ERA OF THE CATHOLIC KINGS, 1479-1517
[Sidenote: Transition from medieval to modern Spain.]
The joint reign of Ferdinand (1479-1516) and Isabella (1474-1504), known
as “the Catholic Kings,” witnessed the substantial fulfilment of the
aims of medieval Hispanic royalty, and at the same time began in
striking fashion that complexity of life and action which characterizes
the modern age. On the one hand the turbulent elements which had for so
long stood for decentralization and disorder as opposed to national
unity and internal peace were done away with or rendered powerless; on
the other, life in its various institutional phases approximated itself
in a considerable degree to that of our own times, and Spain stood forth
from the domestic bickerings which had formerly absorbed her attention
to enter upon the career and status of a world power. The greatest
single event in the period was undoubtedly the discovery of America,
from which came, directly or indirectly, Spain’s principal claims to the
recognition of posterity. Important only in less degree were the
conquest of Granada, the establishment of the Inquisition and the
expulsion from Spain of the non-Catholic elements, and Spain’s entry
into the maelstrom of European politics on a greater scale than ever
before, through the medium of Ferdinand’s intervention in Italy.
Measured by the success attained in their own day the Catholic Kings
prospered in nearly everything they undertook, but the ultimate result,
which could not have been foreseen at the time, was in many respects to
prove disastrous to Spain herself, if, indeed, there were
counter-balancing advantages and a glorious memory. The wealth and
greatness proceeding from the conquest of the Americas were to be
sacrificed in a fruitless attempt to gain a predominant place in
Europe,--which, indeed, Spain might have had, much as England acquired
it, if she had not pursued it so directly and insistently, but had been
willing to devote her attention to her colonies. On the other hand, the
Americas drained Spain of some of her best resources in manhood, while
the Italian wars brought her into the current of the highest European
civilization. These consequences, whatever attitude one may take with
regard to them, did not become manifest until a much later time, but
they had the most pronounced of their impulses, if not in all cases
their origins, in the reign of the Catholic Kings.
[Sidenote: Nature of the union of Castile and Aragon.]
Ferdinand’s accession to the crown of Aragon and the recognition of
Isabella as queen of Castile did not at that time bring about a
political union of the two kingdoms, and resulted in no radical change
in the separate institutions of either. They did mean the establishment
of consistent policies in each (especially in international affairs)
which were to bring about a more effectual union at a later day and
produce the Spanish nation. The first problem of the Catholic Kings was
that of the pacification of their realms. Aragon and Catalonia offered
no serious difficulty, but the violence of the Castilian nobility called
for repression of a vigorous type. Galicia and Andalusia were the
regions where such action was most imperatively needed.
[Sidenote: Overthrow of seigniorial anarchy.]
The real weakness of the seigniorial class is well illustrated by the
case of Galicia. The lawless conduct of the nobility and even of the
high functionaries of the church was traditional, besides which Juana la
Beltraneja had counted with many partisans there. Petty war, the
oppression of individuals and towns (through the medium of illegal
tributes or the collection of those belonging to the kings), and an
almost complete disobedience of royal authority were the rule. Resolved
to do away with such an evil state of affairs the Catholic Kings sent
two delegates there in 1480, the one a soldier, Fernando de Acuña, and
the other a lawyer and member of the _Consejo Real_, Garcí López de
Chinchilla, accompanied by three hundred picked horsemen. Without loss
of time and with praiseworthy energy they proceeded to carry out the
royal will. Forty-six castles were demolished, the tributes which the
nobles had been diverting from the king were collected once more for the
royal treasury, many individuals of greater or less degree (both nobles
and ordinary bandits) were put to death, and others were dominated or
compelled to flee the country. Similar action was taken in Andalusia and
Castile proper, wherefore within a few years the pacification of the
kingdom was achieved; the seemingly hopeless anarchy of the period of
Henry IV had been overcome.
[Sidenote: The conquest of Granada.]
At the same time that the Catholic Kings were engaged in the
establishment of good order in the realm of Castile, they were giving
their attention to another problem which may well be considered as of
domestic import,--the long delayed conquest of Granada. The last years
of the Moslem kingdom epitomized the history of that government during
its more than two centuries of existence, with the important difference
that it was no longer to escape the bitter pill of conquest which its
own weakness and decadent life had long rendered inevitable once a
determined effort should be made. There appeared the figure of the emir,
Abul Hassan, dominated by the passion which his slave girl, Zoraya, had
inspired in him. Other members of his family, notably his brother, El
Zagal (or Al Zagal), and his son, Abu Abdullah, best known as Boabdil,
headed factions which warred with Abul Hassan or with each other.
Meanwhile, the war with Castile, which had broken forth anew in 1481,
was going on, and to the credit of the Moslem warrior as a fighting man
was being sustained, if not with success, at least without great loss of
territory. Ferdinand, to whom treachery was only a fine art of kingship,
availed himself of the internal disorder of Granada to gain advantages
to which his military victories in open combat did not entitle him.
