POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, 1516-1700
[Sidenote: The establishment of absolutism.]
Two outstanding features marked the history of Spanish political
institutions in the era of the House of Hapsburg, or Austria: the
absolutism of the kings; and the development of a modern bureaucratic
machinery. The Hapsburgs did not introduce absolutism into Spain, but,
rather, succeeded to a system which the efforts of their predecessors,
especially the Catholic Kings, had made possible. Nevertheless, it was
in this period that the kings, aided by greater resources than former
Spanish monarchs had possessed, by the prestige of ruling the most
extensive and powerful dominions in the world, and by the predominantly
royalist ideas of the age, including the theory of divine right, were
able for the first time to direct the affairs of state much as they
chose. To be sure, they were still supposed to respect the laws and to
rule for the good of their subjects, but in practice it was left to them
to interpret their own conduct. Instances have already been given of
Charles I’s infringements of the law,--for example, in his employment of
Flemish favorites. He also introduced a system of personal rule, making
himself the head and centre of all governmental action. It was Philip
II, however, who carried the ideal of personal rule to the greatest
extreme. Suspicion and direct intervention in state affairs were the
basic principles of his government, wherefore he gave no man his full
confidence, but tried to do as much as he could himself. If the methods
of Philip II, the most bureaucratic king in history, often had
unfortunate results,--for example, in the case of preparing the famous
Armada,--those of his successors were far more disastrous. Under Philip
III and Philip IV the royal authority was granted to favorites, while
the power of Charles II had necessarily to be exercised most of the time
by some other than the feeble-minded king himself. Thus these reigns
were a period of continual intriguing by different factions for the
king’s confidence, in order that the victors might rule Spain for their
own enrichment.
[Sidenote: Tendencies toward centralization.]
At first sight it would seem that the kings were not successful in their
policy of centralization. It was hardly to be expected that the
dominions outside the peninsula could be brought under the same system
of law and custom as governed in Castile, and the case was much the same
as regards Portugal when that kingdom was added to the monarchy. With
respect to the rest of the peninsula, however, Olivares expressed what
was at least a desirable ideal, when he wished to bring about an
amalgamation on the Castilian pattern, both in law and in common
sentiment, of the dominions of the crown. Some changes were in fact made
which tended to promote legal unification, but in essentials the ancient
customs of Navarre, Aragon, Catalonia, Valencia, and the Basque
provinces were left undisturbed. It is possible that the merger might
have been attempted with safety at almost any time before 1640, when
Olivares tried it,--quite probably so in the sixteenth century. That it
was not undertaken may have been due to the attention given to foreign
wars, but in any event the autonomy of the non-Castilian kingdoms of the
monarchy was more apparent than real. The nobility and many of the
people were intensely royalist, and even when they were not so in
principle they supported the kings because, like them, they were
profoundly Catholic. Furthermore, the organization representing the old
régime had declined internally to such an extent that it was a mere
shadow of its former self. Centralization had in fact been going on
without process of law, and for that very reason it was easy in the next
period to make it legally effective.
[Sidenote: Submissiveness of the Castilian _Cortes_.]
[Sidenote: Comparative independence of the other _Cortes_.]
