241. Now at last I have disposed of the cause of moral evil; _physical
evil_, that is, sorrows, sufferings, miseries, will be less troublesome to
explain, since these are results of moral evil. _Poena est malum passionis,
quod infligitur ob malum actionis_, according to Grotius. One suffers
because one has acted; one suffers evil because one does evil.
_Nostrorum causa malorum_
_Nos sumus_.
It is true that one often suffers through the evil actions of others; but
when one has no part in the offence one must look upon it as a certainty
that these sufferings prepare for us a greater happiness. The question of
_physical evil_, that is, of the origin of sufferings, has difficulties in
common with that of the origin of _metaphysical evil_, examples whereof are
furnished by the monstrosities and other apparent irregularities of the
universe. But one must believe that even sufferings and monstrosities are
part of order; and it is well to bear in mind not only that it was better
to admit these defects and these monstrosities than to violate general
laws, as Father Malebranche sometimes argues, but also that these very
monstrosities are in the rules, and are in conformity with general acts of
will, though we be not capable of discerning this conformity. It is [277]
just as sometimes there are appearances of irregularity in mathematics
which issue finally in a great order when one has finally got to the bottom
of them: that is why I have already in this work observed that according to
my principles all individual events, without exception, are consequences of
general acts of will.
242. It should be no cause for astonishment that I endeavour to elucidate
these things by comparisons taken from pure mathematics, where everything
proceeds in order, and where it is possible to fathom them by a close
contemplation which grants us an enjoyment, so to speak, of the vision of
the ideas of God. One may propose a succession or series of numbers
perfectly irregular to all appearance, where the numbers increase and
diminish variably without the emergence of any order; and yet he who knows
the key to the formula, and who understands the origin and the structure of
this succession of numbers, will be able to give a rule which, being
properly understood, will show that the series is perfectly regular, and
that it even has excellent properties. One may make this still more evident
in lines. A line may have twists and turns, ups and downs, points of
reflexion and points of inflexion, interruptions and other variations, so
that one sees neither rhyme nor reason therein, especially when taking into
account only a portion of the line; and yet it may be that one can give its
equation and construction, wherein a geometrician would find the reason and
the fittingness of all these so-called irregularities. That is how we must
look upon the irregularities constituted by monstrosities and other
so-called defects in the universe.
243. In this sense one may apply that fine adage of St. Bernard (Ep. 276,
Ad Eugen., III): 'Ordinatissimum est, minus interdum ordinate fieri
aliquid.' It belongs to the great order that there should be some small
disorder. One may even say that this small disorder is apparent only in the
whole, and it is not even apparent when one considers the happiness of
those who walk in the ways of order.
244. When I mention monstrosities I include numerous other apparent defects
besides. We are acquainted with hardly anything but the surface of our
globe; we scarce penetrate into its interior beyond a few hundred fathoms.
That which we find in this crust of the globe appears to be the effect of
some great upheavals. It seems that this globe was once on fire, and that
the rocks forming the base of this crust of the earth are scoria remaining
from a great fusion. In their entrails are found metal and mineral [278]
products, which closely resemble those emanating from our furnaces: and the
entire sea may be a kind of _oleum per deliquium_, just as tartaric oil
forms in a damp place. For when the earth's surface cooled after the great
conflagration the moisture that the fire had driven into the air fell back
upon the earth, washed its surface and dissolved and absorbed the solid
salt that was left in the cinders, finally filling up this great cavity in
the surface of our globe, to form the ocean filled with salt water.
245. But, after the fire, one must conclude that earth and water made
ravages no less. It may be that the crust formed by the cooling, having
below it great cavities, fell in, so that we live only on ruins, as among
others Thomas Burnet, Chaplain to the late King of Great Britain, aptly
observed. Sundry deluges and inundations have left deposits, whereof traces
and remains are found which show that the sea was in places that to-day are
most remote from it. But these upheavals ceased at last, and the globe
assumed the shape that we see. Moses hints at these changes in few words:
the separation of light from darkness indicates the melting caused by the
fire; and the separation of the moist from the dry marks the effects of
inundations. But who does not see that these disorders have served to bring
things to the point where they now are, that we owe to them our riches and
our comforts, and that through their agency this globe became fit for
cultivation by us. These disorders passed into order. The disorders, real
or apparent, that we see from afar are sunspots and comets; but we do not
know what uses they supply, nor the rules prevailing therein. Time was when
the planets were held to be wandering stars: now their motion is found to
be regular. Peradventure it is the same with the comets: posterity will
know.
246. One does not include among the disorders inequality of conditions, and
M. Jacquelot is justified in asking those who would have everything equally
perfect, why rocks are not crowned with leaves and flowers? why ants are
not peacocks? And if there must needs be equality everywhere, the poor man
would serve notice of appeal against the rich, the servant against the
master. The pipes of an organ must not be of equal size. M. Bayle will say
that there is a difference between a privation of good and a disorder;
between a disorder in inanimate things, which is purely metaphysical, and a
disorder in rational creatures, which is composed of crime and [279]
sufferings. He is right in making a distinction between them, and I am
right in combining them. God does not neglect inanimate things: they do not
feel, but God feels for them. He does not neglect animals: they have not
intelligence, but God has it for them. He would reproach himself for the
slightest actual defect there were in the universe, even though it were
perceived of none.
247. It seems M. Bayle does not approve any comparison between the
disorders which may exist in inanimate things and those which trouble the
peace and happiness of rational creatures; nor would he agree to our
justifying the permission of vice on the pretext of the care that must be
taken to avoid disturbing the laws of motion. One might thence conclude,
according to him (posthumous Reply to M. Jacquelot, p. 183), 'that God
created the world only to display his infinite skill in architecture and
mechanics, whilst his property of goodness and love of virtue took no part
in the construction of this great work. This God would pride himself only
on skill; he would prefer to let the whole human kind perish rather than
suffer some atoms to go faster or more slowly than general laws require.'
M. Bayle would not have made this antithesis if he had been informed on the
system of general harmony which I assume, which states that the realm of
efficient causes and that of final causes are parallel to each other; that
God has no less the quality of the best monarch than that of the greatest
architect; that matter is so disposed that the laws of motion serve as the
best guidance for spirits; and that consequently it will prove that he has
attained the utmost good possible, provided one reckon the metaphysical,
physical and moral goods together.
248. But (M. Bayle will say) God having power to avert innumerable evils by
one small miracle, why did he not employ it? He gives so much extraordinary
help to fallen men; but slight help of such a kind given to Eve would have
prevented her fall and rendered the temptation of the serpent ineffective.
I have sufficiently met objections of this sort with this general answer,
that God ought not to make choice of another universe since he has chosen
the best, and has only made use of the miracles necessary thereto. I had
answered M. Bayle that miracles change the natural order of the universe.
He replies, that that is an illusion, and that the miracle of the wedding
at Cana (for instance) made no change in the air of the room, except that
instead of receiving into its pores some corpuscles of water, it [280]
received corpuscles of wine. But one must bear in mind that once the best
plan of things has been chosen nothing can be changed therein.
249. As for miracles (concerning which I have already said something in
this work), they are perhaps not all of one and the same kind: there are
many, to all appearances, which God brings about through the ministry of
invisible substances, such as the angels, as Father Malebranche also
believes. These angels or these substances act according to the ordinary
laws of their nature, being combined with bodies more rarefied and more
vigorous than those we have at our command. And such miracles are only so
by comparison, and in relation to us; just as our works would be considered
miraculous amongst animals if they were capable of remarking upon them. The
changing of water into wine might be a miracle of this kind. But the
Creation, the Incarnation and some other actions of God exceed all the
power of creatures and are truly miracles, or indeed Mysteries. If,
nevertheless, the changing of water into wine at Cana was a miracle of the
highest kind, God would have thereby changed the whole course of the
universe, because of the connexion of bodies; or else he would have been
bound to prevent this connexion miraculously also, and cause the bodies not
concerned in the miracle to act as if no miracle had happened. After the
miracle was over, it would have been necessary to restore all things in
those very bodies concerned to the state they would have reached without
the miracle: whereafter all would have returned to its original course.
