TROUBLES AT MADRAS
1783-1785
Sultan Tippoo Sahib of Mysore--Operations in Southern
India--Death of Sir Eyre Coote--Attack on Cuddalore--Peace
with France--Tippoo makes Peace--Strained relations between
civil and military in India--The E. I. Company’s military
establishment--The King’s troops in India--Misconduct of
Madras Government--Quarrel between Council and General
Stuart--Complaints of Council against Burgoyne--Arrest of
Stuart--Council appoint Lang to supersede Burgoyne--Burgoyne
refuses to give over command of the King’s troops--Strange
delusions of the Council--Imminent Conflict between King’s and
Company’s troops--Unworkable arrangement--Fresh quarrel--Burgoyne
arrested--Mutiny of native cavalry--Court Martial on
Burgoyne--His acquittal--His death--End of the quarrel--Burgoyne
justified.
In little more than a month after the Regiment landed, the death
of Hyder Ali occurred. It brought no relief to British interests.
His son and successor, Tippoo, was an experienced soldier, though
inferior to Hyder in ability. He was noted for his religious
fanaticism and a violent temper, joined to a most barbarous cruelty
of disposition. To this was added a spirit of implacable hostility
to the English, the only European power in the country that appeared
formidable to him. Possessed of a full treasury and a powerful
army, he at once took the field with a force that contained 900
European troops, 250 Topasses,[9] and 2000 French sepoys, besides
many thousands of his own Mysore troops. To oppose him, the Madras
Government could dispose only of some 2950 European, and 11,500
native troops. With this force, Major General Stuart took the field
in January, and made his way by slow marches to Vellore. Meanwhile,
Tippoo was forced to withdraw to the westward to defend Mysore from
an attack on that side. On the arrival at Bombay of reinforcements in
Sir Richard Bickerton’s convoy, about 500 of the Company’s recruits,
destined for Madras, were detained, and, on the arrival of the King’s
troops at Madras, about 400 of them were at once sent back to Bombay.
Out of this material a force had been organized, under Major General
Matthews, to advance against Mysore from the west coast. After the
capture of several places, the force was hemmed in at Bednore, and
obliged to surrender to Tippoo, on 30th April 1783. A great loss
was experienced at this time in the death of Sir Eyre Coote at
Madras, on 27th April, three days after his return to resume command
of the operations. After this nothing was done till June, when an
ineffective attack was made on Cuddalore by Major General Stuart.
The French were on the point of striking a counter blow which would
probably have proved successful, when the announcement of peace in
Europe changed the complexion of affairs. The French force with
Tippoo was withdrawn, but otherwise the war continued. At this point
the Mahrattas intervened. Tippoo’s character and his great power
rendered him a menace to the other native Princes, and it was no
part of the Mahratta policy that he should be allowed to crush the
English. They therefore called on him to desist from hostilities.
On his refusing to comply, they signed a treaty of alliance against
him with the English. In the meantime, a successful expedition
under Colonel Fullarton, strengthened by the troops set free by the
peace with France, had penetrated into Mysore, from the south, and
threatened Seringapatam. Under these circumstances, Lord Macartney
and the Madras Council induced Tippoo to sign a treaty of peace, 11th
March 1784; a treaty discreditable to themselves, and disapproved of
by Warren Hastings.
In a letter, dated 6th September 1783, addressed to the Court of
Directors, the Select Committee of the Madras Council states that
Sir John Burgoyne’s regiment, being reported fit for service, had
been ordered to take the field. But the regiment did not move
from San Thomé. The Council desired to send the regiment into the
field without Burgoyne. On the latter notifying his intention of
accompanying his regiment, under orders from General Stuart, the move
was countermanded. The incident was part of the fast ripening quarrel
between the Civil Government and the King’s officers, which must be
mentioned on account of the serious results it had on the fortunes of
the Colonel of the 23rd Light Dragoons.
From the time of their first military establishment in India, the
Company had always evinced great distrust of their military officers,
a feeling that was not without some justification in view of the
character of the adventurers, who at first took service with the
Company. The Company’s troops on their part were under the influence
of the feeling, prevalent in England, that the exercise of sovereign
rights by a company of merchants was derogatory to the dignity of
the Crown. Hence it arose that the Company’s officers were less
deferential to the authority of the Company, than they should have
been, while the Company became more exacting of the respect due to
them, and made it their policy to keep down the army, in numbers, in
rank, and in authority. This feeling of jealousy became intensified
when the services of King’s troops were placed at the disposal of the
Company; and many quarrels detrimental to the public service ensued.
