considerable delay ensued, owing to the swampy nature of the
ground, and the advance did not approach the city till the 23rd.
General Jackson, in command at New Orleans, occupied a long line of
entrenchments at right angles to the river. He was also assisted by
armed vessels on the Mississippi which inflicted severe losses on the
British troops, and greatly delayed their advance. On the morning
of the 8th January, the attack was made, and repulsed with heavy
slaughter. Pakenham fell at the head of his men; Major General Gibbs
died of his wounds the following day, and Major General Keane was
severely wounded. The total loss amounted to 2119 killed, wounded and
missing. So strongly were the enemy posted, that his loss did not
exceed about 80 men. Under this disastrous repulse the expedition
withdrew on the 18th, and re-embarked. A portion of the expedition
was then directed against Fort Bowyer, on Mobile Point, which
capitulated, on 12th February, without resistance. Twenty-eight guns
and over 300 prisoners fell into the hands of the British.
In the middle of March, news was received that a Treaty of Peace had
been signed at Ghent on 24th December, and the war was at an end.
During the summer of 1814, the Head Quarters of the regiment was
moved from La Prairie to Chambly, where they remained as long as
the regiment was in Canada. The four troops left behind in Ireland
had been moved, on the embarkation of the regiment for Canada,
to Radipole Barracks, near Weymouth; and thence to Maidstone, in
February 1814. In July of the same year, the regiment lost its
Colonel, Lord Howe, by death. In his place, Lieutenant General Sir
William Payne Bt., was transferred as Colonel, from the 23rd Light
Dragoons. He was an officer who had served in the Royal Dragoons,
and commanded the British Cavalry at the battle of Talavera. His
connection with the regiment was very brief, as, in the following
January, he was appointed Colonel of the 12th Light Dragoons. In his
place, Major General Sir John Ormsby Vandeleur K.C.B., Lieutenant
Colonel in the regiment, was appointed Colonel.
Sir John Vandeleur had entered the army in 1781, and saw service in
Flanders in 1794, and at the Cape of Good Hope in 1796. He commanded
a brigade of cavalry, under Lake, in the wars against Scindia and
Holkar, 1803-5, and especially distinguished himself at Laswaree,
and on other occasions. In 1807, he exchanged into the 19th as
already mentioned.[66] In 1811, he commanded an infantry brigade in
Spain, under Wellington, and, at Ciudad Rodrigo, led the assault
after Craufurd’s fall, when he was severely wounded. Afterwards he
commanded the 4th cavalry brigade at Waterloo, and succeeded to the
command of the whole of the cavalry, on Lord Uxbridge being wounded.
During 1814, gold lace was substituted for silver in the uniform of
the regiment.
In May 1815, sanction was granted, under the following order, for
Major Lisle’s squadron to wear the badge “Niagara” for their services
on the Niagara frontier. The privilege seems to have been extended
later to the whole regiment.
[Sidenote: 1815.
19th Light Dragoons (Squadron under Major Lisle). Royal Scots--1st
Battalion. 8th or King’s--1st Battalion. 41st--Fl. Cos. 89th--2nd
Batt. 100th--103rd--Glengarry Lt. Inf. Fencibles.]
HORSE GUARDS
_19th May 1815_.
Sir,
I have had the honour to lay before the Commander-in-Chief your
letter of the 26th February last, and am directed to acquaint
you in reply that His Royal Highness the Prince Regent has been
pleased, in the Name and on the behalf of His Majesty, to approve
of the Regiments named in the Margin, being permitted to bear on
their Colors and Appointments in addition to any other Badges,
or Devices, which may have been heretofore permitted to be borne
by those Regiments the Word “Niagara,” in consequence of the
distinguished Conduct of those Corps in the Capture of Fort
Niagara by Assault on the 19th December 1813, and in the Battle
at Lundy’s Lane, in North America, on the 25th July 1814.
I have &c.
H. CALVERT
A. G.
Lt. General
Sir GEORGE PREVOST Bt.
or General Officer Commanding Canada.
Detachments of the regiment were quartered at La Prairie, Isle aux
Noix, Blairfindie, Quebec, Montreal, and St John’s.
In 1816, the whole of the ten troops of the regiment, amounting to
620 rank and file, appear to have been in Canada. At the very end
of the year, the strength of the Canadian establishment was fixed
at 5000 rank and file. In order to bring it down to this number,
the 19th were held under orders to return to England, but, it was
not till the following 6th August that they embarked at Quebec,
and landed at Tilbury, 13th September. On landing they marched to
Romford, where they remained till the following March.
The execution done by the Polish lancers at Waterloo induced the
military authorities in England to arm four regiments with lances.
Accordingly, the 9th, 12th, 16th, and 23rd Light Dragoons were
equipped as Lancers, in September 1816. But great reductions in the
military establishments were in progress, and, in October 1817, the
23rd were disbanded, their horses being made over to the 19th, whose
establishment was reduced to eight troops. At the same time, the 19th
were ordered to be equipped as lancers.[67]
In March 1818, the regiment was moved to Hounslow and Hampton Court,
with detachments at Pimlico and Kensington. On the 26th May, the
regiment, together with the 10th Hussars, was reviewed at Hounslow by
the Prince Regent, and, in November, they were on duty, at Datchet,
for Queen Charlotte’s funeral.
The regimental muster rolls show that in October the regiment had 455
rank and file.
In June of the following year the regiment moved to Brighton, with
troops at Hastings, Arundel and Rottingdean.
A year later (June 1820), the regiment was ordered to Nottingham,
with troops at Mansfield, Sheffield, Loughborough, Peterborough and
Derby. In spite of the distance, they marched to Hounslow to be
reviewed, on 4th August, in company with the 10th Hussars and 12th
Lancers, by George IV., when His Majesty expressed his “unqualified
approbation” of the three regiments.
[Illustration: OFFICERS OF THE XIX^{TH} LANCERS, 1818.
_to face p. 218._]
During the winter, the regiment marched to Manchester, and, in the
end of May, embarked for Ireland, where they were quartered at
Newbridge. But further reductions were in progress, and, on 23rd
August 1821, warrants were issued for the disbandment of the 18th
Light Dragoons and 19th Lancers, which were carried into effect on
10th September. The strength of the 19th, at the time of disbandment,
was 103 officers and non-commissioned officers, 336 rank and file,
273 horses.
PART IV
THE NINETEENTH “PRINCESS OF WALES’ OWN” HUSSARS
(1858-1899)
CHAPTER I
RAISING OF THE REGIMENT
(1858-1882)
The East India Company raises European Cavalry regiments--Their
formation--The Bengal 1st European Light Cavalry--Services
transferred to the Crown--The “White Mutiny”--Made 19th Light
Dragoons, afterwards Hussars--General Pattle--Regiment at
Meerut--General Hall--Regiment ordered to England--Badges of old
19th Light Dragoons granted--Regiment ordered to Ireland--Guidons
of old 19th Light Dragoons presented to the regiment--Regiment
returns to England--Ordered on active service.
In May 1857, the mutiny of the Bengal Native Army occurred, which so
profoundly changed the nature of British administration in India.
Through carelessness and false economy, the East India Company
had allowed the number of European troops in India to sink to a
dangerously low level, in proportion to the number of native troops.
As against some 230,000 native soldiers, the European troops numbered
less than 40,000 men, of whom about 23,500 were royal troops. The
Company’s European troops in India consisted, at that time, of nine
battalions of Infantry, seventeen troops of Horse Artillery, and
forty-eight companies of Foot Artillery. Apart from other measures
for restoring tranquillity, it was determined to raise three
additional battalions of Infantry, and to replace the mutinous Bengal
Native Cavalry by Europeans. Of the ten regiments of regular Bengal
Native Cavalry, seven had mutinied, and two had been disarmed.
In November 1857, intimation was sent to the Governor General that
it had been decided to form four regiments of Cavalry, for the
Company’s service, of men recruited in England, of ages between 20
and 30 years, and of a standard height not less than 5 ft., and not
exceeding 5 ft. 4 in. Each regiment was to consist of ten troops,
with 70 privates per troop, together with the usual number of
officers, non-commissioned officers and staff. All accoutrements,
arms, and equipments were to be of a lighter description than those
in common use by British Cavalry: and the men were to be collected at
a depot in England (Warley), to be trained for three months, before
being embarked for India. A lower standard of height than that of
the Royal Army was adopted, with the intention that the recruiting
for the Royal Army should not be interfered with, and it was thought
that, by tapping a new stratum of recruits, men would be easily
obtained. These anticipations were justified. The whole nation had
been roused by the sufferings of our countrywomen in India, and
recruits flocked in. Three weeks later, the Court of Directors were
obliged to write to the Governor General that, in consequence of the
very rapid recruiting, accommodation could not be provided for the
men, in England, and it was necessary to embark a large body of them,
for Calcutta, at once.
With regard to these undersized men, it may be said here, that a
large number of them made excellent soldiers in time; but there was
a considerable proportion of them, big men on short legs, over 25
years of age at the time of enlistment, who were unfit for cavalry
purposes.
After being kept some time near Calcutta, the men were gradually
forwarded to Allahabad, where they were collected in June 1858, an
almost undisciplined mob, without permanent officers, without horses,
and without equipments. On the 17th June, we find Major General
Sir William Mansfield (afterwards Lord Sandhurst) writing to Major
General Sir Hope Grant, then in the field against the rebels: “We
are about to organize the four regiments of Bengal Dragoons, and to
divide the recruits into four bodies without delay. How would it suit
you to have one of these young corps attached to the ‘Bays’ (2nd
Dragoon Guards), and another to the 7th (Hussars)? Not a man has ever
been on a horse, and the men are at present armed with _muskets_.”
By the end of June, the apportioning of the men into regiments was
complete, and, on the 3rd July, the regiment with which our interest
lies, became established as the Bengal 1st European Light Cavalry,
to be quartered at Allahabad. The other three regiments marched for
various cantonments in North Western India. A fifth regiment was
formed at Peshawur, in November, of volunteers from Royal infantry
regiments, who had been formed into a cavalry corps for temporary
service during the Mutiny.
