THE GERMANS AND THE IRISH
As soon as war broke out, the veteran John Devoy, together with Judge
Cohalan and other sympathisers, put themselves into communication with
Bernstorff, the German Ambassador, von Papen, the Military Attaché,
and Boy-ed, the naval attaché in Washington. The war with Germany was
to be made the supreme opportunity for establishing a Republic in
Ireland. Naturally, the Germans were ready to make use of any means
that might embarrass their enemy, and they were as ready to help the
Irish revolutionaries as they were the Indian. Devoy was in no lack
of funds, for besides the money which he could always collect from
Irish-Americans, he could draw upon the German Secret Service funds.
The Germans described him as one of their ‘agents.’
During the early months of the War James Larkin, of the Irish Transport
Workers, appeared in America on platforms decorated with the German and
Irish flags intertwined, and no pains were spared to make it clear to
Americans that German and Irish interests were identical.
During the autumn of 1914 Sir Roger Casement was in New York. At that
time all that was known in England was that he was in clandestine
communication with Bernstorff. It was not until many months afterwards
that his real scheme was disclosed. His proposals to the Germans were
that he should go over to Berlin and form an Irish Brigade out of the
Irish prisoners of war, and that his brigade, with the assistance of a
German military force, should effect a landing in Ireland when the time
was ripe, but that in the meantime the German Government should furnish
the Irish volunteers with great supplies of arms and munitions in order
that, when the time came, they should be able to take the field and
welcome the invaders. A document (Casement called it a ‘Treaty’) was
negotiated and signed between 23rd and 28th December 1914.
I do not believe that any disloyal thought had entered into Casement’s
head before the War. He had been for many years in the service of
the Foreign Office as a consular officer in West and East Africa and
Brazil; he had published accounts of atrocities by the Belgians on the
Congo and by certain Peruvians in Putumayo; he had been knighted for
his services in 1911. In view of his subsequent conduct, it may be well
to bear in mind that he wrote to the Foreign Secretary on 19th June
1911, in terms somewhat extravagant for the moderate honour of a Knight
Bachelor which had been conferred upon him. This letter was read at his
trial.
[Illustration: THE STABLE IN WHICH TREASURY NOTES WERE FORGED.]
Casement sailed for Norway in October with a Norwegian servant who
afterwards gave some information about the voyage. The vessel was
stopped by one of our auxiliary cruisers, but Casement was not
recognised. While he was in Norway he circulated a fabricated story
which, however, he himself may have believed, that the British Minister
was concerned in a plot against his life; but when Bernstorff was urged
to make public capital of this he replied that it would be better to
wait for confirmation. In fact, in adopting this cautious attitude he
was doing no more than Casement’s former official colleagues had always
done.
Casement arrived in Berlin on 2nd November. Soon after his arrival he
had an interview with Zimmermann, of the Foreign Office.
He asked Devoy to send over an Irish-speaking priest, and in due course
the Rev. John T. Nicholson was dispatched from America via Italy and
Switzerland to become Roman Catholic chaplain at the internment camp
in which the Irish prisoners were being collected. The expenses of
Casement’s journey are believed to have been furnished by John Devoy.
Throughout 1915 the real direction of Irish affairs was in the hands of
John Devoy and Bernstorff, who was acting through him. The process of
arming the Irish rebels was not proceeding quite smoothly. Von Papen
had purchased for use in India or in Ireland 11,000 rifles, 4,000,000
cartridges, and a number of revolvers, but the Germans were quite
firm in their view that these could not safely be landed in Ireland.
Instructions and information were carried to and fro by Devoy’s
messengers who, as American citizens, could travel about Ireland very
much as they liked. But early in February 1916 Devoy began to change
his waiting policy. The Irish volunteers had become increasingly
active. There was the threat of conscription, for though Ireland had
been exempt from compulsory service Devoy expected that the leaders
in Ireland would be arrested and that then, when everything was in
confusion, conscription would be enforced. He decided, therefore,
that there must be a rising on Easter Saturday, 1916, on the occasion
of a review of the Irish Volunteers, and that the Germans must land
munitions in or near Limerick at some time between Good Friday and
Saturday. He was also counting upon German military help as soon as a
rising had begun.
It may be wondered why the arrest of the leaders, so much dreaded
by Devoy, was not carried out. According to rumour, Mr. Birrell, the
Chief Secretary, was much swayed by the opinions of the Nationalist
leaders, who counselled tolerance under every provocation for fear of
precipitating a disastrous conflict.
On 4th March the Germans promised to send two or three trawlers
containing 20,000 rifles and 10 machine guns to Tralee Bay between 20th
and 23rd April, and a messenger was dispatched to Ireland from America
with full instructions. The Irish leaders were very anxious that a
submarine should enter the Liffey and go right up to the Pigeon House
at the same time.
