A POPULAR ARMAMENT.
It was ordained that the navy should reap all the boys and the men that
were to be gathered in the warfare of this spring. The amphibious
failures in the southwest involved no graver consequences than a vast
futile expenditure of Northern time, money, and men; such waste has been
too common, of late, to excite much popular disgust or surprise. In
other parts, the keenest correspondent has been put to great straits for
memorable matter; for a skirmish, or a raid, even on a large scale, can
hardly carry much beyond a local interest.
On the last day of April, the summer land-campaign began in earnest,
when its truculent commander led the "finest army on the planet" across
the Rappahanock, unopposed.
If all other warlike music was prudently silent then, be sure, the
General's own private trumpet flourished very sonorously; indeed, for
many days past it had not ceased to ring. Few armaments have set forth
under more pompous auspices. First came the great review, graced by the
presence of the White House Court, who witnessed the marching past of
the biennial veterans with perfect patience, if not satisfaction. The
"specials" of the Republican papers outdid themselves on that occasion;
magnificently ignoring his temporary dignity, they hesitated not to
compare each member of the President's family with a corresponding
European royalty, giving, of course, the preference to the
home-manufactured article: it was good to read their raptures over the
gallant bearing of Master Lincoln, as if "the young Iulus" (as they
_would_ call him) had shown himself worthy of high hereditary honors.
One writer, I think, did allow, that the balance of grace might incline
rather to Eugénie the Empress, than to the President's stout,
good-tempered spouse; but he was much more cynical or conscientious than
most of his fellows.
Thenceforward one became aweary of the sight, sound, and name of
"Hooker." The right man was in the right place at last: had his counsels
been followed in the Peninsula, when the caution or incapacity of
McClellan threw the grand opportunity away, the Federal flag would have
floated over Richmond last summer. Was there not the hero's own
testimony to that effect, rendered before the War Committee, months ago,
wherein, with a chivalrous generosity, he ceased not to exalt himself on
the ruined reputation of his late commander? Even as Ajax prayed for
light, the people cried aloud for one week of fair weather: no more was
wanted to crush and utterly confound the hopes of Rebels, Copperheads,
and perfidious Albion. Every illustrated journal was crowded with
portraits, of Fighting Joe and his famous white charger; it was said,
that horse and rider could never show themselves without eliciting a
burst of cheering, such as rang out near the Lake Regillus, when
Herminus and Black Auster broke into the wavering battle. No wonder. Had
he not thoroughly reorganized the army demoralized by Burnside's defeat,
till there was but one word in every soldier's mouth, and that
word--"Forward!"
There was joy, as for a victory, when it was known that the Falmouth
camp was broken up, and that the eager battalions had left the
Rappahannock fairly behind them: as to success, only fools or traitors
could question it. Even the Democratic journals were carried away by the
tide, and hardly ventured to hesitate their doubts. The hero's own
proclamation, issued on the south bank of the river, was surely enough
to reassure the most timid unbeliever.
How vaunt and prophecy were fulfilled, all the world knows now. A more
miserable waste of apparently ample means and material has seldom been
recorded in the annals of modern war. General Hooker stands forth the
worthy rival of that mighty monarch, who,
"With fifty thousand men,
Marched up the hill and then--marched down again."
But of the two, the exploit of the American strategist is much the most
brilliant and memorable; his preparations and blunders were conducted on
a vaster scale, and, Varus-like, scorning the triviality of a bloodless
disgrace, he left sixteen thousand dead, wounded, and missing behind in
his retreat.
The defeated General may well pray to be saved from his friends: the
strongest ground of condemnation might be drawn from the excuses of some
of these injudicious partisans. Not more than a third of the Federal
forces was, they say, at any one time engaged: yet Hooker's last words
to his troops, before going into action, boasted that the enemy must,
perforce, fight him on his own ground. The Federal commander recognized,
perhaps not less than his opponent, the importance of the simple old
tactic--bringing a superior force to bear on detached or weak points of
the adverse line--which has entered, under one form or another, into
most great military combinations since war became a science; but he
appears to have been utterly incapable of reducing theory to practice.
For the twentieth time in this war, a Northern general was
outmanoeuvred and beaten, simply because his adversary--understanding
how to husband an inferior strength--seized the right moment for
bringing it into play.
I do not mean to assert that the Confederates invariably advance in
column, or to advocate this especial mode of attack: a successful
outflanking of the enemy may turn out an advantage not less decided than
the breaking of his centre; but, when half-disciplined troops are to be
handled, concentrative movements must surely be safer than extensive
ones. It would be well to remember that, among all the trained
battalions of Europe, our own crack regiments are supposed to be the
only ones that can be thoroughly relied on for attacking in line.
