SECTION VI. CONCEPT OF SPECIES.

In departing from phenomena by successive abstractions and

generalisations, we rise to laws that are more and more extensive:

so in setting out from the individual, species, genera, orders,

branches, and the like, are formed by a succession of abstractions and

generalisations. We have already followed this labor of the intellect

in its primitive attempts to introduce order into the multiplicity and

variety of living beings (Ch. III.). We saw its start in the period

of generic images, its passage through the various degrees of the

concrete-abstract period, and its final outcome by diverse paths into

a unitary conception. We must now take up the subject from the point

at which we left it, and consider the nature of the classificatory

concepts at the final term of their development, the moment of their

highest scientific determination. If the geometers were the first who

abstracted from extension the essential data of Space; if the astronomers

accomplished an analogous operation for Time; the naturalists for

their part had by abstraction to disengage from among the numerous

characteristics of living beings, those which, as fundamental, enable

them to reduce individuals to species, species to genera, and so on.

They are the inventors of the concepts which govern this province of

experience.

The notion of the individual, which is the basis, and preliminary

material, of biological classification, is sufficiently clear so long

as we confine ourselves to the higher creatures; it becomes obscure

and equivocal in descending to the lower grades, where life multiplies

by budding, or by division. Hence it has been a great stumbling-block

to the naturalists. For our purpose, the point is negligible. We can

without inconvenience omit the debates on this subject, and presume

that individuality always has its fixed characteristics. The work of

abstraction and of generalisation alone concern us.

Among all others, the Concept of Species is certainly the one which—more

especially in our own day—has been the most studied and disputed. Many

efforts have been made to determine its essential characters, to which

some attribute, and others refuse, an objective value. In effect, and

broadly speaking—two contrary theories obtain in this connexion:

1. That of fixity of species, the oldest, and long paramount: still

perhaps finding its partisans. If we accept this, we admit at the same

time that the naturalist in determining species, reveals a mystery of

nature, and partially discovers the plan of creation.

2. The complete antithesis of the foregoing, which maintains that only

individuals exist. In its absolute and radical form, this assertion seems

rarely to have been brought forward. It has, however, been said that

“the idea of species is not given to us by nature itself.”[131] In point

of fact, the contention of the transformists is different. They do not

refuse to recognise the grouping of living beings, according to their

degrees of similarity, into varieties and species; but they grant to

species only a momentary fixedness in time and space. It does not exist,

it is not a natural type, it is transitionally a stable variation; the

individual is the reality. From our point of view, this signifies that

the specific characters isolated by abstraction are of value only as

practical means of simplification in no way helping us to penetrate into

the nature of things.

However this may be,—and without for the moment inquiring whether the

work of abstraction in this province gives objective or subjective

results, whether it limits itself to simplification in relation to man,

or discovers in relation to nature,—let us follow it in its ascending

progress. Once again, we can distinguish two principal stages: that of

species corresponding to empirical and concrete law; that of genera, and

the still higher forms, corresponding to theoretical and ideal laws.

I.

The nature of a concept is fixed by the determination of its _constituent

elements_; these are determined by abstraction. Abstraction that is not

vulgar and arbitrary, but scientific, should disclose characteristics

that are the substitutes for a group (here living beings in general),

taking its place, and enabling us to think it. These constituent elements

of the concept of species are met with in nearly all the naturalists’

definitions.[132] They are two in number; species is determined by

two essential characteristics: similarity (morphological criterion),

filiation (physiological criterion).

1. Similarity seems at first sight easy to determine—as though we had

only to open our eyes; yet by this elementary procedure we hardly pass

beyond the level of generic images, and there is risk of falling into

many errors. It is necessary to penetrate into resemblances deeper than

the superficial; and here is the first degree of complexity. Buffon

observed that “the horse and the donkey, which are distinct species,

resemble each other more than the water spaniel and the harrier, which

are of the same species.” The facts which our contemporaries denote by

the name of _polymorphism_, entirely baffle the criterion of similarity.

Not to speak of the obvious difference between the larva and the perfect

insect, the caterpillar and the butterfly, or between the males, females,

and neuters of bees, ants, and termites; there are cases in which the

disparity between the two sexes is so great that the male and the female,

taken respectively as two different creatures, have been classified in

distinct _genera_, and even _orders_: e. g., the lampyris or glow-worm,

_Lernea_, and many others. The character of the resemblance is thus too

often vague, sometimes deceptive, nearly always inadequate: it follows

that we must resort to the other, to filiation.

2. This, the physiological criterion, again appears to leave no opening

for equivocation, since it can be materially stated. Generally speaking,

one is imbued with the notion that children resemble their parents, that

the immediate product is the reproduction of the type of the progenitors.

But the alternating generations (metagenesis, geneagenesis) discovered

in the course of the present century, show that this conception is

too simple, and often fallacious. This mode of reproduction is by

no means rare; we meet with it among a great number of the lower

plants, infusoria, worms, and even insects. “The dominating fact in

the reproduction of all these creatures, is that a _sexual_ being, of

definite form, gives birth to _a-sexual_ beings which do not resemble

it, but which in their turn produce by a sort of budding, or by fission

of their bodies, the sexual creatures similar to those from which they

issued.” Vogt, accordingly, in his definition of species, is forced to

include the case of alternate generation by saying: “Species is the

reunion of all the individuals that originate from the same parents, and

are in themselves, _or in their descendants_, similar to their primordial

ancestors.”

In brief, the general notion of species depends upon two ideas, complex

notwithstanding their apparent simplicity, fluctuating in spite of their

apparent precision.

Till now, we have spoken of species as if it were directly superposed

upon individuals, as if it resulted from immediate generalisation. This

is not the naturalists’ position. Their classification descends from the

species to the individual by decreasing generalisations of the race and

the variation. Thus the human species comprises several races (white,

yellow, etc.), the white race comprises several variations (English,

Arab type, etc.). To the partisan of fixedness of species, these three

general notions have not the same value: species alone has peculiar

and irreducible characters, which are deduced from the function of

reproduction and the facts of cross-breeding.

Couple two individuals of distinct _species_: the union is generally

sterile. If otherwise, the hybrids which result from it are unfruitful.

If, as rarely happens, they propagate themselves, the offspring rapidly

return to the type of one of the ancestral species.

Couple two individuals of distinct _races_ or _variations_, the union

will be fruitful; the resulting cross-breeds are again fertile; the

progenitors are able to create and fix varieties, and even races.

Hence, it is concluded, species must be a thing that exists, that

protects itself, does not let itself be encroached upon.

Evidently the debated question is one of facts: and both the parties in

dispute adduce experimental evidence. Few in number as they may be, there

are fertile hybrids, which perpetuate themselves. They are found among

birds and mammals, e. g., the alpaca and the vicuna, the bull and the

zebu, the goat and the sheep—which have for issue the ovicaprinæ,—the

hare and the rabbit—whose offspring is the leporide, (their perpetuity

has been contested). On the other hand, if certain _species_ have thus

been formed by a durable blend, there exist _races_ that have been

refractory to all attempts at cross-breeding: i. e., the domestic and

Brazilian guinea-pig, different races of rats, of rabbits, etc.

We need not enter into the discussion, nor enumerate the observations

and experiments invoked on either side: they are to be found in special

works. Our aim was to discover the constituent elements of the notion of

species in its scientific aspect. Now, neither the morphological element

nor the physiological element has any distinguishing mark of permanence

and universality. The concept of species is possessed of no absolute

value; neither is it a simple replica in the mind of the “plan of

nature.” The result of abstraction and of generalisation, it corresponds

to something which is fixed for a certain time in certain conditions; it

has temporary and provisional objectivity.[133]

II.

Contemporary discussion is almost entirely centred upon species. Little

is said about genera, and still less of the higher divisions. We do not,

in any case, find what we require: the determination of constitutive

elements, of general acceptance, which shall be for the genus, family,

order, or class, the equivalent of the two denotative marks—morphological

and physiological—that are attributed to species.

This has not always been the case. At the time when there was general

belief in a scheme of creation, the naturalists were careful, by bringing

together species, genera, families, etc., to disengage more and more

general characters, which they regarded as essential, and determined by

the nature of the thing. We have already said that Linnæus was the first

to formulate a precise notion of genus, to which he expressly attributed

a _reality_: “You must know,” he says, in his _Philosophia botanica_,

“that it is not character that constitutes the genus, but genus the

character; that character devolves from genus, not genus from character;

that character exists not in order that genus should come about (_fiat_),

but so that the genus should be known.” In the binary nomenclature which

he adopted, the first term designates the genus, the second one of the

species included. Thus the dog and the wolf have characters by which

they resemble each other, and are distinguished from other animals (five

fingers on the anterior limbs, four only on the posterior, twenty-two

teeth in the upper and lower jaw, etc.) Linnæus classifies them as the

genus _Canis_, of which _Canis familiaris_, _Canis lupus_, _Canis

vulpes_, etc., are the species. Again, the genus _Felis_, determined

by the characters common to certain animals exclusively, comprises in

its species: the cat (_Felis catus_), the lion (_Felis leo_), the tiger

(_Felis tigris_), etc.

Agassiz, the last representative of the line of naturalists who

aspired at reproducing the order of nature in the hierarchy of their

classificatory concepts, characterises the genera and divisions superior

to them by vague formulæ. Of these we can judge from the following

passage:

“Individuals are the support, at the actual moment, of the characters

not merely of species, but of all other divisions. As representative of

_genus_, they have certain details of a definite and specific structure,

identical with those possessed by the representatives of other species.

