PREFACE

* * * * *

It has ever been seen that men in general have resorted to outward forms

for the expression of their religion: sound piety, that is to say, light

and virtue, has never been the portion of the many. One should not wonder

at this, nothing is so much in accord with human weakness. We are impressed

by what is outward, while the inner essence of things requires

consideration of such a kind as few persons are fitted to give. As true

piety consists in principles and practice, the outward forms of religion

imitate these, and are of two kinds: the one kind consists in ceremonial

practices, and the other in the formularies of belief. Ceremonies resemble

virtuous actions, and formularies are like shadows of the truth and

approach, more or less, the true light. All these outward forms would be

commendable if those who invented them had rendered them appropriate to

maintain and to express that which they imitate--if religious ceremonies,

ecclesiastical discipline, the rules of communities, human laws were always

like a hedge round the divine law, to withdraw us from any approach to

vice, to inure us to the good and to make us familiar with virtue. That was

the aim of Moses and of other good lawgivers, of the wise men who founded

religious orders, and above all of Jesus Christ, divine founder of the

purest and most enlightened religion. It is just the same with the

formularies of belief: they would be valid provided there were nothing [50]

in them inconsistent with truth unto salvation, even though the full truth

concerned were not there. But it happens only too often that religion is

choked in ceremonial, and that the divine light is obscured by the opinions

of men.

The pagans, who inhabited the earth before Christianity was founded, had

only one kind of outward form: they had ceremonies in their worship, but

they had no articles of faith and had never dreamed of drawing up

formularies for their dogmatic theology. They knew not whether their gods

were real persons or symbols of the forces of Nature, as the sun, the

planets, the elements. Their mysteries consisted not in difficult dogmas

but in certain secret observances, whence the profane, namely those who

were not initiated, were excluded. These observances were very often

ridiculous and absurd, and it was necessary to conceal them in order to

guard them against contempt. The pagans had their superstitions: they

boasted of miracles, everything with them was full of oracles, auguries,

portents, divinations; the priests invented signs of the anger or of the

goodness of the gods, whose interpreters they claimed to be. This tended to

sway minds through fear and hope concerning human events; but the great

future of another life was scarce envisaged; one did not trouble to impart

to men true notions of God and of the soul.

Of all ancient peoples, it appears that the Hebrews alone had public dogmas

for their religion. Abraham and Moses established the belief in one God,

source of all good, author of all things. The Hebrews speak of him in a

manner worthy of the Supreme Substance; and one wonders at seeing the

inhabitants of one small region of the earth more enlightened than the rest

of the human race. Peradventure the wise men of other nations have

sometimes said the same, but they have not had the good fortune to find a

sufficient following and to convert the dogma into law. Nevertheless Moses

had not inserted in his laws the doctrine of the immortality of souls: it

was consistent with his ideas, it was taught by oral tradition; but it was

not proclaimed for popular acceptance until Jesus Christ lifted the veil,

and, without having force in his hand, taught with all the force of a

lawgiver that immortal souls pass into another life, wherein they shall

receive the wages of their deeds. Moses had already expressed the beautiful

conceptions of the greatness and the goodness of God, whereto many

civilized peoples to-day assent; but Jesus Christ demonstrated fully [51]

the results of these ideas, proclaiming that divine goodness and justice

are shown forth to perfection in God's designs for the souls of men.

I refrain from considering here the other points of the Christian doctrine,

and I will show only how Jesus Christ brought about the conversion of

natural religion into law, and gained for it the authority of a public

dogma. He alone did that which so many philosophers had endeavoured in vain

to do; and Christians having at last gained the upper hand in the Roman

Empire, the master of the greater part of the known earth, the religion of

the wise men became that of the nations. Later also Mahomet showed no

divergence from the great dogmas of natural theology: his followers spread

them abroad even among the most remote races of Asia and of Africa, whither

Christianity had not been carried; and they abolished in many countries

heathen superstitions which were contrary to the true doctrine of the unity

of God and the immortality of souls.

