Russia’s frontiers in Europe and Asia—Conclusions as to their
suitability to the needs of the Empire.
The second chapter of a report, made in 1900, when I was Minister for
War, contained a strategical review of our frontiers. The general
conclusions arrived at may be summarized as follows:
1. _Swedish Frontier._[21]—This is 1,000 miles long, and traverses a
rugged, inaccessible, and sparsely populated country. Starting from
the extreme northern point of the Gulf of Bothnia, and running due
north, it acts as a sharply defined ethnographical line between the
Scandinavians on the west and the Finns on the east. The southern
portion quite corresponds to our requirements, but the northern is
too artificially drawn, and is disadvantageous to us, as it cuts
Finland off from the Arctic Ocean, and gives all the coast to Norway.
We would naturally like to see a realignment of this portion, but
the advantages to be gained are too insignificant to warrant our
quarrelling about them. Still, the situation on this section of our
border cannot be considered to be all that is to be desired.
It has been shown in the preceding chapter what efforts and sacrifices
have been made by Russia in order to gain access to the Baltic Sea
and the Gulfs of Finland and Bothnia. We had to fight four wars with
Sweden, and put 1,800,000 men into the field, and only won at last
after losing some 130,000 men in killed and wounded. The main factor in
our success was the influence on events exercised by Peter the Great,
for it was his victory at Poltava which opened the way for us. At the
beginning of the eighteenth century the Viborg province was, to a
certain extent, Russianized: Russian villages and churches were to be
found in it, and our language was the predominant tongue. In 1809, by
the peaceful Treaty of Friederichsham, Finland passed for ever into the
Empire. All that then remained to be done was to take advantage of our
victories, and quietly but firmly incorporate the conquered province
with the rest of Russia. But we did not do this. Being fully occupied
elsewhere—in fortifying our foothold on the Black and Caspian Seas, in
advancing towards the Pacific, in a long struggle in the Caucasus,
in wars with Poland and in Central Asia—we paid little attention to
what was going on in Finland, and rested content with the outward
peacefulness, order, and submission of its people. The Finns took
advantage of this, and from 1810 to 1890 unceasingly worked against
us, hoping always to succeed in obtaining complete autonomy. In 1811
the Viborg province, won by us at so great a cost, was again made over
to them, though they have not to this day completely obliterated in it
all traces of Russian citizenship. Then, with the assistance of certain
of our statesmen, we learned by degrees to forget that Finland had
ever really been an integral portion of our Empire; we were gradually
taught to feel that she ought to be administered according to the
Swedish Constitution of 1772, and, finally, that she was not really a
Russian province, but an autonomous State. In 1880 the law of universal
military service was enacted. This gave Finland a national army—not a
large one, it is true, but one which, by a well-thought-out system of
reserves, enabled her to put in the field an armed force of 100,000 men
near the Russian capital. Thus the Finns, without shedding a drop of
blood, but by working cautiously, continuously, and systematically for
eighty years, have succeeded in again shutting us out from the Gulfs
of Finland and Bothnia, and have, to a great extent, robbed us of the
fruits of our victories. Therefore, as the kingdom[22] of Norway and
Sweden is weak, and as Finland, which stretches almost to the walls of
the Russian capital, and screens not only it, but the whole of Northern
Russia, is of immense importance to us, we ought, instead of planning
any rectification of the Swedish frontier, to think how best to remove
the causes of friction between the two countries. Sweden could only
hope to take Finland from us if the Finns’ dream of independence came
true; she could only risk operations against us in that country if the
inhabitants joined her or were at least sympathetic. Consequently, to
insure our safety on that frontier, it is our duty to smooth the way as
much as possible for the early unification of Finland and Russia.
The following is a quotation from my report:
“However just our claims to the possession of Finland may be, it
must be acknowledged that our mistaken policy with regard to her,
lasting for eighty years, cannot be rectified all at once. Hasty
action in dealing with matters which touch the domestic life of a
people can only irritate and intensify difficulties. A firm and,
at the same time, cautious attitude, extending, perhaps, over many
years, is essential in order that we may be able in the end to take
our proper place on the shores of the Gulfs of Bothnia and Finland.
We must be particularly careful how we introduce any change into
the people’s mode of life, and must frankly admit that Finland has
reached a more advanced state of civilization than many of our
provinces, although this has been done mainly at the expense of the
Russian people. We should respect Finnish culture, in the hope that
when Finland is united to us it will assist and not harm us.”
2. _Western Frontier._—From Cape Polangen on the Baltic Coast to the
mouth of the Danube in the Black Sea Russia marches for 738 miles with
Germany, 761 with Austro-Hungary, and 467 with Roumania.
The northern and southern extremities of this frontier line are fairly
straight. In the middle, from Raigrod to Litomerj, it runs due west,
and bending round, continues for 390 miles to Myslowitz, along the
southern and eastern frontiers of Germany, and thence for 213 miles
along the northern frontiers of Austro-Hungary. It juts out into
these States, forming our Warsaw Military District, important both
by its position and its strategic significance. This area, formerly
the kingdom of Poland, was joined to Russia by the Treaty of Vienna
in 1815. By holding this area we can envelop the southern frontier of
Eastern Prussia and the northern frontier of Galicia. Operating from
this theatre, we can cut off those provinces from their neighbours
by advancing towards the Baltic Sea on the north, or the difficult
Carpathian range on the south. On the other hand, the district is
itself liable to be cut off by offensive movements from north and
south, directed on the fortress of Brest-Litovsk. Its position,
therefore, makes it of decided importance. Were we more ready for war
than our neighbours, it might constitute a source of strength to us.
If, on the other hand, Germany and Austria together are able to throw
greater numbers into the field, and can concentrate more rapidly than
we can, it will merely be a weak spot.
The German frontier, 738 miles in length, follows no natural feature.