As representative of _family_, they have a definite constitution,

expressive of a distinct and specific model, in forms resembling those

of the representatives of other genera. As representative of _order_,

they take definite rank, as compared with the representatives of other

families. As representative of _class_, they manifest the structural

plan of their ramifications by the aid of special means, and according

to specific directions. As representative of _branches_ the individuals

are all organised on a distinct plan which differs from the plan of other

branch-lines.”[134]

It was shown above (Ch. III.) that the contemporary classifications,

which are radically embryological, transformist, and generic, proceed

otherwise, and have a different aim. Their ideal is to draw up the

genealogical tree of living beings, with its multiple ramifications,

marking the principal moments of evolution.

But if, leaving aside the material of these (animal or vegetable)

classifications, we consider only the psychological labor by which they

are constituted, we find that the transformists and their adversaries

have at least one common point which is of cardinal importance. The

notion of fundamental types—conceived as fixed or provisory—is for

the one as for the other a compass, a guide in research, a normal,

by means of which deviations are appreciated. Hence, these concepts

have a practical value, and it is true that we find abstraction and

generalisation in their principal rôle, which is, not to discover, but to

simplify, above all to be useful.

In effect, the one side, yielding to the natural tendency of the mind to

reify abstractions, admit the permanence and objectivity of types: they

believe firmly that they have in certain concepts the possibility of an

ideal reconstruction of the entire world of living beings. This faith

sustains them and urges them on to more and more exact determinations.

Their opponents, the transformists of every degree, are guided by

a different ideal; they search after continuity, transition, forms

of passage. Species, genera, families, etc., are but provisory

starting-points, with intermediate lacunæ which they endeavor to bridge

over. Although the animal order, the chain of life, is itself only a

theoretical construction, a natural abstraction, many fine works could

be quoted which are inspired by this faith in continuity. Such, e. g.,

are Huxley, Cope, and others upon the genus _Equus_, establishing the

filiation of the four-fingered _Eohippus_ of the old Tertiary epoch,

with the Hipparion of the new Tertiary epoch, and with the Horse of the

Quaternary period.

The hierarchy of concepts formed by superposition of abstractions and

generalisations only facilitates the task. The sole incontestable

value that can be assigned to any notion of species, and still more

to genus, and other still more general concepts, is that of utility.

They are successful implements in the investigation of nature. All

other pretensions are open to discussion. One position more especially

is untenable: that which claims for concepts, the pure results of

abstraction, an absolute value. It is obvious that they can have none.

They are neither reality nor fiction, but approximations.

* * * * *

Laws and species—two general notions which must be connected—were

bound to vary in the course of evolution, because they are entirely

subordinated to the conditions which govern the existence of phenomena

and of living beings. Let us—merely as an illustration to fix our

ideas—admit the hypothesis of a primitive nebula. Imagine (which is

impossible) an intelligent being, able, at that point in the world’s

history, to draw up a scheme of the existing laws. He could discover

none but those which govern matter in the gaseous state,—some of which

are still extant, others unknown to us, and unknowable—since, their

conditions of existence having ceased, they are annihilated. When at

a later time this matter, uniformly diffused and dispersed through

space, became divided from one or other cause into vast nebulous

spheres commencing their slow revolution, our hypothetical being might

have surprised the birth of the astronomical laws. Subsequently, the

constitution of the liquid state of matter, and then of the solid state

in its different degrees, would give birth to new physico-chemical laws,

others meantime disappearing. When, finally, life—whatever may have been

its origin—appeared, other laws again loomed forth, and the possibility

of classification. Yet to the hypothetical spectator, these must needs

be highly singular, highly dissimilar from our own—unless we admit the

hypothesis of a world created at one throw.

It is needless to enter into the details of this long evolution, as

it is generally admitted to have been. Enough to remember that the

matter whence abstraction deduces laws and species has varied, and may

vary again in the course of ages. If, on the other hand, we consider

the slow progress of human knowledge, and the incessant corrections

imposed by experience and reasoning from century to century, we find

ourselves confronted with two variable factors, one objective, the other

subjective. No permanence can result from their union. Long as may be

the stability of laws and species, nothing guarantees their perpetual

duration. So that after two centuries which make a brave show in the

history of the sciences, we may still advance the formula of Leibnitz:

“Our determinations of physical species are provisional and proportional

to our knowledge.”[135]

Many other concepts might be added to the preceding, among them, those of

the moral sciences. I forbear, because the history of their fluctuations

would in itself exact a volume. Till now, these have been ill-determined,

badly defined. May we even speak of any regular evolution? Have they not

rather suffered _corsi e ricorsi_, which bring them back perennially to

their point of departure? Whenever—during a development of centuries—the

work of abstraction has succeeded, we have seen it pass through

successive phases:—generic ideas, intermediate forms, higher forms—but

not by any constant process. Sometimes it has rapidly attained the period

of complete simplification, as in mathematics; sometimes it is long

arrested in its progress, as in the natural sciences: sometimes, again,

as in the less established sciences, it is incapable even to the present

day of transcending the lowest stages.

CHAPTER VI.

CONCLUSION.

We have endeavored to show how the faculty of abstracting and of

generalising has been developed empirically, and to follow it in its

spontaneous and natural evolution as shown in history,—not in the

philosophical speculations which are only its efflorescence, and which,

for the most part, ignore or despise its origins. It remains to us,

in conclusion, to seek out how, and by what causes, this intellectual

process has constituted and developed itself: further—what are the

different directions it has followed in the course of its development.

I. To contemporary psychology, the mind is a sum of processes of

dissimilar nature, whose mode of appearance and of evolution depends

upon predetermined conditions. In the total of intellectual operations,

abstraction is a process of secondary formation: it does not belong

to the primary stratum of sensations and percepts, of appetites and

tendencies, of primitive emotions. We found however that it was there in

embryo. How then, instead of remaining in this rudimentary state, has it

been so differentiated as to become a function proper to the intellect,

and with a long development that is still in progress?

The primary condition is the existence of _attention_, which brings a few

points into relief, amid the general confusion. We have shown elsewhere

that attention itself depends originally upon the instinct of individual

preservation.[136] Attention, however, can only precede and prepare

for abstraction, because it is a momentary state of application to the

variable aspects of events, and does not isolate anything.

We know how the first labor of separation, of dissociation, takes effect

in the formation of generic images, and how the extracted quality

_fixed_ itself, for better or worse, by the aid of a visual, auditory,

tactile scheme, by a movement, a gesture, which confers on it a sort of

independence.

Finally, with the word—the substitute for the abstract intuition—the

mental dissociation approximates to a real dissociation: the abstract

character, incarnated in the word, seems, as happens only too often, to

exist by itself. The process of abstraction, with its fitting instrument,

is completely constituted.

During these successive phases, and afterwards, throughout the course

of the historical development of human intelligence, the progress of

abstraction and of generalisation, depends upon two principal causes: one

general, i. e., utility; the other accidental and sporadic, the advent of

inventors.

I. In his book on _Darwinism_ (Ch. XV.) Wallace, in contesting the

theory that applies the law of conservation of variations, useful in

the struggle for existence, to the mental faculties, insists at length

upon the mathematical faculty; he maintains that it is an inexplicable

exception, a case that cannot be reduced to law. The inaptitude of

inferior races for even the simplest calculations is well known;

how—from such a rudimentary origin—could it develop into the genius of

a Newton, a Laplace, or a Gauss? What motive power accounts for this

development? The author establishes by a host of sufficiently useless

historical details, that mathematical superiority played no part in the

struggle of tribe with tribe, and later on of people with people (Greeks

against Persians), and that the victory resulted from other causes, moral

and social. For this there is abundant evidence. But since mathematical

aptitude is only a particular instance of abstraction, albeit one of the

most perfect, the question ought to be proposed under a more general

form. Had the aptitude for abstraction, _ab initio_, any practical value?

Yes, “the motive power that caused its development, that Wallace claims

without specifying it, is utility.”

To avoid possibility of equivocation, let us remark that the development

of the attitude for abstracting and generalising may be explained in

a two-fold manner: by acknowledging the influence of heredity, and by

omitting it.

In the former case, it is supposed that this aptitude appears as a

“spontaneous variation” in the individual or race, that it fixes itself,

is reciprocal, grows by slow accumulation in the course of generations.

This theory postulates the heredity of acquired characters, which is

accepted by some, rejected by others, more especially since the advent of

Weismann. I refrain from invoking it, by reason of its hypothetical and

disputed nature. The probability of any transmission would moreover be

far harder to establish here than in other psychical directions, such as

imagination, or feeling.

In the second case, with elimination of the hereditary factor, progress

must be attributed to social causes, utility and imitation. From all time

there have been minds which when face to face with practical problems

knew better than others how to extract the essential, and neglect the

accessory, in the complex of facts. The utility of abstraction is

identical with that of attention, which does not require demonstration;

it may be summed up in a single word: to simplify. As the process

succeeds, it finds imitators. There is no need to admit at the outset

any reflected and fully conscious abstraction: a happy instinct, guided

by the needs of life, is sufficient at the commencement. Races that

are poorly gifted in this respect, or little apt at imitating their

betters, have never got beyond a low level. In effect, abstraction and

generalisation are the nerve of all knowledge that transcends sensation.

Is this mode of cognition useful? There can be no possible doubt as to

the answer.