Thus this miracle demanded more than at first appears.
250. As for physical evil in creatures, to wit their sufferings, M. Bayle
contends vigorously against those who endeavour to justify by means of
particular reasons the course of action pursued by God in regard to this.
Here I set aside the sufferings of animals, and I see that M. Bayle insists
chiefly on those of men, perhaps because he thinks that brute beasts have
no feeling. It is on account of the injustice there would be in the
sufferings of beasts that divers Cartesians wished to prove that they are
only machines, _quoniam sub Deo justo nemo innocens miser est_: it is
impossible that an innocent creature should be unhappy under such a master
as God. The principle is good, but I do not think it warrants the inference
that beasts have no feeling, because I think that, properly speaking,
perception is not sufficient to cause misery if it is not accompanied [281]
by reflexion. It is the same with happiness: without reflexion there is
none.
_O fortunatos nimium, sua qui bona norint!_
One cannot reasonably doubt the existence of pain among animals; but it
seems as if their pleasures and their pains are not so keen as they are in
man: for animals, since they do not reflect, are susceptible neither to the
grief that accompanies pain, nor to the joy that accompanies pleasure. Men
are sometimes in a state approaching that of the beasts, when they act
almost on instinct alone and simply on the impressions made by the
experience of the senses: and, in this state, their pleasures and their
pains are very slight.
251. But let us pass from the beasts and return to rational creatures. It
is with regard to them that M. Bayle discusses this question: whether there
is more physical evil than physical good in the world? (_Reply to the
Questions of a Provincial_, vol. II, ch. 75.) To settle it aright, one must
explain wherein these goods and evils lie. We are agreed that physical evil
is simply displeasure and under that heading I include pain, grief, and
every other kind of discomfort. But does physical good lie solely in
pleasure? M. Bayle appears to be of this opinion; but I consider that it
lies also in a middle state, such as that of health. One is well enough
when one has no ill; it is a degree of wisdom to have no folly:
_Sapientia prima est,_
_Stultitia caruisse_.
In the same way one is worthy of praise when one cannot with justice be
blamed:
_Si non culpabor, sat mihi laudis erit_.
That being the case, all the sensations not unpleasing to us, all the
exercises of our powers that do not incommode us, and whose prevention
would incommode us, are physical goods, even when they cause us no
pleasure; for privation of them is a physical evil. Besides we only
perceive the good of health, and other like goods, when we are deprived of
them. On those terms I would dare to maintain that even in this life goods
exceed evils, that our comforts exceed our discomforts, and that M.
Descartes was justified in writing (vol. I, Letter 9) 'that natural reason
teaches us that we have more goods than evils in this life'.
[282]
252. It must be added that pleasures enjoyed too often and to excess would
be a very great evil. There are some which Hippocrates compared to the
falling sickness, and Scioppius doubtless only made pretence of envying the
sparrows in order to be agreeably playful in a learned and far from playful
work. Highly seasoned foods are injurious to health and impair the niceness
of a delicate sense; and in general bodily pleasures are a kind of
expenditure of the spirit, though they be made good in some better than in
others.
253. As proof, however, that the evil exceeds the good is quoted the
instance of M. de la Motte le Vayer (Letter 134), who would not have been
willing to return to the world, supposing he had had to play the same part
as providence had already assigned to him. But I have already said that I
think one would accept the proposal of him who could re-knot the thread of
Fate if a new part were promised to us, even though it should not be better
than the first. Thus from M. de la Motte le Vayer's saying it does not
follow that he would not have wished for the part he had already played,
provided it had been new, as M. Bayle seems to take it.
254. The pleasures of the mind are the purest, and of greatest service in
making joy endure. Cardan, when already an old man, was so content with his
state that he protested solemnly that he would not exchange it for the
state of the richest of young men who at the same time was ignorant. M. de
la Motte le Vayer quotes the saying himself without criticizing it.
Knowledge has doubtless charms which cannot be conceived by those who have
not tasted them. I do not mean a mere knowledge of facts without that of
reasons, but knowledge like that of Cardan, who with all his faults was a
great man, and would have been incomparable without those faults.
_Felix, qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas!_
_Ille metus omnes et inexorabile fatum_
_Subjecit pedibus._
It is no small thing to be content with God and with the universe, not to
fear what destiny has in store for us, nor to complain of what befalls us.
Acquaintance with true principles gives us this advantage, quite other than
that the Stoics and the Epicureans derived from their philosophy. There is
as much difference between true morality and theirs as there is [283]
between joy and patience: for their tranquillity was founded only on
necessity, while ours must rest upon the perfection and beauty of things,
upon our own happiness.
255. What, then, shall we say of bodily sufferings? May they not be
sufficiently acute to disturb the sage's tranquillity? Aristotle assents;
the Stoics were of a different opinion, and even the Epicureans likewise.
M. Descartes revived the doctrine of these philosophers; he says in the
letter just quoted: 'that even amid the worst misfortunes and the most
overwhelming sufferings one may always be content, if only one knows how to
exercise reason'. M. Bayle says concerning this (_Reply to the Questions of
a Provincial_, vol. III, ch. 157, p. 991) 'that it is saying nothing, that
it is prescribing for us a remedy whose preparation hardly anyone
understands'. I hold that the thing is not impossible, and that men could
attain it by dint of meditation and practice. For apart from the true
martyrs and those who have been aided in wonderful wise from on high, there
have been counterfeits who imitated them. That Spanish slave who killed the
Carthaginian governor in order to avenge his master and who evinced great
joy in his deed, even in the greatest tortures, may shame the philosophers.
Why should not one go as far as he? One may say of an advantage, as of a
disadvantage:
_Cuivis potest accidere, quod cuiquam potest_.
256. But even to-day entire tribes, such as the Hurons, the Iroquois, the
Galibis and other peoples of America teach us a great lesson on this
matter: one cannot read without astonishment of the intrepidity and
well-nigh insensibility wherewith they brave their enemies, who roast them
over a slow fire and eat them by slices. If such people could retain their
physical superiority and their courage, and combine them with our
acquirements, they would surpass us in every way,
_Extat ut in mediis turris aprica casis_.
They would be, in comparison with us, as a giant to a dwarf, a mountain to
a hill:
_Quantus Eryx, et quantus Athos, gaudetque nivali_
_Vertice se attollens pater Apenninus ad auras._
[284]
257. All that which is effected by a wonderful vigour of body and mind in
these savages, who persist obstinately in the strangest point of honour,
might be acquired in our case by training, by well-seasoned mortifications,
by an overmastering joy founded on reason, by great practice in preserving
a certain presence of mind in the midst of the distractions and impressions
most liable to disturb it. Something of this kind is related of the ancient
Assassins, subjects and pupils of the Old Man or rather the Seigneur
(_Senior_) of the Mountain. Such a school (for a better purpose) would be
good for missionaries who would wish to return to Japan. The Gymnosophists
of the ancient Indians had perhaps something resembling this, and that
Calanus, who provided for Alexander the Great the spectacle of his burning
alive, had doubtless been encouraged by the great examples of his masters
and trained by great sufferings not to fear pain. The wives of these same
Indians, who even to-day ask to be burned with the bodies of their
husbands, seem still to keep something of the courage of those ancient
philosophers of their country. I do not expect that there should
straightway be founded a religious order whose purpose would be to exalt
man to that high pitch of perfection: such people would be too much above
the rest, and too formidable for the authorities. As it rarely happens that
people are exposed to extremes where such great strength of mind would be
needed, one will scarce think of providing for it at the expense of our
usual comforts, albeit incomparably more would be gained than lost thereby.
258. Nevertheless the very fact that one has no need of that great remedy
is a proof that the good already exceeds the evil. Euripides also said:
[Greek: pleiô ta chrêsta tôn kakôn einai brotois].
