THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES
Stage I.--The Gas Attack, April 22-30
Situation at Ypres--The poison gas--The Canadian ordeal--The fight in
the wood of St. Julien--The French recovery--Miracle days--The
glorious Indians--The Northern Territorials--Hard fighting--The net
result--Loss of Hill 60.
It may be remembered that the northern line of the Ypres position,
extending from Steenstraate to Langemarck, with Pilken somewhat to
the south of the centre, had been established and held by the British
during the fighting of October 21, 22, and 23. Later, when the
pressure upon the British to the east and south became excessive, the
French took over this section. The general disposition of the Allies
at the 22nd of April was as follows.
The Belgians still held the flooded Yser Canal up to the
neighbourhood of Bixschoote. There the line was carried on by the
French Eighth Army, now commanded by General Putz in the place of
General d'Urbal. His troops seem to have been all either Colonial or
Territorial, two classes which had frequently shown the utmost
gallantry, but were less likely to meet an unexpected danger with
steadiness than the regular infantry of the line. These formations
held the trenches from Bixschoote on the canal {46} to the
Ypres-Poelcapelle road, two thousand yards east of Langemarck, on the
right. At this point they joined on to Plumer's Fifth Corps, the
Canadian Division, Twenty-eighth and Twenty-seventh British
Divisions, forming a line which passed a mile north of Zonnebeke,
curling round south outside the Polygon Wood to the point where the
Fifth Division of the Second Corps kept their iron grip upon Hill 60.
The average distance from Ypres to all these various lines would be
about five miles. Smith-Dorrien, as commander of the Second Army,
was general warden of the district.
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{47}
[Illustration: Ypres]
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[Sidenote: The coming of the poison gas. April 22.]
Up to the third week of April the enemy opposite the French had
consisted of the Twenty-sixth Corps, with the Fifteenth Corps on the
right, all under the Duke of Würtemberg, whose headquarters were at
Thielt. There were signs, however, of secret concentration which had
not entirely escaped the observation of the Allied aviators, and on
April 20 and 21 the German guns showered shells on Ypres. About 5
P.M. upon Thursday, April 22, a furious artillery bombardment from
Bixschoote to Langemarck began along the French lines, including the
left of the Canadians, and it was reported that the Forty-fifth
French Division was being heavily attacked. At the same time a
phenomenon was observed which would seem to be more in place in the
pages of a romance than in the record of an historian. From the base
of the German trenches over a considerable length there appeared jets
of whitish vapour, which gathered and swirled until they settled into
a definite low cloud-bank, greenish-brown below and yellow above,
where it reflected the rays of the sinking sun. This ominous bank of
vapour, impelled by a northern breeze, drifted {49} swiftly across
the space which separated the two lines. The French troops, staring
over the top of their parapet at this curious screen which ensured
them a temporary relief from fire, were observed suddenly to throw up
their hands, to clutch at their throats, and to fall to the ground in
the agonies of asphyxiation. Many lay where they had fallen, while
their comrades, absolutely helpless against this diabolical agency,
rushed madly out of the mephitic mist and made for the rear,
over-running the lines of trenches behind them. Many of them never
halted until they had reached Ypres, while others rushed westwards
and put the canal between themselves and the enemy. The Germans,
meanwhile, advanced, and took possession of the successive lines of
trenches, tenanted only by the dead garrisons, whose blackened faces,
contorted figures, and lips fringed with the blood and foam from
their bursting lungs, showed the agonies in which they had died.
Some thousands of stupefied prisoners, eight batteries of French
field-guns, and four British 4.7's, which had been placed in a wood
behind the French position, were the trophies won by this disgraceful
victory. The British heavy guns belonged to the Second London
Division, and were not deserted by their gunners until the enemy's
infantry were close upon them, when the strikers were removed from
the breech-blocks and the pieces abandoned. It should be added that
both the young officers present, Lieuts. Sandeman and Hamilton Field,
died beside their guns after the tradition of their corps.
By seven o'clock the French had left the Langemarck district, had
passed over the higher ground about Pilken, and had crossed the canal
towards {50} Brielen. Under the shattering blow which they had
received, a blow particularly demoralising to African troops, with
their fears of magic and the unknown, it was impossible to rally them
effectually until the next day. It is to be remembered in
explanation of this disorganisation that it was the first experience
of these poison tactics, and that the troops engaged received the gas
in a very much more severe form than our own men on the right of
Langemarck. For a time there was a gap five miles broad in the front
of the position of the Allies, and there were many hours during which
there was no substantial force between the Germans and Ypres. They
wasted their time, however, in consolidating their ground, and the
chance of a great coup passed for ever. They had sold their souls as
soldiers, but the Devil's price was a poor one. Had they had a corps
of cavalry ready, and pushed them through the gap, it would have been
the most dangerous moment of the war.
[Sidenote: The Canadian ordeal.]
A portion of the German force, which had passed through the gap left
by the retirement of the French, moved eastwards in an endeavour to
roll up the Canadian line, the flank of which they had turned. Had
they succeeded in doing this the situation would have become most
critical, as they would have been to the rear of the whole of the
Fifth Army Corps. General Alderson, commanding the Canadians, took
instant measures to hold his line. On the exposed flank were the
13th (Royal Highlanders) and 15th (48th Highlanders), both of the 3rd
Brigade. To the right of these were the 8th Canadians and 5th
Canadians in the order named. The attack developed along two-thirds
of a front of five thousand yards, but was most severe upon the left,
where it had become a {51} flank as well as a frontal assault; but in
spite of the sudden and severe nature of the action, the line held
splendidly firm. Any doubt as to the quality of our Canadian
troops--if any such doubt had existed--was set at rest for ever, for
they met the danger with a joyous and disciplined alacrity. General
Turner, who commanded the 3rd Brigade upon the left, extended his men
to such an extent that, while covering his original front, he could
still throw back a line several thousand yards long to the south-west
and so prevent the Germans breaking through. By bending and thinning
his line in this fashion he obviously formed a vulnerable salient
which was furiously attacked by the Germans by shell and rifle fire,
with occasional blasts of their hellish gas, which lost something of
its effectiveness through the direction of the wind. The Canadian
guns, swinging round from north to west, were pouring shrapnel into
the advancing masses at a range of two hundred yards with fuses set
at zero, while the infantry without trenches fired so rapidly and
steadily that the attack recoiled from the severity of the
punishment. The British 118th and 365th Batteries did good work in
holding back this German advance.