To officer each of these regiments, the officers of two of the ten
mutinied or disbanded Bengal Native Cavalry regiments were utilized:
but, instead of placing them upon a single list, they were kept on
separate lists for promotion, which were styled Right and Left Wings,
corresponding to their late regiments. All officers newly appointed,
who had belonged to neither of the old Native regiments, were to be
borne on the strength of the Right Wing, so that, in process of time,
the Left Wing was destined to disappear; but the process would have
been one of thirty years or more, according to the rate of promotion
then existing in the Company’s service.
The Bengal 1st European Light Cavalry was officered by the surviving
officers of the 1st and 3rd Bengal Native Cavalry, both of which
regiments had mutinied. For remounts, the men were given a number of
horses hastily purchased at the Cape of Good Hope and in Australia,
most of them wild unbroken bush horses that had never been handled.
An officer who served with the regiment at this time, writing of it
forty years afterwards, says:--
“No regiments were ever raised under such absurd conditions, and,
if the object had been to prove them a failure, no course better
calculated to achieve that end could have been pursued. The only
old soldiers sent to assist us were two or three infantry men
from a Fusilier regiment, none higher in rank than Corporal.
When the authorities were addressed on this subject, one or two
cavalry soldiers, I think from the 7th Hussars, were sent; the
highest in rank being a Lance Corporal who was promptly made a
Troop Sergeant Major, and I don’t think turned out a success. The
horses, like the men, were all untrained, and some of the horses
from the Cape were perfect devils, very difficult to clean, and
for some time impossible to ride or to shoe. I have a vivid
recollection of one roan, who stood in his stall for days covered
with mud, because no one could go near him. Out of the crowd of
raw recruits, we had to find all our Non-Commissioned officers
from Troop Sergeant Major downwards, so it may be imagined what
little respect was paid to the highest grades.”
On the 1st November 1858, the Crown assumed the government of India,
and the East India Company thenceforth ceased to exist. No attention
was paid to the view that might be taken of the change, in the
ranks of the Company’s army. The British soldier, though he yields
to discipline, never forgets that he is a soldier by his own free
will; he objects to be treated like a conscript. The late Company’s
European soldiers quickly came to believe that their rights had been
infringed. Had they been asked to volunteer for service under the
Crown, they would have done so almost to a man; but they objected
to be handed over “like bullocks,” as they expressed it. The Indian
government consulted its legal advisers, who treated the objection as
a purely technical one, prompted by a wish for the offer of a bounty.
So long as the men were retained for the local service for which they
had enlisted, it was considered that they had no grievance. It was
decided that the men had no case, and a General Order to this effect
was published in April 1859. The agitation quickly assumed a serious
aspect, and, during May, there was a time when, in a few cantonments,
a collision between the Royal and the late Company’s European troops
appeared possible. The movement was not confined to the newly raised
regiments, but was equally shared in by the old soldiers of the late
Company, who had shown their fine qualities on many a hard fought
field. The behaviour of the 1st Bengal European Light Cavalry was
similar to that of the local European forces in most other places.
All guards and barrack duties were performed without demur, but the
men refused to turn out for parade. On one occasion the canteen was
broken into, and an attempt was made to release prisoners. Mutinous
language was used to officers in a few instances, and shots fired
in defiance, but not with evil intent. Under the circumstances
already related, it is surprising that nothing worse occurred. In one
instance alone, in one of the newly raised infantry regiments, was
there a dangerous attempt to act as an organized armed body hostile
to the State. This was speedily repressed, and the ringleader shot.
The Calcutta government quickly recognized its mistake. In the end
of June, orders were published allowing the men the option of
discharge, but no bounty was offered to those who elected to remain,
while those who took their discharge were not allowed the option of
re-enlistment, as long as they remained in the country. Under the
feeling of exasperation that had grown up, upwards of 10,000 men
elected to take their discharge, of whom 2800 re-enlisted on reaching
England.
The trouble with the Indian local European forces, in 1859, has been
frequently cited as a cogent reason against the maintenance of a body
of British troops in India, for local service only; a measure that
would overcome many difficulties now felt in army administration.
Those who study the events of 1859 must recognize that the trouble
arose, not from the conditions of service, but from the mistakes
of those in authority at Calcutta. The “White Mutiny” was no mere
outbreak against discipline: it was the vindication of the men’s
claim to be consulted in the disposal of their services.
While these events were in progress, orders were received for the
regiment to march to Cawnpore, which it did in June.
Early in 1861, it was determined to cease the maintenance of any
European force for local service in India, and, on 6th May, the
officers, non-commissioned officers and men were called on to
volunteer for General Service. They responded, almost to a man, and
the regiment received the designation of the 19th Light Dragoons. In
the same way, the Bengal 2nd and 3rd European Light Cavalry became
the 20th and 21st Light Dragoons; the 4th and 5th being disbanded.
At the same time, the establishment was assimilated to that of other
British cavalry regiments in India, viz. nine troops (one at the
depot in England) with 585 corporals and privates: 693 of all ranks.
Three months later, under Horse Guards order of 17th August 1861,
the designation of the regiment was changed to the 19th Hussars.
The standard for recruits was assimilated to that of other Hussar
regiments.
At the beginning of February 1862, the regiment was moved to Lucknow.
On the 30th July, in the same year, the complete roll of officers was
gazetted.
_Lieutenant Colonel_ Charles Vanbrugh Jenkins.
_Major_ John Hatfield Brooks.
Roland Richardson.
Henry Cadogan Craigie.
_Sir_ John Hill, _Bt. Bt. Major_.
Henry Edward Ellice.
Robert Baring.
_Captain_ Melville Clarke.
Hugh Henry Gough, _V.C._, _Brevet Major_.
Frederick Peter Luard.
Richard Talbot Plantagenet Stapleton
Charles Manners Sutton Fairbrother.
Charles Hay Fairlie.
Abel Henry Chapman.
Cecil Clarke Jervoise.
Arthur George Webster.
_Lieutenant_ Robert Morris.
Edward Stirling Rivett-Carnac.
John Biddulph.
George Cortlandt Buller Taylor.
Charles John Prinsep.
Albert Hearsey.
Elliot Alexander Money.
Joseph Boulderson.
_Cornet_ Frederick Henry Huth.
Charles Robert St. Quintin.
Francis Dallas Harding.
Seymour Duncan Barrow.
_Riding Master_ George Couch.
_Adjutant_ Abel Henry Chapman.
_Paymaster_ Henry Octavius Currie.
The greater number of them had belonged to the Company’s 1st and 3rd
Bengal Native Cavalry.
In September, General William Pattle C.B. was gazetted to be Colonel
of the regiment. He was an old Company’s officer who had entered the
service in 1800. He served under Lord Lake in the Mahratta campaigns
of 1803 and 1804, and was present at the battles of Alyghur, Delhi,
Laswaree, the siege of Bhurtpore &c. He served through the Mahratta
war of 1817-18, and commanded the cavalry under Sir Charles Napier,
during the conquest of Scinde, and at the battles of Meeanee and
Hyderabad.
Under orders from the War office, dated 6th January 1863, the
establishment was reduced by one troop, leaving seven service troops
and one at Maidstone.
In the autumn, orders were received for the regiment to march to
Meerut, where it arrived 28th November. Here the regiment remained
till the end of 1867. The only events to be noticed during these four
years are a reduction of establishment by 56 privates in 1866: and
the presence of the regiment at the great Durbar held by the Viceroy,
Sir John Lawrence, at Agra, in November 1866, when the 19th were
brigaded with the 2nd Dragoon Guards.
In the beginning of 1865, the regiment lost its Colonel by death. In
his place Lieutenant General John Hall was appointed Colonel.
On the 10th December 1867, the Head Quarters of the regiment, with
four troops, marched for Benares, being followed, a month later, by
the remaining three troops, who marched to Cawnpore.
In the ordinary course of relief, the regiment was intended to leave
India in 1872. In a sudden fit of economy, the Indian Government
decided to get rid of two cavalry regiments, so that, without any
previous warning, the regiment received telegraphic orders, on 18th
January 1870, to proceed to England immediately. Similar orders were
sent to the 7th Hussars, then serving in India. Volunteering was at
once opened to men electing to serve in other regiments remaining in
India, and, on 24th January, the regiment was re-united at Allahabad,
whence it proceeded to Bombay, where it embarked on board the _Jumna_
on the 14th February. So unexpected had been the move, that a draft
for the regiment, from England, joined it four days before sailing.
The strength of the regiment leaving India, was as follows: 18
officers, 51 sergeants and corporals, 7 trumpeters, 257 privates, 28
women and 55 children.
On the 22nd March, the regiment landed at Dover, and proceeded to
Canterbury, whence all the Cavalry Depot troops, excepting those
of the 20th and 21st Hussars, had been moved to Maidstone. But the
British Government were as unwilling to have the home military
establishment increased by the two regiments thus sent from India,
as the Indian Government had been to retain them, and the idea of
disbanding two regiments was entertained. The Manchester school was
predominant; shortsighted financial considerations alone had any
weight. The changes rung in the establishment of the regiment for
the next four months show the hesitating counsels that prevailed.
On the 1st April, one troop was absorbed. A month later, the
establishment was nominally fixed at 25 officers, 457 Sergeants and
privates, and 300 horses, but recruiting to make the regiment up to
that strength was forbidden. At the end of June the establishment of
horses was reduced to 200. A week later, the war between France and
Germany broke out, while the question of the strength of military
establishments was still being bandied about between the Treasury and
the War Office. On the 1st August, orders were received to complete
the strength of the regiment up to 540 of all ranks, which was done
by the end of September. The number of horses was also raised to 350.
Consequent on the increase of establishment, an eighth troop was
formed in February 1871.
In May, the Head Quarters of the regiment and five troops marched to
Brighton; the other three troops going to the camp at Shorncliffe.
On the 17th June, an inspection of the regiment was held at Brighton
by its Colonel, General John Hall.
In August 1872, the regiment marched to Aldershot, and, a few days
after arrival, marched to take part in the Wiltshire manœuvres at
Pewsey, where it was brigaded under the command of Major General
Shute C.B.; returning to Aldershot in September.