_Mala nostra longe judico vinci a bonis._
Homer and divers other poets were of another mind, and men in general agree
with them. The reason for this is that the evil arouses our attention
rather than the good: but this same reason proves that the evil is more
rare. One must therefore not credit the petulant expressions of Pliny, who
would have it that Nature is a stepmother, and who maintains that man is
the most unhappy and most vain of all creatures. These two epithets do not
agree: one is not so very unhappy, when one is full of oneself. It is [285]
true that men hold human nature only too much in contempt, apparently
because they see no other creatures capable of arousing their emulation;
but they have all too much self-esteem, and individually are but too easily
satisfied. I therefore agree with Meric Casaubon, who in his notes on the
Xenophanes of Diogenes Laertius praises exceedingly the admirable
sentiments of Euripides, going so far as to credit him with having said
things _quae spirant_ [Greek: theopneuston] _pectus_. Seneca (Lib. 4, c. 5,
_De Benefic._) speaks eloquently of the blessings Nature has heaped upon
us. M. Bayle in his _Dictionary_, article 'Xenophanes', brings up sundry
authorities against this, and among others that of the poet Diphilus in the
Collections of Stobaeus, whose Greek might be thus expressed in Latin:
_Fortuna cyathis bibere nos datis jubens,_
_Infundit uno terna pro bono mala._
259. M. Bayle believes that if it were a question only of the evil of
guilt, or of moral evil among men, the case would soon be terminated to the
advantage of Pliny, and Euripides would lose his action. To that I am not
opposed; our vices doubtless exceed our virtues, and this is the effect of
original sin. It is nevertheless true that also on that point men in
general exaggerate things, and that even some theologians disparage man so
much that they wrong the providence of the Author of mankind. That is why I
am not in favour of those who thought to do great honour to our religion by
saying that the virtues of the pagans were only _splendida peccata_,
splendid vices. It is a sally of St. Augustine's which has no foundation in
holy Scripture, and which offends reason. But here we are only discussing a
physical good and evil, and one must compare in detail the prosperities and
the adversities of this life. M. Bayle would wish almost to set aside the
consideration of health; he likens it to the rarefied bodies, which are
scarcely felt, like air, for example; but he likens pain to the bodies that
have much density and much weight in slight volume. But pain itself makes
us aware of the importance of health when we are bereft of it. I have
already observed that excess of physical pleasures would be a real evil,
and the matter ought not to be otherwise; it is too important for the
spirit to be free. Lactantius (_Divin. Instit._, lib. 3, cap. 18) had said
that men are so squeamish that they complain of the slightest ill, as if it
swallowed up all the goods they have enjoyed. M. Bayle says, concerning
this, that the very fact that men have this feeling warrants the [286]
judgement that they are in evil case, since it is feeling which measures
the extent of good or evil. But I answer that present feeling is anything
rather than the true measure of good and evil past and future. I grant that
one is in evil case while one makes these peevish reflexions; but that does
not exclude a previous state of well-being, nor imply that, everything
reckoned in and all allowance made, the good does not exceed the evil.
260. I do not wonder that the pagans, dissatisfied with their gods, made
complaints against Prometheus and Epimetheus for having forged so weak an
animal as man. Nor do I wonder that they acclaimed the fable of old
Silenus, foster-father of Bacchus, who was seized by King Midas, and as the
price of his deliverance taught him that ostensibly fine maxim that the
first and the greatest of goods was not to be born, and the second, to
depart from this life with dispatch (Cic., _Tuscul._, lib. 1). Plato
believed that souls had been in a happier state, and many of the ancients,
amongst others Cicero in his Consolation (according to the account of
Lactantius), believed that for their sins they were confined in bodies as
in a prison. They rendered thus a reason for our ills, and asserted their
prejudices against human life: for there is no such thing as a beautiful
prison. But quite apart from the consideration that, even according to
these same pagans, the evils of this life would be counterbalanced and
exceeded by the goods of past and future lives, I make bold to say that we
shall find, upon unbiassed scrutiny of the facts, that taking all in all
human life is in general tolerable. And adding thereto the motives of
religion, we shall be content with the order God has set therein. Moreover,
for a better judgement of our goods and our evils, it will be well to read
Cardan, _De Utilitate ex Adversis Capienda_, and Novarini, _De Occultis Dei
Beneficiis_.
261. M. Bayle dilates upon the misfortunes of the great, who are thought to
be the most fortunate: the constant experience of the fair aspect of their
condition renders them unaware of good, but greatly aware of evil. Someone
will say: so much the worse for them; if they know not how to enjoy the
advantages of nature and fortune, is that the fault of either? There are
nevertheless great men possessed of more wisdom, who know how to profit by
the favours God has shown them, who are easily consoled for their
misfortunes, and who even turn their own faults to account. M. Bayle [287]
pays no heed to that: he prefers to listen to Pliny, who thinks that
Augustus, one of the princes most favoured by fortune, experienced at least
as much evil as good. I admit that he found great causes of trouble in his
family and that remorse for having crushed the Republic may have tormented
him; but I think that he was too wise to grieve over the former, and that
Maecenas apparently made him understand that Rome had need of a master. Had
not Augustus been converted on this point, Vergil would never have said of
a lost soul:
_Vendidit hic auro patriam Dominumque potentem_
_Imposuit, fixit leges pretio atque refixit._
Augustus would have thought that he and Caesar were alluded to in these
lines, which speak of a master given to a free state. But there is every
indication that he applied it just as little to his dominion, which he
regarded as compatible with liberty and as a necessary remedy for public
evils, as the princes of to-day apply to themselves the words used of the
kings censured in M. de Cambray's _Telemachus_. Each one considers himself
within his rights. Tacitus, an unbiassed writer, justifies Augustus in two
words, at the beginning of his _Annals_. But Augustus was better able than
anyone to judge of his good fortune. He appears to have died content, as
may be inferred from a proof he gave of contentedness with his life: for in
dying he repeated to his friends a line in Greek, which has the
signification of that _Plaudite_ that was wont to be spoken at the
conclusion of a well-acted play. Suetonius quotes it:
[Greek: Dote kroton kai pantes hymeis meta charas ktypêsate.]
262. But even though there should have fallen to the lot of the human kind
more evil than good, it is enough where God is concerned that there is
incomparably more good than evil in the universe. Rabbi Maimonides (whose
merit is not sufficiently recognized in the statement that he is the first
of the Rabbis to have ceased talking nonsense) also gave wise judgement on
this question of the predominance of good over evil in the world. Here is
what he says in his _Doctor Perplexorum_ (cap. 12, p. 3): 'There arise
often in the hearts of ill-instructed persons thoughts which persuade them
there is more evil than good in the world: and one often finds in the poems
and songs of the pagans that it is as it were a miracle when something good
comes to pass, whereas evils are usual and constant. This error has [288]
taken hold not of the common herd only, those very persons who wish to be
considered wise have been beguiled thereby. A celebrated writer named
Alrasi, in his _Sepher Elohuth_, or Theosophy, amongst other absurdities
has stated that there are more evils than goods, and that upon comparison
of the recreations and the pleasures man enjoys in times of tranquillity
with the pains, the torments, the troubles, faults, cares, griefs and
afflictions whereby he is overwhelmed our life would prove to be a great
evil, and an actual penalty inflicted upon us to punish us.' Maimonides
adds that the cause of their extravagant error is their supposition that
Nature was made for them only, and that they hold of no account what is
separate from their person; whence they infer that when something
unpleasing to them occurs all goes ill in the universe.
263. M. Bayle says that this observation of Maimonides is not to the point,
because the question is whether among men evil exceeds good. But, upon
consideration of the Rabbi's words, I find that the question he formulates
is general, and that he wished to refute those who decide it on one
particular motive derived from the evils of the human race, as if all had
been made for man; and it seems as though the author whom he refutes spoke
also of good and evil in general. Maimonides is right in saying that if one
took into account the littleness of man in relation to the universe one
would comprehend clearly that the predominance of evil, even though it
prevailed among men, need not on that account occur among the angels, nor
among the heavenly bodies, nor among the elements and inanimate compounds,
nor among many kinds of animals. I have shown elsewhere that in supposing
that the number of the damned exceeds that of the saved (a supposition
which is nevertheless not altogether certain) one might admit that there is
more evil than good in respect of the human kind known to us. But I pointed
out that that neither precludes the existence of incomparably more good
than evil, both moral and physical, in rational creatures in general, nor
prevents the city of God, which contains all creatures, from being the most
perfect state. So also on consideration of the metaphysical good and evil
which is in all substances, whether endowed with or devoid of intelligence,
and which taken in such scope would include physical good and moral good,
one must say that the universe, such as it actually is, must be the best of
all systems.
