PART IV

A Critical Analysis of Patriotism

As an Ethical Concept

BY

CLARENCE REIDENBACH

A DISSERTATION

PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF YALE UNIVERSITY

IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

MAY 1, 1918

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

PART I. THE IMPULSES OF PATRIOTISM

Chapter I. The Impulses of Attachment 9

Chapter II. The Impulses of Antipathy 16

PART II. THE HABITUATION OF PATRIOTISM

Chapter III. The Deliberate Habituation 27

Chapter IV. The Spontaneous Habituation 35

PART III. THE BELIEFS OF PATRIOTISM

Chapter V. The Country as Protector of Self 45

Chapter VI. The Oneness of Country and Self 52

Chapter VII. The Intrinsic Value of One’s Country 57

PART IV. THE NATURE AND VALUE OF PATRIOTISM

Chapter VIII. The Will to National Individuality 71

Chapter IX. The Nation as an Individual 85

Chapter X. The Ethical Value of Patriotism in the

Concrete 99

NOTES

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PREFACE

Patriotism is a live issue. It is almost impossible for any one to be

neutral about it. All men seem to feel that the issue involved is one

that touches the fundamental interests of their lives. Patriotism is an

important concept.

But not all men take the same stand regarding patriotism. There is hot

disagreement upon the question of its moral value. Some champion it

as one of the noblest of all virtues; others spurn it as one of the

basest. Therefore it is highly desirable to arrive at a fair judgment

of the ethical value of patriotism.

One of the chief reasons for the radical disagreement about the

morality of patriotism is that there are widely different assumptions

as to its nature. It is a sentiment of manifold varieties, and the word

patriotism may carry quite different implications to different minds.

The first necessary step, then, before one can pass an ethical judgment

upon it, is to find out what the core of patriotism is.

This dissertation begins, therefore, by undertaking to determine the

nature of patriotism, and with no more of a clue in hand than the one

that it is “the love of country” tries, by an inductive investigation

of what has actually been called patriotism, to bring together the

important facts in which patriotism is manifested. Hence, while the

main purpose of the essay is an ethical one, a large portion of it

is given to inductive analysis. The first three parts are mainly

analytical. The fourth part endeavors to unify in a central concept the

data gathered together in the preceding parts, and, in the light of

that concept and all the facts, to evaluate patriotism as an ethical

ideal. It may be noted here that the first three parts are printed

as they were in the typewritten form presented to Yale University as

a thesis, but that part four has undergone much rearrangement and

revision. Chapter eight has been largely rewritten; chapter nine is

entirely new; and what here appears as chapter ten has been somewhat

changed.

Acknowledgement is hereby made to the members of the faculty of

the department of philosophy in Yale University for many helpful

criticisms. Especially is a debt owed to Professor Charles A.

Bennett, who suggested the field of patriotism as a fruitful one for

investigation, under whose direction the work was done, and whose

criticisms and suggestions have made more definite than would otherwise

have been the case, the problems involved. Thanks are due to Professor

Luther A. Weigle, who read the manuscript, and helped to clarify and

make accurate the expression of the ideas. And my gratitude is given to

my wife, whose assistance in the final preparation of the manuscript

was invaluable, and who by her constant helpfulness and loyalty made it

possible for the whole work to be brought to completion.

Indianapolis, January, 1920.

PART I

THE IMPULSES OF PATRIOTISM

CHAPTER I

THE IMPULSES OF ATTACHMENT

When in 1914 the great war broke out, the world was astounded. There

were forces at work which men were confident would make another

war between first-class powers impossible. International relations

and groupings, such as those of commerce, labor, art, science, and

learning, had increased in strength and number. The terribleness and

waste of war were deemed to be so fully realized that modern nations

would have no taste for armed conflict. But the war came on, and

there must have been mighty causes to be able to produce so gigantic

a result. What were they? What could be the nature of such tremendous

causes, that yet remained concealed and in their issuance so took men

by surprise? The factors were various, and some, of course, had been

noted, but one factor which was unnoticed by the general public and yet

which is one of fundamental importance is the rôle taken in patriotism

by men’s unreasoned dispositions of character. If the phenomenon of

patriotism is to be fully understood, it must be analyzed with a

view of discovering what are these deeply ingrained sets of mind and

character which are its raw material and which make it so powerful.[1]

Patriotism is a complex sentiment. There is, in other words, no single

instinctive response in all human beings to the stimulus, country.

What, then, are some of the dispositions of which patriotism is

composed? There are impulses which make primarily for attachment,

and there are those that make primarily for antipathy. One of the

most important of the impulses of attachment is the disposition of

gregariousness. Hobbes, indeed, and others after him, built their

theories of the state upon the doctrine that man would have been able

to live alone had not the company of others been forced upon him, but

that there is an impulse of gregariousness seems indisputable. It is

simply an observable fact that there are species of animals that not

only live in herds, packs, or flocks, but which also show uneasiness

and distress at being separated from their fellows. James cites the

observation of Galton on the gregariousness of the South African

cattle.[2] If an individual of this species were separated from the

herd it would direct its whole activity towards getting back once

more, and when its object was attained, would plunge into the heart

of the herd as if to bathe its very body in contact with its fellows.

Now man, as well as other animals, lives a group life, and it seems

almost inevitable that he should develop an impulse parallel to the

outward facts of his existence, even were it not probable that he has

inherited gregariousness as a psychical disposition from his animal

ancestors. That the impulse is actually present in the human species

is shown by the fact that there is in man a strong abhorrence of

prolonged solitude. Professor James’ words on this point have come to

be almost classical: “To be alone is one of the greatest evils for him

[the normal man]. Solitary confinement is by many regarded as a mode of

torture too cruel and unnatural for civilized countries to adopt. To

one long pent up on a desert island the sight of a human footprint or

a human form in the distance would be the most tumultuously exciting

of experiences.”[3] But the impulse is also apparent in more normal

experiences. So much do men desire the company of others that it is not

only an element of recreation usually, but the more serious tasks of

life often derive their value not more because of the ostensible end

sought after than because of the human association which is involved.

Wilfred Trotter[4] has made gregariousness central in his study

of society. He begins by approving of the method of those who

have come at the study from the standpoint of the instincts, but

expresses dissatisfaction with the limits of their results, that

is, dissatisfaction with the kind of analysis that would explain

man by referring the whole of his conduct to the instincts of

self-preservation, nutrition, and sex. Such an explanation, he finds,

has been historically attempted, but after it has gone as far as it

could, there has always been left over an unexplained X. Trotter

accepts self-preservation, nutrition, and sex as fundamental instincts,

but completes the list by bringing forward the instinct of the herd

which he offers as the explanation of all human activity which was

left unexplained by the other three instincts mentioned above. To

Trotter there have been two great epoch-making forward steps in the

evolution of life. The first came with the change from unicellular

to multicellular organisms, the great advantage of which was to make

the _group_ of cells the unit of selection, thus to some extent

relieving the single cell of the burden of the struggle for existence,

and permitting it a greater chance for variability without running

a greater risk of extinction. This arrangement, says Trotter, had

important influences upon all the cells comprised in the organism. The

second great evolutionary advance came with the change from solitary to

gregarious animals, and was attended by modifications just as profound

as had accompanied the advance from unicellular to multicellular

organisms. Here again the power of natural evolution operated upon the

group as a unit, thus permitting once more greater variability on the

part of the individual. Association in the herd became increasingly

valuable in the struggle for existence, and tended to become more and

more strongly fixed as a disposition of animal nature, a fact which

had fundamental influence upon the mental characteristics of the

individual. There are psychological traits which would not exist but

for the fact of gregariousness. Shyness, embarrassment, fear, anger,

love, sympathy, sorrow, and gratitude would be devoid of meaning apart

from their connection with social relations.

The first important result of the instinct of gregariousness is that

it makes for homogeneity. That is, it is an impulse making primarily

for attachment. Each individual tends to become thoroughly assimilated

in the life of the group; the group’s ways have a vital meaning to

him. Sensitiveness to the behavior of his fellows is heightened, and

resistiveness to the suggestions of the herd is lowered. A suggestion

from outside is likely to be rejected, and direct experience tends to

have little meaning, if its teachings are at variance with the beliefs

of the group. Altruism arises; it is a natural product of the situation

where the conditions of life are such that each individual is of

necessity constantly in the habit of regarding the welfare of others

as well as that of himself. Danger from the outside stimulates each

individual, and spreads fear through the whole group. The herd huddles

together, and each shares in the panic of all. Loneliness at such a

time is unbearable.

Now man is a social creature, and has the characteristics that result

from herd instinct. He tends to become solidified with those of his

own kind, and feel uncomfortable when out of touch with them; to be

suggestible to the influences of his group, and resistive to the

influences of other groups; to feel altruism towards those of his own

herd and aversion towards those of other herds; to be aroused when the

nation is threatened, and huddle in the group in the face of danger.

All these characteristics under the proper stimuli are manifested

by patriotism. A definition of patriotism from the standpoint of

attachment to the group is that of Sumner: “Patriotism is loyalty to

the civic group to which one belongs by birth or other group bond. It

is a sentiment of fellowship and coöperation in all the hopes, work,

and sufferings of the group.[5]

The herd is not tolerant of the nonconformist. The nonconformist has

in a way become a stranger. He has put himself out of touch with the

group. The group knows him and his ways, but he has not permitted

himself to be thoroughly assimilated by it. And the very thing that

the herd desires and insists upon is homogeneity. In the words of one

writer, “The crowd not only needs to make adherents and thus maintain

its existence and increase in volume and power; it needs no less to

assimilate, to digest, the individuals which it swallows up.”[6] The

individual, then, cannot be too insistent upon the expression of his

own personality. His life, even his inner life, must conform to that of

the group. His emotions will not be a matter merely of his own concern.

“Herd-union does not intensify all emotions. It intensifies those

which are felt in common, but it actually deadens and shuts down those

which are only felt by the individual.”[7] And independent thought is

even more taboo. “Thought ... is markedly individual and personal....

Thought is critical, and the Herd wants unanimity, not criticism.

Consequently Herd-union deadens thought.”[8] Hence the nonconformist

gets himself disliked, and the outcome of the situation has usually

been to submerge the individual, and assimilate him to the group. The

moral of the tale is that patriotism acts in that way. “Patriotism,

which is the crowd-emotion of a Nation, makes at times supreme claims

on every citizen and enforces them by public opinion so powerful that

few can or desire to evade them.”[9]

These observations throw light upon the question whether patriotism

is a _political_ or _national_ emotion. Is patriotism attachment to

the government or state, or is it love of one’s national group? There

can be no doubt that it is the latter rather than the former. It is an

outgrowth of tribal feeling. Bertrand Russell is only overstating a

truth when he says that “Tribal feeling, which always underlay loyalty

to the sovereign, has remained as strong as it ever was, and is now the

chief support for the power of the State.”[10]

There is an egoistic element in the attachment of patriotism. It is an

adhesion to one’s own, and one’s own is but an extension of himself.

Patriotism is a personal matter. That is, it is based upon a personal

relationship. One cleaves to his group not on account of its intrinsic

worth simply but because of what it is worth _to him_. The majority

of men are most loyal to what is nearest themselves. Each one of them

seems to himself to be the center of his sphere, and things vary in

importance in direct ratio to their nearness to the center. This fact

gives the key to a very common kind of patriotism. It is simply the

loyalty that men feel to the extension of their own ego.

“One’s own” includes the people of his group, _i. e._, the people who

are most like himself. These people share many things in common with

himself. They have similar habits and customs, and all this conduces to

render them one’s own. “One’s own” also includes the soil. It is that

which is beneath one’s very feet; it sustains one; it nourishes one.

Furthermore, one knows it as he cannot know any strange land, and as no

stranger can know his land. He lives in it throughout the whole year,

and knows it intimately in all its peculiarities and changing moods.

Consequently, his patriotism has in it a love of the “land where his

fathers died.” Virgil understood the meaning of this love of the soil.

He himself felt it keenly, and because of it refused to accept the old

home estate of a Roman sent into exile. It was characteristic that he

made Æneas lament Troy even when he was going out to establish Rome

itself. It was because of this understanding, in part at least, that he

was led to urge the Romans to get back to the soil, realizing that from

a love of _the soil_ to a love of _our soil_ is but a step.[11]

However, what one has been used to should not be taken as the only

kind of the patriotism of attachment that there is. If adhesion to

one’s own could not be overcome, loyalty to one’s earliest home would

quite uniformly be stronger than patriotism. But sometimes one begins

to feel that his childhood was spent in cramped quarters, and that

his early opinions were inadequate. The emotion that he may be very

likely to feel under such conditions is not that of affection but

that of contempt and disgust. Quite often when there is a conflict

between loyalty to the nation and loyalty to the community, loyalty to

the nation proves the stronger. Another indication that men are not

inseparably bound to what they have been used to is that they change

their nation, adopt another country, and side with it even against

the country of their birth. Some time ago there appeared in one of

the large newspapers a letter from a naturalized German in which was

this sentence: “Perhaps you would appreciate your American citizenship

better if, like me, you had been born and brought up in Germany.”[12]

A reason for this attachment to one’s own is the impulse which impels

one to want to feel at home in his world. It is an impulse which craves

order; and it shows itself in a desire for a unified world. There

seems to be an esthetic element in it; the normal mind with a sense of

beauty cannot endure chaos. It represents a rational demand; it is, for

instance, a driving force in philosophy. It finds another root in the

desire for safety. One wants a friendly world in which he feels sure

of himself and where he can live freely without being troubled by the

strange or unknown. Now one’s country presents a world that he knows

and can find his way in; consequently, it satisfies this demand for a

unified world organized about one’s own life, and by virtue of this

character it is able to furnish an additional item in the stimuli to

patriotism.