Beyond it lies our nearest neighbour—a nation with whom we have been
in close social and economic relationship ever since we got into
touch with European life. At the present time (1900) five separate
lines of railway connect different parts of Russia with Germany’s
Baltic ports and with Berlin; our annual trade with her amounts to
£32,200,000 (the average of the five years from 1893 to 1897), or, in
other words, to 26·5 per cent. of all our foreign trade. The yearly
exports (five-years average) amount to £16,400,000, or 25·1 per cent.
of all our exports; the imports to £15,800,000 (28·6 per cent. of
our imports). In 1897 alone our German exports totalled £17,520,000,
and our imports £17,980,000. Thus the economic connection between
the two countries is very close. Our interests are reciprocal, and,
consequently, economic reasons alone necessitate a preservation on our
part of the present friendly relations. But it is of no use disguising
the fact that the part played by the German Government at the Berlin
Congress gave us reason to change a policy which had always been
favourable to Germany, and her entry into the Triple Alliance, which
was directed against us, was the origin of our _rapprochement_ with
France. The whole of the frontier is artificial, and quite exposed
to invasion from either side. From the Baltic to Filippovo it acts
as an ethnographical dividing-line between the Lithuanian races in
the east and the Germans, German Lithuanians, and Poles on the west,
and separates our Poles from the German Poles. Though there exists no
obvious natural boundary between us and Germany, the racial one has the
same effect as a natural boundary. By a systematic policy Germany has
succeeded in so Teutonizing the one Slav country of Eastern Prussia
that it now constitutes one of the most loyal provinces of the House of
Hohenzollern. The same policy, with less successful results, however,
is being applied to Posen. On our side we are making great efforts to
colonize the Warsaw Military District and the north-western countries
bordering on Germany, so as to bind them closer to us. If we have not
been so successful in our efforts as our neighbours, it is mainly due
to the backward state of our civilization. Our vacillations, also, as
to the best policy whereby to attain the desired result are responsible
for the slow progress made.
By the expenditure of vast sums of money, Germany has made ready in the
most comprehensive sense to march rapidly across our borders with an
army of 1,000,000 men. She has seventeen lines of railway (twenty-three
tracks) leading to our frontiers, which would enable her to send to
the front more than 500 troop-trains daily. She can concentrate the
greater part of her armed forces (fourteen to sixteen army corps) on
our frontier within a few days of the declaration of war; while, apart
from this question of speedy mobilization, she has at her command
far greater technical resources, such as light railways, artillery,
ordnance, and engineering stores, particularly for telegraphs, mobile
siege-parks, etc., than we have. She has also made most careful
preparation for a determined defence of her own border provinces,
especially those of Eastern Prussia. The first-class fortresses of
Thorn, Königsberg, and Posen are improved yearly, entrenched camps are
built at the most important junctions, and material lies ready stacked
for the rapid semi-permanent fortification of field positions.
The crossing-places on the Vistula have been placed in a state of
defence, as have also the various towns and large villages. The whole
population, indeed, is making ready for a national struggle. Since
the Crimean War we also have worked hard to prepare the Vilna and
Warsaw areas for hostilities; but as Germany has done considerably
more in thirty years than we have in fifty, she has outdistanced us.
Her principal and most overwhelming superiority lies in her railways;
to her seventeen lines running to our frontier we can only oppose
five. This advantage is overwhelming, and gives to her and Austria a
superiority which can be counterbalanced neither by large numbers nor
bravery. The fact remains that Germany, by spending milliards—part
of which were supplied by the war indemnity of 1871—has prepared for
hostilities, both in the shape of an energetic offensive and also a
determined defensive. If a war should happen to go against us, she
might attempt to annex the whole of the Warsaw Military District,
or even part of the Vilna District (on the left bank of the Dwina),
for the peoples of these countries might considerably augment her
military strength. On the other hand, those who analyze the possible
consequences of such a war cannot see what advantage Germany would
derive from such expansion. It is incredible that 100,000,000 Russians
would ever become reconciled to the loss of territory which is bound to
the Fatherland by historical ties, and which has cost so much Russian
blood. Such thinkers are convinced, on the contrary, that we should
concentrate ourselves on winning it back at the very first chance. If
we were better prepared for war, or in a case where Germany’s main
forces were diverted in another direction, the Warsaw Military District
would constitute a _place d’armes_, cutting deep in between her and
Austria, whence we might, with equal ease, advance rapidly on either
Berlin or Vienna. The former is 200 and the latter 213 miles from our
frontier; St. Petersburg and Moscow are 533 and 733 miles respectively
from the German, and 900 and 800 from the Austrian, frontier. If,
however, we were successful in such a campaign, and sought to expand
the Empire further, military considerations would point to the
annexation of the whole of Eastern Prussia up to the Vistula. Astride
this river, with possession of both its banks and of its mouths and of
the River Niemen, we should hold a very commanding position as regards
Germany, and should have considerably improved our military frontier.
But these advantages of position would be more than outweighed by the
many disadvantages attending such an increase of territory. There
would arise for us a question of lost provinces comparable to that of
Alsace-Lorraine; but it would be of a more acute nature, for the German
nation would always be watching for an opportunity to regain—by war if
necessary—territory with which the ruling dynasty was so intimately
connected. It may be assumed, therefore—
That, taking the armed forces of both nations as they exist to-day, and
making allowance for their comparative readiness, an invasion of our
territory by German armies is more probable than a Russian invasion of
Germany;
That an invading German army would meet with fewer difficulties than
ours if we marched into Prussia;
That certain territory might be taken from us;
That we might take Prussian territory from Germany, but that the
population of the conquered provinces would always be hostile to us,
on account of the difference in their state of civilization, national
ties, and traditional sentiment;
That both Russia and Germany are such great nations that neither
could possibly accept a loss of territory nor rest until it had been
regained; and
“_That, taking everything into consideration, it would not suit
Germany, and it would certainly not suit us, to go to war for the sake
of altering the existing frontier._”
3. _Austro-Hungarian Frontier._—Austro-Hungary, 243,043 square miles
in area, is larger than Germany, and in 1900 its population was
45,600,000; but while the German nation is exceedingly homogeneous
and patriotic, the people of Austro-Hungary consist of many races.