Two reserve battalions had been brought up in hot haste from Ypres to
strengthen the left of the line. These were the 16th (Canadian
Scottish) and the 10th Canadians. Their advance was directed against
the wood to the west of St. Julien, in which lay our four guns which,
as already described, had fallen into the hands of the Germans.
Advancing about midnight by the light of the moon, these two brave
regiments, under Colonels Leckie and Boyle, rushed at the wood which
the Germans had already {52} entrenched and carried it at the point
of the bayonet after a furious hand-to-hand struggle. Following at
the heels of the flying Germans, they drove them ever deeper into the
recesses of the wood, where there loomed up under the trees the huge
bulk of the captured guns. For a time they were once again in
British hands, but there was no possible means of removing them, so
that the Canadians had to be content with satisfying themselves that
they were unserviceable. For some time the Canadians held the whole
of the wood, but Colonel Leckie, who was in command, found that there
were Germans on each side of him and no supports. It was clear,
since he was already a thousand yards behind the German line, that he
would be cut off in the morning. With quick decision he withdrew
unmolested through the wood, and occupied the German trenches at the
south end of it. Colonel Boyle lost his life in this very gallant
advance, which may truly be said to have saved the situation, since
it engaged the German attention and gave time for reinforcements to
arrive. The immediate pressing necessity was to give the French time
to re-form, and to make some sort of line between the Canadian left
and the French right. As early as half-past two in the morning,
while the two Canadian regiments were struggling in the wood of St.
Julien, the First Cavalry Division were showing once again the value
of a mobile reserve. De Lisle's horsemen were despatched at full
speed to get across the Canal, so as to act as a support and an
immediate reserve for the French. The 2nd East Yorks from the
Twenty-eighth Division was also sent on the same errand.
[Sidenote: April 23.]
With the dawn it became of most pressing importance {53} to do
something to lessen, if not to fill, the huge gap which yawned
between the left of the Canadians and the canal, like a great open
door five miles wide leading into Ypres. Troops were already
streaming north at the call of Smith-Dorrien from all parts of the
British lines, but the need was quick and pressing. The Canadian 1st
Brigade, which had been in reserve, was thrown into the broad avenue
down which the German army was pouring. The four battalions of
General Mercer's Brigade--the 1st (Ontario), 4th, 2nd, and 3rd
(Toronto)--advanced south of Pilken. Nearer still to St. Julien was
the wood, still fringed by their comrades of the 10th and the 16th,
while to the east of St. Julien the remaining six battalions of
Canadians were facing north-eastwards to hold up the German advance
from that quarter, with their flank turned north-west to prevent the
force from being taken in the rear. Of these six battalions the most
northern was the 13th Royal Canadian Highlanders, and it was on the
unsupported left flank of this regiment that the pressure was most
severe, as the Germans were in the French trenches alongside them,
and raked them with their machine-guns without causing them to leave
their position, which was the pivot of the whole line.
[Sidenote: The crisis.]
Gradually, out of the chaos and confusion, the facts of the situation
began to emerge, and in the early morning of April 23 French saw
clearly how great an emergency he had to meet and what forces he had
with which to meet it. The prospect at first sight was appalling if
it were handled by men who allowed themselves to be appalled. It was
known now that the Germans had not only broken a five-mile gap {54}
in the line and penetrated two miles into it, but that they had taken
Steenstraate, had forced the canal, had taken Lizerne upon the
farther side, and had descended the eastern side as far south as
Boesinghe. At that time it became known, to the great relief of the
British higher command, that the left of the Canadian 1st Brigade,
which had been thrown out, was in touch with six French
battalions--much exhausted by their terrible experience--on the east
bank of the canal, about a mile south-east of Boesinghe. From that
moment the situation began to mend, for it had become clear where the
reinforcements which were now coming to hand should be applied. A
line had been drawn across the gap, and it only remained to stiffen
and to hold it, while taking steps to modify and support the salient
in the St. Julien direction, where a dangerous angle had been created
by the new hasty rearrangement of the Canadian line.
It has been said that a line had been drawn across the gap, but dots
rather than a line would have described the situation more exactly.
Patrols had reached the French, but there was no solid obstacle to a
German advance. This was partially remedied through the sacrifices
of a body of men, who have up to now received the less credit in the
matter because, being a mere chance collection of military atoms,
they had no representative character. No finer proof of soldierly
virtue could be given than the behaviour of these isolated British
regiments which were now pushed up out of their rest camps near
Ypres, many of them wearied from recent fighting, and none of them
heartened by the presence of the comrades and superior officers who
had formed their old brigades. The battalions were the 2nd Buffs,
{55} half of the 3rd Middlesex, the 1st York and Lancasters, the 5th
Royal Lancasters, the 4th Rifle Brigade, the 2nd Cornwalls, the 9th
Royal Scots, and half the 2nd Shropshires. These odd battalions were
placed under the command of Colonel Geddes of the Buffs, and may be
described as Geddes' Detachment. These scattered units, hardly
conscious of each other's presence, were ordered upon April 23 not
only to advance and fill the gap, but actually to attack the German
Army, so as to give the impression of strength, and bring the
assailants to a halt while reinforcements were being hurried to the
Ypres front. These battalions, regardless of fire and gas, marched
straight across country at the Germans, got right up to their line,
and though unable to break it, held them fast in their positions.
