* * * * *
_February_ 1712
I said in my essays, 392, that I wished to see the demonstrations mentioned
by M. Bayle and contained in the sixth letter printed at Trévoux in 1703.
Father des Bosses has shown me this letter, in which the writer essays to
demonstrate by the geometrical method that God is the sole true cause of
all that is real. My perusal of it has confirmed me in the opinion which I
indicated in the same passage, namely, that this proposition can be true in
a very good sense, God being the only cause of pure and absolute realities,
or perfections; but when one includes limitations or privations under the
name of realities one can say that second causes co-operate in the
production of what is limited, and that otherwise God would be the cause of
sin, and even its sole cause. And I am somewhat inclined to think that the
gifted author of the letter does not greatly differ in opinion from me,
although he seems to include all modalities among the realities of which he
declares God to be the sole cause. For in actual fact I think he will not
admit that God is the cause and the author of sin. Indeed, he explains
himself in a manner which seems to overthrow his thesis and to grant real
action to creatures. For in the proof of the eighth corollary of his second
proposition these words occur: 'The natural motion of the soul, although
determinate in itself, is indeterminate in respect of its objects. For it
is love of good in general. It is through the ideas of good appearing [390]
in individual objects that this motion becomes individual and determinate
in relation to those objects. And thus as the mind has the power of varying
its own ideas it can also change the determinations of its love. And for
that purpose it is not necessary that it overcome the power of God or
oppose his action. These determinations of motion towards individual
objects are not invincible. It is this noninvincibility which causes the
mind to be free and capable of changing them; but after all the mind makes
these changes only through the motion which God gives to it and conserves
for it.' In my own style I would have said that the perfection which is in
the action of the creature comes from God, but that the limitations to be
found there are a consequence of the original limitation and the preceding
limitations that occurred in the creature. Further, this is so not only in
minds but also in all other substances, which thereby are causes
co-operating in the change which comes to pass in themselves; for this
determination of which the author speaks is nothing but a limitation.
Now if after that one reviews all the demonstrations or corollaries of the
letter, one will be able to admit or reject the majority of its assertions,
in accordance with the interpretation one may make of them. If by 'reality'
one means only perfections or positive realities, God is the only true
cause; but if that which involves limitations is included under the
realities, one will deny a considerable portion of the theses, and the
author himself will have shown us the example. It is in order to render the
matter more comprehensible that I used in the Essays the example of a laden
boat, which, the more laden it is, is the more slowly carried along by the
stream. There one sees clearly that the stream is the cause of what is
positive in this motion, of the perfection, the force, the speed of the
boat, but that the load is the cause of the restriction of this force, and
that it brings about the retardation.
It is praiseworthy in anyone to attempt to apply the geometrical method to
metaphysical matters. But it must be admitted that hitherto success has
seldom been attained: and M. Descartes himself, with all that very great
skill which one cannot deny in him, never perhaps had less success than
when he essayed to do this in one of his answers to objections. For in
mathematics it is easier to succeed, because numbers, figures and
calculations make good the defects concealed in words; but in metaphysics,
where one is deprived of this aid (at least in ordinary [391]
argumentation), the strictness employed in the form of the argument and in
the exact definitions of the terms must needs supply this lack. But in
neither argument nor definition is that strictness here to be seen.
The author of the letter, who undoubtedly displays much ardour and
penetration, sometimes goes a little too far, as when he claims to prove
that there is as much reality and force in rest as in motion, according to
the fifth corollary of the second proposition. He asserts that the will of
God is no less positive in rest than in motion, and that it is not less
invincible. Be it so, but does it follow that there is as much reality and
force in each of the two? I do not see this conclusion, and with the same
argument one would prove that there is as much force in a strong motion as
in a weak motion. God in willing rest wills that the body be at the place
A, where it was immediately before, and for that it suffices that there be
no reason to prompt God to the change. But when God wills that afterwards
the body be at the place B, there must needs be a new reason, of such a
kind as to determine God to will that it be in B and not in C or in any
other place, and that it be there more or less promptly. It is upon these
reasons, the volitions of God, that we must assess the force and the
reality existent in things. The author speaks much of the will of God, but
he does not speak much in this letter of the reasons which prompt God to
will, and upon which all depends. And these reasons are taken from the
objects.
I observe first, indeed, with regard to the second corollary of the first
proposition, that it is very true, but that it is not very well proven. The
writer affirms that if God only ceased to will the existence of a being,
that being would no longer exist; and here is the proof given word for
word:
'Demonstration. That which exists only by the will of God no longer exists
once that will has ceased.' (But that is what must be proved. The writer
endeavours to prove it by adding:) 'Remove the cause, you remove the
effect.' (This maxim ought to have been placed among the axioms which are
stated at the beginning. But unhappily this axiom may be reckoned among
those rules of philosophy which are subject to many exceptions.) 'Now by
the preceding proposition and by its first corollary no being exists save
by the will of God. Therefore, etc.' There is ambiguity in this expression,
that nothing exists save by the will of God. If one means that things [392]
begin to exist only through this will, one is justified in referring to the
preceding propositions; but if one means that the existence of things is at
all times a consequence of the will of God, one assumes more or less what
is in question. Therefore it was necessary to prove first that the
existence of things depends upon the will of God, and that it is not only a
mere effect of that will, but a dependence, in proportion to the perfection
which things contain; and once that is assumed, they will depend upon God's
will no less afterwards than at the beginning. That is the way I have taken
the matter in my Essays.
Nevertheless I recognize that the letter upon which I have just made
observations is admirable and well deserving of perusal, and that it
contains noble and true sentiments, provided it be taken in the sense I
have just indicated. And arguments in this form may serve as an
introduction to meditations somewhat more advanced.