During 1872, the regiment lost its Colonel, Lieutenant General Hall,
who was succeeded by General John Yorke C.B. He was an old officer of
the Royal Dragoons, which regiment he commanded in the Crimean War,
and was severely wounded at Balaclava.
In June 1873, the regiment marched to Windsor, to take part in the
review held in honour of H.M. the Shah of Persia, on the 24th;
returning to Aldershot the following day.
In August, manœuvres were held at Dartmoor, in which the regiment
took part; proceeding by train as far as Exeter, and returning to
Aldershot by route march. The fine appearance of the regiment, and
its proficiency in outpost and reconnoissance duties attracted more
than usual attention on this occasion.
Early in 1874, the regiment was granted the privilege of wearing the
badges so gloriously earned by the old 19th Light Dragoons.
HORSE GUARDS _24th Feb. 1874_.
SIR,
I have the honor, by desire of His Royal Highness the Field
Marshall Commanding in Chief to acquaint you that Her Majesty has
been graciously pleased to approve of the regiment under your
command being permitted to wear the badges granted to the old
19th Light Dragoons for achievements during the present Century,
viz.:
The Elephant
“Assaye” “Niagara”
J. W. ARMSTRONG,
Depy. Adj. General
To the
Officer Commanding
19th Hussars.
It will be observed that the “Seringapatam” badge, granted to the
old 19th Light Dragoons for four campaigns in the last century, was
withheld. The 23rd of September is now observed as an annual holiday
in the regiment, in commemoration of Assaye.
On the 19th May, the regiment took part in the review held at
Aldershot, in honour of H.I.M. the Emperor of Russia.
At the end of June, the regiment marched to new quarters at Hounslow,
with a troop at Hampton Court, and another at Kensington.
At the end of July 1875, the regiment marched to Leeds, with troops
at Preston and Bury.
In June 1876, the regiment proceeded to Ireland. After going through
the drill season at the Curragh, it went into quarters at Longford,
Gort, Castlebar, Dunmore, and Athlone. In the following spring it
returned to the Curragh, and, in October, marched to Dublin, where it
was quartered in the Royal Barracks and Arbour Hill. In the following
August, it again marched to the Curragh, whence, after a month, it
marched for Ballincollig, with out-quarters at Cork, Cahir, Limerick,
Bandon, Fermoy, and afterwards Waterford. In these quarters the
regiment remained till May 1880, when it was again ordered to the
Curragh. In August, the regiment again marched to Dublin, leaving
one squadron at the Curragh. Three months later, a wing was ordered
to Ballinrobe and Lough Mask, by rail, in aid of the civil power,
returning to Dublin after a fortnight’s work, in, what was then
called, the “Boycott” campaign.
In May 1881, the regiment moved to Dundalk, with two troops at
Belfast and one at Belturbet. The time was one of much excitement in
Ireland, when the Land League conspiracy was in full force, and the
regiment was employed, during the winter, in much harassing work in
support of the civil power.
While at Belfast the regiment became possessed of some greatly prized
relics of the old 19th Light Dragoons, through the generosity of a
lady whose husband had served in the old regiment. As is well known,
all cavalry regiments except Hussars and Lancers, at the beginning
of the century, had a standard or guidon for each squadron. After
their return from India, and shortly after the conferring of the
Elephant and Assaye badges (1807) the 19th Light Dragoons received
a new set of guidons.[68] On the regiment being equipped as Lancers
(1817) the guidons could no longer be used, and, on the disbanding
of the regiment they became the property of the Colonel, Sir John
Vandeleur. At his death he bequeathed them to his relative Major
William Armstrong of Farney Castle, Thurles, who had served in the
19th from 1809 to 1819. Major Armstrong’s widow now made known her
wish to restore the guidons to the regiment that bears the number and
badges which the old regiment so worthily earned. On the 28th March
1882, the Belfast squadron paraded, under Lieutenant Colonel Coghill,
and received the guidons with a royal salute. The Princess of Wales’
Own Yorkshire Regiment (formerly the 19th Foot) lent the services of
their band, and the guidons were marched in all honour, through the
town, to barracks, where they were deposited in the Mess Room, after
a royal salute and an address to the squadron from Colonel Coghill.
The honorary guidon granted to the old regiment for Assaye, has not
been traced. If it is still in existence, it is to be hoped that the
possessor will restore it to its rightful guardians.
According to the old custom one guidon in each regiment was known
as the King’s. The King’s guidon was of crimson silk with the
Union badge in the centre. The regimental guidons were of the same
colour as the regimental facings, with the regimental badge in the
centre. Guidons were discarded on active service, after 1811, if not
earlier.[69]
[Illustration: AN OFFICER OF THE XIX^{TH} HUSSARS, 1882.
_to face p. 232._]
In June 1882, the regiment received orders to return to England,
and, while on the march for Aldershot, where it arrived 14th July,
news was received that it was to proceed at once to Egypt on active
service. Weak and sickly men were drafted into Depot, to remain
behind, the four squadrons being completed by volunteers from other
regiments and from the Reserve. The following officers also were
attached to the regiment, for service.
_Captain Lord_ St. Vincent 16th Lancers.
_Lieutenant Sir_ G. Arthur 2nd Life Guards.
” Scott 3rd Hussars.
” Crabbe ” ”
” Morris 7th Hussars.
” Ridley ” ”
” Holland 15th Hussars.
” de Crespigny ” ”
” _Hon._ R. Leigh ” ”
” Blagrove ” ”
” La Terriere 18th Hussars.
CHAPTER II
TROUBLES IN EGYPT
1882-1884.
Troubles in Egypt--Arabi’s rebellion--Capture of
Ismailia--Kassassin--Tel-el-Kebir--End of the War--19th at
Cairo--Badges granted--Troubles in Eastern Soudan--Osman
Digna--Regiment ordered to Suakin--Wreck of the _Neera_--Battle
of El Teb--Heavy losses of the 19th--Battle of Tamai--Osman
Digna’s camp burned--Regiment returns to Cairo--Badges granted.
In June 1879, Mahomed Ismail, the Khedive of Egypt, was deposed by
the Sultan, at the instance of England and France, in favour of
his son Mahommed Tewfik, and a control of Egyptian finances was
established by the two western powers. In the beginning of 1881, a
spirit of insubordination began to show itself among the officers of
the Egyptian army, who quickly recognised their own power to enforce
demands, and adopted as leader, one of their number, Said Ahmed
Arabi, better known as Arabi Pasha. By September, the pretensions
of the army had so far increased that, they forced the Khedive to
dismiss his Ministers. Attempts were soon afterwards made to get rid
of the Anglo-French control. Arabi’s influence increased daily; he
caused himself to be appointed Minister of War; and, by April 1882,
had practically got the whole of the country into his hands. The
Khedive was helpless. In May, the French and English fleets were
sent to Alexandria, in order to strengthen the Khedive’s hands.
But matters did not improve: Arabi openly assumed the direction of
affairs, and began to strengthen the forts commanding the Alexandria
harbour. On the 11th June, serious riots broke out in Alexandria,
in the course of which a number of Europeans were killed, and their
houses pillaged. It was seen in England that a military expedition
to restore order would probably be necessary, and preparations, in
anticipation, began to be made.
In the meantime, the work on the Alexandria fortifications had so
far advanced as to endanger the safety of the fleets. The French
Government was unwilling to take action: the remonstrances of the
British Admiral were met by evasions and denials from Arabi Pasha.
At last, on 11th July, after due notice, the forts were bombarded
and destroyed by the British fleet. A force of seamen and marines
was landed to secure the safety of the Khedive, and put an end to
the pillaging and burning of the town by Arab marauders, and, on
the 17th, two battalions of British infantry, from Cyprus, under
Major General Sir Archibald Alison, landed to hold the town. On the
20th, the British Government definitely decided to send a military
expedition to Egypt, to restore the Khedive’s authority. The French
Government refused to co-operate, and withdrew from further action.
The force sent from England and the Mediterranean stations amounted
to 25,450 men, of whom 2400 were cavalry: the whole being commanded
by Lieutenant General Sir Garnet Wolseley. There being no fear of
their being attacked at sea, they were sent without convoy, as
soon as the ships could be got ready. By the 11th August, the last
transport had sailed from England for Alexandria. The 19th Hussars
were among the last to go. On the 10th August, they embarked at
Southampton, in the _Assyrian Monarch_ and the _Montreal_, with a
total strength of 33 officers, 553 non-commissioned officers and
privates, and 464 horses, under command of Lieutenant Colonel K. J.
W. Coghill. Previous to this, a detachment of 20 men under Lieutenant
Aylmer had sailed in the _Orient_ as escort to H.R.H. the Duke
of Connaught. It was also arranged for a Contingent from India to
operate from Suez, consisting of one battalion of British infantry,
three battalions of Native infantry, and three regiments of Native
cavalry, under command of Major General Sir Herbert Macpherson.
Arabi’s army, at the beginning of July, consisted only of about 9000
men. By calling out reserves, and enlisting Arabs, it soon reached
the number of 60,000 men, and eventually amounted to 100,000.
Before the expedition left England, it had been determined to seize
the Suez Canal, and advance on Cairo from Ismailia; but, as it was
expedient that the Canal should not be blocked or injured, Alexandria
was appointed as the rendezvous of the troops on the Mediterranean
side, and measures were taken to spread the belief that the advance
on Cairo would be made from that place.
