strange things at the hands of both of them; the physician saves
any whom he wishes to save, and any whom he wishes to maltreat he
maltreats--cutting or burning them; and at the same time requiring them
to bring him payments, which are a sort of tribute, of which little or
nothing is spent upon the sick man, and the greater part is consumed by
him and his domestics; and the finale is that he receives money from the
relations of the sick man or from some enemy of his, and puts him out of
the way. And the pilots of ships are guilty of numberless evil deeds of
the same kind; they intentionally play false and leave you ashore when
the hour of sailing arrives; or they cause mishaps at sea and cast away
their freight; and are guilty of other rogueries. Now suppose that we,
bearing all this in mind, were to determine, after consideration, that
neither of these arts shall any longer be allowed to exercise absolute
control either over freemen or over slaves, but that we will summon an
assembly either of all the people, or of the rich only, that anybody who
likes, whatever may be his calling, or even if he have no calling, may
offer an opinion either about seamanship or about diseases--whether as
to the manner in which physic or surgical instruments are to be applied
to the patient, or again about the vessels and the nautical implements
which are required in navigation, and how to meet the dangers of
winds and waves which are incidental to the voyage, how to behave when
encountering pirates, and what is to be done with the old-fashioned
galleys, if they have to fight with others of a similar build--and that,
whatever shall be decreed by the multitude on these points, upon
the advice of persons skilled or unskilled, shall be written down on
triangular tablets and columns, or enacted although unwritten to be
national customs; and that in all future time vessels shall be navigated
and remedies administered to the patient after this fashion.
YOUNG SOCRATES: What a strange notion!
STRANGER: Suppose further, that the pilots and physicians are appointed
annually, either out of the rich, or out of the whole people, and that
they are elected by lot; and that after their election they navigate
vessels and heal the sick according to the written rules.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Worse and worse.
STRANGER: But hear what follows:--When the year of office has expired,
the pilot or physician has to come before a court of review, in which
the judges are either selected from the wealthy classes or chosen by lot
out of the whole people; and anybody who pleases may be their accuser,
and may lay to their charge, that during the past year they have not
navigated their vessels or healed their patients according to the letter
of the law and the ancient customs of their ancestors; and if either of
them is condemned, some of the judges must fix what he is to suffer or
pay.
YOUNG SOCRATES: He who is willing to take a command under such
conditions, deserves to suffer any penalty.
STRANGER: Yet once more, we shall have to enact that if any one is
detected enquiring into piloting and navigation, or into health and the
true nature of medicine, or about the winds, or other conditions of the
atmosphere, contrary to the written rules, and has any ingenious notions
about such matters, he is not to be called a pilot or physician, but a
cloudy prating sophist;--further, on the ground that he is a corrupter
of the young, who would persuade them to follow the art of medicine or
piloting in an unlawful manner, and to exercise an arbitrary rule over
their patients or ships, any one who is qualified by law may inform
against him, and indict him in some court, and then if he is found to
be persuading any, whether young or old, to act contrary to the written
law, he is to be punished with the utmost rigour; for no one should
presume to be wiser than the laws; and as touching healing and health
and piloting and navigation, the nature of them is known to all, for
anybody may learn the written laws and the national customs. If such
were the mode of procedure, Socrates, about these sciences and about
generalship, and any branch of hunting, or about painting or imitation
in general, or carpentry, or any sort of handicraft, or husbandry, or
planting, or if we were to see an art of rearing horses, or tending
herds, or divination, or any ministerial service, or draught-playing, or
any science conversant with number, whether simple or square or cube,
or comprising motion,--I say, if all these things were done in this way
according to written regulations, and not according to art, what would
be the result?
YOUNG SOCRATES: All the arts would utterly perish, and could never be
recovered, because enquiry would be unlawful. And human life, which is
bad enough already, would then become utterly unendurable.
STRANGER: But what, if while compelling all these operations to be
regulated by written law, we were to appoint as the guardian of the laws
some one elected by a show of hands, or by lot, and he caring nothing
about the laws, were to act contrary to them from motives of interest
or favour, and without knowledge,--would not this be a still worse evil
than the former?
YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.
STRANGER: To go against the laws, which are based upon long experience,
and the wisdom of counsellors who have graciously recommended them and
persuaded the multitude to pass them, would be a far greater and more
ruinous error than any adherence to written law?
YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.
STRANGER: Therefore, as there is a danger of this, the next best thing
in legislating is not to allow either the individual or the multitude to
break the law in any respect whatever.
YOUNG SOCRATES: True.
STRANGER: The laws would be copies of the true particulars of action as
far as they admit of being written down from the lips of those who have
knowledge?
YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly they would.
STRANGER: And, as we were saying, he who has knowledge and is a true
Statesman, will do many things within his own sphere of action by his
art without regard to the laws, when he is of opinion that something
other than that which he has written down and enjoined to be observed
during his absence would be better.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, we said so.
STRANGER: And any individual or any number of men, having fixed laws, in
acting contrary to them with a view to something better, would only be
acting, as far as they are able, like the true Statesman?
YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.
STRANGER: If they had no knowledge of what they were doing, they would
imitate the truth, and they would always imitate ill; but if they had
knowledge, the imitation would be the perfect truth, and an imitation no
longer.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Quite true.
STRANGER: And the principle that no great number of men are able to
acquire a knowledge of any art has been already admitted by us.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, it has.
STRANGER: Then the royal or political art, if there be such an art, will
never be attained either by the wealthy or by the other mob.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Impossible.
STRANGER: Then the nearest approach which these lower forms of
government can ever make to the true government of the one scientific
ruler, is to do nothing contrary to their own written laws and national
customs.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good.
STRANGER: When the rich imitate the true form, such a government is
called aristocracy; and when they are regardless of the laws, oligarchy.
YOUNG SOCRATES: True.
STRANGER: Or again, when an individual rules according to law in
imitation of him who knows, we call him a king; and if he rules
according to law, we give him the same name, whether he rules with
opinion or with knowledge.
YOUNG SOCRATES: To be sure.
STRANGER: And when an individual truly possessing knowledge rules, his
name will surely be the same--he will be called a king; and thus the
five names of governments, as they are now reckoned, become one.
YOUNG SOCRATES: That is true.
STRANGER: And when an individual ruler governs neither by law nor by
custom, but following in the steps of the true man of science pretends
that he can only act for the best by violating the laws, while in
reality appetite and ignorance are the motives of the imitation, may not
such an one be called a tyrant?
YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.
STRANGER: And this we believe to be the origin of the tyrant and the
king, of oligarchies, and aristocracies, and democracies,--because men
are offended at the one monarch, and can never be made to believe that
any one can be worthy of such authority, or is able and willing in the
spirit of virtue and knowledge to act justly and holily to all; they
fancy that he will be a despot who will wrong and harm and slay whom he
pleases of us; for if there could be such a despot as we describe, they
would acknowledge that we ought to be too glad to have him, and that he
alone would be the happy ruler of a true and perfect State.
YOUNG SOCRATES: To be sure.
STRANGER: But then, as the State is not like a beehive, and has no
natural head who is at once recognized to be the superior both in body
and in mind, mankind are obliged to meet and make laws, and endeavour to
approach as nearly as they can to the true form of government.
YOUNG SOCRATES: True.
STRANGER: And when the foundation of politics is in the letter only
and in custom, and knowledge is divorced from action, can we wonder,
Socrates, at the miseries which there are, and always will be, in
States? Any other art, built on such a foundation and thus conducted,
would ruin all that it touched. Ought we not rather to wonder at the
natural strength of the political bond? For States have endured all
this, time out of mind, and yet some of them still remain and are not
overthrown, though many of them, like ships at sea, founder from time
to time, and perish and have perished and will hereafter perish, through
the badness of their pilots and crews, who have the worst sort of
ignorance of the highest truths--I mean to say, that they are wholly
unaquainted with politics, of which, above all other sciences, they
believe themselves to have acquired the most perfect knowledge.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.
STRANGER: Then the question arises:--which of these untrue forms of
government is the least oppressive to their subjects, though they are
all oppressive; and which is the worst of them? Here is a consideration
which is beside our present purpose, and yet having regard to the whole
it seems to influence all our actions: we must examine it.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, we must.