It is clear that Jesus Christ, completing what Moses had begun, wished that

the Divinity should be the object not only of our fear and veneration but

also of our love and devotion. Thus he made men happy by anticipation, and

gave them here on earth a foretaste of future felicity. For there is

nothing so agreeable as loving that which is worthy of love. Love is that

mental state which makes us take pleasure in the perfections of the object

of our love, and there is nothing more perfect than God, nor any greater

delight than in him. To love him it suffices to contemplate his

perfections, a thing easy indeed, because we find the ideas of these within

ourselves. The perfections of God are those of our souls, but he possesses

them in boundless measure; he is an Ocean, whereof to us only drops have

been granted; there is in us some power, some knowledge, some goodness, but

in God they are all in their entirety. Order, proportions, harmony delight

us; painting and music are samples of these: God is all order; he always

keeps truth of proportions, he makes universal harmony; all beauty is an

effusion of his rays.

It follows manifestly that true piety and even true felicity consist in the

love of God, but a love so enlightened that its fervour is attended by

insight. This kind of love begets that pleasure in good actions which gives

relief to virtue, and, relating all to God as to the centre, transports the

human to the divine. For in doing one's duty, in obeying reason, one [52]

carries out the orders of Supreme Reason. One directs all one's intentions

to the common good, which is no other than the glory of God. Thus one finds

that there is no greater individual interest than to espouse that of the

community, and one gains satisfaction for oneself by taking pleasure in the

acquisition of true benefits for men. Whether one succeeds therein or not,

one is content with what comes to pass, being once resigned to the will of

God and knowing that what he wills is best. But before he declares his will

by the event one endeavours to find it out by doing that which appears most

in accord with his commands. When we are in this state of mind, we are not

disheartened by ill success, we regret only our faults; and the ungrateful

ways of men cause no relaxation in the exercise of our kindly disposition.

Our charity is humble and full of moderation, it presumes not to domineer;

attentive alike to our own faults and to the talents of others, we are

inclined to criticize our own actions and to excuse and vindicate those of

others. We must work out our own perfection and do wrong to no man. There

is no piety where there is not charity; and without being kindly and

beneficent one cannot show sincere religion.

Good disposition, favourable upbringing, association with pious and

virtuous persons may contribute much towards such a propitious condition

for our souls; but most securely are they grounded therein by good

principles. I have already said that insight must be joined to fervour,

that the perfecting of our understanding must accomplish the perfecting of

our will. The practices of virtue, as well as those of vice, may be the

effect of a mere habit, one may acquire a taste for them; but when virtue

is reasonable, when it is related to God, who is the supreme reason of

things, it is founded on knowledge. One cannot love God without knowing his

perfections, and this knowledge contains the principles of true piety. The

purpose of religion should be to imprint these principles upon our souls:

but in some strange way it has happened all too often that men, that

teachers of religion have strayed far from this purpose. Contrary to the

intention of our divine Master, devotion has been reduced to ceremonies and

doctrine has been cumbered with formulae. All too often these ceremonies

have not been well fitted to maintain the exercise of virtue, and the

formulae sometimes have not been lucid. Can one believe it? Some Christians

have imagined that they could be devout without loving their neighbour,[53]

and pious without loving God; or else people have thought that they could

love their neighbour without serving him and could love God without knowing

him. Many centuries have passed without recognition of this defect by the

people at large; and there are still great traces of the reign of darkness.

There are divers persons who speak much of piety, of devotion, of religion,

who are even busied with the teaching of such things, and who yet prove to

be by no means versed in the divine perfections. They ill understand the

goodness and the justice of the Sovereign of the universe; they imagine a

God who deserves neither to be imitated nor to be loved. This indeed seemed

to me dangerous in its effect, since it is of serious moment that the very

source of piety should be preserved from infection. The old errors of those

who arraigned the Divinity or who made thereof an evil principle have been

renewed sometimes in our own days: people have pleaded the irresistible

power of God when it was a question rather of presenting his supreme

goodness; and they have assumed a despotic power when they should rather

have conceived of a power ordered by the most perfect wisdom. I have

observed that these opinions, apt to do harm, rested especially on confused

notions which had been formed concerning freedom, necessity and destiny;

and I have taken up my pen more than once on such an occasion to give

explanations on these important matters. But finally I have been compelled

to gather up my thoughts on all these connected questions, and to impart

them to the public. It is this that I have undertaken in the Essays which I

offer here, on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of

Evil.