At the time we are treating of, the King’s troops in India were the
mainstay of the Company’s power. The Company was under stringent
engagements to pay them regularly, instead of allowing their pay to
fall into arrears, as was always the case with their own troops. They
were to be commanded as far as possible by King’s officers only, and
the Commander in Chief at each Presidency was appointed by the Crown.
Every King’s officer, whatever the date of his commission, took rank
above all Company’s officers holding similar commissions, and every
field officer of King’s troops, while in India, was given a step of
Brevet rank above his regimental rank. This naturally caused some ill
feeling between the King’s and Company’s officers. The arrangement
had first been made when there was only a single battalion of King’s
troops in India. As the number of King’s troops increased, the extra
rank given to the officers became a very serious grievance to the
Company’s officers, which was further aggravated by the Company’s
policy of maintaining a very small number of field officers, and
of having their regiments commanded by Captains. The instructions
for avoiding disputes with the Company’s officers, that were issued
to Sir John Burgoyne, before sailing from England, had been a
stereotyped formula of orders for all officers sent with troops to
India for more than twenty years past: but such admonitions were of
little use under conditions that made friction inevitable.
The Madras Government was possessed at that time of a perverse
spirit, that led them into all kinds of extravagancies and never
ending quarrels. The Members of the Council fought amongst
themselves; they evaded or disobeyed the orders of the Court of
Directors, and ignored the authority of the Governor General.
Individually, they commanded little respect. Collectively, they
mismanaged everything. They interfered in military matters, that in
a time of war were peculiarly in the province of the chief military
authority; and they frittered away the forces at their disposal in
ill-conceived and badly equipped expeditions that frequently ended
in disaster. Finally, they quarrelled with everybody who was not
immediately under their orders, and wrote long winded complaints to
the Court of Directors and to Bengal, instead of doing their best
under the trying circumstances of the time. The King’s officers on
their side were also difficult to deal with. They asserted their
right to direct how and where the King’s troops should be employed,
and, in other respects, claimed an independence of the Civil
Government incompatible with public interests. In 1780, when the
Commander in Chief, Sir Eyre Coote, had been sent down from Bengal,
after the disaster to Colonel Baillie’s army, he was furnished with
orders for the suspension of the acting Governor, Mr Whitehill,
against whom the gravest charges had been made, and he was specially
invested with powers that to a great extent made him independent
of the Madras Council, including the exclusive direction of the
treasure transmitted for the prosecution of the war. The temporary
grant of such powers was necessary under existing circumstances, but
was none the less resented by the Madras Council; though there was
little active opposition till the assumption of the Governorship by
Lord Macartney in June 1781. The Council complained that more was
not accomplished, Sir Eyre Coote complained that his troops were
sent into the field without supplies; the Council sent an expedition
against the Dutch settlements, without consulting the General, and an
open rupture occurred, in which the Admiral took part, in consequence
of dispatches addressed to both Commanders being opened by the
Resident at Tanjore. At this stage of the quarrel, Sir Eyre Coote’s
health forced him to leave for Bengal. The command devolved on Major
General Stuart, and the quarrel went on worse than ever.
Lord Macartney at once assumed the direction of the campaign, and
made himself ridiculous by forcing Stuart to destroy three of his
own forts, the preservation of which was anxiously desired by Sir
Eyre Coote. Stuart, on his side, claimed the right of exercising the
special powers that had been conferred on Sir Eyre Coote. Stuart’s
position was a peculiar one. While on the King’s half pay list, in
1775, his services were lent to the Company, who conferred on him the
rank of Brigadier General. In October 1781, the Crown gave him the
commission of Major General in India, and, three months later, his
commission was antedated. His position, however, differed from that
of other General Officers, in that he was not borne on the strength
of any regiment, and his status in England was only that of a half
pay Colonel. He had done good service already in the campaign against
Hyder, in which he had lost a leg by a cannon shot.
In December 1782, Stuart withdrew the garrison of Masulipatam for
service elsewhere, without consulting the Government, and at once
both parties entered into a paper war, that absorbed all the energies
that should have been devoted to the war with Tippoo and the French.
Each party bombarded the other with notes and minutes, that continued
to be exchanged after the army had taken the field for Cuddalore,
and the Council wrote to London and Calcutta in the gloomiest terms,
expressing their fears of General Stuart’s designs.[10] In neither
quarter did they elicit any sympathy. In terms of measured sarcasm
Warren Hastings pointed out that their “collected mass of complaint
and invective” was directed in turn against every single British
authority in India except themselves, including the Naval Commander
in Chief, as well as against the Nawab of Arcot and his ministers.