Of its population, 24·1 per cent. is German; the numerous Slav groups
comprise 47 per cent. (Bohemians, Moravians, and Slovaks, 16·9 per
cent.; Croatian-Servians, 11 per cent.; Poles, 8 per cent.; Rusins,
8 per cent.; Slavonians, 3 per cent.); Hungarians, 16·2 per cent.;
Roumanians, 6·6 per cent.; Jews, 4·5 per cent.; and Italians, 1·6 per
cent. As regards the feeling of these various races towards Russia,
the Germans who live at a distance from our frontiers are not hostile;
the Hungarians, if not open enemies, are, at any rate, unfriendly on
account of the part we took in suppressing the rebellion of 1849, and
their latent dislike is fanned by the greatest of the Slav groups, the
Poles. The rest of the Slavs are sympathetic with their kinsmen in
Russia, but the main motive for this sentiment is fear lest they should
be absorbed by the Germans or Magyars.
The Austrian frontiers are nowhere simple, but ever since the
conclusion of the Triple Alliance she has turned her attention—in a
military sense—almost exclusively to her Russian frontier. On glancing
at the map, one’s first thought is that the natural boundary between
the two countries should run along the Carpathian range, but the actual
frontier is a long way on the Russian side of it. Galicia forms, so to
speak, a glacis of this main obstacle (the Carpathians) running down
towards Russia, and it has recently grown up into a splendidly prepared
entrenched camp, connected to the other provinces of Austro-Hungary by
numerous roads across the Carpathians. It is strongly fortified and
stocked with supplies of every nature, both for a protracted defence or
an advance in force into Russia. Austria can now concentrate 1,000,000
men in this area within a very short space of time. For 760 miles we
have a common frontier, and the upper reaches of the Vistula—from
Nepolomnitsa to Zavikhost—and a small stretch of the Dniester, with its
tributary, the Zbruoz, form a natural boundary in this direction. These
rivers, however, possess no strategic value. The frontier is crossed by
four lines of railway:
(_a_) At Granitsa, on the Warsaw-Ivangorod line.
(_b_) At Radziviloff.
(_c_) At Volochisk.
(_d_) At Novoselits.
Our economic relations with Austro-Hungary are not so important as
those with Germany. For the five years 1893–97 the average value of our
trade has amounted to only £5,800,000 per annum, or 4·5 per cent. of
our total trade; of this, the exports are £3,500,000, and the imports
£2,320,000 (4·8 and 4·2 per cent. of the respective totals). In 1897
our exports were £3,900,000, and imports £19,000,000. Though almost
half the races of Austro-Hungary come of kindred stock to our people,
and though much of our blood was shed in the nineteenth century in
order to maintain the reigning house of Austria on the throne, war
between the two nations is by no means impossible in the event of a
general European conflagration, for brothers by blood and religion
will march against brothers. Such a war, which would, except in the
imagination of a few Polish dreamers, be a calamity for all the Slav
races, could not be popular with the Austrian-Germans, however much
their interests may be opposed to ours. In Austro-Hungary it is the
Hungarians and Poles alone who hate us, having, as is well known, many
and good reasons for siding with our possible foes. Upon the subject of
a change of our frontier after war with Austria, I wrote in my report
of 1900 as follows:
“In the event of a successful war with us, the Austro-Hungarian
Government—under pressure from the Poles—would probably insist on
the annexation to Galicia of those Russian border-lands where the
Poles predominate. Some of the Polish and Hungarian patriots even
aspire to moving the Russian frontier back to Brest and the Dnieper.
“It is certain that Russia would never accept any loss of
territory, even after defeat, and would do her utmost to win back
as quickly as possible any which had been taken. On the other hand,
after a successful war against Austro-Hungary, and the probably
ensuing break-up of that Empire, Russia will be confronted with
the problem of whether she should take more territory, and if so,
what? There would then recur the cry for the ‘rectification of the
frontier.’ The Carpathian Mountains seem formed by Nature for a
boundary, so that the whole of Galicia might become part of Russia.
“But we must put the position before ourselves clearly and in good
time. Is such an increase of land and population necessary to us?
Should we be the stronger for such annexation, or, on the other
hand, should we be creating a source of weakness and anxiety for
ourselves? Seventy or a hundred years ago a transfer of Galicia
might very likely have been of advantage and have added to our
strength, though even that is problematical, for it is by no means
certain that Austria would not have tried to win it back; she would
have had an excellent opportunity in 1855. But now, after Galicia
has for so long existed apart from us, it could only be torn from
Austria by force, and therefore unwillingly. Neither the Poles of
Galicia nor its Russian population are anxious to become Russian
subjects. We must not lose sight of the fact that for the Slavs of
Austria, including the Rusins, we can only be a means to an end
(emancipation), not an end in ourselves. Even the Bulgarians and
Servians might turn against us. Nor are the Austrian Slavs in real
need of our help. Every year they are gaining, by persistency and
peaceful methods, more and more civil rights, which are gradually
placing them on an equality with the Germans and the Hungarians.
Notwithstanding their grave economic position; notwithstanding the
grip the Jews are getting on the land, or the taxes, which are
heavier than in Russia, and the inequality of rights of Poles and
Rusins, the people of Galicia consider themselves far more advanced
than their Russian neighbours. In their opinion it would be a
retrograde step to become Russian subjects. This is also a point we
must always keep clearly in our minds, lest we imagine that we have
only to move into Eastern Galicia for the people to rise against
the Austrians—their eternal oppressors. If, on the contrary, we
allow ourselves to be led away by the prospect of rounding off our
possessions by means of natural boundaries, we shall certainly
lay up endless trouble and expense for ourselves in the future.