The 1st Royal Irish, under Colonel Gloster, had done the same farther
to the eastward. For three days these battalions played their part
in the front line, deliberately sacrificing themselves for the sake
of the army. Colonel Geddes himself, with many senior officers, was
killed, and the losses of some of these stubborn units were so heavy
that it is reported that an observer approached a long row of
prostrate men, whom he took to be the 1st York and Lancaster, only to
find that it was the helpless swathe of their dead and wounded
filling a position from which the survivors had been moved. The
other battalions were in no better case, but their audacity in
attacking at a time when even a defence might seem a desperate
business, had its effect, and held up the bewildered van of the
enemy. It might well be quoted as a classical example of military
bluff. Nearly all these battalions were in reserve to the 27th or
28th Divisions, who were {56} themselves holding a long line in face
of the enemy, and who, by turning their reserves to the West, were
like a bank which transfers money to a neighbour at a time when it
may have to face a run upon its own resources. But the times were
recognised as being desperate, and any risk must be run to keep the
Germans out of Ypres and to hold the pass until further help should
come from the south. It was of course well understood that, swiftly
as our reinforcements could come, the movement of the German troops,
all swirling towards this sudden gap in the dam, would necessarily be
even swifter, since they could anticipate such a situation and we
could not. The remains of these battalions had by the evening of the
23rd dug themselves in on a line which roughly joined up the French
and the Canadians.
In the afternoon of the 23rd those of the French troops who had
escaped the gas attack advanced gallantly to recover some of their
ground, and their movement was shared by the Canadian troops on the
British left wing and by Geddes' detachment. The advance was towards
Pilken, the French being on the left of the Ypres-Pilken road, and
the British on the right. Few troops would have come back to the
battle as quickly as our allies, but these survivors of the
Forty-fifth Division were still rather a collection of brave men than
an organised force. The strain of this difficult advance upon a
victorious enemy fell largely upon the 1st and 4th Battalions of
Mercer's 1st Canadian Brigade. Burchall, of the latter regiment,
with a light cane in his hand, led his men on in a debonair fashion,
which was a reversion to more chivalrous days. He fell, but lived
long enough to see his infantry in occupation of the front German
{57} line of trenches. No further progress could be made, but at
least the advance had for the moment been stayed, and a few hours
gained at a time when every hour was an hour of destiny.
[Sidenote: Canadian gallantry.]
A line had now been formed upon the left, and the Germans had been
held off. But in the salient to the right in the St. Julien section
the situation was becoming ever more serious. The gallant 13th
Canadians (Royal Highlanders) were learning something of what their
French comrades had endured the day before, for in the early dawn the
horrible gases were drifting down upon their lines, while through the
yellow mist of death there came the steady thresh of the German
shells. The ordeal seemed mechanical and inhuman--such an ordeal as
flesh and blood can hardly be expected to bear. Yet with admirable
constancy the 13th and their neighbours, the 15th, held on to their
positions, though the trenches were filled with choking and gasping
men. The German advance was blown back by rifle-fire, even if the
fingers which pulled the triggers were already stiffening in death.
No soldiers in the world could have done more finely than these
volunteers, who combined the dashing American spirit with the cool
endurance of the North. Little did Bernhardi think when he penned
his famous paragraph about our Colonial Militia and their uselessness
upon a European battlefield that a division of those very troops were
destined at a supreme moment to hold up one of the most vital German
movements in the Western campaign.
The French upon the left were not yet in a position to render much
help, so General Alderson, who was in command of this movement, threw
back his left {58} wing and held a line facing westwards with the 4th
Rifle Brigade and a few Zouaves, so as to guard against a German
advance between him and the canal. When the night of the 23rd fell
it ended a day of hard desultory fighting, but the Allies could
congratulate themselves that the general line held in the morning had
been maintained, and even improved.
Reinforcements were urgently needed by the advanced line, so during
the early hours of the morning of April 24 two battalions of the York
and Durham Territorial Brigade--the 4th East Yorkshires and
another--were sent from the west to Ypres to reinforce the weary 13th
Brigade, much reduced by its exertions at Hill 60, which was in
immediate support near Brielen. There was no fighting at this point
during the night, but just about daybreak some of the 2nd Canadian
Brigade upon the right of the British line, who were still holding
their original trenches, were driven out of them by gas, and
compelled to re-form a short distance behind them.
Though the British advance upon the left had gained touch with the
Canadian 3rd Brigade, the latter still formed a salient which was so
exposed that the edge of it, especially the 13th and 15th battalions,
were assailed by infantry from the flank, and even from the rear. To
them it seemed, during the long morning of April 24, as if they were
entirely isolated, and that nothing remained but to sell their lives
dearly. They were circumstances under which less spirited troops
might well have surrendered. So close was the fighting that bayonets
were crossed more than once, Major Norsworthy, of the 13th, among
others, being stabbed in a fierce encounter. Very grim was the
spirit of the Canadians. "Fine {59} men, wonderful fellows,
absolutely calm, and I have never seen such courage," wrote a
Victoria Rifle Territorial, who had himself come fresh from the
heroic carnage of Hill 60. It may be added that, good as the
Canadian infantry was, their artillery was worthy to stand behind it.
It is on record that one Canadian heavy battery, that of Colonel
McGee, was so pre-eminently efficient that it was in demand at any
threatened portion of the line.
It was clear on the morning of April 24 that the advanced angle,
where the French and Canadians had been torn apart, could no longer
be held in face of the tremendous shell-fire which was directed upon
it and the continuous pressure of the infantry attacks. The 3rd
Canadian Brigade fell slowly back upon the village of St. Julien.
This they endeavoured to hold, but a concentrated fire rained upon it
from several sides and the retreat continued. A detachment of the
13th and 14th Canadians were cut off before they could get clear, and
surrounded in the village. Here they held out as long as their
cartridges allowed, but were finally all killed, wounded, and taken.
The prisoners are said to have amounted to 700 men. The remainder of
the heroic and decimated 3rd Brigade rallied to the south of St.
Julien, but their retirement had exposed the flank of the 2nd
Canadian Brigade (Curry's), even as their own flank had been exposed
by the retirement of the French Forty-fifth Division. This 2nd
Brigade flung back its left flank in order to meet the situation, and
successfully held its ground.
[Sidenote: The arrival of reinforcements.]