The Madras Government had become contemptible alike in the eyes of
friends and enemies, and it was impossible to work with them. Lost
to all sense of public duty, they formed the project of refusing
to place the troops under command of Sir Eyre Coote on his return
in April. Sir Eyre Coote was, on this occasion, nominated by the
Bengal Government to take the command of all the troops on the Coast,
except the garrison actually required at Madras. Not an unreasonable
arrangement, as Sir Eyre Coote was Commander in Chief in India, and
the Madras Government was dependent for money on Bengal. The Madras
Government sent peremptory orders for Stuart to hasten his march,
in order that the troops might be far distant when Sir E. Coote
arrived, and passed a resolution that he should not have the command.
A letter addressed by the Madras Council to Sir Eyre Coote when he
was dying, drew down upon them a censure from Warren Hastings that
was calculated to penetrate the most pachydermatous self-conceit,
but it had apparently no effect on Lord Macartney and his Council.
Even before Sir Eyre Coote’s death, the feeling of Lord Macartney and
the Council against the King’s officers was shown by a minute of the
Council, at the time of the preparation of the army for the siege
of Cuddalore, wherein an attempt was made to deprive the Generals
bearing the King’s commission of any employment in the field. In it,
an endeavour was made to elicit from Major General Stuart an opinion
that the public interests would be best served by leaving those
officers, five in number, in garrison. This idea was resisted by
Stuart, and Major General Bruce was sent with the army to Cuddalore.
The frigate that conveyed the news of the cessation of hostilities
with France, to the army before Cuddalore, brought also peremptory
orders to Stuart to embark at once for Madras, to answer charges of
misconduct. Bruce was forced by ill health to return a few days later.
The command of the force in the field then devolved temporarily on
Colonel Gordon, till Sir John Burgoyne took command of the returning
army on 13th August. But Sir John Burgoyne had likewise come under
the displeasure of the Select Committee. In the same letter[11] to
the Court of Directors in which they announced the supersession of
Stuart, and their intention to give the command to Burgoyne, they
wrote--
“Sir John Burgoyne expecting a Preference to be given to his men
in point of accommodations and every other respect above all
other Corps of His Majesty’s or the Company’s troops, and making
no allowance for the calamities of the times and the Exigencies
of our situation, has been loud and frequent in his complaints,
and the utmost endeavours on our Part to show attention to
himself as well as to his Regiment have fallen short of the sense
he entertained of the claims of both.”
In another part of the same letter they stated that Burgoyne had
claimed to be a Major General, but they had only his word for it, as
the fact had not been notified to them. Yet, in the Directors’ letter
of 25th January 1782, Burgoyne’s rank as Major General in the East
Indies from 1st June 1781, is precisely stated.
Burgoyne was justifiably angry at the treatment his regiment had
experienced. Nothing had been done by the Madras Government to
have horses in readiness for the regiment on arrival. The quarters
in which the men were first placed were so unhealthy, that by the
middle of July, less than nine months after landing, 78 had died.
His own claims to the rank and allowances of a Major General were
challenged; while, in common with all the senior officers of King’s
troops, he was exasperated by the animus displayed against them by
Lord Macartney and the Council, and the openly avowed intention to
ignore their just claims, in defiance of the intentions of the Crown.
In a letter, dated 3rd September 1783, in which he reports to the
Ministry at home, the fact of his having assumed the command of the
army returning from Cuddalore, he dwells on the grievances of the
King’s General officers, especially “the declaration of the Governor,
who says no King’s officer shall ever Command in Chief here, let
his rank be what it may; and that a junior officer in the Company’s
service should have rank given him superior to what any King’s
officer may have to entitle him to command.” It is evident that the
violent measures shortly afterwards taken by Lord Macartney, were in
pursuance of a long contemplated scheme for getting rid of the King’s
General officers.
From the beginning, Stuart had been quarrelsome and unreasonable in
his dealings with the rest of the Council. The Council complained
loudly of the slowness of his advance on Cuddalore. For this he does
not appear to have been responsible, as the delay was caused by
his having to wait for the squadron and store ships which did not
arrive before Cuddalore till after the army had encamped before the
place. Among other causes of quarrel was the desire of the General
to give effect to the views of the Bengal Government in the affairs
of the Nawab of Arcot; views which were strenuously opposed by the
rest of the Council. Soon after the return of the army to Madras
the Council passed a resolution dismissing Stuart from the service,
and conferring the Commander in Chiefship on Burgoyne. On the 17th
September this was announced to Burgoyne, who was addressed as
Commander in Chief, and requested to attend the Council immediately.