[393]
* * * * *
REFLEXIONS ON THE WORK THAT MR. HOBBES PUBLISHED IN ENGLISH ON 'FREEDOM,
NECESSITY AND CHANCE'
* * * * *
1. As the question of Necessity and Freedom, with other questions depending
thereon, was at one time debated between the famous Mr. Hobbes and Dr. John
Bramhall, Bishop of Derry, in books published by each of them, I have
deemed it appropriate to give a clear account of them (although I have
already mentioned them more than once); and this all the more since these
writings of Mr. Hobbes have hitherto only appeared in English, and since
the works of this author usually contain something good and ingenious. The
Bishop of Derry and Mr. Hobbes, having met in Paris at the house of the
Marquis, afterwards Duke, of Newcastle in the year 1646, entered into a
discussion on this subject. The dispute was conducted with extreme
restraint; but the bishop shortly afterwards sent a note to My Lord
Newcastle, desiring him to induce Mr. Hobbes to answer it. He answered; but
at the same time he expressed a wish that his answer should not be
published, because he believed it possible for ill-instructed persons to
abuse dogmas such as his, however true they might be. It so happened,
however, that Mr. Hobbes himself passed it to a French friend, and allowed
a young Englishman to translate it into French for the benefit of this
friend. This young man kept a copy of the English original, and published
it later in England without the author's knowledge. Thus the bishop was
obliged to reply to it, and Mr. Hobbes to make a rejoinder, and to [394]
publish all the pieces together in a book of 348 pages printed in London in
the year 1656, in 4to., entitled, _Questions concerning Freedom, Necessity
and Chance, elucidated and discussed between Doctor Bramhall, Bishop of
Derry, and Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury_. There is a later edition, of the
year 1684, in a work entitled _Hobbes's Tripos_, where are to be found his
book on human nature, his treatise on the body politic and his treatise on
freedom and necessity; but the latter does not contain the bishop's reply,
nor the author's rejoinder. Mr. Hobbes argues on this subject with his
usual wit and subtlety; but it is a pity that in both the one and the other
we stumble upon petty tricks, such as arise in excitement over the game.
The bishop speaks with much vehemence and behaves somewhat arrogantly. Mr.
Hobbes for his part is not disposed to spare the other, and manifests
rather too much scorn for theology, and for the terminology of the
Schoolmen, which is apparently favoured by the bishop.
2. One must confess that there is something strange and indefensible in the
opinions of Mr. Hobbes. He maintains that doctrines touching the divinity
depend entirely upon the determination of the sovereign, and that God is no
more the cause of the good than of the bad actions of creatures. He
maintains that all that which God does is just, because there is none above
him with power to punish and constrain him. Yet he speaks sometimes as if
what is said about God were only compliments, that is to say expressions
proper for paying him honour, but not for knowing him. He testifies also
that it seems to him that the pains of the wicked must end in their
destruction: this opinion closely approaches that of the Socinians, but it
seems that Mr. Hobbes goes much further. His philosophy, which asserts that
bodies alone are substances, hardly appears favourable to the providence of
God and the immortality of the soul. On other subjects nevertheless he says
very reasonable things. He shows clearly that nothing comes about by
chance, or rather that chance only signifies the ignorance of causes that
produce the effect, and that for each effect there must be a concurrence of
all the sufficient conditions anterior to the event, not one of which,
manifestly, can be lacking when the event is to follow, because they are
conditions: the event, moreover, does not fail to follow when these
conditions exist all together, because they are sufficient conditions. All
which amounts to the same as I have said so many times, that everything
comes to pass as a result of determining reasons, the knowledge [395]
whereof, if we had it, would make us know at the same time why the thing
has happened and why it did not go otherwise.
3. But this author's humour, which prompts him to paradoxes and makes him
seek to contradict others, has made him draw out exaggerated and odious
conclusions and expressions, as if everything happened through an absolute
necessity. The Bishop of Derry, on the other hand, has aptly observed in
the answer to article 35, page 327, that there results only a hypothetical
necessity, such as we all grant to events in relation to the foreknowledge
of God, while Mr. Hobbes maintains that even divine foreknowledge alone
would be sufficient to establish an absolute necessity of events. This was
also the opinion of Wyclif, and even of Luther, when he wrote _De Servo
Arbitrio_; or at least they spoke so. But it is sufficiently acknowledged
to-day that this kind of necessity which is termed hypothetical, and
springs from foreknowledge or from other anterior reasons, has nothing in
it to arouse one's alarm: whereas it would be quite otherwise if the thing
were necessary of itself, in such a way that the contrary implied
contradiction. Mr. Hobbes refuses to listen to anything about a moral
necessity either, on the ground that everything really happens through
physical causes. But one is nevertheless justified in making a great
difference between the necessity which constrains the wise to do good, and
which is termed moral, existing even in relation to God, and that blind
necessity whereby according to Epicurus, Strato, Spinoza, and perhaps Mr.
Hobbes, things exist without intelligence and without choice, and
consequently without God. Indeed, there would according to them be no need
of God, since in consequence of this necessity all would have existence
through its own essence, just as necessarily as two and three make five.
And this necessity is absolute, because everything it carries with it must
happen, whatever one may do; whereas what happens by a hypothetical
necessity happens as a result of the supposition that this or that has been
foreseen or resolved, or done beforehand; and moral necessity contains an
obligation imposed by reason, which is always followed by its effect in the
wise. This kind of necessity is happy and desirable, when one is prompted
by good reasons to act as one does; but necessity blind and absolute would
subvert piety and morality.
4. There is more reason in Mr. Hobbes's discourse when he admits that [396]
our actions are in our power, so that we do that which we will when we have
the power to do it, and when there is no hindrance. He asserts
notwithstanding that our volitions themselves are not so within our power
that we can give ourselves, without difficulty and according to our good
pleasure, inclinations and wills which we might desire. The bishop does not
appear to have taken notice of this reflexion, which Mr. Hobbes also does
not develop enough. The truth is that we have some power also over our
volitions, but obliquely, and not absolutely and indifferently. This has
been explained in some passages of this work. Finally Mr. Hobbes shows,
like others before him, that the certainty of events, and necessity itself,
if there were any in the way our actions depend upon causes, would not
prevent us from employing deliberations, exhortations, blame and praise,
punishments and rewards: for these are of service and prompt men to produce
actions or to refrain from them. Thus, if human actions were necessary,
they would be so through these means. But the truth is, that since these
actions are not necessary absolutely whatever one may do, these means
contribute only to render the actions determinate and certain, as they are
indeed; for their nature shows that they are not subject to an absolute
necessity. He gives also a good enough notion of _freedom_, in so far as it
is taken in a general sense, common to intelligent and non-intelligent
substances: he states that a thing is deemed free when the power which it
has is not impeded by an external thing. Thus the water that is dammed by a
dyke has the power to spread, but not the freedom. On the other hand, it
has not the power to rise above the dyke, although nothing would prevent it
then from spreading, and although nothing from outside prevents it from
rising so high. To that end it would be necessary that the water itself
should come from a higher point or that the water-level should be raised by
an increased flow. Thus a prisoner lacks the freedom, while a sick man
lacks the power, to go his way.
