POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, 1700-1808
[Sidenote: Overwhelming success of the absolutist ideal.]
The Bourbon kings aimed to complete the long evolution, dating from
centuries before, toward the personal authority of the monarch in a pure
absolutism. This movement had gone farther in other countries, although
the current had set the other way in England. France under Louis XIV, if
not the most extreme example of an absolute government, was certainly
the most influential, and the phrase “I am the state!” attributed to the
great French monarch, was (whether in fact uttered by him or not)
symbolic of his ideal. It was in the atmosphere of the court of
Versailles that Philip V spent his youth, wherefore it was the most
natural thing in the world for him to desire the establishment in Spain
of a system which he had always been accustomed to believe was the only
true method of rule. Even had Philip ever doubted it, Louis XIV took
care to inculcate in him the concept of absolutism. Philip showed on
various occasions that he understood the French ideal of kingship,--as
in his opposition to the calling of the Castilian _Cortes_, his denial
of the right of the _Consejo_ to share in certain governmental
functions, and his habitual employment of such phrases as “for such is
my will” in royal decrees. The same criterion was followed by his
successors. Charles IV ordered certain laws which were inconsistent with
the absolutist ideal to be stricken out of the _Novísima Recopilación_,
or Latest Compilation of the Laws (1805), before he would allow that
code to be published, stating that those acts (which had been
incorporated in the _Nueva Recopilación_ of 1567) were representative of
a time when the weakness of the monarchy had compelled the kings to make
concessions which were inconsistent with their sovereign authority. The
laws referred to concerned the intervention of the _Consejo_ in royal
donations, the obligation of the king to consult with the three estates
of the _Cortes_ in dealing with momentous affairs, and the injunction
that no new taxes should be levied without the grant of a _Cortes_. In
the statement of their ideal the kings met with little opposition, for
this view was generally supported by all classes of society. Men who
were liberal reformers in other ways were rigid in their maintenance of
the principle of absolutism, and the people themselves, not only
Castilians, but others as well, even including the Catalans, were
intensely royalist.
[Sidenote: Democratic manner and philanthropic rule of the Bourbons.]
Nevertheless, the Bourbons were more democratic in their manner than the
less autocratic kings of the House of Austria. It is said that Philip V
was the first to inaugurate the practice of allowing his higher
government officials to be seated while talking business with him,
whereas the Hapsburg custom had been to require them to remain on their
knees. The kings’ advisers now became veritable ministers, with a more
frank participation in government than had been the case with the
secretaries and favorites of the preceding era. Furthermore, the
Bourbons represented the “enlightened despotism,” which had so many
remarkable manifestations in eighteenth century western Europe. In
keeping with this ideal the kings showed marked interest in social,
economic, and intellectual reforms of a philanthropic character, without
yielding an iota of their political prerogative. A great revolution took
place, having a fundamental groundwork of democracy in it (which was to
find expression at a later time in the field of politics), but which was
accomplished wholly from above. The idea might have been expressed:
“Everything _for_ the people, but nothing _by_ them.” The only exception
to this rule was the royal program whereby the popular element gained an
entrance to the _ayuntamientos_, or municipal governing bodies.
[Sidenote: Unimportance of the Cortes and the suppression of democratic
machinery.]