Joined to Russia, Galicia might in a lesser degree become an
Alsace-Lorraine for us, just as Eastern Prussia would be.”
In the matter of railway development the Austrians also have left us
far behind. While they, by means of eight lines of rail (ten tracks),
can run 260 trains up to the frontier every twenty-four hours, we
can only convey troops up to the same point on four lines! As any of
their troops on the frontier would be in advance of the Carpathians,
this range was formerly looked upon as an obstacle to retirement and
to communication between Galicia and the rest of Austria. But in the
last ten years it has been pierced by five lines of railway, and
preparations have been made to lay three more. Notwithstanding our
unreadiness, the Austrians, even if egged on by the Germans, would not
lightly attack us, for they well know that they would meet a determined
foe and be committed to a national war. On the other hand, we must
not deceive ourselves with any idea that we could easily defeat the
Austrians. Their army, which is of great size and splendidly equipped,
would base itself upon the strong entrenched camp in Galicia, and
could, if properly commanded, throw superior numbers into the field
against us. I recorded the following conclusions upon the Austrian
frontier in my report of 1900:
“_It would be advantageous to neither Austria nor Russia to engage
in war in order to bring about an alteration of the existing
frontier._
“It is satisfactory to be able to draw such conclusions regarding
our frontiers with these two powerful States. Having no desire for
our neighbours’ land, and being at the same time quite prepared
to make any sacrifice for the defence of our own country, we may
hope that if we on our side have no reason to force on a war, our
neighbours will, on their side, use every means to avoid beginning
one with us.”
4. _Roumanian Frontier._—For 466 miles south of Austro-Hungary we
march with Roumania. The frontier runs along the River Pruth and the
northern branch of the delta of the Danube. It is there formed by a
natural line of water; it fully meets our requirements, political and
military, and therefore calls for no change. The young kingdom of
Roumania, consisting of some 51,000 square miles, with a population of
5,000,000, is one of the second-class Powers of Europe. Our trade with
her amounts roughly (taking the average from 1893–97) to £1,020,000 per
annum, constituting O·8 per cent. of our foreign trade. Our exports
amount, on the average, to £750,000 per annum (1·3 per cent. of our
total exports). Two lines of railway run to the frontier from our side:
one to Ungens, whence it continues on to Jassy; the other to Reni,
whence communication extends to Galatz by road, there being no bridge
across the Pruth. Although Roumania owes her very existence to Russia,
the close relations into which she has entered with Germany, and still
more with Austro-Hungary, and her evident anxiety to develop her army
and fortify her frontier on our side, point in no uncertain manner to
the possibility of her taking up arms against us in a European war.
The reason may be that she wishes, in the event of such a conflict, to
wrest from us Bessarabia, half the population of that province being
Roumanian.
5. In _Trans-Caucasia_ we march for 325 miles with Turkey and 465
with Persia. The territory of the former is in three continents, and
amounts to 1,581,400 square miles, with a population of 40,000,000. Our
trade with her (taking the same years as before) reaches £2,110,000
per annum, or 2·1 per cent. of our total foreign trade. The frontier
was fixed after our victorious campaign of 1877–78. As it runs for
the most part along natural boundaries, such as watersheds, it not
only effectually guarantees the integrity of our possessions from any
Turkish attempt at aggression, but it gives us an advantageous route by
which to advance on Erzeroum, the most important point in Asia Minor,
and the only fortress of any strength nearer than Scutari. Thus, the
present frontier may be accepted as being quite satisfactory from our
point of view, and no change is necessary.
In Europe we have no long land frontier with Turkey, as Roumania and
Bulgaria lie between us. The only point at which we are in direct touch
with her on the mainland is in the Caucasus, and this is the only
point where we can engage her by a direct advance across the frontier.
But though we are content with our position, we must not forget that
Turkey, given a favourable opportunity, might make an effort to regain
the territory we have taken from her. To make our position on her
frontier safe, we should pacify the Caucasus, improve the conditions
of the people and our organization of troops there, and strengthen our
command of the Black Sea.
6. _East of Turkey_ we march with Persia for 465 miles in
Trans-Caucasia, to the east again for 275 along the Caspian Sea, and
further still to the east on land for 593 miles up to Zulfikar on the
Heri Rud. Including the Caspian shore, we have a common frontier with
Persia of 1,333 miles.[23] Our trade with her has gradually increased
in the last ten years from £2,000,000 in 1888 to £3,500,000 in 1897. Of
all our land-borne commerce, this is only exceeded by our trade with
Germany, Austria, and China. In nine years our exports have risen from
£900,000 to £1,600,000, and our imports from £1,100,000 to £1,900,000.
Our exports have, however, been artificially stimulated by very
heavy rebates on the export tax on sugar and cotton, and the imports
diminished by the high taxes on tea brought through Persia (from China
and India) and an almost prohibitive tariff on foreign manufactured
goods. Her situation on the Indian Ocean, upon the shortest route to
India from Europe, combined with the undeveloped state of her resources
and her military weakness, makes Persia the natural arena for any
struggle between the great Powers for predominance in the Middle East.
Hitherto Russia and Great Britain have been the principal competitors,
but Germany is now apparently ready to join in the race, for she is
making serious efforts to establish her footing in Asia Minor. The
fact that we are neighbours over an immense length; our long-standing
peaceful relationship;[24] the privileges we enjoy from the Treaty
of Gulistan, which give us a word in the internal administration of
the country, and permit us to maintain exclusive supremacy on the
Caspian, which washes the defenceless shores of Northern Persia; and,
finally, our complete military superiority, can be said to confer at
present on Russia an effective political predominance in the country.