5. There is in Mr. Hobbes's preface an abstract of the disputed points,
which I will give here, adding some expression of opinion. _On one side_
(he says) the assertion is made, (1) 'that it is not in the present power
of man to choose for himself the will that he should have'. That is _well_
said, especially in relation to present will: men choose the objects
through will, but they do not choose their present wills, which spring from
reasons and dispositions. It is true, however, that one can seek new [397]
reasons for oneself, and with time give oneself new dispositions; and by
this means one can also obtain for oneself a will which one had not and
could not have given oneself forthwith. It is (to use the comparison Mr.
Hobbes himself uses) as with hunger or with thirst. At the present it does
not rest with my will to be hungry or not; but it rests with my will to eat
or not to eat; yet, for the time to come, it rests with me to be hungry, or
to prevent myself from being so at such and such an hour of day, by eating
beforehand. In this way it is possible often to avoid an evil will. Even
though Mr. Hobbes states in his reply (No. 14, p. 138) that it is the
manner of laws to say, you must do or you must not do this, but that there
is no law saying, you must will, or you must not will it, yet it is clear
that he is mistaken in regard to the Law of God, which says _non
concupisces_, thou shalt not covet; it is true that this prohibition does
not concern the first motions, which are involuntary. It is asserted (2)
'That hazard' (_chance_ in English, _casus_ in Latin) 'produces nothing',
that is, that nothing is produced without cause or reason. Very _right_, I
admit it, if one thereby intends a real hazard. For fortune and hazard are
only appearances, which spring from ignorance of causes or from disregard
of them. (3) 'That all events have their necessary causes.' _Wrong_: they
have their determining causes, whereby one can account for them; but these
are not necessary causes. The contrary might have happened, without
implying contradiction. (4) 'That the will of God makes the necessity of
all things.' _Wrong_: the will of God produces only contingent things,
which could have gone differently, since time, space and matter are
indifferent with regard to all kinds of shape and movement.
6. _On the other side_ (according to Mr. Hobbes) it is asserted, (1) 'That
man is free' (absolutely) not only 'to choose what he wills to do, but also
to choose what he wills to will.' That is _ill_ said: one is not absolute
master of one's will, to change it forthwith, without making use of some
means or skill for that purpose. (2) 'When man wills a good action, the
will of God co-operates with his, otherwise not.' That is _well_ said,
provided one means that God does not will evil actions, although he wills
to permit them, to prevent the occurrence of something which would be worse
than these sins. (3) 'That the will can choose whether it wills to will or
not.' _Wrong_, with regard to present volition. (4) 'That things happen
without necessity by chance.' _Wrong_: what happens without necessity [398]
does not because of that happen by chance, that is to say, without causes
and reasons. (5) 'Notwithstanding that God may foresee that an event will
happen, it is not necessary that it happen, since God foresees things, not
as futurities and as in their causes, but as present.' That begins _well_,
and finishes _ill_. One is justified in admitting the necessity of the
consequence, but one has no reason to resort to the question how the future
is present to God: for the necessity of the consequence does not prevent
the event or consequent from being contingent in itself.
7. Our author thinks that since the doctrine revived by Arminius had been
favoured in England by Archbishop Laud and by the Court, and important
ecclesiastical promotions had been only for those of that party, this
contributed to the revolt which caused the bishop and him to meet in their
exile in Paris at the house of Lord Newcastle, and to enter into a
discussion. I would not approve all the measures of Archbishop Laud, who
had merit and perhaps also good will, but who appears to have goaded the
Presbyterians excessively. Nevertheless one may say that the revolutions,
as much in the Low Countries as in Great Britain, in part arose from the
extreme intolerance of the strict party. One may say also that the
defenders of the absolute decree were at least as strict as the others,
having oppressed their opponents in Holland with the authority of Prince
Maurice and having fomented the revolts in England against King Charles I.
But these are the faults of men, and not of dogmas. Their opponents do not
spare them either, witness the severity used in Saxony against Nicolas
Krell and the proceedings of the Jesuits against the Bishop of Ypres's
party.
8. Mr. Hobbes observes, after Aristotle, that there are two sources for
proofs: reason and authority. As for reason, he says that he admits the
reasons derived from the attributes of God, which he calls argumentative,
and the notions whereof are conceivable; but he maintains that there are
others wherein one conceives nothing, and which are only expressions by
which we aspire to honour God. But I do not see how one can honour God by
expressions that have no meaning. It may be that with Mr. Hobbes, as with
Spinoza, wisdom, goodness, justice are only fictions in relation to God and
the universe, since the prime cause, according to them, acts through the
necessity of its power, and not by the choice of its wisdom. That is [399]
an opinion whose falsity I have sufficiently proved. It appears that Mr.
Hobbes did not wish to declare himself enough, for fear of causing offence
to people; on which point he is to be commended. It was also on that
account, as he says himself, that he had desired that what had passed
between the bishop and him in Paris should not be published. He adds that
it is not good to say that an action which God does not will happens, since
that is to say in effect that God is lacking in power. But he adds also at
the same time that it is not good either to say the opposite, and to
attribute to God that he wills the evil; because that is not seemly, and
would appear to accuse God of lack of goodness. He believes, therefore,
that in these matters telling the truth is not advisable. He would be right
if the truth were in the paradoxical opinions that he maintains. For indeed
it appears that according to the opinion of this writer God has no
goodness, or rather that that which he calls God is nothing but the blind
nature of the mass of material things, which acts according to mathematical
laws, following an absolute necessity, as the atoms do in the system of
Epicurus. If God were as the great are sometimes here on earth, it would
not be fitting to utter all the truths concerning him. But God is not as a
man, whose designs and actions often must be concealed; rather it is always
permissible and reasonable to publish the counsels and the actions of God,
because they are always glorious and worthy of praise. Thus it is always
right to utter truths concerning the divinity; one need not anyhow refrain
from fear of giving offence. And I have explained, so it seems to me, in a
way which satisfies reason, and does not wound piety, how it is to be
understood that God's will takes effect, and concurs with sin, without
compromising his wisdom and his goodness.