2. The rôle of inventors corresponds to the fact which, in transformist

terminology, is known as spontaneous variation. By inventors, we mean

those who are born with the talent or the genius for abstraction. It

is superfluous to prove that such have been found, in considerable

numbers. They are abstract thinkers by instinct, as others are musicians,

mechanicians, designers. The biography of the great mathematicians

abounds in examples: Pascal inventing geometry out of a few vague

indications from his father; Newton divining Euclid’s demonstrations

from the simple enunciation of the theorems; Ampère, before he could

read or understand the use of figures, making long calculations by means

of a few pebbles; Gauss, at five years old, rectifying the arithmetic

of a workman, etc. If fewer analogous facts can be quoted from the

other sciences, it is because mathematical precocity is frequent, and

is more surprising. All that is the effect of innate disposition: this

word serving only to recapitulate our ignorance of the causes which

produce such minds. In the development of knowledge by abstraction and

generalisation, the first cause—utility—may be likened to the part played

by slow actions in geology; whether in the case of practical inventions,

or of the constitution of an idiom, it is continuous, collective, and

anonymous. The rôle of the great abstract thinkers, on the contrary,

resembles the rapid and epoch-making actions.

II. If we now consider the progress of abstraction from a more general

point of view (instead of following it step by step, from its lowest

to its highest degree, as in the preceding chapters), i. e., according

to its orientation towards a given end, we find that it has followed

three principal directions during its history: practical, speculative,

scientific. These are, indeed, inseparable, inasmuch as practical

abstraction leads to science, scientific abstraction is profitable to

practice, and speculation cannot entirely forego the other two.[137]

Abstraction and practical generalisation are necessarily the first in

order, as we found in studying their first appearance in the lower

animals, in children, and in savages. They serve to distinguish the

qualities of things by some word, or sign; they subserve the simple

adaptations of daily life. Later on, at a higher stage, they note the

appearance of mixed processes, which, while more especially directed to

utility, are already the prelude to scientific knowledge. Disinterested

curiosity has awakened, and timidly makes for daylight. A minimum

acquaintance with the history of the sciences teaches us that all were at

their origin processes of _applied_ research, and that often, in their

uncertain efforts, our forbears found what they were not looking for. The

numerative systems issued from the need of counting objects, and later

on, from rude commercial exchanges. Elementary geometry was required,

in order to measure the fields, to determine a right angle, to fix

relative positions, and to furnish the indispensable parts of primitive

architecture. The invention of the lever, of the balance, of rudimentary

engines for the lifting of heavy masses, gave the first foundations of

mechanics. Astronomy arose in the desire to regulate civil life and

the religious festivals, and the wish (e. g., among the Peruvians and

Mexicans) not to irritate the gods by delaying the sacrifices due to

them. Metallurgy, and later on the search for the philosopher’s stone,

and the elixir of life, were the prelude to scientific chemistry. The

historical outset of each science would furnish a profusion of similar

facts.

The two other operations issued by an internal division of labor from

this—at first the only—tendency of the mind.

First come purely speculative, i. e., philosophical or metaphysical

abstraction and generalisation. This new trend has clean and well defined

characteristics; and it was, in antiquity, the privilege of two peoples

alone, the Greeks and the Hindus. Abstraction leads immediately to the

highest generalisations; from the crude and direct simplification of a

few facts, the mind leaps at a bound to the final causes of things;

it skips the intermediate stages: it ignores the sequence of slow

and progressive evolution. This procedure where, in point of fact,

abstraction and generalisation are only the servants of a particular form

of imagination, found its first complete expression in Plato, and the

Theory of Ideas. With Plato, the human intellect tasted for the first

time the supreme pleasures of playing with the highest abstractions,

and believing firmly that the universe can be summed up, constructed

and explained by the help of some few entities. In this direction,

notwithstanding its manifold changes of aspect, the generalising process

has remained fundamentally the same, and has done no more than repeat

itself. We are here concerned with statement, not with criticism.

Psychologists must needs admit that this tendency to construct the world

(whether or no it be illusory) is a fact inherent in the nature of the

human intellect. Stallo, in the book already quoted,[138] gives an

incisive critique of the fundamental concepts of the physical sciences,

and their unconscious trend towards metaphysics. His appreciation of the

characteristics proper to the purely speculative process of abstraction

and generalisation is so apt, that we cannot do better than transcribe it:

“Whatever diversity may exist between metaphysical systems,

they are all founded upon the express or implied supposition

that there is a fixed correspondence between concepts and

their filiations on the one hand and things and their mode

of interdependence on the other. This fundamental error is

in great part due to a delusory view of the function of

language as an aid to the formation and fixation of concepts.

Roughly stated, concepts are the meanings of words; and the

circumstances that words primarily designate things, or at

least objects of sensation and their sensible interactions,

has given rise to certain fallacious assumptions which, unlike

the ordinary infractions of the laws of logic, are in a sense

natural outgrowths of the evolution of thought (not without

analogy to the organic diseases incident to bodily life) and

may be termed structural fallacies of the intellect. These

assumptions are:

“1. That every concept is the counterpart of a distinct

objective reality, and that hence there are as many things, or

natural classes of things, as there are concepts or notions.

“2. That the more general or extensive concepts and the

realities corresponding to them pre-exist to the less general,

more comprehensive, concepts and their corresponding realities;

and that the latter concepts and realities are derived from

the former, either by a successive addition of attributes or

properties, or by a process of evolution, the attributes or

properties of the former being taken as implications of those

of the latter.

“3. That the order of the genesis of concepts is identical with

the order of the genesis of things.

“4. That things exist independently of and antecedently to

their relations; that all relations are between absolute terms;

and that therefore whatever reality belongs to the properties

of things is distinct from that of the things themselves.”

The differences between this procedure and that proper to the third (or

scientific) direction need hardly be enumerated.

Here the advance is step by step, without for an instant losing hold of

the thread that leads back to the starting-point of experience. Even

where the mind takes giant strides, or leaps across the intermediate

generalisations, it pauses to verify its results and to take up the

thread it had loosed for the moment. This is the typical process. Since

it formed the basis of our discussion of the intermediate and higher

forms of abstraction, we need not here return to it. Yet in conclusion,

it is well to recall once more what makes it of sterling value.

To reduce the essentials of abstraction and generalisation to the

exclusive use of the word (or sign) as is customary, is an error that

can only be explained by the time-honored neglect of the function of

the _unconscious_ in psychology. The sign is no more than an instrument

of simplification, an abbreviated formula. When the mind works with the

aid of concepts, the co-operation of two factors, the one conscious,

the other unconscious or subconscious, is required, in order that its

labor may be legitimate and fruitful: on the one hand, we have words or

signs, accompanied sometimes by a vague representation; on the other

hand, a latent, potential, organised knowledge. We endeavored above (Ch.

IV.) to show how this _couple_ forms and fixes itself. The mechanism is

invariably the same, without exception. Whether we keep up a trivial

conversation by means of the abstract terms which compose our languages,

or whether we ascend to the highest generalisations, there is in the

mental state no more than a difference in degree; there is no difference

in nature. Beneath the words that are the clear factors, exists the dumb

travail, the vague invocation, of the organised experience that gives

life to them. Without this unconscious factor which may, often does,

become conscious, there is nought but illusion. When we induct, deduct,

traverse a long series of abstractions to demonstrate or to discover, the

useful work consists in new relations which establish themselves in our

organised potential knowledge; words are no more than the instruments

that commence the task, facilitate and mark its phases. When the mind

is grappling with the highest abstractions, and climbs from height to

height, what preserves it from catastrophe, and guarantees against error,

is the quantity and quality of the unconscious material stored up

beneath the words. The entomologist who at first sight, and immediately,

classifies one insect among millions of species, acts in virtue of

his long experience, impressed firmly in his memory with salient

characteristics: he proceeds from the sensory data to the name. In the

inverse operation, when he merely enunciates the name, all this acquired

knowledge is the substrate. The existence of these conscious-unconscious

couples is, so to speak, a rule in psychology: general ideas are but

a particular case, perhaps the least well-known: hence we previously

likened them (Ch. IV.) to _mental habits_.

It follows that in proportion as we ascend in generalisation we rise,

not into vacuity, as has been said, but into the simple—as also, it

must be confessed, into the approximate. The relatively empty concepts

(there are none that are absolutely void of content) are the product

of a discontinuous generalisation which prevents descent without

interruption or omission into the concrete. Of course these are chiefly

encountered in the world of pure speculation. They are names representing

a knowledge that is incomplete, partial, inadequate, or ill-organised;

they correspond not to elimination of what is useless, but to deficit of

what is necessary. Having no possible contact with reality, they float

in an unreal atmosphere, and are material for a fragile and quickly

crumbling architecture. The aim of thinking by concepts is to substitute

for complex states, simpler conditions that may be turned and re-turned

in every possible sense, in order the better to discover their relations:

whereas here, by the nature of things, the unconscious activity, the

labor that operates silently in the lower strata, is applied to a soil

that is full of faults and fissures, and can but project a false light

into consciousness.

It has frequently been stated that symbolic thought is thinking by

substitution. This formula is admissible only when we recognise that

the substitute supposes, nay expects, the _actual_ existence of that

for which it is substituted. Substitution is valid in consciousness,

but not for the total operation. To sum up in a word: the psychology of

abstraction and generalisation, is in a great measure the _psychology of

the unconscious_.

We have merely studied general ideas in so far as they have an assignable

origin in experience, and do not transcend its limits. Are there, as some

maintain, notions anterior to any sensory intuition—that can by no means

nor effort be derived from empirical data? It is not our part to discuss

this question. The thesis—whether or no it be legitimate—is a contention

in favor of innate ideas, and in whatever fashion it is conceived (_à

priori_ forms, hereditary disposition, cerebral conformation), it is the

problem of the ultimate constitution of human intelligence, which we have

rigorously eliminated from our present subject.