Man is attached to his country very much as he is attached to himself;

he could not very well help the one any more than he could help the

other. But what is in one way a mere expression of egoism becomes also

an affection. Unless there is some special reason for the contrary,

one is likely to cherish a real affection for that with which he has

long been associated, and especially so, if it has been of use to him.

This fact gives justification for the popular definition of patriotism

as “the _love_ of country.” This affection even may be selfish, but

it may also take on a more altruistic character. Altruism naturally

and perforce develops in a gregarious society. And, moreover, the

parental instinct adds its strength. The protection of the home is a

strong sentiment in patriotism. And the tender emotion of the parental

instinct may be extended to others besides offspring. Patriotism

gets colored by it, and becomes very much like it. McDougall says

that, “Like the fully developed parental sentiment, the patriotism

of many men is a fusion of this quasi-altruistic extension of

the self-regarding sentiment with the truly altruistic sentiment

of love.”[13] Patriotism is, then, in part egoistic and in part

altruistic. In a nation beset with enemies it will indeed take the form

of animosity toward the enemy, but in a prosperous nation will direct

itself very frequently to internal improvement. And it may be said that

it retains something of altruism as well as egoism even in war. It is,

even while being combative towards the _out-group_, altruistic towards

the _in-group_.[14]

The spirit of attachment in patriotism may even go so far as to

become a worship. Religious impulse has frequently been an element

in patriotism. Religion and patriotism were almost the same thing

in Israel. But there are modern parallels. A clergyman not long ago

was reported to have said that the men who died upon the field of

battle (he was thinking of men of his own nation) would straightway

reach heaven, since they had died for their fellow men. It is evident

that being a patriot held something of a religious fervor for that

clergyman. Probably the Kaiser feels a religious exaltation which

sustains him in the belief that he is the instrument of God.

Alfred Loisy[15] opposes Christianity and patriotism to one another,

much to the credit of patriotism. According to Loisy, the teachings of

Christianity and patriotism are incompatible, and those of Christianity

are quite inadequate for the present crisis. Therefore patriotism is

much nobler and not only should but will supplant Christianity. The

only living faith, so he says, is that of devotion to one’s country.

For that men will sacrifice. “Certainly,” says Loisy, “it is an august

life for which a man will sacrifice his own without grudging it; but

it is not for a blessed immortality in the company of Christ and the

saints; it is for the life of the country.”[16] This account of what

Loisy says is set down here not so much because it gives an idea of

patriotism, but because through it Loisy passionately expresses his

own ideal. In his book there breathes a most intense love for France.

This love, he says, is the absorbing passion of the people of France,

and is what unites them. Again we quote his own words: “There are a

faith and love in which it [the army] is unanimous [as against the

lack of unanimity in Christianity]: the love of our country, and an

imperishable belief in her future; over these sentiments, all are in

communion, and the whole country agrees with the army. Here is our

common religion: one which has no unbelievers; in which those who are

faithful to the old creed may fraternize indiscriminately with the

adherents of the newer principles.... Differences [of religion] count

no longer in face of the absorbing interest, the burning passion, the

true religion, both of this and of every moment, namely devotion to the

immortality of France.”[17] “So long as we live, we are determined to

live in our own way; and that which gives us our vigour now against the

invader is neither a lust of conquest, nor the hate which an unjust,

cruel, and fanatical enemy deserves, but the love of our ancient

France, who is our all, whom we yearn to preserve, and whom we are

vowed to save.”[18] Here is a devotion which amounts to a religion,

and it furnishes an example of the working of the religious impulse in

patriotism.

It is not yet time to draw final conclusions, but it is not out of

place to note in passing that patriotism was not condemned by its

egoistic ingredients, and is not now justified by its elements of

altruism. Viewed as a religion, one may say that it is too likely

to become fanatical. The willingness to die upon the battlefield,

rather than goodness, becomes the final test of the desirable citizen.

Moreover, the injury worked upon others is apt to be overlooked.

As a religion, patriotism has the strength, but not the necessary

universality. What it does is wrongly to elevate _a good_ to the

standard of _the Good_.

CHAPTER II

THE IMPULSES OF ANTIPATHY

The impulses of antipathy have played an important role in the

development of patriotism. When one becomes aware of the existence of

other peoples unlike himself, the sense of difference which arises

is liable to take on the character of a strong and active aversion

to and depreciation of them. Nothing is more common than the feeling

that one’s own people is a kind of chosen race, and that all other

races are inferior. A speaker who had lived many years among the

Navajo Indians once said that they regarded and called themselves “The

People.” They were at the top of mankind; the Mexicans ranked next to

them; the Americans came third and last. This was their arrangement of

all the peoples that they knew. The same attitude appears in civilized

man. He is characterized by self-satisfaction, and the peculiarities

of others, even of dialect and pronunciation, are enough to call

forth contempt and ridicule. It follows that strangers can easily

be enemies. In Latin, the word _hostis_ which at first meant simply

_stranger_ or _foreigner_ came later to mean _enemy_. The words of

Loisy are again appropriate: “In the lower stages of human evolution,

a foreigner is not far from being an enemy, if he be not one actually.

In the higher stages of our evolution, among people who think they

are really civilized, he still seems in practice to be of another

species, because he has a different mentality, and unusual ways. Each

separate human group has thus a fashion of collective egoism, whence

comes self-satisfaction, a pride which may possess dignity, which

may be a power, but which also may become a source of blindness and

wickedness.”[19] This antipathy to foreigners has been strong even

when other forces appeared to be in the ascendancy. Such was the case,

for instance, when religion seemed to have the center of the stage;

nationalistic jealousy was a factor in the movements which centered

about Wiclif, Huss, Luther, Henry VIII, and John Knox. These men could

all count upon antipathy to foreigners. And the same antipathy shows

itself today in the fact that the peoples of different nations not only

hate the enemy, but also show a lack of solicitude about their allies.

In the outcry for increased production in the spring of 1917, some

individuals expressed themselves as being ready to plant for American

consumption, but unwilling that any of the products should go to

foreigners. And the “foreigners” that were in mind in some instances

were the Canadians, our next-door neighbors. It may be added, however,

that it does not seem as if there is in race hatred any insurmountable

obstacles to overcoming it. Races which are thrown into contact become

accustomed to one another, and are able to live in harmony.

The form assumed by the general impulse of aversion or antipathy

may be either defensive or aggressive, and may tend toward either

self-preservation or self-assertion. There are nations which of their

own motion will not be warlike, but in which the warlike temper will

flare up when they are once attacked. In such nations patriotism has

been associated with the fight for freedom. Sometimes it seems as

if the definition of the patriot was that he was one who defended

his country’s liberty. This love of freedom is featured in American

expressions of patriotism. A verse from “Hail, Columbia,” will serve as

an example:

“Immortal patriots! rise once more:

Defend your rights, defend your shore:

Let no rude foe with impious hand

Let no rude foe with impious hand

Invade the shrine where sacred lies

Of toil and blood the well-earned prize.”

The call in this verse is that for defense.

There is an instinct that attends this impulse to self-preservation

that strikes one forcibly as being prominent in the patriotism of the

present time, and that is fear. It is an impulse that manifests itself

when one’s existence or vital interests are threatened. The peoples of

the world today are in an excitement of fear because each one of them

believes that national existence and the personal values that depend

upon it are endangered. There is a reason why it is easy for nations,

while trusting in their own good intentions, to be suspicious of one

another. When the individual looks at his own country, he is likely to

see the common people who are all about him and are like himself. And,

since he feels that his own purposes are good, he can easily credit

good motives to his fellow-citizens. But when, on the other hand, he

looks into another country, he is likely to see the governing class

looming up, since that is the class that figures most prominently

in the newspapers. And it is this class which is likely to be most

aggressively nationalistic, and is, moreover, the object of very little

understanding by the ordinary man. Hence, while he thinks that all the

good people that he knows cannot comprise anything that is inhuman, he

can believe that there may very well be foreign monsters. The result is

fear, fear of other countries, a fear that breaks out into a panic when

danger arises, and drives men to seek the safety of the fatherland. Now

the present is a time of panic, and the impulse of fear has put its

impress deep upon current patriotism.

But what is feared tends to become hated too, and so patriotism gets

tinged with hate. Examples of it are at hand. This war has produced

its “Hymn of Hate,” so labeled, and others not so labeled. Many of the

Psalms are expressions of patriotic hate, and since the war began have

been read as such. J. M. Robertson[20] contends that patriotism is

nothing else but fear and hatred. To his mind patriotism is not love

or affection at all, and the only apparent affection there may be, is

that which is compelled by the necessity for common action against an

enemy. Fear itself, Robertson points out, implies a hostile impulse;

love and hate, cohesion and repulsion, are to him strictly correlative

terms; there is no love which is not linked with hate. “It is not,” he

says, “brotherhood, or sympathy, or goodwill that unites the general

population in a flush of passion against another population: the

ostensible brotherhood of the moment is merely a passing product of the

union of egoisms.”[21]

It is certain that in great measure Robertson is right. But one may

well doubt the truth of the assertion that it is necessary to hate in

order to love. It is not necessary to hate one woman in order to love

another, or to have an enemy in order to possess a friend. Neither does

it seem essential in the nature of things to hate one country in order

to be able to love another. Moreover, hatred is not unqualifiedly a

term of opprobrium. How can one rightly care for anything without in

some way resenting attacks upon it? There are such things as righteous

wrath and righteous hatred if they be directed against what is evil.

These remarks upon fear and hatred throw further light upon some of the

phenomena of patriotism already touched upon. One can better understand

now the frantic excitement that often attends a national crisis; fear

“more than ... any other instinct, tends to bring to an end at once all

other mental activity, riveting the attention upon its object to the

exclusion of all others.”[22] New light is thrown upon the solidarity

the group shows. Under the stimulus of fear, the herd instinctively

unites. Unity is the basis of morale. And the individual subordinates

himself to the group; his normal intolerance of isolation is heightened

in the presence of fear. And a corollary of all this is that the

patriotism of fear is destructive of thought, but is prolific in unity

of emotion and action.

Self-assertion is an attitude which under the conflict of interests

with others may be induced. And in the external affairs of nations,

it may be brought to triumph over the motive of security. The means

by which this is done is through the argument that only by taking

an aggressive part can one defend himself, the argument in other

words, that the best defense is a good offense. The result is that

the distinction between defensive and offensive warfare is liable

to be obliterated, a fact which adds to the perplexities of the

problem of war. “The feeling that war is always defensive wrecks the

peace propaganda. The word defensive is capable of being stretched

indefinitely. It is not confined necessarily to preventing an invasion.

A people will feel that it is fighting a defensive war if it attacks

a nation which may attack it in the future.... Or the people may feel

that what it regards as its legitimate expansion is being thwarted....

So by imperceptible gradations every war can be justified, and, as a

matter of fact, is justified as defensive.”[23] When once a war is

started, a people will support it, even if it is aggressive, and if one

couples with this the fact that when a nation arms in self-defense,

it acquires the means of aggression, he can understand how easily a

patriotism which supports only a policy of self-preservation can be

brought to support a policy of self-assertion.

One way in which the will to self-assertion is likely to manifest

itself is as an impulse to expansion. A stationary condition is not

satisfactory to the group; it desires to reach out. This impulse shows

itself in churches and orders of all kinds by the constant demand for

new members. The group wants to see itself grow. But if nations grow,

they are apt to think that they need more land. And when this occurs

their patriotism will attach itself to the desire for expansion, and

become imperialism. J. M. Robertson couples the words _Patriotism and

Empire_ in the title of a book, and in that book he says, “Patriotism

conventionally defined as the love of country, ... turns out rather

obviously to stand for love of more country.”[24] And where there is

coupled with this the impulse of acquisition, it becomes plain why the

economic rivalry of nations has been so important in bringing about the

situation out of which war arises.

The impulse of expansion undergoes but a slight change to become the

will to domination. This latter is a primitive impulse. The Indian was

taught to despise manual labor, but to glory in the overcoming and

plundering of other tribes. It is still dominant in the race. What men

desire, at least in the Western world, is power, and they would rather

exercise dominion over others than be free themselves. Goethe puts the

idea in poetical form:

“How often has it arisen! Yes, and it will arise

Ever and evermore! No man yields sovereignty

Unto his fellow: none will yield to him

Who won the power by force, and by force keeps his hold.

For man, who cannot rule his own unruly heart,

Is hot to rule his neighbor, bind him to his will.”[25]

The desire for dominion was awakened by the Napoleonic aggressions,

and has played a great part in fanning the flame of nationalism in the

nineteenth century. It has given nationalism an aggressive and militant

character. And the people of a democratic country are not immune from

the virus; they as well as kings sometimes give themselves up to the

thirst for domination, a fact which has at least some bearing upon

whether or not democracy will make the world safe. The citizen rarely

disputes the external sovereignty of his country. Consequently the fact

of internal democracy by no means gives assurance that a country will

uniformly abstain from assuming the attitude of a dynastic state when

it faces the world. Democracy often ceases at the water’s edge.