9. As to the authorities derived from Holy Scripture, Mr. Hobbes divides
them into three kinds; some, he says, are for me, the second kind are
neutral, and the third seem to be for my opponent. The passages which he
thinks favourable to his opinion are those which ascribe to God the cause
of our will. Thus Gen. xlv. 5, where Joseph says to his brethren, 'Be not
grieved, nor angry with yourselves, that you sold me hither: for God did
send me before you to preserve life'; and verse 8, 'it was not you that
sent me hither, but God.' And God said (Exod. vii. 3), 'I will harden
Pharaoh's heart.' And Moses said (Deut. ii. 30), 'But Sihon King of [400]
Heshbon would not let us pass by him: for the Lord thy God hardened his
spirit, and made his heart obstinate, that he might deliver him into thy
hand.' And David said of Shimei (2 Sam. xvi. 10), 'Let him curse, because
the Lord hath said unto him: Curse David. Who shall then say, wherefore
hast thou done so?' And (1 Kings xii. 15), 'The King [Rehoboam] hearkened
not unto the people; for the cause was from the Lord.' Job xii. 16: 'The
deceived and the deceiver are his.' v. 17: 'He maketh the judges fools'; v.
24: 'He taketh away the heart of the chief of the people of the earth, and
causeth them to wander in a wilderness'; v. 25: 'He maketh them to stagger
like a drunken man.' God said of the King of Assyria (Isa. x. 6), 'Against
the people will I give him a charge, to take the spoil, and to take the
prey, and to tread them down like the mire of the streets.' And Jeremiah
said (Jer. x. 23), 'O Lord, I know that the way of man is not in himself:
it is not in man that walketh to direct his steps.' And God said (Ezek.
iii. 20), 'When a righteous man doth turn from his righteousness, and
commit iniquity, and I lay a stumbling-block before him, he shall die.' And
the Saviour said (John vi. 44), 'No man can come to me, except the Father
which hath sent me draw him.' And St. Peter (Acts ii. 23), 'Jesus having
been delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have
taken.' And Acts iv. 27, 28, 'Both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the
Gentiles and the people of Israel, were gathered together, for to do
whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done.' And St.
Paul (Rom. ix. 16), 'It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that
runneth, but of God that showeth mercy.' And v. 18: 'Therefore hath he
mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth'; v. 19:
'Thou wilt say then unto me, why doth he yet find fault? For who hath
resisted his will?'; v. 20: 'Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest
against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, why hast
thou made me thus?' And 1 Cor. iv. 7: 'For who maketh thee to differ from
another? and what hast thou that thou didst not receive?' And 1 Cor. xii.
6: 'There are diversities of operations, but it is the same God which
worketh all in all.' And Eph. ii. 10: 'We are his workmanship, created in
Christ Jesus unto good works, which God hath before ordained that we should
walk in them.' And Phil. ii. 13: 'It is God which worketh in you both to
will and to do of his good pleasure.' One may add to these passages all
those which make God the author of all grace and of all good [401]
inclinations, and all those which say that we are as dead in sin.
10. Here now are the neutral passages, according to Mr. Hobbes. These are
those where Holy Scripture says that man has the choice to act if he wills,
or not to act if he wills not. For example Deut. xxx. 19: 'I call heaven
and earth to record this day against you, that I have set before you life
and death, blessing and cursing: therefore choose life, that both thou and
thy seed may live.' And Joshua xxiv. 15: 'Choose you this day whom ye will
serve.' And God said to Gad the prophet (2 Sam. xxiv. 12), 'Go and say unto
David: Thus saith the Lord, I offer thee three things; choose thee one of
them, that I may do it unto thee.' And Isa. vii. 16: 'Until the child shall
know to refuse the evil and choose the good.' Finally the passages which
Mr. Hobbes acknowledges to be apparently contrary to his opinion are all
those where it is indicated that the will of man is not in conformity with
that of God. Thus Isa. v. 4: 'What could have been done more to my
vineyard, that I have not done in it? Wherefore, when I looked that it
should bring forth grapes, brought it forth wild grapes?' And Jer. xix. 5:
'They have built also the high places of Baal, to burn their sons with fire
for burnt offerings unto Baal; which I commanded not, nor spake it, neither
came it into my mind.' And Hos. xiii. 9: 'O Israel, thou hast destroyed
thyself; but in me is thine help.' And I Tim. ii. 4: 'God will have all men
to be saved, and to come unto the knowledge of the truth.' He avows that he
could quote very many other passages, such as those which indicate that God
willeth not iniquity, that he willeth the salvation of the sinner, and
generally all those which declare that God commands good and forbids evil.
11. Mr. Hobbes makes answer to these passages that God does not always will
that which he commands, as for example when he commanded Abraham to
sacrifice his son, and that God's revealed will is not always his full will
or his decree, as when he revealed to Jonah that Nineveh would perish in
forty days. He adds also, that when it is said that God wills the salvation
of all, that means simply that God commands that all do that which is
necessary for salvation; when, moreover, the Scripture says that God wills
not sin, that means that he wills to punish it. And as for the rest, Mr.