The greater part of the troops being gathered at Alexandria, on
the 18th August, preparations were made as if an attack on Aboukir
was intended. Troops were re-embarked, and sailed under convoy of
the fleet, at noon on the 19th, anchoring in Aboukir Bay the same
afternoon. After dark, while demonstrations of bombarding the Aboukir
forts were made, the transports weighed anchor, entered the Canal,
and commenced landing at Ismailia on the 20th. The movement was
unexpected by the enemy, and no resistance was experienced. By the
22nd, complete command had been gained of the whole Canal from Port
Said to Suez. On the 21st, Nefisha, four miles in front of Ismailia,
was occupied. Early on the 24th, a small force was pushed forward
to El Magfar, which was occupied after a slight skirmish, in which
Lieutenant Aylmer’s detachment of the 19th Hussars took part. At El
Magfar, it was found necessary to push on to Tel-el-Mahuta, to secure
the water supply. The place was strongly occupied by the enemy, and
the small British force was exposed to long range fire of guns and
small arms, for many hours, while reinforcements were coming up,
which did not happen till the evening. The next morning, the whole
force advanced, and occupied Tel-el-Mahuta after a slight opposition,
while the cavalry pushed forward, and occupied the enemy’s camp at
Mahsamah without resistance. Seven guns, with a large quantity of
small arms, ammunition and stores, fell into the hands of the British
troops. Early on the 26th, Kassassin was occupied by a brigade of
infantry under Major General Graham, and the troops from Suez began
to arrive at Ismailia.
The 19th Hussars, in the _Assyrian Monarch_ and the _Montreal_, did
not reach Alexandria in time to take part in these operations. They
reached Ismailia on the 24th, and completed their disembarkation
by the evening of the 26th. The duty assigned to them was to act
as Divisional troops; the Right Wing, consisting of two squadrons
under Lieutenant Colonel Coghill, formed part of the 1st Division
under Lieutenant General Willis; the remaining two squadrons, under
Lieutenant Colonel A. G. Webster, formed part of the 2nd Division
under Lieutenant General Sir E. Hamley. One troop was detailed as
escort to Sir Garnet Wolseley throughout the campaign. The Right Wing
joined the Head Quarters of the 1st Division at Tel-el-Mahuta, on the
evening of the 27th.
On the 28th, a demonstration was made by the enemy against Graham’s
force at Kassassin. The Right Wing of the 19th was ordered in support
to Mahsamah; but, on its being ascertained that no serious attack
was intended they returned to Tel-el-Mahuta. Graham, having been
reinforced, and expecting the Heavy Cavalry Brigade to join him, made
a general advance after sunset. The orders for the heavy cavalry had,
however, miscarried, and did not reach Major General Lowe for several
hours. Making a wide sweep into the desert, Lowe fell upon the left
of the enemy in the dark, and charged, rolling up their infantry;
the darkness made pursuit impossible. The sound of the heavy firing,
caused the Division at Tel-el-Mahuta to turn out again, but after a
brief advance they returned to camp, with the exception of the 19th
Hussars, who pushed on to Kassassin, which they reached at daybreak.
It was not till noon, after visiting the scene of the previous
night’s encounter, that they were able to off-saddle and rest.
The following twelve days were spent in preparing for the advance
on Tel-el-Kebir, 13 miles from Kassassin, where Arabi’s army had
constructed a formidable line of entrenched works. During these days,
the 19th Hussars and the Indian Native Cavalry were employed in
continual outpost and reconnoissance duties. On the 5th, Lieutenant
Holland was badly wounded.
By the 8th, all was ready for massing the whole force at Kassassin
preparatory to the advance on Tel-el-Kebir. Early on the 9th, Arabi
advanced in force on Kassassin, attacking in two separate bodies
simultaneously, one in front from Tel-el-Kebir, and the other in
flank from Es Salihiyeh. Willis repelled the double attack with ease,
and pushed the enemy back to within cannon shot of Tel-el-Kebir,
capturing four guns.
Soon after dark on the 12th, the whole force consisting of 17,000
men, with 61 guns, moved out of camp to some high ground in front of
Kassassin, in preparation for an attack on Arabi Pasha’s entrenched
lines. At 1.30 in the morning, the troops moved silently forwards
through the desert, their march directed by a naval officer steering
by the stars. The four infantry brigades, in two lines, led the
way, supported on the right by the heavy cavalry brigade and horse
artillery, and on the left by the naval brigade. In rear of the
naval brigade, followed the 19th Hussars under Lieutenant Colonel
Coghill. One troop of the regiment remained at Mahsamah, and another
at Tel-el-Mahuta, to guard those points. At five in the morning
the attack was delivered; after half an hour’s severe fighting, the
British infantry was in complete possession of the lines. While the
heavy cavalry pushed on to Zagazig to cut off fugitives, the 19th,
under Coghill, passed through an opening in the entrenchments, and
seized the Tel-el-Kebir railway station and bridge, cutting off a
great number of fugitives. Thence the pursuit was continued for
three hours, when the 19th returned to the enemy’s late camp. In
the afternoon they started again in the track of the heavy cavalry,
leaving a troop to protect burial parties, and reached Belbeis that
evening. On the following evening Cairo was taken possession of, and
Arabi surrendered himself. The only casualty in the regiment was
Lieutenant Barclay who was struck by a fragment of shell from one of
the first guns fired by the enemy at Tel-el-Kebir.
The war was over. A medal, with clasp for Tel-el-Kebir, was given to
all who took part in the campaign. The medals were presented to the
regiment by Lady Dufferin, in Her Majesty’s name, in the following
February. H.H. the Khedive also gave a star.
A few weeks after the arrival of the regiment in Cairo, a virulent
epidemic attacked the horses. In order to shake it off, the regiment
was moved to Helouan, at the end of the first week in November, with
248 sick horses, 56 having died in Cairo. A good deal of sickness
also set in among the men. In the following March the regiment
returned to Cairo, and occupied the Abassiyeh barracks, having lost
18 men and 141 horses in the interval. When the regiment went to
Egypt it had four coloured squadrons, chesnut, bay, brown, and black,
while the band were mounted on greys. Experience showed that the
greys bore the climate better than any others; the chesnuts also bore
the climate well. The dark coloured horses suffered most, and were
more liable, than the others, to sore backs. In respect to age, the
percentage of deaths among horses between five and ten years, was
double that among horses between ten and fifteen years. In the hurry
of departure from England, about twenty horses, over fifteen years of
age, were taken. They were employed as waggon horses, and had perhaps
harder work than those under saddle; yet they stood the climate and
work better than all the others.
Affairs in Lower Egypt, to outward appearance, seemed to be settling
down so satisfactorily that, in November, the regiment received
orders to hold itself in readiness to proceed to England. This
prospect endured only for a week, when news from Upper Egypt was
received, altering all arrangements.
While the British government were busying themselves with Lower
Egypt, they paid scanty attention to the Soudan, which they regarded
as a burden and encumbrance that Egypt would do well to get rid of.
The Khedive’s government did not hold this view, and continued to
occupy themselves in dealing with a movement that had originated in
Kordofan, the importance of which was greatly under-estimated at
the time. Simultaneously with the insubordination of the Egyptian
army and the rise of Arabi Pasha, another pretender to power, of a
more serious type had arisen in the South. In May 1881, an Arab,
in Kordofan, named Mahomed Ahmed, proclaimed himself to be the
Mahdi, and preached a religious war. Matters were not improved by
communications from Arabi, published in the Soudan, proclaiming
that the Khedive’s government was at an end, and that no obedience
should be paid to it. By the end of 1882, the Mahdi had gathered a
large force of fighting men, and had inflicted several disastrous
defeats on the Egyptian troops. In April 1883, an Egyptian force,
which came to be known as the “English Army,” was organized at
Khartoum, under the command of Major General Hicks, who had with
him a number of English officers, to advance on Kordofan, and put
down the revolt.[70] In October, this force was utterly destroyed,
and the whole of the Soudan was in a blaze. It was at once realized
that the reconquest of Kordofan and the complete suppression of
the Mahdi would require operations on a scale that could not then
be undertaken. A complete withdrawal from the Western Soudan was
therefore determined on. To effect this, Colonel Gordon with £40,000
was sent to Khartoum. Meanwhile, the uprising of the tribes had
developed in another direction.
In August 1883, a slave trader, named Osman Digna, in the Eastern
Soudan, had raised the tribesmen, in the name of the Mahdi, and
attacked the Egyptian posts in the vicinity of Suakin, the principal
seaport of the Soudan, laying siege to Sinkat and Tokar. An Egyptian
force for the relief of these places was organized in Cairo, and
sent down, under Major General Baker, in December. On the 4th
February 1884, while advancing to the relief of Tokar, it was utterly
destroyed, Baker and his staff making their escape with difficulty.
The fall of Sinkat and massacre of its garrison quickly followed. The
presence of British men-of-war at Suakin, alone saved that place.
It was evident that without British troops nothing could be done.
But beyond securing the safety of Suakin and effecting the relief of
Tokar, the British Government had no definite plans.
To effect these objects, a force was organized at Cairo, under Major
General Graham, and dispatched from Suez. The 19th Hussars commanded
by Lieutenant Colonel A. G. Webster, left Cairo on the 17th February,
and embarked in the _Osiris_ and the _Neera_, with a strength of
20 officers, 457 non-commissioned officers and men, and 395 horses.
Three hundred of the horses were small Syrian Arabs procured from the
Egyptian cavalry. The force was destined to land at Trinkitat, about
50 miles south of Suakin, and the nearest point on the coast to Tokar.
The _Osiris_ reached Trinkitat on the 22nd February, and the
portion of the 19th on board, disembarked the following day. In a
reconnoissance made on the 24th, they came in touch with the enemy at
once. The _Neera_, less fortunate, struck on a rock off Suakin, and
became a total wreck, though men and horses were all saved; but they
did not reach Trinkitat till the 25th. The regiment was brigaded with
the 10th Hussars and mounted infantry, about 750 men in all, under
Colonel Herbert Stewart. On the 28th, the whole force, consisting of
about 4500 men, moved from Trinkitat to Fort Baker, but, before this,
the news of the fall of Tokar had been received.
On the 29th, the force advanced against the enemy, who occupied a
strong position at El Teb. Moving in a large square, they found the
Arab force in position on an isolated ridge covered with bush scrub,
and protected with parapets and rifle pits. A squadron of the 10th
Hussars covered the front and left face of the square; a troop of the
19th covered the right face. The rest of the cavalry were disposed in
rear of the square, in three lines, commanded respectively by Lieut.