These preparations on the part of the Germans were not a military or
naval enterprise, they were directed by the German Foreign Office. On
26th March Devoy was informed that three trawlers and a cargo steamer
would arrive with 1400 tons of cargo, and that lighters must be ready
to unload them. These instructions were transmitted to Ireland. On the
19th the Germans had agreed to arrange a demonstration by airship and
naval attack to divert attention from the landing of the munitions, and
these took place; but the Germans would not consent to the landing of
troops, which had been urged so strongly by both Casement and Devoy,
nor would they send a submarine up the Liffey, because the naval
authorities foresaw technical difficulties.
We must now return to Casement in Germany. Evidence was given at his
trial about the manner in which he carried out the first part of his
scheme--the formation of an Irish Brigade. His reception by the Irish
prisoners of war was not all that he had expected. Many of the men
were inclined to give him a hostile reception, but he did succeed in
seducing fifty-six men from their oath of allegiance. How far they
were impressed by his appeal to patriotism for Ireland or how far by
their desire to obtain more liberty and better treatment from the
Germans there are no means of knowing. These men were put under the
command of Monteith, who obtained a commission as lieutenant, and
were removed to a camp at Lossen. Rumour says that their behaviour,
especially when not entirely under the influence of sobriety, was
embarrassing to the Germans, who were compelled to limit their bounds,
and to impose certain other restrictions. They provided them with a
handsome green uniform but not with arms.
A highly-placed personage in Germany has since told me that towards the
end of 1915 the attitude of the German authorities towards Casement had
cooled; so much so that a very strong hint was conveyed to him to leave
the capital. However this may be, in January 1916 he went to Munich,
and from there to Kuranstalt for a health cure. While he was undergoing
this cure and was still in bed he received on 3rd March a letter from
Monteith, asking him to come to Berlin at once. He replied that he
could not move, and that Monteith should come to him. On 7th March
Monteith arrived and told him that on 1st March Lieutenant Frey, of the
General Staff, Political Section, had sent for him and told him that
they had received a message from Devoy to the effect that something
was about to happen, and asking for the dispatch of munitions, which
the Germans were now ready to supply. Upon this, Casement drew up a
memorandum setting out the best means of landing arms in Ireland,
and Monteith returned with it to Berlin. In the memorandum Casement
suggested that he and two picked men should be conveyed to Ireland in a
submarine to concert measures with the Irish leaders for landing the
arms. On 16th March he went himself to Berlin and had an interview with
Captain Nadolny and two other officers of the Political Section of the
General Staff, who told him that the Admiralty had declined to furnish
a submarine; that Devoy had asked for trained gunners; that instead
of 100,000 rifles only 20,000 could be sent, together with 10 machine
guns and 5,000,000 cartridges. Captain Nadolny asked whether Casement
would be prepared to take over with him the fifty-six members of the
Irish Brigade from Lossen. To this Casement objected that it was highly
improbable that the whole body could equally be trusted.
This news was most disturbing to Casement, who had never dreamed
of an armed rebellion taking place so soon. All he wanted was that
the Germans should pour arms into Ireland and follow later with a
military expedition. After thinking things over, he called at the
German Admiralty on 17th March to ask why it was impossible to send
a submarine, and on learning that the objections were technical he
suggested sending a messenger over to Ireland to bring back accurate
particulars of the local plans and the scheme for landing the arms. It
happened that in the previous November one John M’Govey had come over
from the United States as a volunteer. The German Admiralty approved
of the suggestion, and on Sunday, 19th March, M’Govey was sent into
Denmark with instructions to reach Dublin without delay. Monteith,
meanwhile, was to obtain from the German military authorities an
experimental gun with which to train the Irish Brigade at Lossen.
[Illustration: ONE OF THE MACHINES USED IN FORGING TREASURY NOTES.]
Having made these arrangements Casement returned to Bavaria. As he
said afterwards, he felt himself under no obligation to the German
Government. He thought that the munitions should have been offered
much earlier, ‘since the political services of Irishmen in America to
the German cause far transcended the value of any possible gift of arms
Germany might make to Ireland.’ He had always been opposed to any armed
revolt in Ireland unless it was backed up by strong German military
help. He said that in the ‘Treaty’ of 23rd to 28th December 1914 it
was stipulated that ‘should the Irish Brigade be sent to Ireland, the
German Government would support its dispatch with adequate military
support of men, arms, and supplies.’ On 29th March he returned to
Berlin very much concerned about his responsibility towards the Irish
soldiers whom he had seduced from their loyalty. As he expressed it,
‘They had committed treason under a distinct and formal promise, sealed
and delivered, by the German Imperial Government, that, in the event
of their being dispatched to Ireland, they should be supported by an
ample German force, a part of an Army of Deliverance.’ He had also an
uneasy feeling that if any of them should chance to be captured on the
high seas they might, with perfect justice, turn King’s Evidence and
establish a very damaging case against himself, who would be regarded
as a paid tool of the German Government.