If Hooker thought himself strong enough to cross the rear of Lee's army,
and cut him off from Richmond, while a combined movement against the
city was being executed by Dix and Keyes from the southeast, the delay
of forty hours, during which he advanced about six miles, can scarcely
be excused, or even accounted for. That the wary foe should be taken
entirely by surprise, was a contingency too improbable to be calculated
on by any sane tactician, however sanguine.
To dispense almost entirely with the aid of the cavalry arm, on the eve
of a general engagement, was certainly a bold stroke of strategy--too
bold to be justified by any independent successes likely to be achieved
by the detachment. Stoneman's exploits appear to have been greatly
exaggerated; but, whatever were the results, they might clearly have
been attained if he had crossed the Rappahannock alone with one
horseman, leaving the main guard to attend more dress-parades in the
Falmouth camp. To pretend that weather in anywise influenced Hooker's
retreat is utterly absurd. No change for the worse took place till the
Tuesday evening, when the army had fallen back on the river bank; the
troops were actually recrossing when the rain began: then it did come
down in earnest.
Nocte pluit tota, redeunt spectacula mare--
a spectacle frequently repeated in this war--that of a Federal General
"changing his base" in hot haste, without flourish of trumpet.
At the most critical moment, Fighting Joe seems to have been afflicted
with the fatal indecision, by no means incompatible with perfect
physical fearlessness, which has ruined wiser plans than ever were
moulded in his brain. Rumor hints broadly at a sudden fit of depression,
not unnatural in one notoriously addicted to the use of stimulants; but
this is, probably, the ill-natured invention of an enemy.
At all such seasons, some subordinate must needs lift some of the
dishonor from the shoulders of the chief. The non-arrival of
reinforcements is much the easiest way of accounting for a foiled
combination. The rout of Howard's corps was not to be considered, as it
happened under the General's own eye: so Sedgwick was, by some, made the
Grouchy of the day: but he seems to have fought his division as well as
any of his fellows, and it was probably a superior force that checked
his advance towards the main army, and eventually hurled him back upon
the Rappahannock.
Perhaps the Confederate organs do not greatly exaggerate, when they
claim Chancellorville as _the_ victory of this war: though there is a
fearful counterpoise in the loss of the South's favorite leader. But the
great Army of the Potomac, in its shameful retreat, could not console
itself by the boast of having done to death the terrible enemy, at whose
name they had learnt to tremble. A miserable mistake (so the Richmond
papers say) slew Stonewall Jackson, in the crisis of victory, with a
Confederate bullet, as he was reconnoitering with his staff in front of
his line.
Surely it is glory, sufficient for any one of woman born, that the news
of his death should have sent a start and a shiver through thirty
millions of hearts. I subjoin a funeral notice, which utters very simply
and strongly the feeling of the country that the stern, pure soldier
served so well: but a strange honor and respect attaches to his memory
amongst those whom in life he never ceased to disquiet. Even the rabid
Republican journalists rejoice--not coarsely or ungenerously--speaking
with bated tones, as is fit and natural in presence of a good man's
corpse.
Let us return to our poor Hooker, who is sitting now, somewhat gloomily,
in the shade. Human nature can spare so little sympathy for braggarts in
disaster, that we may possibly have been too hard on his demerits. In
this respect the Grim old Fighting Cox (as the historian of the Mackerel
Brigade calls him) is absolutely incorrigible. Conceive a General--on
the very morning after the reverse was consummated--proclaiming to his
soldiers "that they had added to the laurels already won by the Army of
the Potomac!" If a succession of defeats are equal to one victory--on
the principle of two negatives making an affirmative--or if nothing
added to a cipher brings out a substantial product, there may possibly
be something in these words beyond the desperation of bombast,
otherwise----
But, in justice to Joseph, let us ask--Are the materials at his command,
or at that of any Federal commander, really so powerful or manageable as
they seem?