In doing this they were greatly aided by supports which came from the
rear. This welcome reinforcement consisted of three battalions of
the 84th Brigade, {60} under Colonel Wallace. These three battalions
were ordered to advance about four o'clock in the afternoon, their
instructions being to make straight for Fortuin. Their assault was a
desperate one, since there was inadequate artillery support, and they
had to cross two miles of open ground under a dreadful fire. They
went forward in the open British formation--the 1st Suffolks in the
van, then the 12th London Rangers, and behind them the 1st Monmouths.
Numerous gassed Canadians covered the ground over which they
advanced. The losses were very heavy, several hundred in the
Suffolks alone, but they reached a point within a few hundred yards
of the enemy, where they joined hands with the few Canadians who were
left alive in those trenches. They hailed their advent with cheers.
The whole line lay down at this point, being unable to get farther,
and they were joined at a later date by the 9th Durhams, who came up
on the right. This body, which may be called Wallace's detachment,
remained in this position during the night, and were exposed to
severe attack next day, as will be seen later. So perilous was their
position at the time the 9th Durhams came up that preparations had
been made for destroying all confidential records in view of the
imminent danger of being overwhelmed.
In this and subsequent fighting the reader is likely to complain that
he finds it difficult to follow the movements or order of the troops,
but the same trouble was experienced by the generals at the time. So
broken was the fighting that a regimental officer had units of nine
battalions under him at one moment. The general situations both now
and for the next three days may be taken to be this: that certain
{61} well-defined clumps of British troops--Twenty-eighth Division,
10th Brigade, Canadians, and so forth--are holding back the Germans,
and that odd battalions or even companies are continually pushed in,
in order to fill the varying gaps between these ragged forces and to
save their flanks, so far as possible, from being turned. These odd
battalions coalesced into irregular brigades which are named here
Geddes', Tuson's, or Wallace's detachment, after their senior officer.
[Sidenote: Days of miracle.]
Every hour of this day was an hour of danger, and fresh ground had
been abandoned and heavy losses incurred. None the less it may be
said that on the evening of Saturday, April 24, the worst was over.
From the British point of view it was a war of narrow escapes, and
this surely was among the narrowest. The mystics who saw bands of
bowmen and of knights between the lines during the retreat from Mons
did but give definite shape to the undeniable fact that again and
again the day had been saved when it would appear that the energy,
the numbers, or the engines of the enemy must assure a defeat. On
this occasion the whole front had, from an unforeseen cause, fallen
suddenly out of the defence. Strong forces of the Germans had only
five miles to go in order to cut the great nerve ganglion of Ypres
out of the British system. They were provided with new and deadly
devices of war. They were confronted by no one save a single
division of what they looked upon as raw Colonial Militia, with such
odds and ends of reinforcements as could be suddenly called upon.
And yet of the five miles they could only accomplish two, and now
after days of struggle the shattered tower of the old Cloth Hall in
front of them was as {62} inaccessible as ever. It needs no visions
of over-wrought men to see the doom of God in such episodes as that.
The innocent blood of Belgium for ever clogged the hand of Germany.
Reinforcements were now assembling to the immediate south of St.
Julien. By evening the Northumberland Brigade and the Durham Light
Infantry Brigade--both of the Fiftieth Territorial Division--had
reached Potijze. More experienced, but not more eager, was Hull's
10th Regular Brigade, which had come swiftly from the Armentières
region. All these troops, together with Geddes' detachment and two
battalions of the York and Durham Territorials, were placed under the
hand of General Alderson for the purpose of a strong counter-attack
upon St. Julien. This attack was planned to take place on the
morning of Sunday, April 25. When night fell upon the 24th the front
British line was formed as follows:--
The Twenty-seventh and Twenty-eighth Divisions held their original
trenches facing eastwards. In touch with their left was the 2nd
Canadian Brigade, with one battalion of the 1st Canadian Brigade.
Then came Wallace's detachment with two battalions of the York and
Durham Territorials joining with the remains of the 3rd Canadian
Brigade. Thence Geddes' detachment and the 13th Brigade prolonged
the line, as already described, towards the canal. Behind this
screen the reinforcements gathered for the attack.
[Sidenote: April 25.]
The advance was made at 6.30 in the morning of April 25, General Hull
being in immediate control of the attack. It was made in the first
instance by the 10th Brigade and the 1st Royal Irish from the {63}
82nd Brigade. The remains of the indomitable 3rd Canadian Brigade
kept pace with it upon the right. Little progress was made, however,
and it became clear that there was not weight enough behind the
advance to crush a way through the obstacles in front. Two flank
battalions retired, and the 2nd Seaforths were exposed to a terrible
cross-fire. "We shouted to our officers (what was left of them) to
give the order to charge, knowing in our minds that it was hopeless,
as the smoke was so thick from their gas shells that we could see
nothing on either side of us." Some cavalry was seen, the first for
many days, but was driven off by the machine-gun of the Highlanders.
Finally a brigade of Northumberland Territorials came up to sustain
the hard-pressed line, passing over some two miles of open country
under heavy fire on their advance. It was then nearly mid-day. From
that point onwards the attackers accepted the situation and dug
themselves in at the farthest point which they could reach near the
hamlet of Fortuin, about a mile south of St. Julien.
It will be remembered that Wallace's detachment had upon the day
before already reached this point. They were in a position of
considerable danger, forming a salient in front of the general line.
Together with the 9th Durhams upon their right, they sustained
several German assaults, which they drove back while thrusting wet
rifle rags into their mouths to keep out the drifting gas. From
their right trenches they had the curious experience of seeing
clearly the detraining of the German reserves at Langemarck Station,
and even of observing a speech made by a German general before his
troops hurried from the train into the battle. This advanced line
was held {64} by these troops, not only during the 25th, but for
three more days, until they were finally relieved after suffering
very heavy losses, but having rendered most vital service.