[289]
264. Moreover, M. Bayle will not have it that our transgression should have
anything to do with the consideration of our sufferings. He is right when
it is simply a matter of appraising these sufferings; but the case is not
the same when one asks whether they should be ascribed to God, this indeed
being the principal cause of M. Bayle's difficulties when he places reason
or experience in opposition to religion. I know that he is wont to say that
it is of no avail to resort to our free will, since his objections tend
also to prove that the misuse of free will must no less be laid to the
account of God, who has permitted it and who has co-operated therein. He
states it as a maxim that for one difficulty more or less one must not
abandon a system. This he advances especially in favour of the methods of
the strict and the dogma of the Supralapsarians. For he supposes that one
can subscribe to their opinion, although he leaves all the difficulties in
their entirety, because the other systems, albeit they put an end to some
of the difficulties, cannot meet them all. I hold that the true system I
have expounded satisfies all. Nevertheless, even were that not so, I
confess that I cannot relish this maxim of M. Bayle's, and I should prefer
a system which would remove a great portion of the difficulties, to one
which would meet none of them. And the consideration of the wickedness of
men, which brings upon them well-nigh all their misfortunes, shows at least
that they have no right to complain. No justice need trouble itself over
the origin of a scoundrel's wickedness when it is only a question of
punishing him: it is quite another matter when it is a question of
prevention. One knows well that disposition, upbringing, conversation, and
often chance itself, have much share in that origin: is the man any the
less deserving of punishment?
265. I confess that there still remains another difficulty. If God is not
bound to account to the wicked for their wickedness, it seems as if he owes
to himself, and to those who honour him and love him, justification for his
course of action with regard to the permission of vice and crime. But God
has already given that satisfaction, as far as it is needed here on earth:
by granting us the light of reason he has bestowed upon us the means
whereby we may meet all difficulties. I hope that I have made it plain in
this discourse, and have elucidated the matter in the preceding portion of
these Essays, almost as far as it can be done through general arguments.
Thereafter, the permission of sin being justified, the other evils [290]
that are a consequence thereof present no further difficulty. Thus also I
am justified in restricting myself here to the evil of guilt to account for
the evil of punishment, as Holy Scripture does, and likewise well-nigh all
the Fathers of the Church and the Preachers. And, to the end that none may
say that is only good _per la predica_, it is enough to consider that,
after the solutions I have given, nothing must seem more right or more
exact than this method. For God, having found already among things
possible, before his actual decrees, man misusing his freedom and bringing
upon himself his misfortune, yet could not avoid admitting him into
existence, because the general plan required this. Wherefore it will no
longer be necessary to say with M. Jurieu that one must dogmatize like St.
Augustine and preach like Pelagius.
266. This method, deriving the evil of punishment from the evil of guilt,
cannot be open to censure, and serves especially to account for the
greatest physical evil, which is damnation. Ernst Sonner, sometime
Professor of Philosophy at Altorf (a university established in the
territory of the free city of Nuremberg), who was considered an excellent
Aristotelian, but was finally recognized as being secretly a Socinian, had
composed a little discourse entitled: _Demonstration against the Eternity
of Punishment_. It was founded on this somewhat trite principle, that there
is no proportion between an infinite punishment and a finite guilt. It was
conveyed to me, printed (so it seemed) in Holland; and I replied that there
was one thing to be considered which had escaped the late Herr Sonner:
namely that it was enough to say that the duration of the guilt caused the
duration of the penalty. Since the damned remained wicked they could not be
withdrawn from their misery; and thus one need not, in order to justify the
continuation of their sufferings, assume that sin has become of infinite
weight through the infinite nature of the object offended, who is God. This
thesis I had not explored enough to pass judgement thereon. I know that the
general opinion of the Schoolmen, according to the Master of the Sentences,
is that in the other life there is neither merit nor demerit; but I do not
think that, taken literally, it can pass for an article of faith. Herr
Fecht, a famous theologian at Rostock, well refuted that in his book on
_The State of the Damned_. It is quite wrong, he says (§ 59); God cannot
change his nature; justice is essential to him; death has closed the door
of grace, but not that of justice.
[291]
267. I have observed that sundry able theologians have accounted for the
duration of the pains of the damned as I have just done. Johann Gerhard, a
famous theologian of the Augsburg Confession (in _Locis Theol._, loco de
Inferno, § 60), brings forward amongst other arguments that the damned have
still an evil will and lack the grace that could render it good. Zacharias
Ursinus, a theologian of Heidelberg, who follows Calvin, having formulated
this question (in his treatise _De Fide_) why sin merits an eternal
punishment, advances first the common reason, that the person offended is
infinite, and then also this second reason, _quod non cessante peccato non
potest cessare poena_. And the Jesuit Father Drexler says in his book
entitled _Nicetas, or Incontinence Overcome_ (book 2, ch. 11, § 9): 'Nec
mirum damnatos semper torqueri, continue blasphemant, et sic quasi semper
peccant, semper ergo plectuntur.' He declares and approves the same reason
in his work on _Eternity_ (book 2, ch. 15) saying: 'Sunt qui dicant, nec
displicet responsum: scelerati in locis infernis semper peccant, ideo
semper puniuntur.' And he indicates thereby that this opinion is very
common among learned men in the Roman Church. He alleges, it is true,
another more subtle reason, derived from Pope Gregory the Great (lib. 4,
Dial. c. 44), that the damned are punished eternally because God foresaw by
a kind of _mediate knowledge_ that they would always have sinned if they
had always lived upon earth. But it is a hypothesis very much open to
question. Herr Fecht quotes also various eminent Protestant theologians for
Herr Gerhard's opinion, although he mentions also some who think
differently.
268. M. Bayle himself in various places has supplied me with passages from
two able theologians of his party, which have some reference to these
statements of mine. M. Jurieu in his book on the _Unity of the Church_, in
opposition to that written by M. Nicole on the same subject, gives the
opinion (p. 379) 'that reason tells us that a creature which cannot cease
to be criminal can also not cease to be miserable'. M. Jacquelot in his
book on _The Conformity of Faith with Reason_ (p. 220) is of opinion 'that
the damned must remain eternally deprived of the glory of the blessed, and
that this deprivation might well be the origin and the cause of all their
pains, through the reflexions these unhappy creatures make upon their
crimes which have deprived them of an eternal bliss. One knows what burning
regrets, what pain envy causes to those who see themselves deprived of a
good, of a notable honour which had been offered to them, and which [292]
they rejected, especially when they see others invested with it.' This
position is a little different from that of M. Jurieu, but both agree in
this sentiment, that the damned are themselves the cause of the
continuation of their torments. M. le Clerc's Origenist does not entirely
differ from this opinion when he says in the _Select Library_ (vol. 7, p.
341): 'God, who foresaw that man would fall, does not condemn him on that
account, but only because, although he has the power to recover himself, he
yet does not do so, that is, he freely retains his evil ways to the end of
his life.' If he carries this reasoning on beyond this life, he will
ascribe the continuation of the pains of the wicked to the continuation of
their guilt.
269. M. Bayle says (_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, ch. 175, p.
1188) 'that this dogma of the Origenist is heretical, in that it teaches
that damnation is not founded simply on sin, but on voluntary impenitence':
but is not this voluntary impenitence a continuation of sin? I would not
simply say, however, that it is because man, having the power to recover
himself, does not; and would wish to add that it is because man does not
take advantage of the succour of grace to aid him to recover himself. But
after this life, though one assume that the succour ceases, there is always
in the man who sins, even when he is damned, a freedom which renders him
culpable, and a power, albeit remote, of recovering himself, even though it
should never pass into action. And there is no reason why one may not say
that this degree of freedom, exempt from necessity, but not exempt from
certainty, remains in the damned as well as in the blessed. Moreover, the
damned have no need of a succour that is needed in this life, for they know
only too well what one must believe here.