Probably no one civilized nation is composed of elements so difficult to
mould into the form of a thoroughly organized army, as the Northern
States of the Union. The men individually, especially those drawn from
the West, are fully endowed with the courage, activity, and endurance
inherent in the Anglo-Saxon race: they can act promptly and daringly
enough on their own independent resources; but, when required to move as
unreasoning units of a mass, directed by a superior will, they utterly
fail. All the antecedents of the Federal recruit interfere with his
progress towards the mechanical perfection of the trained soldier. The
gait and demeanor of the country lads are not more shambling and
slovenly than those of the ordinary British; but the latter from his
youth up, has imbibed certain ideas of subordination to superiors, which
make him yield more pliantly and implicitly to after discipline. Now,
the American is taught to contemn all such old-world ideas as respect of
persons. Even the All-mighty Dollar cannot command deference, though it
may enforce obedience. The volunteer carries with him into the ranks, an
ostentatious spirit of self-assertion and independence. He has always
mixed on terms of as much equality as his purse would allow of, with the
class from which his officers have emerged by election; and knows that,
at the expiration of their service, each will resume his place as if no
such distinction had existed. So he goes into action fully prepared to
criticise the orders of his superiors, and even to ignore them if they
clash too strongly with his private judgment; he has no intention of
abating one iota of his franchise, or one privilege of an enlightened
citizen. In the regular army, ceremonial is rather better observed; but,
even here, you will observe the barriers of grade frequently
transgressed, both in manner and tone: the volunteers will rarely salute
even a field-officer, unless on parade, or by special orders.
This spirit of independent judgment is by no means confined to the rank
and file. The evidence before the War Committee shows how seldom a
General-in-Chief can depend on the hearty co-operation of his Division
leaders, and how unreservedly dissent was often expressed by those whose
lips discipline ought to have sealed.
The fact is, that a spirit of party impregnates all the military
organization of the North: a Federal army is a vast political machine.
State Governors have followed the example of the Administration in their
selection of the higher officers: these, as a rule, owe their election
entirely to their own influence, or that of their friends; all other
qualifications are disregarded. It is idle to expect that such men can
command the confidence of the soldiers by virtue of their rank; they
have to win this by individual prowess.[3] The Confederates have been
more just and wise. Some of these political appointments were made at
the beginning of the war, but changes were made as soon as incapacity
was manifest, and almost all posts of importance are now occupied by
officers educated at West Point, or at one of many military schools long
established at the South.
[Footnote 3: It is well to remember, that, before the Committee for
inquiring into the conduct of the war, Generals McDowell and Rosecrans,
in the most explicit terms, attributed many disasters to the fact, of
the soldiers having no confidence in the officers who led them.]
An army of free-thinkers is very hard to handle either in camp or field.
They do not grumble, perhaps, so much as the British "full private;"
indeed they have little cause, for the commissariat arrangements, even
in remote departments, are admirable, and the Union grudges no comfort,
or even luxury, to her armies. But they become "demoralized" (the word
is a cant one now) surprisingly fast, and recover from such, depression
very, very slowly. When the moment for action arrives, such men get
fresh heart in the first excitement, but they lack stability, and if any
sudden check ensues, involving change of ground to the rear, a few
minutes are enough to turn a retreat into a rout. You may send forth
your volunteer, with all the pomp and circumstance of war, and greet his
return with all enthusiasm of welcome; you may make him the hero of
paragraph and tale (I believe it is treasonable to choose any other
_jeune premier_ for a love story just now); you may put a flag into his
hand, more riddled and shot-torn than any of our old Peninsular
standards; you may salute him "veteran," a month after the first baptism
of fire; but the savor of the conscript and the citizen will cling to
him still.
What would you have? The _esprit de corps_, which has more or less been
kept alive in civilized armies since the days of the Tenth Legion, is,
perforce, wanting here. All military organization is posterior to the
War of Independence. It is certainly not their fault if even the regular
battalions can inscribe on their colors no nobler name than that of some
desultory Mexican or Border battle. If Australia should become an
empire, she must carry the same blank ensigns without shame. But when a
regiment has no traditionary honors to guard, it lacks a powerful
deterrent from self-disgrace.
It is easy to deride martinets and pipe-clay: all the drill in
Christendom will not make a good soldier out of a weakling or a coward;
but, unless you can turn men into machines, so far as to make them act
independently of individual thought or volition, you can never depend on
a body of non-fatalists for advancing steadily, irrespective of what may
be in their front; nor for keeping their ranks unbroken under a hail of
fire, or on a sinking, ship. As skirmishers, the Federal soldiers act
admirably; and in several instances have carried fortified positions
with much dash and daring; it is in line of battle, on a stricken field,
that they are--to say the least--uncertain. In spite of the
highly-colored pictures of charges, &c., I do not believe that, from the
very beginning of this war, any one battalion has actually _crossed_
bayonets with another, though they may often have come within ten yards
of collision. This fact (which I have taken some trouble to verify) is
surely sufficiently significant.