Whilst the British were vainly endeavouring to advance to the north,
a new German attack developed suddenly from the north-east in the
region of Broodseinde, some five miles from St. Julien. This attack
was on a front of eight hundred yards. The trenches attacked were
those of the 84th and 85th Brigades of the Twenty-eighth Division,
and no doubt the Germans held the theory that these would be found to
be denuded or at least fatally weakened, their occupants having been
drafted off to stiffen the Western line. Like so many other German
theories, this particular one proved to be a fallacy. In spite of a
constant shower of poison shells, which suffocated many of the
soldiers, the enemy were vigorously repulsed, the 2nd East Surrey
Regiment getting at one time to hand-to-hand fighting. The few who
were able to reach the trenches remained in them as prisoners. Great
slaughter was caused by a machine-gun of the 3rd Royal Fusiliers
under Lieutenant Mallandain. Still, the movement caused a further
strain upon the resources of the British General, as it was necessary
to send up three battalions to remain in reserve in this quarter in
case of a renewal of the attack. On the other hand, the 11th Brigade
(Hasler), less the 1st East Lancashires, came up from the south to
join the 10th, and Indian troops were known to be upon the way. The
flank of the 85th Brigade was in danger all day, and it was covered
by the great devotion of the 8th Durham Light Infantry to the north
of it. This battalion lost heavily both in killed, {65} wounded, and
prisoners, but it fought with remarkable valour in a very critical
portion of the field. Early in the morning of the 26th the 1st
Hants, on the right of the newly-arrived 11th Brigade, joined up with
the 3rd Royal Fusiliers on the left of the 85th Brigade, and so made
the line complete. Shortly after the arrival of the Hampshires the
enemy charged through the dim dawn with a shout of "Ve vos the Royal
Fusiliers." Wily Hampshire was awake, however, and the trick was a
failure.
Up to the evening of Sunday, April 25, the 2nd Canadian Brigade had
succeeded in holding its original line, which was along a slight
eminence called the Gravenstrafel Ridge. All the regiments had
fought splendidly, but the greatest pressure had been borne by
Colonel Lipsett's 8th Battalion (90th Winnipeg Rifles), who had been
gassed, enfiladed, and bombarded to the last pitch of human
endurance. About five o'clock their trenches were obliterated by the
fury of the German bombardment, and the weary soldiers, who had been
fighting for the best part of four days, fell back towards Wieltje.
That evening a large part of the Canadian Division, which had endured
losses of nearly 50 per cent and established a lasting reputation for
steadfast valour, were moved into reserve, while the Lahore Indian
Division (Keary) came into the fighting line. It is a remarkable
illustration, if one were needed, of the unity of the British Empire
that, as the weary men from Montreal or Manitoba moved from the
field, their place was filled by eager soldiers from the Punjab and
the slopes of the Himalayas.
That evening a fresh French Division, the One Hundred and
Fifty-second, under General de Ligne, {66} came up from the south,
and two others were announced as being on their way, so that a
powerful French offensive was assured for next day upon the further
side of the Canal. De Lisle's First Division of Cavalry continued to
support the French opposite Lizerne, while Kavanagh's Second Division
was dismounted and pushed into the French territorial trenches in
front of Boesinghe. The enemy had come within shelling distance of
Poperinghe, and caused considerable annoyance there, as the town was
crowded with wounded.
Splendid work was done during these days by the motor ambulances,
which on this one evening brought 600 wounded men from under the very
muzzles of the German rifles in front of St. Julien. Several of them
were destroyed by direct hits, but no losses damped their splendid
ardour.
[Sidenote: Glorious advance of the Indians.]
The Lahore Division having now arrived, it was directed to advance on
the left of the British and on the right of the French, along the
general line of the Ypres-Langemarck road. Encouraged by this
reinforcement, and by the thickening line of the French, General
Smith-Dorrien, who had spent several nightmare days, meeting one dire
emergency after another with never-failing coolness and resource,
ordered a general counter-attack for the early afternoon of April 26.
There was no sign yet of any lull in the German activity which would
encourage the hope that they had shot their bolt. On the contrary,
during the whole morning there had been confused and inconclusive
fighting along the whole front, and especially along the
Gravenstrafel Ridge, where the British 10th and 11th Brigades were
now opposing the advance. The 11th Brigade and 85th Brigade {67}
suffered heavily from shell-fire. About two o'clock the
counter-attack was set in motion, all forces co-operating, the
general idea being to drive the enemy back from the line between
Boesinghe on the left and Zonnebeke on the right. Of the French
attack on the east of the Canal one can only say that it kept pace
generally with the British, but on the west of the Canal it was
pushed very strongly in the direction of the village of Lizerne,
where the Germans had established an important bridge-head.
The Indians advanced to the right of the French, with the Jullundur
Brigade upon the right and the Ferozepore Brigade upon the left, the
Sirhind Brigade in reserve. This Indian advance was an
extraordinarily fine one over fifteen hundred yards of open under a
very heavy shell-fire. They had nearly reached the front line of
German trenches, and were making good progress, when before them
there rose once more the ominous green-yellow mist of the poisoners.
A steady north-east wind was blowing, and in a moment the Indians
were encircled by the deadly fumes. It was impossible to get
forward. Many of the men died where they stood. The mephitic cloud
passed slowly over, but the stupefied men were in no immediate
condition to resume their advance. The whole line was brought to a
halt, but the survivors dug themselves in, and were eventually
supported and relieved by the Sirhind Brigade, who, with the help of
the 3rd Sappers and Miners and the 34th Pioneers, consolidated the
front line. General Smith-Dorrien tersely summed up the
characteristics of this advance of the Lahore Division when he said
that it was done "with insufficient artillery preparation, up an open
slope in the face of overwhelming {68} shell, rifle, and machine-gun
fire and clouds of poison gas, but it prevented the German advance
and ensured the safety of Ypres." In this war of great military
deeds there have been few more heroic than this, but it was done at a
terrible cost. Of the 129th Baluchis, only a hundred could be
collected that night, and many regiments were in little better case.
The 1st Manchesters and 1st Connaughts had fought magnificently, but
it cannot be said that there was any difference of gallantry between
Briton and Indian.
[Sidenote: The Northern Territorials. April 26.]