Hobbes ascribes it to the forms of expression used among men. But one will
answer him that it would be to God's discredit that his revealed will [402]
should be opposed to his real will: that what he bade Jonah say to the
Ninevites was rather a threat than a prediction, and that thus the
condition of impenitence was implied therein; moreover the Ninevites took
it in this sense. One will say also, that it is quite true that God in
commanding Abraham to sacrifice his son willed obedience, but did not will
action, which he prevented after having obtained obedience; for that was
not an action deserving in itself to be willed. And it is not the same in
the case of actions where he exerts his will positively, and which are in
fact worthy to be the object of his will. Of such are piety, charity and
every virtuous action that God commands; of such is omission of sin, a
thing more alien to divine perfection than any other. It is therefore
incomparably better to explain the will of God as I have explained it in
this work. Thus I shall say that God, by virtue of his supreme goodness,
has in the beginning a serious inclination to produce, or to see and cause
to be produced, all good and every laudable action, and to prevent, or to
see and cause to fail, all evil and every bad action. But he is determined
by this same goodness, united to an infinite wisdom, and by the very
concourse of all the previous and particular inclinations towards each
good, and towards the preventing of each evil, to produce the best possible
design of things. This is his final and decretory will. And this design of
the best being of such a nature that the good must be enhanced therein, as
light is enhanced by shade, by some evil which is incomparably less than
this good, God could not have excluded this evil, nor introduced certain
goods that were excluded from this plan, without wronging his supreme
perfection. So for that reason one must say that he permitted the sins of
others, because otherwise he would have himself performed an action worse
than all the sin of creatures.
12. I find that the Bishop of Derry is at least justified in saying,
article XV, in his Reply, p. 153, that the opinion of his opponents is
contrary to piety, when they ascribe all to God's power only, and that Mr.
Hobbes ought not to have said that honour or worship is only a sign of the
power of him whom one honours: for one may also, and one must, acknowledge
and honour wisdom, goodness, justice and other perfections. _Magnos facile
laudamus, bonos libenter._ This opinion, which despoils God of all goodness
and of all true justice, which represents him as a Tyrant, wielding an
absolute power, independent of all right and of all equity, and [403]
creating millions of creatures to be eternally unhappy, and this without
any other aim than that of displaying his power, this opinion, I say, is
capable of rendering men very evil; and if it were accepted no other Devil
would be needed in the world to set men at variance among themselves and
with God; as the Serpent did in making Eve believe that God, when he
forbade her the fruit of the tree, did not will her good. Mr. Hobbes
endeavours to parry this thrust in his Rejoinder (p. 160) by saying that
goodness is a part of the power of God, that is to say, the power of making
himself worthy of love. But that is an abuse of terms by an evasion, and
confounds things that must be kept distinct. After all, if God does not
intend the good of intelligent creatures, if he has no other principles of
justice than his power alone, which makes him produce either arbitrarily
that which chance presents to him, or by necessity all that which is
possible, without the intervention of choice founded on good, how can he
make himself worthy of love? It is therefore the doctrine either of blind
power or of arbitrary power, which destroys piety: for the one destroys the
intelligent principle or the providence of God, the other attributes to him
actions which are appropriate to the evil principle. Justice in God, says
Mr. Hobbes (p. 161), is nothing but the power he has, which he exercises in
distributing blessings and afflictions. This definition surprises me: it is
not the power to distribute them, but the will to distribute them
reasonably, that is, goodness guided by wisdom, which makes the justice of
God. But, says he, justice is not in God as in a man, who is only just
through the observance of laws made by his superior. Mr. Hobbes is mistaken
also in that, as well as Herr Pufendorf, who followed him. Justice does not
depend upon arbitrary laws of superiors, but on the eternal rules of wisdom
and of goodness, in men as well as in God. Mr. Hobbes asserts in the same
passage that the wisdom which is attributed to God does not lie in a
logical consideration of the relation of means to ends, but in an
incomprehensible attribute, attributed to an incomprehensible nature to
honour it. It seems as if he means that it is an indescribable something
attributed to an indescribable something, and even a chimerical quality
given to a chimerical substance, to intimidate and to deceive the nations
through the worship which they render to it. After all, it is difficult for
Mr. Hobbes to have a different opinion of God and of wisdom, since he
admits only material substances. If Mr. Hobbes were still alive, I would
beware of ascribing to him opinions which might do him injury; but it [404]
is difficult to exempt him from this. He may have changed his mind
subsequently, for he attained to a great age; thus I hope that his errors
may not have been deleterious to him. But as they might be so to others, it
is expedient to give warnings to those who shall read the writings of one
who otherwise is of great merit, and from whom one may profit in many ways.
It is true that God does not reason, properly speaking, using time as we
do, to pass from one truth to the other: but as he understands at one and
the same time all the truths and all their connexions, he knows all the
conclusions, and he contains in the highest degree within himself all the
reasonings that we can develop. And just because of that his wisdom is
perfect.
[405]
* * * * *
OBSERVATIONS ON THE BOOK CONCERNING 'THE ORIGIN OF EVIL' PUBLISHED RECENTLY
IN LONDON
* * * * *
1. It is a pity that M. Bayle should have seen only the reviews of this
admirable work, which are to be found in the journals. If he had read it
himself and examined it properly, he would have provided us with a good
opportunity of throwing light on many difficulties, which spring again and
again like the head of the hydra, in a matter where it is easy to become
confused when one has not seen the whole system or does not take the
trouble to reason according to a strict plan. For strictness of reasoning
performs in subjects that transcend imagination the same function as
figures do in geometry: there must always be something capable of fixing
our attention and forming a connexion between our thoughts. That is why
when this Latin book, so learned and so elegant of style, printed
originally in London and then reprinted in Bremen, fell into my hands, I
judged that the seriousness of the matter and the author's merit required
an attention which readers might fairly expect of me, since we are agreed
only in regard to half of the subject. Indeed, as the work contains five
chapters, and the fifth with the appendix equals the rest in size, I have
observed that the first four, where it is a question of evil in general and
of physical evil in particular, are in harmony with my principles (save for
a few individual passages), and that they sometimes even develop with force
and eloquence some points I had treated but slightly because M. Bayle [406]
had not placed emphasis upon them. But the fifth chapter, with its sections
(of which some are equal to entire chapters) speaking of freedom and of the
moral evil dependent upon it, is constructed upon principles opposed to
mine, and often, indeed, to those of M. Bayle; that is, if it were possible
to credit him with any fixed principles. For this fifth chapter tends to
show (if that were possible) that true freedom depends upon an indifference
of equipoise, vague, complete and absolute; so that, until the will has
determined itself, there would be no reason for its determination, either
in him who chooses or in the object; and one would not choose what pleases,
but in choosing without reason one would cause what one chooses to be
pleasing.