STRANGER: You may say that of the three forms, the same is at once the
hardest and the easiest.
YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean?
STRANGER: I am speaking of the three forms of government, which I
mentioned at the beginning of this discussion--monarchy, the rule of the
few, and the rule of the many.
YOUNG SOCRATES: True.
STRANGER: If we divide each of these we shall have six, from which the
true one may be distinguished as a seventh.
YOUNG SOCRATES: How would you make the division?
STRANGER: Monarchy divides into royalty and tyranny; the rule of the
few into aristocracy, which has an auspicious name, and oligarchy; and
democracy or the rule of the many, which before was one, must now be
divided.
YOUNG SOCRATES: On what principle of division?
STRANGER: On the same principle as before, although the name is now
discovered to have a twofold meaning. For the distinction of ruling with
law or without law, applies to this as well as to the rest.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.
STRANGER: The division made no difference when we were looking for the
perfect State, as we showed before. But now that this has been separated
off, and, as we said, the others alone are left for us, the principle of
law and the absence of law will bisect them all.
YOUNG SOCRATES: That would seem to follow, from what has been said.
STRANGER: Then monarchy, when bound by good prescriptions or laws,
is the best of all the six, and when lawless is the most bitter and
oppressive to the subject.
YOUNG SOCRATES: True.
STRANGER: The government of the few, which is intermediate between that
of the one and many, is also intermediate in good and evil; but the
government of the many is in every respect weak and unable to do either
any great good or any great evil, when compared with the others, because
the offices are too minutely subdivided and too many hold them. And this
therefore is the worst of all lawful governments, and the best of all
lawless ones. If they are all without the restraints of law, democracy
is the form in which to live is best; if they are well ordered, then
this is the last which you should choose, as royalty, the first form, is
the best, with the exception of the seventh, for that excels them all,
and is among States what God is among men.
YOUNG SOCRATES: You are quite right, and we should choose that above
all.
STRANGER: The members of all these States, with the exception of the
one which has knowledge, may be set aside as being not Statesmen but
partisans,--upholders of the most monstrous idols, and themselves idols;
and, being the greatest imitators and magicians, they are also the
greatest of Sophists.
YOUNG SOCRATES: The name of Sophist after many windings in the argument
appears to have been most justly fixed upon the politicians, as they are
termed.
STRANGER: And so our satyric drama has been played out; and the troop of
Centaurs and Satyrs, however unwilling to leave the stage, have at last
been separated from the political science.
YOUNG SOCRATES: So I perceive.
STRANGER: There remain, however, natures still more troublesome, because
they are more nearly akin to the king, and more difficult to discern;
the examination of them may be compared to the process of refining gold.
YOUNG SOCRATES: What is your meaning?
STRANGER: The workmen begin by sifting away the earth and stones and
the like; there remain in a confused mass the valuable elements akin to
gold, which can only be separated by fire,--copper, silver, and other
precious metal; these are at last refined away by the use of tests,
until the gold is left quite pure.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, that is the way in which these things are said to
be done.
STRANGER: In like manner, all alien and uncongenial matter has been
separated from political science, and what is precious and of a kindred
nature has been left; there remain the nobler arts of the general and
the judge, and the higher sort of oratory which is an ally of the royal
art, and persuades men to do justice, and assists in guiding the helm of
States:--How can we best clear away all these, leaving him whom we seek
alone and unalloyed?
YOUNG SOCRATES: That is obviously what has in some way to be attempted.
STRANGER: If the attempt is all that is wanting, he shall certainly be
brought to light; and I think that the illustration of music may assist
in exhibiting him. Please to answer me a question.
YOUNG SOCRATES: What question?
STRANGER: There is such a thing as learning music or handicraft arts in
general?
YOUNG SOCRATES: There is.
STRANGER: And is there any higher art or science, having power to decide
which of these arts are and are not to be learned;--what do you say?
YOUNG SOCRATES: I should answer that there is.
STRANGER: And do we acknowledge this science to be different from the
others?
YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.