Twice he had Boabdil in his power as a prisoner, and on each occasion
let him go, so that he might cause trouble for El Zagal, who had become
emir, at the same time making promises of peace and of abstention from
conquest which he disloyally failed to observe. Another time, El Zagal
was similarly deceived. By these means, after ten years of war,
Ferdinand was able to enter the Granadine plain and besiege the Moslem
capital, courageously defended by Boabdil and his followers. The
military camp of Santa Fe was founded, and for months the siege went on,
signalized by deeds of valor on both sides. Overcome by hunger the
defenders were at length obliged to capitulate, and on January 2, 1492,
the Castilian troops occupied the Alhambra. Some time later Boabdil and
his household departed for Africa. It is fitting to observe that many of
the legends concerning this prince, notably those which reflect on his
courage and manliness, are without foundation in fact.
[Sidenote: Forced conversion of the Mudéjares of Castile.]
The terms of surrender had included numerous articles providing for the
security of the Moslem population. Virtually they amounted to a promise
that the Mudéjar, or Moslem, element would not be molested in any
respect, whether in Granada or elsewhere in Castile. Such a treaty could
not long be enforced in the face of the religious ardor and intolerance
of the age. The greatest men of the kingdom, and among them the most
notable of all, the archbishop of Toledo, Ximénez de Cisneros, confessor
of the queen, joined in urging a different policy. Pressure began to be
exerted in direct contravention of the treaty to bring about an enforced
conversion of the Mudéjares to Christianity. A Moslem uprising was the
result, and this was seized upon by Ximénez as justifying a complete
disregard, henceforth, of the terms of the capitulation, on the ground
that the Moslems had nullified the treaty by their rebellion,--a
convenient argument which did not enquire into the real causes of the
outbreak. Christianization by force, not without a number of serious
uprisings, now went on at a rapid rate, and was completed by a royal
decree of 1502 which ordered that all Mudéjares in the Castilian domains
should accept Christianity or leave the country. Many took the latter
course, but the greater number remained, Christians in outward
appearance if not so at heart. Officially there were no more Mudéjares
in Castile except slaves. The newly converted element became known,
henceforth, as “Moriscos,” thus attaching them by association of ideas
to their ancient faith, and since their Christianity did not inspire
much confidence they were made subject to the dread Inquisition.
[Sidenote: Castilian activities in northwestern Africa and the Canary
Islands.]
The discovery of America in 1492, together with other factors, directed
Castilian attention to the Canary Islands and northwestern Africa,
bringing the Spanish kingdom into contact and rivalry with the
Portuguese, who had devoted themselves to exploration, conquest, and
colonization in that region for nearly a century. It may suffice here to
say that in successive treaties of 1480, 1494, and 1509 Portugal
recognized Castile’s claim to the Canaries and certain posts in
northwestern Africa. The security of the American route was not the
principal motive of Castilian interest at that time in northwestern
Africa. The wars with Granada and the danger of fresh invasions, coupled
with the crusading zeal which had been aroused against the Moslems, and
aggravated by the activities of North African corsairs, were perhaps the
leading factors affecting the policy of the Catholic Kings. In 1494 the
definitive conquest of the Canary Islands was made, and at the same time
a post was established on the neighboring coast of western Africa to
serve as a centre for the resistance to the Moslems. Meanwhile, private
attacks by Spaniards on North African ports were being made, but it was
not until 1497 that the Catholic Kings formally embarked on that
enterprise. Bent upon checking piracy in that region they took
possession of Melilla, which thenceforth became an important Spanish
post.
[Sidenote: Ferdinand’s European policy.]
While Ferdinand had much to do with the events which have thus far been
discussed, he and his subjects of Aragon and Catalonia were more
interested in other affairs. Ferdinand aimed at nothing less than a
predominant place for Spain in European affairs, to be preceded by the
establishment of Aragonese supremacy in the Mediterranean. The principal
stumbling-block was the power of the French kings. Ferdinand schemed,
therefore, to bring about the isolation and humiliation of France. The
entering wedge came through the French possession of the Catalan regions
of Cerdagne and the Roussillon which had been granted to the king of
France by Juan II. Charles VIII of France consented to restore the two
provinces, but in return exacted Ferdinand’s promise not to interfere
with the former’s designs respecting the kingdom of Naples. Ferdinand
readily agreed in 1493 to aid no enemy of the French king save the pope,
and not to form matrimonial alliances between members of his family and
those of the reigning houses of Austria, England, and Naples. With
Cerdagne and the Roussillon in his possession he proceeded with
characteristic duplicity to disregard the treaty. Marriage alliances
were projected or arranged, some of them to be sure before 1493, not
only with the ruling families of Portugal and Navarre but also with
those of Austria and England. Thus Ferdinand hoped to secure
considerable accessions of territory and to avoid any interference on
the part of the Holy Roman Empire and England, the only outstanding
powers which might be able to hinder his plots against France. It is
perhaps poetic justice that these plans, so cleverly made and executed
at the time, were to have an ultimate result which was quite different
from that which Ferdinand had reason to expect. Untimely deaths rendered
the various Portuguese alliances of no effect; the authorities of
Navarre would have nothing to do with Ferdinand’s proffer; and Spanish
Catherine in England was to figure in the famous divorce from Henry
VIII, precipitating the English Reformation. One marriage was productive
of results, that of Juana, heir of Ferdinand and Isabella, to Philip the
Handsome of Burgundy. Thus the Spanish kings were brought into the line
of the Hapsburg family and of imperial succession, which was to prove
less a boon than a fatality.