In a General order of the same date, the Council, anticipating
objections, justified their action by arguing that Stuart held only a
half pay commission from the King, and that the Company could do as
they pleased with him as he held no position under the Crown in India.
As Burgoyne entered the Fort a salute was fired from the ramparts,
but he at once informed the Council that, while they could dispose
of the command of the Company’s forces as they pleased, he had no
power to supersede Stuart who held the King’s commission of Major
General, and the command of the King’s troops _de jure_, and, so
long as he was able to act, could only be deprived of his command by
the King’s order. On this he was told that, if he did not accept the
command, it was intended to make Lieutenant Colonel Lang a Company’s
officer, a Lieutenant General, and appoint him Commander-in-Chief.
Burgoyne continued firm in his resolve, but was detained till 8 in
the evening on various pretexts. Meanwhile, without his knowledge,
arrangements were made for Stuart’s arrest, and a letter was sent to
Lieutenant Colonel Lang appointing him Commander-in-Chief of the army
with the rank of Lieutenant General. The order issued a few hours
previously, appointing Burgoyne Commander-in-Chief, was ignored as if
it had never existed. Burgoyne was then told that he might retire.
On leaving the Council room, he found the gates closed and the
drawbridges drawn up, and learned that Stuart had been arrested by a
company of sepoys, in his own house, and brought, a close prisoner,
into the Fort, under circumstances of much indignity. The excuse
afterwards assigned by the Select Committee for this extraordinary
proceeding was, that they believed Stuart was about to seize the
Government by force.
On the following day Burgoyne wrote to the Select Committee,
expressing his intention of taking command of the King’s troops,
since Stuart was incapacitated from acting. He received no reply,
and, on arrival at the camp he found two orders, one constituting
Lang a Lieutenant General, and the other directing Lang to take
command of the whole army; thus superseding Burgoyne and four other
Major Generals and several Lieutenant Colonels, who had been senior
to Lang.
Burgoyne at once assembled the King’s Officers in his tent, and
related to them what had passed. For his own part, he said, he
should consider himself wanting in his duty, to pay obedience to
any other than a senior officer of the King’s appointment: that
General Stuart being deprived of the possibility of acting, the
command of the King’s troops devolved on himself. He did not
attempt to bias the opinions of any of the gentlemen present: he
recommended the avoidance of altercation or even discussion with the
Company’s officers, lest unforeseen consequences might ensue. The
officers present said they would obey no orders but those of the
Commander-in-Chief representing the King, viz.: Sir John Burgoyne.
The same afternoon Lang arrived in camp, and met the King’s officers
in Burgoyne’s tent, where he delivered an order from the Council
instructing Burgoyne to surrender the command of the Army to him.
Burgoyne replied that he would give over the command of the Company’s
troops to whomsoever the Council chose to appoint, but that his duty
to the King required that he should not deliver over the command
of the King’s troops to any person not regularly authorized by His
Majesty: he placed his tents at Colonel Lang’s service. Lang replied
that he had a house at the Mount, and remained silent some time,
till, on the officers calling out that they would obey Sir John
Burgoyne only, he got up and went away. On the same day a letter
was addressed to the Admiral by Sir John, asking for advice and
support, and requesting an asylum on board the flag ship, in the
event of any attempt being made on his person. The Admiral was so
situated that he might have discreetly acted as mediator between
the contending parties had he been so disposed; but, perhaps, his
previous experiences of the Madras Council made him unwilling to be
mixed up in the quarrel. Anyhow, he refused to have anything to do
with the matter.
Very little was needed to produce a conflict between the King’s and
Company’s troops that night. The King’s troops had been exasperated
at the animosity displayed by the Council towards Sir Eyre Coote and
the King’s officers in general. They were alarmed at the violence
offered to General Stuart, and were resolved to repel by force any
repetition of this violence in Burgoyne’s case. In order to prevent
surprise, guards were posted round the Camp. The Council, on their
part, had been haunted all along by the idea that the King’s Officers
aimed at subverting the Government. Two battalions of Bengal Sepoys
with some guns were ordered down to protect Lang’s house, and the
gates of the Fort were kept shut. Each party expected to be attacked,
and, for the next forty-eight hours, a very slight occurrence might
have precipitated a disastrous conflict.