Pride is a part of patriotism. Men walk with heads up and chests out

at the consciousness of belonging to a conquering or respected nation.

The triumphal processions of the Romans were a spectacle that no doubt

stirred patriotism of this variety in noble Roman hearts. They could

“point with pride” to their glory. And a little touch of glory makes

the whole world kin; modern men in their swelling national pride are of

the same stock as the ancient men of Rome. Men now identify themselves

with their group, and feel that along with it, they themselves rise or

fall in importance. If the country submits to another’s will, they hang

their heads in shame; if it imposes upon another its own will, they

hold their heads high. An important practical consequence of national

pride is that no people now would voluntarily consent to peace without

honor, which is food for thought in the planning of peace.

The patriotism of pride is not loath to meet its adversary upon the

field of honor. When nations have a lively sense of power and prestige,

a situation is created which furnishes admirable fuel for trouble.

For insecure pride will induce fear, and fearful pride will allow no

nation to do other than to resent insults, real or supposed, promptly

and bitterly. Material interests need not clash in order that a war be

provoked. If the patriot says to himself that the country’s honor has

been assailed, the fight is on, no matter what the insult may consist

in; it may have to do with only a matter of mere punctilio. An insult

has been offered, and injured pride does not enjoy itself until it

reaps revenge. Of course the crime is that the insult is a public one.

“The act that, more certainly than any other, provokes vengeful emotion

is the public insult, which, if not immediately resented, lowers one

in the eyes of one’s fellows. Such an insult calls out one’s positive

self-feeling, with its impulse to assert oneself and to make good one’s

value and power in the public eye.”[26]

But it does not happen that any one country is allowed to assert

itself without opposition. Others will follow the example, attempt to

assert themselves, and make good their prestige. What then happens

is that there is a race for power, and patriotism becomes a spirit

of rivalry or emulation.[27] The fact is that what most of us desire

is not only well-being but prestige, not only the _Good_, but the

_Better_ or the _Best_. Athletic contests are invested with such great

interest not only because they may be good games, but because they

are _contests_, contests perhaps between traditional rivals, or are

for the championship of this, that, or the other. It is likewise with

countries. National welfare is viewed at the present time very largely

as a competitive success. And affairs have come to such a condition

that no one country dares to let up in its vigilance in the universal

competition. Individually it is helpless. If it relaxes, its competitor

will monopolize all the advantages, its own prestige will be lowered,

and it will be inviting aggression in which it will be preyed upon.

There doesn’t seem to be much help for the situation except in the

concerted action of nations. But in the meanwhile the struggle goes on,

and patriots throw themselves into the spirit of it with abandon.

It should be said that it is not inevitable that the impulse of rivalry

should issue exclusively in destructive conflict. One does not need to

destroy his competitor in order that he himself should be benefited,

and in fact enlightened competition does desire the preservation and

welfare of the competitors. One way in which the emulative impulse

differs from the combative impulse, for instance, is just this, that it

does seek to preserve a defeated competitor. The possibility is, then,

that patriotism may be sublimated into a higher and more innocent form

of rivalry than what we have at present.

We have, however, to deal with the present fact that the rivalry of

nations is likely to issue in war. And hence it becomes necessary to

take into consideration the impulse of pugnacity. The plain fact is

that war has a fascination. Even if one’s own country be not involved,

one turns eagerly to the war news in the daily papers. History is

the history of wars. The attractiveness of war is expressed in the

following verse of Richard Le Gallienne:

“War

I abhor

And yet how sweet

The sound along the marching street

Of drum and fife! and I forget

Wet eyes of widows, and forget

Broken old mothers, and the whole

Dark butchery without a soul.”

There is that about the martial life which excites enthusiasm, and that

enthusiasm gets connected with patriotism. Patriotism runs at high tide

in war times.[28]

And now, does the presence of the instinct of pugnacity compel at once

an unfavorable verdict on patriotism? There is no doubt that pugnacity

may lead to what is undesirable; it does become “dark butchery without

a soul.” Is patriotism for that to be condemned? In answer to this two

things may be said. To begin with, militancy may be a good, and can no

more be condemned in the abstract than can pacifism. There is no ground

for saying that pacifism is a virtue in itself. One might be pacifistic

simply because he did not care about his fellow men, or simply because

he was afraid to fight. Nonresistance is indeed under some conditions a

good, and so is the impulse of pugnacity. Totally devoid of it, neither

the individual nor the nation can live in other than pusillanimous

cowardice; their ideals will not be much, and from them shall be taken

even the little that they have. In the second place, patriotism does

not issue exclusively in war. It has already been shown that it has a

positive character of attachment, and may develop without reference to

war, but wholly with reference to the pursuits of peace.

The analysis of the impulses of patriotism has emphasized the truth of

a proposition that was stated at the beginning; patriotism is a complex

phenomenon. It is, as it actually appears, composed of a wide variety

of impulses, which appear in shifting combinations, and show themselves

now in one person and time and now in another.

The conclusion may also be drawn that there has been found here no

ground for passing a final verdict either favorable or unfavorable upon

patriotism. There has been found in the instinctive basis of patriotism

an element which gives it its tremendous power, but that result does

not answer the question regarding the moral worth of patriotism.

Instincts are just tendencies that taken simply as instincts have no

moral character at all. Their moral worth depends upon the way in which

they are used. Consequently, before one can estimate the worth of

patriotism, he must see how these impulses are used in it.

The impulses themselves are not patriotism. They form raw material

for and give character to it, but they themselves are not patriotism.

They serve equally well as raw material for other human interests far

removed from this one. Instincts alone are unorganized, and are capable

of being shaped into an indefinite number of meanings. The further

question that will ultimately have to be answered is that concerning

what the organizing factor is that can ever give to any combination

of impulses the meaning,--patriotism. That investigation will next be

entered upon.

PART II

THE HABITUATION OF PATRIOTISM

CHAPTER III

THE DELIBERATE HABITUATION

One way by which the impulses and dispositions of human character are

amalgamated in patriotism is by habituation. The habits of patriotism

are just as powerful and important as the impulses. The impulses,

in fact, are molded into habits, and are profoundly modified by the

environment and regimen to which they are subjected. The habits become

the masters of the impulses. Thought at this point enters into the

problem, but it is not the individual’s own thought; it is the thought

of the society which surrounds him. His articles of faith are habits

acquired from society. “... It is through habit that the influence

of intelligence has most control over the lives of the majority of

civilized men.”[29] On the part of the individual, the thought is

involuntary, or at least unvoluntary, and is accompanied by like

action. Most of man’s beliefs are nonrational, even though he supposes

that he has come to hold them by his own free and deliberate choice.

Society holds tremendous power over the building of character; in large

measure, it controls the material that the mind has to work on. And

this control is of primary importance. “... The essential fact which

has made the Great Society possible is the discovery, handed down by

tradition and instruction, that Thought can be fed by deliberately

collected material, and stimulated, sustained, and to a certain extent,

controlled by an effort of will.”[30]

Now, the patriotic spirit, along with other dispositions, may be

acquired as a habit, and the mold into which patriotism runs is

notoriously with most men a matter of circumstances and habituation.

Along this line, it is interesting to speculate as to what American

patriotism would be if this country had never separated from England,

if the thirteen colonies had not been able to form a federation, or

if the South had been successful in the Civil War. The loyalty of

Americans would have been totally different, but no doubt would be just

as devoted as it actually is. It is a historical fact that English

patriotism has modified itself to correspond to the expansion of the

empire. In view of all this, one can hardly resist the conclusion that

patriotism depends quite largely upon habituation and use and wont.

Patriotism is a national habit; and it is a habit which even were it

proved to be nothing but evil, would not be easily broken, since it is

acquired from life’s earliest years onward.

“The superstitions of our early years,

E’en when we know them to be nothing more,

Lose not for that their hold upon our hearts;

Not all are free who ridicule their chains.”[31]

There are two kinds of the habituation of patriotism, deliberate and

spontaneous, conscious and unconscious, direct and indirect. The more

obvious of the two is that of conscious and deliberate habituation.

There are agencies that are constantly being used with deliberate

purpose towards the regimentation of the populace in patriotism.

“Patriotism is systematically cultivated by anniversaries, pilgrimages,

symbols, songs, recitations, etc.”[32] There are numerous patriotic

societies, such as the Grand Army of the Republic, the Daughters of the

American Revolution, the Sons of Veterans, the Woman’s Relief Corps,

the Daughters of the Confederacy, and others.[33]

But there are other and more important forces back of the inculcation

of patriotism. In most countries the state with all its power is

vigilant lest patriotism be allowed to become otiose. And it has means

at its disposal that range from the selection and repression of news to

the active use of all sorts of influences which sway the mind of the

public. And these influences do not go unemployed. There are those in

the state who have a special interest in arousing a strong sentiment

of patriotism. Conspicuous among such are the professional soldiers.

They, of course, want a solidified population. Their training has

emphasized their appreciation of the value of obedience and uniformity.

These virtues are essentials in the discipline of an army, and in

terms of military logic they seem to be essentials in the organization

of a country. J. M. Robertson has a division of a book which he has

devoted to a discussion of the regimentation of militarism.[34] But

the guardianship of the patriotic fire within the state is not turned

over entirely into soldierly hands. Other interests, whose nature and

motives in contrast with the straightforward purposes of the country’s

guardians are such as to make it difficult to describe them in the

dispassionate spirit of scientific and philosophic discourse, are ready

with their assistance. And, of course, the ordinary civilian temper is

not averse to the rigorous regimentation of patriotic loyalty.

Hegel[35] thought that it was both right and necessary that the

state should control public opinion. He considered that the people

had no opinions of very great worth. “... The people, in so far as

this term signifies a special part of the citizens, does not know what

it wills. To know what we will, and further what the absolute will,

namely, reason, wills, is the fruit of deep knowledge and insight,

and is therefore not the property of the people.”[36] Public opinion

without the guidance of the state was unorganized and dangerous. “The

many as individuals, whom we are prone to call the people, are indeed

a collective whole, but merely as a multitude or formless mass, whose

movement and action would be elemental, void of reason, violent, and

terrible.”[36] Therefore it was necessary for the proper source of

authority to organize public opinion. And, of course, this work of

organization and direction was to be the task of the officials of the

state. “The highest state officials have necessarily deeper and more

comprehensive insight into the workings and needs of the state, and

also greater skill and wider practical experience.”[37] There are

others who do not hold Hegel’s philosophical system that yet agree with

him in upholding the high sovereignty and controlling supervision of

the state.

Ecclesiastical institutions often serve as habituators of nationalistic

spirit. The rise of nationalism in Spain affords an interesting

example, for religious motives were at the height of their strength

in those days. Ferdinand and Isabella got control of the hierarchical

religious organizations in their dominions by taking from the Pope and

to themselves the power to name the prelates of the Catholic church

in Spain. The Crusading Orders had great vogue in the country, and

Ferdinand got himself elected to the office of Grand Master in the most

important of them. These measures accomplished, they were made to tell

by the rulers of Spain in the process of furthering their dynastic and

nationalistic ambitions. In Japan, Bushido, a mixture of Confucian and

Shinto elements, is a spirit of patriotism which is at the disposal

of the state. In Germany, the pastors of the established churches are

state officials; they are state-appointed and state-paid, and they

reflect the state’s purposes. In all Christian countries, including

our own, the churches observe the national patriotic holidays both in

time of war and peace, and in time of war preach patriotism from the

pulpits, sometimes at the solicitation of the state, sometimes of their

own volition.

The newspapers are of cardinal importance as agencies of the

inculcation of patriotism. It is natural that the newspapers should be

insurgently patriotic. They are dependent upon the public for their

subsistence. And the mass of the public is conservative. Consequently,

the newspapers are as a rule conservative also. Now patriotism is a

venerable virtue easy for the public to believe in, and it is almost

inevitable that journalism should play up that virtue. It is also

almost as inevitable that the patriotism of the press should be of

the militant kind. To take that character is simply to follow the

line of least resistance. Public opinion reacts upon the press and

circumscribes its initiative. And when a people becomes inflamed

against another people, the newspapers as a rule (there are, of course,

some that are independent in their thought and leadership) have to fall

in line; the sheet that opposed the trend of public emotion would have

to pay for its folly. The newspapers, moreover, on the whole represent

the gentlemanly business class, and wars promise most to the interests

of that class. Conflict is quite apt to grow out of economic rivalry,

whence it naturally follows that those who are most nearly concerned in

that rivalry (and the newspapers are controlled by such as are of that

class) will be most interested in the prosecution of a war which bids

fair to enlarge the economic opportunities of their own country.

Along with the newspapers as habituators of patriotism go also less

ephemeral kinds of literature. “The Man Without a Country,”[38] for

instance, has a definite patriotic purpose. And patriotic orations,

songs, and poetry have the same purpose. Sometimes these compositions

are not jingoistic, but very often they are. Wordsworth’s poetry,

for instance, is of the nonjingoistic character; it is strongly

marked by love of the soil. But Wordsworth was of unusually broad

sympathies, and his is not the kind of poetry usually made use of in

teaching patriotism. J. M. Robertson has written an essay in which he

called attention to the proclivity of poets to write in a jingoistic

strain.[39] Virgil, himself a man of broad sympathies, wrote the Æneid

at the request of Augustus, whose empire-building purposes needed an

epic after the model of Homer about the founding of Rome.