There are two famous labyrinths where our reason very often goes astray:

one concerns the great question of the Free and the Necessary, above all in

the production and the origin of Evil; the other consists in the discussion

of continuity and of the indivisibles which appear to be the elements

thereof, and where the consideration of the infinite must enter in. The

first perplexes almost all the human race, the other exercises philosophers

only. I shall have perchance at another time an opportunity to declare

myself on the second, and to point out that, for lack of a true conception

of the nature of substance and matter, people have taken up false positions

leading to insurmountable difficulties, difficulties which should properly

be applied to the overthrow of these very positions. But if the [54]

knowledge of continuity is important for speculative enquiry, that of

necessity is none the less so for practical application; and it, together

with the questions therewith connected, to wit, the freedom of man and the

justice of God, forms the object of this treatise.

Men have been perplexed in well-nigh every age by a sophism which the

ancients called the 'Lazy Reason', because it tended towards doing nothing,

or at least towards being careful for nothing and only following

inclination for the pleasure of the moment. For, they said, if the future

is necessary, that which must happen will happen, whatever I may do. Now

the future (so they said) is necessary, whether because the Divinity

foresees everything, and even pre-establishes it by the control of all

things in the universe; or because everything happens of necessity, through

the concatenation of causes; or finally, through the very nature of truth,

which is determinate in the assertions that can be made on future events,

as it is in all assertions, since the assertion must always be true or

false in itself, even though we know not always which it is. And all these

reasons for determination which appear different converge finally like

lines upon one and the same centre; for there is a truth in the future

event which is predetermined by the causes, and God pre-establishes it in

establishing the causes.

The false conception of necessity, being applied in practice, has given

rise to what I call _Fatum Mahometanum_, fate after the Turkish fashion,

because it is said of the Turks that they do not shun danger or even

abandon places infected with plague, owing to their use of such reasoning

as that just recorded. For what is called _Fatum Stoicum_ was not so black

as it is painted: it did not divert men from the care of their affairs, but

it tended to give them tranquillity in regard to events, through the

consideration of necessity, which renders our anxieties and our vexations

needless. In which respect these philosophers were not far removed from the

teaching of our Lord, who deprecates these anxieties in regard to the

morrow, comparing them with the needless trouble a man would give himself

in labouring to increase his stature.

It is true that the teachings of the Stoics (and perhaps also of some

famous philosophers of our time), confining themselves to this alleged

necessity, can only impart a forced patience; whereas our Lord inspires

thoughts more sublime, and even instructs us in the means of gaining

contentment by assuring us that since God, being altogether good and [55]

wise, has care for everything, even so far as not to neglect one hair of

our head, our confidence in him ought to be entire. And thus we should see,

if we were capable of understanding him, that it is not even possible to

wish for anything better (as much in general as for ourselves) than what he

does. It is as if one said to men: Do your duty and be content with that

which shall come of it, not only because you cannot resist divine

providence, or the nature of things (which may suffice for tranquillity,

but not for contentment), but also because you have to do with a good

master. And that is what may be called _Fatum Christianum_.

Nevertheless it happens that most men, and even Christians, introduce into

their dealings some mixture of fate after the Turkish fashion, although

they do not sufficiently acknowledge it. It is true that they are not

inactive or negligent when obvious perils or great and manifest hopes

present themselves; for they will not fail to abandon a house that is about

to fall and to turn aside from a precipice they see in their path; and they

will burrow in the earth to dig up a treasure half uncovered, without

waiting for fate to finish dislodging it. But when the good or the evil is

remote and uncertain and the remedy painful or little to our taste, the

lazy reason seems to us to be valid. For example, when it is a question of

preserving one's health and even one's life by good diet, people to whom

one gives advice thereupon very often answer that our days are numbered and

that it avails nothing to try to struggle against that which God destines

for us. But these same persons run to even the most absurd remedies when

the evil they had neglected draws near. One reasons in somewhat the same

way when the question for consideration is somewhat thorny, as for instance

when one asks oneself, _quod vitae sectabor iter_? what profession one must

choose; when it is a question of a marriage being arranged, of a war being

undertaken, of a battle being fought; for in these cases many will be

inclined to evade the difficulty of consideration and abandon themselves to

fate or to inclination, as if reason should not be employed except in easy

cases. One will then all too often reason in the Turkish fashion (although

this way is wrongly termed trusting in providence, a thing that in reality

occurs only when one has done one's duty) and one will employ the lazy

reason, derived from the idea of inevitable fate, to relieve oneself of the

need to reason properly. One will thus overlook the fact that if this [56]

argument contrary to the practice of reason were valid, it would always

hold good, whether the consideration were easy or not. This laziness is to

some extent the source of the superstitious practices of fortune-tellers,

which meet with just such credulity as men show towards the philosopher's

stone, because they would fain have short cuts to the attainment of

happiness without trouble.

I do not speak here of those who throw themselves upon fortune because they

have been happy before, as if there were something permanent therein. Their

argument from the past to the future has just as slight a foundation as the

principles of astrology and of other kinds of divination. They overlook the

fact that there is usually an ebb and flow in fortune, _una marea_, as

Italians playing basset are wont to call it. With regard to this they make

their own particular observations, which I would, nevertheless, counsel

none to trust too much. Yet this confidence that people have in their

fortune serves often to give courage to men, and above all to soldiers, and

causes them to have indeed that good fortune they ascribe to themselves.

Even so do predictions often cause that to happen which has been foretold,

as it is supposed that the opinion the Mahometans hold on fate makes them

resolute. Thus even errors have their use at times, but generally as

providing a remedy for other errors: and truth is unquestionably better.

But it is taking an unfair advantage of this alleged necessity of fate to

employ it in excuse for our vices and our libertinism. I have often heard

it said by smart young persons, who wished to play the freethinker, that it

is useless to preach virtue, to censure vice, to create hopes of reward and

fears of punishment, since it may be said of the book of destiny, that what

is written is written, and that our behaviour can change nothing therein.

Thus, they would say, it were best to follow one's inclination, dwelling

only upon such things as may content us in the present. They did not

reflect upon the strange consequences of this argument, which would prove

too much, since it would prove (for instance) that one should take a

pleasant beverage even though one knows it is poisoned. For the same reason

(if it were valid) I could say: if it is written in the records of the

Parcae that poison will kill me now or will do me harm, this will happen

even though I were not to take this beverage; and if this is not written,

it will not happen even though I should take this same beverage;

consequently I shall be able to follow with impunity my inclination to [57]

take what is pleasing, however injurious it may be; the result of which

reasoning is an obvious absurdity. This objection disconcerted them a

little, but they always reverted to their argument, phrased in different

ways, until they were brought to understand where the fault of the sophism

lies. It is untrue that the event happens whatever one may do: it will

happen because one does what leads thereto; and if the event is written

beforehand, the cause that will make it happen is written also. Thus the

connexion of effects and causes, so far from establishing the doctrine of a

necessity detrimental to conduct, serves to overthrow it.

Yet, without having evil intentions inclined towards libertinism, one may

envisage differently the strange consequences of an inevitable necessity,

considering that it would destroy the freedom of the will, so essential to

the morality of action: for justice and injustice, praise and blame,

punishment and reward cannot attach to necessary actions, and nobody will

be under obligation to do the impossible or to abstain from doing what is

absolutely necessary. Without any intention of abusing this consideration

in order to favour irregularity, one will nevertheless not escape

embarrassment sometimes, when it comes to a question of judging the actions

of others, or rather of answering objections, amongst which there are some

even concerned with the actions of God, whereof I will speak presently. And

as an insuperable necessity would open the door to impiety, whether through

the impunity one could thence infer or the hopelessness of any attempt to

resist a torrent that sweeps everything along with it, it is important to

note the different degrees of necessity, and to show that there are some

which cannot do harm, as there are others which cannot be admitted without

giving rise to evil consequences.

Some go even further: not content with using the pretext of necessity to

prove that virtue and vice do neither good nor ill, they have the hardihood

to make the Divinity accessary to their licentious way of life, and they

imitate the pagans of old, who ascribed to the gods the cause of their

crimes, as if a divinity drove them to do evil. The philosophy of

Christians, which recognizes better than that of the ancients the

dependence of things upon the first Author and his co-operation with all

the actions of creatures, appears to have increased this difficulty. Some

able men in our own time have gone so far as to deny all action to [58]

creatures, and M. Bayle, who tended a little towards this extraordinary

opinion, made use of it to restore the lapsed dogma of the two principles,

or two gods, the one good, the other evil, as if this dogma were a better

solution to the difficulties over the origin of evil. Yet again he

acknowledges that it is an indefensible opinion and that the oneness of the

Principle is incontestably founded on _a priori_ reasons; but he wishes to

infer that our Reason is confounded and cannot meet her own objections, and

that one should disregard them and hold fast the revealed dogmas, which

teach us the existence of one God altogether good, altogether powerful and

altogether wise. But many readers, convinced of the irrefutable nature of

his objections and believing them to be at least as strong as the proofs

for the truth of religion, would draw dangerous conclusions.

Even though there were no co-operation by God in evil actions, one could

not help finding difficulty in the fact that he foresees them and that,

being able to prevent them through his omnipotence, he yet permits them.

This is why some philosophers and even some theologians have rather chosen

to deny to God any knowledge of the detail of things and, above all, of

future events, than to admit what they believed repellent to his goodness.

The Socinians and Conrad Vorstius lean towards that side; and Thomas

Bonartes, an English Jesuit disguised under a pseudonym but exceedingly

learned, who wrote a book _De Concordia Scientiae cum Fide_, of which I

will speak later, appears to hint at this also.

They are doubtless much mistaken; but others are not less so who, convinced

that nothing comes to pass save by the will and the power of God, ascribe

to him intentions and actions so unworthy of the greatest and the best of

all beings that one would say these authors have indeed renounced the dogma

which recognizes God's justice and goodness. They thought that, being

supreme Master of the universe, he could without any detriment to his

holiness cause sins to be committed, simply at his will and pleasure, or in

order that he might have the pleasure of punishing; and even that he could

take pleasure in eternally afflicting innocent people without doing any

injustice, because no one has the right or the power to control his

actions. Some even have gone so far as to say that God acts thus indeed;

and on the plea that we are as nothing in comparison with him, they liken

us to earthworms which men crush without heeding as they walk, or in

general to animals that are not of our species and which we do not [59]

scruple to ill-treat.

I believe that many persons otherwise of good intentions are misled by

these ideas, because they have not sufficient knowledge of their

consequences. They do not see that, properly speaking, God's justice is

thus overthrown. For what idea shall we form of such a justice as has only

will for its rule, that is to say, where the will is not guided by the

rules of good and even tends directly towards evil? Unless it be the idea

contained in that tyrannical definition by Thrasymachus in Plato, which

designated as _just_ that which pleases the stronger. Such indeed is the

position taken up, albeit unwittingly, by those who rest all obligation

upon constraint, and in consequence take power as the gauge of right. But

one will soon abandon maxims so strange and so unfit to make men good and

charitable through the imitation of God. For one will reflect that a God

who would take pleasure in the misfortune of others cannot be distinguished

from the evil principle of the Manichaeans, assuming that this principle

had become sole master of the universe; and that in consequence one must

attribute to the true God sentiments that render him worthy to be called

the good Principle.

Happily these extravagant dogmas scarce obtain any longer among

theologians. Nevertheless some astute persons, who are pleased to make

difficulties, revive them: they seek to increase our perplexity by uniting

the controversies aroused by Christian theology to the disputes of

philosophy. Philosophers have considered the questions of necessity, of

freedom and of the origin of evil; theologians have added thereto those of

original sin, of grace and of predestination. The original corruption of

the human race, coming from the first sin, appears to us to have imposed a

natural necessity to sin without the succour of divine grace: but necessity

being incompatible with punishment, it will be inferred that a sufficient

grace ought to have been given to all men; which does not seem to be in

conformity with experience.

But the difficulty is great, above all, in relation to God's dispositions

for the salvation of men. There are few saved or chosen; therefore the

choice of many is not God's decreed will. And since it is admitted that

those whom he has chosen deserve it no more than the rest, and are not even

fundamentally less evil, the goodness which they have coming only from the

gift of God, the difficulty is increased. Where is, then, his justice [60]

(people will say), or at the least, where is his goodness? Partiality, or

respect of persons, goes against justice, and he who without cause sets

bounds to his goodness cannot have it in sufficient measure. It is true

that those who are not chosen are lost by their own fault: they lack good

will or living faith; but it rested with God alone to grant it them. We

know that besides inward grace there are usually outward circumstances

which distinguish men, and that training, conversation, example often

correct or corrupt natural disposition. Now that God should call forth

circumstances favourable to some and abandon others to experiences which

contribute to their misfortune, will not that give us cause for

astonishment? And it is not enough (so it seems) to say with some that

inward grace is universal and equal for all. For these same authors are

obliged to resort to the exclamations of St. Paul, and to say: 'O the

depth!' when they consider how men are distinguished by what we may call

outward graces, that is, by graces appearing in the diversity of

circumstances which God calls forth, whereof men are not the masters, and

which have nevertheless so great an influence upon all that concerns their

salvation.

Nor will it help us to say with St. Augustine that, all men being involved

in the damnation caused by the sin of Adam, God might have left them all in

their misery; and that thus his goodness alone induces him to deliver some

of them. For not only is it strange that the sin of another should condemn

anyone, but there still remains the question why God does not deliver

all--why he delivers the lesser number and why some in preference to

others. He is in truth their master, but he is a good and just master; his

power is absolute, but his wisdom permits not that he exercise that power

in an arbitrary and despotic way, which would be tyrannous indeed.

Moreover, the fall of the first man having happened only with God's

permission, and God having resolved to permit it only when once he had

considered its consequences, which are the corruption of the mass of the

human race and the choice of a small number of elect, with the abandonment

of all the rest, it is useless to conceal the difficulty by limiting one's

view to the mass already corrupt. One must, in spite of oneself, go back to

the knowledge of the consequences of the first sin, preceding the decree

whereby God permitted it, and whereby he permitted simultaneously that [61]

the damned should be involved in the mass of perdition and should not be

delivered: for God and the sage make no resolve without considering its

consequences.

I hope to remove all these difficulties. I will point out that absolute

necessity, which is called also logical and metaphysical and sometimes

geometrical, and which would alone be formidable in this connexion, does

not exist in free actions, and that thus freedom is exempt not only from

constraint but also from real necessity. I will show that God himself,

although he always chooses the best, does not act by an absolute necessity,

and that the laws of nature laid down by God, founded upon the fitness of

things, keep the mean between geometrical truths, absolutely necessary, and

arbitrary decrees; which M. Bayle and other modern philosophers have not

sufficiently understood. Further I will show that there is an indifference

in freedom, because there is no absolute necessity for one course or the

other; but yet that there is never an indifference of perfect equipoise.

And I will demonstrate that there is in free actions a perfect spontaneity

beyond all that has been conceived hitherto. Finally I will make it plain

that the hypothetical and the moral necessity which subsist in free actions

are open to no objection, and that the 'Lazy Reason' is a pure sophism.

Likewise concerning the origin of evil in its relation to God, I offer a

vindication of his perfections that shall extol not less his holiness, his

justice and his goodness than his greatness, his power and his

independence. I show how it is possible for everything to depend upon God,

for him to co-operate in all the actions of creatures, even, if you will,

to create these creatures continually, and nevertheless not to be the

author of sin. Here also it is demonstrated how the privative nature of

evil should be understood. Much more than that, I explain how evil has a

source other than the will of God, and that one is right therefore to say

of moral evil that God wills it not, but simply permits it. Most important

of all, however, I show that it has been possible for God to permit sin and

misery, and even to co-operate therein and promote it, without detriment to

his holiness and his supreme goodness: although, generally speaking, he

could have avoided all these evils.

Concerning grace and predestination, I justify the most debatable

assertions, as for instance: that we are converted only through the [62]

prevenient grace of God and that we cannot do good except with his aid;

that God wills the salvation of all men and that he condemns only those

whose will is evil; that he gives to all a sufficient grace provided they

wish to use it; that, Jesus Christ being the source and the centre of

election, God destined the elect for salvation, because he foresaw that

they would cling with a lively faith to the doctrine of Jesus Christ. Yet

it is true that this reason for election is not the final reason, and that

this very pre-vision is still a consequence of God's anterior decree. Faith

likewise is a gift of God, who has predestinated the faith of the elect,

for reasons lying in a superior decree which dispenses grace and

circumstance in accordance with God's supreme wisdom.

Now, as one of the most gifted men of our time, whose eloquence was as

great as his acumen and who gave great proofs of his vast erudition, had

applied himself with a strange predilection to call attention to all the

difficulties on this subject which I have just touched in general, I found

a fine field for exercise in considering the question with him in detail. I

acknowledge that M. Bayle (for it is easy to see that I speak of him) has

on his side all the advantages except that of the root of the matter, but I

hope that truth (which he acknowledges himself to be on our side) by its

very plainness, and provided it be fittingly set forth, will prevail over

all the ornaments of eloquence and erudition. My hope for success therein

is all the greater because it is the cause of God I plead, and because one

of the maxims here upheld states that God's help is never lacking for those

that lack not good will. The author of this discourse believes that he has

given proof of this good will in the attention he has brought to bear upon

this subject. He has meditated upon it since his youth; he has conferred

with some of the foremost men of the time; and he has schooled himself by

the reading of good authors. And the success which God has given him

(according to the opinion of sundry competent judges) in certain other

profound meditations, of which some have much influence on this subject,

gives him peradventure some right to claim the attention of readers who

love truth and are fitted to search after it.

The author had, moreover, particular and weighty reasons inducing him to

take pen in hand for discussion of this subject. Conversations which he had

concerning the same with literary and court personages, in Germany and in

France, and especially with one of the greatest and most accomplished [63]

of princesses, have repeatedly prompted him to this course. He had had the

honour of expressing his opinions to this Princess upon divers passages of

the admirable _Dictionary_ of M. Bayle, wherein religion and reason appear

as adversaries, and where M. Bayle wishes to silence reason after having

made it speak too loud: which he calls the triumph of faith. The present

author declared there and then that he was of a different opinion, but that

he was nevertheless well pleased that a man of such great genius had

brought about an occasion for going deeply into these subjects, subjects as

important as they are difficult. He admitted having examined them also for

some long time already, and having sometimes been minded to publish upon

this matter some reflexions whose chief aim should be such knowledge of God

as is needed to awaken piety and to foster virtue. This Princess exhorted

and urged him to carry out his long-cherished intention, and some friends

added their persuasions. He was all the more tempted to accede to their

requests since he had reason to hope that in the sequel to his

investigation M. Bayle's genius would greatly aid him to give the subject

such illumination as it might receive with his support. But divers

obstacles intervened, and the death of the incomparable Queen was not the

least. It happened, however, that M. Bayle was attacked by excellent men

who set themselves to examine the same subject; he answered them fully and

always ingeniously. I followed their dispute, and was even on the point of

being involved therein. This is how it came about.

I had published a new system, which seemed well adapted to explain the

union of the soul and the body: it met with considerable applause even from

those who were not in agreement with it, and certain competent persons

testified that they had already been of my opinion, without having reached

so distinct an explanation, before they saw what I had written on the

matter. M. Bayle examined it in his _Historical and Critical Dictionary_,

article 'Rorarius'. He thought that my expositions were worthy of further

development; he drew attention to their usefulness in various connexions,

and he laid stress upon what might still cause difficulty. I could not but

reply in a suitable way to expressions so civil and to reflexions so

instructive as his. In order to turn them to greater account, I published

some elucidations in the _Histoire des Ouvrages des Savants_, July 1698. M.

Bayle replied to them in the second edition of his _Dictionary_. I sent[64]

him a rejoinder which has not yet been published; I know not whether he

ever made a further reply.

Meanwhile it happened that M. le Clerc had inserted in his _Select Library_

an extract from the _Intellectual System_ of the late Mr. Cudworth, and had

explained therein certain 'plastic natures' which this admirable author

applied to the formation of animals. M. Bayle believed (see the

continuation of _Divers Thoughts on the Comet_, ch. 21, art. 11) that,

these natures being without cognition, in establishing them one weakened

the argument which proves, through the marvellous formation of things, that

the universe must have an intelligent Cause. M. le Clerc replied (4th art.