The parallels of our own Parliamentary army, and of the French levies
after the first Revolution, suggest themselves naturally here; but they
will not quite hold good. The stern fanatics who followed Cromwell went
to their work--whether of fighting or prayer--with all their heart, and
soul, and strength, conning the manual not less studiously than the
psalter, while their General would devote himself for days together to
the minutest duties of a drill-sergeant. With all this, and with his
"trust in Providence," it was long before the wary Oliver would bring
his Ironsides fairly face to face,
With the bravos of Alsatia and the pages of Whitehall.
It is true that the Revolutionary army of '93 was utterly different from
those, wherein the Maison du Roi took the right of the line. It was
hastily raised, and loosely constructed, out of rude material perilous
to handle. But--putting aside that military aptitude inherent in every
Frenchman--in all ranks there was a leaven of veterans strong enough to
keep the turbulent conscripts in order, though the aristocratic element
of authority was wanting. Traditions of subordination and discipline
survived in an army, not the less thoroughly French, because it was
rabidly Republican. The recruits liked to feel themselves soldiers; they
were willing to give up for awhile the pageantry of war, but not its
decorum; and, in that implicit obedience to their officers, there
mingled a sturdy plebeian pride; they would not allow that it was harder
to follow the wave of Colonel Bonhommne's sabre, than that of Marshal de
Montmorenci's baton; or that the word of command rang out more
efficiently from the patrician's dainty lips, than from under the rough
moustaches of the proletarian.
The regular army here does little to help the volunteer service, beyond
giving subalterns as field-officers (a lieutenant would rarely be
satisfied with a troop or a company); the rank is, of course, temporary,
though sometimes substantiated by brevet. It is possible, that a few
non-commissioned officers may be found, who have served in a similar or
subordinate capacity in the regular army during the Mexican war; but
such exceptions are too rare to affect the civism of the entire force.
True it is, that the Federal levies have to face enemies not a whit
superior in discipline. Indeed, Harry Wynd's motto, "I fight for mine
own hand," is especially favored in the South. But when one side is
battling for independence, the other for subjugation, there must ever be
an essential difference in the spirit animating their armies. The
impetuosity of the Confederate onset is acknowledged even here: on
several occasions it has been marked by a wild energy and recklessness
of life, worthy to be compared with the Highland charge, which swept
away dragoon and musketeer at Killiecrankie and Prestonpans.
I am not disposed to question the hardihood or endurance of the Yankee
militant; nor even to deny that a sense of patriotism may have much to
do with his dogged determination to persevere, now, even to the end: but
as for enthusiasm--you must look for it in the romances of war that
crowd the magazines, or in the letters of vividly imaginative
correspondents, or--anywhere but among the Federal rank and file. Such a
feeling is utterly foreign to the national character; nor have I seen a
trace of it in any one of the many soldiers with whom I have spoken of
the war. All the high-flown sentiment of the Times or Tribune will not
prevent the Yankee private from looking at his duty in a hard,
practical, business-like way; he is disposed to give his country its
money's worth, and does so, as a rule, very fairly; but military ardor
in the States is not exactly a consuming fire at this moment. The
hundred-dollar bounty has failed for some time to fill up the gaps made
by death or desertion: and the strong remedy of the Conscription Act
will not be employed a day too soon. Perhaps those who augur favorably
for Northern success expect that coerced levies will fight more fiercely
and endure more cheerfully than the mustered-out volunteers. _Qui vivra
verra._
It is simple justice, to allow that the native soldiers have borne
themselves, as a rule, better than the aliens. The Irish
Brigade--reduced to a skeleton, now, by the casualties of two years--has
performed good service under Meagher, who himself has done much to
redeem the ridicule incurred in early days; but the Germans have not
been distinguished either for discipline, or daring. The Eleventh
Division, whose shameful rout at Chancellorville is still in every one's
mouth, was almost exclusively a "Dutch" corps.
But other difficulties beset a Federal General, besides the
intractability of his armed material, and the jealousies of immediate
subordinates. The uncertainty of his position is in itself a snare. When
the chief is first appointed, no panegyric seems adequate to his past
merit, and the glories are limitless that he is certain to win. If he
should inaugurate his command with the shadow of a success, the
Government organs chant themselves hoarse in praise and prophecy. But
the popular hero knows right well, that the ground is already mined
under his feet; the first reverse will drag him down into a pit of
obscurity, if not of odium, deep and dark as Abiram's grave. Of all
taskmasters, a Democracy is the most pitilessly irrational; it were
better for an unfaithful or unlucky servant to fall into Pharaoh's
hands, than to lie at the mercy of a free and enlightened, people.