2. This principle of choice without cause or reason, of a choice, I say,
divested of the aim of wisdom and goodness, is regarded by many as the
great privilege of God and of intelligent substances, and as the source of
their freedom, their satisfaction, their morality and their good or evil.
The fantasy of a power to declare one's independence, not only of
inclination, but of reason itself within and of good and evil without, is
sometimes painted in such fine colours that one might take it to be the
most excellent thing in the world. Nevertheless it is only a hollow
fantasy, a suppression of the reasons for the caprice of which one boasts.
What is asserted is impossible, but if it came to pass it would be harmful.
This fantastic character might be attributed to some Don Juan in a St.
Peter's Feast, and a man of romantic disposition might even affect the
outward appearances of it and persuade himself that he has it in reality.
But in Nature there will never be any choice to which one is not prompted
by the previous representation of good or evil, by inclinations or by
reasons: and I have always challenged the supporters of this absolute
indifference to show an example thereof. Nevertheless if I call fantastic
this choice whereto one is determined by nothing, I am far from calling
visionaries the supporters of that hypothesis, especially our gifted
author. The Peripatetics teach some beliefs of this nature; but it would be
the greatest injustice in the world to be ready to despise on that account
an Occam, a Suisset, a Cesalpino, a Conringius, men who still advocated
certain scholastic opinions which have been improved upon to-day.
3. One of these opinions, revived, however, and introduced by [407]
degenerate scholasticism, and in the Age of Chimeras, is vague indifference
of choice, or real chance, assumed in our souls; as if nothing gave us any
inclination unless we perceived it distinctly, and as if an effect could be
without causes, when these causes are imperceptible. It is much as some
have denied the existence of insensible corpuscles because they do not see
them. Modern philosophers have improved upon the opinions of the Schoolmen
by showing that, according to the laws of corporeal nature, a body can only
be set in motion by the movement of another body propelling it. Even so we
must believe that our souls (by virtue of the laws of spiritual nature) can
only be moved by some reason of good or evil: and this even when no
distinct knowledge can be extracted from our mental state, on account of a
concourse of innumerable little perceptions which make us now joyful and
now sad, or again of some other humour, and cause us to like one thing more
than another without its being possible to say why. Plato, Aristotle and
even Thomas Aquinas, Durand and other Schoolmen of the sounder sort reason
on that question like the generality of men, and as unprejudiced people
always have reasoned. They assume that freedom lies in the use of reason
and the inclinations, which cause the choice or rejection of objects. But
finally some rather too subtle philosophers have extracted from their
alembic an inexplicable notion of choice independent of anything
whatsoever, which is said to do wonders in solving all difficulties. But
the notion is caught up at the outset in one of the greatest difficulties,
by offending against the grand principle of reasoning which makes us always
assume that nothing is done without some sufficient cause or reason. As the
Schoolmen often forgot to apply this great principle, admitting certain
prime occult qualities, one need not wonder if this fiction of vague
indifference met with applause amongst them, and if even most worthy men
have been imbued therewith. Our author, who is otherwise rid of many of the
errors of the ordinary Schoolmen, is still deluded by this fiction: but he
is without doubt one of the most skilful of those who have supported it.
_Si Pergama dextra_
_Defendi possent, etiam hac defensa fuissent._
He gives it the best possible turn, and only shows it on its good side. He
knows how to strip spontaneity and reason of their advantages, [408]
transferring all these to vague indifference: only through this
indifference is one active, resisting the passions, taking pleasure in
one's choice, or being happy; it appears indeed that one would be miserable
if some happy necessity should oblige us to choose aright. Our author had
said admirable things on the origin and reasons of natural evils: he only
had to apply the same principles to moral evil; indeed, he believes himself
that moral evil becomes an evil through the physical evils that it causes
or tends to cause. But somehow or other he thinks that it would be a
degradation of God and men if they were to be made subject to reason; that
thus they would all be rendered passive to it and would no longer be
satisfied with themselves; in short that men would have nothing wherewith
to oppose the misfortunes that come to them from without, if they had not
within them this admirable privilege of rendering things good or tolerable
by choosing them, and of changing all into gold by the touch of this
wondrous faculty.
4. We will examine it in closer detail presently; but it will be well to
profit beforehand by the excellent ideas of our author on the nature of
things and on natural evils, particularly since there are some points in
which we shall be able to go a little further: by this means also we shall
gain a better understanding of the whole arrangement of his system. The
first chapter contains the principles. The writer calls substance a being
the idea of which does not involve the existence of another. I do not know
if there are any such among created beings, by reason of the connexion
existing between all things; and the example of a wax torch is not the
example of a substance, any more than that of a swarm of bees would be. But
one may take the terms in an extended sense. He observes aptly that after
all the changes of matter and after all the qualities of which it may be
divested, there remain extension, mobility, divisibility and resistance. He
explains also the nature of notions, and leaves it to be understood that
_universals_ indicate only the resemblances which exist between
_individuals_; that we understand by _ideas_ only that which is known
through an immediate sensation, and that the rest is known to us only
through relations with these ideas. But when he admits that we have no idea
of God, of spirit, of substance, he does not appear to have observed
sufficiently that we have immediate apperception of substance and of spirit
in our apperception of ourselves, and that the idea of God is found in[409]
the idea of ourselves through a suppression of the limits of our
perfections, as extension taken in an absolute sense is comprised in the
idea of a globe. He is right also in asserting that our simple ideas at
least are innate, and in rejecting the _Tabula rasa_ of Aristotle and of
Mr. Locke. But I cannot agree with him that our ideas have scarce any more
relation to things than words uttered into the air or writings traced upon
paper have to our ideas, and that the bearing of our sensations is
arbitrary and _ex instituto_, like the signification of words. I have
already indicated elsewhere why I am not in agreement with our Cartesians
on that point.