An important habituator of patriotism in the training of the young is

the public school system. The public schools are almost always used

by those who have them in charge for the maintenance of the existing

order. But the “existing order” quite regularly means the political

one, and hence the road is opened for the teaching of patriotism.

Prussia seems to be an extreme case of the deliberate use of the

schools for pushing the pet programs of the politically favored

classes. “In Prussia the avowed use of the schools, not for the spread

of truth but for the ‘War against social-democracy’ may be in part

responsible for that absence of Love between members of different

classes, that class-war of which the growth of social-democracy is only

one symptom.”[40] Prussia also exhibits a peculiarly active brand

of patriotism. It has been commonly assumed in the United States

that education will make for democracy but it is not necessarily so.

Education, instead of being aimed at freeing and developing the mind,

may be aimed only at regimentation in a certain system of ideas. The

fact of the business is that as a rule it is so aimed, even where there

is no such clear and persistent purpose as there is in Prussia; it

is all too easy to fall into the rut of doing the same old things in

the same old way. It is simply easier to inculcate the same old ideas

than it is to teach the ever-varying young idea how to shoot. And what

education turns out under such methods is not free and independent

thinkers, but a habituated uniform product. “School education, unless

it is regulated by the best knowledge and good sense, will produce

men and women who are all of one pattern, as if turned in a lathe....

Any institution which runs for years in the same hands will produce

a type.... In the continental schools and barracks, in newspapers,

books, etc., what is developed by education is dynastic sentiment,

national sentiment, soldierly sentiment.”[41] And so the schools are

used for the maintenance of patriotism,--patriotism which only too

often is narrow and militaristic. An example of the better kind of

purpose to teach patriotism is that in view in Bosanquet’s lecture on

the subject.[42] An example of the kind which is likely not to be so

temperate and well-considered is that which grows out of the demand

for the teaching of patriotism which arises under the stimulus of war.

On May 17, 1917, there appeared in a small-town newspaper[43] an

article dated from New York City, and which was evidently furnished by

some news association. The headlines were as follows: “College Course

in Patriotism. Chicago’s Mayor Starts Chair in Lincoln University.

Students True Americans.” The opening paragraph ran thus: “For the

first time in the history of American education a chair has been

established for the teaching of American Patriotism. Inspired by the

work being done by the Lincoln Memorial University, William Hale

Thompson, Mayor of Chicago, will provide $25,000 for this purpose.” A

little further on occurred the sentence, “Plans have already been made

for the opening of the Patriotism Department.” These plans may not have

been actually carried out, and if they were, may have obtained solid

results, but the sound of the article was such as would lead one to

suspect that what was accomplished would rather prove to be superficial

and sensational. This whole attempt has been cited here not because it

is an isolated incident, but for the reason that it is an illustration,

extreme though it may be, of a tendency.

The public schools have textbooks for the purpose of training in

patriotic loyalty, books which tell of the duties of citizens, and are

replete with songs and poems to illustrate the points brought out.[44]

The schools of our land make it a part of their chief business to

teach loyalty to the country. For this business history is plastic

material. “History, in every country, is so taught as to magnify that

country: children learn to believe that their own country has always

been in the right and almost always victorious, that it has produced

almost all the great men, and that it is in all respects superior to

all other countries. Since these beliefs are flattering, they are

easily absorbed, and hardly ever dislodged from instinct by later

knowledge.”[45] The unpleasant facts are not brought out. Americans,

for example, do not usually have it called to their attention that in

the War of 1812, most of their vessels were tied up in port at the end

of the war, their national capital was captured by the enemy, they won

only one important land battle and that after the war was over, and

that their representatives in the peace negotiations had to surrender

the principle for which the war was fought. The war ended because both

sides were willing to return to the _status quo ante_. The patriotic

bias dominates even the historian himself. “No historian ever gets out

of the mores of his own society of origin.... Even if he rises above

the limitations of party, he does not get outside the patriotic and

ethical horizon in which he has been educated, especially when he deals

with the history of other countries and other times than his own. Each

historian regards his own nation as the torchbearer of civilization;

its mores give him his ethical standards by which he estimates whatever

he learns of other peoples.... In modern Russian literature may be

found passages about the ‘Civilizing mission’ of Russia which might

be translated, _mutatis mutandis_, from passages in English, French,

or German literature about the civilizing mission of England, France,

or Germany. Probably the same is true of Turkish, Hindoo, or Chinese

literature. The patriotism of the historian rules his judgment,

especially as to excuses and apologies for things done in the past, and

most of all as to the edifying omissions,--a very important part of the

task of the historian.... There is a compulsion on the historian to act

in this way, for if he wrote otherwise, his fellow-countrymen would

ignore his work.”[46]

The habituation of patriotism finds in _symbols_ an instrument

admirably suited to its purpose. The mind really reacts more strongly

to symbols than it does to the facts of sense-experience. The potency

of symbols does not suffer from the admixture of distractions by

which direct sense-experience is accompanied. Symbols are more purely

meaning, and they come with the momentum of their meaning. Now the

word “country,” embodying an abstract and fairly simple idea, serves

as a symbol and produces a pure emotion as in art. Other words and

phrases could be named that are similar in the responses that they

elicit. “The Monroe Doctrine” is one of the pet symbols of the United

States. In patriotic poetry and hymnology the flag is featured. It is

a symbol of the country. Children are taught to sing about the flag,

by means of which a symbol is implanted in their minds, the love of

music is appealed to, and patriotism is connected with their childhood

sentiments. The appeal of symbols comes home to one when he stands

at the dividing line between two countries, at Niagara Falls, let us

say, and gazes upon two flags, one of them his own and the other not.

At the present time Great Britain is our ally, but the emotion upon

beholding the British flag is nothing as compared with the feeling of

affection experienced upon beholding the American flag. The British

emblem, though respected, is strange; the American flag is one’s

own. Sumner discusses what he calls the tyranny of the apparatus of

suggestion, that is, symbols or tokens, and from him is worth quoting

the following pertinent passage: “The tyranny is greatest in regard to

‘American’ and ‘Americanism.’ Who dare say that he is not ‘American’?

Who dare repudiate what is declared to be ‘Americanism’? It follows

that if anything is base and bogus it is always labeled ‘American.’

If a thing is to be recommended which cannot be justified, it is put

under ‘Americanism.’ Who does not shudder at the fear of being called

‘unpatriotic’? And to repudiate what any one chooses to call ‘American’

is to be unpatriotic. If there is any document of Americanism, it is

the Declaration of Independence. Those who have Americanism especially

in charge have repudiated the doctrine that ‘governments derive their

just powers from the consent of the governed,’ because it stood in the

way of what they wanted to do. They denounce those who cling to the

doctrine as un-American. Then we see what Americanism and patriotism

are. They are the duty laid upon us all to applaud, follow, and obey

whatever a ruling clique of newspapers and politicians chooses to

say or wants to do. ‘England’ has always been, amongst us, a kind of

counter token, or token of things to be resisted and repudiated. The

‘symbols’ or ‘tokens’ always have this utility for suggestion. They

carry a coercion with them and overwhelm people who are not trained to

verify assertions and dissect fallacies.”[47] When one’s attention

is called to these things, it cannot help but impose upon him the

obligation of examining the bases and nature of his own patriotic

enthusiasm.

The deliberate habituation of patriotism has a bearing upon the problem

of peace. Knowledge of other peoples will not bring harmony and mutual

goodwill unless it is sympathetic knowledge, and, if it is to be

sympathetic, our mental prepossessions must be shaped so as to open our

minds to a just appreciation of unwelcome facts and ways at variance

with our own. And to accomplish this, the teaching of patriotism will

have to be directed towards the realizing of the devoutly to be wished

consummation.

CHAPTER IV

THE SPONTANEOUS HABITUATION

The spontaneous habituation of patriotism has no conscious and set

purpose, institution, or program. This is the habituation that makes

itself felt from the mere fact that individuals in a society tend

more and more to become assimilated to one another. Germany affords

an extreme example of the deliberate habituation in patriotism.

Every agency within the empire, including state, church, newspapers,

schools, and so on, has been used towards securing a uniform result,

that of nationalistic passion. But every country offers an example

of the spontaneous habituation of patriotism. There is no less of

nationalistic loyalty among the Allies than there is in Germany. It is

interesting that the two kinds of habituation have come into combat.

“Among the number of embattled principles and counter principles which

this war has brought into the field, we must include as not the least

interesting the duel between conscious national direction on the one

side and unconscious national will and knowledge on the other.”[48] In

the spontaneous habituation of patriotism we are dealing with a more

subtle and powerful force than the deliberate habituation. The former

goes deeper than the latter into human life. What we try to teach may

not be learned, but what we are sets copy in the copybook of life. “The

genuine beliefs, though not usually the professed precepts, of parents

and teachers are almost unconsciously acquired by most children; and

even if they depart from these beliefs in later life, something of

them remains deeply implanted, ready to emerge in a time of stress or

crisis.”[49]

It is natural that the citizens of a country should be thus habituated.

In fact, in large measure, they habituate themselves. The basis of

it is first of all that men are alike, and are faced with similar

problems. The fact that men have like instincts, instincts, moreover,

that have to adjust themselves to identical life conditions,

makes it easy to assimilate them to one another and to the group.

Suggestibility is one of these dispositions of human nature. McDougall

defines it as “a process of communication resulting in the acceptance

with conviction of the communicated proposition in the absence of

logically adequate grounds for its acceptance.”[50] Suggestion, of

course, is not omnipotent. There is, for one thing, what is known as

a contra-suggestion, that is, behavior in which people do just the

opposite to what one tries to persuade them to do. Early in the regime

of Mr. Herbert Hoover as food administrator one butcher reported that

his customers wanted meat more on meatless than on any other days. And

there is always the possibility that suggestion may be disregarded

altogether. But human beings are interdependent, and are open to

guidance through suggestions from the ideas and practices of their

fellows. An individual cannot think everything out for himself. Some

hardly ever do any serious thinking and even the more serious take

the bulk of their thoughts, at least in other fields than their own

special one, upon suggestion. Choice is exhausting. It is hard business

thinking, and we are likely to shirk the irksomeness of it if we can.

“Either to be exceptional or to appreciate the exceptional requires a

considerable expenditure of energy, and no one can afford this in many

directions.”[51] The chances are, then, that except in such cases as

where for some reason we are specially critical, an idea suggested will

find lodgement in the mind and tend to issue in action; and this fact

is tremendously important in the understanding of a social phenomenon

such as patriotism.

It is rather ominous that today political thought does not seem to be

as active as it once was. “My own impression,” says Graham Wallas,

“formed after questioning a good many people in different parts of

England is that, in our country, the quantity of such discussion

[serious discussion on public questions] which takes place ... is

diminishing.”[52] The great cause of this is the modern industrial

system, and it is likely that what is true of England is true also of

America. And if serious _discussion_ is diminishing it means probably

that men are doing less serious _thinking_ on political subjects, and

that they are likely to become more suggestible with regard to them.

The application to the subject of patriotism is obvious.

Imitation[53] is another disposition of human nature that is close

to that of suggestibility. There is contra-imitation as well as

contra-suggestion, and besides imitation there is also invention. But

it is a powerful social force. For the interdependence of man makes for

imitation as well as suggestibility. And society really owes a great

deal to it. An invention in social living cannot hope to survive unless

it is freely adopted by masses who have no thought of stopping to

reason out its utility. And the effect of imitation is that it causes

an immense impetus towards uniformity and solidarity within the group.

“... Men and other animals imitate what they see others, _especially

they of their own species_, do.”[54] And imitation of one’s own

group tends to assimilate him to it, to habituate him in its ways,

and secure his loyalty to it and its ideals, which is to say, that

imitation is a factor in the making of patriotism.

The fact that suggestion and imitation exercise their greatest force

within the group makes it pertinent to recognize the part that _the

group_ plays in the process of habituation in patriotism. The fact is

that because of the individual’s membership in a group, the suggestions

that come to him impinge upon his consciousness with a good deal of

force. They strike him from all directions at almost the same time,

and have a multiple dynamic behind them. Now the nation is a group.

The space-annihilating devices of the present day in conjunction with

the photographs and vivid descriptive reporting of the newspapers have

extended and intensified the connections between the individual and his

national group. The crowd for the individual may now well be, and in

time of national crisis is, the people of his country.

This, however, is especially true of city populations, a fact which

must have allowance made for it in the gauging of public opinion. It is

the voice of the city-population that has too often been taken as the

expression of public opinion. “The voice of ‘the people’ is very often

nowadays only the voice of the city crowd, faintly re-echoed, if echoed

at all, in the smaller towns. Sometimes also the noise is that of a few

editors of newspapers.”[55] Another fact which ought to be noted is

that there are prestige-groups within society. Examples of such are an

old-fashioned aristocracy, the governing class, and in a democracy, the

majority. Such groups often exercise compelling coercive power.