Colonel Wood, 10th Hussars, Lieut. Colonels Barrow and Webster, 19th
Hussars. By their defeat of General Baker, and the capture of Tokar,
the enemy had become possessed of guns, small arms and ammunition,
which they used very efficiently. As the British force came within
range, the cavalry cleared away from the front of the square, which
moved to the right, across the front of the position, so as to attack
the left flank of the enemy, and the British guns came into action.
In forty minutes, the enemy’s guns being silenced, the square moved
forward again. As they approached the ridge, the enemy’s fire ceased,
and, in small groups of twenty and thirty men, the Arabs dashed at
the face of the square with the most reckless valour. Not one of them
succeeded in reaching it. Again the British infantry advanced, and
again with desperate courage a great force of Arabs hurled themselves
on the British bayonets. There are no braver men than the Arabs of
the Soudan. Armed with sword and spear, in spite of hundreds being
shot down, many of them succeeded in coming hand to hand with their
foes and the matter was decided by the bayonet. Thus, fighting at
every step, the British infantry swept steadily along the whole line
of the enemy’s position, capturing seven guns in their progress. The
enemy’s number was computed at from 6000 to 10,000 men. Of these,
over 2000 lay dead on the ridge. As the remainder drew off across
the plain beyond, the first two lines of British cavalry swept round
the end of the ridge, and pursued. After driving the main body of
the enemy before them for some distance, it was found necessary to
return to encounter a large body of the enemy they had passed in
the broken ground, and that now interposed between them and the
infantry. The 10th Hussars, and two squadrons of the 19th under
Lieutenant Colonel Barrow, charged a large body of Arabs composed of
horsemen, men on camels, and footmen, and at once became involved in
a desperate hand to hand conflict. This body of Arabs had not been
engaged with our infantry, and were quite fresh. Thirty Arab horsemen
charged one of the leading squadrons, three of them getting through
and wheeling their horses in pursuit regardless of the second line.
The Arab swordsmen and spearmen, taking advantage of the scrub and
broken ground, hamstrung horses as they passed, and then attacked
the riders. Captain Freeman of the 19th and several men were
killed, and many wounded. Of all those who lost their horses in the
_mêlée_, Colonel Barrow alone escaped alive. His horse was killed,
and he received a thrust from a spear that passed through his arm
and penetrated his side. Surrounded by numbers of the enemy, he must
have been killed, had it not been for the devotion of Quarter Master
Sergeant William Marshall who rode to his assistance, seconded by
Sergeant Fenton and Private Boseley. Marshall gave the Colonel his
hand. Running in this fashion, in rear of the charging squadrons,
Barrow, with the heavy spear swaying to and fro in his side,
managed to get free of the enemy before he sank down. His attendant
trumpeter, in spite of sixteen terrible wounds, kept his horse going,
and escaped from the press, to die of his injuries later. Captain
Jenkins, on whom the command of the two squadrons devolved, on Barrow
being disabled, was engaged by three of the enemy at once. His horse
was wounded in three places, but he himself escaped with a slight
wound. Horsemen, as a rule, have little difficulty in dispersing and
driving before them disordered infantry: but, so extraordinary was
the activity and bravery of the Arabs, and the skill with which they
used their spears and two-handed swords that, in the uneven ground
covered with low mimosa bushes, they were more than a match for
horsemen. It was not till some men had dismounted, and opened fire on
them, that they sullenly drew off and retreated.
Meanwhile, the other two squadrons of the regiment, acting
independently under Lieutenant Colonel Webster and Major
Hanford-Flood, had cleared the flank of numerous small parties of
the enemy. By 1.30 the action was at an end. The total British
loss was 34 killed or died of wounds, and 155 wounded. To this
the 19th Hussars contributed one officer killed, two wounded, 13
non-commissioned officers and men killed or died of wounds, 20
wounded; a heavier loss than fell on any other regiment engaged
at El Teb. Every single casualty in the regiment was caused in
hand-to-hand combat, by sword or spear. For his gallant behaviour,
Quartermaster Sergeant William Marshall received the Victoria Cross.
Lieutenant Colonel Barrow’s wound was of so terrible a nature that it
was not thought possible he could survive, but he lived to go through
another and more arduous campaign.
On the following day the force advanced on Tokar. Sergeant James Fatt
of the 19th while scouting in advance, rode boldly into the village,
while it was still uncertain whether there would be any opposition,
and brought out one of the villagers. Osman Digna’s camp was taken
without resistance: two guns and a great quantity of small arms,
ammunition and stores, captured from General Baker’s force, being
taken by the cavalry.
On the 5th March, the regiment paraded, for inspection by General
Graham and Colonel Stewart, and received complimentary addresses from
both officers.
On the 6th, the force re-embarked at Trinkitat, and landed at Suakin
the following day, to encounter Osman Digna in person, who was
encamped at Tamai, sixteen miles from Suakin. On the night of the
12th, the whole force bivouacked in front of Osman Digna’s position;
the infantry at about one mile, the cavalry four miles in rear of
the infantry. At eight the next morning, the advance commenced:
the two infantry brigades in squares, the cavalry in rear of the
left. The Arab skirmishers, who had pelted the British encampment
with rifle fire during the night, fell back, increasing in numbers
as they retired. Seeing a great number of the enemy in front of
them, massed in a ravine, the front line of the 2nd brigade charged
with the bayonet, destroying the formation of their square. The
active Arabs broke into the opening, stabbing and slashing at close
quarters. Numbers followed, and for a few minutes a catastrophe was
imminent. The cavalry galloped forward on the left, dismounted, and
poured volley after volley into the flank of the advancing Arabs,
while the bayonet and spear contended for victory within the square
itself. The 1st brigade, which had repulsed a similar charge, swept
the right face of the 2nd brigade square with its fire, and, in a few
minutes, the last surviving Arab who had penetrated the square had
paid the penalty. The ranks were reformed, and the infantry advance
was resumed, the cavalry clearing away the numerous small parties of
the enemy who still clung to the broken ground. The battle was over.
In those few minutes over 2000 of the enemy had fallen, out of an
estimated number of 12,000: of the British force, 109 officers and
men were killed, and 112 wounded. The 19th Hussars lost one killed
and two wounded.
On the following day the force advanced to Tamai, burned Osman
Digna’s camp, and returned to Suakin. For a fortnight the force
lay at Suakin, the cavalry and mounted infantry being employed in
daily reconnoissances. On the 27th, the whole force advanced for a
distance of 25 miles to ascertain if the enemy remained in any force.
A few hundreds only were found. Beyond some desultory skirmishing,
which drew from the General in command a highly complimentary order,
nothing serious occurred, and the force returned to Suakin.
“Too high praise can scarcely be given to the Cavalry and Mounted
Infantry, who bore the brunt of a long skirmish on rocky ground
unsuited for cavalry action, and who, the following morning,
although nearly twenty-four hours without water for their horses,
performed admirable scouting duty during the advance of the force
in a mountainous district, when distant peaks and ridges had to
be crowned and watched.”[71]
It being considered that the objects of the expedition had been
fully attained, the force was broken up and withdrawn. The 19th
embarked on the 1st April, and returned to Cairo on the 6th.
By G.O. 10 of January 1885 the regiment was permitted to add the date
“1884” to the badges on its appointments. A medal with clasps for El
Teb and Tamai were granted to those present.
CHAPTER III
CAMPAIGN ON THE NILE
1884-1899
Troubles in the Western Soudan--Expedition to relieve
Khartoum--19th ordered up the Nile--Korti--The Desert
Column--Action at Abu Klea--Action at Abu Krou--Quartermaster
Lima killed--The horses--Metemmeh--Fall of Khartoum--Return of
the Column--The River Column--Action at Kirbekan--Return of the
Column--Summer Quarters--Regiment returns to Cairo--Squadron sent
to Suakin--Serious losses--Returns to Cairo--Designation granted
of “Princess of Wales’ Own”--Death of Colonel Barrow--19th
returns to England--Badge of “Mysore” granted--19th embarks for
India--Bangalore--Secunderabad.
In the meantime, matters in the Western Soudan had steadily been
getting worse. In March, the Mahdi’s forces had reached Khartoum;
by the end of May Berber had fallen, cutting off communication
between Khartoum and Cairo, and the wave of rebellion rolled steadily
northward. Still the Government in England did nothing. They had
resolutely ignored the whole Soudan question, and allowed matters to
drift. Gordon’s urgent advice to occupy Berber with British troops,
in order to keep open the route to Suakin, had been disregarded, and
his demand for Zobehr Pasha to be sent to Khartoum, as the only
chance of saving the situation, was emphatically refused. It was not
till August, that the British Cabinet recognised that some effort
might be required to relieve Khartoum, and even to defend Lower Egypt
from the Mahdi. By the middle of August preparations were made for
dispatching a small body of troops to Wady Halfa, and a squadron of
the 19th Hussars was held in readiness. Then followed more delay. It
was not till the middle of September that preparations for an advance
beyond Wady Halfa began to be made in earnest.
On the 25th October, three squadrons of the regiment, under Lieut.
Colonel Barrow, left Cairo, and reached Wady Halfa, by rail and
steamer, on 12th November, with a total strength of 21 officers, and
353 Non-Commissioned officers and men. Two instances of the eager
spirit to get to the front, that animated the whole regiment, must
not go unrecorded. At the moment of leaving the barracks in Cairo,
a man met with an accident that necessitated his being left behind.
In a minute one of the men detailed to remain at Cairo stepped
forward in his place, in marching order, with kit complete. He had
got himself ready on the chance of some such opportunity occurring,
and it is pleasant to know that he got it. At Assiout, next morning,
a stowaway was discovered, a bandboy, who accounted for himself by
saying “He was the only _man_ in the band without a medal, and he
could not stand it.”
Experience had shown that English horses could not stand hard work
under a tropical sun, with scarcity of water and desert fare. It
was therefore decided, before leaving Cairo, to mount the regiment
entirely on the small Syrian Arab horses used by the Egyptian
cavalry. Three hundred and fifty of these little horses had been sent
up in advance, and were taken over by the regiment on arrival at Wady
Halfa. The regiment was at this time in superb condition. The men
had an average of seven years’ service, and most of them had been
through the preceding campaigns of Tel-el-Kebir and Suakin. From Wady
Halfa the regiment marched, by squadrons, to Korti, where it arrived
on the 20th December.