As regards economic predominance, we have in our hands only the trade
of the three northern provinces; throughout the rest of the country it
does not belong to us. In the southern provinces it is almost entirely
in the hands of Great Britain. By seizing points on the coast of the
Indian Ocean, by constructing railways[25] and developing her trade
with Persia, Great Britain apparently aspires not only to make certain
of supremacy in the south, but gradually to capture the trade of the
central provinces, and even to compete with us in the north. Germany
will also soon be a serious competitor of ours; she already controls
the important trade route from Trebizond to Tabriz. The following is
the conclusion I recorded in the report I have quoted from above:
“Our Persian frontier has been settled and delimitated along
its whole length, and neither for strategic nor other reasons
is any change desirable; nor do we wish to obtain any further
concessions of land from Persia. On the contrary, not only would
the acquirement of fresh districts filled by alien peoples, and
the consequent expense of administration, be of no advantage to
us, but any action likely to undermine the friendly feelings now
underlying all our dealings with the Persians would be distinctly
detrimental to our interests. From the military standpoint, there
appears to be no need to realign the frontier. It separates kindred
races only for a short distance—_i.e._, the Persians and Turkomans
in Lenkoran and along the Artek. Following natural landmarks
for the rest of its length, it acts as a racial division—in
Trans-Caucasia between the Armenians and Turks; in Azerbaijan
between the Persians, Turko-Tartars, and the Kurds; in Central Asia
between the Turkomans and Russians of Trans-Caucasia, and the Kurds
and Persians of Khorasan. For the last fifty years our trade with
Persia, taking imports and exports, has increased enormously, and
it is now our duty to preserve and develop it, and to take every
step in order that the northern markets may, year by year, become
more completely dominated by us; but a further growth of trade is
only possible if the people of the country feel secure and internal
order is maintained. By the conquest of the Turkomans twenty years
ago we guaranteed peaceful development to the people of Khorasan,
and we are now reaping the fruits of our victory at Geok Tepe,
for our trade in Khorasan alone amounts to about £10,000,000 a
year. If, therefore, the necessity should arise in the future, it
will certainly be our duty to assist the Persian Government to
maintain order in those portions of country nearest to our border.
Consequently, our most urgent duties in Persia are, at present,
the maintenance of order in the provinces nearest us, and of our
command of the markets in the north of the country.”
7. _Eastwards_ again from the Persian frontier runs that of
Afghanistan, which has not long been delimitated. It is 1,259 miles
long, and traverses a desert as far as the Oxus, and then runs along
that river. This frontier is satisfactory, and well defined.
Bounded on the west by Persia, on the south and east by Baluchistan and
the Indian Empire, Afghanistan contains the immense range of the Hindu
Kush Mountains, with their numerous ramifications. In size it is some
217,800 square miles, with a population of 5,000,000 to 6,000,000, of
which 56 per cent. are Afghan and 44 per cent. non-Afghan tribes. As it
lies between our territory in Central Asia and Great Britain’s Indian
Empire, it has long been an object of interest to the British, who have
desired to establish in it an exclusive supremacy. Being afraid of an
attempt on our part to march on India, they have followed our every
move in Central Asia with a vigilant eye. So long ago as 1873 they
tried to arrive at an agreement with us whereby, if they refrained from
interference in Bokhara, we, on our side, should undertake to abstain
from any intervention in Afghanistan. Since then they have moved
forward several steps on the frontiers of the country, and have even
annexed a portion of it. But in proportion as they have advanced beyond
the Indus, they have, instead of assuring more peace upon the border,
met greater difficulties, with the result that their present position
on the north-west frontier of India is unsettled and unsatisfactory.
Afghanistan has not only not become British, but under twenty years of
Abdur Rahman’s energetic administration has become stronger—so much so
that it is now really an independent empire,[26] with a sound military
organization. As regards the country’s sentiments, it is as hostile to
us as it is to the British.
Since 1873 we also have greatly added to our possessions in Central
Asia. We conquered Turkomania and the Khanate of Khokand, defeated the
inhabitants of Khiva, and turned it into a trading centre; and although
we did not annex Bokhara, by running a railway through it and including
it within our fiscal area we secured absolute supremacy. In this way we
pushed our frontiers on to Persia and Afghanistan, and, having drawn
our boundary along natural features, we now possess a clearly defined
line along the whole of which we are blessed with peace. The conclusion
I came to regarding the Afghan frontier was expressed as follows in my
report of 1900:
“If we compare the success of British policy in India since 1873
with the results of our progress in Central Asia, we have reason
to congratulate ourselves. We are at present better and more
peacefully established than they are. There would not be any
advantage in changing our present position for a worse one, which
we would certainly do if we annexed part of Afghanistan. Since
the non-Afghan peoples of Northern Afghanistan wish to be taken
over by us, it would seem natural that we should annex Afghan
Turkestan and the Herat province. Such annexation would bring us
over 2,000,000 new subjects, of whom the majority are industrious
and skilled tillers of the soil; would advance our frontier to
the Hindu Kush, which has long been the dream of many Russians;
and would give us possession of the far-famed Herat, a place most
undoubtedly of great strategical importance. At first sight the
gain seems indisputable; but from a closer study of the subject, it
is clear that the result of the realization of these schemes would
be to create for ourselves immense difficulties in the present and
possible danger in the future. In the first place, the geographical
boundaries would not coincide with the ethnographical. For, in
moving our frontier up to the edge of the Hindu Kush, we should be
forced to take over tribes of Afghan descent, and yet at the same
time exclude some non-Afghan races kindred to those we had already
taken over. This in itself bristles with difficulties. Where the
inhabitants of the valleys are peasants, Uzbegs, and Tajiks, they
would probably submit to us without opposition, but the hillmen,
even those of non-Afghan descent, would fight fiercely for their
liberty. Even after conquering them, we, like the British in India
to-day, would have no peace. Continual risings would take place
along our new frontier, the hillmen from Afghanistan proper would
begin to raid just as the tribes do on the Indian border, and
continual expeditions would be necessary. We should be compelled
in the end, just as the British have been, to move the frontier
forward repeatedly, and to absorb more territory. So it would go on
until our frontier eventually coincided with that of British India.