270. The illustrious prelate of the Anglican Church who published recently
a book on the origin of evil, concerning which M. Bayle made some
observations in the second volume of his _Reply_, speaks with much subtlety
about the pains of the damned. This prelate's opinion is presented
(according to the author of the _Nouvelles de la République des Lettres_,
June 1703) as if he made 'of the damned just so many madmen who will feel
their miseries acutely, but who will nevertheless congratulate themselves
on their own behaviour, and who will rather choose to be, and to be that
which they are, than not to be at all. They will love their state, unhappy
as it will be, even as angry people, lovers, the ambitious, the [293]
envious take pleasure in the very things that only augment their misery.
Furthermore the ungodly will have so accustomed their mind to wrong
judgements that they will henceforth never make any other kind, and will
perpetually pass from one error into another. They will not be able to
refrain from desiring perpetually things whose enjoyment will be denied
them, and, being deprived of which, they will fall into inconceivable
despair, while experience can never make them wiser for the future. For by
their own fault they will have altogether corrupted their understanding,
and will have rendered it incapable of passing a sound judgement on any
matter.'
271. The ancients already imagined that the Devil dwells remote from God
voluntarily, in the midst of his torments, and that he is unwilling to
redeem himself by an act of submission. They invented a tale that an
anchorite in a vision received a promise from God that he would receive
into grace the Prince of the bad angels if he would acknowledge his fault;
but that the devil rebuffed this mediator in a strange manner. At the
least, the theologians usually agree that the devils and the damned hate
God and blaspheme him; and such a state cannot but be followed by
continuation of misery. Concerning that, one may read the learned treatise
of Herr Fecht on the _State of the Damned_.
272. There were times when the belief was held that it was not impossible
for a lost soul to be delivered. The story told of Pope Gregory the Great
is well known, how by his prayers he had withdrawn from hell the soul of
the Emperor Trajan, whose goodness was so renowned that to new emperors the
wish was offered that they should surpass Augustus in good fortune and
Trajan in goodness. It was this that won for the latter the pity of the
Holy Father. God acceded to his prayers (it is said), but he forbade him to
make the like prayers in future. According to this fable, the prayers of
St. Gregory had the force of the remedies of Aesculapius, who recalled
Hippolytus from Hades; and, if he had continued to make such prayers, God
would have waxed wroth, like Jupiter in Vergil:
_At pater omnipotens aliquem indignatus ab umbris_
_Mortalem infernis ad lumina surgere vitae,_
_Ipse repertorem medicinae talis et artis_
_Fulmine Phoebigenam Stygias detrusit ad undas._
[294]
Godescalc, a monk of the ninth century, who set at variance the theologians
of his day, and even those of our day, maintained that the reprobate should
pray God to render their pains more bearable; but one is never justified in
believing oneself reprobate so long as one is alive. The passage in the
Mass for the dead is more reasonable: it asks for the abatement of the
torments of the damned, and, according to the hypothesis that I have just
stated, one must wish for them _meliorem mentem_. Origen having applied the
passage from Psalm lxxvii, verse 10: God will not forget to be gracious,
neither will he shut up his loving-kindness in displeasure, St. Augustine
replies _(Enchirid._, c. 112) that it is possible that the pains of the
damned last eternally, and that they may nevertheless be mitigated. If the
text implied that, the abatement would, as regards its duration, go on to
infinity; and yet that abatement would, as regards its extent, have a _non
plus ultra_. Even so there are asymptote figures in geometry where an
infinite length makes only a finite progress in breadth. If the parable of
the wicked rich man represented the state of a definitely lost soul, the
hypothesis which makes these souls so mad and so wicked would be
groundless. But the charity towards his brothers attributed to him in the
parable does not seem to be consistent with that degree of wickedness which
is ascribed to the damned. St. Gregory the Great (IX _Mor._, 39) thinks
that the rich man was afraid lest their damnation should increase his: but
it seems as though this fear is not sufficiently consistent with the
disposition of a perfectly wicked will. Bonaventura, on the Master of the
Sentences, says that the wicked rich man would have desired to see everyone
damned; but since that was not to be, he desired the salvation of his
brothers rather than that of the rest. This reply is by no means sound. On
the contrary, the mission of Lazarus that he desired would have served to
save many people; and he who takes so much pleasure in the damnation of
others that he desires it for everyone will perhaps desire that damnation
for some more than others; but, generally speaking, he will have no
inclination to gain salvation for anyone. However that may be, one must
admit that all this detail is problematical, God having revealed to us all
that is needed to put us in fear of the greatest of misfortunes, and not
what is needed for our understanding thereof.
273. Now since it is henceforth permitted to have recourse to the misuse of
free will, and to evil will, in order to account for other evils, [295]
since the divine permission of this misuse is plainly enough justified, the
ordinary system of the theologians meets with justification at the same
time. Now we can seek with confidence _the origin of evil in the freedom of
creatures_. The first wickedness is well known to us, it is that of the
Devil and his angels: the Devil sinneth from the beginning, and for this
purpose the Son of God was manifested, that he might destroy the works of
the Devil (1 John iii. 8). The Devil is the father of wickedness, he was a
murderer from the beginning, and abode not in the truth (John viii. 44).
And therefore God spared not the angels that sinned, but cast them down to
Hell, and delivered them into chains of darkness, to be reserved unto
judgement (2 Pet. ii. 4). And the angels which kept not their own
habitation, he hath reserved in _eternal_ (that is to say everlasting)
chains under darkness unto the judgement of the great day (Jude i. 6).
Whence it is easy to observe that one of these two letters must have been
seen by the author of the other.
274. It seems as if the author of the Apocalypse wished to throw light upon
what the other canonical writers had left obscure: he gives us an account
of a battle that took place in Heaven. Michael and his angels fought
against the Dragon, and the Dragon fought and his angels. 'But they
prevailed not, neither was their place found any more in heaven. And the
great Dragon was cast out, that old serpent, called the Devil, and Satan,
which deceiveth the whole world: and he was cast out into the earth, and
his angels were cast out with him' (Rev. xii. 7, 8, 9). For although this
account is placed after the flight of the woman into the wilderness, and it
may have been intended to indicate thereby some revulsion favourable to the
Church, it appears as though the author's design was to show simultaneously
the old fall of the first enemy and a new fall of a new enemy.
275. Lying or wickedness springs from the Devil's own nature, [Greek: ek
tôn idiôn] from his will, because it was written in the book of the eternal
verities, which contains the things possible before any decree of God, that
this creature would freely turn toward evil if it were created. It is the
same with Eve and Adam; they sinned freely, albeit the Devil tempted them.
God gives the wicked over to a reprobate mind (Rom. i. 28), abandoning them
to themselves and denying them a grace which he owes them not, and indeed
ought to deny to them.
276. It is said in the Scriptures that God hardeneth (Exod. iv. 21 and[296]
vii. 3; Isa. lxiii. 17); that God sendeth a lying spirit (1 Kings xxii.