STRANGER: And ought the other sciences to be superior to this, or no
single science to any other? Or ought this science to be the overseer
and governor of all the others?
YOUNG SOCRATES: The latter.
STRANGER: You mean to say that the science which judges whether we ought
to learn or not, must be superior to the science which is learned or
which teaches?
YOUNG SOCRATES: Far superior.
STRANGER: And the science which determines whether we ought to persuade
or not, must be superior to the science which is able to persuade?
YOUNG SOCRATES: Of course.
STRANGER: Very good; and to what science do we assign the power of
persuading a multitude by a pleasing tale and not by teaching?
YOUNG SOCRATES: That power, I think, must clearly be assigned to
rhetoric.
STRANGER: And to what science do we give the power of determining
whether we are to employ persuasion or force towards any one, or to
refrain altogether?
YOUNG SOCRATES: To that science which governs the arts of speech and
persuasion.
STRANGER: Which, if I am not mistaken, will be politics?
YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good.
STRANGER: Rhetoric seems to be quickly distinguished from politics,
being a different species, yet ministering to it.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.
STRANGER: But what would you think of another sort of power or science?
YOUNG SOCRATES: What science?
STRANGER: The science which has to do with military operations against
our enemies--is that to be regarded as a science or not?
YOUNG SOCRATES: How can generalship and military tactics be regarded as
other than a science?
STRANGER: And is the art which is able and knows how to advise when we
are to go to war, or to make peace, the same as this or different?
YOUNG SOCRATES: If we are to be consistent, we must say different.
STRANGER: And we must also suppose that this rules the other, if we are
not to give up our former notion?
YOUNG SOCRATES: True.
STRANGER: And, considering how great and terrible the whole art of war
is, can we imagine any which is superior to it but the truly royal?
YOUNG SOCRATES: No other.
STRANGER: The art of the general is only ministerial, and therefore not
political?
YOUNG SOCRATES: Exactly.
STRANGER: Once more let us consider the nature of the righteous judge.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good.
STRANGER: Does he do anything but decide the dealings of men with one
another to be just or unjust in accordance with the standard which he
receives from the king and legislator,--showing his own peculiar virtue
only in this, that he is not perverted by gifts, or fears, or pity, or
by any sort of favour or enmity, into deciding the suits of men with one
another contrary to the appointment of the legislator?
YOUNG SOCRATES: No; his office is such as you describe.
STRANGER: Then the inference is that the power of the judge is not
royal, but only the power of a guardian of the law which ministers to
the royal power?
YOUNG SOCRATES: True.
STRANGER: The review of all these sciences shows that none of them is
political or royal. For the truly royal ought not itself to act, but to
rule over those who are able to act; the king ought to know what is and
what is not a fitting opportunity for taking the initiative in matters
of the greatest importance, whilst others should execute his orders.
YOUNG SOCRATES: True.
STRANGER: And, therefore, the arts which we have described, as they
have no authority over themselves or one another, but are each of them
concerned with some special action of their own, have, as they ought to
have, special names corresponding to their several actions.
YOUNG SOCRATES: I agree.
STRANGER: And the science which is over them all, and has charge of the
laws, and of all matters affecting the State, and truly weaves them
all into one, if we would describe under a name characteristic of their
common nature, most truly we may call politics.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Exactly so.
STRANGER: Then, now that we have discovered the various classes in
a State, shall I analyse politics after the pattern which weaving
supplied?
YOUNG SOCRATES: I greatly wish that you would.
STRANGER: Then I must describe the nature of the royal web, and show how
the various threads are woven into one piece.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly.
STRANGER: A task has to be accomplished, which, although difficult,
appears to be necessary.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly the attempt must be made.
STRANGER: To assume that one part of virtue differs in kind from
another, is a position easily assailable by contentious disputants, who
appeal to popular opinion.
YOUNG SOCRATES: I do not understand.
STRANGER: Let me put the matter in another way: I suppose that you would
consider courage to be a part of virtue?
YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly I should.
STRANGER: And you would think temperance to be different from courage;
and likewise to be a part of virtue?
YOUNG SOCRATES: True.