Immense sums of money would be required for the organization and
administration of the country taken over, for the construction of
roads and fortified positions for large numbers of troops, and to
meet the cost of expeditions, etc. Finally, it must be remembered
that the people of Afghan Turkestan and Herat, who now look on
us as their liberators from Afghan oppression, might, when taken
over, change their feeling towards us. The consequence would be
that, instead of keeping neighbours well disposed towards us, and
ready to assist us when called upon, we should be acquiring fresh
responsibilities in the shape of discontented subjects, who would
require military garrisons for their control.”
In 1878—_i.e._, twenty-seven years ago—when I was in the Asiatic
Section of the Headquarters Staff, I was convinced of the necessity for
Russia and Great Britain to work together harmoniously in Asia, and I
was opposed to every plan of offensive operations towards India. After
our brush with the Afghans at Kushk in 1885, when relations with Great
Britain became very strained, and a rupture might have occurred at any
moment, we made preparations to concentrate an army in Central Asia in
case the British should declare war. I was nominated for the
appointment of Chief of the Staff to this force, and at the committee
meetings, over which General Vannovski presided, I expressed my opinion
openly as to the necessity for a peaceful agreement with Great Britain.
I pointed out that the interests of the two Powers on the continent of
Asia were identical, for both had to reckon with the natural desire of
conquered nationalities to overthrow their masters, and that it would
therefore be far more rational for our troops in Central Asia to assist
Great Britain in her struggle with the local peoples than for us to
advance towards India with the object of raising it against the
British. When I was in command of the Trans-Caspian district from 1890
to 1898, I did everything within my power to maintain peace on the
Afghan border, and, after I had succeeded in obtaining the construction
of a railway to Kushk, I urged the necessity of coming to an agreement
with Great Britain, so that, by joining up the railway systems of India
and Turkestan, we might once for all put an end to our rivalry in the
Middle East. I still continued to advocate an agreement after becoming
War Minister, and my résumé on the Afghan frontier in the report
already quoted concluded with the following words:
“I cannot but express my firm conviction that the connection of the
Indian and Central Asian railway systems by a line from Chaman to
Kushk, via Kandahar and Herat, would create a line of international
importance. Such a line would in the future assist the peaceful
delimitation of our sphere of influence in Afghanistan, and if
Great Britain will abandon her policy of everywhere putting
impediments in our path, would facilitate a _rapprochement_[27]
based upon the mutual interests of the two nations. Absolutely
convinced as I am that the possession of India would in twenty
years’ time be a misfortune and an insupportable burden for Russia,
I consider it both natural and right that we should establish an
_entente_ with Great Britain, so that in case of any great rising
in India we should be on the side of the British. The twentieth
century must see a great conflict between the Christian and the
other nationalities in Asia. It is essential for the welfare of
humanity that we should in such case be allied with the Christian
Power against the pagan races.”
My opinions on the Chinese, Korean, and Japanese frontiers I will, on
account of their importance, quote verbatim, where possible, from my
report:
“From the Pamirs almost to the Pacific, we march with China for 6,074
miles. China is about 4,267,000 square miles in extent, and contains
about 400,000,000 inhabitants, so that it has the largest population
in the world. The great mass of the people are Buddhists, about
20,000,000 are Mohammedans, and about 1,150,000 Christians. Our trade
with China, which has been gradually increasing during the last ten
years, has risen from £3,100,000 in 1888 to £4,560,000 in 1897.
“Notwithstanding the immense length of this frontier, our exports
are insignificant; but it is to be hoped that the railway-line
through Manchuria, with its branch to Port Arthur, will alter
this unprofitable state of affairs in our favour.[28] Although we
have had relations with China for two centuries, and although our
frontiers are identical for over 6,000 miles, they have not once
been violated by military operations. The number of troops kept in
Siberia has always been exceedingly small. This has been due to the
generally peaceful disposition of the Chinese, to the position of
the River Amur, and other natural obstacles—lofty mountain ranges
and vast steppes—and to the absence of any really close tie between
China and her subject races nearest to our frontier.
“Our occupation of the Ussuri district necessitated raising new
bodies of troops for garrison purposes. Finally, the Chino-Japanese
War and its consequences compelled us to take further and rapid
action to strengthen our forces in the Far East. This war showed
up the extreme political weakness of China on the one hand, and
the great power and energy of Japan on the other—facts of immense
significance in East Asian affairs. Our frontier with China is of
such length that we naturally cannot remain indifferent to this
development. Japan betrayed an intention of taking possession
of Korea, our neighbour; we were therefore compelled, by force
of circumstances, to establish a sort of temporary protectorate
over it, and, by an agreement with Japan, Korea was declared to
be independent, and was ostensibly left to itself. But we did not
confine ourselves to this. For the great services we had rendered
China in the war, we obtained on commercial pretexts a concession
for a railway through Manchuria from Trans-Baikalia to Vladivostok,
and as the immediate consequence of this, we found it necessary
to try and get a concession of part of the Kuan-tung Peninsula,
with the ports of Dalny and Port Arthur.[29] This forward policy
compelled us to augment our forces in the east with troops
withdrawn from European Russia, thereby weakening, to a certain
extent, our position in the west.[30] Notwithstanding the more
active line we have taken up, and the inclusion of the whole of
Manchuria within our sphere of influence, we must remember that we
are at present quite content with our frontier, and that to change
it by the annexation of any portion of Manchuria, for instance,
would be in the highest degree undesirable.