23); strong delusion that they should believe a lie (2 Thess. ii. 11); that
he deceived the prophet (Ezek. xiv. 9); that he commanded Shimei to curse
(2 Sam xvi. 10); that the children of Eli hearkened not unto the voice of
their father, because the Lord would slay them (1 Sam. ii. 25); that the
Lord took away Job's substance, even although that was done through the
malice of brigands (Job i. 21); that he raised up Pharaoh, to show his
power in him (Exod. ix. 19; Rom. ix. 17) that he is like a potter who
maketh a vessel unto dishonour (Rom. ix. 21); that he hideth the truth from
the wise and prudent (Matt. xi. 25); that he speaketh in parables unto them
that are without, that seeing they may see and not perceive, and hearing
they may hear and not understand, lest at any time they might be converted,
and their sins might be forgiven them (Mark iv. 12; Luke viii. 10); that
Jesus was delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God
(Acts ii. 23); that Pontius Pilate and Herod with the Gentiles and the
people of Israel did that which the hand and the counsel of God had
determined before to be done (Acts iv. 27, 28); that it was of the Lord to
harden the hearts of the enemy, that they should come against Israel in
battle, that he might destroy them utterly, and that they might have no
favour (Joshua xi. 20); that the Lord mingled a perverse spirit in the
midst of Egypt, and caused it to err in all its works, like a drunken man
(Isa. xix. 14); that Rehoboam hearkened not unto the word of the people,
for the cause was from the Lord (1 Kings xii. 15); that he turned the
hearts of the Egyptians to hate his people (Ps. cv. 25). But all these and
other like expressions suggest only that the things God has done are used
as occasion for ignorance, error, malice and evil deeds, and contribute
thereto, God indeed foreseeing this, and intending to use it for his ends,
since superior reasons of perfect wisdom have determined him to permit
these evils, and even to co-operate therein. 'Sed non sineret bonus fieri
male, nisi omnipotens etiam de malo posset facere bene', in St. Augustine's
words. But this has been expounded more fully in the preceding part.
277. God made man in his image (Gen. i. 26); he made him upright (Eccles.
vii. 29). But also he made him free. Man has behaved badly, he has fallen;
but there remains still a certain freedom after the fall. Moses said as
from God: 'I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that I
have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing; therefore [297]
choose life' (Deut. xxx. 19). 'Thus saith the Lord: Behold, I set before
you the way of life, and the way of death' (Jer. xxi. 8). He has left man
in the power of his counsel, giving him his ordinances and his
commandments. 'If thou wilt, thou shalt keep the commandments' (or they
shall keep thee). 'He hath set before thee fire and water, to stretch forth
thine hand to whichever thou wilt' (Sirach xv. 14, 15, 16). Fallen and
unregenerate man is under the domination of sin and of Satan, because it
pleases him so to be; he is a voluntary slave through his evil lust. Thus
it is that free will and will in bondage are one and the same thing.
278. 'Let no man say, I am tempted of God'; 'but every man is tempted, when
he is drawn away of his own lust and enticed' (Jas. i. 13, 14). And Satan
contributes thereto. He 'blindeth the minds of them which believe not' (2
Cor. iv. 4). But man is delivered up to the Devil by his covetous desire:
the pleasure he finds in evil is the bait that hooks him. Plato has said so
already, and Cicero repeats it: 'Plato voluptatem dicebat escam malorum.'
Grace sets over against it a greater pleasure, as St. Augustine observed.
All _pleasure_ is a feeling of some perfection; one _loves_ an object in
proportion as one feels its perfections; nothing surpasses the divine
perfections. Whence it follows that charity and love of God give the
greatest pleasure that can be conceived, in that proportion in which one is
penetrated by these feelings, which are not common among men, busied and
taken up as men are with the objects that are concerned with their
passions.
279. Now as our corruption is not altogether invincible and as we do not
necessarily sin even when we are under the bondage of sin, it must likewise
be said that we are not aided invincibly; and, however efficacious divine
grace may be, there is justification for saying that one can resist it. But
when it indeed proves victorious, it is certain and infallible beforehand
that one will yield to its allurements, whether it have its strength of
itself or whether it find a way to triumph through the congruity of
circumstances. Thus one must always distinguish between the infallible and
the necessary.
280. The system of those who call themselves Disciples of St. Augustine is
not far removed from this, provided one exclude certain obnoxious things,
whether in the expressions or in the dogmas themselves. In the
_expressions_ I find that it is principally the use of terms like [298]
'necessary' or 'contingent', 'possible' or 'impossible', which sometimes
gives a handle and causes much ado. That is why, as Herr Löscher the
younger aptly observed in a learned dissertation on the _Paroxysms of the
Absolute Decree_, Luther desired, in his book _On the Will in Bondage_, to
find a word more fitting for that which he wished to express than the word
necessity. Speaking generally, it appears more reasonable and more fitting
to say that obedience to God's precepts is always _possible_, even for the
unregenerate; that the grace of God is always _resistible_, even in those
most holy, and that _freedom_ is exempt not only from _constraint_ but also
from _necessity_, although it be never without infallible _certainty_ or
without inclining _determination_.
281. Nevertheless there is on the other hand a sense wherein it would be
permitted to say, in certain conjunctures, that the _power_ to do good is
often lacking, even in the just; that sins are often _necessary_, even in
the regenerate; that it is _impossible_ sometimes for one not to sin; that
grace is _irresistible_; that freedom is not exempt from _necessity_. But
these expressions are less exact and less pleasing in the circumstances
that prevail about us to-day. They are also in general more open to misuse;
and moreover they savour somewhat of the speech of the people, where terms
are employed with great latitude. There are, however, circumstances which
render them acceptable and even serviceable. It is the case that sacred and
orthodox writers, and even the holy Scriptures, have made use of
expressions on both sides, and no real contradiction has arisen, any more
than between St. Paul and St. James, or any error on either side that might
be attributable to the ambiguity of the terms. One is so well accustomed to
these various ways of speaking that often one is put to it to say precisely
which sense is the more ordinary and the more natural, and even that more
intended by the author (_quis sensus magis naturalis, obvius, intentus_).
For the same writer has different aims in different passages, and the same
ways of speaking are more or less accepted or acceptable before or after
the decision of some great man or of some authority that one respects and
follows. As a result of this one may well authorize or ban, as opportunity
arises and at certain times, certain expressions; but it makes no
difference to the sense, or to the content of faith, if sufficient
explanations of the terms are not added.
282. It is therefore only necessary to understand fully some distinctions,
such as that I have very often urged between the necessary and the [299]
certain, and between metaphysical necessity and moral necessity. It is the
same with possibility and impossibility, since the event whose opposite is
possible is contingent, even as that whose opposite is impossible is
necessary. A distinction is rightly drawn also between a proximate potency
and a remote potency; and, according to these different senses, one says
now that a thing may be and now that it may not be. It may be said in a
certain sense that it is necessary that the blessed should not sin; that
the devils and the damned should sin; that God himself should choose the
best; that man should follow the course which after all attracts him most.
But this necessity is not opposed to contingency; it is not of the kind
called logical, geometrical or metaphysical, whose opposite implies
contradiction. M. Nicole has made use somewhere of a comparison which is
not amiss. It is considered impossible that a wise and serious magistrate,
who has not taken leave of his senses, should publicly commit some
outrageous action, as it would be, for instance, to run about the streets
naked in order to make people laugh. It is the same, in a sense, with the
blessed; they are still less capable of sinning, and the necessity that
forbids them to sin is of the same kind. Finally I also hold that 'will' is
a term as equivocal as potency and necessity. For I have already observed
that those who employ this axiom, that one does not fail to do what one
wills when one can, and who thence infer that God therefore does not will
the salvation of all, imply a _decretory will_. Only in that sense can one
support this proposition, that wisdom never wills what it knows to be among
the things that shall not happen. On the other hand, one may say, taking
will in a sense more general and more in conformity with customary use,
that the wise will is _inclined_ antecedently to all good, although it
_decrees_ finally to do that which is most fitting. Thus one would be very
wrong to deny to God the serious and strong inclination to save all men,
which Holy Scripture attributes to him; or even to attribute to him an
original distaste which diverts him from the salvation of a number of
persons, _odium antecedaneum_. One should rather maintain that the wise
mind tends towards all good, as good, in proportion to his knowledge and
his power, but that he only produces the best that can be achieved. Those
who admit that, and yet deny to God the antecedent will to save all men,
are wrong only in their misuse of the term, provided that they acknowledge,
besides, that God gives to all help sufficient to enable them to win [300]
salvation if only they have the will to avail themselves thereof.