With his mind filled with these disturbing thoughts, he called again
upon Captain Nadolny, who, to his surprise, addressed him in terms of
great discourtesy and accused him of a breach of faith in having sent
M’Govey to Ireland without consulting him. Probably the traditional
jealousy between the naval and military departments was at the bottom
of this outburst. Nadolny further threatened that unless Casement
submitted to the conditions a telegram would be sent to Devoy that
though Germany was quite ready to send the help she had promised,
the whole plan had been frustrated by Casement himself, and he would
then appear as a traitor to the Irish cause. The next day he was asked
to call again, and on this occasion he was treated with conventional
politeness. Captain Nadolny pointed out that it was the Irish who had
decided upon a revolt; the Germans were in no way responsible: they
were merely fulfilling their promise to furnish arms to the fullest
possible extent at the request of the Irish. He made the aims of the
German Government quite clear: they were not idealistic but severely
practical. They would supply the arms, but they expected them to be
used without delay, and if Casement opposed the plan he would stop the
arms and throw the entire responsibility upon him.
Casement replied that the German Government was entirely ignoring the
agreement it had made with him in December 1914; that he felt sure
that at the most the Irish would be able to put 12,000 men into the
field, and that the rebellion must fail. He said that a firing-party of
twelve machine gunners ought to be furnished by the Germans to cover
the disembarkation of the arms. In view of all that Captain Nadolny had
said, he thought that the arms must be sent on the date fixed, but he
still pressed for a submarine in which he would go by himself without
the Irish soldiers, and, to impress Nadolny still further, he declared
that he would take poison with him for use if the steamer conveying him
were stopped by a British warship, in order to escape the indignities
reserved for him ‘should I fall into the hands of the Government I have
dared so unwisely to defy.’
Casement had written a letter to von Wedell. A man of this name was
captured by a patrol boat off the north of Scotland in 1915. On the
way to the coast the patrol boat struck a mine and foundered, and
von Wedell, with most of the crew, was drowned. A few weeks later the
German Government began to inquire about him through the American
Embassy. Where was he? Was he interned? Did the British Government
know where he was, and was he in a position where he could communicate
with his friends? We could say with perfect truth that the British
Government did know where he was, and believed he could communicate
with his friends. Great importance must have been attached to this
man, for as late as 1917 among the instructions given to a spy was a
direction that he should ascertain the fate of von Wedell.
On 1st April Casement was ill in bed, and on that date he read in the
_Irish World_ Devoy’s speech at the Irish Convention on 4th and 5th
March. On this he modified his views about the rebellion, and thought
that Devoy’s contention that the British Government was determined
to destroy the Irish Volunteers and arrest the leaders, and that
conscription would be applied to Ireland, altered the whole situation.
A rising did seem to be necessary, and he decided to go. The Germans
met him half-way and furnished the submarine, in which he, Monteith,
and Corporal Bailey arrived in Tralee Bay on Good Friday, 21st April.
Has there ever been a time in history when Irish rebels appealing for
foreign aid have not wrecked all by their hopeless incapacity for
organisation and administration? For mark what happened. The Germans
were true to their promise. They had loaded a small steamer, the _Aud_,
with 1400 tons of munitions concealed under a deck-load of timber. She
had Norwegian papers, and professed to be bound for the west coast of
Africa, and her naval crew were cleverly disguised in the ordinary kit
of a Norwegian tramp. There was ample time for the rebels to prepare
for unloading the cargo. They had done nothing. The ship proceeded
round the north of Scotland unobserved, and anchored in Tralee Bay
on Good Friday. Almost immediately a small patrol boat ranged up
alongside, went through her papers, and made a cursory inspection
of the deck, though the Germans alleged that one of the hatches was
actually open at the time of the visit and the arms were thus exposed
to view. The Germans thought that their presence in Tralee Bay had
excited no suspicion, but the captain thought it prudent, as there was
no sign from the shore, to put to sea and come in again with his cargo
when the coast was clear. But fortune was against him. His ship was
sighted by the _Blue Bell_, who signalled her to stop and then ordered
her to follow to Queenstown. For a short time she obeyed the order,
and then the signalman on the _Blue Bell_ reported that her engines
had stopped, and that they had run up a flag to the fore. At the same
moment there was a dull explosion. The German war-flag broke at the
top-mast and the ship’s crew were seen leaving in the boats. The _Aud_
was sinking by the head. When the crew were received on board the _Blue
Bell_ they were in German naval uniform, but they refused to give any
account of themselves, and they were sent over to Scotland Yard for
examination.
This incident was tinged with romance. There was nothing actually to
show what the _Aud_ had on board and why she had put into Tralee. The
first step was for the Admiralty to dispatch a diver to the scene of
the sinking. Fortunately the sea was calm. I saw the diver on his
return. He was a very spruce, intelligent, and observant young man.
He described to me the sandy bottom of the bay on which the _Aud_ was
lying with a great rent in her side, and the floor of the Atlantic
littered with broken rifles, six of which he had brought back with
him. There were Russian marks on the rifles. We sent for the Russian
military attaché, and then it was found that even this grudging service
to the cause of Ireland had been done on the cheap, for the rifles were
all Russian, captured at Tannenberg, and very much the worse for wear.