FOOTNOTES

[1] _La parole_ is here, and subsequently, translated by _speech_; _le

mot_ by _words_, or _language_,—_verbal_ language being throughout

understood.—_Trans._

[2] Schmidkunz, _Ueber die Abstraction_. Halle: Stricker, 1889. This

little work of forty-three pages contains a good historical and

theoretical exposition of the question.

[3] Schmidkunz, _loc. cit._ This author, who rightly insists upon the

positive character of abstraction (which is too frequently considered

as a negation) observes that no concept, not even that of infinity, is

in its psychological genesis the result of negation, for, “in order to

deduce from the idea of a finite thing the idea of infinity, it is first

necessary to abstract from that thing its quality of finality, which is

certainly a positive act; subsequently, in order to reach infinity, it

is sufficient either constantly to increase the time, magnitude, and

intensity of the finite, which is a positive process; or to deny the

limits of the finite, which is tantamount to denying the negation.”

[4] _Psychology of Attention._ Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co.

[5] See especially Hoeffding, _Psychologie_. German translation. Second

Edition, pp. 223 et seq.

[6] W. James, _Psychology_. Vol. I., p. 459.

[7] Herbert Spencer, _Principles of Psychology_. Vol. I., Part 2, Chapter

II.—Bain (in the last chapter of _Emotions and Will_) says that nothing

more fundamental can possibly be assigned as a mark of intelligence than

the feeling of difference between consecutive or co-existing impressions.

“There are cases, however, where agreement imparts the shock requisite

for rousing the intellectual wave; but it is agreement so qualified as

to be really a mode of difference.” For a review and ample discussion

of this problem see Ladd’s _Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory_,

Chapter XIV. The earlier psychologists, in considering the “faculty of

comparison” which acts by resemblance and difference, as primordial, had

observed the same fact, although they described it in different terms.

[8] W. James, _Psychology_. Vol. I., pp. 502 and 506.

[9] This term is borrowed from the well-known works of Galton on

composite photographs, which are scarcely more than twenty years old.

Huxley in his book on Hume (Chapter IV.) appears to be the first who

introduced it into psychology, as shown by the following passage: “This

mental operation may be rendered comprehensible by considering what

takes place in the formation of compound photographs—when the images

of the faces of six sitters, for example, are each received on the

same photographic plate, for a sixth of the time requisite to take

one portrait. The final result is that all those points in which the

six faces agree are brought out strongly, while all those in which

they differ are left vague; and thus what may be termed a _generic_

portrait of the six is produced. Thus our ideas of single complex

impressions are incomplete in one way, and those of numerous, more or

less similar, complex impressions are incomplete in another way; that

is to say, they are generic.... And hence it follows that our ideas of

the impressions in question are not, in the strict sense of the word,

copies of those impressions; while at the same time they may exist in

the mind independently of language.” Romanes employs the word “recept”

for “generic images,” as marking their intermediate place between the

“percept” which is below, and the “concept” which is above them.

[10] For details see Romanes, _Animal Intelligence_, Chapters III. and

V. As to the probability of their possessing means of communication for

assistance in their co-operative labors see below, Chapter II.

[11] Romanes. _Animal Intelligence_, Chapter III.

[12] C. Lloyd Morgan. _Animal Life and Intelligence_, Chapter IX., p. 364.

[13] Houzeau, _Etudes sur les facultés mentales des animaux_, Vol. II.,

p. 264 et seq. The same author gives an example of generalisation in bees.

[14] Darwin, _The Descent of Man_, Vol. I., Chapter III.

[15] Romanes, _loc. cit._, Chapter XVII.

[16] At the end of the passage in question there is an extraordinary

account of the arithmetical powers of a dog which Lubbock explains by

“thought reading.” I omit this instance, since we are deliberately

rejecting all rare or doubtful cases.

[17] _Mental Evolution in Man_, Chapter III., p. 58.

[18] J. Sully, _The Human Mind_, I., 460. The author gives excellent

diagrams to represent the difference in the two cases. For reasoning from

particular to particular, cf. also J. S. Mill, _Logic_, II., Chapter

III., p. 3; Bradley, _Logic_, II., Chapter II., p. 2.

[19] _In re_ analogy, consult Stern’s monograph, _Die Analogie im

volksthümlichen Denken_, Berlin, 1894.

[20] _Three Introductory Lectures on the Science of Thought, delivered

at the Royal Institution_, appendix, p. 6, letter 4; Chicago, 1888. It

should, however, be remembered that the writer who thus uses the logic of

images has a mind preformed by the logic of signs: which is not the case

with animals.

[21] _Psychology_, II., 348 et seq. James, however, recalls the case

of another dog accustomed to find and carry wedges for splitting wood.

One day he did not return. After half an hour they looked for him; he

was biting and tearing at the handle of a hatchet stuck in a block

(the wedge was not forthcoming). Had this animal clear perception of

the common character of the two instruments used for splitting? “This

interpretation is possible, but it seems to me far to transcend the

limits of ordinary canine abstraction.” (_Loc. cit._, p. 352.) James

attempts another explanation. It is singular that he does not invoke

training, and association with man: that this is an influential factor

in the intellectual development of animals cannot be doubted. It is

advisable to adduce exclusively their spontaneous inventions, with no

possible suggestion: such facts alone are clear and convincing.

[22] Lloyd Morgan, whose tendencies have already been indicated,

distinguishes three sorts of inferences: (1) unconscious inference on

immediate construction (perceptual); (2) intelligent inference (conceded

to animals), dealing with constructs and reconstructs (perceptual); and

(3) rational inference, implying analysis and isolation (conceptual).

(_Op. cit._, p. 362.)

[23] _Nouveaux Essais_, Book III., Chapter I.

[24] Cf. Taine, _L’Intelligence_, Vol. I., Book I., Chapter II., Part 2,

Note 1. Preyer, _Die Seele des Kindes_, Chapter XVI.

[25] Romanes, _Mental Evolution in Man_, p. 283.

[26] B. Pérez, _op. cit._, 210.

[27] Houzeau, _op. cit._, II., 202.

[28] Cf. _Revue Philosophique_, July, 1890.

[29] Max Müller, however, is an exception. He has not made the smallest

concession on this point in any of his works, including the last

(_Three Lectures_, etc., cited above). He even maintains that a society

of deaf-mutes would hardly rise above the intellectual level of a

chimpanzee. “A man born dumb, notwithstanding his great cerebral mass

and his inheritance of strong intellectual instincts, would be capable

of few higher intellectual manifestations than an orang or a chimpanzee,

if he were confined to the society of dumb associates” (p. 92). This

thesis was attacked by thirteen critics, including Romanes, Galton, the

Duke of Argyle, etc., but Max Müller meets them all and replies to them

without flinching. It must be confessed that the arguments invoked by his

correspondents are very unequal in merit. Some are convincing, others

not. The Duke of Argyle says happily that “words are necessary to the

progress of thought, but not at all to the _act_ of thinking.” Ebbels (p.

13, appendix) shows that Max Müller has unduly limited the question by

excluding all processes anterior to the formation of concepts; we think

in images; the transition from one form to another is imperceptible,

and the faculty of abstraction does not appear suddenly along with the

signs. On the other hand, we cannot admit as evidence the facts invoked

by other correspondents, e. g., chess-players who combine and calculate

solely by the aid of visual images; answers to letters, conceived in the

first place as a general plan before they are developed in words, etc. It

is forgotten that the persons capable of these operations have had long

practice in verbal analysis, thereby attaining a high intellectual level.

So, in the physical order, the practical gymnast, even when not executing

any particular feat, possesses a suppleness and agility of body, due to

exercise, which translates itself into all his movements.

[30] _De l’Education des sourds-muets_, 2 vol., 1827. Notwithstanding

its somewhat remote date, the book has lost none of its interest in this

particular. It must also be remembered that institutions for deaf-mutes

are far more numerous now than at the beginning of the century, and

that the children are placed in them much earlier. Formerly they were

abandoned to themselves or instructed very late; in proportion to their

age, they presented better material for the study of their development.

[31] Tylor, _Early History of Mankind_, p. 80. Romanes, _Mental Evolution

in Man_, Chapter VI.

[32] Kussmaul, _Die Störungen der Sprache_, Chapter xxx.

[33] Cf. as proof, the story related by Kussmaul (_op. cit._, VII.): A

young deaf-mute was arrested by the police of Prague as a vagabond. He

was placed in an institution and questioned by suitable methods, when

he made known that his father had a mill with a house and surroundings

which he described exactly; that his mother and sister were dead, and his

father had re-married; that his step-mother had ill-treated him, and that

he had planned an escape which had succeeded. He indicated the direction

of the mill to the east of Prague. Inquiries were made, and all these

statements were verified.

[34] Romanes, _Mental Evolution_, etc., p. 150.

[35] W. James, _Psychology_, I., 266, for the second observation;

_Philosophical Review_, I., No. 6, p. 613 et seq. for the first.

[36] _Sign-Language Among the North American Indians_, 1881. Published

in Report of the Bureau of Ethnology at Washington. Cf. also: Tylor,

_op. cit._; Romanes, _op. cit._, VI.; Lubbock, _Origin of Civilisation_,

Chapter VI.; Kleinpaul, _Zeitschrift für Völkerpsych._, VI., 353.

[37] Lubbock. _The Origin of Civilisation and the Primitive Condition of

Man_, p. 417.