283. In the _dogmas_ themselves held by the Disciples of St. Augustine I
cannot approve the damnation of unregenerate children, nor in general
damnation resulting from original sin alone. Nor can I believe that God
condemns those who are without the necessary light. One may believe, with
many theologians, that men receive more aid than we are aware of, were it
only when they are at the point of death. It does not appear necessary
either that all those who are saved should always be saved through a grace
efficacious of itself, independently of circumstances. Also I consider it
unnecessary to say that all the virtues of the pagans were false or that
all their actions were sins; though it be true that what does not spring
from faith, or from the uprightness of the soul before God, is infected
with sin, at least virtually. Finally I hold that God cannot act as if at
random by an absolutely absolute decree, or by a will independent of
reasonable motives. And I am persuaded that he is always actuated, in the
dispensation of his grace, by reasons wherein the nature of the objects
participates. Otherwise he would not act in accordance with wisdom. I grant
nevertheless that these reasons are not of necessity bound up with the good
or the less evil natural qualities of men, as if God gave his grace only
according to these good qualities. Yet I hold, as I have explained already
here, that these qualities are taken into consideration like all the other
circumstances, since nothing can be neglected in the designs of supreme
wisdom.
284. Save for these points, and some few others, where St. Augustine
appears obscure or even repellent, it seems as though one can conform to
his system. He states that from the substance of God only a God can
proceed, and that thus the creature is derived from nothingness (Augustine
_De Lib. Arb._, lib. 1, c. 2). That is what makes the creature imperfect,
faulty and corruptible (_De Genesi ad Lit._, c. 15, _Contra Epistolam
Manichaei_, c. 36). Evil comes not from nature, but from evil will
(Augustine, in the whole book _On the Nature of Good_). God can command
nothing that would be impossible. 'Firmissime creditur Deum justum et bonum
impossibilia non potuisse praecipere' (_Lib. de Nat. et Grat._, c. 43, p.
69). Nemo peccat in eo, quod caveri non potest (lib. 3, _De Lib. Arb._, c.
16, 17, _lib._ 1 _Retract._ c. 11, 13, 15). Under a just God, none can be
unhappy who deserves not so to be, 'neque sub Deo justo miser esse [301]
quisquam, nisi mereatur, potest' (lib. 1, c. 39). Free will cannot carry
out God's commands without the aid of grace (_Ep. ad Hilar.
Caesaraugustan._). We know that grace is not given according to deserts
(Ep. 106, 107, 120). Man in the state of innocence had the aid necessary to
enable him to do good if he wished; but the wish depended on free will,
'habebat adjutorium, per quod posset, et sine quo non vellet, sed non
adjutorium quo vellet' (_Lib. de Corrept._, c. 11 et c. 10, 12). God let
angels and men try what they could do by their free will, and after that
what his grace and his justice could achieve (ibid., c. 10, 11, 12). Sin
turned man away from God, to turn him towards creatures (lib. 1, qu. 2, _Ad
Simplicium_). To take pleasure in sinning is the freedom of a slave
(_Enchirid._, c. 103). 'Liberum arbitrium usque adeo in peccatore non
periit, ut per illud peccent maxime omnes, qui cum delectatione peccant'
(lib. 1, _Ad Bonifac._, c. 2, 3).
285. God said to Moses: 'I will be gracious to whom I will be gracious, and
will shew mercy on whom I will shew mercy' (Exod. xxxiii. 19). 'So then it
is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that
sheweth mercy' (Rom. ix. 15, 16). That does not prevent all those who have
good will, and who persevere therein, from being saved. But God gives them
the willing and the doing. 'Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have
mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth' (Rom. ix. 18). And yet the same
Apostle says that God willeth that all men should be saved, and come to the
knowledge of the truth; which I would not interpret in accordance with some
passages of St. Augustine, as if it signified that no men are saved except
those whose salvation he wills, or as if he would save _non singulos
generum, sed genera singulorum_. But I would rather say that there is none
whose salvation he willeth not, in so far as this is permitted by greater
reasons. For these bring it about that God only saves those who accept the
faith he has offered to them and who surrender themselves thereto by the
grace he has given them, in accordance with what was consistent with the
plan of his works in its entirety, than which none can be better conceived.
286. As for predestination to salvation, it includes also, according to St.
Augustine, the ordinance of the means that shall lead to salvation.
'Praedestinatio sanctorum nihil aliud est, quam praescientia et praeparatio
beneficiorum Dei, quibus certissime liberantur quicunque liberantur' (_Lib.
de Persev._, c. 14). He does not then understand it there as an [302]
absolute decree; he maintains that there is a grace which is not rejected
by any hardened heart, because it is given in order to remove especially
the hardness of hearts (_Lib. de Praedest._, c. 8; _Lib. de Grat._, c. 13,
14). I do not find, however, that St. Augustine conveys sufficiently that
this grace, which subdues the heart, is always efficacious of itself. And
one might perhaps have asserted without offence to him that the same degree
of inward grace is victorious in the one, where it is aided by outward
circumstances, but not in the other.
287. Will is proportionate to the sense we have of the good, and follows
the sense which prevails. 'Si utrumque tantundem diligimus, nihil horum
dabimus. Item: Quod amplius nos delectat, secundum id operemur necesse est'
(in c. 5, _Ad Gal._). I have explained already how, despite all that, we
have indeed a great power over our will. St. Augustine takes it somewhat
differently, and in a way that does not go far, when he says that nothing
is so much within our power as the action of our will. And he gives a
reason which is almost tautological: for (he says) this action is ready at
the moment when we will. 'Nihil tam in nostra potestate est, quam ipsa
voluntas, ea enim mox ut volumus praesto est' (lib. 3, _De Lib. Arb._, c.
3; lib. 5, _De Civ. Dei_, c. 10). But that only means that we will when we
will, and not that we will that which we wish to will. There is more reason
for saying with him: '_aut voluntas non est, aut libera dicenda est_' (d.
1, 3, c. 3); and that what inclines the will towards good infallibly, or
certainly, does not prevent it from being free. 'Perquam absurdum est, ut
ideo dicamus non pertinere ad voluntatem [libertatem] nostram, quod beati
esse volumus, quia id omnino nolle non possumus, nescio qua bona
constrictione naturae. Nec dicere audemus ideo Deum non voluntatem
[libertatem], sed necessitatem habere justitiae, quia non potest velle
peccare. Certe Deus ipse numquid quia peccare non potest, ideo liberum
arbitrium habere negandus est?' (_De Nat. et Grat._, c. 46, 47, 48, 49). He
also says aptly, that God gives the first good impulse, but that afterwards
man acts also. 'Aguntur ut agant, non ut ipsi nihil agant' (_De Corrept._,
c. 2).
288. I have proved that free will is the proximate cause of the evil of
guilt, and consequently of the evil of punishment; although it is true that
the original imperfection of creatures, which is already presented in the
eternal ideas, is the first and most remote cause. M. Bayle [303]
nevertheless always disputes this use of the notion of free will; he will
not have the cause of evil ascribed to it. One must listen to his
objections, but first it will be well to throw further light on the nature
of freedom. I have shown that freedom, according to the definition required
in the schools of theology, consists in intelligence, which involves a
clear knowledge of the object of deliberation, in spontaneity, whereby we
determine, and in contingency, that is, in the exclusion of logical or
metaphysical necessity. Intelligence is, as it were, the soul of freedom,
and the rest is as its body and foundation. The free substance is
self-determining and that according to the motive of good perceived by the
understanding, which inclines it without compelling it: and all the
conditions of freedom are comprised in these few words. It is nevertheless
well to point out that the imperfection present in our knowledge and our
spontaneity, and the infallible determination that is involved in our
contingency, destroy neither freedom nor contingency.