Farther to the eastwards another fine advance had been made by the
Northumberland Brigade of Territorials (Riddell) of the Fiftieth
Division, who had just arrived from England. Some military historian
has remarked that British soldiers never fight better than in their
first battle, and this particular performance, carried out by men
with the home dust still upon their boots, could not have been
improved upon. In this as in other attacks it was well understood
that the object of the operations was rather to bluff the Germans
into suspending their dangerous advance than to actually gain and
permanently hold any of the lost ground. The brigade advanced in
artillery formation which soon broke into open order. The fire, both
from the German guns, which had matters all their own way, and from
their riflemen, was incessant and murderous. The 6th Northumberland
Fusiliers were on the left with the 7th upon the right, the other two
battalions being nominally in second line but actually swarming up
into the gaps. In spite of desperately heavy losses the gallant
Geordies won their way across open fields, with an occasional rest
behind a bank or hedge, until they were on the actual outbuildings of
St. Julien. They held on to the edge {69} of the village for some
time, but they had lost their Brigadier, the gallant Riddell, and a
high proportion of their officers and men. Any support would have
secured their gains, but the 151st Durham Light Infantry Brigade
behind them had their own hard task to perform. The battalions which
had reached the village were compelled to fall back. Shortly after
six in the evening the survivors had dropped back to their own
trenches. Their military career had begun with a repulse, but it was
one which was more glorious than many a facile success.
On their right the Twenty-eighth Division had been severely attacked,
and the pressure was so great that two and a half battalions had to
be sent to their help, thus weakening the British advance to that
extent. Had these battalions been available to help the
Northumbrians, it is possible that their success could have been made
good. The strain upon our overmatched artillery may be indicated by
the fact that on that one afternoon the 366th Battery of the
Twenty-eighth Division fired one thousand seven hundred and forty
rounds. The troops in this section of the battlefield had been flung
into the fight in such stress that it had been very difficult to keep
a line without gaps, and great danger arose from this cause on
several occasions. Thus a gap formed upon the left of the Hampshire
Regiment, the flank of the 11th Brigade, through which the Germans
poured. Another gap formed on the right of the Hampshires between
them and the 3rd Royal Fusiliers of the 85th Brigade. One company of
the 8th Middlesex was practically annihilated in filling this gap,
but by the help of the 8th Durham Light Infantry and other Durham and
Yorkshire Territorials the line was restored. The {70} 2nd
Shropshire Light Infantry also co-operated in this fierce piece of
fighting, their Colonel Bridgford directing the operation.
The Indians upon the left had suffered from the gas attack, but the
French near the Canal had been very badly poisoned. By 3.30 they had
steadied themselves, however, and came forward once again, while the
Indians kept pace with them. The whole net advance of the day upon
this wing did not exceed three hundred yards, but it was effected in
the face of the poison fumes, which might well have excused a
retreat. In the night the front line was consolidated and the
Sirhind reserve brigade brought up to occupy it. It was a day of
heavy losses and uncertain gains, but the one vital fact remained
that, with their artillery, their devil's gas, and their north-east
wind, the Germans were not a yard nearer to that gaunt, tottering
tower which marked the goal of their desire.
[Sidenote: A day of hard fighting. April 27.]
The night of the 26th was spent by the British in reorganising their
line, taking out the troops who were worn to the bone, and
substituting such reserves as could be found. The French had been
unable to get forward on the east of the Canal, but on the west,
where they were farther from the gas, they had made progress, taking
trenches between Boesinghe and Lizerne, and partially occupying the
latter village. In the early afternoon of the 27th our indomitable
Allies renewed their advance upon our left. They were held up by
artillery fire, and finally, about 7 P.M., were driven back by gas
fumes. The Sirhind and Ferozepore Indian Brigades kept pace with the
French upon the right, but made little progress, for the fire was
terrific. The losses of the Sirhind Brigade were {71} very heavy,
but they held their own manfully. The 1st and 4th Gurkhas had only
two officers left unwounded in each battalion. The 4th King's also
made a very fine advance. Four battalions from corps reserve--the
2nd Cornwalls, 2nd West Ridings, 5th King's Own, and 1st York and
Lancaster--were sent up at 3 P.M., under Colonel Tuson, to support
the Indians. The whole of this composite brigade was only one
thousand three hundred rifles, three out of the four battalions
having been with Geddes' decimated force. The advance could not get
forward, but when in the late evening the French recoiled before the
deadly gas, the left of the Sirhind Brigade would have been in the
air but for the deployment of part of Tuson's detachment to cover
their flank. At 9 P.M. the Morocco Brigade of the French Division
came forward once more and the line was re-formed, Tuson's detachment
falling back into support. Once again it was a day of hard fighting,
considerable losses, and inconclusive results, but yet another day
had gone and Ypres was still intact. On the right of the British the
10th and 11th Brigades had more than held their own, and the line of
the Gravenstrafel Ridge was in their hands. Across the Canal also
the French had come on, and the Germans were being slowly but surely
pushed across to the farther side. By the evening of the 28th a
continuation of this movement had entirely cleared the western side,
and on the eastern had brought the French line up to the
neighbourhood of Steenstraate.
[Sidenote: Results.]
At this point the first phase of the second battle of Ypres may be
said to have come to an end, although for the next few days there was
desultory fighting {72} here and there along the French and British
fronts. The net result of the five days' close combat had been that
the Germans had advanced some two miles nearer to Ypres. They had
also captured the four large guns of the London battery, eight
batteries of French field-guns, a number of machine-guns, several
thousand French, and about a thousand British prisoners. The losses
of the Allies had been very heavy, for the troops had fought with the
utmost devotion in the most difficult circumstances. Our casualties
up to the end of the month in this region came to nearly 20,000 men,
and at least 12,000 French would have to be added to represent the
total Allied loss. The single unit which suffered most was the
British 10th Brigade (Hull), consisting of the 1st Warwicks, 2nd
Seaforths, 1st Irish Fusiliers, 2nd Dublin Fusiliers, and 7th Argyll
and Sutherlands. These battalions lost among them no fewer than 63
officers and 2300 men, a very high proportion of their total numbers.
Nearly as high were the losses of the three Canadian brigades, the
first losing 64 officers and 1862 men; the second 71 officers and
1770 men; while the third lost 62 officers and 1771 men. The
Northumbrian Division was also very hard hit, losing 102 officers and
2423 men, just half of the casualties coming from the Northumberland
Infantry Brigade. The Lahore Division had about the same losses as
the Northern Territorials, while the Twenty-seventh and Twenty-eighth
Divisions each lost about 2000. General Hasler, of the 11th Brigade,
General Riddell, of the Northumberlands, Colonel Geddes, of the
Buffs, Colonels Burchall, McHaig, and Boyle, of the 4th, 7th, and
10th Canadians, Colonel Martin, of the 1st King's Own Lancasters,
Colonel {73} Hicks, of the 1st Hants, with many senior regimental
officers, were among the dead. No British or Canadian guns were lost
save the four heavy pieces, which were exposed through the
exceptional circumstance of the gas attack. The saving of all the
Canadian guns was an especially fine achievement, as two-thirds of
the horses were killed, and it was necessary to use the same teams
again and again to get away pieces which were in close contact with
the enemy.
The airmen, too, did great work during this engagement, bombarding
Steenstraate, Langemarck, Poelcapelle, and Paschendaale. In so short
an account of so huge an operation it is difficult to descend to the
individual, but no finer deed could be chronicled in the whole war
than that of Lieutenant Rhodes-Moorhouse, who, having been mortally
wounded in the execution of his duty, none the less steered his
machine home, delivered her at the hangar, and made his report before
losing consciousness for ever.
As to the German losses, they were very considerable. The
Twenty-sixth Corps returned a casualty list of 10,572, and the
Twenty-seventh of 6101. These are great figures when one considers
that it was almost entirely to their rifles that the British had to
trust. There were many other units engaged, and the total could not
have been less than 25,000 killed, wounded, or taken.
In this hard-fought battle the British, if one includes the whole
area of contest, had seven divisions engaged--the Fourth, Fifth,
Twenty-seventh, Twenty-eighth, Fiftieth, Canadian, and Lahore.
Nearly half of these were immobile, however, being fixed to the long
line of eastern trenches. Forty thousand men would be a fair
estimate of those available from first {74} to last to stop the
German advance. It would be absurd to deny that the advantage rested
with the Germans, but still more absurd to talk of the honours of war
in such a connection. By a foul trick they gained a trumpery
advantage at the cost of an eternal slur upon their military
reputation. It was recognised from this time onwards that there was
absolutely nothing at which these people would stick, and that the
idea of military and naval honour or the immemorial customs of
warfare had no meaning for them whatever. The result was to infuse
an extraordinary bitterness into our soldiers, who had seen their
comrades borne past them in the agonies of asphyxiation. The
fighting became sterner and more relentless, whilst the same feeling
was reflected in Great Britain, hardening the resolution with which
the people faced those numerous problems of recruiting, food supply,
and munitions which had to be solved. Truly honesty is the better
policy in war as in peace, for no means could have been contrived by
the wit of man to bring out the full, slow, ponderous strength of the
British Empire so effectively as the long series of German outrages,
each adding a fresh stimulus before the effect of the last was
outworn. Belgium, Louvain, Rheims, Zeppelin raids, Scarborough,
poison-gas, the _Lusitania_, Edith Cavell, Captain Fryatt--these were
the stages which led us on to victory. Had Germany never violated
the Belgian frontier, and had she fought an honest, manly fight from
first to last, the prospect would have been an appalling one for the
Allies. There may have been more criminal wars in history, and there
may have been more foolish policies, but the historian may search the
past in vain for any such combination {75} of crime and folly as the
methods of "frightfulness" by which the Germans endeavoured to carry
out the schemes of aggression which they had planned so long.
[Sidenote: Reorganization.]
The gain of ground by the Germans from north to south in this
engagement necessitated a drawing-in of the line from east to west
over a front of nearly eight miles in order to avoid a dangerous
projecting salient at Zonnebeke. It was hard in cold blood to give
up ground which had been successfully held for so many months, and
which was soaked with the blood of our bravest and best. On the
other hand, if it were not done now, while the Germans were still
stunned by the heavy losses which they had sustained and wearied out
by their exertions, it might be exposed to an attack by fresh troops,
and lead to an indefensible strategic position.
[Sidenote: May 2.]
Upon Sunday, May 2, they made a fresh attack on the north of Ypres
along the front held by the French to the immediate south of Pilken
and along the British left to the east of St. Julien, where the
newly-arrived 12th Brigade (Anley) and the remains of the 10th and
11th were stationed. The 12th Brigade, which came up on May 1,
consisted at that time of the 1st King's Own Lancasters, 2nd
Lancashire Fusiliers, 2nd Essex, 5th South Lancashires (T.F.), 2nd
Monmouths (T.F.), and 2nd Royal Irish. The attack was in the first
instance carried out by means of a huge cloud of gas, which was
ejected under high pressure from the compressed cylinders in their
trenches, and rapidly traversed the narrow space between the lines.
As the troops fell back to avoid asphyxiation they were thickly
sprayed by shrapnel from the German guns. The German infantry {76}
followed on the fringe of their poison cloud, but they brought
themselves into the zone of the British guns, and suffered
considerable losses. Many of the troops in the trenches drew to one
side to avoid the gas, or even, in some cases, notably that of the
7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, waited for the gas to come,
and then charged swiftly through it to reach the stormers upon the
other side, falling upon them with all the concentrated fury that
such murderous tactics could excite. The result was that neither on
the French nor on the British front did the enemy gain any ground.
Two battalions of the 12th Brigade--the 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers and
the 2nd Essex--suffered heavily, many of the men being poisoned. The
Lancashire Fusiliers lost 300 men from this cause, among them the
heroic machine-gunner, Private Lynn, who stood without a respirator
in the thick of the fumes, and beat off a German attack almost
single-handed, at the cost of a death of torture to himself.
It was found that even when the acute poisoning had been avoided, a
great lassitude was produced for some time by the inhalation of the
gas. In the case of Hull's 10th Brigade, which had been practically
living in the fumes for a fortnight, but had a specially bad dose on
May 2, it was found that out of 2500 survivors, only 500 were really
fit for duty. The sufferings of the troops were increased by the use
of gas shells, which were of thin metal with highly-compressed gas
inside. All these fiendish devices were speedily neutralised by
means of respirators, but a full supply had not yet come to hand, nor
had the most efficient type been discovered, so that many of the
Allies were still poisoned.