Here was assembled the expeditionary force, under General Lord
Wolseley; perhaps the most singular force ever put into the field
by Great Britain, to fight in one of the most remarkable campaigns;
starting from a base a thousand miles from the sea. In addition to
the 19th Hussars, who were the only horsemen with the force, and
nine battalions of infantry, there were four Camel Corps, composed
respectively of picked men from different Heavy and Light Cavalry
regiments, the Foot Guards, and Infantry of the Line; a Naval Brigade
of Bluejackets and Marines; a Battery of Royal Artillery, and two
Camel Batteries. The boats by which the Nile had been ascended had
been built in England, and were managed by Canadian voyageurs, some
of whom were of Indian blood, and by Kroomen from the west coast of
Africa, while the camels were managed by Arab drivers brought for the
purpose from Aden.
The original intention had been to follow the course of the river the
whole way to Khartoum, but now a fresh disposition became necessary.
A letter from Gordon, dated 4th November, was received, showing that
provisions in Khartoum were running short, and time would not allow
of the slow but less hazardous advance along the river. The new plan
was to send a compact flying column across the desert to Metemmeh,
under Brigadier General Sir Herbert Stewart, for the purpose of
opening communication with Khartoum. A second column, under Major
General W. Earle, was to ascend the river, clearing away all parties
of the enemy, and, eventually, to recapture Berber. The rest of the
force was to remain at Korti, where Lord Wolseley’s Head Quarters
were fixed. The 19th Hussars were destined to furnish a contingent to
both columns.
THE DESERT COLUMN
The task before the Desert Column was no easy one. Between Korti
and Metemmeh 176 miles of barren desert have to be traversed. At
two places only is water in any considerable quantity procurable;
at Jakdul 98 miles from Korti, and at Abu Klea, about 53 miles from
Jakdul. The first operation was to establish a post at Jakdul, where
as yet the enemy had not appeared.
On the 30th December, a force of 1107 men of all ranks, with 2200
camels, started from Korti, under Sir Herbert Stewart. With them went
2 officers and 32 men of the 19th. Being the only horsemen with the
force, the whole of the scouting duties devolved upon the men of the
19th. The rest of the force were mounted on camels. One gallon of
water for each man, and two for each horse, were carried on camels.
In the early morning of the 2nd January, the Jakdul wells were
reached, in 63 hours after leaving Korti. Only a few stragglers of
the enemy were sighted. On the same evening the force set out on its
return to Korti, leaving a garrison of 420 men at Jakdul.
On the 8th January, Sir Herbert Stewart again started with the main
column, consisting of 1607 men, 2228 camels, and 306 camel drivers.
The 19th Hussars, on this occasion, mustered 135 officers and men,
with 155 horses, under Lieut. Colonel Barrow. On the 14th, the column
left Jakdul: about 1800 combatants of all ranks, with 1118 camels.
Early on the 16th, the 19th were pushed on ahead of the column,
and came in touch with the enemy in front of the Abu Klea wells. A
patrol, under Major French, pursued a small body of men right into
the gorge leading to the wells, and captured one of them, on the spot
where next day’s action was fought. A number of horsemen appearing
and threatening to cut him off, French was obliged to relinquish
his prisoner, and retire to the entrance of the gorge. Here Barrow
dismounted his men in order to keep the road open for Stewart’s
force. Though threatened on both flanks by the enemy’s horsemen, the
position was easily held by carbine fire, and the power of the enemy
to dispute the advance of the column at this point was checkmated.
On the arrival of the column a zeriba was formed for the night,
three and a half miles from the water. As the camp was being formed,
the enemy appeared in considerable numbers, and opened a distant
fire, wounding one man and several horses of the 19th. As darkness
closed in the enemy became bolder, and, during the whole night, the
force was exposed to a constant fire which did little harm beyond
disturbing the much needed rest of the men. At daybreak, the fire
increased in intensity; several officers and men were struck down,
and the 19th had several horses killed and disabled while standing at
their pickets. At 9 A.M. the force was formed in square, preparatory
to an advance towards the water which was of such vital importance.
While the square was forming, the 19th were ordered to move out and
hold in check a body of some 500 of the enemy, horsemen and footmen
combined, who threatened to get round to the rear of the square.
An hour after the hussars had left, the square advanced. The small
force moved slowly, frequent halts being necessary to permit of the
camels, loaded with ammunition and water, closing up. The ground was
uneven, with ravines and hollows that prevented the full strength of
the enemy being seen. Suddenly a great body of Arabs, 5000 strong,
rose from a fold in the ground, and rushed at the square. So rapid
and overwhelming was their attack, aided by the inequalities of the
ground, and the fact that the fire from the square was at first
impeded by its own retiring skirmishers that, in spite of the heavy
fire poured upon them, the Arabs succeeded in penetrating the square,
as at Tamai, stabbing and slashing in every direction. At the same
moment, a squadron of horsemen charged the square, but were repulsed.
For five minutes the hand-to-hand conflict raged, till the last Arab
who penetrated the formation was killed. The remainder, who had been
heavily punished by rifle and artillery fire drew off, though for
a time it seemed doubtful if they would not renew the attack. The
19th, who had helped the square with dismounted fire, followed and
cut off many stragglers, but the number of the enemy was too great
to admit of a charge on the main body. The horses also were hardly
able to move out of a walk, having been thirty hours without water.
In this brief conflict the small British force lost 74 killed, and 94
wounded, some of whom died of their injuries. As at El Teb and Tamai,
the fatal skill with which the Arabs used their weapons is shown
by the relative numbers of killed and wounded. Of the Arabs, whose
strength was estimated at about 9000 men, 1100 dead were counted in
close proximity to the square.
On the retreat of the enemy, Barrow pushed on and occupied the wells,
from which the enemy had to be driven by carbine fire. It was late at
night before the infantry obtained the much needed water.
The greater part of the 18th was spent in building a small fort at
Abu Klea, and establishing a post there, for the protection of the
wounded and defence of the wells. While this was in progress, the
19th returned to the battle field and buried the British dead. Late
in the afternoon the small column moved out, to traverse the 25 miles
of desert that must be crossed before the Nile could be reached. The
19th Hussars led the way. As night closed in, progress became very
slow. Men and camels were exhausted, and, in the darkness, great
confusion ensued. Night marching over an unknown route is a doubtful
expedient. In the early morning of the 19th, the line of the Nile,
with villages, was sighted about six miles distant. But between
them and the column was a gravel ridge on which the enemy appeared,
and soon, dense masses of them were visible, swarming out to meet
the column. In view of the distress for want of water, it had been
Sir Herbert Stewart’s wish to reach the Nile without fighting; but
this was now impossible. The camels were collected together, and a
zeriba of brushwood, saddles, boxes &c. formed. By 8 o’clock the
enemy’s fire became heavy. Among the earliest to be struck was the
commander of the column, Sir Herbert Stewart, who received a wound
that afterwards proved mortal. Speaking to Colonel Barrow just before
he received the fatal wound, he said, “Take care of the 19th Hussars,
they have done well.” The command devolved on Colonel Sir Charles
Wilson. It was necessary to drive the enemy away, but nothing could
be done till the zeriba was complete, and, owing to the exhaustion of
the men, the work proceeded slowly. In the interval there were many
casualties, and here the 19th Hussars lost Quarter Master A. G. Lima,
who was killed by a shot through the head.
At last all was ready. The 19th Hussars came in, and picketted their
horses, which were so exhausted as to be scarcely able to carry the
men. Colonel Barrow and his men were detailed to assist in holding
the zeriba, while the rest of the force marched out to engage the
enemy. By 2 o’clock the square had formed up outside the zeriba,
and moved off. With it went a few dismounted men of the 19th, under
Lieutenant Craven.
As the square moved towards the Nile, the enemy’s fire increased,
and many men fell. The progress made was very slow. The bush and
sandhills on three sides swarmed with Arabs. As the square neared the
ridge, the men dropped fast under the heavy rifle fire to which they
were exposed. Suddenly the enemy’s fire ceased, and a great swarm of
Arabs poured down on the square. There were no skirmishers to mask
the fire, as at Abu Klea, and the Arabs were met by a steady fire
that swept away the foremost ranks wholesale. Not an Arab lived to
reach the square, and a ringing British cheer went up as the enemy
were seen to be flying in all directions. The way to the Nile was no
longer closed. Half an hour after dark the river was reached, near
the village of Abu Krou. It was not till the afternoon of the 20th
that the 19th Hussar horses were able to drink. Half of them had been
72 hours without water; none of them less than 56 hours, yet only
3 succumbed. If English horses had been employed, probably not one
would have survived.
“The cavalry horses were quite done up. The way in which Barrow
managed to bring the 19th Hussars across the desert is one of
the best things in the expedition; but the horses had only had
a short drink at Abu Klea, and then they had barely enough to
wash their mouths out until they got to the Nile on the 20th. The
scouting of the Hussars during the march was admirably done; they
were ubiquitous. But want of food and water no horses can fight
against, and they were but a sorry spectacle as they moved out of
the zeriba to go down to the river. They reached the Nile almost
useless as cavalry, and could only be employed for scouting
purposes, at short distances from the camp.”[72]
During the whole march from Korti the entire scouting duty had been
taken by the 19th Hussars, so that, each day, they covered far more
ground than the rest of the force. The men also were thoroughly
exhausted with the tremendous efforts they had been called on to
make, but their health continued to be good. There was wonderful
freedom from sickness of any kind. The casualties in the whole force
on the 19th January, amounted to 1 officer and 22 non-commissioned
officers and men killed; 8 officers and 90 non-commissioned officers
and men wounded. Many non-combatants also were killed or wounded.
The 20th was occupied in placing the village of Gubat in a state of
defence, and, at dawn of the 21st, Barrow and his Hussars rode out to
reconnoitre Metemmeh, preparatory to an attack in force. So exhausted
were the horses that all the Hussars could do was to ride up in a
body to some high ground on the north of the village, while the rest
of the force opened fire from the east side. While the attack was
proceeding, four small steamers sent down by Gordon from Khartoum on
the 14th December, appeared in sight, and landed some native troops.