The coerciveness of the crowd makes for national unity, but it has

unwelcome features. It is too likely to lead to a high disregard of the

rights of the nonconformist and an unsympathetic and uncompromising

attitude towards other nations. There are no incentives to broad-minded

thought and sympathy within a homogeneous crowd. Opposition is the real

matrix out of which reason and tolerance are extracted. The government

of the United States of America had a tolerant spirit stamped upon it

because the makers of our institutions were many men of many minds. The

only way to do justice to their differences was by compromise. Close

agreement confirms convictions, but does not stimulate the imagination.

“Where all think alike, no one thinks very much. But whatever he does

think, he can think with all his soul.”[56] Without the differences it

is more than likely that America would not have been quite so tolerant.

It follows that the nation, because it has no critic to which it

listens, is likely to be hard-minded, fanatical, and unyielding.

The atmosphere in which the individual lives and moves and has

his being is that of his people’s customs or mores. These are

intellectualized folkways. Folkways are the group’s ways of dealing

with its environment. Mores are the folkways plus the convictions

as to their relation to welfare. Sumner defines them as follows:

“The mores are the folkways, including the philosophical and ethical

generalizations as to societal welfare which are suggested by them, and

inherent in them, as they grow.”[57] Tradition, which is crowd-memory,

perpetuates the mores, and they become the life _milieu_ of the

individuals of each generation. A large part of one’s education,

especially his moral education, is gained from the traditions and mores

of his people. And their teachings are all the more authoritative

because one is almost wholly unconscious of learning from them. “We

learn the mores as unconsciously as we learn to walk and eat and

breathe. The masses never learn how we walk, and eat, and breathe,

and they never know any reason why the mores are what they are. The

justification of them is that when we wake to consciousness of life

we find them facts which already hold us in the bonds of tradition,

custom, and habit.... The most important fact about the mores is their

dominion over the individual. Arising he knows not whence or how,

they meet his opening mind in earliest childhood, give him his outfit

of ideas, faiths, and tastes, and lead him into prescribed mental

processes. They bring to him codes of action, standards, and rules of

ethics.”[58]

The mores have a bearing upon patriotism in various ways. In the first

place, they are _teachers_ of loyalty. They teach loyalty to the group

and to country. Patriotism has become imbedded in the mores, and when

one learns from them, he becomes indoctrinated with patriotism. The

concept of patriotism has a long history, and has become a venerable

ideal. It is not possible that the masses should escape having it

taught them. The Japanese provide an example of a race that _par

excellence_ shows the effects of centuries of training in nationalistic

loyalty; it has given to them a marvellous solidarity. “In the war with

Russia, in 1904, this people showed what a group is capable of when it

has a strong ethos. They understand each other; they act as one man;

they are capable of discipline to the death. Our western tacticians

have had rules for the percentage of loss which troops would endure,

standing under fire, before breaking and running. The rule failed

for the Japanese. They stood to the last man. Their prowess at Port

Arthur against the strongest fortifications, and on the battlefields

of Manchuria, surpassed all record. They showed what can be done in

the way of concealing military and naval movements when every soul in

the population is in a voluntary conspiracy not to reveal anything.

These traits belong to a people which has been trained by generations

of invariable mores.”[59] One of the most thoroughly grounded ideals of

the Japanese mores is that of patriotism.

In view of the function of the mores as teachers of loyalty, it becomes

necessary to recognize that peace is not going to be easily provided

for by facile external arrangements or even by the use of information,

persuasion, and reason. If patriotic loyalty is in such large part a

matter of habituation, then a change in it will have to be something of

a matter of habituation too.

The mores are the _objects_ of loyalty. One gets into the way of

saying, “These ways are my ways and I am going to stick by them. They

are mine; I am going to preserve and foster them, and no one shall take

them from me.” Loyalty to the mores forms national character. It is

tradition which forms a nation of British, Saxon, and Norman strains.

Tradition unites Walloon and Fleming in Belgium, Breton and Gens du

Midi in France.[60] The likenesses of a people owe no more to the

fact of race than to that of the mores. And so the mores become what

the patriot is conscious of being loyal to. His patriotism is not so

much love of country as love of the mores. The mores for such a spirit

of loyalty are the country. When it sings, its song should be, “My

_mores_, ’tis of thee, of thee I sing.” What it claims for itself is

the right to be true to the traditions of its own people. When asked to

justify its allegiance, it in turn asks the question:

“And who are they who best may claim our trust?

Surely our own people, of whose blood we are;

Who from our infancy have proved their love,

And never have deceived us, save, perchance,

When kindly guile was wholesomer for us

Than truth itself.”[61]

The loyalty to national customs stiffens patriotism, and because of

that is, from the standpoint of the patriot, highly desirable, but the

problem that it sets is that of preventing it from being satisfied to

remain a mere unreasoning superstition.

The mores get embodied in character, and come to be a veritable

_spirit_ of loyalty. They grow out of the life of the people, and

return to that life. They become actually constituent in personality.

The mores become a part of ourselves; we not only think of them, we

think with them. They are so natural that we do not notice them.

“The more thoroughly American a man is, the less he can perceive

Americanism. He will embody it; all he does, says, or writes will

be full of it; but he can never truly see it, simply because he has

no exterior point of view from which to look at it.”[62] Under such

conditions, how could one help being patriotic? It is not something

that he strives after; it is to be what he cannot help being. He is

patriotic simply because he is himself.

Some conclusions from the study of the habits of patriotism may now

be drawn. The complexity of patriotism has further manifested itself.

And it is evident that the habits of patriotism, like the impulses,

may be either good or bad, or so far as the motive of the individual

is concerned, ethically colorless. The patriotism of habituation is

natural, like breathing. The habituated patriot will go with the

group, and groups like individuals sometimes fall into bad habits. But

groups also acquire good habits, and will in those matters be worth

serving. Habituation and conformity in such a case will be valuable.

Their weakening would often be really disastrous. “There are cases in

which the discrediting of tradition is like picking out the mortar that

holds together the fabric of society.”[63] There are times when the

discrediting of patriotism would mean the destruction of the nation.

The great objection to the patriotism of habituation is that it cannot

criticize itself. The lack of criticism will, of course, make for

overwhelming strength. In commenting upon the patriotism of the present

time, Russell has written as follows: “This instinct [patriotism], just

because, in its intense form, it was new and unfamiliar, had remained

uninfected by thought, not paralyzed or devitalized by doubt and cold

detachment.”[64] But it is just an accident if such patriotism is good.

It may easily be the patriotism of the man who takes the stand, “My

country, right or wrong,” a position which, while there is something

to be said for it on the ground that countries are fundamental

institutions which must not be lightly abandoned to destruction, is

hardly one to be striven for as an ethical ideal. The road to goodness

is not by chance, but by intelligent self-direction. And the goodness

of patriotism rests upon the use of intelligence. Patriotism could not

as matters now stand be done away with by criticism, but its nature

could be molded. We could habituate ourselves to admire and serve in

our life what really was to be admired and served.

But the process of habituation, while it produces a powerful spirit

of group loyalty, can hardly give a full account of the rise of a

conscious ideal like patriotism. The question would remain, “Why the

habituation, and why so much insistence upon it?” The process implies

a reason for its existence. And reasons become effective through the

action of an intelligent agent. The objection to a theory like that

of Sumner is that by it social activity is looked at too exclusively

on the outside when it ought also to be looked at on the inside. The

theory does not do justice to the initiative of the mind. The mores

for the most part seem almost to be active entities, which, starting

from environmental conditions, develop themselves. Minds are held in

their grip. But mores are products of human activity and reflection,

and if one would understand them, he must understand the mind, with

not only its impulses, but also its ways of thought. Sumner’s own work

shows that he believes in something beyond the mores, and that he has

an ideal of acting above them. His confidence is placed in thought. He

believes that he at least can reflect upon the group ways, and that a

science, or perhaps even a philosophy, of the mores can be established.

The following are his own words: “Since it appears that the old mores

are mischievous if they last beyond the duration of the conditions and

needs to which they are adapted, and that constant, gradual, smooth,

and easy readjustment is the course of things which is conducive to

healthful life, it follows that _free and rational criticism_ of

traditional mores is essential to societal welfare.”[65]

Human beings are moved not only by instincts and habits, but also by

reasons. And it is with the reasoned beliefs of patriotism that the

following part will deal.

PART III

THE BELIEFS OF PATRIOTISM

CHAPTER V

THE COUNTRY AS PROTECTOR OF SELF

Patriotism has reasons upon which it rests; it is not a mere

instinctive reaction, nor yet simply a habit.[66] Thought exists, and

men think. Graham Wallas says that there is an impulse to think. “This

independent action of Intelligence is, I believe, in its simplest

forms as ‘natural’ to us, as much due to inherited disposition, as is

the working of anyone of the usual list of instincts.”[67] There is

a rationale of patriotism. Patriotism may be unreasoned, but is not

for that necessarily unreasonable. It may coincide with the passions

of the masses, but may nevertheless rest on logical grounds, and on

ideals. It may be the object of conscious choice. The treatment of the

immigrant shows that we have a belief that patriotism can be chosen by

the individual. We insist on the loyalty of the German-American, which

being interpreted means that we are demanding loyalty to a country

of choice rather than to the country of birth. And for those born

Americans, we adopt the injunction of Tennyson,

“Love thou thy land, with love far-brought

From out the storied Past, and used

Within the Present, but transfused

Thro’ future time by power of thought.”[68]

The fact that men do think and have ideals is one of the very reasons

why patriotism is now so strong.

What are the reasons urged why one should be patriotic? One belief is

that one owes his earthly salvation to his country. It is a belief

that expresses on the level of consciousness the impulse to seek

safety and help. Men believe that the country is the protector in this

present world of all the values of life. It is the feeling that Spencer

expressed when he apostrophized the state in the following language: “I

supposed you were to act the part of an Argus-eyed and Briareus-armed

guardian, ever watching over my interests, ever ready to step in and

defend them; so that whether sleeping or waking, absorbed in business

or immersed in pleasure, I might have the gratifying consciousness of

being carefully shielded from injury.”[69] Webster appealed to the same

feeling in his reply to Hayne: “It is to that Union we owe our safety

at home, and our consideration and dignity abroad.... It has been to us

all a copious fountain of national, social, personal happiness.”[70]

And the patriot feels that for the protection that he has received he

must show his gratitude. In return for the blessings of the country,

he will offer up the sacrifice of patriotism. If one asks the plain

man why he is patriotic, why he thinks, for instance, that he ought to

enlist, the answer that is often made is that, “The country has done a

lot for me, and now she needs me. I am going to do what I can for my

country.”

The country affords protection within the group that it organizes.

And for this reason, the citizens will support the state. They feel

that government is a good thing; it guarantees justice and fair play.

And patriotism with them will grow out of that feeling. It will, of

course, be a give and take affair. It will not be selfless, altruistic

devotion. Patriotism of this kind demands that justice be consistently

dispensed. Most men will not long serve a state that treats them

unfairly. No patriotism will survive flagrant and continued injustice.

And, in truth, why should it? Green states the answer: “If the

authority of any government--its claim on our obedience--is held to be

derived not from an original covenant, or from any covenant, but from

the function which it serves in maintaining those conditions of freedom

which are conditions of the moral life, then no act of the people in

revocation of a prior act need be reckoned necessary to justify its

dissolution. _If it ceases to serve this function, it loses its claim

on our obedience._”[71]

A country is a peace unit. And men will welcome it as such, for there

is in men an impulse to peace. The state in modern times arose in

part as a keeper of the peace. The church was once the power that

policed Europe, and when that was so, men gave the church their supreme

allegiance. But the time came when the fear of God was no longer a

sufficient power to keep men in order, so it became necessary for some

other agency than the church to take up the task. Semi-official bodies

arose whose business it was to preserve peace, but they passed away.

There was then no power to keep the lawless forces in check. The nobles

of feudalism fought with one another, and were petty and irresponsible

tyrants over their people. Their regime became unbearable. Consequently

the people united with the kings, and a central power was established

that stopped the wars of the nobles and cities, and gave peace.

The state within its boundaries is the preserver of law and order. And

the discharge of that function recommends the state to its citizens.

Hobbes[72] exalted the state because of his desire for order. The

England of his day was torn by civil war. Even J. S. Mill[73]

expressed some sympathy with speculative Toryism, as for instance it

appeared in Wordsworth, because what it meant in such a case, Mill

said, was the proposition that man ought to be governed. Patriotic

eloquence takes account of the benefit that the state affords as the

preserver of the peace. Josiah Quincy, Jr., called for patriotic

loyalty to country on the ground that in it “Each individual, of

whatever condition, has the consciousness of living under known laws,

which secure equal rights, and guarantee to each whatever portion of

the goods of life, be it great or small, chance or talent or industry

may have bestowed.”[74]

The civilized life itself at present depends upon the state. The word

civilization is derived from a stem meaning “state.” Civilization is

that which is possible to men in states, that is, where peace, law,

and order prevail. The state has been a tremendous gain because it

has been a larger integration of men, a larger unit of coöperation.