5. For the purpose of advancing to the first Cause, the author seeks a
criterion, a distinguishing mark of truth; and he finds it in the force
whereby our inward assertions, when they are evident, compel the
understanding to give them its consent. It is by such a process, he says,
that we credit the senses. He points out that the distinguishing mark in
the Cartesian scheme, to wit, a clear and distinct perception, has need of
a new mark to indicate what is clear and distinct, and that the congruity
or non-congruity of ideas (or rather of terms, as one spoke formerly) may
still be deceptive, because there are congruities real and apparent. He
appears to recognize even that the inward force which constrains us to give
our assent is still a matter for caution, and may come from deep-rooted
prejudices. That is why he confesses that he who should furnish another
criterion would have found something very advantageous to the human race. I
have endeavoured to explain this criterion in a little _Discourse on Truth
and Ideas_, published in 1684; and although I do not boast of having given
therein a new discovery I hope that I have expounded things which were only
confusedly recognized. I distinguish between truths of fact and truths of
reason. Truths of fact can only be verified by confronting them with truths
of reason, and by tracing them back to immediate perceptions within us,
such as St. Augustine and M. Descartes very promptly acknowledged to be
indubitable; that is to say, we cannot doubt that we think, nor indeed that
we think this thing or that. But in order to judge whether our inward
notions have any reality in things, and to pass from thoughts to objects,
my opinion is that it is necessary to consider whether our perceptions are
firmly connected among themselves and with others that we have had, in such
fashion as to manifest the rules of mathematics and other truths of [410]
reason. In this case one must regard them as real; and I think that it is
the only means of distinguishing them from imaginations, dreams and
visions. Thus the truth of things outside us can be recognized only through
the connexion of phenomena. The criterion of the truths of reason, or those
which spring from conceptions, is found in an exact use of the rules of
logic. As for ideas or notions, I call _real_ all those the possibility of
which is certain; and the _definitions_ which do not mark this possibility
are only _nominal_. Geometricians well versed in analysis are aware what
difference there is in this respect between several properties by which
some line or figure might be defined. Our gifted author has not gone so
far, perhaps; one may see, however, from the account I have given of him
already, and from what follows, that he is by no means lacking in
profundity or reflexion.
6. Thereafter he proceeds to examine whether motion, matter and space
spring from themselves; and to that end he considers whether it is possible
to conceive that they do not exist. He remarks upon this privilege of God,
that as soon as it is assumed that he exists it must be admitted that he
exists of necessity. This is a corollary to a remark which I made in the
little discourse mentioned above, namely that as soon as one admits that
God is possible, one must admit that he exists of necessity. Now, as soon
as one admits that God exists, one admits that he is possible. Therefore as
soon as one admits that God exists, one must admit that he exists of
necessity. Now this privilege does not belong to the three things of which
we have just spoken. The author believes also especially concerning motion,
that it is not sufficient to say, with Mr. Hobbes, that the present
movement comes from an anterior movement, and this one again from another,
and so on to infinity. For, however far back you may go, you will not be
one whit nearer to finding the reason which causes the presence of motion
in matter. Therefore this reason must be outside the sequence; and even if
there were an eternal motion, it would require an eternal motive power. So
the rays of the sun, even though they were eternal with the sun, would
nevertheless have their eternal cause in the sun. I am well pleased to
recount these arguments of our gifted author, that it may be seen how
important, according to him, is the principle of sufficient reason. For, if
it is permitted to admit something for which it is acknowledged there is no
reason, it will be easy for an atheist to overthrow this argument, by [411]
saying that it is not necessary that there be a sufficient reason for the
existence of motion. I will not enter into the discussion of the reality
and the eternity of space, for fear of straying too far from our subject.
It is enough to state that the author believes that space can be
annihilated by the divine power, but in entirety and not in portions, and
that we could exist alone with God even if there were neither space nor
matter, since we do not contain within ourselves the notion of the
existence of external things. He also puts forward the consideration that
in the sensations of sounds, of odours and of savours the idea of space is
not included. But whatever the opinion formed as to space, it suffices that
there is a God, the cause of matter and of motion, and in short of all
things. The author believes that we can reason about God, as one born blind
would reason about light. But I hold that there is something more in us,
for our light is a ray from God's light. After having spoken of some
attributes of God, the author acknowledges that God acts for an end, which
is the communication of his goodness, and that his works are ordered
aright. Finally he concludes this chapter very properly, by saying that God
in creating the world was at pains to give it the greatest harmony amongst
things, the greatest comfort of beings endowed with reason, and the
greatest compatibility in desires that an infinite power, wisdom and
goodness combined could produce. He adds that, if some evil has remained
notwithstanding, one must believe that these infinite divine perfections
could not have (I would rather say ought not to have) taken it away.
7. Chapter II anatomizes evil, dividing it as we do into metaphysical,
physical and moral. Metaphysical evil consists in imperfections, physical
evil in suffering and other like troubles, and moral evil in sin. All these
evils exist in God's work; Lucretius thence inferred that there is no
providence, and he denied that the world can be an effect of divinity:
_Naturam rerum divinitus esse creatam;_
because there are so many faults in the nature of things,
_quoniam tanta stat praedita culpa._
Others have admitted two principles, the one good, the other evil. There
have also been people who thought the difficulty insurmountable, and among
these our author appears to have had M. Bayle in mind. He hopes to [412]
show in his work that it is not a Gordian knot, which needs to be cut; and
he says rightly that the power, the wisdom and the goodness of God would
not be infinite and perfect in their exercise if these evils had been
banished. He begins with the evil of imperfection in Chapter III and
observes, as St. Augustine does, that creatures are imperfect, since they
are derived from nothingness, whereas God producing a perfect substance
from his own essence would have made thereof a God. This gives him occasion
for making a little digression against the Socinians. But someone will say,
why did not God refrain from producing things, rather than make imperfect
things? The author answers appositely that the abundance of the goodness of
God is the cause. He wished to communicate himself at the expense of a
certain fastidiousness which we assume in God, imagining that imperfections
offend him. Thus he preferred that there should be the imperfect rather
than nothing. But one might have added that God has produced indeed the
most perfect whole that was possible, one wherewith he had full cause for
satisfaction, the imperfections of the parts serving a greater perfection
in the whole. Also the observation is made soon afterwards, that certain
things might have been made better, but not without other new and _perhaps_
greater disadvantages. This _perhaps_ could have been omitted: for the
author also states as a certainty, and rightly so, at the end of the
chapter, _that it appertains to infinite goodness to choose the best_; and
thus he was able to draw this conclusion a little earlier, that imperfect
things will be added to those more perfect, so long as they do not preclude
the existence of the more perfect in as great a number as possible. Thus
bodies were created as well as spirits, since the one does not offer any
obstacle to the other; and the creation of matter was not unworthy of the
great God, as some heretics of old believed, attributing this work to a
certain Demogorgon.