They brought intelligence of Arab reinforcements being on the march
from Khartoum. It was important to husband ammunition, and incur no
further losses of men, so the attack was withdrawn. But the Arab
reinforcements never reached Metemmeh. The news of the disastrous
defeats their comrades had sustained at Abu Klea and Abu Krou, caused
them to retrace their steps.
Reconnoissances having shown that no large force of the enemy was in
the vicinity, Sir Charles Wilson started on the 24th for Khartoum,
with two of the steamers, taking with him two hundred men. On the
28th, after great difficulties, Khartoum was reached, and found to
be in the hands of the Arabs. The town had been captured by the
Mahdi, two days before, and Gordon was dead. On the 4th February,
Sir Charles Wilson and his party rejoined the camp at Gubat, after
adventures that read more like a page of romance than of modern
history. In the interval, both his steamers had been wrecked, and
the whole party had been continuously under fire for eight days
and a half. In the meantime, the force at Gubat received some
reinforcements and supplies from Korti. The 19th were engaged in
daily skirmishes with the outlying pickets of the enemy who showed
a wholesome respect for them: “Even the fierce Baggara horsemen
appeared unwilling to cross swords with our Hussars,” wrote one who
was present with the force. On the 11th, Major General Sir Redvers
Buller arrived to take command of the force, with orders to retire on
Abu Klea.
On the 14th February, Gubat was evacuated, and Abu Klea reached on
the 15th, followed by the enemy who annoyed the force with long range
rifle fire. At Abu Klea, on the 17th, a smart skirmish took place
which cost the force 3 killed and 27 wounded. Among the killed was
Sergeant Horwood of the 19th Hussars, who was acting as Sergeant
Major with the Mounted Infantry. It had been intended to occupy
Abu Klea permanently, in view of a second advance on Khartoum in
the autumn; but want of food, scarcity of water, and the complete
breakdown of transport necessitated Buller’s withdrawal to Korti. On
the 16th, the 19th Hussars marched out for Jakdul, leaving at Abu
Klea with Sir R. Buller a small detachment under Major French. The
march was a painful one, about half the men being on foot. While on
the march they heard of Sir Herbert Stewart’s death near Jakdul.
Wishing to be present at the funeral of the commander they had
served under in two campaigns, they made a long forced march into
Jakdul, but arrived too late. They had the melancholy satisfaction
of erecting a walled enclosure, with headstone, round his grave. On
the 3rd March they left Jakdul, and reached Korti on the 8th. On
the 23rd February the last of the desert column left Abu Klea, and
returned to Korti, 16th March. In a dispatch from Jakdul, dated 26th
February, Sir R. Buller wrote of the 19th Hussars:--
“I wish expressly to remark on the very excellent work done
by the small detachment of the 19th Hussars, both during our
occupation of Abu Klea and during our retirement. Each man has
done the work of ten, and it is not too much to say that the
force owes much to Major French and his 13 troopers.”
Meanwhile, the men of the 19th, left at Korti, had not been idle. In
February they were engaged in establishing two watering posts in the
desert, distant respectively twelve and thirty miles from Korti, for
the use of the retiring force. The water was conveyed in tin lined
biscuit boxes, and every animal in camp was pressed into the service.
THE RIVER COLUMN
The primary object of General Earle’s column was to clear the river
line of all hostile parties as far as Abu Hamed, punishing, _en
route_, the Monassir tribe of Arabs who had treacherously murdered
Colonel Stewart and a small party sent down by Gordon from Khartoum,
in September. At Abu Hamed a base was to be established for a further
advance on Berber. The force, under General Earle, consisted of four
battalions of infantry, a battery of Egyptian Artillery, an Egyptian
Camel Corps, and one squadron of the 19th Hussars; the latter under
Major Hanford-Flood, amounting to 91 sabres and 107 horses. The total
strength of the force was about 3000 officers and men.
The force left Korti, in detachments, for Hamdab, about 50 miles
up the river, whence the final start was to be made. On the 18th
January, 60 men of the 19th Hussars together with the Egyptian Camel
Corps, under Major Flood, made a forced march into the desert to
surprise a party of the enemy collected at the wells of El Kooa, 35
miles from Hamdab. The Arabs having received timely notice of their
coming, hastily broke up their camp and disappeared, before Flood’s
arrival. The detachment returned to Hamdab after 32 hours’ absence.
On the 24th, the start was made; the Hussars, Camel Corps and
baggage, marching along the left bank, the infantry and stores in
boats. Progress was very slow, the banks of the river being rough
and difficult, and the frequent rapids and cataracts causing great
labour in tracking the boats up. On the 27th, the cavalry skirmishers
first came in touch with the enemy, but beyond a harmless interchange
of shots at long range nothing occurred. This happened frequently,
the enemy falling back, day by day, as the river column advanced.
The progress of the boats was very slow owing to the succession of
rapids here formed by the Nile. Major Flood’s men worked and camped
independently, reconnoitring along the left bank, far ahead of the
main body, and, owing to the rocky nature of the ground, often at a
considerable distance from the river. The rocky ridge, on which the
battle of Kirbekan was afterwards fought, was ascended and mapped,
and a reconnoissance of the 19th Hussars was pushed some way into the
Shukook Pass, five days before the action. On the 6th February, a two
days’ halt at Birti became necessary, in consequence of the fall of
Khartoum making a change of plans possible. The enemy meanwhile had
fallen back to the Shukook Pass.
On the 8th, the advance was resumed, and it became known that the
enemy, about 1000 strong, had advanced from the Shukook Pass, and
taken position in some extremely strong ground at Kirbekan, in front
of the Pass, about 14 miles from Earle’s Head Quarters. The 8th
and 9th were employed in reconnoitring, and closing up the troops
preparatory to the attack. On the 8th, Major Flood, with twenty of
his men, exchanged volleys with the enemy, and drove in some of their
advanced posts. On the 9th, the whole of the mounted troops felt
the enemy again. That night the troops bivouacked in their allotted
stations, the most advanced of the infantry being only a short mile
from the enemy’s position.
On the morning of the 10th, General Earle, with 1196 men of all
ranks, moved forward to the attack. The enemy occupied a position
on a line of low rocky eminences at right angles to the river, and
a detached steep ridge in echelon with the rocky eminences. It was
determined to march right round the rear of their position by the
desert side, closing their retreat, and attack them in flank and rear
from the river side. Two companies of the Staffordshire regiment,
with two guns were left in front of the position to occupy the
enemy’s attention, and keep down their fire. The 19th Hussars led the
way, and the force marched right round the enemy’s position till the
river was again reached in the enemy’s right rear. As soon as they
saw their retreat was cut off, a number of the enemy tried to escape
by swimming the river, many of them being shot in the attempt. But a
considerable number of them still held their ground. The Black Watch
were accordingly ordered to assault the line of rocky eminences,
while the Staffordshire regiment assaulted the ridge. As the Black
Watch won their way along the lower eminences, a desperate rush was
made by a body of the enemy, which was repulsed, and the eminences
crowned by the Highlanders; the Arabs gallantly fighting to the last
man. In the moment of victory, General Earle was killed by a shot
from a hut which he had incautiously approached. The assault on the
high steep ridge offered greater difficulties, but the position was
gallantly carried by the Staffordshire men. Both regiments had their
commanding officers killed.
In the meantime, Flood’s Hussars and the Egyptian Camel Corps had
gained the entrance to the Shukook Pass, and captured one of the
enemy’s camps, in which were a number of standards, camels and
donkeys. The enemy opened fire from the surrounding hills without
effect. The victory was purchased with the loss of three officers
and nine men killed, four officers and forty-four men wounded. The
enemy’s force was subsequently ascertained to have been from fifteen
hundred to two thousand men, but of these only about six hundred
fought well.
The advance of the column was continued, on the 12th, under Colonel
H. Brackenbury, on whom the command had devolved by General Earle’s
death. The enemy had disappeared, but progress was slow, through
the continuous rapids. On the 20th, a suitable place was found for
crossing the Nile. A scouting party of the 19th was first rowed
across, and brushed away some of the enemy’s scouts. By the afternoon
of the 21st, the whole force was transported to the right bank, at
Hebbeh, the scene of Colonel Stewart’s murder in September. The
murderers had fled, and beyond the destruction of their property no
other punishment could be meted out to them. By the evening of the
23rd, the whole force was concentrated at Huella, 26 miles from Abu
Hamed.
All was ready for the advance on Abu Hamed, where a strong force of
the enemy was known to be posted. Hardly had the troops commenced
their march, on the 24th, when orders were received from Korti
directing their return to Merawi. Sir Redvers Buller’s withdrawal
from Abu Klea rendered a farther advance on Berber out of the
question, and the River Column had to return. While the main body
commenced to descend the river, Major Flood’s squadron scouted
another six miles towards Abu Hamed, without seeing an enemy.
Descending by the right bank, Merawi was reached on the 5th March,
and, on the 6th, after recrossing the river to Abu Dom, the River
Column was broken up. One troop of the 19th was left at Abu Dom,
while the remainder marched for Korti.
In spite of the extremely hard work, the health of the troops, as
with the Desert Column, had been excellent. Not a single man of Major
Flood’s party had been on the sick list, from the time of leaving
Korti till the date of return. Of the horses, three had succumbed.
The performance of the small Arab horses both with the River and
Desert Columns, carrying a heavy weight, on scanty fare and less
water, is a marvel of endurance.
The next few days were spent in arranging for the distribution of
the troops into summer quarters, in anticipation of the advance on
Khartoum in the autumn. The quarters selected for the 19th were
Merawi, Abu Dom, Tani, Kurot, Abu Kussi, and Dongola. By the 1st
April, they were all located in the assigned positions. Before
leaving Korti, the regiment was inspected by Lord Wolseley, who
addressed them in terms of commendation that will long be remembered
in the regiment.