Just that is its primary function,--to make it possible for men to

live together. And without the exercise of that function by the state,

we should be likely to be plunged back again into the chaos of petty

warring factions. Now patriotism gets connected with this desire that

government be preserved. The patriot is very apt to feel that if _his_

country should be destroyed, it would be a blow at the very foundations

of all government and safety. He connects civilization with his own

state, and feels that, “... they who assail the idea, the ideal, of

the country itself, assail all civilized life and, so far forth, are

suicides as well as traitors.”[75]

But the state does not stop with the bare maintenance of law and order.

It does other things which are believed to be for the general welfare.

It looks out for education, transportation, sanitation, the care of

the infirm, and so forth; it works for better social, industrial, and

class conditions. The state, in other words, is felt to have a right

to do all those things which will promote the welfare of mankind.

Mill said, “... it is not admissible that the protection of persons

and that of property are the sole purposes of government. The ends of

government are as comprehensive as those of the social union.”[76]

And Aristotle[77] intimated that the state should not only make bare

existence possible, but should promote the good life.

The result has been that men have taken an attitude toward the state

very much like the attitude that they have taken toward God. To many

people the state has become God. They feel that all the values of life

depend upon it, as Plato[78] felt that all the values of life depended

upon the state that he described. That does not mean that they go

directly to the state for everything that they want; they do not do

that with God. They simply expect the state somehow to guarantee these

values, and to supply them only as a last resort. But they will go to

it for everything that they want and which they can secure in no other

way. In the following quotation, the state is described in terms that

might almost refer to Providence: “No American boy or girl ... lived

a day, even, at the beginning of his life, when he was not protected

by the law of the United-States. From that moment the United-States

watched over him in ways perhaps which he never thought of. Perhaps the

school in which these words are read would not have existed except for

the United-States laws with regard to education. Very likely the bread

and butter which the boy had for breakfast could never have existed but

that the country called the United-States had made laws and carried on

government in such ways that the grain could be raised, that the cattle

could be fed, and the butter made. It is in a thousand such ways as

this that the country in which we live takes care of us in every hour

of our lives.... The tie which binds you and me to the country which

takes care of us is a tie as real and it involves duties as distinct

as the ties which bind a boy to his mother to whom he owes his life

and who has always taken care of him.”[79] What happens when a country

towards which men have felt in this way, calls for the allegiance of

its citizens? Their loyalty will be accorded it in the same measure as

the completeness with which they have trusted to it.

The state is the only institution in a given area that embodies the

general will, and consequently it federates the largest number of

loyalties among the people who live there. A class organization could

not federate so many loyalties. It could not be done, for instance, by

syndicalistic organizations.[80] If a man were a member of all such

organizations that he was eligible to, his whole life would still lack

unity. There must, then, be something that will unify the life of the

individual, and unify the whole of society. The fact of the matter is

that the state at the present time is, and in the predictable future is

likely to be, the factor which does this. And it is therefore likely

also to continue to draw the supreme loyalty of men.

One kind of patriotism is, then, based upon the belief that the country

is the preserver of law and order. If necessary, the patriot will place

himself at the service of the state in order to help it discharge

its function as a police power. And he feels it to be necessary also

to show his patriotism in his own obedience to the laws. In the

Crito,[81] Socrates, who had shown his patriotism upon the battlefield,

showed it again by submitting himself to the laws of that country which

by its institutions had nourished and protected him. Bosanquet cites

this action of Socrates, and himself adds the comment: “That is one

thing; true patriotism is the law-abiding spirit.”[82]

The state also acts as a protector against aggressions from without,

and on this account men cling to it. The patriot _fears_ other

nations; he believes that they are actuated by sinister designs. The

foe in patriotic songs and poetry is always ‘haughty’ and ‘wicked.’

He believes also that if the opportunity is presented, they will

work those sinister designs against his country. Nor is the fear

altogether groundless. To say the least, most governments cannot be

trusted to look after the interests of their competitors as well

as they look after their own, and the way in which the world is at

present organized makes it seem necessary for each nation to look

out for itself. Even Russell says that “the fear by which the State

is strengthened is reasonable under present circumstances.”[83] Then

why should not the state protect its own interests and the interests

of its citizens? The citizen himself will not admit that the state’s

protection should simply be limited to the prevention of the harm that

his fellow-citizens might do. He will say: “When we agreed that it was

the essential function of the state to protect--to administer the law

of equal freedom--to maintain men’s rights--we virtually assigned to

it the duty, not only of shielding each citizen from the trespasses

of his neighbours, but of defending him, in common with the community

at large, against foreign aggression.”[84] The efforts to provide

protection has indeed proved to be too big a job for even the state,

acting alone, and has led to alliances between states. Such alliance is

deemed essential. Diplomatic isolation could not now be tolerated by

scarcely any government or population but the most primitive. Perhaps

in this very direction lies a way to world internationalism. But the

protection is still state protection; the alliances themselves are the

results of the activities of states.

The fear of other states sometimes gets expressed as the belief that

_existence_ itself, both national and personal, is threatened. Loisy

gives vent to this belief: “Are we then right to be patriotic, even

at the risk of being less or not at all Christian? Doubtless; because

our only chance of living is bound up with our patriotism.”[85] What

he seems to fear is French extermination. But more often the patriot

believes that by his loyalty, his own and his country’s freedom are

preserved. Patriotism is a demand for freedom. Zimmerman a long time

ago pointed out that nearly every people glories in its real or

supposed freedom. “Not a few nations,” he says, “are seen resembling

the primitive Greeks, in overvaluing themselves on their real liberty;

and others, like the degenerate Greeks, priding themselves only on

the shadow of an antiquated liberty.”[86] The United States came into

existence only after a severe fight for liberty, and consequently

American patriotism has had the ideal of freedom deeply impressed upon

it. The words of Patrick Henry come the nearest to being classical.

“Is life so dear, or peace so sweet, as to be purchased at the price

of chains and slavery? Forbid it, Almighty God! I know not what course

others may take; but as for me, give me liberty or give me death!”[87]

The Constitution enumerates liberty next to the possession of life

among the inalienable rights of men. Lincoln expressed it again in his

Gettysburg address. “... We here highly resolve that these dead shall

not have died in vain; that this nation, under God, shall have a new

birth of freedom, and that government of the people, by the people,

and for the people, shall not perish from the earth.”[88] The notes

of freedom and self-rule of the people are the dominant ones in the

passage with which Lincoln closed the speech. It has been the President

of the United States who has most clearly and consistently defined the

aim of the Allies in this present war as that of making the world safe

for democracy, _i. e._, for freedom. But the countries which are called

autocratic also insist that they are fighting for freedom, and they are

proclaiming to their peoples that they are fighting on the defensive,

and in the cause of liberty. The ideal of freedom is dear to all.

Along with the demand for freedom goes the insistence that _those

things which are of great value_ to one shall be held sacred. The

defense of homes is a cause that arouses masculine patriotism. There

is an old saying found in Bacon that “Love of his country begins in a

man’s own house.”[89] The patriot will sacrifice for his home; and he

will die that his posterity may enjoy the privileges of a free country.

The _pursuit of happiness_ is another of the privileges that men

deem inalienable. And the pursuit of happiness in grown-ups seems to

be mostly the pursuit of trade. Consequently they will prize what

protects, and hate what threatens business. One hates the invader of

his country because he does not want the means of his livelihood to

pass under the control of an unsympathetic power. The land is the form

of wealth that is inevitably seized by the invader. And patriotism,

because of this, gains another connection with the soil. “...

Patriotism envelops the real estate because the real estate nourishes

the lives and careers of the patriots.... The emotions of loyalty

and value congregate about the ‘vital interests’ of our lives.”[90]

The laying on of burdens of taxation too grievous to be borne is an

unwarrantable interference with the pursuit of happiness. And so

patriotism often starts over taxes. It was so in the formation of the

United States. The following extract from a speech by Samuel Adams

to the newly elected representatives to the Massachusetts colonial

legislature from Boston, will show what the drift then was: “... As

you represent a town which lives by its trade,” he said, “we expect

in a very particular manner, though you make it the object of your

attention to support our commerce in all its just rights, to vindicate

it from all unreasonable impositions and promote its prosperity.”[91]

The trader looks to his government for protection, and when he receives

it, he has a particular reason for desiring the continued good health

of his country. The same holds true of workingmen. John Dewey says:

“... The simple fact of the case is that at present workingmen have

more to gain from their own national state in the way of legislative

and administrative concessions than they have from some other state, or

from any international organization.”[92] And as long as this is true,

tradesmen, laborers, and all others who have anything to gain by it

will be patriots, and violent patriots.

What kind of patriotism is it that rests upon the belief in one’s

country as the protector of self? Is it patriotism at all? It is

not that disinterested love of country that the common man has been

formally taught to regard as patriotism. But it is loyalty to country,

and whatever answers to that description must be patriotism. It no

doubt makes the state a kind of business affair. The primary motive

is that of prudence. A man defends his country because he needs it.

But some men serve God in that way, and we call it religion. And so

this profit-and-loss attachment to country may come under the term

patriotism. One reason, therefore, for patriotism is that the country

is needful for the protection of life’s values. But, on the other

hand, the attachment to country is not patriotism, if the country is

looked at _merely_ as means. Patriotism views the country somehow as

end. If the real and only motive which is getting expressed is that of

self-interest, any show of patriotism is after all mere _camouflage_.

The point is that men will actually come to feel real gratitude and

love for the country which has protected them. It is a psychological

fact that affection attaches itself to what has been useful. In this

way and for this reason, affection attaches itself to country, and

becomes patriotism.

CHAPTER VI

THE ONENESS OF COUNTRY AND SELF

The patriot identifies himself with his country. He believes that he

and his country are one. This belief is the coming to consciousness of

the impulse to cling to one’s own. And this conviction becomes another

reason for patriotism. Patriotic loyalty of this kind is not a business

affair. It will not abandon the country even if the latter should prove

unsuccessful in providing protection, but will remain steadfast through

all the country’s vicissitudes. One’s country may fail to protect

him, but if it is still a recognizable expression of himself, he will

love it. The government or state may be faulty, and yet the patriot

will still be true. Veblen intimates that one might just as well have

foreign officials as home-grown capitalists administer one’s affairs of

government.[93] But the patriot is not likely to be persuaded to think

Veblen’s way, and the reason is that the home-grown capitalists somehow

seem closer than the foreign officials. It is quite true that there are

those who refuse to be patriotic because their country does not give

them what they believe to be justice. Anarchists are not patriotic.

Socialists sometimes are not patriotic. Some among the laboring classes

have come to wear their patriotic allegiance but lightly. But the issue

for them has ceased to be merely that of getting justice. It has come

to the point where the injustice of the industrial situation has gone

so far that the dissatisfied classes do not even recognize themselves

in the state that is supposed to represent them. And when that feeling

of strangeness creeps into a man’s heart, he is no longer likely to be

a patriot. Patriotism is rendered to a country that is one’s own. In

view of this, it seems rather significant that the rise of nationalism

has been cotemporal with the rise of democracy.

The country is a part of one’s objectified self. And one cannot be

a self without being objectified. He has to come to expression in

some way, and he has to have the means and material through which to

express himself. The individual would lose in individuality if his

group were broken up. He cannot be a normal human being independent

of the group; and the group for the civilized man includes “country.”

“In a profound sense, man is born under the relations of country and

of government. He can no more live a rational, civilized life without

a country, and apart from government, than without the family and

apart from the social order. Scarce human is the individual to whom

are applicable Homer’s contemptuous words,--‘No tribe, nor state, nor

home hath he.’”[94] The country pours itself into the individual.

Jacks says: “The distinction between our own thoughts and the nation’s

thoughts is being obliterated. Ask the first honest man you meet to

tell you what he is thinking, and if he answers faithfully, he will

tell you something of what the nation is thinking.”[95] The patriot

instinctively feels the oneness between his country and himself, and

often has a clear belief concerning it. Washington spoke of “that

country, in whose service I have spent the prime of my life; for whose

sake I have consumed so many anxious days and watchful nights, and

_whose happiness, being extremely dear to me, will always constitute

no inconsiderable part of my own_.”[96] Washington identified himself

with America, and so do all patriots identify themselves with their

country. If the patriot were asked why one should love his country, his

reply might very well be, “Why should one love himself?”

The identification of oneself with his country is greatly helped out

by the fact that the country is an outgrowth of the family. The idea

of kinship has been extended to the national group. The nation is

believed to be of one race. McDougall in speaking of the self-regarding

instinct calls attention to the fact that it is extended to others,

and says: “... This extension should not, and usually does not, stop

short at the family; in primitive societies the tribe and the clan,

which are the collective objects of the regards of other tribes and

clans, become also the objects of this sentiment; and among ourselves

the growing child is led on in the same way to identify himself with,

and to extend his self-regarding sentiment to his school, his college,

his town, his profession as a class or collective unit, and finally to

his country or nation as a whole.[97] The extension of the sentiment

culminates in its application to the country, and this application has

been historically possible because the country has been believed to be

the organization of a homogeneous race.

But the feeling of oneness with the country does not rest solely upon

the belief in blood kinship. Ethnologists are now pretty well agreed

that there are no pure races, and that nationality does not coincide

with race homogeneity. C. D. Burns points out that the Belgians, at

the time they were seeking nationality, were of different blood. “The

group had asserted their common ambition and their distinction from all

other groups. They were not all the same blood or language, but their

traditions and purposes were the same.”[98] It is not exclusively

a common ancestry, then, that provides the basis for one to feel at

one with his country. It is not so much a question of genesis as of

condition. One feels at home in a country which in general has the

same sort of character and life as his own. The largest factor is that

of a common consciousness, no matter how produced. What this means

may be understood from the words of Bosanquet: “Broadly speaking, the

limit of a country or nation is the limit of a common experience, such

that the people share the same mind and feelings, and can understand

each other’s ways of living and make allowance for each other so that

the same laws and institutions are acceptable and workable for all of

them.”[99] The patriot in a foreign land feels truly like an innocent

abroad, but his own country is home, sweet home to him.

The love of the country as one’s objectified self coincides with the

desire for attachment. Man, in other words, wants to objectify himself.

He is not satisfied with solipcism. He wants a world, and a world that

somehow represents himself. Without that he is a lost soul. “The man

without a country” is pathetic because he has no attachment, no fixed

world that he can call his own. The country provides a satisfying

object of attachment, in which the patriot’s soul can be at rest.

Patriotism is devotion to a cause, and the cause is one’s own. The

patriot has made it his by his own choice. It is a part of himself.

Royce in speaking of patriotic loyalty says: “This plan of the patriot

has two features: (1) It is through and through a social plan, obedient

to the general will of one’s country, submissive; (2) it is through

and through an exaltation of the self, of the inner man, who now feels

glorified through his sacrifice, dignified in his self-surrender, glad

to be his country’s servant and martyr,--yet sure that through this

very readiness for self-destruction he wins the rank of hero.”[100]

The call of _war_ is not only a call to sacrifice, but also a call to

self-expression. Royce continues: “This war-spirit, for the time at

least, makes self-sacrifice seem to be self-expression, makes obedience

to the country’s call seem to be the proudest sort of display of one’s

own powers. Honor now means submission, and to obey means to have one’s

way. Power and service are at one. Conformity is no longer opposed to

having one’s own will. One has no will but that of the country.”[101]

Patriotism in this character simplifies the problem of duty. It

provides a cause into which one can throw himself with all his heart,

avoid the conflict of a divided mind, and it is able to do all this

for a man for the reason that the cause is his own. It makes a joy out

of a duty. An expression of the joy that comes to one in the service

of his country’s cause is to be found in the words supposed to have

been uttered by Epaminondas when he was dying upon the battlefield.

Zimmermann cites the incident: “Epaminondas, the Theban, when lying

on the ground mortally wounded with a spear at the battle of Leuctra,

all that troubled him was the event of the battle, and what was to

become of his arms; but on his shield being held up to him, and with

assurances that the day had gone for the Theban side, he said to the

bystanders with a cheerful countenance, ‘Let not this day, friends, be

considered as the end of my life, but as the beginning of my happiness

and the consummation of my glory. I have the satisfaction of leaving

my country victorious, haughty Sparta humbled, and Greece freed.’

Then drawing the spear out of his breast, he expired.”[102] Even if

Epaminondas did not express any such dramatic sentiment, it was a

common enough experience among mankind to be the subject of a credible

bit of fiction. The joy was in the fact that the cause had triumphed, a

cause that he had made his own. The patriot identifies himself with his

country; in it he sees himself; and he shares its sorrows and successes.

The patriot is provincial. He begins his life of attachment by being

loyal to what is nearest the center of his own interests. And such

attachment is natural. We are not likely to be so vitally interested in

far-away things as in the things that are near. It is simply a case of

where the power of gravitation varies in inverse ratio to the distance

between the gravitating bodies. Now, the patriot’s own nation is nearer

to him than is any other, and consequently to it he renders his warmest

devotion. Even many who deplore the narrowness of nationalism and

themselves do not share that narrowness, do nevertheless have a warm

devotion for their own country. This devotion, strong in spite of a

consciousness of the country’s shortcomings, shows itself in Cowper’s

line:

“England, with all thy faults, I love thee still.”[103]

The patriot believes that he is an unnatural son if he is not devoted

to his country. To turn against the country is comparable to turning

against his own mother. And of course no real man of flesh and blood

and the ordinary feelings of normal human beings, would do such a thing

as that. The traitor is abnormal, and is something amounting to almost

a monster. All normal men are believed to thrill to the sentiment,

“This is my own, my native land!”[104]

The country is so close that it is felt to be inhuman baseness not to

be true to the ties that bind one to it.

Patriotism is, then, in part a clinging to the nation as an expression

of one’s own life. The patriot fiercely resents attacks upon the

nation, for they are attacks upon himself. They assail the periphery

of his personality. He wants his country to be free because in it he

finds himself expressed, and because he claims the right to continue

his self-expression through the country. Therefore he hates conquest by

an enemy. He would rather die fighting than be subjugated, because in

dying for his country he asserts himself in one last final defiant act.

It is a supreme act of self-assertion. The country is the patriot’s, it

is vital to him, and while life lasts he will not see it perish from

the earth.

CHAPTER VII

THE INTRINSIC VALUE OF ONE’S COUNTRY

The patriot believes that his country is intrinsically a fundamental

value. It is a cause that is worthy. He sees various things in the

country that furnish the bases for this belief. Sometimes he beholds in

the state a sacred or semi-sacred institution. A philosophy which put

the theory of the state in such a way as to furnish a basis for this

belief was that of Hegel. For Hegel, the state was the development of

the absolute Idea in the world. The state did not arise in response to

the needs of men, as philosophers like Mill and Spencer[105] have held,

and as would probably be held by the patriot who looks upon the country

as protector or expression of himself. Hegel said, “It is a very

distorted account of the matter when the state, in demanding sacrifices

from the citizens, is taken to be simply the civic community, whose

object is merely the security of life and property. Security cannot

possibly be obtained by the sacrifice of what is to be secured.... The

nation as a state is the spirit substantively realized and directly

real. Hence, it is the absolute power on earth.”[106] Hegel felt that

way about the Prussian State. And others have felt almost the same way

about their state. The desire for a solid and immutable condition of

life that the view represents is a fundamental one. And when Hegel or

any one else takes that view of his state, he is at once likely to be a

devoted patriot.

The popular parallel to Hegel’s conclusion is the belief that the

country comes from God. Men seem to want to feel that their origins are

worthy of reverence, and that they are especially favored. In ancient

times most people traced their ancestry back to their God. The Japanese

do the same thing in modern times, and have a religion which is the

expression of that belief. The Shinto religion inculcates reverence for

the sovereign, ancestral memory, filial piety, nature worship, and the

belief that the imperial family, which is descended from their god,

is the fountain head of the whole nation. These elements have been

infused into Bushido, which Nitobe calls _The Soul of Japan_, and which

embodies and inculcates the Japanese national ideals. But the belief in

the semi-sacred character of the nation is common in all countries. How

often do we hear it said that America is God’s Modern Chosen People.

And at least one of the sovereigns of Europe does not cease to mention

the patriotism of his tutelary god not only in his prayers, but also in

his proclamations.

This belief in the sacredness of one’s country has in monarchies a

splendid symbol to which to attach itself in the person of the king or

emperor. The ruling classes encourage this attachment; they themselves

feel that they rule by divine right. They have inherited the belief

from the traditions of the Middle Ages and from such philosophical

theories as that of Hegel. And the people, also habituated to a certain

extent in those ideas, share the same belief. If they are thoroughly

loyal, they take an attitude towards their king similar to that assumed

by religious devotees towards their God. But emperor-worship is not

at all necessary to state-worship. Many who no longer believe in the

divine right of kings still believe in the divine right of states. The

state is still often looked upon as sacred and sovereign. The Greek

conception of the omnipotent polis is in the _hinterland_ of our minds.

There has come down from the Middle Ages a habit of sovereignty which

the world has not shaken off. And, moreover, men want a supreme power

which guarantees safety. Patriotism thrives in such soil. When people

are possessed of these beliefs, patriotism with them can become almost

a religion.

The belief that one has a glorious country is a form of the belief in

its value. This kind of patriotism is fed by contemplation of the great

names of the past and the deeds of conquering heroes. It can attach

itself to any characteristic in which the country excels. Some of the

reasons for patriotism advanced in a school textbook ran somewhat as

follows: Our country is a great nation. Our territory is big. We have

an immense population. Our wealth is surpassingly great. Our power is

tremendous. Our educational standards are high. And we are the great

exponent of a land of freedom.[107] The moral was that any American

boy or girl ought to recognize that he lived in a grand and glorious

country. One of the very common causes of pride is the extent of

commerce, and in this way the economic factor makes another connection

with patriotism. A few years ago, one of the potent reasons for the

proposal to subsidize an American merchant marine was that the country

did not like to feel that the flag was not floating over the sea as it

once had.

The consciousness of national glory grows on the pride of power. The

belief in the country’s greatness fuses with and derives dynamic from

the impulse to power. National power is precious to a certain type of

patriot. It is even more precious than peace. “The plain fact is that

people do not prize tranquillity above all other goods. They desire

influence and power, and are willing to accept the responsibilities

and the suffering that these entail.”[108] These facts throw light upon

the patriotism of aggressive nations. The patriots of those nations

glory in their country’s glory, and grow great in the consciousness of

its power. Imperialism grows out of this temper. And once a country is

embarked on a career of imperialism, it is hardly to be satisfied short

of dominion over the world. Even then it will sigh for new worlds to

conquer. And this characteristic of an insatiable lust for glory should

not be lost sight of when we are considering the taming of an enemy by

nonresistance.

The patriotism that feeds upon the country’s glory is jealous of the

national prestige. Prestige is glory. And a nation cannot continue

to glory either at home or abroad if it suffers its prestige to be

lowered. Consequently it must sometimes fight simply to protect that

prestige. Many of our citizens during the period of crisis with Mexico

over the exploits of Villa and also during the critical time in our

affairs with Germany before war was declared, believed that if we did

not fight, our prestige value would be lowered all over the world, and

that we should be deprived of the power of acting effectively in world

politics. The desire of a nation for revenge also is the desire, as

much as anything else, to restore her fallen prestige.

Solicitude for the country’s honor is another outgrowth of the

patriotism that delights in national glory. One kind of honor is that

of Belgium standing up in the face of aggression for its integrity and

for its loyalty to its international obligations. A weaker kind is very

much like the desire for prestige. It is a desire for the respect of

others. It appears in the reason that Nitobe gives for Japan’s opening

its doors to the western world. “The sense of honor which cannot bear

being looked down upon as an inferior power,--that was the strongest of

motives.”[109] This sense of honor will lead to high achievements, but

the tragedy is that it will so easily lead to war. C. D. Broad says,

“... It is chiefly when people can be persuaded that questions of honor

are involved that they can be got to fight.”[110] And when a war is

started, no country wants to accept defeat. Each one emblazons on its

sword the device which is said to have been on the sword of a faithful

knight of feudal times: “Never draw me without right; never sheathe me

without honor.”

The trouble which is implicit in the situation is that nations believe

that their glory and welfare are matters of competitive success. It

is all too commonly believed that the gain of one nation must mean

the loss of another. Consequently, the attitude that is taken on all

sides is simply that of intelligent self-interest. Jealousy arises

out of such a situation, and jealousy is one of the effective causes

of war. One of the most significant factors in the diplomatic history

preceding the present war was that of the rivalry of the great European

powers for strategic land areas, and for control of the important sea

routes of the world. There has been a problem of the Mediterranean, the

Adriatic, Constantinople, the North Sea, the Baltic, the China Sea, the

Persian Gulf, and so on. Germany, younger than the other nations, has

been making a desperate effort to catch up with them, and the present

war is in great part the outgrowth of the friction arising out of that

effort.[111]

But it is encouraging that the glory of nations does not consist

exclusively in competitive success, and that there are those who

realize it. There are those who see that the true good of all countries

may be worked out at the same time. J. S. Mill expressed a high ideal

of patriotism when he said: “I believe that the good of no country can

be obtained by any means but such as tend to that of all countries,

nor ought to be sought otherwise, even if attainable.”[112] This may

be matched by a passage from American patriotic eloquence uttered by

no less a patriot than Charles Sumner: “I hope to rescue those terms

[national glory], so powerful over the minds of men, from the mistaken

objects to which they are applied, from deeds of war and the extension

of empire, that henceforward they may be attached only to acts of

justice and humanity.”[113] The highest good of nations really lies in

the use of those things which do not perish in the using and of which

there is enough for all. They are the things of the mind and of the

spirit. The hope is that the rivalry of nations may be transferred from

destructive to constructive pursuits. Much better would be friendly

rivalry in the accomplishments of science, art, scholarship, social

welfare, and like things.

The belief in the value of one’s country sometimes expresses itself

in the conviction that the country embodies lofty ideals. Patriots

believe that their nation represents a great tradition, and stands for

ideals that are important to the human race. A country may be said to

be organized about these beliefs. A people is not really effectively

unified until it is held together by the power of a common ideal. And

that ideal is a source of strength to patriotism. This idealistic

character has impressed itself upon even the warlike temper of peoples.

They do not usually fight over causes that are avowedly materialistic

and predatory. It takes a big idea to appeal to the people. “...

Peoples in their larger corporate activities are not mercenary, but

idealist. They know that wars do not ‘pay’ in the low, material sense.

They are not seeking present ease and comfort, seldom a present good

of any kind, but the triumph of an ideal which they associate with

their national life. Their _method_ may be wrong, but their _purpose_

is essentially altruistic, perhaps the least selfish of any activity

we know.”[114] And the ideal that moves a people must be a morally high

ideal, or at least must seem to be so. A government could scarcely hope

to win a hard war without having first enlisted the community’s moral

convictions.

Ideals are in part inherited from the nation’s past. What has united

in the past has been these common ideals; and it is because there

were such that the memory of the past is so valuable. But for the

idealist the future is fully as important as the past. A people is

held together by what Green calls its “social expectation.”[115] What

binds us together in America is not so much the past as the future. Our

past is a vital factor in our unity. It is remarkable how the various

elements in our population can apparently so naturally appropriate

“the Puritan fathers” as their own. The Puritan fathers were only

one element in the founding of the United States, and at least

three-quarters of the present inhabitants of this land have no physical

inheritance from them, but a far greater proportion of the American

people count themselves as their spiritual progeny. Nevertheless, the

American people contains great heterogeneous groups and masses who

have never been assimilated to the Puritan ideals or traditions. There

is no common past for all our people. We root back into many lands

and many traditions. The tie that really binds is what we believe to

be our common destiny, the ideals that we believe ourselves to be

progressively realizing. The roots of our unity are in the sky.

The ideals which a nation believes that it exemplifies are various.

Sometimes it is that of good government. Virgil felt that Rome was

spreading peace and order throughout the world.[116] Sometimes it is

the ideal of justice. The patriot seems to feel that in his country’s

just cause eternal justice itself is being incarnated. “A patriot he

[Washington] was in the highest sense, not because he loved his country

with a selfish love, but because he loved justice on the broadest

scale, and believed that the cause of his country was that of eternal

justice.”[117] But the ideal which has been exploited perhaps more

than any other is that of freedom. Patriots thrill at the thought

that not only is their country the guardian of their freedom, but is

the champion of freedom throughout all the world. This ideal has the

honor of having most keenly aroused the consciences of states. “It is

a curious fact that practically every case in which altruistic action

has been professed by or recommended to a nation has been a case in

which the ‘liberty’ of some human beings was in question. Thus both the

antislavery and the Bulgarian agitations [in England] were questions

of liberty; and the whole Palmerstonian policy was directed against

tyranny. There is indeed some ground for believing that the positive

international moral sense has at present only developed with regard to

freedom. There are many people, especially in this country, who would

say that it is the duty of a state, regardless of its own interests, to

protect the freedom of another state, especially if the inhabitants of

the latter are of kindred race to themselves.”[118]

Patriotism often rests upon the belief in the value of the country’s

civilization. The civilization of a country is its art, culture,

customs, and in general its way of living. It is its _kultur_. Loisy

speaks for France, “... though we do not brag of our culture, we are

sure that the ruin of France would be no gain to civilization....

We are safeguarding a notable portion of our human inheritance from

the madness of the destroyer.”[119] Sometimes the element of the

civilization cherished most is that of religion. The Jewish patriotism

was an example of this. Sometimes there is a belief that one’s own

nation has a way of doing things better than others. Germany is an

example. At other times, pride is founded upon the greatness of one’s

institutions. The English and Americans feel such pride. Sometimes

patriotism waxes enthusiastic over economic accomplishment. The

following is an expression of patriotism which, while it will no doubt

be astonishing to most people, nevertheless seems to be sincere: “It

is an element of patriotism to reverence the successful business

man of America, and Our Nation must request and heed the advice and

admonitions of men experienced in affairs.”[120] The context shows that

the author likes the _status quo_ of industry and wealth, and wants

more of the same thing.

Each state group has its own history, and is convinced that it

makes its own contribution to the world’s civilization. The patriot

applies to his own country the spirit that was expressed by Mazzini:

“Every people has its special mission, which will coöperate towards

the fulfillment of the general mission of Humanity. That mission

constitutes its nationality. Nationality is sacred.”[121] The sense of

having a mission possessed Israel; it possesses Germany; it possesses

America. Longfellow wrote to America,

“Humanity with all its fears,

With all the hopes of future years,

Is hanging breathless on thy fate.”[122]

In fact, the number of the civilizing missions that the world is

favored with is identically equal to the number of countries that have

each a national consciousness. The consciousness of being the anointed

one sometimes strikes the level of the ludicrous. The following is not

an example,--for the New Englander: “As from the first to this day, let

New England continue to be an example to the world of the blessings of

free government, and of the means and capacity of men to maintain it.

And in all times to come, as in all times past, may Boston be among the

foremost and boldest to exemplify and uphold whatever constitutes the

prosperity, the happiness, and the glory of New England.”[123]

The patriotism that justifies itself with the reason that the country

is an intrinsic value often expresses itself in a desire for a better

country. Patriotism is not exclusively love of country just as it is.

It is love of an ideal country. The actual country becomes a subject of

criticism. Literary men have often satirized their country at the same

time that they loved it. And the criticism may be all the more bitter

because the love is great. The country’s shortcomings are felt by those

who love it the most. The following lines inflict the faithful wound of

a true patriot:

“The ever-lustrous name of patriot

To no man may be denied because he saw

Where in his country’s wholeness lay the flaw,

Where, on her whiteness, the unseemly blot.

England! thy loyal sons condemn thee.--What!

Shall we be meek who from thine own breasts draw

Our fierceness? Not ev’n _thou_ shalt overawe

Us, thy proud children nowise basely got.

Be this the measure of our loyalty--

To feel thee noble and weep thy lapse the more.

This truth by thy true servants is confess’d--

Thy sins, who love thee most, do most deplore.

Know thou thy faithful! Best they honour thee

Who honour in thee only what is best.”[124]

Patriotism consequently does not mean blind devotion to country, right

or wrong. And the plain fact is that there actually are patriots who

do not conceive that devotion to country must be consistent even at

the expense of one’s moral convictions. Loyalty to country with them

does not set aside loyalty to the moral law. The following lines are

taken from an essay commendatory to patriotism: “Let patriotism wholly

conform itself to the moral law; let it judge all things, national as

well as individual, by the unalterable, supreme, standard of right

and wrong; let it sanction no blind following of the flag, nor any

unethical exalting of the country’s dominance above the country’s

righteousness; let it reject the notion that because war has been

declared, patriots must enlist; let it repudiate the idea that because

a war has been begun, it must be allowed to end only when victory has

been secured;--and there will not only be fewer wars, but also, on one

side at least, wars more in keeping with justice and truth.”[125] The

author is a patriot, but his patriotism is directed by a high ethical

ideal.

It follows that patriotism is not inextricably bound up with jingoism.

Patriotism is not exclusively a war-time virtue. In truth pacifists may

well assert, and do sometimes, that they are patriots, and differ from

other patriots only in the way in which they show their patriotism.

There are uses for the patriot in time of peace as well as in time

of war. A practical statesman in a patriotic address has said, “We

need men who will not only be ready to sacrifice for their country in

time of war, but who will not be a menace to it in time of peace! We

want patriots in finance. We want patriotism in the organization of

corporations. We want patriots in the conduct of public utilities. We

want patriots in rendering loyal obedience to the law.”[126] Washington,

who was a patriot in war, preferred peace, and was a patriot in peace

as well as in war. When he was about to resign his commission as

commander-in-chief of the army, he wrote his “Letter to the Governors”

in which he made suggestions for putting the Federal Government on

a right basis. His “Farewell Address” was characterized by paternal

solicitude for the future of his country. On both occasions Washington,

first in peace as well as in war, expressed what was a true spirit of

patriotism.

The patriotism that looks within the country demands public spirit.

It calls for unselfishness on the part of the individual and devotion

to the betterment of the country. J. S. Mill’s _Autobiography_ shows

in its pages that Mill was actuated in his work by an unselfish and

devoted public spirit. High-minded patriots demand everyday devotion

to the country. Bosanquet tells us what patriotism means to him. He

says: “In their patriotism, their feeling for the community, Hegel

tells us, people are apt to follow their custom of being generous

before they are just, and excuse themselves by a potential romantic

magnanimity for a lack of prosaic everyday loyalty to the commonwealth.

But it is this latter, the sense of daily duty, which is real

patriotism--the foundation and seed-plot of the former.”[127]

This public spirit means, for one thing, that the individual himself

be a good citizen. “... Patriotism demands that, in ourselves, we

be good and true. The country’s worthy citizen must be personally

worthy,--emulous of culture, devoted to virtue. No man personally

dishonorable, can be patriotic in the highest degree.”[128] It means,

for another thing, that a man shall be interested in the welfare of

the people of his country. Although an enthusiasm for the people

sometimes weakens nationalistic feeling, as in the case of Tolstoy,

nevertheless patriotism often derives great strength from humanitarian

sympathy. This sympathy shows itself nowadays in the desire for a

greater measure of justice in the relations between the classes. In a

patriotic address, John Grier Hibben says: “In the throes of its new

birth the world today needs a new industrial conscience, a new sense

of social responsibility, a new standard of national integrity. We

must realize that the strength of a nation lies ultimately not in its

natural resources, or in its method of efficiency, or in its numerical

superiority, or in its army, or navy, but in its moral and spiritual

vigor.”[129] Even J. M. Robertson, who on the whole thinks that

patriotism is a bad thing, has for the nation an ideal of “scientific

social development.”[130] It is easy to see in his book that he has

a large sympathy with “the people” not only of other countries, but

also of his own. That is his patriotism. The International Reform

Bureau published a book entitled “Patriotic Studies.” And it was not,

as one might suppose, a series of learned articles on the subject

of Patriotism. It was a compilation of Congressional documents of

the years 1888-1905 for the study of public questions. The questions

treated in this volume were the following: “1. Moral and Social

Functions of Education. 2. Municipal Reform. 3. Immigration. 4. The

Lord’s Day and the Rest Day. 5. The Labor Problem. 6. The Family. 7.

National Reforms. 8. Amusements, With Special Reference to Purity.

9. Gambling. 10. Prevention and Punishment of Crime. 11. The Liquor

Problem. 12. The New Charity.”[131] All this was considered by an

International Bureau of Reform to be “patriotic studies.” Patriotism

then, reveals itself in the doing of those things that aim at the

true welfare of mankind within a country. And such activities are

patriotism. “In the peace movement, the temperance reform, the

judicious and practicable schemes for the abolition of bondage, the

attempts to discover a more Christian organization of society;--in

every association and all efforts that seek the highest welfare of man,

and prepare the way for his free culture and rightful enjoyment, as a

creature of God, the American idea justifies itself and culminates;

and by strengthening this tendency, and only thus can Patriotism be

faithful to its law, and vindicate its nature.”[132]

It is quite consistent with patriotism that the country should be

cherished as the servant of humanity. The ideal of service sometimes

becomes a reason for patriotism. Mazzini’s[133] patriotism was of

this kind. His ideal was that a nation should claim not its own

aggrandizement, but its right to serve humanity as a distinct group.

This kind of patriotism is that which Royce would recommend as an

example of the best loyalty. “Enlightened loyalty takes no delight in

great armies or in great navies for their own sake. If it consents to

them, it views them merely as transiently necessary calamities. It has

no joy in national prowess, except in so far as that prowess means

a furtherance of universal loyalty.... We want loyalty to loyalty

taught by helping many people to be loyal to their own special causes,

and by showing them that loyalty is a precious common human good, and

that it can never be a good to harm any man’s loyalty except solely in

necessary defense of our own loyalty.... And so, a cause is good, not

only for me, but for mankind, in so far as it is essentially a _loyalty

to loyalty_, that is, is an aid and a furtherance of loyalty in my

fellows.”[134] And Royce, in his last book, made the application to

patriotism: “Let us, with all our might, with whatever moral influence

we possess, with our own honor, with our lives if necessary, be ready,

if ever and whenever the call comes to our people, to sacrifice for

mankind as Belgium has sacrificed; to hazard all, as Belgium has

hazarded all, _for the truer union of mankind and for the future of

human brotherhood_”.[135] The truest patriot, from this point of view,

will be the man whose insight will reveal to him what his nation can

most naturally and best do for humanity, and who uses his powers to win

the devotion of the nation to the ideal of performing that service.

What conclusions now are yielded by the bearings of the reasons of

patriotism? Is patriotism either justified or discredited by them?

Once more it is apparent that no ground has been reached upon which

alone to base a general judgment. To begin with, no reason simply as

such is either good or bad; some of the reasons of patriotism are good

and some are evil. Moreover, these beliefs are often based merely upon

impulse and regimentation. There is “instinctive inference as well

as ... instinctive impulse.”[136] One will hunt reasons for what he

believes; many of his reasons are simply after-thoughts. And sometimes

beliefs are not as accurate as instincts and habits. A man’s feelings

may often have more meaning than his beliefs. So the fact that a thing

appears to be reasoned does not necessarily make it reasonable.

The reasons found in patriotism are another element adding to its

complexity. And the complexity is all the more involved because

impulses and habits have remained in patriotism along with reasons.

Patriotism is composed of all three,--impulses, habits, and reasons.

The nature of patriotism will have to be found in a concept that

unifies all these elements, and its ethical value can be clearly

assessed only in the light of that concept. Therefore, the nature and

value of patriotism will be the objects of attention in the remaining

chapters.

PART IV

THE NATURE AND VALUE OF PATRIOTISM