[38] Gérando, _op. cit._, II., note K, p. 203. Among the gestures that

are identical under their double form may be noted stone, water, large,

tall, to see, finished, man, house, good, pretty, now, etc.

[39] _Philosophy of the Human Mind_, Ch. I., sect. 2.

[40] Kleinpaul, _loc. cit._

[41] Writing, ideography, originated in an analytical process analogous

with the language of gestures. Like the latter, it (1) isolates terms,

(2) arranges them in a certain order, (3) translates thought in a crude

and somewhat vague form. Curious examples of this may be found in Max

Müller’s _Chips from a German Workshop_, XIV. The aborigines of the

Caroline Islands sent a letter to a Spanish captain, as follows: Above, a

man with extended arms, sign of greeting. Below, to the left, the objects

he has to offer; five big shells, seven little ones, three others of

different forms. To the right and centre, drawing of the objects wanted

in exchange: three large fish hooks, four small ones, two axes, and two

pieces of iron.

[42] _Ants, Bees, and Wasps_, VII.—Romanes, _Animal Intelligence_, IV.

[43] _Animal Intelligence_, XVI., p. 445.

[44] The most interesting of the many observations on this subject

are those of Dr. Wilks, F. R. S., published in the _Journal of Mental

Science_, July, 1879.

[45] _Mental Evolution in Man_, p. 137.

[46] _Der Ursprung der Sprache_ (1877). Fr. Müller maintained a similar

view.

[47] A. Lefèvre, _Les races et les langues_ (_Bibliothèque scientifique

internationale_), pp. 5-6.

[48] _Loc. cit._, 372.

[49] Heinicke, _Beobachtungen über Stumme_, 75, 137.

[50] Romanes, _Mental Evolution in Man_, pp. 377-379.

[51] For documents, consult especially Tylor, _Primitive Culture_, V;

Sayce _Principles of Comparative Philology_, I., § 17.

[52] This list may be found in _The Science of Thought_, p. 406.

[53] How were primitive terms (roots or words) formed? A much-debated and

still unsolved question. Man had at his disposal one primary element, the

interjection. By all accounts this remained sterile, unfertile; it did

not give birth to words; it remained in articulate language as a mark

of its emotional origin. A second proceeding was that of imitation with

the aid of sound, onomatopœia. From antiquity to the present time, it

has been regarded as the parent, _par excellence_. This was accepted by

Renan, Whitney, Tylor, H. Paul, etc.; rejected by M. Müller, Bréal, P.

Regnaud, etc. No one disputes the formation of many words by onomatopœia,

but those who question its value as a universal process say that “if in

certain sounds of our idioms we seem to hear an imitation of the sounds

of nature, we must recollect that the same noises are represented by

quite different sounds in other languages, which are also held by those

who utter them to be onomatopœia. Thus it would be more just to say

that we hear the sounds of nature through the words to which our ear

has been accustomed from infancy” (Bréal). I have observed that those

who study the spontaneous formation of language in children, claim

for them but little onomatopœism. On the other hand, a word created

by undoubted onomatopœia is sometimes by means of association, or of

strange analogies, transferred successively to so many objects that all

trace of the transformations of meaning may be lost, and the imitative

origin actually denied. Such was Darwin’s case, cited above, where the

onomatopœia of the duck finally served to designate all liquids, all that

flies, all pieces of money. If the successive extensions of the term had

not been observed, who could have recovered its origin?

[54] Sayce, _loc. cit._, IV., §§ 3-5.

[55] We cannot doubt, however, that there is in the child (and so too for

primitive man) a period of pure and simple denomination, when, in the

face of perceived objects, he utters a word, as a spontaneous action,

a reflex, with no understood affirmation. But this act is rather the

prelude, and attempt at speech, an advance towards language proper.

[56] There is in Iroquois a word that signifies, “I demand money from

those who have come to buy garments from me.” Esquimaux is equally rich

in terms of this sort. Yet we must recognise that these immense composite

words, themselves formed from abbreviated and fused words, virtually

imply the beginning of decomposition.

[57] _Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion_, ed. 1891, p. 196.

[58] Whitney, _The Life and Growth of Language_, Chap. X. Sayce, _op.

cit._, VI., 28, rejects them absolutely.

[59] Renan, _Histoire générale des langues sémitiques_, pp. 128 and 363.

[60] We can see how little the _real_ order of evolution resembles the

theoretical order of the XVIII. century, evolved from pure reasoning:

“The complex notions of substances were the _first_ known, since they

came from the senses, and must therefore have been the first to have

names” (Condillac). “With regard to adjectives, the notion must have

developed with _exceeding difficulty_, since every adjective is an

abstract term, and abstraction is a painful, or unnatural operation” (J.

J. Rousseau).

[61] P. Regnaud, _Origine et philosophie du langage_, p. 317.

[62] On this point, consult especially Sayce, _op. cit._, II., § 9, and

P. Regnaud, _op. cit._, pp. 296-299.

[63] “The word _être_ is irreducible, indecomposable, primitive, and

wholly intellectual. I know no language in which the French word _être_

is expressed by a corresponding word representing a sensible idea. Hence

it is not true that all the roots of the language are in last resort

signs of sensory ideas.” (V. Cousin, _Histoire de la phil. au XIII

siècle_, 1841, II., p. 274.)

[64] For the psychology of relation consult Herbert Spencer,

_Psychology_, I., p. 65, II., pp., 360 et seq.; James, _Psychology_,

I., pp., 203 et seq. The latter gives the history of the subject,

which is very brief, and remarks that the idealogues form an honorable

exception to the general abstention. Thus Destutt de Tracy established a

distinction between feelings of _sensation_ and feelings of _relation_.

[65] Regnaud, _op. cit._, pp. 304 et seq.

[66] It is superfluous to give examples of such a well-known fact. See

Darmesteter, _The Life of Words_.

[67] Intelligence is taken here in its restricted sense, as the synonym

of abstracting, generalising, judging, reasoning.

[68] _De l’intelligence_, Vol. I., Bk. IV., Chap. I., p. 254, first

edition.

[69] _De l’intelligence_, I., Bk. IV., Chap. I., p. 254, first ed.

[70] _Mental Evolution in Man_, pp. 74 and 75.

[71] As Paulhan remarks, “L’abstraction et les idées abstraites”

(_Revue Philosophique_, Jan., 1889, p. 26 et seq.), these two processes

are initially linked one with the other, so that we find analytical

syntheses, and synthetical analyses.

[72] _Op. cit._, VIII., 158-165.

[73] We have touched on this subject incidentally in _La psychologie

des sentiments_ (Part II, IX, § 2, pp. 305 et seq.). Many tribes do

not get beyond polydemonism, peopling the universe with innumerable

genii; this is the reign of the concrete. A certain progress is marked

by subordinating the genius of each tree to the god of the forest, the

different genii of a river to the god of the river, etc. At a degree

higher, the intellect constitutes a single god for water, one for fire,

one for the earth, etc. Thus there come to be genii of individual,

specific, and generic origin.

[74] Tylor, _Primitive Culture_, I., gives abundant data on this

question. Chap. VII. is entirely devoted to it.

[75] In the account of his travels among the Damaras (in his _Tropical

South Africa_, p. 133) Galton says: “In practice, whatever they may

possess in their language, they certainly use no numeral greater than

three. When they wish to express four, they take to their fingers, which

are to them as formidable instruments of calculation as a sliding-rule

is to our English schoolboy. They puzzle very much after five, because

no spare hand remains to grasp and secure the fingers that are required

for ‘units,’—yet they seldom lose oxen: the way in which they discover

the loss of one, is not by the number of the herd being diminished, but

by the absence of a face they know.” [This tallies with what we said

above, Chap. I., as to so-called numeration in animals and children.]

“When bartering is going on, each sheep must be paid for separately. Thus

suppose two sticks of tobacco to be the rate of exchange for one sheep,

it would sorely puzzle a Damara to take two sheep and give him four

sticks. I have done so and seen a man first put two of the sticks apart

and take a sight over them at one of the sheep he was about to sell.

Having satisfied himself that one was honestly paid for, and finding

to his surprise that exactly two sticks remained in hand to settle the

account for the other sheep, he would be afflicted with doubts; the

transaction seemed to come out too pat to be correct, and he would refer

back to the first couple of sticks, and then his mind got hazy and

confused, and wandered from one sheep to the other, and he broke off the

transaction until two sticks were put into his hand and one sheep driven

away, and then the other two sticks given him and the second sheep driven

away.” Galton relates many other similar facts which he had himself

witnessed.

[76] And the barley-corn of English measure.—_Tr._

[77] Wundt (_Logik_, I., pp. 113 et seq.) gives what he regards as a

complete classification of concepts, but it does not correspond with our

design. It may be summarised as follows. Four classes: I. Identical or

equivalent concepts; Aristotle = Alexander’s tutor. II. Subordinate or

superordinate concepts; mammals and vertebrates, etc. III. Co-ordinated

concepts, comprising five species: i. Disjunctive concepts; sound and

noise, French and German, etc. They are subordinate to a larger concept.

ii. Correlative concepts, with reciprocal relations; men and women,

mountain and valley. iii. Contrary concepts; high and low, good and

bad. iv. Contingent concepts; such, i. e., as touch, with very minute,

perceptible differences; this highly important category comprises

numbers. v. Interferent concepts, which coincide or partially cross;

negro and slave, rectangle and parallelogram. IV. Concepts which are

interdependent; etc., space and movement, crime and punishment, demand

and supply, labor and wages. This table may suit the logician but not

the psychologist, because it presents the concepts under what may be

termed the static order, i. e., ready formed: we, on the other hand,

are considering them as dynamic, i. e., in their becoming and order of

genesis.