OPERATIONS NEAR SUAKIN
While their comrades had thus been busy on the Nile, the remnant
of the regiment left at Cairo had found work to do. The effect
of the operations, near Suakin, in March 1884, had been quite
temporary. Osman Digna had recovered his authority, and was again
threatening the port. It was also considered that, by making a
diversion at Suakin, the operations near Berber and the reopening
of the Suakin-Berber road would be facilitated. It was determined,
therefore, to send a sufficient force to crush Osman Digna, and to
make a railway line to Berber. The capture of Berber, before the
great heat of the summer set in, was then considered feasible.
Before the force, which was to be commanded by Lieut. General Sir
Gerald Graham, could arrive, a weak squadron of the 19th Hussars,
under Captain Apthorp, was dispatched from Cairo on the 24th January,
together with two Horse Artillery guns, followed next day by a
battalion of infantry. On landing at Suakin, reconnoissances were
instituted to ascertain the strength and position of the enemy. On
the 1st February, a small force of all arms reconnoitred, under Major
General Fremantle, towards Hasheem, 8 miles west of Suakin. The Arabs
were found in great numbers, in a position too strong to attack. The
infantry were formed in square, while the cavalry and guns were sent
forward to try and draw the enemy out of their position. But the
memory of El-Teb and Tamai were too fresh in the Arab mind for them
to be induced to attack the arrayed infantry. They refused to quit
their position, and after a prolonged skirmish, General Fremantle’s
force returned to camp. One Egyptian trooper was wounded, and the
19th Hussars lost a horse.
On the 3rd, Captain Apthorp was sent with 40 of his own men and 40
Egyptian troopers to reconnoitre along the Berber road. At Hamdoob,
10 miles from Suakin, a camp and village, occupied by the enemy, was
surprised and burnt. While the small party were thus occupied, a
great body of Arabs, 5000 strong, had moved from Tamai and Hasheem
to intercept them, and took post in a ravine two miles from Hamdoob,
completely blocking their return to Suakin. The Arab force was so
well concealed that the squadron was almost in contact with them
before their presence was discovered, and the great mass of Arabs,
footmen and men mounted on camels, bore down on the small body of
cavalry at once. There was no time to dismount and fire, and it was
hopeless to attempt to break through: nothing was left them but to
ride for Suakin by a circuitous route. Turning eastwards the squadron
started on a long gallop round the enemy’s flank. The Arabs followed
in overwhelming numbers, and, moving on a shorter line, together with
their knowledge of the ground, were able to harass the squadron for
several miles. The 19th lost 8 men and 11 horses, while the Egyptian
troop lost three men and six horses.
The number of Arabs in the neighbourhood of Suakin was too great to
allow of distant reconnoissances, little more of interest occurred,
therefore, till the arrival of Sir Gerald Graham’s force. Early in
March, they began to arrive, but the whole force was not completed
till nearly the middle of April. On the 17th March, the 19th Hussar
squadron re-embarked for Cairo in order to join the Head Quarters of
the regiment at Dongola, in readiness for the advance on Khartoum in
the autumn.
Our interest with the Suakin force ceases here. It is sufficient
to say that it amounted to 12,500 men, composed of troops from
England, a contingent of native troops from India, and a contingent
from New South Wales consisting of two batteries of artillery, and
500 infantry. It had also with it a balloon detachment, the first
occasion on which balloons were used by British troops in warfare.
On the 20th March, it fought a successful action at Hasheem, and
again on the 22nd, at Tofrik, when an enormous number of the enemy
were killed at a rather heavy cost to the British troops engaged. On
the 3rd April, Tamai was occupied, and the last of the enemy’s force
broken up. By the end of April, 18 miles of railway were completed,
and the tribes in the neighbourhood had given in their submission;
when the intention of the British Government to abandon the advance
on Khartoum became known. On the 17th May, the withdrawal of the
troops commenced, and again Suakin was left with only a small force
to protect the port.
We left the three squadrons of the 19th at Dongola and other stations
south of that place, with all thoughts concentrated on preparations
for the autumn advance on Khartoum. The regimental establishment
was increased by 110 men, bringing up the strength to 740 sabres.
Four strong squadrons were being prepared for the field: but over
13 years were to elapse before Khartoum was again seen by British
troops. About the 22nd April it was announced that the intention
of advancing on Khartoum in the autumn had been abandoned, and
orders were issued for the withdrawal of the troops. The retirement
commenced on the 26th May, when Merawi was evacuated. The troops were
withdrawn down the river in detachments, each post being evacuated
in turn as it became the southernmost point of occupation. On the
22nd June, the Head Quarters of the 19th marched out of Dongola, the
last of the force to leave for Lower Egypt. At Wady Halfa the hot
and tedious march came to an end, and from that point the regiment
reached the railway at Assiout in barges. At Wady Halfa, Korosko and
Assouan they made over their horses to the 20th Hussars, and, by
the 14th August, the regiment was reunited in Cairo. In the whole
campaign the regiment had suffered a total loss of two officers,
Lt. Colonel Taylor (died of fever) and Quarter Master Lima, and 18
non-commissioned officers and men.
In July 1885, Her Majesty was graciously pleased to confer on the
regiment the designation of “Princess of Wales’ Own,” in recognition
of “its distinguished services in Egypt and the Soudan.”
By G.O. 10 of January 1886 the regiment was permitted to bear on its
appointments, the words “Nile 1884-85” “Abu Klea,” in commemoration
of the ascent of the river Nile and the operations in the Eastern
Soudan.
[Illustration: COLONEL PERCY BARROW, C.B.
_From a Photograph._]
At the beginning of 1886, the regiment experienced a severe loss
in the death of its commander, Colonel Percy Barrow. The desperate
wound he had received at El Teb, on the 19th February 1884, was
one from which complete recovery was impossible. In spite of grave
inconvenience to himself, he had gone through the most arduous part
of the Nile campaign without flinching, while the skill and judgment
with which he handled his men during the march of the Desert Column
won the applause of the whole force. While preparing the regiment
for some regimental games, a violent exertion re-opened the old
wound, and after thirty hours of intense suffering he expired on the
13th January, in his 38th year. In him the army lost a soldier of
great promise. The son of a well known Indian Officer, Major General
Lousada Barrow, who commanded a Corps of Volunteer Cavalry in the
Indian Mutiny and at the relief of Lucknow, Percy Barrow entered the
19th Hussars as Cornet in 1868. In 1879, he was selected to command a
corps of Mounted Infantry and some irregular troops in the Zulu war;
and served through the Boer war of 1881 in command of the Mounted
Infantry. The soldierly spirit that animated him, and his intense
devotion to everything that concerned the welfare of the regiment,
can only be appreciated by those who have been privileged to read his
letters written in quarters and in the field. Telegrams of condolence
to the regiment from Her Majesty the Queen and from Her Royal
Highness the Princess of Wales testified to the general appreciation
of the loss the public service had suffered in his death. His remains
were removed to England and interred at Saltwood near Hythe. To
command the regiment, his brother-in-law, Colonel Boyce Combe, was
transferred from the 10th Hussars to the 19th.
In May, the regiment was ordered to proceed to England, and embarked
at Alexandria on the 19th, in the _Geelong_ and the _Iona_, leaving
their horses behind them. On the 6th and 7th June, they landed at
Harwich and Woolwich, and proceeded to Norwich, three troops being
sent to Colchester. The regiment was much gratified at the receipt,
on landing, of a telegram, welcoming them to England, from H.R.H. the
Princess of Wales. In July, one of the Colchester troops was recalled
to Head Quarters. The establishment of the regiment was fixed at 24
officers, 469 warrant officers non-commissioned officers and men, and
300 horses.
In the following March, the two troops at Colchester were sent to
Birmingham, being replaced, in September, at Colchester by two troops
from Head Quarters.
In October, the establishment was increased by 132 rank and file and
80 horses. For this purpose the necessary horses were transferred to
the regiment from the 14th and 21st Hussars. A month later, by which
time 56 recruits had been enlisted, the order was cancelled, and the
horses were transferred to the 18th and 20th Hussars. At the end of
the year, the Colchester squadron rejoined Head Quarters.
In April 1888, the regiment marched from Norwich and Birmingham to
Hounslow, Hampton Court and Kensington.
In September, the regiment was brought on the strength of the 1st
Army Corps, and its establishment increased to 707 of all ranks with
424 horses.
In March 1889, under Army Order No. 136, the regiment was granted
permission to wear “Mysore” on its appointments, in commemoration of
the campaigns against Tippoo in the last century, in which the old
19th Light Dragoons had borne so distinguished a part. The badge is
certainly more appropriate than the old one of “Seringapatam” which
was discarded.
In the same month the regiment lost its Colonel, Major General John
Yorke, C.B. In his place Major General and Honorary Lieut. General
Coote Synge Hutchinson was gazetted to the regiment. He was an old
2nd Dragoon Guards’ officer, and had served with that regiment
through the Indian Mutiny.
In the following June, the regiment marched to Aldershot. On the 3rd
July, it was employed in London on the occasion of H.M. the Shah of
Persia visiting the City.
In September 1890, the regiment took part in the manœuvres on
Berkshire Downs.
On the 26th June 1891, a special inspection of the regiment was held
by H.R.H. the Princess of Wales; and, on the 8th July, the 19th took
part in a review at Hounslow before H.I.M. the German Emperor.
The regiment was again destined for foreign service. At the end of
July, it marched to Shorncliffe, and, on 1st September, embarked at
Portsmouth, in the _Euphrates_, for India, arriving at Bombay on the
28th, whence it was forwarded by train to Secunderabad in relief of
the 7th Hussars. In November the regiment was transferred, by train,
to Bangalore.
Towards the end of 1892 the squadron system was substituted for the
troop system in the regiment.
In October 1896, the 19th P.W.O. Hussars were transferred to
Secunderabad. Here we must take leave of the regiment. The history
of a regiment in quarters possesses little interest. “Soldiers in
peace are like chimneys in summer.” When the time comes for the 19th
P.W.O. Hussars to take the field again, they will be found like their
predecessors, over one hundred years ago, “ready in all that depends
upon them, and willing beyond description.”
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A.
YEARLY LISTS OF THE OFFICERS OF THE NINETEENTH.