[Sidenote: The acquisition of Naples.]
Charles VIII wished to revive the Angevin claim to the Neapolitan
territory held at the time by the illegitimate branch of Alfonso V of
Aragon, related by blood to Ferdinand the Catholic. Alleging that Naples
was a fief of the pope and therefore excepted from the treaty of 1493,
Ferdinand resisted the pretensions of Charles, and formed an alliance
with the pope, the emperor, Venice, and Milan against him. The forces of
the league proving too much for him, Charles was forced in 1497 to
suspend hostilities, whereupon Ferdinand agreed with him in secret to
divide Naples between them, renewing the agreement with Louis XII, who
ascended the French throne in 1498. The division was carried into
effect, but a quarrel sprang up over a certain portion of the territory,
and war broke out. Thanks to the military genius of the great Spanish
leader, Gonzalo de Córdoba, Ferdinand was victorious by the year 1504,
and Naples came under his authority.
[Sidenote: Juana la Loca and Philip the Handsome.]
In the same year, 1504, Isabella the Catholic died, leaving her throne
to her elder daughter, Juana, and in case she should prove unable to
govern to Ferdinand as regent until Juana’s heir should become twenty
years of age. Since Juana had already given evidence of that mental
instability which was to earn for her the soubriquet “La Loca” (the
Crazy), it was the intention of both Isabella and Ferdinand that the
latter should rule, but Philip the Handsome, husband of Juana,
intervened to procure the regency for himself. This was a serious
set-back to the plans of Ferdinand, but fortunately for him there
occurred the unexpected death of Philip in 1506. On the occasion of the
latter’s burial Juana gave such ample proof of her mental unfitness that
it was now clear that Ferdinand would be called in as regent. In 1507 he
was so installed, and he now had the resources of Spain at his back in
the accomplishment of his ambitious designs. Leaving Cardinal Ximénez to
effect conquests in northern Africa and to carry into execution other
Castilian projects Ferdinand once again turned his attention to the
aggrandizement of Aragon in Italy.
[Sidenote: The aggrandizement of Aragon in Italy and the conquest of
Navarre.]
In 1508 Ferdinand joined an alliance of the pope, the emperor, and Louis
XII of France against Venice, whereby he rounded out his Neapolitan
possessions. Seeing that the French were gaining more than he desired he
formed a new alliance, in 1511, with the pope, the emperor, Venice, and
Henry VIII of England against France. The French were defeated and
thrown out of Italy. Meanwhile, Ferdinand had taken advantage of the
French sympathies of the ruler of Navarre and the excommunication of
that king by the pope to overrun Navarre in 1512. The pope sanctioned
the conquest of that part of the kingdom lying south of the Pyrenees,
and it was definitely added to the Spanish domain. The French became
dangerous anew with the accession of the glory-loving, ambitious
Francis I in 1515. Ferdinand hastened to concert a league against him,
into which entered the pope, the emperor, Milan, Florence, the Swiss
states, and England, but war had hardly broken out when in 1516
Ferdinand died. For good or evil he had brought Spain into a leading
place in European affairs. If his methods were questionable they were in
keeping with the practices of his age; he was only worse than his rivals
in that he was more successful.
[Sidenote: The accession of Charles I.]
Juana was still alive, but was utterly incompetent to act as head of the
state. The logic of events and the will of Ferdinand pointed to her
eldest son, Charles of Ghent, as the one to rule Aragon and Navarre and
to act as regent of Castile (during his mother’s life), although he had
not attained to his twentieth year, a condition which had been exacted
by the will of Isabella. Until such time as he could reach Spain, for he
was then in the Low Countries, Cardinal Ximénez served as regent. With
two acts of doubtful propriety Charles I, the later Charles V of the
Empire, began his reign in the peninsula. He sent word to Ximénez,
demanding that he be proclaimed king of Castile, despite the fact that
the queen, his mother, was living. Notwithstanding the opposition of the
_Cortes_ and his own unwillingness Ximénez did as Charles had required.
In 1517 Charles reached Spain, surrounded by a horde of Flemish
courtiers. Foreseeing the difficulties likely to result from this
invasion of foreign favorites Ximénez wrote to Charles, giving him
advice in the matter, and hastening to meet him asked for an interview.
Instead of granting this request Charles sent him a note, thanking him
for his services, and giving him leave to retire to his diocese “to rest
and await the reward of Heaven for his merits.”