[78] For details, with quotations in point, consult Agassiz: _De

l’espèce_, Chap. III., and E. Perrier, _La Philosophie zoologique avant

Darwin_, Chap. II.

[79] Agassiz, _op. cit._, gives a summary of the successive improvements.

They are of interest not merely to the zoölogist, but also from our own

point of view, as showing the increasing preponderance of analysis, and

search for fundamental characteristics, to the exclusion of the external

resemblances which served as basis for the more primitive classifications.

[80] Under the heading “Observations on General Terms” the _American

Journal of Psychology_, III. i, p. 144 (Jan., 1890) gives the results of

an investigation conducted upon 113 school children aged 13 to 18. The

words _being_, _the infinite_, _literature_, _abstraction_, _number_,

_play_, _coldness_, _horror_, etc., were written down, and a few moments

were given the pupils to transcribe their impressions in each case.

The summarised answers are not devoid of interest, but the object of the

inquiry is evidently very different from our own.

[81] The word “law” was purposely chosen for its ambiguity; physical

laws, moral or social laws. The immense majority of answers were in the

juristic sense. Ex., Code, Law of the Twelve Tables, a judge, woman with

scales, etc.

[82] For the word _infinity_, those who fall under this type see the

printed word, or the mathematical sign ∞.

[83] It should be noted that he lived among these animals and

experimented with them almost daily.

[84] The results of the investigation were published, partly in the

_Revue Philosophique_, October, 1891, partly at the International

Congress of Psychology, second session, London, 1892 (_International

Congress of Experimental Psychology._ London: Williams & Norgate, pp. 20,

et seq.).

[85] Thus Taine, who is usually regarded as a Nominalist, tells us

that, “A general idea is a name, nothing more than a name, a name which

_signifies_ and _comprehends_ a sequence of similar facts, or class

of similar individuals, accompanied usually by the sensory but vague

representation of some of these facts or individuals.” (The words

italicised for emphasis are not so distinguished in the text.)

[86] We are dealing only with comprehension, and not with invention

(discovery of a law, or of general features in nature). Invention

requires quite different mental processes.

[87] Cournot, _Essai sur les fondements de nos connaissances_. I., § 109,

p. 231.

[88] Dugas. _Du Psittacisme et de la pensée symbolique_, pp. 121 et seq.

[89] Paulhan. _Revue philosophique._ July, 1889, pp. 77 et seq.

[90] Höffding. _Psychologie._ Eng. tr., p. 168.

[91] Maclellan & Dewey (_Psychology of Number and Its Application to

Methods of Teaching Arithmetic_, New York, 1895) made pedagogical

deductions from this fact. They ask, for beginners, that the examples

should be borrowed from continuous quantity, and that number be

considered as a particular species of measure.—In his book _Our Notions

of Number and Space_ (Boston, 1894) Nichols, taking a theory of James

about judgments of number as the basis of his experiments, tries to

show that the simultaneous sensation of two points applied to the skin

originates in the successive sensation of a distinct contact upon two

separate tactile circles.

[92] I do not insist on any such rash thesis. A discussion of it will be

found in the _Report of the Int. Congress of Exp. Psychol. in London_

(_cit._, pp. 35-41).

[93] _Psychology_, II., p. 653.

[94] Liard, _La science positive et la métaphysique_, p. 226. It should

be remarked that the process by subtraction is met with even among

uncivilised people, though very rarely. The plan of making numerals by

subtraction, says Tylor (_op. cit._, I., p. 264), is known in North

America, and is well shown in the Aino language of Yesso, where the words

for 8 and 9 obviously mean “two from ten,” “one from ten.”

[95] “The childish and savage practice of counting on the fingers and

toes lies at the foundation of our arithmetical science. Ten seems

the most convenient arithmetical basis offered by systems founded

on hand-counting, but twelve would have been better, and duodecimal

arithmetic is in fact a protest against the less convenient decimal

arithmetic in ordinary use. The case is the not uncommon one of high

civilisation bearing evident traces of the rudeness of its origin in

ancient barbaric life.” (Tylor, _loc. cit._, I. p. 272)

[96] For the most recent view of this discussion, with the arguments on

either side, see Couturat: _De l’Infini mathématique_ (1896). 2nd part.

Bk. III.

[97] Cournot, _op. cit._, I., p. 331 et seq. Renouvier, _Logique_, I.,

pp. 377-394. Poinsot, _Théorie nouvelle de la rotation des corps_, p. 78.

[98] For a summary of these investigations, see the chapter “Sensations

of Orientation” in Prof. E. Mach’s _Popular Scientific Lectures_, 3rd

ed., Chicago, 1898; and for original discussions of the whole subject of

space-sensations, see the same author’s _Analysis of the Sensations_,

Chicago, 1897.—_Trans._

[99] Münsterberg, _Beiträge zur experimen. Psychologie_, pp. 182 et seq.

Wundt, _Physiol. Psychologie_, 4th ed., II. pp. 95-96.

[100] This is not the place to enter into the well-known discussion

between the “nativists” and the “empiricists.” To the former all

sensation, visual or tactile, contains from its outset a _quantum_ of

extension which is the primitive element, and the foundation for our

spatial constructions. For the others there are only local signs, tactile

or visual, and movements whose synthesis suffices to constitute all the

modalities of existence. Whichever hypothesis be adopted, the extension

in point is always that given by concrete data (not that of space

conceived in the abstract)—directly cognised according to some, a genetic

construction according to others. This discussion has no direct relation

with our subject: for the full debate see Ribot’s _Psychologie allemande

contemporaine_, Ch. V. James (_Psychology_, II. Ch. XX.) has recently

taken up the nativistic theory, giving new arguments in its favor.

[101] Extracted from Spencer’s _Psychology_, Vol. I. § 90.

[102] Lotze, _Mikrokosmus_, II. p. 47.

[103] Stallo, _Concepts of Modern Physics_, Chap. XIII., p. 225, _Int.

Sc. Ser._, third ed. He also gives a very concise criticism of Mill’s

theory of induction in geology.

[104] _System of Logic_, I. Bk. II., Chap. 15, § 1.

[105] The complete history of this question, from its first beginnings to

contemporaneous work, may be studied in Nichols’s “Psychology of Time,”

_Am. J. of Psychol._, III. pp. 453-530.

[106] For these and the following experiments, cf. Wundt, _Physiologische

Psychologie_, 4th ed., I. pp. 408 et seq.

[107] _Psychol._, I. 642.

[108] M. Janet has studied this subject, under the title “Une illusion

d’optique interne” (_Rev. Phil._, 1877, III. pp. 497 et seq.) and

explains the illusion by supposing that the apparent duration of a

certain portion of time, in the life of each individual, is proportional

to the total duration of his life.

[109] Nichols, _op. cit._, p. 502.

[110] _Analysis of the Sensations_, Chicago, 1897, pp. 110 et seq.

[111] H. Spencer, _Psychology_, I., § 91, p. 215.

[112] Horwicz, _Psychologische Analysen_, III., 145. Guyau, _Genèse de

l’idée du temps_, pp. 35 et seq.

[113] _Beiträge zur experimentellen Psychologie_, II., 1889.

[114] Van Ende cites a large number of facts in point, but they are not

all equally convincing. _Histoire naturelle de la croyance_, pp. 208-212.

[115] Romanes, _Animal Intelligence_, p. 314. It should be remarked that

the author only reports the fact from another witness—that the narrator

said it had occurred “thirty years before,” and “that he did not pretend

to remember under what precise circumstances the habit of coming into the

street was acquired.”

[116] According to Delambre, the Chaldæans could only discover the

cycle which the Greek mathematicians called _saros_ by studying their

commemorative notes; i. e., from a considerable mass of observations,

they _extracted_ or _abstracted_ a constant recurrence.

[117] For details see, in addition to Nichols’s article as previously

cited, Sully, _The Human Mind_, II., Appendix E, and James, _Psychology_,

I., pp. 632 et seq.

[118] Fouillée, _Psychologie des Idées-forces_, II., 81-204.

[119] Mach, _Analysis of the Sensations_, English translation (Chicago,

1897), pp. 111-112.

[120] Ward, article “Psychology,” in the _Encyclopædia Britannica_,

Vol. XX., pp., 65 et seq.—On the metaphysics of time considered as pure

heterogeneity, see the recent work of Bergson, _Essai sur les données

immédiates de la conscience_, pp. 76 et seq.

[121] Lewes, _Problems of Life and Mind_, II. p. 375.

[122] For the discussion of this point, see Renouvier, _Logique_, II. 324.

[123] Romanes gives some examples of what he terms appreciation of

causality in animals, including that of a setter that was frightened

at thunder. “On one occasion a number of apples were being shot out of

bags upon the wooden floor of an apple room, the sound in the house as

each bag was shot closely resembled that of distant thunder. The setter

therefore became terribly alarmed; but when I took him to the apple-room

and showed him the real cause of the noise, his dread entirely forsook

him, and on again returning to the house he listened to the rumbling with

all cheerfulness.” Other analogous cases are to be found in his _Mental

Evolution in Animals_, Chap. X.

[124] For the study of Chance, see Cournot, _op. cit._, I., Chap. iii.