The following day, Burgoyne summoned Major Generals Bruce, Campbell,
Ogle, and Adams to confer with him, and a remonstrance, signed by
the five, was drawn up and forwarded to the Council; to the effect
that they were determined not to act under Lang’s orders. Lang had
meanwhile issued orders for the Army to march on the following day,
in order to test their obedience. Lieut. Colonel Floyd was also
senior to Lang by the date of his commission. Several regiments gave
assurances of support to Burgoyne and Floyd. At a conference of the
senior officers a course of action was determined on, and Burgoyne
withdrew from the camp, at midnight, to his house in Madras. The
vedettes round the camp were at once withdrawn. The next morning,
Floyd likewise withdrew from the army; handing over his command to
Lt. Colonel Mackenzie of the 73rd, who was junior to Lang by date of
commission. The force marched, and took up fresh ground in rear of
their former position.
On reaching Madras, Burgoyne addressed a letter to the Select
Committee notifying his withdrawal from the camp, and offering
himself for arrest if Government had a mind to seize his person. The
offer was somewhat embarrassing to the Select Committee, who evaded
the point by saying that, as Burgoyne had refused to take command of
the Army, Lang had been appointed in his place, and there was nothing
more to be said in the matter. On this, Burgoyne deputed Floyd to
carry a letter to Lord Macartney, in which he asserted his position
as senior officer bearing the King’s commission, and pointed out that
he alone had power to convene Courts Martial.[12]
Lord Macartney was a man of violent temper and overbearing
disposition that kept him in continual hot water. He demanded
unhesitating submission to his views from all with whom he came in
contact. His relations with the supreme government at Calcutta were
as unyielding as with those in immediate contact with him at Madras.
His chief merit was his personal honesty in money matters, at a time
of great laxity; a merit on which he was by no means silent, and
which he did not insist on in his colleagues. He threw himself with
ardour into the chronic quarrels carried on by the Madras Council
with the Bengal Government and the military authorities, and, in
pursuit of the quarrels, lost sight of the great interests at stake,
and brought the Madras settlement to the verge of anarchy. Even
before Sir Eyre Coote’s death he had been induced to believe that
General Stuart had designs against the Government. This belief, for
which not a scrap of evidence was ever brought forward, led him into
a line of conduct that brought about corresponding and increasing
opposition from Stuart. After Stuart’s arrest, the same suspicion
was transferred to Burgoyne, with even less presumption of justice
than had existed in Stuart’s case. Burgoyne proposed an interview
in the presence of witnesses. Had Lord Macartney been less bent on
the quarrel, he would have grasped the opportunity of coming to
some understanding. Instead of this he used the most uncompromising
language to Floyd. “Government would not recede; Government must
be peremptory;” and he still affected to treat Burgoyne as having
refused the command of the army. The following day, Burgoyne received
a letter from the Select Committee arguing the old point of General
Stuart’s commission, and asserting that Burgoyne had acknowledged the
validity of Lang’s promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General, in
spite of which he had withdrawn from camp without Lang’s permission.
The Committee would not contest with him about any authority he
might undertake to exercise, unless it endangered the public safety,
but would not countenance his resumption of command. Lang’s command
extended to the King’s as well as the Company’s troops, and they (the
Committee) would convey dispatches addressed to either Commander
in Chief, to Lang. If Sir John Burgoyne thought proper to act as
Commander in Chief, and to convene Courts Martial, the Committee
had no objection “unless their duty forced them to interfere.” Such
unworkable arrangements were bound to lead to further quarrels.
On the same day, as previously proposed by him, Sir John Burgoyne
had an interview with Lord Macartney, Major General Bruce and Lt.
Colonel Floyd being present. Throughout the quarrel, Burgoyne had
been actuated by a desire to arrive at some working arrangement that
would enable the public service to be carried on, while preserving
the rights of the King whose senior representative he was. In this
spirit he sought an interview with the Governor. But there was no
corresponding desire for peace on the side of the Governor and
Council, and Lord Macartney’s behaviour was disingenuous. Burgoyne
asked for explanations to some parts of the Select Committee’s
letter, which he discussed generally. Lord Macartney would give no
direct answer, and was very guarded in what he said. He was only a
Member of the Government, not authorized to decide, but only to speak
their sentiments, and to represent matters to the other Members.
Would Sir John put down in writing what questions he pleased, he
would engage to lay them before the Select Committee, and obtain
replies to them. Lord Macartney’s intention was to obtain the same
control over the King’s troops, as he exercised over the Company’s
troops. To gain this end he was resolved to give the command to a
Company’s officer, who would naturally be more pliable than a King’s
officer, though it was a recognised principle with the British
Government to keep the command of the King’s troops under an officer
of their own appointment. It is almost incredible that this miserable
quarrel should have gone on at a time of the greatest public
distress, when Tippoo was triumphant in the field, and it was still
uncertain that the Mahrattas would not take up arms again.
Stuart was, shortly afterwards, shipped off to England under close
arrest, in a ship specially purchased for the purpose, though, for
want of funds, the pay of the troops was in some instances over two
years in arrears. During imprisonment, he was denied the use of pen
and ink, and was only allowed to see Burgoyne on public business
in presence of the officer on duty over him. At the time of his
embarkation, he believed that it was intended to put him to death at
sea.
Burgoyne assumed the command of the King’s troops without further
direct opposition, but the Council lost no opportunity of thwarting
him and lowering his authority, while they encouraged others to
resist it. Burgoyne, on his part, cast moderation aside, and was
bent on pushing his claims to extremity. He ignored General Lang,
and issued orders that clashed with those of the civil government,
producing confusion, perplexity, and relaxation of discipline in
every rank. The Major Generals, who had joined in signing the
protest against Lang’s promotion, and several others among the
officers commanding regiments withdrew their support from Burgoyne.
In October, Burgoyne placed Lieutenant Colonel Sterling of the
36th under arrest for disobedience of orders: the Select Committee
released him. The soldiers too had their grievances about batta which
should have been paid to them, but was withheld by Lord Macartney.
The men of the 98th were on the eve of mutiny, and the men of
Burgoyne’s own regiment formed the project of going to the Fort in a
body to ask redress. Burgoyne sternly repressed both movements, but
the Select Committee gave him credit for causing them. A fresh crisis
in the quarrel was inevitable.
In December, General Ogle reported certain matters seriously
affecting the private character of an officer of the 73rd. The rest
of the officers of the regiment refused to allow the matter to be
patched up, as General Ogle desired. Burgoyne had no option but to
convene a General Court Martial, which he did, appointing Lieutenant
Colonel Straubenzee of the 52nd as President. The Court was also
to try two soldiers of the 98th, who had appealed from a Regimental
Court Martial. On such occasions it was customary for the Council to
appoint the Judge Advocate. They refused to nominate one for this or
any Court Martial Sir John might order to assemble, and refused to
grant a place in the Fort for the Court to assemble in. They also
forbade Straubenzee to leave Poonamallee where he was commanding.
Burgoyne then arranged for the Court to assemble at Poonamallee,
but without making the change known, and ordered Straubenzee still
to hold himself in readiness to preside. He also ordered Colonel
Sterling to appear for trial before the Court. The Select Committee
thereupon, on the 31st December, issued an order placing Burgoyne
under arrest for disobedience of orders in September, and for
exciting mutiny and sedition, and appointed Major General Alan
Campbell to command the King’s troops. No attempt was made on this
occasion to place the King’s troops under Lang.
The absurdity of the Select Committee’s action, both in Stuart’s
and Burgoyne’s cases, was shown by their inability to form a Court
Martial for the trial of those officers. They tried to get Burgoyne
to proceed to England, but he refused to go. He proceeded, for a
time, to Pondicherry under open arrest, while the dual commands of
the King’s and Company’s forces continued. For the next eighteen
months Lord Macartney’s quarrels and intrigues, added to his unjust
measures touching the pay and allowances of the army, produced
results that bid fair to end in the ruin of the British government on
the Coast.
In April 1784, a mutiny occurred among four newly formed Native
Cavalry Regiments at Arnee. Arrears of pay for twelve months were
owing to them, and they likewise had unsatisfied claims on the Nawab
of Arcot, from whose service they had been transferred. They seized
the fort of Arnee, and imprisoned their officers. A month’s pay
was given them, but they held out for the whole arrears. The 36th
Foot and one hundred men of the 23rd Light Dragoons were dispatched
to Arcot, to join General Lang. On the night of the 15th May they
marched for Arnee, which they reached soon after daybreak, and after
a brief parley the mutineers laid down their arms.[13] In October,
one of the King’s infantry regiments at Arcot broke out into open
mutiny, but were overawed by the men of the 23rd, and the two other
regiments in garrison, who stuck to their officers. These were by no
means the only instances of grave insubordination both among King’s
or Company’s troops, due to Lord Macartney’s ill-advised measures.
The officers had to complain of broken faith as well as the men.