STRANGER: I shall venture to put forward a strange theory about them.
YOUNG SOCRATES: What is it?
STRANGER: That they are two principles which thoroughly hate one another
and are antagonistic throughout a great part of nature.
YOUNG SOCRATES: How singular!
STRANGER: Yes, very--for all the parts of virtue are commonly said to be
friendly to one another.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.
STRANGER: Then let us carefully investigate whether this is universally
true, or whether there are not parts of virtue which are at war with
their kindred in some respect.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Tell me how we shall consider that question.
STRANGER: We must extend our enquiry to all those things which we
consider beautiful and at the same time place in two opposite classes.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Explain; what are they?
STRANGER: Acuteness and quickness, whether in body or soul or in the
movement of sound, and the imitations of them which painting and music
supply, you must have praised yourself before now, or been present when
others praised them.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.
STRANGER: And do you remember the terms in which they are praised?
YOUNG SOCRATES: I do not.
STRANGER: I wonder whether I can explain to you in words the thought
which is passing in my mind.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Why not?
STRANGER: You fancy that this is all so easy: Well, let us consider
these notions with reference to the opposite classes of action under
which they fall. When we praise quickness and energy and acuteness,
whether of mind or body or sound, we express our praise of the quality
which we admire by one word, and that one word is manliness or courage.
YOUNG SOCRATES: How?
STRANGER: We speak of an action as energetic and brave, quick and manly,
and vigorous too; and when we apply the name of which I speak as the
common attribute of all these natures, we certainly praise them.
YOUNG SOCRATES: True.
STRANGER: And do we not often praise the quiet strain of action also?
YOUNG SOCRATES: To be sure.
STRANGER: And do we not then say the opposite of what we said of the
other?
YOUNG SOCRATES: How do you mean?
STRANGER: We exclaim How calm! How temperate! in admiration of the slow
and quiet working of the intellect, and of steadiness and gentleness in
action, of smoothness and depth of voice, and of all rhythmical movement
and of music in general, when these have a proper solemnity. Of all such
actions we predicate not courage, but a name indicative of order.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.
STRANGER: But when, on the other hand, either of these is out of place,
the names of either are changed into terms of censure.
YOUNG SOCRATES: How so?
STRANGER: Too great sharpness or quickness or hardness is termed
violence or madness; too great slowness or gentleness is called
cowardice or sluggishness; and we may observe, that for the most part
these qualities, and the temperance and manliness of the opposite
characters, are arrayed as enemies on opposite sides, and do not mingle
with one another in their respective actions; and if we pursue the
enquiry, we shall find that men who have these different qualities of
mind differ from one another.
YOUNG SOCRATES: In what respect?
STRANGER: In respect of all the qualities which I mentioned, and very
likely of many others. According to their respective affinities to
either class of actions they distribute praise and blame,--praise to
the actions which are akin to their own, blame to those of the opposite
party--and out of this many quarrels and occasions of quarrel arise
among them.
YOUNG SOCRATES: True.
STRANGER: The difference between the two classes is often a trivial
concern; but in a state, and when affecting really important matters,
becomes of all disorders the most hateful.
YOUNG SOCRATES: To what do you refer?
STRANGER: To nothing short of the whole regulation of human life. For
the orderly class are always ready to lead a peaceful life, quietly
doing their own business; this is their manner of behaving with all
men at home, and they are equally ready to find some way of keeping the
peace with foreign States. And on account of this fondness of theirs for
peace, which is often out of season where their influence prevails, they
become by degrees unwarlike, and bring up their young men to be like
themselves; they are at the mercy of their enemies; whence in a
few years they and their children and the whole city often pass
imperceptibly from the condition of freemen into that of slaves.
YOUNG SOCRATES: What a cruel fate!
STRANGER: And now think of what happens with the more courageous
natures. Are they not always inciting their country to go to war, owing
to their excessive love of the military life? they raise up enemies
against themselves many and mighty, and either utterly ruin their
native-land or enslave and subject it to its foes?
YOUNG SOCRATES: That, again, is true.
STRANGER: Must we not admit, then, that where these two classes exist,
they always feel the greatest antipathy and antagonism towards one
another?