Demagogues, and the crowds they sway, are just as impatient and
impulsive now, as when the mob of the Agora cheered the bellowing of
Cleon; neither is their wrath less clamorous because it has ceased to
lap blood. A Federal chief must be very sanguine or very short sighted,
who, beyond the glare and glitter of his new headquarters, does not mark
the loom of Cynoscephalæ. Conceive the worry, of feeling yourself
perpetually on your promotion--of knowing, that by delay you risk the
imputation of cowardice or incapacity, while on the first decisive
action must be periled the supremacy, that all men are so loth to
surrender. The unhappy commander, if a literate, might often think of
Porsena's front rank at the Bridge, when
Those in the rear cried, "Forward,"
Those in the van cried, "Back."
To few minds is allotted such a temperate and steady strength as would
enable a man, thus tried and tempted, to weigh all chances calmly;
determined to strike, only when the time should come; disregarding the
extravagant expectations alike of friend or foe; shrinking no more from
the responsibilities of unavoidable failure, than from any other
personal dangers. If such a chief could once fairly grasp the staff of
command, a virtual dictatorship might work great things for the North.
But whence is he likely to emerge? Hardly from the midst of this vast
political and military turmoil, where every man is struggling and
straining to clutch at the veriest shred of power.
Hooker has fared better than his fellows in misfortune. The Washington
Cabinet, usually ready enough to make sacrifices to popular indignation,
still stand by their discomfited favorite with creditable firmness. Even
before the army crossed the river, there appeared significant articles
in the Government organs, begging the public to be patient and moderate
in anticipation. The press-prophets, who indulged in the most
magnificent sketches of what _ought_ to be done, were those, with whose
patriotic regrets over defeat, would mingle some exultation over a
disgraced political opponent. So people in general seem content to give
the Fighting One another chance.
This unusual clemency may be easily accounted for. It would be almost
impossible to pitch on any one with the slightest pretensions to fill
the vacated path. If you except Rosecrans, and perhaps Franklin, there
is hardly a Division leader who has not, at one time or another,
betrayed incapacity enough to disqualify him from holding any important
command. West Point may send forth as good theoretical soldiers as
Sandhurst, or St. Cyr, while the practical experience of American
Generals might equal that of our own officers before the Crimean war;
but the best from West Point have gone southward long ago, and by the
retirement of McClellan the North lost, probably, her one promising
strategist. Cool and provident in the formation of his plans, though
somewhat unready in their execution, and scarcely equal to sudden
emergencies, if he achieved no brilliant success, he was likely to steer
clear of grave disaster. The dearth of tacticians is made very manifest,
by the list of candidates suggested in the event of Hooker's removal
from command.
There are horses, invariably beaten in public, which never appear
without being heavily backed; and there are men, who contrive to retain
a certain number of partisans, zealous enough to ignore all patent
demerits, and to give their favorite credit for any amount of possible
unproved capacity. Yet one would have thought the Republicans might have
hesitated in bringing forward Fremont, who has already been removed for
blunders hardly to be excused by ignorance; and though the name of
Sickles is, unhappily, well known in Europe, it is somewhat startling to
find him, so early in the day, aspirant to the highest military honors.
His advocate admits that the latter hero's professional opportunities
have been scanty, but, says he, placidly, "Neither was Cæsar bred a
soldier." If the sentence was written in sobriety, no praise can be too
high for the audacity of that superb comparison. Another patriot was
exceedingly anxious that General Halleck should be incontinently removed
from the War Office, to make room for--Butler. We accept these things
calmly now; for repeated proof has taught us, that world-wide infamy
bars no man's road to profit and honor, when Black Republicans weigh the
merits of the claimant. The Abolitionist organs of that same week
contained glowing accounts of McNeil's exploits in Missouri, and
announced with much satisfaction an accession to Negley's Brigade in the
shape of Colonel Turchin. I quote the words: "He was received with great
delight, and will, no doubt, do good service, if allowed. It will be
remembered that he was court-martialed some time since, for punishing
guerrillas."
Atrocities have been so rife here of late, that even wholesale murder
and ravishment have a chance of being lost in the crowd: in any other
civilized land than this, that reminder might well have been spared.
Surely the Confederates in the Southwest have two prizes now before
them, well worth the winning; but in the front of battle Tarquin is
seldom found, and in the rout they must ride far and fast who would
reach his shoulders with the steel. The real perils of these men will
begin when the war is done; the hot Southern vendetta will cool
strangely, if all the three shall die in their beds.