289. Our knowledge is of two kinds, distinct or confused. Distinct
knowledge, or _intelligence_, occurs in the actual use of reason; but the
senses supply us with confused thoughts. And we may say that we are immune
from bondage in so far as we act with a distinct knowledge, but that we are
the slaves of passion in so far as our perceptions are confused. In this
sense we have not all the freedom of spirit that were to be desired, and we
may say with St. Augustine that being subject to sin we have the freedom of
a slave. Yet a slave, slave as he is, nevertheless has freedom to choose
according to the state wherein he is, although more often than not he is
under the stern necessity of choosing between two evils, because a superior
force prevents him from attaining the goods whereto he aspires. That which
in a slave is effected by bonds and constraint in us is effected by
passions, whose violence is sweet, but none the less pernicious. In truth
we will only that which pleases us: but unhappily what pleases us now is
often a real evil, which would displease us if we had the eyes of the
understanding open. Nevertheless that evil state of the slave, which is
also our own, does not prevent us, any more than him, from making a free
choice of that which pleases us most, in the state to which we are reduced,
in proportion to our present strength and knowledge.
290. As for spontaneity, it belongs to us in so far as we have within us
the source of our actions, as Aristotle rightly conceived. The [304]
impressions of external things often, indeed, divert us from our path, and
it was commonly believed that, at least in this respect, some of the
sources of our actions were outside ourselves. I admit that one is bound to
speak thus, adapting oneself to the popular mode of expression, as one may,
in a certain sense, without doing violence to truth. But when it is a
question of expressing oneself accurately I maintain that our spontaneity
suffers no exception and that external things have no physical influence
upon us, I mean in the strictly philosophical sense.
291. For better understanding of this point, one must know that true
spontaneity is common to us and all simple substances, and that in the
intelligent or free substance this becomes a mastery over its actions. That
cannot be better explained than by the System of Pre-established Harmony,
which I indeed propounded some years ago. There I pointed out that by
nature every simple substance has perception, and that its individuality
consists in the perpetual law which brings about the sequence of
perceptions that are assigned to it, springing naturally from one another,
to represent the body that is allotted to it, and through its
instrumentality the entire universe, in accordance with the point of view
proper to this simple substance and without its needing to receive any
physical influence from the body. Even so the body also for its part adapts
itself to the wishes of the soul by its own laws, and consequently only
obeys it according to the promptings of these laws. Whence it follows that
the soul has in itself a perfect spontaneity, so that it depends only upon
God and upon itself in its actions.
292. As this system was not known formerly, other ways were sought for
emerging from this labyrinth, and the Cartesians themselves were in
difficulties over the subject of free will. They were no longer satisfied
by the 'faculties' of the Schoolmen, and they considered that all the
actions of the soul appear to be determined by what comes from without,
according to the impressions of the senses, and that, ultimately, all is
controlled in the universe by the providence of God. Thence arose naturally
the objection that there is therefore no freedom. To that M. Descartes
replied that we are assured of God's providence by reason; but that we are
likewise assured of our freedom by experience thereof within ourselves; and
that we must believe in both, even though we see not how it is possible to
reconcile them.
[305]
293. That was cutting the Gordian knot, and answering the conclusion of an
argument not by refuting it but by opposing thereto a contrary argument.
Which procedure does not conform to the laws for philosophical disputes.
Notwithstanding, most of the Cartesians contented themselves with this,
albeit the inward experience they adduce does not prove their assertion, as
M. Bayle has clearly shown. M. Regis (_Philos._, vol. 1, Metaph., book 2,
part 2, c. 22) thus paraphrases M. Descartes' doctrine: 'Most
philosophers', he says, 'have fallen into error. Some, not being able to
understand the relation existing between free actions and the providence of
God, have denied that God was the first efficient cause of free will: but
that is sacrilegious. The others, not being able to apprehend the relation
between God's efficacy and free actions, have denied that man was endowed
with freedom: and that is a blasphemy. The mean to be found between these
two extremes is to say' (id. ibid., p. 485) 'that, even though we were not
able to understand all the relations existing between freedom and God's
providence, we should nevertheless be bound to acknowledge that we are free
and dependent upon God. For both these truths are equally known, the one
through experience, and the other through reason; and prudence forbids one
to abandon truths whereof one is assured, under the pretext that one cannot
apprehend all the relations existing between them and other truths well
known.'
294. M. Bayle here remarks pertinently in the margin, 'that these
expressions of M. Regis fail to point out that we are aware of relations
between man's actions and God's providence, such as appear to us to be
incompatible with our freedom.' He adds that these expressions are
over-circumspect, weakening the statement of the problem. 'Authors assume',
he says, 'that the difficulty arises solely from our lack of enlightenment;
whereas they ought to say that it arises in the main from the enlightenment
which we have, and cannot reconcile' (in M. Bayle's opinion) 'with our
Mysteries.' That is exactly what I said at the beginning of this work, that
if the Mysteries were irreconcilable with reason, and if there were
unanswerable objections, far from finding the mystery incomprehensible, we
should comprehend that it was false. It is true that here there is no
question of a mystery, but only of natural religion.
295. This is how M. Bayle combats those inward experiences, whereon [306]
the Cartesians make freedom rest: but he begins by reflexions with which I
cannot agree. 'Those who do not make profound examination', he says
(_Dictionary_, art. 'Helen.', lit. [Greek: TD]), 'of that which passes
within them easily persuade themselves that they are free, and that, if
their will prompts them to evil, it is their fault, it is through a choice
whereof they are the masters. Those who judge otherwise are persons who
have studied with care the springs and the circumstances of their actions,
and who have thought over the progress of their soul's impulses. Those
persons usually have doubts about their free will, and even come to
persuade themselves that their reason and mind are slaves, without power to
resist the force that carries them along where they would not go. It was
principally persons of this kind who ascribed to the gods the cause of
their evil deeds.'
296. These words remind me of those of Chancellor Bacon, who says that a
little philosophy inclineth us away from God, but that depth in philosophy
bringeth men's minds about to him. It is the same with those who reflect
upon their actions: it appears to them at first that all we do is only
impulsion from others, and that all we apprehend comes from without through
the senses, and is traced upon the void of our mind _tanquam in tabula
rasa_. But more profound meditation shows us that all (even perceptions and
passions) comes to us from our own inner being, with complete spontaneity.
297. Yet M. Bayle cites poets who pretend to exonerate men by laying the
blame upon the gods. Medea in Ovid speaks thus:
_Frustra, Medea, repugnas,_
_Nescio quid Deus obstat, ait._
And a little later Ovid makes her add:
_Sed trahit invitam nova vis, aliudque Cupido,_
_Mens aliud suadet; video meliora proboque,_
_Deteriora sequor_.
But one could set against that a passage from Vergil, who makes Nisus say
with far more reason:
_Di ne hunc ardorem mentibus addunt,_
_Euryale, an sua cuique Deus fit dira cupido?_
298. Herr Wittich seems to have thought that in reality our independence is
only apparent. For in his _Diss. de providentia Dei actuali_ (n. 61) [307]
he makes free will consist in our being inclined towards the objects that
present themselves to our soul for affirmation or denial, love or hate, in
such a way that we _do not feel_ we are being determined by any outward
force. He adds that it is when God himself causes our volitions that we act
with most freedom; and that the more efficacious and powerful God's action
is upon us, the more we are masters of our actions. 'Quia enim Deus
operatur ipsum velle, quo efficacius operatur, eo magis volumus; quod
autem, cum volumus, facimus, id maxime habemus in nostra potestate.' It is
true that when God causes a volition in us he causes a free action. But it
seems to me that the question here is not of the universal cause or of that
production of our will which is proper to it in so far as it is a created
effect, whose positive elements are actually created continually through
God's co-operation, like all other absolute reality of things. We are
concerned here with the reasons for willing, and the means God uses when he
gives us a good will or permits us to have an evil will. It is always we
who produce it, good or evil, for it is our action: but there are always
reasons that make us act, without impairing either our spontaneity or our
freedom. Grace does no more than give impressions which are conducive to
making will operate through fitting motives, such as would be an attention,
_a dic cur hic_, a prevenient pleasure. And it is quite evident that that
does not interfere with freedom, any more than could a friend who gives
counsel and furnishes motives. Thus Herr Wittich has not supplied an answer
to the question, any more than M. Bayle, and recourse to God is of no avail
here.