Nowhere was the absolutism of the kings more manifest than in their
dealings with the Castilian _Cortes_. The principal functions of this
body had always been to grant or withhold subsidies and to make
petitions, which the kings might, or might not, enact into law. In this
period the deputies were so submissive that they never failed to grant
the required subsidy, despite the exhaustion of the country, while their
petitions received scant attention. Under the circumstances, since the
grant of a subsidy by the representatives of the towns was now the only
reason for calling a _Cortes_, the nobles and the clergy were not always
summoned. Charles I encountered some resistance of the _Cortes_ in the
early part of his reign, but in later years the kings experienced no
serious difficulty. The deputies themselves lost interest, and not
infrequently sold their privilege of attendance to some individual who
might even be a non-resident of the town he was to represent. The kings
procured the right to appoint many of the deputies, or else issued
orders to the towns, directing them how to instruct their delegates, and
also gave pensions to the deputies, thus insuring the expression of
their own will in the meetings of the _Cortes_. It is not strange that
the _Cortes_ was called frequently,--forty-four times down to 1665. In
1665 the function of granting subsidies was given directly to the
towns,--with the result that no _Cortes_ was held in the entire reign of
Charles II. The various other _Cortes_ of the peninsula were more
fortunate than that of Castile. Those of the kingdom of Aragon (Aragon
proper, Catalonia, and Valencia) had always participated more than that
of Castile in legislation, and had been more prone to voice their
grievances. The calling of a _Cortes_ in these regions involved
difficulties, especially in Valencia, where the king was obliged to be
present, in order to constitute a legal meeting. The need for funds was
such, however, that a number of _Cortes_ were summoned,--seventeen in
Aragon, thirteen in Catalonia, fourteen in Valencia, and seventy-three
in Navarre,--but the kings did not obtain a great deal from them. Often
the delegates refused to make a grant, or else gave so little that it
hardly covered the expenses of the king’s journey to the place of
meeting. No effort was made to join these bodies with that of Castile to
form a national _Cortes_; the force of particularism was as yet too
strong to attempt it.
[Sidenote: Subservience of the towns to the royal will.]
Just as in the case of the Castilian _Cortes_, so also in that of the
towns, the absolutism of the kings made itself felt to a marked degree,
for the way had been prepared in previous reigns, and in this instance
the royal authority was equally as noteworthy in Aragon, Catalonia,
Valencia, and Majorca as in Castile. This was brought about principally
through the decline of the towns in political spirit, a movement which
had been going on since the fourteenth century. As a result the
_ayuntamientos_ had usurped the powers which formerly belonged to the
general assembly of citizens, and now their functions became absorbed
more and more by the kings through their officials in the towns, such as
the _corregidores_ and others. So great was the authority of the kings
that they were able to make a profit for the treasury by the sale in
perpetuity of local offices, and when the evils which resulted became
too pronounced they gave orders abolishing all such positions acquired
before 1630. Furthermore, all local legislation of an important
character had to receive the sanction of the _Consejo Real_. Much the
same local officials as in the past administered the affairs of the
municipalities, and the methods of their acquisition of office continued
to be diverse, being in some towns by election, in others by lot, in
still others by inheritance, and in yet others by royal appointment; but
in all of the large royal towns (_realengos_) the king’s authority was
paramount. In fine, local autonomy was virtually dead, although the
forms of the period when the towns were a virile political factor still
persisted. In two classes of municipalities the royal victory was not
complete. One was that of the small villages, where the system of the
medieval _villa_, or _concejo_, obtained, but since these units were of
small consequence the retention of their earlier liberties had little or
no effect on the general situation. The other was that of the
seigniorial towns, most of them in Aragon, Catalonia, and Navarre, where
the struggles of past eras, of the citizens against the lords, were
repeated in this.
[Sidenote: Importance of the bureaucracy.]
With the advance both in royal authority and in the scope and extension
of government it was inevitable that the new bureaucracy, which had made
its appearance in the modern sense under the Catholic Kings, should
increase in the number of its officials and in power until it absorbed a
great part of the functions which the kings themselves had formerly
exercised in person. Aside from the royal secretaries, the
governor-generals (during the absence of the king), regents, and members
of the various administrative groups there were often individuals
without portfolios who exercised great power as private counselors of
the king. Some of the members of the _Consejo Real_ were also prominent
in this extra-official way. The importance of the royal secretaries, of
whom there were always more than one, was notably great in this period.
Whenever one of them became the favorite, the others were nevertheless
retained, grouping themselves around the one who had the ear of the
king. The office of the latter became a universal bureau and secretariat
of state (_Secretaría de Estado y del Despacho Universal_), presiding
over the others.
[Sidenote: Power of the _Consejo Real_.]