[Also J. Venn “The Logic of Chance,” etc.—_Tr._]

[125] Under the title _Zur Entwickelung von Kant’s Theorie der

Naturcausalität_, (_Philosophische Studien_, IX, 3 and 4), Wundt

gives us a rapid historical sketch. He holds that speculation, in

antiquity, is characterised by the method of contraries: the opposition

of being and becoming, etc. It is wholly qualitative. The ancients

progressed by definition. Elaboration of the concept of mechanical

causation was impossible, by reason of the absence of any quantitative

determination. This began with Galileo. The progress of mathematics,

and the introduction of fractional and irrational numbers made it

possible to search out, not merely measure, but also the relation between

magnitudes—i. e., _function_. This became the type, and at the same

time the goal of all intellectual elaboration, as applied to natural

phenomena. This method culminated in the seventeenth century, with the

predominance of the logical type. In consequence of the old concept of

substance, forces were taken as cause, phenomena as effect. The latter is

more frequently derived from cause by deduction, not by intuition. The

cause of a determined event might either be the total of its conditions,

or one antecedent event. This last conception prevailed, as being the

more favorable to the application of mathematics. The eighteenth century

marks the genesis of the biological sciences. The growing importance of

observation and experimental research made against the preponderance

of mathematics. The facts of experience were held more solid than the

conclusions of reason. The type of causality is placed no longer in

deduction, but in sensory intuition; it is the residuum of experience.

This tendency found its exponent in Hume. Kant endeavored to reconcile

the two theses; that which models object upon subject (seventeenth

century) and that which models subject upon object (eighteenth century).

[126] The question is sometimes raised as to whether psychical (and

consequently moral, social) facts ought to be included under the formula

of conservation of energy and correlation of forces. Since the only

evidence produced has been of the nature of theoretical affirmations, or

vague and partial experiences, without quantitative determination, the

question so far remains open. The concept of natural causality was in the

same way considered above in its positive sense, i. e., as a relation of

invariable sequence, without inquiring whether it extends to all forms of

experience,—or whether it is limited.

[127] W. James, _Psychology_, II., p. 671.

[128] Sigwart in his _Logik_, Book II. (English translation by

Helen Dendy) has made a profound study of the classification of the

psychological laws in psychology, and their relative value. He divides

them into three categories, according to the nature of the relations

which they express: 1. Psychophysical laws which formulate constant

relations between states of consciousness and the cerebral states. Ex.

the relation between the sensation directly received, and the image that

is reproduced in consciousness. 2. Psychological laws properly so-called;

these express the internal relations of the states of consciousness.

Ex. Law of conservation of impressions, law of association, law of

systematisation by volition. 3. Laws expressive of the reciprocal

action that human thoughts and volitions exert one upon the other: they

presuppose the intervention of social causes, and are to this day vague

and ill-determined; hence there are no fixed rules for the government of

humanity, or the bringing up of children.

[129] “Fundamental laws are, or should be, only the simplest, most

abridged, and most economical mode of expressing facts, within the limits

of precision possible to our observations and experiences. The laws of

nature are simple, essentially because—among all the possible modes of

expression—we choose the simplest” (see Mach, _Mechanics_, Chicago, 1893,

and _Popular Scientific Lectures_, 23d ed., Chicago, 1898, under the

headings “Economy of Thought,” “Law,” etc.). “In formulating a general,

simple, precise law, based upon relatively few experiences, which,

moreover, present certain divergencies, we only obey a necessity from

which the human mind cannot free itself.” (Poincaré.)

[130] Since our subject is the tracing out of the _concept_ of law in its

different degrees, starting from the generic image, we have no need to

study the nature of the laws proper to each science (logic, mathematics,

mechanics, physico-chemistry, biology, etc.), nor to discuss their value.

For this point, see Boutroux, _L’idée de loi naturelle dans la science et

la philosophie contemporaine_. Paris, 1895.

[131] Brown, quoted by Quatrefages (_Précurseurs de Darwin_, p. 218), who

adds, “If this were the case, one would not find many species denoted

by particular names among savages, and our own illiterate population.

The general notion of species is on the contrary one of those that are

forced upon us, directly we look round. The difficulty is to formulate

it clearly, to give it scientific precision, and this is a very real

problem.”

[132] Quatrefages (_op. cit._, pp. 219-222) gives a great number of

definitions of species. A few may be quoted: “Species should be defined

as a succession of wholly similar individuals, perpetuated by means of

generation” (De Jussieu).—“Species is a constant succession of like

individuals, which reproduce themselves” (Buffon).—“By species we mean

any collection of similar individuals, that have been produced by

individuals like unto themselves” (Lamarck).—“Species is the individual

repeated and continued in time and space” (Blainville).—“Species is the

totality of all individuals that have the same origin, and of those that

are as like them, as they are among themselves” (Brown), etc., etc.

[133] For the transformists, as is well known, variety, race, and species

are not fixed concepts. “From variety to race, from race to species,

there is a continuous insensible passage. Individual modifications, at

first slight, give rise to a variety or to a race. Continuing to augment,

and extending to a constantly increasing number of individuals, they

may come to constitute specific characters. Pursuing its evolution, the

species then finally reaches the rank of the genus, family, etc.”

[134] _De l’Espèce_, Ch. II., §§ 6 and 7.

[135] _Nouveaux Essais_, III, § 6, 23.

[136] _Psychology of Attention_, Ch. I. (Chicago: Open Court Publishing

Co.)

[137] For a study of the function and practical value of symbolism

consult Ferrero, _Les lois psychologiques du symbolisme_; Paris, F. Alcan.

[138] _The Concepts and Theories of Modern Physics_, Ch. IX., p. 137, 3rd

ed.

INDEX.

Abstraction, a positive operation, 2;

a process of secondary formation, 216 et seq.;

has followed three principal directions: practical, speculative,

scientific, 220 et seq.;

higher forms of, 111 et seq.;

implies a dissociative process, 8;

intermediate forms of, 86 et seq.;

prior to speech, 1 et seq.;

stages of, 10 et seq.

Abstract thought, a skeleton, 135.

Acoustic space, 148.

Adjective, the, 76.

Agassiz, 7, 105, 107, 211.

Ampère, 219.

Analogy, 27, 84.

Animals, causality in, 184;

counting of, 19;

language of, 58;

psychology of, 11 et seq.;

reasoning of, 30;

time-sense of, 169.

Antecedent and consequent, 180, 183 et seq.

Ants, intelligence of, 12 et seq., 27, 55.

Arabic, 76.

Archimedes, 190.

Architecture, 28.

Aristotle, 45, 105 et seq.

Arithmogenesis, 139.

Articulation, 63.

Artists, 134.

Association of images, 18;

by similarity, 24.

Astronomers, the first, 173.

Attention, 134, 217.

Auditory types, 112, 121 et seq.

Aztec language, 73.

Baer, Von, 108.

Bain, 7.

Barter, 109.

Bees, intelligence of, 14, 56.

Belief in a universal law of causality, 185 et seq.

Belt, Mr., 13.

Bergson, 178.

Binet, 37.

Blainville, 206.

Boole, 38.

Boutroux, 203.

Bradley, 25.

Bréal, 70, 71.

Brehm, 170.

Brown, 205, 206.

Buffon, 206, 207.

Cases, grammatical, 81.

Causality, belief in a universal law of, 185 et seq.

Cause, empirical origin of, 181;

history of concept of, 180 et seq.;

universalisation of the concept of, 185 et seq.

Chaldæans, 173.

Chance, idea of, 187 et seq.

Charcot, 127.

Chess-players, 40.

Child, numeration in the, 35;

general ideas of, 31 et seq.;

time-sense of, 171.

Chinese, 62, 69.

Class, 211.

Classification, biological, history of, 103 et seq., 204.

Cognition, cardinal operations of, 1.

Communication, 55 et seq.

Compositors, 121.

Concepts, 11, 92, 135;

hierarchy of, 109, 213;

relatively empty, 225;

the inferior, 88;

ultimate nature of, 113.

Concrete type, 115.

Condillac, 31, 77.

Consciousness, the condition of any notion of time, 175 et seq.

Convertibility, 192.

Cope, 212.

Copernicus, 197.

Counting, 35, 99, 143.

Cournot, 134, 146, 187, 188.

Couturat, 144.

Cross-breeding, 208.

Cuvier, 107, 108.

Czermak, 160.

D’Alembert, 201.

Damaras, 99.

Darmesteter, 84.

Darwin, 12, 18, 34, 63.

Deaf-mutes, psychology of, 39;

language of, 41;

syntax of, 43;

numeration in, 45;

religious notions of, 46.

Decimal system, 143.

Declensions, 81.

Delambre, 173.

De Jussieu, 206.

De Quincy, 150.

Descartes, 197.

Determinism, 188, 193.

Dewey, 139.

Dietze, 161.

Differences, 90.

Dissociation, 27.

Dogs, intelligence of, 17, 20, 29.

Dual, the, 77.

Duck, 34.

Dugas, 136.

Duke of Argyle, 40.

Duration, concrete, 159 et seq.;

perception of, 161 et seq.;

reproduction of, 162.

Ebbels, 40.

Economy of thought, 202.

Effort, sense of, 182 et seq.

Elephant, intelligence of, 15.

Ellendorf, Dr., 13.

Empirical laws, 198.

Empiricists, 149.

Energy, conservation of, 192.

Esquimaux, 74.

Euclidean geometry, 156 et seq.

Evolution in our ideas, 195.

Exchange, 110.

Expectation, in reasoning, state of, 25.

Extension, concrete, feeling of, 147 et seq.;

characterised, 158.

Extracts, 70.