Naturally, all machinery of a democratic character was viewed with
suspicion, and such was the case with the _Cortes_. Only at the
accession of Luis I was a _Cortes_ called to swear in the new king,
although that body was several times asked to acknowledge the princes of
Asturias. The _Cortes_ of Castile was summoned four times by Philip V
and once each by Charles III and Charles IV, but in two of the meetings
under Philip not all of the elements were called, and in the dismissal
of the _Cortes_ of Charles IV it was made apparent that the nobles and
clergy had no necessary inclusion in that body. Furthermore, the
_Cortes_ was called to perform some specific act,--such as the
recognition of the princes above-named, the making and later the
revocation of the so-called Salic law, and the approval of Philip’s
renunciation of his rights to the French throne,--after which it was
dismissed, without having an opportunity to discuss other matters. When
the _Cortes_ of 1789 was retained in session to treat of certain
economic questions, some of the deputies formulated petitions concerning
affairs of government,--whereupon the authorities hastened to bring the
sittings to a close. The _Cortes_ of other regions were equally lacking
in importance. The _Cortes_ of Aragon met once, and that of Valencia not
at all; both were incorporated into the Castilian _Cortes_ in 1709. The
_Cortes_ of Catalonia met twice, but after 1724 it followed the course
already taken in the case of Aragon and Valencia, and the same was true
of the representatives from Majorca. The _Cortes_ of Navarre continued
to meet separately, being called eleven times, but it took no action of
conspicuous importance. Nevertheless, the memory of the former power of
the _Cortes_ was not dead, and many persons saw in its restoration,
possibly with new functions, a means for the reform of the country. In
addition to having rendered the _Cortes_ completely innocuous the kings
took other steps to check popular intervention in national affairs. It
had been the custom for the municipalities to send special commissioners
to the capital to negotiate for them with the crown. This practice
(which reminds one of the colonial agent of American history) was
forbidden by a law of 1715 (repeated in 1804), on the alleged ground of
avoiding unnecessary expense to the towns. A law of 1777 allowed the
sending of special agents, however, for one purpose,--that of witnessing
the births of royal children! Thus did the kings contribute both to the
security and to the glamour of royalty.
[Sidenote: Royal opposition to the entry of the encyclopedist and
revolutionary ideas from France.]
If the Spanish kings were so careful to avoid any diminution in their
authority through the restoration of the former powers of the _Cortes_,
it may well be imagined that they were alarmed over the political ideas
of the French encyclopedists of the later eighteenth century and still
more so over those of the French revolutionaries after 1789. The works
of such French writers as Diderot, Voltaire, Rousseau, Montesquieu, and
Mirabeau, or of the Englishmen Hobbes, Locke, Hume, and others were in
many libraries of Spain, and some of them were translated. The
Encyclopedia itself found its way into the peninsula. High Spanish
officials, like Aranda, maintained correspondence with some of the
French reformers, as did also some of the great Spanish nobles,--for
example, the Duke of Alba with Rousseau, and the Marquis of Miranda with
Voltaire. It was the fashion, too, for Spaniards to get part of their
education in France, or for French professors, French laborers, and,
later, French revolutionary propagandists to cross the Pyrenees. Thus
the new ideas gained a footing in Spain, where they were taken up at
educational institutions, especially at the University of Salamanca, and
by some newspapers (for that type of periodical had begun to appear),
although expressions were naturally somewhat guarded. With the outbreak
of the French Revolution, Floridablanca sent troops to the northern
frontier to prevent the entry of political agitators. The Inquisition
issued edicts against the introduction of prohibited books, and
published a new index in 1790, followed by a supplement in 1805, for the
rationalist ideas of the French reformers were not in accord with those
of the church. The civil authorities took similar action; the
Encyclopedia was barred in 1784, and many other works at other times; in
1792 officials were placed at customs-houses to examine all writings,
whether printed or manuscript; and in 1805 a tribunal of printing
(_Juzgado de Imprenta_) was created, independent of the _Consejo_ and
the Inquisition. These measures failed to prevent the dissemination of
French literature and thought, but were successful in checking any
effective expression of democratic or republican ideals during this
period. While men of influence approved the philanthropic side of the
new ideas, very few of them accepted their political tenets. It was
quite the usual thing for men to say that the contract between monarch
and people was equally binding on both, or to express admiration for the
freedom of thought permitted in England, while they opposed the forming
of deliberative assemblies in Spain, and stood solidly behind the
principle of absolutism. Some of the younger men went completely over to
revolutionary ideas, and in 1795 some republican clubs were discovered,
while many of the inhabitants of Guipúzcoa gave substantial aid to the
French army of invasion in 1794. The reaction came quickly, as a result
of the tyrannical conduct of the French military authorities. Thus the
spirit of democracy in Spain seemed crushed, but it was not in fact
destroyed, as was amply proved a few years later in the radical outburst
of the _Cortes_ of Cádiz.
[Sidenote: Pronounced acceleration of the tendencies toward a
centralized state.]
Side by side with the development of absolutism there had been an effort
on the part of the kings for many centuries to promote the
centralization of political and administrative authority in the state as
represented by the crown, and to bring about uniformity in the law.
These tendencies were accelerated by the Bourbons, whose first
opportunity came as a result of the War of the Spanish Succession, when
Philip V was opposed by many of the non-Castilian parts of Spain. In
1707 the special statutes and privileges of Aragon and Valencia were
abolished and their place taken by the laws and practices of Castile. In
both regions a royally appointed _audiencia_ and captain-general were
set up. This action was not taken for Catalonia until 1716. In that year
it was provided by the so-called decree of the “new plan” (_Nueva
Planta_) that the laws and customs of Castile were to apply in
Catalonia; that the Catalan language was not to be used in the
administration of justice; that an _audiencia_ and captain-general of
royal selection were to serve as the principal governmental agencies of
the region; that Catalonia was to be divided into twelve districts, over
which _corregidores_ named by the king should rule; and that the
twenty-four _regidores_ (councilmen) of the _ayuntamiento_ of Barcelona,
which city had been deprived of its former type of government, should
also be royally appointed. The decree of 1716 did not attempt to
establish complete unification with Castile, however. Many former
Catalan rights continued to exist until the nineteenth century,--such,
for example, as the Catalan system of criminal law and the issue of
Catalan coins. Furthermore, there was no appeal from the decisions of
the _audiencia_ to the central government,--an exceptional case.
Nevertheless, the principles of centralization and unification had been
in the main attained, and later measures tended to secure these ends
still more completely. Philip’s opponents in the War of the Spanish
Succession were persecuted, and the royal ideas were furthered by the
acts of the influential partisans of the king; in 1717 the bishop of
Gerona, Taverner, summoned a provincial council with a view to
“threatening with the wrath of God and the excommunication of the
church” whoever should be unfaithful to Philip V and to ordering
confessors to treat such infidelity as a sin. In Majorca the king placed
an _audiencia_ and a commandant-general, appointing also the local
councillors of Palma and Alcudia, while the _audiencia_ named those of
the other towns. The special privileges of the Basque provinces were
respected in theory, but, without apparent change in the laws, the
central government gradually obtained control through the inspection or
the intervention of ministers of state and the _Consejos_. Much the same
course was followed with Navarre, in which the former agencies of
government were left apparently undisturbed. The policy of
centralization was also manifested in other respects than those of a
purely regional application. Thus exemptions from military service were
limited; the reversion of seigniorial rights to the king was
facilitated; and, in fine, the tendency was to reduce all forms of
jurisdiction, territorial or otherwise, to the king or his
representatives in the central administration. Many regions continued to
have at least the vestiges of their former institutions, but enough was
done so that the Spanish kingdom may fairly be said to have become
unitary for the first time in history.
[Sidenote: Changes in administrative machinery.]
The most notable change in the machinery of government concerned the
development of the secretariats. There got to be five of them,
corresponding to the more important of the _Consejos_ under the _Consejo
de Castilla_, as follows: state (_Estado_); grace and justice (_Gracia y
Justicia_); war and finance (_Guerra y Hacienda_); navy (_Marina_); and
the Indies (_Indias_). There were variations from this arrangement at
different times; for example, the navy and the Indies were often a
single secretariat in the first half century of the era. Gradually it
became the custom to call the secretaries ministers, and these officials
began to absorb the powers formerly confided to the _Consejos_,
presaging the disappearance of the latter and the development of modern
ministries. As already pointed out, they also acquired a greater liberty
and initiative in the performance of their duties, especially in the
reigns of Ferdinand VI and Charles III. It was customary for them to
consult with the king every morning, however. No new _Consejos_, or
councils, were added in this period, and the _Consejo de Aragón_, last
of the councils of the former crown of Aragon, was suppressed in 1707.
Essentially, the _Consejos_ continued to exercise the same functions as
formerly, although losing ground to the rapidly advancing secretaries,
or ministers. The _Consejo de Castilla_ retained its importance,
however, and its president, or governor, was the leading officer of
state. It is to be noted that both the _Consejo_ and the _Cámara_,
despite their retention of the name Castile, dealt with the affairs of
other regions of the peninsula, quite as much as did the councils with
more general names. Except for Navarre, which continued to be a
viceroyalty, the other regions of Spain apart from New Castile (Aragon,
Catalonia, Valencia, Majorca, Granada, Andalusia, Old Castile, Galicia,
Asturias, Extremadura, and the Canary Islands) were placed under
captain-generals or commandant-generals with military and administrative
powers. A number of _audiencias_ were added, until now there were eleven
such bodies (Valladolid, Granada, Galicia, Seville, the Canaries,
Majorca, Valencia, Saragossa, Barcelona, Asturias, and Extremadura),
exercising both civil and judicial functions. In 1718 the institution of
the intendancies was created to take over financial administration in
the various regions, although this reform was not put into effect
definitely until 1749. There were twenty-three intendants, of whom six
were military. Under the captain-generals there were smaller districts
ruled by _corregidores_, most of whom were civilians. The judicial
functions of the _corregidor_ were gradually taken over by _alcaldes
mayores_, who ranked under the _corregidores_, leaving the executive
power in the hands of the latter. In some cases these lesser districts
were ruled over by officials called military governors. The term
“province” was applied to districts of very unequal size. While there
were only eight in the combined realms of Aragon, Navarre, and the
Basque provinces, there were twenty-four in Castile. Charles III planned
to divide Spain into a number of provinces of about the same size, but
did not carry out his idea.
[Sidenote: Increased royal control over the towns and the
democratization of local political machinery.]
While municipal life as a virile factor which might withstand the king
had long since been dead, there was too much local authority still in
existence to please the autocratic Bourbons. Furthermore, abuses in
administration had developed which caused the kings to be
philanthropically desirous of a remedy. To accomplish these ends they
aimed at a more complete subjection of the towns to the royal authority
and the democratization of the _ayuntamientos_. The principal difficulty
in the way of these objectives was the fact that many municipal offices
were held as a perpetual right by specific families, especially in the
case of the _regidores_,--for which state of affairs the kings of the
House of Austria had not infrequently been responsible by their sales of
such privileges. This resulted in an aristocratic control of the
municipalities, with consequent usurpations of land by the rich and the
placing of the burdens of taxation on the poor. Unable to buy up these
hereditary rights the royal government chose to follow what was in
effect a policy of legal confiscation. This was easily accomplished for
Aragon, Catalonia, Valencia, and Majorca; as already pointed out, the
king took advantage of the outcome of the War of the Spanish Succession
to take all of these appointments into his own hands or into those of
the _audiencias_. As for Castile, laws were passed requiring the
approval of the central authorities before an heir to municipal office
could succeed to such an inheritance. As a result the government was
enabled to refuse its assent in a number of cases. Meanwhile, the
_alcaldes_ continued to be appointed by the king or by the lord,
according as they were royal (_realengos_) or seigniorial (_señoríos_)
towns. Even the seigniorial towns were attacked, for a law of 1802
provided with regard to them that the servants or dependents of the lord
could not exercise jurisdiction in his place; that the royal institution
of the _residencia_ was never to be dispensed with; and that the
_alcaldes mayores_ of the large towns must be lawyers who had been
licensed to practice by the royal _consejos_ or _audiencias_. No attempt
was made to disturb the composition of the _ayuntamientos_ of Navarre
and the Basque provinces, although these regions, like the rest of
Spain, were subject to laws of a general character concerning
municipalities. One such general law, in 1751, required all
municipalities to send their accounts annually to the _Cámara de
Castilla_ for inspection, and this was supplemented by a law of 1764,
ordering them to deposit their surplus funds with the royal intendant of
the province. Another decree, dated 1760, assigned the direction of
municipal finance to the _Consejo_. Yet other laws were enacted, the
total effect of which, together with those just mentioned, was to place
the whole question of municipal income and expenditures in royal hands.
The initiative for the democratization of the _ayuntamientos_ came in
the reign of Charles III. In 1766 he created the post of deputy of the
common people (_diputado del común_), which official was empowered to
examine the financial accounts of the towns. These officers, of whom
there were to be two in the smaller towns and four in the larger, were
chosen by a body of men who had previously been elected by the people.
In like manner a popular syndic (_síndico_) was elected who represented
the masses before the _ayuntamiento_, with a right to take part in
deliberations and to propose reforms. At the same time, the office of
_regidor_ was thrown open to plebeians. This law was a blow at the
_caballero_ class of the nobility, which had monopolized the holding of
municipal office. There was much dissatisfaction over the enactment,
and the Basque provinces went so far as to protest. Nevertheless, there
was no outward resistance; the aristocracy of the towns limited itself
to opposing the election of plebeians and to hindering their action in
office.
[Sidenote: Important ministers of the first half century of Bourbon
rule.]
Despite the thoroughgoing nature of the Bourbon absolutism, it is
fitting for the first time to award special credit to the secretaries of
state, or ministers, although the kings were responsible for their
selection as well as for their acts. This was an age of great reformers.
The initiative came from France on the accession of Philip V, and the
first great name is that of a Frenchman, Orry. When he came to Spain, in
1701, he found that the income of the state was about 142,000,000
_reales_ ($8,875,000) while expenditures were 247,000,000 ($15,437,500).
The outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession made the situation
still worse. Yet he displayed such ability that national receipts
actually advanced in course of the war, and were some 160,000,000
($10,000,000) at its end. Amelot, another Frenchman, was an even more
remarkable figure. He coöperated with Orry to increase the revenues, and
reorganized and bettered the administration of the army. The Italian
Alberoni and the Dutchman Ripperdá were less notable as reformers. With
the fall of the latter in 1726 there began an era of great ministers of
Spanish birth. First of these was Patiño, who, though born in Italy, was
of a Galician family. He was especially prominent for his financial
reforms, but was also noteworthy for his measures to develop commerce
and improve the army and navy. In an age when graft was general, and in
a country which has rarely been backward in this particular, Patiño was
able to achieve the distinction of dying poor; his death occurred in
1736. The next notable financial reformer was Campillo, an Asturian who
had been born poor, though of _hidalgo_ rank. More important, however,
was Somodevilla, a Castilian of very humble birth who became Marquis of
Ensenada, by which name he is more generally known. The period of his
power was from 1743 to 1754, and his reforms covered the same matters as
those mentioned above in the case of Patiño, although he was especially
remarkable in his endeavors on behalf of the Spanish navy. His fall in
1754 (as a result of his disagreement with Ferdinand VI with regard to
the treaty with Portugal concerning Sacramento and Paraguay) was
received with rejoicing in England; the English ambassador reported
exultingly that Spain would build no more ships. Ensenada was
responsible, also, for the construction of important public works, and
once suggested the idea of single tax as worthy of trial in Spain.
[Sidenote: Great reformers of the reigns of Charles III and IV.]
The greatest reformers, however, belonged to the reign of Charles III
and the early years of Charles IV. Earlier ministers had increased the
national revenues and cut down expenses, but the deficit had not been
wiped out. One of the great names of both of the above-named reigns was
that of the Count of Aranda, of a distinguished Aragonese noble family.
Aranda was obstinate, brutal in speech, aggressive, and energetic, but a
man of vast information and clear foresight,--as witness his prediction,
in 1775, of the future greatness of the yet unborn United States. Aside
from his connection with Spain’s foreign policies he particularly
distinguished himself while president of the _Consejo de Castilla_ by
the reforms, already referred to, whereby Madrid became a clean and
acceptable city. Yet more famous was José Moñino, son of an
ecclesiastical notary of Murcia, who was ennobled as the Count of
Floridablanca. An honorable man in every sense of the word, just,
intelligent, and solicitous for his friends, he was hot-tempered, and
unbending in his hostility to his opponents. His action made itself felt
in the improvement of the means of communication in the peninsula and in
his economic reforms of a commercial nature, such as the great free
trade decree of 1778, which abandoned certain phases of the narrowly
monopolistic policy which Spain had always followed in her trade with
the colonies. Campomanes was an Asturian and, like Somodevilla, of very
humble birth, but he rose to be, many hold, the greatest of the men who
labored for the social and economic regeneration of Spain in the
eighteenth century. He was also the most representative of his age, for,
in addition to his measures to develop a better system of internal
communications and to foster industry, commerce, and technical popular
education, he was a determined royalist,--the embodiment, therefore, of
the ideal of the enlightened despotism. Like Aranda and Floridablanca he
served for a time under Charles IV, although his greatest work belonged
to the reign of Charles III. Three names deserve mention for the reign
of Charles IV. Jovellanos was an Asturian of an illustrious family. He
distinguished himself by his reforms in finance in conjunction with one
Saavedra, but both were early deprived of their posts, as a result of
the hostility of Godoy. The third name is that of Godoy, who introduced
notable reforms in public instruction and in the organization of the
army and navy,--whatever may be the judgment with regard to his foreign
policy. The names of some of the great ministers of the Indies are also
worthy of record. In addition to Patiño and Ensenada the most noteworthy
were Julián de Arriaga (1750 or 1751-1776) and José de Gálvez
(1776-1787), especially the former. The results, in terms of revenue, of
the activities of the great ministers may serve to give some indication
of the effectiveness of their work. In 1766, receipts exceeded
expenditures by about 133,000,000 _reales_ ($8,312,500). In 1778
revenues amounted to 630,000,000 ($39,375,000); in 1784 to 685,000,000
($42,812,500); and in 1787 to 616,000,000 ($38,500,000). Though annual
expenditures were much less, the government was never able to overcome
the deficit, although the national debt reached its lowest point in the
reign of Charles III. In 1791 revenues were some 800,000,000
($50,000,000), but they fell to a general level of about 600,000,000
($37,500,000) in the years 1793 to 1795, while expenditures, which had
reached 708,000,000 ($44,250,000) in 1793, were 1,030,000,000
($64,375,000) in 1795. Thus the deficit began to increase again, and in
1808 it was over 7,200,000,000 _reales_ ($450,000,000), an enormous sum
as national indebtedness went then.
[Sidenote: Opposition of vested interests to the reforms.]
The efforts made by the great reformers appear the more commendable when
one considers the difficulties they had to overcome. Great changes
always run counter to vested interests, but this was more than usually
the case in Spain.
[Sidenote: Prevalence of graft.]
[Sidenote: Difficulties over questions of etiquette and of
jurisdiction.]
The nobles and the church were the most powerful elements in opposition;
even though their authority was but little, as compared with that of
earlier years, they were still able to hinder the execution of laws
which damaged their interests. Nearly everyone seemed to have an
exemption from taxation, or desired it, but the reformers set themselves
resolutely against that state of affairs. Their success against the
force of vested interests was only fair, for that element was too great
to overcome; the very bureaucracy itself displayed a weakness in this
particular, for it insisted on the maintenance of a custom which had
sprung up that government officials might buy certain articles at a
fixed price, whatever the charge to others. This calls to mind the
overwhelming evil of graft, which it seemed impossible to eliminate;
indeed, high officials were altogether too prone to regard it as a more
or less legitimate perquisite, and did not hesitate to accept large
gifts of money from foreign diplomats. Difficulties over questions of
etiquette, inherent in a centralized bureaucratic government, also stood
in the way of the proper execution of the laws. For example, a serious
dispute arose in 1745 between the bishop of Murcia and the Inquisition,
when the latter claimed that the members of that body should have a
better place in church than others. It was at length decided that they
should not. In 1782 the commandant-general of Majorca complained that
the wives of the _oidores_ of the _audiencia_ had not called on his wife
on the occasion of the king’s birthday. He was sustained, and the
_regente_ (regent, or president) of the _audiencia_ was imprisoned for a
number of months by way of punishment. Several years later the ladies of
Palma complained that the wife of the commandant-general was in the
habit of going out in the street with an armed escort and demanding a
military salute. This time the ladies were upheld, and the escort was
prohibited. These are only a few instances out of thousands, and if
there was so much stir over such trifling matters it can well be
imagined how much more serious the problem was in the case of disputes
between officials as to jurisdiction. Official etiquette is an important
matter in all countries, but Spaniards have always been insistent on
the letter of their rights and very sensitive over the omission of any
act to which their position entitles them. Furthermore, these
controversies carried in their train vast files of papers, of charges,
answers and countercharges, and the evidence of witnesses. These
questions had to be resolved, causing great expenditure in both time and
money. No country was ever more diligent than Spain in the
multiplication of state papers over affairs which ranged from those of
vital importance to the most trivial incidents. The historian may have
cause to rejoice over the existence of so much material, but the nation
suffered,--although it is difficult to see how its contemporary
accumulation could have been avoided in an absolutism like that of the
Spanish Bourbons.
[Sidenote: Improvement of the army and ineffectual attempts at
additional reforms.]
One of the principal objects of the reforms was the rehabilitation of
the army and navy so that Spain might be in a better position in
international affairs. In the army the volunteer system was employed for
a while, but it was effective only in procuring contingents of foreign
mercenaries and in filling the ranks of the royal guard. Gradually the
idea of the draft came into favor, and it was tried several times,
becoming a definitive law in the reign of Charles III. The law of
Charles III provided that one man in every five--hence the term _quinta_
for this institution--should become subject to military service for a
term of eight years. This system was resisted in all parts of the
peninsula, but was allowed to stand, although it proved impossible of
enforcement. Through graft or favor, whether of the local officials
charged with administering the law or of doctors who examined the
individual drawn, practically nobody was required to serve except those
totally lacking in influence. It was customary to seize tramps and petty
criminals and send them instead of the legitimately drafted men. The
government itself adopted the principle of forced levies, or
impressment, of vagabonds and bad characters, but these men proved to be
poor soldiers and deserted frequently. Thus the number of troops was not
great, but in any event it would have been difficult to support more
numerous contingents, owing to the lack of funds; even as matters were
it was customary to grant a four months’ furlough at the season when
crops were gathered. In times of war, rigorous methods were used to get
the needed men, or else they came forward voluntarily, out of
patriotism. The reserve was formed by regional bodies of militia, which
did not draw back when their services were needed in war. At the
beginning of the era it is said that there were 20,000 poorly equipped
soldiers in the Spanish army; in 1737 the total of infantry and cavalry
was 42,920; in 1758 the total of all arms, 108,777. Numbers increased
under Charles III, but declined under Charles IV. In 1808, at the moment
of the outbreak against Napoleon, there were from 136,000 to 147,000 but
only about 100,000 effective troops, and even these were badly armed.
The situation becomes clear in the light of the expense involved; the
army of 1758, in a time of peace, cost some 205,000,000 _reales_
($12,812,500), a saving of 34,000,000 ($2,125,000) over the expenditures
required prior to the enactment of certain reforms by Ferdinand VI. It
will be seen that a considerable portion of the annual revenue was
needed. In this period the hierarchy of officials (from the
captain-generals down through the various grades of generals, colonels,
captains, and lieutenants) and of military units (such as brigades,
regiments, battalions, and companies) was established in, broadly
speaking, the form it has retained ever since. The gun with the bayonet
had now become the principal infantry weapon, and artillery had been
developed to a high point as compared with the previous era. Flags and
uniforms varied; the latter were picturesque, but adapted more to
encouraging the soldier’s morale than to developing his freedom of
action. A number of military schools were founded for the different
branches of the service,--the infantry, cavalry, artillery, and
engineers.
[Sidenote: Birth of a real Spanish navy, but difficulties attending its
improvement.]
The eighteenth century marked the birth of a real Spanish navy. At the
outset, and during the great war which opened the era, there was
virtually none at all, but in 1714 Orry took steps, which were later
furthered by Alberoni, Patiño, and especially by Ensenada, to develop an
effective fleet. In 1761 there were 49 men-of-war (_navíos_), 22
frigates, and a number of smaller ships; in 1788, 64 men-of-war, 53
frigates, and 60 boats of other types, with 50,000 sailors, 20,000
infantry, 3000 artillerymen, and numerous officials of the navy
department. Each war with England during the century resulted in the
destruction of a considerable portion of the fleet, and the battle of
Trafalgar, in 1805, destroyed it as a fighting unit, even though Spain
still had 42 men-of-war, 30 frigates, and 146 other ships in 1806. The
man-of-war was the principal type of vessel employed in this era,
carrying from sixty to a hundred cannon, while the faster sailing
frigate had from thirty to fifty cannon. Many auxiliary
vessels--transports and smaller fighting ships, such as brigs and sloops
of war--were used. The galley went out of service, although one was
built as late as 1794. The Spanish navy suffered from a number of
defects, however, which made it distinctly inferior to the English, or
even to the French. The wood for the masts was fragile and the material
for the sails was of bad quality, while boats were so poorly taken care
of, that they deteriorated rapidly. The provision of food supplies and
effects for the men was faulty, and the men on board, especially the
artillerymen and the infantry, were of very poor calibre. Ensenada
remarked that the Spanish navy of his day was all appearances, without
substance, but set about to the best of his ability to rectify the
situation. He improved shipyards, sent officers of talent abroad to
study the methods employed elsewhere, gave inducements to English
shipbuilders to come to Spain, built shops for the making of rigging and
other equipment needed on ships of war, endeavored to improve the
personnel of Spanish crews, and surrounded himself with the most
competent naval men he could find. Ensenada and the other reformers did
a great deal, but they could not overcome the never-ending difficulties
in the way of obtaining men in sufficient numbers and of suitable
quality for the requirements of the navy. The fishermen of the Spanish
coasts continued to be drafted as sailors, and became less unwilling to
serve than formerly when efforts were made to be punctual in payments of
wages and to protect the families of the mariners. The recruiting of
marine infantry and artillerymen, however, suffered from the same evil
as the raising of the land forces, with one important result, which was
that Spanish cannon were badly served.
[Sidenote: Legislation of the era and the _Novísima recopilación_.]
Naturally, a period so rich in reforms as this was bound to have a great
body of legislation. In Castile this was almost exclusively in the
various forms of royal orders, recording the directions given by the
king and his ministers, and the decisions of the _Consejos_. Thus the
work of the _Nueva Recopilación_ of 1567 got to be out of date, although
five new editions were published in the eighteenth century, with the
addition of some of the recent laws. Finally, a proposal for another
codification was approved, and the compilation was made by Juan de la
Reguera, who brought it out in twelve books, under the title of the
_Novísima recopilación de las leyes de España_ (Newest, or Latest,
Compilation of the Laws of Spain). Reguera claimed to have solved the
problem of the concentration of legal material, but in fact his work
suffered from the same defects as the earlier codes of Montalvo and
Arrieta. His distribution of the laws was faulty, and he failed to
indicate many important acts which were still in force. Furthermore, he
reproduced the ordinance of Alcalá (1348), repeated in the laws of Toro
and the _Nueva Recopilación_, according to which the laws of various
earlier codes, such as the _Fuero Real_, remained in effect in so far as
they had not been repealed by later legislation, and the _Partidas_ was
valid as supplementary law. Thus the old evils of the lack of unity of
the law and lack of clearness subsisted. Nobody could be certain whether
a law was still in effect or not, and it remained the practice to cite
textbooks and the ancient codes of Justinian on the ground that they
might have a bearing as supplementary law, unless there was something
clearly stated to the contrary in the _Novísima Recopilación_. In
Catalonia there was a new codification in 1704, and in Navarre in 1735.
In most of the formerly separate legal jurisdictions, however, the laws
of Castile applied, henceforth, as a result of the changes brought
about, as already mentioned, at the close of the War of the Spanish
Succession.
[Sidenote: Reforms in the Americas and their results.]
It remains to deal with the relations of the crown and the church, to
which the next chapter is devoted, and to allude to the important
reforms in the Americas. Much that was beneficial to the colonies at the
time was achieved, and much else which in fact helped them to be the
better prepared in the approaching combat with the mother country. In
the main, however, the policies of subjection and of the development of
the revenues in the supposed interests of Spain were followed, with the
result that resentments were kept alive and ultimate disaster invited.