Meanwhile, the _Consejo Real_ advanced in power, and new councils were
added. The most notable reform in the _Consejo Real_ was its division in
1608 into four sections, or _salas_, respectively of government
(_Gobierno_), justice (_Justicia_), “fifteen hundred” (_Mil y
quinientos_), and the provinces (_Provincia_). The last three had to do
with affairs of justice, while the _Sala de Gobierno_, the most
important of the four, was supposed to concern itself mainly with
politics and administration. Nevertheless, the variety of functions
which had always characterized the _Consejo_ as a whole applied in like
manner to each of the _salas_. Thus the _Sala de Gobierno_ handled such
widely divergent matters as the extirpation of vice and sin, the
economic development of the country, the decision in cases of conflict
of laws or jurisdictions, cases of recourse of _fuerza_, the cleaning
and improvement of Madrid, questions of peace and war, together with a
great number of others. Moreover, many of its functions were judicial in
character. Important affairs, especially those on which the king
requested advice, were taken up by the _Consejo_ in full (_en
pleno_),--that is, by a joint meeting of the four _salas_. While the
_Consejo_ had been in origin a purely consultive body, it now acquired
the privilege of making suggestions to the king of its own volition and
of indicating its objections to any measures he might have taken. It
was natural that the decisions, or _autos_, of the _Consejo_ should have
great weight, both as affecting matters of justice, and as concerned
government and administration in general, since the _Consejo_ might make
new laws and annul or dispense with old ones, although of course
consulting with the king before publishing its decision. The _autos_ of
the _Consejo_ became, therefore, an important source of legislation, and
in 1552 it was decided that they should have the same force as the laws
of the king himself. Late in the sixteenth century it became customary
to call the _Consejo_ the _Consejo de Castilla_ (Council of Castile), by
which name, henceforth, it was more generally known.
[Sidenote: Importance of the Cámara.]
In like manner other councils were formed (in addition to those dating
from the era of the Catholic Kings) which relieved the monarch of many
of his responsibilities. The most important was the _Consejo de la Real
Cámara_ (Council of the Royal Chamber), more often called the _Cámara de
Castilla_, or simply the _Cámara_. This was founded by Philip II in 1588
to assist him in handling such matters as the kings had always retained
for themselves, apart from the _Consejo Real_, such as questions arising
in connection with the _patronato real_, or royal patronage, of the
church and appointments generally to the various councils, _audiencias_,
and other important posts in Castilian administration. Men of the
highest character were chosen to compose the _Cámara_, and secrecy as to
their discussions was imposed upon them. In 1616 the _Cámara_ advanced a
step further, in that certain affairs--such as pardons for crime,
authorizations for entailing estates in primogeniture, the
naturalization of foreigners, and the removal of civil and political
disabilities from individuals subject to them--were left for it to
resolve without consulting the king. The king still intervened in the
more important matters. Among the new councils of the era were those of
finance (_Hacienda_), war (_Guerra_), and indulgences (_Cruzada_), all
of Castilian origin.
[Sidenote: Expansion of the royal judiciary.]
The expansion of officialdom in the peninsula made its presence felt in
the judiciary as elsewhere. The three judicial _salas_ of the _Consejo
Real_ and in some cases the _Sala de Gobierno_ as well became the
fountain-head of justice, under the king. This was especially true of
the full _Consejo_, which met weekly. This body also named special
judges, such as _visitadores_, both to procure information for the
_Consejo_ and to inspect the tribunals of lower grade. The number of
_audiencias_ was increased until there were five in the peninsula and
one each in Majorca and the Canary Islands, besides a number in the
Americas.[55] Below these was the hierarchy of the lesser officials.
There were still various outstanding jurisdictions, such as those of the
towns, the military orders, the Inquisition, and the church, but one of
the keynotes of the era was the advance of the royal courts at the
expense of the others. The administration of justice left much to be
desired, however. As a result of the wars and civil conflicts and the
general state of misery and lack of discipline, public security was
almost non-existent. Banditry and crime went unsuppressed, and
legislation served for little in the face of the corruption of officials
and the lack of means to make the laws effective.
[Sidenote: Vastness of the royal expenditures.]
Frequent references have already been made to the desperate state of
Spanish finances in the era of the House of Austria and to its
importance as an ultimate factor affecting Spanish dominion in the
Americas. Vast sums were expended for political and military ends, the
only compensations for which were extensions of territory and power and
a satisfaction of the desire for glory, without reflecting themselves in
an increase of public wealth, the well-being of Spaniards, or even in
commercial advantage; on the contrary, economic development was checked
or hindered by the continual wars in which the kings engaged.
Expenditures very greatly increased over what they had been before. It
will be sufficient to explain this if some comment is made on two
noteworthy objects to which state revenues were devoted: the maintenance
of the court; and the cost of the wars. The ordinary expenses of the
royal family jumped under Charles I to about 150,000 ducats ($2,250,000)
a year,--more than ten times the amount required by the Catholic Kings.
To this should be added the vast sums granted to the princes; in 1550
Philip (the later Philip II) received 55,000 ducats (over $800,000) in
the course of four months. The expenditures of the court constantly
increased. In 1562 the ordinary court expenses amounted to 415,000
ducats (well over $6,000,000), and under Philip III they were 1,300,000
(nearly $20,000,000) annually. In addition there were the _fiestas_
(festivities) and royal marriages, on which tremendous sums were
squandered. As for military expenditures the war in Flanders alone
consumed 37,488,565 ducats (nearly $600,000,000) in the space of eleven
years, 1598 to 1609, and other campaigns were costly in proportion,--and
this in spite of the fact that supplies were often not provided and
salaries were left unpaid, leading to tumults on the part of the
soldiery. To gain an adequate idea of the vastness of these sums one
must bear in mind, not only the greater purchasing power of money in
that day and the comparatively small population of the peninsula,
especially the small number of taxpayers, but also the fact that the
resources of the Spanish state then were as little, as compared with
those of the present day, as they were great in comparison with those of
medieval Spain.
[Sidenote: Tremendous increase in taxation in Castile.]
It is no wonder that the people through their representatives in the
_Cortes_ began to ask for peace and the termination of military
adventures, even in the period when victories were frequent; the nobles
also favored an end of the wars,--when the kings endeavored to get them,
too, to grant a subsidy. One result of the greater financial
requirements of the state was an increase in taxation, both in the
collection of the existing taxes at a higher rate, and in the imposition
of new ones. The grants, or _servicios_, of the Castilian _Cortes_ were
frequent and large in amount. In 1538 there appeared the new tax of the
_millones_, so-called because it was calculated in millions of ducats.
This was an excise on articles of prime necessity,--meat, wine, oil, and
vinegar. It was extended soon to powder, lead, sulphur, red ochre,
vermilion, sealing-wax, and playing cards, which together were called
the _siete rentillas_ (seven little rents). Salt, gold, silver, mercury,
and many other materials were the subject of a state monopoly, and to
them were added in the reign of Philip IV the monopoly on tobacco, which
was to prove an exceptionally profitable source of revenue. The _diezmo_
and _cruzada_ (otherwise Bula) continued to be collected from the
church, together with several new rents which were authorized by the
pope. One of these was the _subsidio de galeras_ (subsidy of the
galleys), or _galeras_, so-called because it was theoretically designed
to assist in the expenses of the galleys used in fighting the Moslem
peoples. This was granted in 1561, and consisted of an annual subsidy of
420,000 ducats (over $6,000,000). The _alcabala_ and the various customs
duties were increased. Stamp taxes were extended to new types of
documents. The nobles were required to pay a tax called _lanzas_
(lances) in lieu of military service. Various offices and titles were
made subject to the _media anata_ (half annates), a discount of a half
year’s salary, or rents, in the first year of enjoyment. The
transmission of a title of nobility to one’s heir was also taxed. Vanity
was seized upon as likely to yield a revenue, and money was collected in
return for the privilege of using the word “_Don_” before one’s
Christian name. In like manner illegitimate children were pronounced
legitimate on payment of a specified sum. Other methods were employed to
obtain ready cash which tended ultimately to dry up certain sources of
revenue: the coinage was debased; portions of the government rents were
disposed of; public offices and royal towns were granted in perpetuity;
and the title of _hidalgo_ was sold to many persons, who thereby entered
the non-taxpaying class. Other ways of acquiring funds were made use of,
ranging from the high-handed to the shameless. Under the name of
_donativos_ (gifts) the government resorted to forced loans, or even
trickery, to exact money from the nobles and churchmen; confiscations of
goods for offences against religion and for other delinquencies were
frequently ordered; and most disgusting of all was the _limosna al rey_
(alms for the king), which was collected by gentlemen of the court, each
accompanied by a parish priest and a friar, in a house to house canvass
of the citizens, who were asked to give what they could spare. If the
kings and their favorites thought of the most obvious way to accumulate
funds, economy in expenditures, they at least did not try to put it into
practice; the court _fiestas_ were held, even if the king’s gentlemen
had to beg the money and the nation had to starve.
[Sidenote: Taxes in the other kingdoms.]
The above refers to taxes collected in Castile, but the other dominions
of Spain, peninsula and otherwise, produced considerable amounts for the
state. Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia yielded much less than Castile.
The Low Countries were profitable for a time; Charles I procured 450,000
ducats a year (nearly $7,000,000) at the outset of his reign. Under
Philip II, however, they were the scene of heavy expenditures. The
Americas have often been considered as the principal financial resort of
the Spanish kings, and although this is not certain and may even be
doubtful they did yield vast sums. Prior to the conquest of Mexico the
annual revenues were only some 70,000 ducats (about $1,000,000), but the
conquests of Cortés, followed soon by those of Pizarro in Peru, resulted
in an enormous increase. Under Philip II they amounted annually to about
1,200,000 ($18,000,000) according to some writers, and to as much as
2,000,000 ($30,000,000) in the opinion of others. Castilian taxes were
applied in the new world, together with certain others arising out of
the special circumstances of colonial affairs, such as the royal fifth
on precious metals from the mines and the poll tax collected from the
Indians. Data are not at hand for an accurate estimate of the entire
revenues of Spain, but it seems clear that they increased enormously in
the period. They may have reached their highest point under Philip III,
when it was estimated that they were some 24,000,000 ducats
($360,000,000) a year, of which not more than half reached the Spanish
treasury. An estimate made toward the close of the century gave the
revenues as about 17,750,000 ($270,000,000), of which only a third was
actually available.
[Sidenote: Growth of the national debt.]
Despite these relatively great sums the national debt was a constant
factor, and advanced greatly in amount under Philip II, who is said to
have left a debt of 100,000,000 ducats ($1,500,000,000). This was
reduced in later reigns, but was still 70,000,000 (well over
$1,000,000,000) in 1690,--a huge sum as national debts went then, even
though creditors were frequently scaled down or not paid at all. One of
the important elements in the debt was that of the loans made by
Flemish, German, and Italian bankers, especially those of Genoa. The
frequency with which these loans were sought and the high rate of
interest required have caused Spain to be characterized, with accuracy,
as a mere bridge over which the wealth of the Americas (and, to be sure,
that of the peninsula itself) passed to other nations as interest and
part payment of the nation’s debts. In 1539 this form of indebtedness
amounted to about 1,000,000 ducats ($15,000,000), and in 1560, some
7,000,000 (over $100,000,000). When the Spanish kings were unable to pay
a note that had become due, as much as 33-1/3 per cent might be charged
for its renewal; indeed, the ordinary rate of interest ranged from 15 to
30 per cent. The inability of Philip II to meet his obligations caused
all but the Genoese bankers to refuse him credit, and they joined with
the others when he suspended the payment of interest on their notes.
Unable to get funds in any other way, Philip surrendered to the Genoese,
who exacted as part payment for fresh loans a share in various revenues
of the Spanish state, such as in that of the salt monopoly and in
certain of the taxes collected from the church,--thus belying the
original object for which the latter had been imposed. The _Cortes_,
though it had declined in other respects, was perhaps the most important
organ of public finance. It not only voted subsidies but also collected
them, a function which it had exercised in previous eras. It had charge
of several other taxes as well, such as the productive _alcabala_ and
the _millones_. For these purposes special committees of the _Cortes_
were formed. Nevertheless, the _Consejo de Hacienda_, founded in 1593,
grew rapidly in functions and in power, and by the close of the
seventeenth century is said to have had over 60,000 employes. This vast
number was due in part to the variety in the origin and character of the
various tributes. Without taking into consideration the inevitable
accompaniment of graft, such a horde of officials involved the state in
a heavy cost for the collection and administration of the revenues.
[Sidenote: The Spanish army in the days of its greatness.]
The principal element in the Spanish army was the volunteer soldiery in
the king’s pay. Foreign mercenaries were obtained for stated lengths of
time or for specific campaigns, but Spaniards enlisted for indefinite
service, and thus became the veterans of the army. Military life was
popular during the sixteenth century and the early part of the
seventeenth, and the army abounded in _hidalgos_ and others of yet
higher rank who did not disdain to serve as privates. Later the number
of Spanish recruits grew less, when the state began to fail in its
regularity of payments, and their withdrawal marked the era when defeats
became frequent. Among the noteworthy changes in tactics was the
appearance of the regiment. Firearms had now come into general use, and
cannon were greatly improved, but it was the pikemen of the Spanish
infantry who formed the principal branch of the army until near the
close of the period. Because of the inferiority of their weapons the
troops with firearms were regarded as a mere auxiliary to the pikemen.
Armies were small; 20,000 to 40,000 men was perhaps the usual rule. Even
in the century of Spain’s greatness many lands were left without
garrison, as occurred nearly always in the case of the Americas; one
report of the period of Charles I stated that there was not a port in
the colonies which could resist an attack of three hundred men. The
worst evils in connection with the army were those of bad administration
and a lack of regularity in paying the troops and in remitting funds for
munitions and other supplies. Fraud and graft accounted for a great deal
of the money which the state did apply to the army. These factors
contributed to a lack of military discipline; it was not unusual for
ragged and starving soldiers to beg from door to door, and it is not to
be wondered at that the troops occasionally took the matter of the
collection of their wages into their own hands. It was customary for
women of bad repute to accompany the armies, and it sounds strange today
that one of the military manuals of the time recommended that there
should be eight women, who should be common to all, for every hundred
soldiers. Nevertheless, the Spanish infantry, for more than a century,
enjoyed the reputation of being the most capable military unit in
Europe.
[Sidenote: Naval warfare.]
Despite the frequency of naval warfare and the necessity of maintaining
communications with the Americas, comparatively little attention was
paid to the marine establishment, and properly speaking there was no
official navy in the entire period. The principal method employed to
assemble a fleet was by renting ships, whether from Spaniards or
foreigners. In addition a few were built by the state, or purchased, and
in times of stress merchant vessels were pressed into service, but this
proved ruinous to commerce and ship-building alike. So long as other
powers used the same methods Spain was not greatly handicapped, but with
the development of national navies in England, France, and the
Protestant Netherlands, she was placed at a disadvantage. Nevertheless,
considerable fleets were often assembled. In 1643 a special fleet called
the _Armada de Barlovento_ (fleet of the Barlovento, modern Windward,
Islands) was organized at colonial expense for the defence of the
Americas. It was soon withdrawn,--but the tax remained. The fleet of the
Catalonian deputation was maintained for a while, but disappeared early
in the seventeenth century. There were also a number of private fleets,
engaged principally in reprisals against the Moslems, a kind of piracy.
While privateering of this sort was forbidden by law the kings
frequently granted dispensations which enabled the traffic to be carried
on almost continuously. Greater strictness was employed in the Americas
lest the privateers should fail to resist the temptation to pick up
Spanish merchantmen, but the prohibition there was at length removed,
and the Spanish boats rendered great service against pirates and
national enemies. During the sixteenth century Spanish fleets were
manned by volunteer forces, but this was changed in the seventeenth to
compulsory service of the fishermen of the coasts. The heavier work,
especially the rowing of the galleys, was done by captives in war and by
criminals, who served terms in the galleys rather than in prison. During
most of the period the galley, with three banks of oars, was the
principal type of vessel. In ocean warfare, the _nao_, or light
sailing-vessel, soon came into use, and this was gradually supplanted by
heavier ships, until late in the era there developed the _fragata_, or
frigate, of over two thousand tons, capable of carrying as many as 120
cannon. While the artillery was the principal arm of the fleet, Spanish
tactics were at fault in depending on getting close to the enemy and
boarding him, making a military action out of the combat and paying
little attention to the use of cannon of long range. The same evils
which have been described in connection with the army--graft,
irregularity of payments, and laxity of discipline--obtained also in the
navy; in the expedition of Charles I against Tunis, room on board was
found for four thousand _enamoradas_ (sweethearts!) of the soldiers and
sailors.