_Facultas signatrix_, 55.

Family, 211.

Ferrero, 220.

First causes, 190.

Fouillée, 177.

Fox, ruses of, 18.

Franklin, 55.

Function, notion of mathematical, 190.

Galileo, 190.

Galton, 10, 40, 99.

Gauss, 148, 156, 218, 220.

Geese, time-sense of, 170.

Geiger, 63.

Genera, 210 et seq.

General ideas, thinking by, 9;

their grades distinguished, 101;

likened to mental habits, 131, 225;

meaning of, 135;

observations on, 114 et seq.

Generalisation, 9, 185.

Generic image, 10, 87 et seq., 93, 169, 183, 196;

an almost passive condensation of resemblances, 18;

a spontaneous fusion of images, 22;

comes half way between individual representation and abstraction

properly so called, 23.

Genii, 95.

Geometry, born of practical needs, 148 et seq.;

non-Euclidean, 156 et seq.

Gérando, 40, 41, 51.

Gesture, language of, 48 et seq., 66.

Glass, 163.

Goethe, 109, 134.

Guyau, 166, 178.

_Habere_, 79.

Haeckel, 108.

Hare, ruses of, 18.

Hebrew, 69.

Heinicke, 64.

Helmholtz, 62.

Heredity of acquired characters, 218.

Hoeffding, 4, 136.

Horwicz, 165, 166.

Houzeau, 17, 18, 36.

Huber, 55.

Hume, 187, 190.

Huxley, 10, 22, 212.

Hybrids, 208.

Hysterics, 127.

Idealogues, 68.

_Idées-forces_, 177.

Identity, sense of, 6.

Ideography, 53.

Images, logic of, 26 et seq., 40;

also 5 et seq., 111.

Imagination, forms of, 112.

Indifferent point, 163.

Individual, notion of the, 204.

Inference, 24, 26, 30.

Infinity, 144.

Intelligence, 87.

Inventors, rôle of, 219.

Iroquois, 74.

Isolates, 17.

James, W., 6, 9, 29, 30, 46, 80, 140, 149, 162, 175, 176, 194.

Janet, 163.

Kant, 137, 158, 175, 190.

Kepler, 197, 202.

Kirby, 55.

Kleinpaul, 52.

Kussmaul, 45, 46.

Ladd, 7.

Lamarck, 206.

Language, origin of, 31 et seq., 54 et seq.

Languages, natural organisms, 83;

savage, 95 et seq.

Laplace, 218.

Lapp, 76.

Law, origin of concept of, 194 et seq.;

theoretical or ideal, 200.

Laws, defined, 197;

called by the names of their inventors, 198;

vary in the course of evolution, 213.

Lefèvre, A., 61.

Leibnitz, 31, 129, 140, 214.

Leroy, G., 18, 19, 30, 57.

Lewes, 180.

Liard, 142.

Linnæus, 106, 210.

Lobachévski, 156.

Locke, 31.

Lotze, 150, 151, 178.

Lubbock, 20, 50, 55, 96.

Mach, E., 148, 163, 164, 178, 202.

Maclellan, 139.

Magpie, 20, 21.

Maine de Biran, 181.

Mallery, Colonel, 49, 50, 51.

Mariotte, 202.

Mathematical faculty, the, 217.

Mathematicians, 126.

Mathematics, originated in observation, 148.

Mayer, R., 191.

Measure of quantity, 100.

Memory, 132.

Mill, John Stuart, 24, 25, 26, 34, 138, 151, 154, 155, 181, 191.

Mimicry, language of, 52.

Mind, the, 9, 216.

Miracles, 186.

Mivart, St. George, 48.

Monkeys, intelligence of, 19.

Montesquieu, 197.

Morgan, C. Lloyd, 16, 30.

Motion, psychology of, 182.

Motor types, 112.

Müller, Fr., 60.

Müller, Max, 28, 39, 40, 59, 60, 69, 71, 74, 79, 80, 92.

Münsterberg, 148, 163, 166, 167, 177.

Muscular types, 112.

Mussels, 84.

Names, individual, appellative or general?, 32.

Nativists, 149.

Neanderthal anthropoid, 61.

Neo-geometers, 157.

Neretina, 7.

Newton, 218, 219.

Nichols, 139, 161, 164, 175.

Noiré, L., 60.

Nomenclature, 105 et seq.

Nominalists, 122, 128.

Normal time, 167.

Nothing, the answer, 127 et seq.

Number, concept of, history and theories of its origin, 137 et seq.

Numbers, sequence of, 142 et seq.;

nature of, 146.

Numeration, in animals, 19;

in the child, 35;

its development, 98.

Observations on general terms, 114 et seq.

Oken, 108.

Onomatopœia, 71, 72.

Order, 211.

Owen, Richard, 109.

Painter, 117.

Parallels, axiom of, 157.

Pascal, 219.

Paul, Hermann, 69, 71.

Paulhan, 90, 136.

Perception, utility its mainspring, 4.

Percepts, 111.

Pérez, B., 36.

Performing animals, 15.

Perrier, E., 105.

Physiologist, 119.

Phonogram, 71.

Photographs, composite, 10, 22.

Plato, 222.

Plurality, 139.

Poincaré, 202.

Poinsot, 146.

Polymorphism, 207.

Practical judgments, 93.

Present, the, its nature, 160 et seq.

Preyer, 33, 38, 72, 139.

Progress, 219.

_Quack_, 34.

Quantity, measure of, 100.

Quatrefages, 205, 206.

Ratiocination, 25.

Realism, 128.

Reasoning, signification of, 23;

prior to speech, 38.

Réaumur, 14.

Recepts, 10, 26, 89.

Reflexion, 94.

Regnaud, P., 71, 78, 79.

Regularity, conception of, 196.

Relations, 80, 81.

Renan, 59, 69, 71, 76.

Renouvier, 145, 146, 175, 181.

Representation, 5.

Representative faculty, 112.

Reproduction, 207.

Resemblances, 6, 90.

Respiration, 166.

Rhythm, 164, 165.

Ribot, his observations on general ideas, 135.

Riemann, 156, 158.

Romanes, 10, 13, 14, 19, 34, 35, 40, 43, 46, 55, 57, 63, 66, 89, 93,

170, 184.

Roots, 69 et seq., 75.

Rousseau, J. J., 77.

Rubicon, passage of the, 92.

Sanskrit, 69.

Savage languages, 95 et seq.

Savage races, time-sense of, 171.

Sayce, 67, 70, 73, 75, 77, 96.

Schelling, 108.

Schleicher, 83.

Schmidkunz, 2, 3.

Schneider, 7.

Sciences, origin of the, 221.

Scientists, 135.

Scott, 43.

Semi-circular canals, 149.

Sensation-limits, 166.

Sequence of numbers, 142 et seq.

Siamese, 62.

Sicard, Abbé, 44.

Sidgwick, Prof., 125.

Sigismund, 33.

Signs, logic of, 27;

imitative, 43;

language of, 49;

development of, 92;

the importance of, 144 et seq.

Sigwart, 199.

Similarities, 90, 195.

Simplification, 135.

Skeleton, abstract thought a, 135.

Smith, Adam, 31.

Song, speech is derived from, 62.

Space, origin of the concept of, 146 et seq.;

acoustic, 148;

sense of, 148;

abstract notion of, 151 et seq.;

_n_-dimensional, 156;

Euclidean, 157;

characterised, 158.

Species, origin and growth of the concept of, 203 et seq.;

fixity of, 205;

constituent elements of the concept of, 206;

defined, 206;

vary in the course of evolution, 213.

Specific characters, 205 et seq.

Speech, origin of, 54 et seq., 59 et seq.;

development of, 67.

Spence, 55.

Spencer, Herbert, 7, 62, 80, 137, 150, 165, 175.

Stallo, 153, 158, 222.

Steinthal, 59.

Stern, 26.

Stewart, Dugald, 31, 51.

Substantive, the, 76.

Substitution, 27, 110, 226.

Sully, J., 25, 160, 175.

Sylvester, 148.

Symbolic thought, 132, 226.

Symbolism, complete, 109.

Symbols, 145.

Taine, 33, 34, 73, 87, 129.

Temporal signs, 178.

Ten, the most convenient arithmetical basis, 143.

Thermodynamics, 192.

Time, origin of the concept of, 159;

consciousness of, 164 et seq.;

sense of, 164;

conception of infinite, 174;

measure of, 174 et seq.;

psychological process by which its primitive notion is constituted

in consciousness, 175 et seq.

Time-perception, simple repetition the elements of, 176;

the work of attention, 178.

Tracy, Destutt de, 80.

Tylor, 43, 50, 67, 71, 99, 142, 143.

Unconscious activity, 132.

Unconscious, the, 224;

psychology of the, 226.

Unity, idea of, 138;

abstract, 141.

Unity-type, 143.

Utility, 218, 219;

law of, 5.

Van Ende, 170.

Venn, J., 188.

_Vera causa_, 181.

Verb, the, 78, 97.

Vierordt, 163.

Visual types, 112, 119 et seq.

Vital force, 193.

Vocalisation, 61.

Vogt, 208.

Waitz, 178.

Wallace, 217.

Ward, 178.

Wasps, intelligence of, 14.

Weismann, 218.

Whitney, 69, 71, 75, 80.

Wilks, Dr., 58.

Will, the type of causality, 181 et seq.

Wizel, Adam, 126.

Words, do we think without them?, 40;

they pass to autocracy, 102.

Writing, 53.

Wundt, 103, 149, 161, 162, 163, 176, 189, 196.

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