{77}
[Sidenote: May 3.]
Upon May 3 the enemy renewed his attack upon the 11th Brigade, now
commanded by Brigadier-General Prowse, and the 1st Rifle Brigade,
which was the right flank regiment, was badly mauled, their trenches
being almost cleared of defenders. The 1st Somersets also suffered
heavily. Part of the 1st York and Lancasters and the 5th King's Own
Lancasters were rushed up to the rescue from the supports of the
Twenty-eighth Division. The gallant Colonel of the latter battalion,
Lord Richard Cavendish, was wounded while waving on his men with his
cane and shouting, "Come along, King's Own." At the same time the
German infantry tried to push in between the 11th Brigade on our left
and the 85th on the right, at the salient between the Fourth and
Twenty-eighth Divisions, the extreme north-east corner of the British
lines. The fight was a very desperate one, being strongly supported
by field-guns at short ranges. Three more British battalions--the
2nd Buffs, 3rd Fusiliers, and 2nd East Yorks--were thrown into the
fight, and the advance was stopped. That night the general
retirement took place, effected in many cases from positions within a
few yards of the enemy, and carried out without the loss of a man or
a gun. The retirement was upon the right of the British line, and
mainly affected the Twenty-seventh, and to a less degree the
Twenty-eighth, Divisions. The Fourth Division upon the left or north
did not retire, but was the hinge upon which the others swung.
During the whole of these and subsequent operations the Fourth
Division was splendidly supported by the French artillery, which
continually played upon the attacking Germans.
[Sidenote: Lost of Hill 60.]
Before closing this chapter, dealing with the gas {78} attacks to the
north of Ypres, and beginning the next one, which details the furious
German assault upon the contracted lines of the Fifth Army Corps, it
would be well to interpolate some account of the new development at
Hill 60. This position was a typical one for the German use of gas,
just as the Dardanelles lines would have been for the Allies, had
they condescended to such an atrocity upon a foe who did not
themselves use such a weapon. Where there is room for flexibility of
manoeuvre, and a temporary loss of ground is immaterial, the gas is
at a discount; but where there is a fixed and limited position it is
without respirators practically impossible to hold it against such an
agency. Up to now the fighting at Hill 60 had furnished on both
sides a fine epic of manliness, in which man breasted man in honest
virile combat. Alas, that such a brave story should have so cowardly
an ending! Upon the evening of May 1 the poisoners got to work, and
the familiar greenish gas came stealing out from the German trenches,
eddied and swirled round the base of the hill, and finally submerged
the summit, where the brave men of the Dorsets in the trenches were
strangled by the chlorine as they lay motionless and silent, examples
of a discipline as stern as that of the Roman sentry at Herculaneum.
So dense were the fumes that the Germans could not take possession,
and it was a reinforcement of Devons and Bedfords of the 15th Brigade
who were the first to reach the trenches, where they found the bodies
of their murdered comrades, either fixed already in death or writhing
in the agonies of choking. It is said that the instructions of the
relieving force were to carry up munitions and to carry down the
Dorsets. One officer and {79} 50 men had been killed at once, while
4 officers and 150 men were badly injured, many of them being
permanently incapacitated. The 59th Company of Royal Engineers were
also overwhelmed by the fumes, three officers and many men being
poisoned.
The gas attack upon Hill 60 on May 1 may have been a mere experiment
upon the part of the Germans to see how far they could submerge it,
for it was not followed up by an infantry advance. A more sustained
and more successful attack was made by the same foul means upon May
5. Early in the morning the familiar cloud appeared once more, and
within a few minutes the British position was covered by it. Not
only the hill itself, but a long trench to the north of it was
rendered untenable, and so was another trench two thousand yards
north of Westhoek.
The 2nd West Ridings were holding the front trench at the time, and
suffered horribly from the poison. Mr. Valentine Williams, in his
admirable account of the episode, says: "There appeared staggering
towards the dug-out of the commanding officer of the Duke's in the
rear two figures, an officer and an orderly. The officer was as pale
as death, and when he spoke his voice came hoarsely from his throat.
Beside him his orderly, with unbuttoned coat, his rifle clasped in
his hand, swayed as he stood. The officer said slowly, in his
gasping voice, 'They have gassed the Duke's. I believe I was the
last man to leave the hill. The men are all up there dead. They
were splendid. I thought I ought to come and report.' That officer
was Captain Robins.... They took him and his faithful orderly to
hospital, but the gallant officer died that night." His two
subalterns, Lieut. Miller {80} and another, both remained in the
front trench until they died.
Such was the upshot of the fighting at Hill 60. What with the shells
and what with the mines, very little of the original eminence was
left. The British still held the trenches upon the side while the
Germans held the summit, if such a name could be applied. The
British losses, nearly all from poison, had been considerable in the
affair, and amounted to the greater part of a thousand men, the
Dorsets, Devons, Bedfords, and West Ridings being the regiments which
suffered most heavily. When the historian of the future sums up the
deeds of the war it is probable that he will find nothing more
remarkable than the patient endurance with which the troops faced a
death of torture from the murderous gas in the days when no
protection had yet been afforded them.
One incident of this period may be quoted as showing the peculiar
happenings of modern warfare. The village of Poperinghe was at this
time the chief depot for stores and resting-place for wounded, being
ten miles to the rear of the line. Great surprise and confusion were
caused, therefore, by a sudden fall of immense shells, which came out
of space with no indication whatever as to their origin. They caused
more fright than damage, but were excessively unnerving. From their
measured fall it was clear that they all came from one single gun of
gigantic power behind the far distant German line. To the admirable
aeroplanes was given the task of solving the mystery, and regardless
of gun-fire or hostile craft they quartered the whole country round
until at last, by a combination of luck and skill, they concluded
that a Belgian barn, five miles behind the enemy {81} line and
fifteen from Poperinghe, was the lair of the monster. A large
British gun came stealthily up and lay concealed till dawn when it
opened upon the barn. The third or fourth shell went home, a
magazine exploded, the barn went up, and there was peace henceforth
in Poperinghe.
{82}