[Sidenote: Beginnings of diplomacy.]
In common with other European countries Spain developed a diplomatic
service in this period. The sending of special embassies and the making
of treaties had been customary since ancient times, but the practice of
appointing ministers to reside at foreign courts and that of receiving
those sent from abroad did not begin in Spain until the reign of Charles
I. The initiative had come earlier from the Italian republics. From this
time forward Spanish diplomacy, like that of other countries, took on a
modern form, and ambassadors sent reports about the state of the
countries to which they were accredited, strove to obtain advantages for
Spain, endeavored to check the intrigues of the ambassadors of other
nations, and made treaties. The use of spies as an auxiliary to
ambassadorial work was general. For a time Spanish diplomacy enjoyed a
high reputation for success, but in the later seventeenth century it was
quite overshadowed by the French.
[Sidenote: The _Nueva Recopilación_ and other codes.]
The absolutism of the monarchy, its bureaucratic character, and the
instinct of the _letrados_ for reducing everything to rules and
regulations produced an abundance of legislation, much of which was
exceedingly minute in detail and casual in subject-matter. It was
natural therefore that there should be a desire for a fresh
codification, and this at length took shape in a compilation by
Bartolomé de Arrieta in 1567 of the _Nueva Recopilación_ (New
Compendium, or Compilation), so-called with reference to the code of
Montalvo, its predecessor, of the period of the Catholic Kings. The new
collection, which was for Castile only, filled nine volumes, and
amounted to little more than an elaboration of the _Ordenanzas_ of
Montalvo, with the addition of laws enacted since 1484. It contained the
same defects, omitting many royal orders or petitions of the _Cortes_
which had been granted, neglecting to eliminate obsolete laws, and
failing to correct others whose text contained errors. Furthermore, in
perpetuating the hierarchy of legal sources which had been established
in the _Leyes de Toro_ it failed to distinguish between laws in the
so-called supplementary codes (such as the _Partidas_) which were indeed
supplementary or obsolete and those which had in fact come to be in
force as the principal law. As a result the _Nueva Recopilación_ was
generally discredited, and the Roman law of the _Partidas_, or even of
the code of Justinian, was cited in preference. The force of government
maintained the new code, however, and it ran through four more
editions,--1581, 1592, 1598, and 1640,--and in each case added
legislation since the preceding publication. The zeal for codification
found expression also in Aragon, Catalonia, Vizcaya, and Guipúzcoa,
while the laws with regard to the Americas were gathered together, after
various lesser publications had been made in earlier times, in the
_Recopilación de las Leyes de Indias_, first issued in 1680. The
tendency toward the legal unity of the peninsula was not systematically
striven for by the kings, since the variety in private law did not
greatly affect their political sovereignty. Nevertheless, something was
accomplished along these lines, and within each separate unit a great
deal was effected. Thus, in Castile many of the former privileges which
made for a division into classes and for consequent differences in the
law were done away with, and the same process, though on a smaller
scale, made itself felt in the other kingdoms of the peninsula.
[Sidenote: Underlying discontent of the people over the Spanish
political system.]
The submissiveness of the Spanish peoples under absolute rule has often
been greatly exaggerated. In fact, neither then nor ever since were they
loth to criticise the “_mal gobierno_” (bad government). Evidences are
to be found on every hand of complaints against the bureaucratic
organization which was absorbing a great part of the national wealth
and of dissatisfaction with the system of government by favorites, the
evils of which were only too apparent. Not a few went so far as to
desire a republic. Nevertheless, as a general rule, people favored the
principle of monarchy, and did not object to the reigning house, but
they did desire a reform of the existing régime. The ideal of limited
monarchy found strong support among political thinkers, due in a measure
to the resentment of Catholics over the enforced apostasy of the
subjects of Protestant princes. On this account the _Cortes_ had
numerous defenders, some of whom urged its participation in legislation.
Many treatises also pronounced against such practices as the sale of
public offices or the grant of posts in perpetuity, and against others
which have been described as current in this era. In fine, Spaniards
were well aware of the evils of their political system and, though
patient, were keenly desirous of reform,--despite which, little
attention was paid to their wishes.