Sir John Burgoyne’s arrest did not prevent him from looking after
the welfare of the regiment. There had been many casualties among
the horses,[14] as well as among the men; and Lord Macartney is said
to have conceived the idea of gradually allowing the 23rd Light
Dragoons to disappear from want of horses and men, and of raising
a corps of European cavalry in their place. As the men died, the
extra horses were taken from the regiment, and Lt. Colonel Floyd
was forbidden to entertain recruits, of whom a certain number were
procurable, probably from Infantry regiments on the spot. Sir John
thereupon addressed the Bengal Government, by whom a reference was
made to Madras recommending the deficiencies to be made good. The
Madras Government thought the regiment was very well as it was, and
demurred to corresponding with Sir John while he was under arrest.
The Bengal Govt. pointed out that that need not prevent them from
corresponding with the next officer in the regiment. They dwelt on
the importance of maintaining the regiment in an efficient state, and
expressed their sense of the value of the services rendered by the
Regiment in dealing with the Mutiny of the Native Cavalry at Arnee,
and their “desire of giving the Company’s service the full benefit
of the good discipline of H.M.’s 23rd Light Dragoons.” The Madras
Government replied that they would be glad if the Bengal Govt. would
take over the whole of the charges of the regiment. For their part,
they thought it useless to recruit for the regiment, when there were
already more men than horses, and it would be better to transfer
the superfluous men to the Infantry, as horses were expensive, and
a diminution in their number was a useful economy. Warren Hastings
brushed all such cobwebs aside, and sent 147 horses from Hyderabad
to remount the regiment. In spite of their protests, the Madras
Government entered into a correspondence with Sir John which was
characterized on both sides by much bitterness. A detachment of the
regiment was at this time at Ellore in the Masulipatum district.
There seems to have been some expectation at this time that the
regiment would be recalled to England, probably on account of Lord
Macartney’s recommendations to the Court of Directors. Anyhow, a
Madras letter, dated 26th May 1785, published in the _Calcutta Public
Advertiser_, says: “The 23rd Regiment is to remain in India. The
appointments and recommendations of Sir John Burgoyne, are approved
of.” In the middle of July, a detachment of the regiment was sent to
Arcot, but was almost immediately recalled to San Thomé.
Meanwhile, Sir John Burgoyne’s troubles were coming to an end. On
the news of the quarrels, resulting in Burgoyne’s arrest, reaching
England, much interest was excited in the highest quarters. The
matter was twice discussed in the House of Commons, on the 19th July
and 9th August, and it was generally recognised that the trouble had
primarily arisen from a faulty system. Burgoyne was held to have
been correct in his behaviour, and received reassuring letters,
written by the King’s commands, pending the official settlement of
the question. It was determined to appoint at once a new Commander in
Chief of Madras, besides filling the vacancy caused by the death of
Sir Eyre Coote, and to remove the chief actors in the quarrel on both
sides. Burgoyne continued under arrest till the nearly simultaneous
arrival in Madras, at the beginning of June, of Lieut. General Robert
Sloper as Commander in Chief in India, and Lieut. General Sir John
Dalling as Commander in Chief in Madras. General Sloper brought with
him instructions to convene a Court Martial for Burgoyne’s trial,
and for Burgoyne’s return to England after the trial, whatever its
result might be. Lord Macartney, at the same time, received orders
for the surrender of the assignment to the Nawab of Arcot, and
private intelligence of the appointment of his successor. He had
been severely wounded, a few months before, in a duel with one of
the Council, due to his own overbearing temper, and his health was
bad. Believing that he was about to be recalled, he resigned his
post, and sailed for Calcutta to confer with the Bengal Government
before sailing for Europe. While in Calcutta, he received news of
his appointment to succeed Warren Hastings; but his health would not
permit him to stop in India, and he sailed for England.[15]
General Sloper appointed a Court Martial on Burgoyne, with Sir
John Dalling as President. The Madras Council at once claimed the
right to appoint the Prosecutor, which being disallowed, they wrote
complaints in their usual style to the Court of Directors. Another
grievance with the Council was, that they were not given a copy of
the Proceedings. Their desire apparently was to prosecute the quarrel
through Lord Macartney in England. The wish of the Government in
England, and of the Court of Directors, was to bury the unseemly
quarrel as speedily as possible, and the Proceedings were withheld.
A year and a half later, the Madras Government were still writing to
the Governor General for a copy. The exact charges, of which there
were nineteen, cannot now be ascertained, but they partially related
to Sir John Burgoyne’s behaviour in September 1783, more than three
months before the date of his arrest, and charged him with causing
and exciting mutiny and sedition, and refusing to take command of the
King’s troops. On the 11th July, after sitting for nineteen days, the
Court came to the following resolutions--
[Sidenote: 1st.]