“On the extreme western side our boundary, running along the lofty
spurs of the Tian-Shan Mountains, is so strong by nature that,
although the people of Kashgaria on one side of it are racially
akin to our native population in Eastern Turkestan on the other,
there would be no gain in altering the boundary. Further north
the border-line bisects the basin of the Ili, peopled partly by
tribes of the same race. Annexation of the fertile province of
Kuldja, projecting like a strong bastion to the east, would, on
the contrary, have been of some advantage to us, as it would have
facilitated defence, and would have acted as a menace to the
Chinese. Such an advantage is of minor importance, however, and not
enough to warrant impairing our relations with China. All the way
to Manchuria the boundary-line runs across the Mongolian steppes,
where its position is sufficiently strong for us to cope both with
local conditions and with China’s lack of control over her border
tribes. Finally, in the extreme east—in Manchuria—the frontier is
less assured, and, owing to the construction of a line of railway
to connect the Ussuri district with Trans-Baikalia by the shortest
route through Manchuria, our position has become disquieting.
“As regards the position of the Chinese province between the Amur
district on the north, the Ussuri district on the north-east,
and the Kuan-tung Peninsula on the south, the question naturally
arises: What shall we do with it in the future? To annex it would
be very unprofitable, not to mention the fact that the seizure
of this—one of the most important provinces of China—would for
ever destroy the ancient peaceful relationship between China and
ourselves. It would result in many Manchurians settling in our
territory, in the Amur and Ussuri districts, which now are only
thinly peopled by Russians, and our weak colonies would be swamped
by the flowing tide of yellow. Eastern Siberia would become quite
un-Russian, and it must be remembered that it is the Russians
alone who form, and will form in the future, the reliable element
of the population. Such an inrush of Chinese into the Pri-Amur
district would undoubtedly improve the standard of its agriculture
and convert its deserts into flowering gardens; but, at the same
time, surplus land in Siberia, every acre of which we ought to
preserve for our own people, would be passing into the hands of
non-Russian races. The population of Russia of the twentieth
century will need it all. As this will probably amount to some
400,000,000 in the year 2000, we must begin now to set aside land
for at least a quarter of this number. It would, therefore, be
preferable if Manchuria remained an integral part of China. But if
we decide against its annexation, we ought undoubtedly to take
every means to obtain absolute commercial control, consolidating
our position by constructing lines through it, such as the
Trans-Baikal-Vladivostok and Port Arthur railways. We should not
obtain any further concessions from China, but our policy towards
her in the near future should be—
“1. Not to permit any increase in, nor development of the training
of, her armed forces, particularly in the north, and to forbid the
presence of foreign military instructors in that quarter.
“2. To develop our social and commercial relations with her as much
as possible, in the northern provinces to commence with.
“3. To avoid as far as possible any dispute on her soil with other
European nations, to insure which we should confine our attentions
to North China, and undertake no railway enterprises south of the
Great Wall, more especially in the Yang-tsze Valley.
“The last portion of our frontier marches with Korea, a country
with an area of 80,000 square miles, and containing a population
of at least 11,000,000, amongst whom are only some 2,000 to 10,000
Chinese, 45,000 to 55,000 Japanese, and some 300 Europeans.[31] The
position of Korea is peculiar; she is subordinate both to China
and Japan, and yet, since 1897—by the agreement between ourselves
and the latter Power—her independence has been acknowledged.
Extreme caution is therefore demanded in our dealings with and
our policy concerning her. Though we feel no necessity to annex
the country ourselves, we can under no circumstances consent
to the establishment in it of an energetic Japan or any other
Power. For the present, a Korea, weak, independent, but under
our protection, is for us the simplest solution of the question.
The immediate establishment of a Protectorate would not only
necessitate all sorts of expense, but might drag us unprepared into
war. And so in this case, just as in Persia and in North China,
we must work systematically towards gradually acquiring absolute
economic control of the country. The occupation of the Kuan-tung
Peninsula, the permanent fortification of our position there, and
the completion of the roads running through Manchuria, are steps
in advance, and important ones, in this problem of the future. _At
present we are in no way ready to take an active line in Korea,
and must, at any cost, avoid stirring up a conflict with Japan on
account of Korean affairs._
“We are certain to encounter Japan’s strenuous opposition in our
endeavour to obtain control of the Korean markets, even if it be
only in the shape of political or mere trade competition, and if
we cannot altogether avoid a conflict, we shall in all probability
have to fight her in the beginning of the twentieth century.”
From this very brief survey of our frontiers it is seen how we are
for over 11,000 miles in touch with nine States, and nowhere wish
any realignment of our frontier. This is highly satisfactory, and if
we are content with our present boundaries, and concern ourselves in
the present century solely with the consolidation of the position we
have gained during the past 200 years, the danger of war with our
neighbours seems remote. For the present generation such a course
is absolutely essential. Immense were the sacrifices made by our
forebears in adding to our great Empire, but the struggle which is
even now necessary to preserve the existence of our frontier regions
is so severe that it is retarding still further the naturally slow
economic development of the mass of the people in Russia itself. Our
border districts exist, in fact, at the expense of the interior of
the country, and have up to the present been a source of weakness
rather than of strength to the Empire at large. So over-burdened is
the present generation with the many requirements necessary for their
administration and defence, that to undertake at the same time any
fresh foreign enterprises may soon become quite beyond our powers.