8. Let us now proceed to physical evil, which is treated of in Chapter IV.
Our famous author, having observed that metaphysical evil, or imperfection,
springs from nothingness, concludes that physical evil, or discomfort,
springs from matter, or rather from its movement; for without movement
matter would be useless. Moreover there must be contrariety in these
movements; otherwise, if all went together in the same direction, there
would be neither variety nor generation. But the movements that cause [413]
generations cause also corruptions, since from the variety of movements
comes concussion between bodies, by which they are often dissipated and
destroyed. The Author of Nature however, in order to render bodies more
enduring, distributed them into _systems_, those which we know being
composed of luminous and opaque balls, in a manner so excellent and so
fitting for the display of that which they contain, and for arousing wonder
thereat, that we can conceive of nothing more beautiful. But the crowning
point of the work was the construction of animals, to the end that
everywhere there should be creatures capable of cognition,
_Ne regio foret ulla suis animalibus orba._
Our sagacious author believes that the air and even the purest aether have
their denizens as well as the water and the earth. But supposing that there
were places without animals, these places might have uses necessary for
other places which are inhabited. So for example the mountains, which
render the surface of our globe unequal and sometimes desert and barren,
are of use for the production of rivers and of winds; and we have no cause
to complain of sands and marshes, since there are so many places still
remaining to be cultivated. Moreover, it must not be supposed that all is
made for man alone: and the author is persuaded that there are not only
pure spirits but also immortal animals of a nature akin to these spirits,
that is, animals whose souls are united to an ethereal and incorruptible
matter. But it is not the same with animals whose body is terrestrial,
composed of tubes and fluids which circulate therein, and whose motion is
terminated by the breaking of the vessels. Thence the author is led to
believe that the immortality granted to Adam, if he had been obedient,
would not have been an effect of his nature, but of the grace of God.
9. Now it was necessary for the conservation of corruptible animals that
they should have indications causing them to recognize a present danger,
and giving them the inclination to avoid it. That is why what is about to
cause a great injury must beforehand cause pain such as may force the
animal to efforts capable of repulsing or shunning the cause of this
discomfort, and of forestalling a greater evil. The dread of death helps
also to cause its avoidance: for it if were not so ugly and if the
dissolution of continuity were not so painful, very often animals would
take no precautions against perishing, or allowing the parts of their [414]
body to perish, and the strongest would have difficulty in subsisting for a
whole day.
God has also given hunger and thirst to animals, to compel them to feed and
maintain themselves by replacing that which is used up and which disappears
imperceptibly. These appetites are of use also to prompt them to work, in
order to procure a nourishment meet for their constitution, and which may
avail to invigorate them. It was even found necessary by the Author of
things that one animal very often should serve as food for another. This
hardly renders the victim more unhappy, since death caused by diseases is
generally just as painful as a violent death, if not more so; and animals
subject to being preyed upon by others, having neither foresight nor
anxiety for the future, have a life no less tranquil when they are not in
danger. It is the same with inundations, earthquakes, thunderbolts and
other disorders, which brute beasts do not fear, and which men have
ordinarily no cause to fear, since there are few that suffer thereby.
10. The Author of Nature has compensated for these evils and others, which
happen only seldom, with a thousand advantages that are ordinary and
constant. Hunger and thirst augment the pleasure experienced in the taking
of nourishment. Moderate work is an agreeable exercise of the animal's
powers; and sleep is also agreeable in an altogether opposite way,
restoring the forces through repose. But one of the pleasures most intense
is that which prompts animals to propagation. God, having taken care to
ensure that the species should be immortal, since the individual cannot be
so here on earth, also willed that animals should have a great tenderness
for their little ones, even to the point of endangering themselves for
their preservation. From pain and from sensual pleasure spring fear,
cupidity and the other passions that are ordinarily serviceable, although
it may accidentally happen that they sometimes turn towards ill: one must
say as much of poisons, epidemic diseases and other hurtful things, namely
that these are indispensable consequences of a well-conceived system. As
for ignorance and errors, it must be taken into account that the most
perfect creatures are doubtless ignorant of much, and that knowledge is
wont to be proportionate to needs. Nevertheless it is necessary that one be
exposed to hazards which cannot be foreseen, and accidents of such kinds
are inevitable. One must often be mistaken in one's judgement, because it
is not always permitted to suspend it long enough for exact [415]
consideration. These disadvantages are inseparable from the system of
things: for things must very often resemble one another in a certain
situation, the one being taken for the other. But the inevitable errors are
not the most usual, nor the most pernicious. Those which cause us the most
harm are wont to arise through our fault; and consequently one would be
wrong to make natural evils a pretext for taking one's own life, since one
finds that those who have done so have generally been prompted to such
action by voluntary evils.
11. After all, one finds that all these evils of which we have spoken come
accidentally from good causes; and there is reason to infer concerning all
we do not know, from all we do know, that one could not have done away with
them without falling into greater troubles. For the better understanding of
this the author counsels us to picture the world as a great building. There
must be not only apartments, halls, galleries, gardens, grottoes, but also
the kitchen, the cellar, the poultry-yard, stables, drainage. Thus it would
not have been proper to make only suns in the world, or to make an earth
all of gold and of diamonds, but not habitable. If man had been all eye or
all ear, he would not have been fitted for feeding himself. If God had made
him without passions, he would have made him stupid; and if he had wished
to make man free from error he would have had to deprive him of senses, or
give him powers of sensation through some other means than organs, that is
to say, there would not have been any man. Our learned author remarks here
upon an idea which histories both sacred and profane appear to inculcate,
namely that wild beasts, poisonous plants and other natures that are
injurious to us have been armed against us by sin. But as he argues here
only in accordance with the principles of reason he sets aside what
Revelation can teach. He believes, however, that Adam would have been
exempted from natural evils (if he had been obedient) only by virtue of
divine grace and of a covenant made with God, and that Moses expressly
indicates only about seven effects of the first sin. These effects are: