"After the conquest, the serfs were scattered over the large estates

of the Barbarians, each having his house, his lot, and his peculium, in

return for which he paid rent and performed service. They were rarely

separated from their homes when their land was sold; they and all that

they had became the property of the purchaser. The law favored this

realization of the serf, in not allowing him to be sold out of the

country."

What inspired this law, destructive not only of slavery, but of property

itself? For, if the master cannot drive from his domain the slave whom

he has once established there, it follows that the slave is proprietor,

as well as the master.

"The Barbarians," again says M. Laboulaye, "were the first to recognize

the slave's rights of family and property,--two rights which are

incompatible with slavery."

But was this recognition the necessary result of the mode of servitude

in vogue among the Germanic nations previous to their conversion to

Christianity, or was it the immediate effect of that spirit of justice

infused with religion, by which the seignior was forced to respect in

the serf a soul equal to his own, a brother in Jesus Christ, purified by

the same baptism, and redeemed by the same sacrifice of the Son of God

in the form of man? For we must not close our eyes to the fact that,

though the Barbarian morals and the ignorance and carelessness of the

seigniors, who busied themselves mainly with wars and battles, paying

little or no attention to agriculture, may have been great aids in

the emancipation of the serfs, still the vital principle of this

emancipation was essentially Christian. Suppose that the Barbarians had

remained Pagans in the midst of a Pagan world. As they did not change

the Gospel, so they would not have changed the polytheistic customs;

slavery would have remained what it was; they would have continued to

kill the slaves who were desirous of liberty, family, and property;

whole nations would have been reduced to the condition of Helots;

nothing would have changed upon the terrestrial stage, except the

actors. The Barbarians were less selfish, less imperious, less

dissolute, and less cruel than the Romans. Such was the nature upon

which, after the fall of the empire and the renovation of society,

Christianity was to act. But this nature, grounded as in former times

upon slavery and war, would, by its own energy, have produced nothing

but war and slavery.

"GRADUALLY the serfs obtained the privilege of being judged by the same

standard as their masters...."

When, how, and by what title did they obtain this privilege?

"GRADUALLY their duties were regulated."

Whence came the regulations? Who had the authority to introduce them?

"The master took a part of the labor of the serf,--three days, for

instance,--and left the rest to him. As for Sunday, that belonged to

God."

And what established Sunday, if not religion? Whence I infer, that

the same power which took it upon itself to suspend hostilities and

to lighten the duties of the serf was also that which regulated the

judiciary and created a sort of law for the slave.

But this law itself, on what did it bear?--what was its principle?--what

was the philosophy of the councils and popes with reference to this

matter? The reply to all these questions, coming from me alone, would

be distrusted. The authority of M. Laboulaye shall give credence to my

words. This holy philosophy, to which the slaves were indebted for every

thing, this invocation of the Gospel, was an anathema against property.

The proprietors of small freeholds, that is, the freemen of the middle

class, had fallen, in consequence of the tyranny of the nobles, into a

worse condition than that of the tenants and serfs. "The expenses of war

weighed less heavily upon the serf than upon the freeman; and, as for

legal protection, the seigniorial court, where the serf was judged by

his peers, was far preferable to the cantonal assembly. It was better to

have a noble for a seignior than for a judge."

So it is better to-day to have a man of large capital for an associate

than for a rival. The honest tenant--the laborer who earns weekly a

moderate but constant salary--is more to be envied than the independent

but small farmer, or the poor licensed mechanic.

At that time, all were either seigniors or serfs, oppressors or

oppressed. "Then, under the protection of convents, or of the

seigniorial turret, new societies were formed, which silently spread

over the soil made fertile by their hands, and which derived their power

from the annihilation of the free classes whom they enlisted in their

behalf. As tenants, these men acquired, from generation to generation,

sacred rights over the soil which they cultivated in the interest of

lazy and pillaging masters. As fast as the social tempest abated, it

became necessary to respect the union and heritage of these villeins,

who by their labor had truly prescribed the soil for their own profit."

I ask how prescription could take effect where a contrary title and

possession already existed? M. Laboulaye is a lawyer. Where, then, did

he ever see the labor of the slave and the cultivation by the tenant

prescribe the soil for their own profit, to the detriment of a

recognized master daily acting as a proprietor? Let us not disguise

matters. As fast as the tenants and the serfs grew rich, they wished

to be independent and free; they commenced to associate, unfurl their

municipal banners, raise belfries, fortify their towns, and refuse to

pay their seigniorial dues. In doing these things they were perfectly

right; for, in fact, their condition was intolerable. But in law--I mean

in Roman and Napoleonic law--their refusal to obey and pay tribute to

their masters was illegitimate.

Now, this imperceptible usurpation of property by the commonalty was

inspired by religion.

The seignior had attached the serf to the soil; religion granted the

serf rights over the soil. The seignior imposed duties upon the serf;

religion fixed their limits. The seignior could kill the serf with

impunity, could deprive him of his wife, violate his daughter, pillage

his house, and rob him of his savings; religion checked his invasions:

it excommunicated the seignior. Religion was the real cause of the

ruin of feudal property. Why should it not be bold enough to-day to

resolutely condemn capitalistic property? Since the middle ages, there

has been no change in social economy except in its forms; its relations

remain unaltered.

The only result of the emancipation of the serfs was that property

changed hands; or, rather, that new proprietors were created. Sooner

or later the extension of privilege, far from curing the evil, was to

operate to the disadvantage of the plebeians. Nevertheless, the new

social organization did not meet with the same end in all places. In

Lombardy, for example, where the people rapidly growing rich through

commerce and industry soon conquered the authorities, even to the

exclusion of the nobles,--first, the nobility became poor and degraded,

and were forced, in order to live and maintain their credit, to gain

admission to the guilds; then, the ordinary subalternization of property

leading to inequality of fortunes, to wealth and poverty, to jealousies

and hatreds, the cities passed rapidly from the rankest democracy under

the yoke of a few ambitious leaders. Such was the fate of most of the

Lombardic cities,--Genoa, Florence, Bologna, Milan, Pisa, &c,.--which

afterwards changed rulers frequently, but which have never since risen

in favor of liberty. The people can easily escape from the tyranny of

despots, but they do not know how to throw off the effects of their own

despotism; just as we avoid the assassin's steel, while we succumb to a

constitutional malady. As soon as a nation becomes proprietor, either

it must perish, or a foreign invasion must force it again to begin its

evolutionary round. [59]

"The communes once organized, the kings treated them as superior

vassals. Now, just as the under vassal had no communication with the

king except through the direct vassal, so also the commoners could enter

no complaints except through the commune.

"Like causes produce like effects. Each commune became a small and

separate State, governed by a few citizens, who sought to extend their

authority over the others; who, in their turn, revenged themselves

upon the unfortunate inhabitants who had not the right of citizenship.

Feudalism in unemancipated countries, and oligarchy in the communes,

made nearly the same ravages. There were sub-associations, fraternities,

tradesmen's associations in the communes, and colleges in the

universities. The oppression was so great, that it was no rare thing to

see the inhabitants of a commune demanding its suppression...."--Meyer:

Judicial Institutions of Europe.

In France, the Revolution was much more gradual. The communes, in taking

refuge under the protection of the kings, had found them masters rather

than protectors. Their liberty had long since been lost, or, rather,

their emancipation had been suspended, when feudalism received its

death-blow at the hand of Richelieu. Then liberty halted; the prince of

the feudatories held sole and undivided sway. The nobles, the clergy,

the commoners, the parliaments, every thing in short except a few

seeming privileges, were controlled by the king; who, like his early

predecessors, consumed regularly, and nearly always in advance, the

revenues of his domain,--and that domain was France.

Finally, '89 arrived; liberty resumed its march; a century and a

half had been required to wear out the last form of feudal

property,--monarchy.

The French Revolution may be defined as _the substitution of real right

for personal right;_ that is to say, in the days of feudalism, the value

of property depended upon the standing of the proprietor, while, after

the Revolution, the regard for the man was proportional to his property.

Now, we have seen from what has been said in the preceding pages, that

this recognition of the right of laborers had been the constant aim of

the serfs and communes, the secret motive of their efforts. The movement

of '89 was only the last stage of that long insurrection. But it seems

to me that we have not paid sufficient attention to the fact that the

Revolution of 1789, instigated by the same causes, animated by the same

spirit, triumphing by the same struggles, was consummated in Italy four

centuries ago. Italy was the first to sound the signal of war against

feudalism; France has followed; Spain and England are beginning to move;

the rest still sleep. If a grand example should be given to the world,

the day of trial would be much abridged.

Note the following summary of the revolutions of property, from the days

of the Roman Empire down to the present time:--

1. Fifth century.--Barbarian invasions; division of the lands of the

empire into independent portions or freeholds.

2. From the fifth to the eighth century.--Gradual concentration of

freeholds, or transformation of the small freeholds into fiefs, feuds,

tenures, &c. Large properties, small possessions. Charlemagne (771-814)

decrees that all freeholds are dependent upon the king of France.

3. From the eighth to the tenth century.--The relation between the crown

and the superior dependents is broken; the latter becoming freeholders,

while the smaller dependents cease to recognize the king, and adhere to

the nearest suzerain. Feudal system.

4. Twelfth century.--Movement of the serfs towards liberty; emancipation

of the communes.

5. Thirteenth century.--Abolition of personal right, and of the feudal

system in Italy. Italian Republics.

6. Seventeenth century.--Abolition of feudalism in France during

Richelieu's ministry. Despotism.

7. 1789.--Abolition of all privileges of birth, caste, provinces, and

corporations; equality of persons and of rights. French democracy.

8. 1830.--The principle of concentration inherent in individual property

is REMARKED. Development of the idea of association.

The more we reflect upon this series of transformations and changes,

the more clearly we see that they were necessary in their principle, in

their manifestations, and in their result.

It was necessary that inexperienced conquerors, eager for liberty,

should divide the Roman Empire into a multitude of estates, as free and

independent as themselves.

It was necessary that these men, who liked war even better than liberty,

should submit to their leaders; and, as the freehold represented the

man, that property should violate property.

It was necessary that, under the rule of a nobility always idle when not

fighting, there should grow up a body of laborers, who, by the power

of production, and by the division and circulation of wealth, would

gradually gain control over commerce, industry, and a portion of the

land, and who, having become rich, would aspire to power and authority

also.

It was necessary, finally, that liberty and equality of rights having

been achieved, and individual property still existing, attended by

robbery, poverty, social inequality, and oppression, there should be

an inquiry into the cause of this evil, and an idea of universal

association formed, whereby, on condition of labor, all interests should

be protected and consolidated.

"Evil, when carried too far," says a learned jurist, "cures itself; and

the political innovation which aims to increase the power of the State,

finally succumbs to the effects of its own work. The Germans, to secure

their independence, chose chiefs; and soon they were oppressed by their

kings and noblemen. The monarchs surrounded themselves with volunteers,

in order to control the freemen; and they found themselves dependent

upon their proud vassals. The _missi dominici_ were sent into the

provinces to maintain the power of the emperors, and to protect the

people from the oppressions of the noblemen; and not only did they usurp

the imperial power to a great extent, but they dealt more severely with

the inhabitants. The freemen became vassals, in order to get rid of

military service and court duty; and they were immediately involved in

all the personal quarrels of their seigniors, and compelled to do

jury duty in their courts.... The kings protected the cities and

the communes, in the hope of freeing them from the yoke of the grand

vassals, and of rendering their own power more absolute; and those same

communes have, in several European countries, procured the establishment

of a constitutional power, are now holding royalty in check, and

are giving rise to a universal desire for political reform."--Meyer:

Judicial Institutions of Europe.

In recapitulation.

What was feudalism? A confederation of the grand seign iors against the

villeins, and against the king. [60] What is constitutional government?

A confederation of the bourgeoisie against the laborers, and against the

king. [61]

How did feudalism end? In the union of the communes and the royal

authority. How will the bourgeoisie aristocracy end? In the union of the

proletariat and the sovereign power.

What was the immediate result of the struggle of the communes and the

king against the seigniors? The monarchical unity of Louis XIV. What

will be the result of the struggle of the proletariat and the sovereign

power combined against the bourgeoisie? The absolute unity of the nation

and the government.

It remains to be seen whether the nation, one and supreme, will be

represented in its executive and central power by ONE, by FIVE, by ONE

HUNDRED, or ONE THOUSAND; that is, it remains to be seen, whether the

royalty of the barricades intends to maintain itself by the people, or

without the people, and whether Louis Philippe wishes his reign to be

the most famous in all history.

I have made this statement as brief, but at the same time as accurate

as I could, neglecting facts and details, that I might give the more

attention to the economical relations of society. For the study of

history is like the study of the human organism; just as the latter

has its system, its organs, and its functions, which can be treated

separately, so the former has its ensemble, its instruments, and its

causes. Of course I do not pretend that the principle of property is

a complete resume of all the social forces; but, as in that wonderful

machine which we call our body, the harmony of the whole allows us to

draw a general conclusion from the consideration of a single function or

organ, so, in discussing historical causes, I have been able to reason

with absolute accuracy from a single order of facts, certain as I was

of the perfect correlation which exists between this special order and

universal history. As is the property of a nation, so is its family,

its marriage, its religion, its civil and military organization, and

its legislative and judicial institutions. History, viewed from this

standpoint, is a grand and sublime psychological study.

Well, sir, in writing against property, have I done more than quote the

language of history? I have said to modern society,--the daughter and

heiress of all preceding societies,--_Age guod agis:_ complete the

task which for six thousand years you have been executing under the

inspiration and by the command of God; hasten to finish your journey;

turn neither to the right nor the left, but follow the road which lies

before you. You seek reason, law, unity, and discipline; but hereafter

you can find them only by stripping off the veils of your infancy, and

ceasing to follow instinct as a guide. Awaken your sleeping conscience;

open your eyes to the pure light of reflection and science; behold the

phantom which troubled your dreams, and so long kept you in a state of

unutterable anguish. Know thyself, O long-deluded society[1] know thy

enemy!... And I have denounced property.

We often hear the defenders of the right of domain quote in defence of

their views the testimony of nations and ages. We can judge, from what

has just been said, how far this historical argument conforms to the

real facts and the conclusions of science.

To complete this apology, I must examine the various theories.

Neither politics, nor legislation, nor history, can be explained and

understood, without a positive theory which defines their elements,

and discovers their laws; in short, without a philosophy. Now, the two

principal schools, which to this day divide the attention of the world,

do not satisfy this condition.

The first, essentially PRACTICAL in its character, confined to a

statement of facts, and buried in learning, cares very little by what

laws humanity develops itself. To it these laws are the secret of the

Almighty, which no one can fathom without a commission from on high.

In applying the facts of history to government, this school does not

reason; it does not anticipate; it makes no comparison of the past with

the present, in order to predict the future. In its opinion, the

lessons of experience teach us only to repeat old errors, and its whole

philosophy consists in perpetually retracing the tracks of antiquity,

instead of going straight ahead forever in the direction in which they

point.

The second school may be called either FATALISTIC or PANTHEISTIC. To

it the movements of empires and the revolutions of humanity are the

manifestations, the incarnations, of the Almighty. The human race,

identified with the divine essence, wheels in a circle of appearances,

informations, and destructions, which necessarily excludes the idea of

absolute truth, and destroys providence and liberty.

Corresponding to these two schools of history, there are two schools

of jurisprudence, similarly opposed, and possessed of the same

peculiarities.

1. The practical and conventional school, to which the law is always a

creation of the legislator, an expression of his will, a privilege

which he condescends to grant,--in short, a gratuitous affirmation to be

regarded as judicious and legitimate, no matter what it declares.

2. The fatalistic and pantheistic school, sometimes called the

historical school, which opposes the despotism of the first, and

maintains that law, like literature and religion, is always the

expression of society,--its manifestation, its form, the external

realization of its mobile spirit and its ever-changing inspirations.

Each of these schools, denying the absolute, rejects thereby all

positive and a priori philosophy.

Now, it is evident that the theories of these two schools, whatever view

we take of them, are utterly unsatisfactory: for, opposed, they form no

dilemma,--that is, if one is false, it does not follow that the other

is true; and, united, they do not constitute the truth, since they

disregard the absolute, without which there is no truth. They are

respectively a THESIS and an ANTITHESIS. There remains to be found,

then, a SYNTHESIS, which, predicating the absolute, justifies the will

of the legislator, explains the variations of the law, annihilates

the theory of the circular movement of humanity, and demonstrates its

progress.

The legists, by the very nature of their studies and in spite of their

obstinate prejudices, have been led irresistibly to suspect that the

absolute in the science of law is not as chimerical as is commonly

supposed; and this suspicion arose from their comparison of the various

relations which legislators have been called upon to regulate.

M. Laboulaye, the laureate of the Institute, begins his "History of

Property" with these words:--

"While the law of contract, which regulates only the mutual interests of

men, has not varied for centuries (except in certain forms which relate

more to the proof than to the character of the obligation), the civil

law of property, which regulates the mutual relations of citizens, has

undergone several radical changes, and has kept pace in its variations

with all the vicissitudes of society. The law of contract, which holds

essentially to those principles of eternal justice which are engraven

upon the depths of the human heart, is the immutable element of

jurisprudence, and, in a certain sense, its philosophy. Property, on

the contrary, is the variable element of jurisprudence, its history, its

policy."

Marvellous! There is in law, and consequently in politics, something

variable and something invariable. The invariable element is obligation,

the bond of justice, duty; the variable element is property,--that is,

the external form of law, the subject-matter of the contract. Whence

it follows that the law can modify, change, reform, and judge property.

Reconcile that, if you can, with the idea of an eternal, absolute,

permanent, and indefectible right.

However, M. Laboulaye is in perfect accord with himself when he adds,

"Possession of the soil rests solely upon force until society takes it

in hand, and espouses the cause of the possessor;" [62] and, a little

farther, "The right of property is not natural, but social. The laws not

only protect property: they give it birth," &c. Now, that which the

law has made the law can unmake; especially since, according to

M. Laboulaye,--an avowed partisan of the historical or pantheistic

school,--the law is not absolute, is not an idea, but a form.

But why is it that property is variable, and, unlike obligation,

incapable of definition and settlement? Before affirming, somewhat

boldly without doubt, that in right there are no absolute principles

(the most dangerous, most immoral, most tyrannical--in a word, most

anti-social--assertion imaginable), it was proper that the right of

property should be subjected to a thorough examination, in order to put

in evidence its variable, arbitrary, and contingent elements, and

those which are eternal, legitimate, and absolute; then, this operation

performed, it became easy to account for the laws, and to correct all

the codes.

Now, this examination of property I claim to have made, and in the

fullest detail; but, either from the public's lack of interest in

an unrecommended and unattractive pamphlet, or--which is more

probable--from the weakness of exposition and want of genius which

characterize the work, the First Memoir on Property passed unnoticed;

scarcely would a few communists, having turned its leaves, deign to

brand it with their disapprobation. You alone, sir, in spite of the

disfavor which I showed for your economical predecessors in too severe

a criticism of them,--you alone have judged me justly; and although I

cannot accept, at least literally, your first judgment, yet it is to

you alone that I appeal from a decision too equivocal to be regarded as

final.

It not being my intention to enter at present into a discussion of

principles, I shall content myself with estimating, from the point of

view of this simple and intelligible absolute, the theories of property

which our generation has produced.

The most exact idea of property is given us by the Roman law, faithfully

followed in this particular by the ancient legists. It is the absolute,

exclusive, autocratic domain of a man over a thing,--a domain which

begins by USUCAPTION, is maintained by POSSESSION, and finally, by the

aid of PRESCRIPTION, finds its sanction in the civil law; a domain which

so identifies the man with the thing, that the proprietor can say, "He

who uses my field, virtually compels me to labor for him; therefore he

owes me compensation."

I pass in silence the secondary modes by which property can be

acquired,--_tradition, sale, exchange, inheritance_, &c.,--which have

nothing in common with the origin of property.

Accordingly, Pothier said THE DOMAIN OF PROPERTY, and not simply

PROPERTY. And the most learned writers on jurisprudence--in imitation

of the Roman praetor who recognized a RIGHT OF PROPERTY and a RIGHT

OF POSSESSION--have carefully distinguished between the DOMAIN and the

right of USUFRUCT, USE, and HABITATION, which, reduced to its natural

limits, is the very expression of justice; and which is, in my opinion,

to supplant domanial property, and finally form the basis of all

jurisprudence.

But, sir, admire the clumsiness of systems, or rather the fatality of

logic! While the Roman law and all the savants inspired by it teach that

property in its origin is the right of first occupancy sanctioned by

law, the modern legists, dissatisfied with this brutal definition, claim

that property is based upon LABOR. Immediately they infer that he who no

longer labors, but makes another labor in his stead, loses his right to

the earnings of the latter. It is by virtue of this principle that

the serfs of the middle ages claimed a legal right to property, and

consequently to the enjoyment of political rights; that the clergy were

despoiled in '89 of their immense estates, and were granted a pension

in exchange; that at the restoration the liberal deputies opposed the

indemnity of one billion francs. "The nation," said they, "has acquired

by twenty-five years of labor and possession the property which the

emigrants forfeited by abandonment and long idleness: why should the

nobles be treated with more favor than the priests?" [63]

This position is quite in harmony with my principles, and I heartily

applaud the indignation of M. Lerminier; but I do not know that a

proprietor was ever deprived of his property because UNWORTHY; and as

reasonable, social, and even useful as the thing may seem, it is quite

contrary to the uses and customs of property.

All usurpations, not born of war, have been caused and supported by

labor. All modern history proves this, from the end of the Roman empire

down to the present day. And as if to give a sort of legal sanction to

these usurpations, the doctrine of labor, subversive of property,

is professed at great length in the Roman law under the name of

PRESCRIPTION.

The man who cultivates, it has been said, makes the land his own;

consequently, no more property. This was clearly seen by the old

jurists, who have not failed to denounce this novelty; while on the

other hand the young school hoots at the absurdity of the first-occupant

theory. Others have presented themselves, pretending to reconcile

the two opinions by uniting them. They have failed, like all the

_juste-milieux_ of the world, and are laughed at for their eclecticism.

At present, the alarm is in the camp of the old doctrine; from all sides

pour IN DEFENCES OF PROPERTY, STUDIES REGARDING PROPERTY, THEORIES OF

PROPERTY, each one of which, giving the lie to the rest, inflicts a

fresh wound upon property.

Consider, indeed, the inextricable embarrassments, the contradictions,

the absurdities, the incredible nonsense, in which the bold defenders of

property so lightly involve themselves. I choose the eclectics, because,

those killed, the others cannot survive.

M. Troplong, jurist, passes for a philosopher in the eyes of the editors

of "Le Droit." I tell the gentlemen of "Le Droit" that, in the judgment

of philosophers, M. Troplong is only an advocate; and I prove my

assertion.

M. Troplong is a defender of progress. "The words of the code," says he,

"are fruitful sap with which the classic works of the eighteenth century

overflow. To wish to suppress them... is to violate the law of progress,

and to forget that a science which moves is a science which grows." [64]

Now, the only mutable and progressive portion of law, as we have already

seen, is that which concerns property. If, then, you ask what reforms

are to be introduced into the right of property? M. Troplong makes no

reply; what progress is to be hoped for? no reply; what is to be the

destiny of property in case of universal association? no reply; what is

the absolute and what the contingent, what the true and what the false,

in property? no reply. M. Troplong favors quiescence and _in statu

quo_ in regard to property. What could be more unphilosophical in a

progressive philosopher?

Nevertheless, M. Troplong has thought about these things. "There are,"

he says, "many weak points and antiquated ideas in the doctrines of

modern authors concerning property: witness the works of MM. Toullier

and Duranton." The doctrine of M. Troplong promises, then, strong

points, advanced and progressive ideas. Let us see; let us examine:--

"Man, placed in the presence of matter, is conscious of a power over it,

which has been given to him to satisfy the needs of his being. King

of inanimate or unintelligent nature, he feels that he has a right to

modify it, govern it, and fit it for his use. There it is, the subject

of property, which is legitimate only when exercised over things, never

when over persons."

M. Troplong is so little of a philosopher, that he does not even know

the import of the philosophical terms which he makes a show of using. He

says of matter that it is the SUBJECT of property; he should have said

the OBJECT. M. Troplong uses the language of the anatomists, who apply

the term SUBJECT to the human matter used in their experiments.

This error of our author is repeated farther on: "Liberty, which

overcomes matter, the subject of property, &c." The SUBJECT of

property is man; its OBJECT is matter. But even this is but a slight

mortification; directly we shall have some crucifixions.

Thus, according to the passage just quoted, it is in the conscience and

personality of man that the principle of property must be sought. Is

there any thing new in this doctrine? Apparently it never has occurred

to those who, since the days of Cicero and Aristotle, and earlier, have

maintained that THINGS BELONG TO THE FIRST OCCUPANT, that occupation may

be exercised by beings devoid of conscience and personality. The human

personality, though it may be the principle or the subject of property,

as matter is the object, is not the CONDITION. Now, it is this condition

which we most need to know. So far, M. Troplong tells us no more than

his masters, and the figures with which he adorns his style add nothing

to the old idea.

Property, then, implies three terms: The subject, the object, and the

condition. There is no difficulty in regard to the first two terms. As

to the third, the condition of property down to this day, for the Greek

as for the Barbarian, has been that of first occupancy. What now would

you have it, progressive doctor?

"When man lays hands for the first time upon an object without a

master, he performs an act which, among individuals, is of the greatest

importance. The thing thus seized and occupied participates, so to

speak, in the personality of him who holds it. It becomes sacred, like

himself. It is impossible to take it without doing violence to his

liberty, or to remove it without rashly invading his person. Diogenes

did but express this truth of intuition, when he said: 'Stand out of my

light!'"

Very good! but would the prince of cynics, the very personal and very

haughty Diogenes, have had the right to charge another cynic, as rent

for this same place in the sunshine, a bone for twenty-four hours of

possession? It is that which constitutes the proprietor; it is that

which you fail to justify. In reasoning from the human personality and

individuality to the right of property, you unconsciously construct

a syllogism in which the conclusion includes more than the premises,

contrary to the rules laid down by Aristotle. The individuality of

the human person proves INDIVIDUAL POSSESSION, originally called

_proprietas_, in opposition to collective possession, _communio_.

It gives birth to the distinction between THINE and MINE, true signs

of equality, not, by any means, of subordination. "From equivocation to

equivocation," says M. Michelet, [65] "property would crawl to the end

of the world; man could not limit it, were not he himself its limit.

Where they clash, there will be its frontier." In short, individuality

of being destroys the hypothesis of communism, but it does not for that

reason give birth to domain,--that domain by virtue of which the holder

of a thing exercises over the person who takes his place a right of

prestation and suzerainty, that has always been identified with property

itself.

Further, that he whose legitimately acquired possession injures nobody

cannot be nonsuited without flagrant injustice, is a truth, not of

INTUITION, as M. Troplong says, but of INWARD SENSATION, [66] which has

nothing to do with property.

M. Troplong admits, then, occupancy as a condition of property. In that,

he is in accord with the Roman law, in accord with MM. Toullier and

Duranton; but in his opinion this condition is not the only one, and it

is in this particular that his doctrine goes beyond theirs.

"But, however exclusive the right arising from sole occupancy, does it

not become still more so, when man has moulded matter by his labor;

when he has deposited in it a portion of himself, re-creating it by his

industry, and setting upon it the seal of his intelligence and activity?

Of all conquests, that is the most legitimate, for it is the price of

labor.

"He who should deprive a man of the thing thus remodelled, thus

humanized, would invade the man himself, and would inflict the deepest

wounds upon his liberty."

I pass over the very beautiful explanations in which M. Troplong,

discussing labor and industry, displays the whole wealth of his

eloquence. M. Troplong is not only a philosopher, he is an orator, an

artist. HE ABOUNDS WITH APPEALS TO THE CONSCIENCE AND THE PASSIONS. I

might make sad work of his rhetoric, should I undertake to dissect it;

but I confine myself for the present to his philosophy.

If M. Troplong had only known how to think and reflect, before

abandoning the original fact of occupancy and plunging into the theory

of labor, he would have asked himself: "What is it to occupy?" And he

would have discovered that OCCUPANCY is only a generic term by which

all modes of possession are expressed,--seizure, station, immanence,

habitation, cultivation, use, consumption, &c.; that labor,

consequently, is but one of a thousand forms of occupancy. He would have

understood, finally, that the right of possession which is born of labor

is governed by the same general laws as that which results from the

simple seizure of things. What kind of a legist is he who declaims when

he ought to reason, who continually mistakes his metaphors for legal

axioms, and who does not so much as know how to obtain a universal by

induction, and form a category?

If labor is identical with occupancy, the only benefit which it secures

to the laborer is the right of individual possession of the object of

his labor; if it differs from occupancy, it gives birth to a right equal

only to itself,--that is, a right which begins, continues, and ends,

with the labor of the occupant. It is for this reason, in the words of

the law, that one cannot acquire a just title to a thing by labor alone.

He must also hold it for a year and a day, in order to be regarded as

its possessor; and possess it twenty or thirty years, in order to become

its proprietor.

These preliminaries established, M. Troplong's whole structure falls of

its own weight, and the inferences, which he attempts to draw, vanish.

"Property once acquired by occupation and labor, it naturally preserves

itself, not only by the same means, but also by the refusal of the

holder to abdicate; for from the very fact that it has risen to the

height of a right, it is its nature to perpetuate itself and to last for

an indefinite period.... Rights, considered from an ideal point of

view, are imperishable and eternal; and time, which affects only the

contingent, can no more disturb them than it can injure God himself."

It is astonishing that our author, in speaking of the IDEAL, TIME, and

ETERNITY, did not work into his sentence the DIVINE WINGS of Plato,--so

fashionable to-day in philosophical works.

With the exception of falsehood, I hate nonsense more than any thing

else in the world. PROPERTY ONCE ACQUIRED! Good, if it is acquired; but,

as it is not acquired, it cannot be preserved. RIGHTS ARE ETERNAL! Yes,

in the sight of God, like the archetypal ideas of the Platonists. But,

on the earth, rights exist only in the presence of a subject, an object,

and a condition. Take away one of these three things, and rights no

longer exist. Thus, individual possession ceases at the death of the

subject, upon the destruction of the object, or in case of exchange or

abandonment.

Let us admit, however, with M. Troplong, that property is an absolute

and eternal right, which cannot be destroyed save by the deed and at

the will of the proprietor. What are the consequences which immediately

follow from this position?

To show the justice and utility of prescription, M. Troplong supposes

the case of a bona fide possessor whom a proprietor, long since

forgotten or even unknown, is attempting to eject from his possession.

"At the start, the error of the possessor was excusable but not

irreparable. Pursuing its course and growing old by degrees, it has

so completely clothed itself in the colors of truth, it has spoken

so loudly the language of right, it has involved so many confiding

interests, that it fairly may be asked whether it would not cause

greater confusion to go back to the reality than to sanction the

fictions which it (an error, without doubt) has sown on its way? Well,

yes; it must be confessed, without hesitation, that the remedy would

prove worse than the disease, and that its application would lead to the

most outrageous injustice."

How long since utility became a principle of law? When the Athenians, by

the advice of Aristides, rejected a proposition eminently advantageous

to their republic, but also utterly unjust, they showed finer moral

perception and greater clearness of intellect than M. Troplong. Property

is an eternal right, independent of time, indestructible except by the

act and at the will of the proprietor; and here this right is taken from

the proprietor, and on what ground? Good God! on the ground of ABSENCE!

Is it not true that legists are governed by caprice in giving and taking

away rights? When it pleases these gentlemen, idleness, unworthiness, or

absence can invalidate a right which, under quite similar circumstances,

labor, residence, and virtue are inadequate to obtain. Do not be

astonished that legists reject the absolute. Their good pleasure is law,

and their disordered imaginations are the real cause of the EVOLUTIONS

in jurisprudence.

"If the nominal proprietor should plead ignorance, his claim would be

none the more valid. Indeed, his ignorance might arise from inexcusable

carelessness, etc."

What! in order to legitimate dispossession through prescription, you

suppose faults in the proprietor! You blame his absence,--which may

have been involuntary; his neglect,--not knowing what caused it; his

carelessness,--a gratuitous supposition of your own! It is absurd. One

very simple observation suffices to annihilate this theory. Society,

which, they tell us, makes an exception in the interest of order in

favor of the possessor as against the old proprietor, owes the latter

an indemnity; since the privilege of prescription is nothing but

expropriation for the sake of public utility.

But here is something stronger:--

"In society a place cannot remain vacant with impunity. A new man arises

in place of the old one who disappears or goes away; he brings here his

existence, becomes entirely absorbed, and devotes himself to this post

which he finds abandoned. Shall the deserter, then, dispute the honor of

the victory with the soldier who fights with the sweat standing on his

brow, and bears the burden of the day, in behalf of a cause which he

deems just?"

When the tongue of an advocate once gets in motion, who can tell where

it will stop? M. Troplong admits and justifies usurpation in case of

the ABSENCE of the proprietor, and on a mere presumption of his

CARELESSNESS. But when the neglect is authenticated; when the

abandonment is solemnly and voluntarily set forth in a contract in the

presence of a magistrate; when the proprietor dares to say, "I cease to

labor, but I still claim a share of the product,"--then the absentee's

right of property is protected; the usurpation of the possessor would

be criminal; farm-rent is the reward of idleness. Where is, I do not say

the consistency, but, the honesty of this law?

Prescription is a result of the civil law, a creation of the legislator.

Why has not the legislator fixed the conditions differently?--why,

instead of twenty and thirty years, is not a single year sufficient to

prescribe?--why are not voluntary absence and confessed idleness as good

grounds for dispossession as involuntary absence, ignorance, or apathy?

But in vain should we ask M. Troplong, the philosopher, to tell us

the ground of prescription. Concerning the code, M. Troplong does not

reason. "The interpreter," he says, "must take things as they are,

society as it exists, laws as they are made: that is the only sensible

starting-point." Well, then, write no more books; cease to reproach your

predecessors--who, like you, have aimed only at interpretation of the

law--for having remained in the rear; talk no more of philosophy and

progress, for the lie sticks in your throat.

M. Troplong denies the reality of the right of possession; he denies

that possession has ever existed as a principle of society; and he

quotes M. de Savigny, who holds precisely the opposite position, and

whom he is content to leave unanswered. At one time, M. Troplong asserts

that possession and property are CONTEMPORANEOUS, and that they exist AT

THE SAME TIME, which implies that the RIGHT of property is based on the

FACT of possession,--a conclusion which is evidently absurd; at

another, he denies that possession HAD ANY HISTORICAL EXISTENCE PRIOR

TO PROPERTY,--an assertion which is contradicted by the customs of many

nations which cultivate the land without appropriating it; by the Roman

law, which distinguished so clearly between POSSESSION and PROPERTY; and

by our code itself, which makes possession for twenty or thirty years

the condition of property. Finally, M. Troplong goes so far as to

maintain that the Roman maxim, _Nihil comune habet proprietas cum

possessione_--which contains so striking an allusion to the possession

of the _ager publicus_, and which, sooner or later, will be again

accepted without qualification--expresses in French law only a judicial

axiom, a simple rule forbidding the union of an _action possessoire_

with an _action petitoire_,--an opinion as retrogressive as it is

unphilosophical.

In treating of _actions possessoires_, M. Troplong is so unfortunate or

awkward that he mutilates economy through failure to grasp its

meaning "Just as property," he writes, "gave rise to the action for

revendication, so possession--the _jus possessionis_--was the cause

of possessory interdicts.... There were two kinds of interdicts,--the

interdict _recuperandae possessionis_, and the interdict _retinendae

possessionis_,--which correspond to our _complainte en cas de saisine

et nouvelete_. There is also a third,--_adipiscendae possessionis_,--of

which the Roman law-books speak in connection with the two others.

But, in reality, this interdict is not possessory: for he who wishes

to acquire possession by this means does not possess, and has not

possessed; and yet acquired possession is the condition of possessory

interdicts." Why is not an action to acquire possession equally

conceivable with an action to be reinstated in possession? When the

Roman plebeians demanded a division of the conquered territory; when

the proletaires of Lyons took for their motto, _Vivre en travaillant, ou

mourir en combattant_ (to live working, or die fighting); when the most

enlightened of the modern economists claim for every man the right to

labor and to live,--they only propose this interdict, _adipiscendae

possessionis_, which embarrasses M. Troplong so seriously. And what is

my object in pleading against property, if not to obtain possession? How

is it that M. Troplong--the legist, the orator, the philosopher--does

not see that logically this interdict must be admitted, since it is the

necessary complement of the two others, and the three united form an

indivisible trinity,--to RECOVER, to MAINTAIN, to ACQUIRE? To break this

series is to create a blank, destroy the natural synthesis of things,

and follow the example of the geometrician who tried to conceive of

a solid with only two dimensions. But it is not astonishing that M.

Troplong rejects the third class of _actions possessoires_, when

we consider that he rejects possession itself. He is so completely

controlled by his prejudices in this respect, that he is unconsciously

led, not to unite (that would be horrible in his eyes), but to identify

the _action possessoire_ with the _action petitoire_. This could be

easily proved, were it not too tedious to plunge into these metaphysical

obscurities.

As an interpreter of the law, M. Troplong is no more successful than

as a philosopher. One specimen of his skill in this direction, and I am

done with him:--

Code of Civil Procedure, Art. 23: "_Actions possessoires_ are only when

commenced within the year of trouble by those who have held possession

for at least a year by an irrevocable title."

M. Troplong's comments:--

"Ought we to maintain--as Duparc, Poullain, and Lanjuinais would have

us--the rule _spoliatus ante omnia restituendus_, when an individual,

who is neither proprietor nor annual possessor, is expelled by a third

party, who has no right to the estate? I think not. Art. 23 of the

Code is general: it absolutely requires that the plaintiff in _actions

possessoires_ shall have been in peaceable possession for a year at

least. That is the invariable principle: it can in no case be modified.

And why should it be set aside? The plaintiff had no seisin; he had no

privileged possession; he had only a temporary occupancy, insufficient

to warrant in his favor the presumption of property, which renders the

annual possession so valuable. Well! this _ae facto_ occupancy he has

lost; another is invested with it: possession is in the hands of this

new-comer. Now, is not this a case for the application of the principle,

_In_ _pari causa possesser potior habetur_? Should not the actual

possessor be preferred to the evicted possessor? Can he not meet the

complaint of his adversary by saying to him: 'Prove that you were an

annual possessor before me, for you are the plaintiff. As far as I am

concerned, it is not for me to tell you how I possess, nor how long

I have possessed. _Possideo quia possideo_. I have no other reply, no

other defence. When you have shown that your action is admissible, then

we will see whether you are entitled to lift the veil which hides the

origin of my possession.'"

And this is what is honored with the name of jurisprudence and

philosophy,--the restoration of force. What! when I have "moulded matter

by my labor" [I quote M. Troplong]; when I have "deposited in it a

portion of myself" [M. Troplong]; when I have "re-created it by

my industry, and set upon it the seal of my intelligence" [M.

Troplong],--on the ground that I have not possessed it for a year, a

stranger may dispossess me, and the law offers me no protection! And if

M. Troplong is my judge, M. Troplong will condemn me! And if I resist

my adversary,--if, for this bit of mud which I may call MY FIELD, and

of which they wish to rob me, a war breaks out between the two

competitors,--the legislator will gravely wait until the stronger,

having killed the other, has had possession for a year! No, no, Monsieur

Troplong! you do not understand the words of the law; for I prefer

to call in question your intelligence rather than the justice of the

legislator. You are mistaken in your application of the principle, _In

pari causa possessor potior habetur:_ the actuality of possession here

refers to him who possessed at the time when the difficulty arose, not

to him who possesses at the time of the complaint. And when the code

prohibits the reception of _actions possessoires_, in cases where the

possession is not of a year's duration, it simply means that if, before

a year has elapsed, the holder relinquishes possession, and ceases

actually to occupy _in propria persona_, he cannot avail himself of an

_action possessoire_ against his successor. In a word, the code treats

possession of less than a year as it ought to treat all possession,

however long it has existed,--that is, the condition of property ought

to be, not merely seisin for a year, but perpetual seisin.

I will not pursue this analysis farther. When an author bases two

volumes of quibbles on foundations so uncertain, it may be boldly

declared that his work, whatever the amount of learning displayed in it,

is a mess of nonsense unworthy a critic's attention.

At this point, sir, I seem to hear you reproaching me for this conceited

dogmatism, this lawless arrogance, which respects nothing, claims a

monopoly of justice and good sense, and assumes to put in the pillory

any one who dares to maintain an opinion contrary to its own. This

fault, they tell me, more odious than any other in an author, was too

prominent a characteristic of my First Memoir, and I should do well to

correct it.

It is important to the success of my defence, that I should vindicate

myself from this reproach; and since, while perceiving in myself other

faults of a different character, I still adhere in this particular to

my disputatious style, it is right that I should give my reasons for my

conduct. I act, not from inclination, but from necessity.

I say, then, that I treat my authors as I do for two reasons: a REASON

OF RIGHT, and a REASON OF INTENTION; both peremptory.

1. Reason of right. When I preach equality of fortunes, I do not advance

an opinion more or less probable, a utopia more or less ingenious, an

idea conceived within my brain by means of imagination only. I lay down

an absolute truth, concerning which hesitation is impossible, modesty

superfluous, and doubt ridiculous.

But, do you ask, what assures me that that which I utter is true?

What assures me, sir? The logical and metaphysical processes which I

use, the correctness of which I have demonstrated by a priori reasoning;

the fact that I possess an infallible method of investigation and

verification with which my authors are unacquainted; and finally, the

fact that for all matters relating to property and justice I have found

a formula which explains all legislative variations, and furnishes a

key for all problems. Now, is there so much as a shadow of method in M.

Toullier, M. Troplong, and this swarm of insipid commentators, almost

as devoid of reason and moral sense as the code itself? Do you give the

name of method to an alphabetical, chronological, analogical, or merely

nominal classification of subjects? Do you give the name of method

to these lists of paragraphs gathered under an arbitrary head, these

sophistical vagaries, this mass of contradictory quotations and

opinions, this nauseous style, this spasmodic rhetoric, models of which

are so common at the bar, though seldom found elsewhere? Do you take for

philosophy this twaddle, this intolerable pettifoggery adorned with a

few scholastic trimmings? No, no! a writer who respects himself, never

will consent to enter the balance with these manipulators of law,

misnamed JURISTS; and for my part I object to a comparison.

2. Reason of intention. As far as I am permitted to divulge this secret,

I am a conspirator in an immense revolution, terrible to charlatans and

despots, to all exploiters of the poor and credulous, to all salaried

idlers, dealers in political panaceas and parables, tyrants in a word of

thought and of opinion. I labor to stir up the reason of individuals to

insurrection against the reason of authorities.

According to the laws of the society of which I am a member, all the

evils which afflict humanity arise from faith in external teachings and

submission to authority. And not to go outside of our own century, is

it not true, for instance, that France is plundered, scoffed at, and

tyrannized over, because she speaks in masses, and not by heads? The

French people are penned up in three or four flocks, receiving their

signal from a chief, responding to the voice of a leader, and thinking

just as he says. A certain journal, it is said, has fifty thousand

subscribers; assuming six readers to every subscriber, we have three

hundred thousand sheep browsing and bleating at the same cratch. Apply

this calculation to the whole periodical press, and you find that, in

our free and intelligent France, there are two millions of creatures

receiving every morning from the journals spiritual pasturage. Two

millions! In other words, the entire nation allows a score of little

fellows to lead it by the nose.

By no means, sir, do I deny to journalists talent, science, love

of truth, patriotism, and what you please. They are very worthy and

intelligent people, whom I undoubtedly should wish to resemble, had I

the honor to know them. That of which I complain, and that which has

made me a conspirator, is that, instead of enlightening us, these

gentlemen command us, impose upon us articles of faith, and that without

demonstration or verification. When, for example, I ask why these

fortifications of Paris, which, in former times, under the influence

of certain prejudices, and by means of a concurrence of extraordinary

circumstances supposed for the sake of the argument to have existed, may

perhaps have served to protect us, but which it is doubtful whether

our descendants will ever use,--when I ask, I say, on what grounds they

assimilate the future to a hypothetical past, they reply that M.

Thiers, who has a great mind, has written upon this subject a report of

admirable elegance and marvellous clearness. At this I become angry, and

reply that M. Thiers does not know what he is talking about. Why, having

wanted no detached forts seven years ago, do we want them to-day?

"Oh! damn it," they say, "the difference is great; the first forts

were too near to us; with these we cannot be bombarded." You cannot be

bombarded; but you can be blockaded, and will be, if you stir. What! to

obtain blockade forts from the Parisians, it has sufficed to prejudice

them against bombardment forts! And they thought to outwit the

government! Oh, the sovereignty of the people!...

"Damn it! M. Thiers, who is wiser than you, says that it would be absurd

to suppose a government making war upon citizens, and maintaining itself

by force and in spite of the will of the people. That would be absurd!"

Perhaps so: such a thing has happened more than once, and may happen

again. Besides, when despotism is strong, it appears almost legitimate.

However that may be, they lied in 1833, and they lie again in

1841,--those who threaten us with the bomb-shell. And then, if M. Thiers

is so well assured of the intentions of the government, why does he not

wish the forts to be built before the circuit is extended? Why this

air of suspicion of the government, unless an intrigue has been planned

between the government and M. Thiers?

"Damn it! we do not wish to be again invaded. If Paris had been

fortified in 1815, Napoleon would not have been conquered!" But I tell

you that Napoleon was not conquered, but sold; and that if, in 1815,

Paris had had fortifications, it would have been with them as with the

thirty thousand men of Grouchy, who were misled during the battle. It is

still easier to surrender forts than to lead soldiers. Would the selfish

and the cowardly ever lack reasons for yielding to the enemy?

"But do you not see that the absolutist courts are provoked at our

fortifications?--a proof that they do not think as you do." You believe

that; and, for my part, I believe that in reality they are quite at ease

about the matter; and, if they appear to tease our ministers, they do so

only to give the latter an opportunity to decline. The absolutist courts

are always on better terms with our constitutional monarchy, than

our monarchy with us. Does not M. Guizot say that France needs to

be defended within as well as without? Within! against whom? Against

France. O Parisians! it is but six months since you demanded war, and

now you want only barricades. Why should the allies fear your doctrines,

when you cannot even control yourselves?... How could you sustain a

siege, when you weep over the absence of an actress?

"But, finally, do you not understand that, by the rules of modern

warfare, the capital of a country is always the objective point of its

assailants? Suppose our army defeated on the Rhine, France invaded, and

defenceless Paris falling into the hands of the enemy. It would be the

death of the administrative power; without a head it could not live. The

capital taken, the nation must submit. What do you say to that?"

The reply is very simple. Why is society constituted in such a way that

the destiny of the country depends upon the safety of the capital?

Why, in case our territory be invaded and Paris besieged, cannot the

legislative, executive, and military powers act outside of Paris? Why

this localization of all the vital forces of France?... Do not cry out

upon decentralization. This hackneyed reproach would discredit only

your own intelligence and sincerity. It is not a question of

decentralization; it is your political fetichism which I attack. Why

should the national unity be attached to a certain place, to certain

functionaries, to certain bayonets? Why should the Place Maubert and the

Palace of the Tuileries be the palladium of France?

Now let me make an hypothesis.

Suppose it were written in the charter, "In case the country be again

invaded, and Paris forced to surrender, the government being annihilated

and the national assembly dissolved, the electoral colleges shall

reassemble spontaneously and without other official notice, for the

purpose of appointing new deputies, who shall organize a provisional

government at Orleans.

"If Orleans succumbs, the government shall reconstruct itself in the same

way at Lyons; then at Bordeaux, then at Bayonne, until all France be

captured or the enemy driven from the land. For the government may

perish, but the nation never dies. The king, the peers, and the deputies

massacred, VIVE LA FRANCE!"

Do you not think that such an addition to the charter would be a better

safeguard for the liberty and integrity of the country than walls and

bastions around Paris? Well, then! do henceforth for administration,

industry, science, literature, and art that which the charter ought

to prescribe for the central government and common defence. Instead of

endeavoring to render Paris impregnable, try rather to render the loss

of Paris an insignificant matter. Instead of accumulating about one

point academies, faculties, schools, and political, administrative,

and judicial centres; instead of arresting intellectual development

and weakening public spirit in the provinces by this fatal

agglomeration,--can you not, without destroying unity, distribute social

functions among places as well as among persons? Such a system--in

allowing each province to participate in political power and action, and

in balancing industry, intelligence, and strength in all parts of the

country--would equally secure, against enemies at home and enemies

abroad, the liberty of the people and the stability of the government.

Discriminate, then, between the centralization of functions and the

concentration of organs; between political unity and its material

symbol.

"Oh! that is plausible; but it is impossible!"--which means that the

city of Paris does not intend to surrender its privileges, and that

there it is still a question of property.

Idle talk! The country, in a state of panic which has been cleverly

worked upon, has asked for fortifications. I dare to affirm that it

has abdicated its sovereignty. All parties are to blame for this

suicide,--the conservatives, by their acquiescence in the plans of the

government; the friends of the dynasty, because they wish no opposition

to that which pleases them, and because a popular revolution would

annihilate them; the democrats, because they hope to rule in their turn.

[67] That which all rejoice at having obtained is a means of future

repression. As for the defence of the country, they are not troubled

about that. The idea of tyranny dwells in the minds of all, and brings

together into one conspiracy all forms of selfishness. We wish the

regeneration of society, but we subordinate this desire to our ideas

and convenience. That our approaching marriage may take place, that our

business may succeed, that our opinions may triumph, we postpone reform.

Intolerance and selfishness lead us to put fetters upon liberty; and,

because we cannot wish all that God wishes, we would, if it rested with

us, stay the course of destiny rather than sacrifice our own interests

and self-love. Is not this an instance where the words of Solomon

apply,--"_L'iniquite a menti a elle-meme_"?

It is said that on this question of the fortification of Paris the staff

of "Le National" are not agreed. This would prove, if proof were needed,

that a journal may blunder and falsify, without entitling any one to

accuse its editors. A journal is a metaphysical being, for which no one

is really responsible, and which owes its existence solely to mutual

concessions. This idea ought to frighten those worthy citizens who,

because they borrow their opinions from a journal, imagine that they

belong to a political party, and who have not the faintest suspicion

that they are really without a head.

For this reason, sir, I have enlisted in a desperate war against

every form of authority over the multitude. Advance sentinel of the

proletariat, I cross bayonets with the celebrities of the day, as

well as with spies and charlatans. Well, when I am fighting with an

illustrious adversary, must I stop at the end of every phrase, like

an orator in the tribune, to say "the learned author," "the eloquent

writer," "the profound publicist," and a hundred other platitudes with

which it is fashionable to mock people? These civilities seem to me no

less insulting to the man attacked than dishonorable to the aggressor.

But when, rebuking an author, I say to him, "Citizen, your doctrine is

absurd, and, if to prove my assertion is an offence against you, I

am guilty of it," immediately the listener opens his ears; he is all

attention; and, if I do not succeed in convincing him, at least I give

his thought an impulse, and set him the wholesome example of doubt and

free examination.

Then do not think, sir, that, in tripping up the philosophy of your very

learned and very estimable confrere, M. Troplong, I fail to appreciate

his talent as a writer (in my opinion, he has too much for a jurist);

nor his knowledge, though it is too closely confined to the letter of

the law, and the reading of old books. In these particulars, M. Troplong

offends on the side of excess rather than deficiency. Further, do not

believe that I am actuated by any personal animosity towards him, or

that I have the slightest desire to wound his self-love. I know M.

Troplong only by his "Treatise on Prescription," which I wish he had not

written; and as for my critics, neither M. Troplong, nor any of those

whose opinion I value, will ever read me. Once more, my only object is

to prove, as far as I am able, to this unhappy French nation, that

those who make the laws, as well as those who interpret them, are not

infallible organs of general, impersonal, and absolute reason.

I had resolved to submit to a systematic criticism the semi-official

defence of the right of property recently put forth by M. Wolowski,

your colleague at the Conservatory. With this view, I had commenced

to collect the documents necessary for each of his lectures, but, soon

perceiving that the ideas of the professor were incoherent, that his

arguments contradicted each other, that one affirmation was sure to be

overthrown by another, and that in M. Wolowski's lucubrations the

good was always mingled with the bad, and being by nature a little

suspicious, it suddenly occurred to me that M. Wolowski was an advocate

of equality in disguise, thrown in spite of himself into the position

in which the patriarch Jacob pictures one of his sons,--_inter

duas clitellas_, between two stools, as the proverb says. In more

parliamentary language, I saw clearly that M. Wolowski was placed

between his profound convictions on the one hand and his official duties

on the other, and that, in order to maintain his position, he had to

assume a certain slant. Then I experienced great pain at seeing the

reserve, the circumlocution, the figures, and the irony to which

a professor of legislation, whose duty it is to teach dogmas with

clearness and precision, was forced to resort; and I fell to cursing

the society in which an honest man is not allowed to say frankly what he

thinks. Never, sir, have you conceived of such torture: I seemed to be

witnessing the martyrdom of a mind. I am going to give you an idea of

these astonishing meetings, or rather of these scenes of sorrow.

Monday, Nov. 20, 1840.--The professor declares, in brief,--1. That the

right of property is not founded upon occupation, but upon the impress

of man; 2. That every man has a natural and inalienable right to the use

of matter.

Now, if matter can be appropriated, and if, notwithstanding, all

men retain an inalienable right to the use of this matter, what is

property?--and if matter can be appropriated only by labor, how long

is this appropriation to continue?--questions that will confuse and

confound all jurists whatsoever.

Then M. Wolowski cites his authorities. Great God! what witnesses he

brings forward! First, M. Troplong, the great metaphysician, whom we

have discussed; then, M. Louis Blanc, editor of the "Revue du Progres,"

who came near being tried by jury for publishing his "Organization of

Labor," and who escaped from the clutches of the public prosecutor only

by a juggler's trick; [68] Corinne,--I mean Madame de Stael,--who, in

an ode, making a poetical comparison of the land with the waves, of the

furrow of a plough with the wake of a vessel, says "that property exists

only where man has left his trace," which makes property dependent

upon the solidity of the elements; Rousseau, the apostle of liberty and

equality, but who, according to M. Wolowski, attacked property only AS

A JOKE, and in order to point a paradox; Robespierre, who prohibited

a division of the land, because he regarded such a measure as a

rejuvenescence of property, and who, while awaiting the definitive

organization of the republic, placed all property in the care?? of

the people,--that is, transferred the right of eminent domain from the

individual to society; Babeuf, who wanted property for the nation, and

communism for the citizens; M. Considerant, who favors a division of

landed property into shares,--that is, who wishes to render property

nominal and fictitious: the whole being intermingled with jokes and

witticisms (intended undoubtedly to lead people away from the HORNETS'

NESTS) at the expense of the adversaries of the right of property!

November 26.--M. Wolowski supposes this objection: Land, like

water, air, and light, is necessary to life, therefore it cannot

be appropriated; and he replies: The importance of landed property

diminishes as the power of industry increases.

Good! this importance DIMINISHES, but it does not DISAPPEAR; and this,

of itself, shows landed property to be illegitimate. Here M. Wolowski

pretends to think that the opponents of property refer only to property

in land, while they merely take it as a term of comparison; and, in

showing with wonderful clearness the absurdity of the position in which

he places them, he finds a way of drawing the attention of his hearers

to another subject without being false to the truth which it is his

office to contradict.

"Property," says M. Wolowski, "is that which distinguishes man from the

animals." That may be; but are we to regard this as a compliment or a

satire?

"Mahomet," says M. Wolowski, "decreed property." And so did Genghis

Khan, and Tamerlane, and all the ravagers of nations. What sort of

legislators were they?

"Property has been in existence ever since the origin of the human

race." Yes, and so has slavery, and despotism also; and likewise

polygamy and idolatry. But what does this antiquity show?

The members of the Council of the State--M. Portalis at their head--did

not raise, in their discussion of the Code, the question of the

legitimacy of property. "Their silence," says M. Wolowski, "is a

precedent in favor of this right." I may regard this reply as personally

addressed to me, since the observation belongs to me. I reply, "As long

as an opinion is universally admitted, the universality of belief serves

of itself as argument and proof. When this same opinion is attacked,

the former faith proves nothing; we must resort to reason. Ignorance,

however old and pardonable it may be, never outweighs reason."

Property has its abuses, M. Wolowski confesses. "But," he says, "these

abuses gradually disappear. To-day their cause is known. They all arise

from a false theory of property. In principle, property is inviolable,

but it can and must be checked and disciplined." Such are the

conclusions of the professor.

When one thus remains in the clouds, he need not fear to equivocate.

Nevertheless, I would like him to define these ABUSES of property, to

show their cause, to explain this true theory from which no abuse is to

spring; in short, to tell me how, without destroying property, it can

be governed for the greatest good of all. "Our civil code," says M.

Wolowski, in speaking of this subject, "leaves much to be desired." I

think it leaves every thing undone.

Finally, M. Wolowski opposes, on the one hand, the concentration of

capital, and the absorption which results therefrom; and, on the other,

he objects to the extreme division of the land. Now I think that I have

demonstrated in my First Memoir, that large accumulation and minute

division are the first two terms of an economical trinity,--a THESIS and

an ANTITHESIS. But, while M. Wolowski says nothing of the third term,

the SYNTHESIS, and thus leaves the inference in suspense, I have shown

that this third term is ASSOCIATION, which is the annihilation of

property.

November 30.--LITERARY PROPERTY. M. Wolowski grants that it is just to

recognize the rights of talent (which is not in the least hostile to

equality); but he seriously objects to perpetual and absolute property

in the works of genius, to the profit of the authors' heirs. His main

argument is, that society has a right of collective production over

every creation of the mind. Now, it is precisely this principle of

collective power that I developed in my "Inquiries into Property and

Government," and on which I have established the complete edifice of

a new social organization. M. Wolowski is, as far as I know, the first

jurist who has made a legislative application of this economical law.

Only, while I have extended the principle of collective power to every

sort of product, M. Wolowski, more prudent than it is my nature to be,

confines it to neutral ground. So, that that which I am bold enough

to say of the whole, he is contented to affirm of a part, leaving

the intelligent hearer to fill up the void for himself. However, his

arguments are keen and close. One feels that the professor, finding

himself more at ease with one aspect of property, has given the rein to

his intellect, and is rushing on towards liberty.

1. Absolute literary property would hinder the activity of other men,

and obstruct the development of humanity. It would be the death of

progress; it would be suicide. What would have happened if the

first inventions,--the plough, the level, the saw, &c.,--had been

appropriated?

Such is the first proposition of M. Wolowski.

I reply: Absolute property in land and tools hinders human activity, and

obstructs progress and the free development of man.

What happened in Rome, and in all the ancient nations? What occurred

in the middle ages? What do we see to-day in England, in consequence of

absolute property in the sources of production?

The suicide of humanity.

2. Real and personal property is in harmony with the social interest.

In consequence of literary property, social and individual interests are

perpetually in conflict.

The statement of this proposition contains a rhetorical figure, common

with those who do not enjoy full and complete liberty of speech. This

figure is the _anti-phrasis_ or _contre-verite_. It consists, according

to Dumarsais and the best humanists, in saying one thing while meaning

another. M. Wolowski's proposition, naturally expressed, would read as

follows: "Just as real and personal property is essentially hostile to

society, so, in consequence of literary property, social and individual

interests are perpetually in conflict."

3. M. de Montalembert, in the Chamber of Peers, vehemently protested

against the assimilation of authors to inventors of machinery; an

assimilation which he claimed to be injurious to the former. M. Wolowski

replies, that the rights of authors, without machinery, would be nil;

that, without paper-mills, type foundries, and printing-offices,

there could be no sale of verse and prose; that many a mechanical

invention,--the compass, for instance, the telescope, or the

steam-engine,--is quite as valuable as a book.

Prior to M. Montalembert, M. Charles Comte had laughed at the inference

in favor of mechanical inventions, which logical minds never fail to

draw from the privileges granted to authors. "He," says M. Comte, "who

first conceived and executed the idea of transforming a piece of wood

into a pair of sabots, or an animal's hide into a pair of sandals, would

thereby have acquired an exclusive right to make shoes for the human

race!" Undoubtedly, under the system of property. For, in fact, this

pair of sabots, over which you make so merry, is the creation of the

shoemaker, the work of his genius, the expression of his thought; to him

it is his poem, quite as much as "Le Roi s'amuse," is M. Victor Hugo's

drama. Justice for all alike. If you refuse a patent to a perfecter of

boots, refuse also a privilege to a maker of rhymes.

4. That which gives importance to a book is a fact external to the

author and his work. Without the intelligence of society, without its

development, and a certain community of ideas, passions, and interests

between it and the authors, the works of the latter would be worth

nothing. The exchangeable value of a book is due even more to the SOCIAL

CONDITION than to the talent displayed in it.

Indeed, it seems as if I were copying my own words. This proposition

of M. Wolowski contains a special expression of a general and absolute

idea, one of the strongest and most conclusive against the right of

property. Why do artists, like mechanics, find the means to live?

Because society has made the fine arts, like the rudest industries,

objects of consumption and exchange, governed consequently by all the

laws of commerce and political economy. Now, the first of these laws is

the equipoise of functions; that is, the equality of associates.

5. M. Wolowski indulges in sarcasm against the petitioners for literary

property. "There are authors," he says, "who crave the privileges of

authors, and who for that purpose point out the power of the melodrama.

They speak of the niece of Corneille, begging at the door of a theatre

which the works of her uncle had enriched.... To satisfy the avarice of

literary people, it would be necessary to create literary majorats, and

make a whole code of exceptions."

I like this virtuous irony. But M. Wolowski has by no means exhausted

the difficulties which the question involves. And first, is it just that

MM. Cousin, Guizot, Villemain, Damiron, and company, paid by the State

for delivering lectures, should be paid a second time through the

booksellers?--that I, who have the right to report their lectures,

should not have the right to print them? Is it just that MM. Noel and

Chapsal, overseers of the University, should use their influence in

selling their selections from literature to the youth whose studies they

are instructed to superintend in consideration of a salary? And, if

that is not just, is it not proper to refuse literary property to every

author holding public offices, and receiving pensions or sinecures?

Again, shall the privilege of the author extend to irreligious and

immoral works, calculated only to corrupt the heart, and obscure the

understanding? To grant this privilege is to sanction immorality by law;

to refuse it is to censure the author. And since it is impossible, in

the present imperfect state of society, to prevent all violations of the

moral law, it will be necessary to open a license-office for books as

well as morals. But, then, three-fourths of our literary people will

be obliged to register; and, recognized thenceforth on their own

declaration as PROSTITUTES, they will necessarily belong to the public.

We pay toll to the prostitute; we do not endow her.

Finally, shall plagiarism be classed with forgery? If you reply "Yes,"

you appropriate in advance all the subjects of which books treat; if

you say "No," you leave the whole matter to the decision of the judge.

Except in the case of a clandestine reprint, how will he distinguish

forgery from quotation, imitation, plagiarism, or even coincidence? A

savant spends two years in calculating a table of logarithms to nine

or ten decimals. He prints it. A fortnight after his book is selling

at half-price; it is impossible to tell whether this result is due to

forgery or competition. What shall the court do? In case of doubt, shall

it award the property to the first occupant? As well decide the question

by lot.

These, however, are trifling considerations; but do we see that, in

granting a perpetual privilege to authors and their heirs, we really

strike a fatal blow at their interests? We think to make booksellers

dependent upon authors,--a delusion. The booksellers will unite against

works, and their proprietors. Against works, by refusing to push their

sale, by replacing them with poor imitations, by reproducing them in

a hundred indirect ways; and no one knows how far the science of

plagiarism, and skilful imitation may be carried. Against proprietors.

Are we ignorant of the fact, that a demand for a dozen copies enables a

bookseller to sell a thousand; that with an edition of five hundred he

can supply a kingdom for thirty years? What will the poor authors do in

the presence of this omnipotent union of booksellers? I will tell them

what they will do. They will enter the employ of those whom they now

treat as pirates; and, to secure an advantage, they will become wage

laborers. A fit reward for ignoble avarice, and insatiable pride. [69]

Contradictions of contradictions! "Genius is the great leveller of the

world," cries M. de Lamartine; "then genius should be a proprietor.

Literary property is the fortune of democracy." This unfortunate

poet thinks himself profound when he is only puffed up. His eloquence

consists solely in coupling ideas which clash with each other: ROUND

SQUARE, DARK SUN, FALLEN ANGEL, PRIEST and LOVE, THOUGHT and POETRY,

GUNIUS {???}, and FORTUNE, LEVELING and PROPERTY. Let us tell him, in

reply, that his mind is a dark luminary; that each of his discourses is

a disordered harmony; and that all his successes, whether in verse or

prose, are due to the use of the extraordinary in the treatment of the

most ordinary subjects.

"Le National," in reply to the report of M. Lamartine, endeavors to

prove that literary property is of quite a different nature from landed

property; as if the nature of the right of property depended on the

object to which it is applied, and not on the mode of its exercise and

the condition of its existence. But the main object of "Le National"

is to please a class of proprietors whom an extension of the right of

property vexes: that is why "Le National" opposes literary property.

Will it tell us, once for all, whether it is for equality or against it?

6. OBJECTION.--Property in occupied land passes to the heirs of the

occupant. "Why," say the authors, "should not the work of genius pass

in like manner to the heirs of the man of genius?" M. Wolowski's reply:

"Because the labor of the first occupant is continued by his heirs,

while the heirs of an author neither change nor add to his works. In

landed property, the continuance of labor explains the continuance of

the right."

Yes, when the labor is continued; but if the labor is not continued,

the right ceases. Thus is the right of possession, founded on personal

labor, recognized by M. Wolowski.

M. Wolowski decides in favor of granting to authors property in their

works for a certain number of years, dating from the day of their first

publication.

The succeeding lectures on patents on inventions were no less

instructive, although intermingled with shocking contradictions inserted

with a view to make the useful truths more palatable. The necessity

for brevity compels me to terminate this examination here, not without

regret.

Thus, of two eclectic jurists, who attempt a defence of property, one

is entangled in a set of dogmas without principle or method, and is

constantly talking nonsense; and the other designedly abandons the

cause of property, in order to present under the same name the theory

of individual possession. Was I wrong in claiming that confusion reigned

among legists, and ought I to be legally prosecuted for having said

that their science henceforth stood convicted of falsehood, its glory

eclipsed?

The ordinary resources of the law no longer sufficing, philosophy,

political economy, and the framers of systems have been consulted. All

the oracles appealed to have been discouraging.

The philosophers are no clearer to-day than at the time of the eclectic

efflorescence; nevertheless, through their mystical apothegms, we

can distinguish the words PROGRESS, UNITY, ASSOCIATION, SOLIDARITY,

FRATERNITY, which are certainly not reassuring to proprietors. One of

these philosophers, M. Pierre Leroux, has written two large books, in

which he claims to show by all religious, legislative, and philosophical

systems that, since men are responsible to each other, equality of

conditions is the final law of society. It is true that this philosopher

admits a kind of property; but as he leaves us to imagine what property

would become in presence of equality, we may boldly class him with the

opponents of the right of increase.

I must here declare freely--in order that I may not be suspected of

secret connivance, which is foreign to my nature--that M. Leroux has

my full sympathy. Not that I am a believer in his quasi-Pythagorean

philosophy (upon this subject I should have more than one observation to

submit to him, provided a veteran covered with stripes would not despise

the remarks of a conscript); not that I feel bound to this author by any

special consideration for his opposition to property. In my opinion, M.

Leroux could, and even ought to, state his position more explicitly and

logically. But I like, I admire, in M. Leroux, the antagonist of our

philosophical demigods, the demolisher of usurped reputations, the

pitiless critic of every thing that is respected because of its

antiquity. Such is the reason for my high esteem of M. Leroux; such

would be the principle of the only literary association which, in this

century of coteries, I should care to form. We need men who, like

M. Leroux, call in question social principles,--not to diffuse doubt

concerning them, but to make them doubly sure; men who excite the mind

by bold negations, and make the conscience tremble by doctrines of

annihilation. Where is the man who does not shudder on hearing M. Leroux

exclaim, "There is neither a paradise nor a hell; the wicked will not

be punished, nor the good rewarded. Mortals! cease to hope and fear; you

revolve in a circle of appearances; humanity is an immortal tree, whose

branches, withering one after another, feed with their debris the root

which is always young!" Where is the man who, on hearing this desolate

confession of faith, does not demand with terror, "Is it then true that

I am only an aggregate of elements organized by an unknown force, an

idea realized for a few moments, a form which passes and disappears? Is

it true that my mind is only a harmony, and my soul a vortex? What is

the ego? what is God? what is the sanction of society?"

In former times, M. Leroux would have been regarded as a great culprit,

worthy only (like Vanini) of death and universal execration. To-day, M.

Leroux is fulfilling a mission of salvation, for which, whatever he

may say, he will be rewarded. Like those gloomy invalids who are always

talking of their approaching death, and who faint when the doctor's

opinion confirms their pretence, our materialistic society is agitated

and loses countenance while listening to this startling decree of the

philosopher, "Thou shalt die!" Honor then to M. Leroux, who has revealed

to us the cowardice of the Epicureans; to M. Leroux, who renders new

philosophical solutions necessary! Honor to the anti-eclectic, to the

apostle of equality!

In his work on "Humanity," M. Leroux commences by positing the necessity

of property: "You wish to abolish property; but do you not see that

thereby you would annihilate man and even the name of man?... You wish

to abolish property; but could you live without a body? I will not tell

you that it is necessary to support this body;... I will tell you that

this body is itself a species of property."

In order clearly to understand the doctrine of M. Leroux, it must be

borne in mind that there are three necessary and primitive forms of

society,--communism, property, and that which to-day we properly call

association. M. Leroux rejects in the first place communism, and combats

it with all his might. Man is a personal and free being, and therefore

needs a sphere of independence and individual activity. M. Leroux

emphasizes this in adding: "You wish neither family, nor country, nor

property; therefore no more fathers, no more sons, no more brothers.

Here you are, related to no being in time, and therefore without a name;

here you are, alone in the midst of a billion of men who to-day inhabit

the earth. How do you expect me to distinguish you in space in the midst

of this multitude?"

If man is indistinguishable, he is nothing. Now, he can be

distinguished, individualized, only through a devotion of certain things

to his use,--such as his body, his faculties, and the tools which he

uses. "Hence," says M. Leroux, "the necessity of appropriation;" in

short, property.

But property on what condition? Here M. Leroux, after having condemned

communism, denounces in its turn the right of domain. His whole doctrine

can be summed up in this single proposition,--_Man may be made by

property a slave or a despot by turns_.

That posited, if we ask M. Leroux to tell us under what system of

property man will be neither a slave nor a despot, but free, just, and

a citizen, M. Leroux replies in the third volume of his work on

"Humanity:"--

"There are three ways of destroying man's communion with his fellows and

with the universe:... 1. By separating man in time; 2. by separating him

in space; 3. by dividing the land, or, in general terms, the instruments

of production; by attaching men to things, by subordinating man to

property, by making man a proprietor."

This language, it must be confessed, savors a little too strongly of the

metaphysical heights which the author frequents, and of the school of

M. Cousin. Nevertheless, it can be seen, clearly enough it seems to me,

that M. Leroux opposes the exclusive appropriation of the instruments of

production; only he calls this non-appropriation of the instruments of

production a NEW METHOD of establishing property, while I, in accordance

with all precedent, call it a destruction of property. In fact, without

the appropriation of instruments, property is nothing.

"Hitherto, we have confined ourselves to pointing out and combating the

despotic features of property, by considering property alone. We have

failed to see that the despotism of property is a correlative of the

division of the human race;... that property, instead of being organized

in such a way as to facilitate the unlimited communion of man with his

fellows and with the universe, has been, on the contrary, turned against

this communion."

Let us translate this into commercial phraseology. In order to destroy

despotism and the inequality of conditions, men must cease from

competition and must associate their interests. Let employer and

employed (now enemies and rivals) become associates.

Now, ask any manufacturer, merchant, or capitalist, whether he would

consider himself a proprietor if he were to share his revenue and

profits with this mass of wage-laborers whom it is proposed to make his

associates.

"Family, property, and country are finite things, which ought to be

organized with a view to the infinite. For man is a finite being,

who aspires to the infinite. To him, absolute finiteness is evil. The

infinite is his aim, the indefinite his right."

Few of my readers would understand these hierophantic words, were I to

leave them unexplained. M. Leroux means, by this magnificent formula,

that humanity is a single immense society, which, in its collective

unity, represents the infinite; that every nation, every tribe, every

commune, and every citizen are, in different degrees, fragments or

finite members of the infinite society, the evil in which results

solely from individualism and privilege,--in other words, from the

subordination of the infinite to the finite; finally, that, to attain

humanity's end and aim, each part has a right to an indefinitely

progressive development.

"All the evils which afflict the human race arise from caste. The family

is a blessing; the family caste (the nobility) is an evil. Country is

a blessing; the country caste (supreme, domineering, conquering) is an

evil; property (individual possession) is a blessing; the property

caste (the domain of property of Pothier, Toullier, Troplong, &c.) is an

evil."

Thus, according to M. Leroux, there is property and property,--the one

good, the other bad. Now, as it is proper to call different things by

different names, if we keep the name "property" for the former, we must

call the latter robbery, rapine, brigandage. If, on the contrary, we

reserve the name "property" for the latter, we must designate the former

by the term POSSESSION, or some other equivalent; otherwise we should be

troubled with an unpleasant synonymy.

What a blessing it would be if philosophers, daring for once to say all

that they think, would speak the language of ordinary mortals! Nations

and rulers would derive much greater profit from their lectures, and,

applying the same names to the same ideas, would come, perhaps, to

understand each other. I boldly declare that, in regard to property, I

hold no other opinion than that of M. Leroux; but, if I should adopt the

style of the philosopher, and repeat after him, "Property is a blessing,

but the property caste--the _statu quo_ of property--is an evil," I

should be extolled as a genius by all the bachelors who write for the

reviews. [70] If, on the contrary, I prefer the classic language of Rome

and the civil code, and say accordingly, "Possession is a blessing, but

property is robbery," immediately the aforesaid bachelors raise a hue

and cry against the monster, and the judge threatens me. Oh, the power

of language!

"Le National," on the other hand, has laughed at M. Leroux and his ideas

on property, charging him with TAUTOLOGY and CHILDISHNESS. "Le National"

does not wish to understand. Is it necessary to remind this journal that

it has no right to deride a dogmatic philosopher, because it is without

a doctrine itself? From its foundation, "Le National" has been a nursery

of intriguers and renegades. From time to time it takes care to warn its

readers. Instead of lamenting over all its defections, the democratic

sheet would do better to lay the blame on itself, and confess the

shallowness of its theories. When will this organ of popular interests

and the electoral reform cease to hire sceptics and spread doubt? I will

wager, without going further, that M. Leon Durocher, the critic of M.

Leroux, is an anonymous or pseudonymous editor of some bourgeois, or

even aristocratic, journal.

The economists, questioned in their turn, propose to associate capital

and labor. You know, sir, what that means. If we follow out the

doctrine, we soon find that it ends in an absorption of property, not by

the community, but by a general and indissoluble commandite, so that

the condition of the proprietor would differ from that of the workingman

only in receiving larger wages. This system, with some peculiar

additions and embellishments, is the idea of the phalanstery. But it

is clear that, if inequality of conditions is one of the attributes of

property, it is not the whole of property. That which makes property a

DELIGHTFUL THING, as some philosopher (I know not who) has said, is

the power to dispose at will, not only of one's own goods, but of their

specific nature; to use them at pleasure; to confine and enclose them;

to excommunicate mankind, as M. Pierre Leroux says; in short, to make

such use of them as passion, interest, or even caprice, may suggest.