But with a growing population, will our Empire be content with the
existing frontiers, or will Russia have to solve further problems of
expansion? And what will they be? Such was the question I put to myself
in submitting my report. I considered it natural that Russia, “without
increasing her extent either in Europe or Asia,” should try in the
twentieth century to gain access to warm seas, which are ice-free all
the year round, such as the inner Mediterranean seas and the outlets
which are open all the year round into the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
As regards the difficulties and dangers in undertaking these schemes I
said:
“However natural our wishes may be to possess an outlet from the
Black Sea and access to the Indian or to the Pacific Oceans, such
aims could not be realized without inflicting grave injury upon
the interests of almost the whole world. In fact, so much is this
the case, that in the pursuit of such aims we must be prepared
to fight combinations of any of the following nations: Great
Britain, Germany, Austria, Turkey, China, and Japan. It is not
the actual move on our part to any of the above-mentioned places
that is feared by others, but the consequence of such a move—if
successful. The possession of the Bosphorus and the passage
into the Mediterranean would enable us to take decisive action
as regards the Egyptian question, and to make the Suez Canal
international,[32] and our presence on the Indian Ocean would be a
continual menace to India. But the chief disturbing element in the
minds of the more advanced nations of Europe and America (which
are now the factories and workshops of the whole world) would be
the fear of our competition in the marts of the world. Having in
our hands the main lines of railway connecting the Pacific Ocean
and the Baltic Sea, with feeder lines from the Bosphorus, the
Indian and Pacific Oceans, we could, with our inexhaustible natural
wealth, control the industry of the globe.”
Such has been the recent growth of armaments among all nations that
the difficulties which will confront us in any effort to reach warm
seas in this century will absolutely put into the shade any faced by
us in the past, and the powers of the present generation may well
prove unequal to the effort required to gain what is, after all,
only necessary for our children’s children. Indeed, a comparison of
fighting strengths leads to the inevitable conclusion that not only
is the present generation too weak to undertake fresh tasks to secure
what is necessary for the existence of the 400,000,000 of our future
population, but that the relative greater power of our probable enemies
makes it extremely difficult to guarantee the integrity of the Empire.
The following is the reference to this point in my report:
“Within the last fifty years the military resources of our
neighbours have so increased, and Germany and Austria, more
especially, are so much better prepared to invade us, that our
western frontier is now exposed to greater danger than it has ever
been in the whole of our history.
“Our military position on the Turkish frontier also is no longer
as favourable as it was in the beginning of the nineteenth
century. This is particularly the case now that Germany seems to
be taking so much interest in Turkish affairs. Again, the defence
of the Caucasus has also become difficult. So, too, on the Afghan
frontier we now have powerful neighbours, who in organization and
armament are more on a level with our troops in Turkestan than
they were in the beginning of the last century. An Afghan invasion
of our territory is by no means an impossibility, a fact which
complicates considerably the defence of Turkestan.
“China is at present alone in having no army worthy of serious
consideration, and she is impotent against us in the Pri-Amur[33]
or Kuan-tung districts. But in the place of a weak China has arisen
a powerful Japan, whose armed forces may prove a danger to our
troops in the Far East until sufficient reinforcements can be sent
out.
“Still, notwithstanding our great length of frontier to be
defended and the immense development in the military power of our
neighbours, the difficulties in the way of defeating us on our own
soil are so obvious and so great that, if we confine our actions to
self-defence, no enemy will be likely to attack us.”
Finally, an analysis of the strength and resources of our nearest
neighbours forced me to the conclusion that “_our western frontier
has never in the whole history of Russia been exposed to such danger
in the event of a European war as it is now, and that accordingly the
attention of the War Department in the first years of the present
century should be confined to strengthening our position on that side,
and not diverted to aggressive enterprises elsewhere_.”
FOOTNOTES:
[21] The frontiers with Norway and Sweden were settled by the Treaty of
Friederichsham in 1809, and the St. Petersburg Convention of 1826.
[22] [Written before the partition.—ED.]
[23] In Trans-Caucasia the frontier along the Rivers Araks and Astara
was fixed by the Treaty of Turkmanchai in 1828, and in Trans-Caspia
along the Artek and the Kopet Dagh ridge by the Agreement at Teheran in
1881.
[24] The Trans-Caucasian frontier has held good for seventy years.
[25] [The line to Nushki is evidently referred to.—ED.]
[26] [_Sic._—ED.]
[27] [This view is interesting in the light of more recent events.—ED.]
[28] In 1897 the chief exports were: Cotton-stuffs, £344,100; naphtha
and its products, £100,800; and wool, £40,400. The chief imports were:
Tea, £3,210,900; cotton goods, £170,200; woven materials, £165,800;
live stock, £78,700; and leather, £72,300. Total exports, £640,000;
total imports, £3,920,000.
The central and largest section of the Chinese frontier was fixed by
the Nerchinsk Treaty of 1687, and the Burinsk and Kiakhta Treaties
of 1727; the most western by the Treaties of Chuguchag in 1864, and
St. Petersburg in 1881 (after the pacification of Kuldja); the most
eastern, along the Rivers Amur and Sungari, by the Treaties of Aigun
in 1858, and Peking in 1860; and our last acquirement of territory in
China—the southern part of the Kuan-tung Peninsula—was ceded to us in
1898.
[29] The route through Manchuria shortens the line of the Great
Siberian Railway, and is therefore of great commercial value, but is
dangerous for military reasons. The route along the Amur would be
better, for it traverses Russian territory only, and is covered by that
river.
[30] To enable us to provide sufficient units in Kuan-tung, the War
Department was obliged to weaken the establishment of troops in the
Odessa and Kieff Military Districts by 6,000 men.
[31] The recent arrivals are composed chiefly of Japanese, with a few
Chinese. Their number is always greater in the warm weather, when they
come to Korea on business (fishing, timber-cutting, etc.).
[32] [_Sic._ General Kuropatkin seems to have written this by an
oversight.—ED.]
[33] [The Pri-Amur is the Russian Amur Province situated on the north
side of the Amur River.—ED.]