That Major General Sir John Burgoyne did not refuse to take upon
him the command of the King’s troops after Major General Stuart
was put under an arrest; but that he declined superseding that
Major General, so long as he viewed him especially appointed by
the King, and he remained in the capacity of acting as such.
[Sidenote: 2nd.]
That the line of conduct pursued by Major General Sir John
Burgoyne on the 19th September and quitting camp the eve of that
day, was productive of the happiest consequences.
[Sidenote: 3rd.]
That in no instance whatsoever did Major General Sir John
Burgoyne disobey any orders immediately proceeding from the
Government.
[Sidenote: 4th.]
That the equivocal situation of Lieut. General Lang, from his
standing in both services,[16] and this Government having
at present no charter rights to confer such high ranks, well
warranted his Majesty’s general officers in witholding from him
their obedience.
[Sidenote: 5th.]
That the orders sent to Lieut. Colonel Sterling by Major
General Sir John Burgoyne, seem to be solely for promoting good
discipline in his Majesty’s troops, and to respect only their
internal economy, which, as the King’s Commander in Chief, he had
not only a right to give, but enforce also.
[Sidenote: 6th.]
That in the instance for which Major General Sir John Burgoyne
was originally put in arrest, it appears the government acted
from half information, not having before them the postscript to
the General Orders of Major General Sir John Burgoyne.
[Sidenote: 7th.]
That the letters before the Court from Major General Sir John
Burgoyne to Lord Macartney or the Presidency, so far from being
mutinous or seditious, are not even disrespectful. The facts
which they assert are strong; but in the manner and expression
they are as decent and proper as the circumstances which gave
them birth could reasonably admit.
SENTENCE.
The Court having thus maturely considered of the evidence and
records in support of the prosecution, and likewise the defence
and those in support of it, is of opinion that the Prisoner Major
General Sir John Burgoyne Bart. is not guilty of the charges
alledged against him; and doth therefore most fully and honorably
acquit him of all and every part of the same.[17]
(Signed)
JOHN DALLING,
Lieut. General & President.
Immediately on the close of the proceedings, the Council addressed
Burgoyne in peremptory and discourteous terms, desiring him to
leave the country; and there appeared every chance of a fresh
quarrel arising, when some influence (probably Sir John Dalling’s)
intervened, and thenceforward there was peace. Burgoyne’s claims
for arrears of pay and allowances, for himself as Commander in
Chief, his Aide-de-camp, and his secretary, for the period he had
been under arrest, were admitted; his passage money was advanced to
him, and he was preparing to sail, when death overtook him on the
23rd of September at the age of forty-six. A tablet to his memory
was placed in St. Mary’s Church in the Fort, by the officers of the
King’s troops. Lang was withdrawn from the service by the Court
of Directors who granted him a special pension of one thousand a
year. Stuart, a few years later, was given the Colonelcy of H.M.’s
31st. In consequence of these disputes, the offices of Governor and
Commander-in-Chief were, soon after, vested in the same person, in
each of the Presidencies. In order to prevent a recurrence of the
dispute in General Sloper’s case, it was ordered, at the time of his
appointment, that in the event of the Company ceasing to employ him,
his right to command the King’s troops should also cease. A project
for amalgamating the King’s and Company’s forces in India, in order
to put an end to the rivalry between the two services, was seriously
considered two years later, but the only change made was to put an
end to the supersession of the Company’s by the King’s officers.
In studying the details of this unhappy quarrel, the conviction
forces itself upon one that there were persons in the background,
who, for their own purposes, fomented the dispute, and aggravated
the differences between the principal parties, by filling their
minds with suspicions and ideas that were equally groundless and
mischievous. This is plainly stated to have been the case by
an officer of the 73rd Highlanders who published a Narrative of
the war with Hyder. “Had it not been for the cordiality and good
fellowship which universally subsisted betwixt the King’s and
Company’s officers, who had shared the fatigues of war together,
notwithstanding the artful steps that had been taken to sow the seeds
of dissension amongst them, these broils might have terminated in
a manner very fatal to the settlement.”[18] Long afterwards, Lord
Macartney acknowledged his mistake. In December 1797, speaking to Sir
David Baird, he said, “Had I known as much of you military gentlemen,
when I was in India, as I have learned since, we never should have
had any difference.” Sir John Burgoyne’s justification was complete.