What is the possession of money, a share in an agricultural or

industrial enterprise, or a government-bond coupon, in comparison with

the infinite charm of being master of one's house and grounds, under

one's vine and fig-tree? "_Beati possidentes_!" says an author quoted by

M. Troplong. Seriously, can that be applied to a man of income, who has

no other possession under the sun than the market, and in his pocket

his money? As well maintain that a trough is a coward. A nice method of

reform! They never cease to condemn the thirst for gold, and the

growing individualism of the century; and yet, most inconceivable

of contradictions, they prepare to turn all kinds of property into

one,--property in coin.

I must say something further of a theory of property lately put forth

with some ado: I mean the theory of M. Considerant.

The Fourierists are not men who examine a doctrine in order to ascertain

whether it conflicts with their system. On the contrary, it is their

custom to exult and sing songs of triumph whenever an adversary passes

without perceiving or noticing them.

These gentlemen want direct refutations, in order that, if they are

beaten, they may have, at least, the selfish consolation of having been

spoken of. Well, let their wish be gratified.

M. Considerant makes the most lofty pretensions to logic. His method

of procedure is always that of MAJOR, MINOR, AND CONCLUSION. He would

willingly write upon his hat, "_Argumentator in barbara_." But M.

Considerant is too intelligent and quick-witted to be a good logician,

as is proved by the fact that he appears to have taken the syllogism for

logic.

The syllogism, as everybody knows who is interested in philosophical

curiosities, is the first and perpetual sophism of the human mind,--the

favorite tool of falsehood, the stumbling-block of science, the advocate

of crime. The syllogism has produced all the evils which the fabulist

so eloquently condemned, and has done nothing good or useful: it is

as devoid of truth as of justice. We might apply to it these words of

Scripture: "_Celui qui met en lui sa confiance, perira_." Consequently,

the best philosophers long since condemned it; so that now none but the

enemies of reason wish to make the syllogism its weapon.

M. Considerant, then, has built his theory of property upon a syllogism.

Would he be disposed to stake the system of Fourier upon his arguments,

as I am ready to risk the whole doctrine of equality upon my refutation

of that system? Such a duel would be quite in keeping with the warlike

and chivalric tastes of M. Considerant, and the public would profit by

it; for, one of the two adversaries falling, no more would be said about

him, and there would be one grumbler less in the world.

The theory of M. Considerant has this remarkable feature, that, in

attempting to satisfy at the same time the claims of both laborers and

proprietors, it infringes alike upon the rights of the former and the

privileges of the latter. In the first place, the author lays it down as

a principle: "1. That the use of the land belongs to each member of the

race; that it is a natural and imprescriptible right, similar in all

respects to the right to the air and the sunshine. 2. That the right

to labor is equally fundamental, natural, and imprescriptible." I have

shown that the recognition of this double right would be the death of

property. I denounce M. Considerant to the proprietors!

But M. Considerant maintains that the right to labor creates the right

of property, and this is the way he reasons:--

Major Premise.--"Every man legitimately possesses the thing which his

labor, his skill,--or, in more general terms, his action,--has created."

To which M. Considerant adds, by way of comment: "Indeed, the land not

having been created by man, it follows from the fundamental principle

of property, that the land, being given to the race in common, can in

no wise be the exclusive and legitimate property of such and such

individuals, who were not the creators of this value."

If I am not mistaken, there is no one to whom this proposition, at first

sight and in its entirety, does not seem utterly irrefutable. Reader,

distrust the syllogism.

First, I observe that the words LEGITIMATELY POSSESSES signify to the

author's mind is _LEGITIMATE PROPRIETOR;_ otherwise the argument, being

intended to prove the legitimacy of property, would have no meaning. I

might here raise the question of the difference between property and

possession, and call upon M. Considerant, before going further, to

define the one and the other; but I pass on.

This first proposition is doubly false. 1. In that it asserts the act

of CREATION to be the only basis of property. 2. In that it regards this

act as sufficient in all cases to authorize the right of property.

And, in the first place, if man may be proprietor of the game which he

does not create, but which he KILLS; of the fruits which he does not

create, but which he GATHERS; of the vegetables which he does not

create, but which he PLANTS; of the animals which he does not create,

but which he REARS,--it is conceivable that men may in like manner

become proprietors of the land which they do not create, but which they

clear and fertilize. The act of creation, then, is not NECESSARY to the

acquisition of the right of property. I say further, that this act alone

is not always sufficient, and I prove it by the second premise of M.

Considerant:--

Minor Premise.--"Suppose that on an isolated island, on the soil of a

nation, or over the whole face of the earth (the extent of the scene of

action does not affect our judgment of the facts), a generation of

human beings devotes itself for the first time to industry, agriculture,

manufactures, &c. This generation, by its labor, intelligence, and

activity, creates products, develops values which did not exist on the

uncultivated land. Is it not perfectly clear that the property of this

industrious generation will stand on a basis of right, if the value

or wealth produced by the activity of all be distributed among the

producers, according to each one's assistance in the creation of the

general wealth? That is unquestionable."

That is quite questionable. For this value or wealth, PRODUCED BY THE

ACTIVITY OF ALL, is by the very fact of its creation COLLECTIVE wealth,

the use of which, like that of the land, may be divided, but which as

property remains UNDIVIDED. And why this undivided ownership? Because

the society which creates is itself indivisible,--a permanent unit,

incapable of reduction to fractions. And it is this unity of society

which makes the land common property, and which, as M. Considerant

says, renders its use imprescriptible in the case of every individual.

Suppose, indeed, that at a given time the soil should be equally

divided; the very next moment this division, if it allowed the right

of property, would become illegitimate. Should there be the slightest

irregularity in the method of transfer, men, members of society,

imprescriptible possessors of the land, might be deprived at one blow of

property, possession, and the means of production. In short, property

in capital is indivisible, and consequently inalienable, not necessarily

when the capital is UNCREATED, but when it is COMMON or COLLECTIVE.

I confirm this theory against M. Considerant, by the third term of his

syllogism:--

Conclusion.--"The results of the labor performed by this generation are

divisible into two classes, between which it is important clearly to

distinguish. The first class includes the products of the soil which

belong to this first generation in its usufructuary capacity, augmented,

improved and refined by its labor and industry. These products consist

either of objects of consumption or instruments of labor. It is clear

that these products are the legitimate property of those who have

created them by their activity.... Second class.--Not only has this

generation created the products just mentioned (objects of consumption

and instruments of labor), but it has also added to the original value

of the soil by cultivation, by the erection of buildings, by all

the labor producing permanent results, which it has performed. This

additional value evidently constitutes a product--a value created by

the activity of the first generation; and if, BY ANY MEANS WHATEVER,

the ownership of this value be distributed among the members of

society equitably,--that is, in proportion to the labor which each

has performed,--each will legitimately possess the portion which he

receives. He may then dispose of this legitimate and private property

as he sees fit,--exchange it, give it away, or transfer it; and no other

individual, or collection of other individuals,--that is, society,--can

lay any claim to these values."

Thus, by the distribution of collective capital, to the use of which

each associate, either in his own right or in right of his authors,

has an imprescriptible and undivided title, there will be in the

phalanstery, as in the France of 1841, the poor and the rich; some men

who, to live in luxury, have only, as Figaro says, to take the

trouble to be born, and others for whom the fortune of life is but an

opportunity for long-continued poverty; idlers with large incomes, and

workers whose fortune is always in the future; some privileged by birth

and caste, and others pariahs whose sole civil and political rights are

THE RIGHT TO LABOR, AND THE RIGHT TO LAND. For we must not be deceived;

in the phalanstery every thing will be as it is to-day, an object of

property,--machines, inventions, thought, books, the products of art,

of agriculture, and of industry; animals, houses, fences, vineyards,

pastures, forests, fields,--every thing, in short, except the

UNCULTIVATED LAND. Now, would you like to know what uncultivated land is

worth, according to the advocates of property? "A square league hardly

suffices for the support of a savage," says M. Charles Comte. Estimating

the wretched subsistence of this savage at three hundred francs

per year, we find that the square league necessary to his life is,

relatively to him, faithfully represented by a rent of fifteen francs.

In France there are twenty-eight thousand square leagues, the total rent

of which, by this estimate, would be four hundred and twenty thousand

francs, which, when divided among nearly thirty-four millions of people,

would give each an INCOME OF A CENTIME AND A QUARTER. That is the new

right which the great genius of Fourier has invented IN BEHALF OF THE

FRENCH PEOPLE, and with which his first disciple hopes to reform the

world. I denounce M. Considerant to the proletariat!

If the theory of M. Considerant would at least really guarantee this

property which he cherishes so jealously, I might pardon him the flaws

in his syllogism, certainly the best one he ever made in his life. But,

no: that which M. Considerant takes for property is only a privilege

of extra pay. In Fourier's system, neither the created capital nor

the increased value of the soil are divided and appropriated in any

effective manner: the instruments of labor, whether created or not,

remain in the hands of the phalanx; the pretended proprietor can touch

only the income. He is permitted neither to realize his share of the

stock, nor to possess it exclusively, nor to administer it, whatever it

be. The cashier throws him his dividend; and then, proprietor, eat the

whole if you can!

The system of Fourier would not suit the proprietors, since it takes

away the most delightful feature of property,--the free disposition of

one's goods. It would please the communists no better, since it involves

unequal conditions. It is repugnant to the friends of free association

and equality, in consequence of its tendency to wipe out human character

and individuality by suppressing possession, family, and country,--the

threefold expression of the human personality.

Of all our active publicists, none seem to me more fertile in resources,

richer in imagination, more luxuriant and varied in style, than M.

Considerant. Nevertheless, I doubt if he will undertake to reestablish

his theory of property. If he has this courage, this is what I would say

to him: "Before writing your reply, consider well your plan of action;

do not scour the country; have recourse to none of your ordinary

expedients; no complaints of civilization; no sarcasms upon equality;

no glorification of the phalanstery. Leave Fourier and the departed in

peace, and endeavor only to re-adjust the pieces of your syllogism. To

this end, you ought, first, to analyze closely each proposition of your

adversary; second, to show the error, either by a direct refutation, or

by proving the converse; third, to oppose argument to argument, so that,

objection and reply meeting face to face, the stronger may break down

the weaker, and shiver it to atoms. By that method only can you boast of

having conquered, and compel me to regard you as an honest reasoner, and

a good artillery-man."

I should have no excuse for tarrying longer with these phalansterian

crotchets, if the obligation which I have imposed upon myself of making

a clean sweep, and the necessity of vindicating my dignity as a writer,

did not prevent me from passing in silence the reproach uttered against

me by a correspondent of "La Phalange." "We have seen but lately," says

this journalist, [71] "that M. Proudhon, enthusiast as he has been for

the science created by Fourier, is, or will be, an enthusiast for any

thing else whatsoever."