of the 5th vol. of his _Select Library_) that these natures required to be

directed by divine wisdom. M. Bayle insisted (7th article of the _Histoire

des Ouvrages des Savants_, August 1704) that direction alone was not

sufficient for a cause devoid of cognition, unless one took the cause to be

a mere instrument of God, in which case direction would be needless. My

system was touched upon in passing; and that gave me an opportunity to send

a short essay to the illustrious author of the _Histoire des Ouvrages des

Savants_, which he inserted in the month of May 1705, art. 9. In this I

endeavoured to make clear that in reality mechanism is sufficient to

produce the organic bodies of animals, without any need of other plastic

natures, provided there be added thereto the _preformation_ already

completely organic in the seeds of the bodies that come into existence,

contained in those of the bodies whence they spring, right back to the

primary seeds. This could only proceed from the Author of things,

infinitely powerful and infinitely wise, who, creating all in the beginning

in due order, had _pre-established_ there all order and artifice that was

to be. There is no chaos in the inward nature of things, and there is

organism everywhere in a matter whose disposition proceeds from God. More

and more of it would come to light if we pressed closer our examination of

the anatomy of bodies; and we should continue to observe it even if we

could go on to infinity, like Nature, and make subdivision as continuous in

our knowledge as Nature has made it in fact.

In order to explain this marvel of the formation of animals, I made use of

a Pre-established Harmony, that is to say, of the same means I had used to

explain another marvel, namely the correspondence of soul with body, [65]

wherein I proved the uniformity and the fecundity of the principles I had

employed. It seems that this reminded M. Bayle of my system of accounting

for this correspondence, which he had examined formerly. He declared (in

chapter 180 of his _Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, vol. III, p.

1253) that he did not believe God could give to matter or to any other

cause the faculty of becoming organic without communicating to it the idea

and the knowledge of organic nature. Also he was not yet disposed to

believe that God, with all his power over Nature and with all the

foreknowledge which he has of the contingencies that may arrive, could have

so disposed things that by the laws of mechanics alone a vessel (for

instance) should go to its port of destination without being steered during

its passage by some intelligent guide. I was surprised to see that limits

were placed on the power of God, without the adduction of any proof and

without indication that there was any contradiction to be feared on the

side of the object or any imperfection on God's side. Whereas I had shown

before in my Rejoinder that even men often produce through automata

something like the movements that come from reason, and that even a finite

mind (but one far above ours) could accomplish what M. Bayle thinks

impossible to the Divinity. Moreover, as God orders all things at once

beforehand, the accuracy of the path of this vessel would be no more

strange than that of a fuse passing along a cord in fireworks, since the

whole disposition of things preserves a perfect harmony between them by

means of their influence one upon the other.

This declaration of M. Bayle pledged me to an answer. I therefore purposed

to point out to him, that unless it be said that God forms organic bodies

himself by a perpetual miracle, or that he has entrusted this care to

intelligences whose power and knowledge are almost divine, we must hold the

opinion that God _preformed_ things in such sort that new organisms are

only a mechanical consequence of a preceding organic constitution. Even so

do butterflies come out of silkworms, an instance where M. Swammerdam has

shown that there is nothing but development. And I would have added that

nothing is better qualified than the preformation of plants and of animals

to confirm my System of Pre-established Harmony between the soul and the

body. For in this the body is prompted by its original constitution to

carry out with the help of external things all that it does in accordance

with the will of the soul. So the seeds by their original constitution [66]

carry out naturally the intentions of God, by an artifice greater still

than that which causes our body to perform everything in conformity with

our will. And since M. Bayle himself deems with reason that there is more

artifice in the organism of animals than in the most beautiful poem in the

world or in the most admirable invention whereof the human mind is capable,

it follows that my system of the connexion between the body and the soul is

as intelligible as the general opinion on the formation of animals. For

this opinion (which appears to me true) states in effect that the wisdom of

God has so made Nature that it is competent in virtue of its laws to form

animals; I explain this opinion and throw more light upon the possibility

of it through the system of preformation. Whereafter there will be no cause

for surprise that God has so made the body that by virtue of its own laws

it can carry out the intentions of the reasoning soul: for all that the

reasoning soul can demand of the body is less difficult than the

organization which God has demanded of the seeds. M. Bayle says (_Reply to

the Questions of a Provincial_, ch. 182, p. 1294) that it is only very

recently there have been people who have understood that the formation of

living bodies cannot be a natural process. This he could say also (in

accordance with his principles) of the communication between the soul and

the body, since God effects this whole communication in the system of

occasional causes to which this author subscribes. But I admit the

supernatural here only in the beginning of things, in respect of the first

formation of animals or in respect of the original constitution of

pre-established harmony between the soul and the body. Once that has come

to pass, I hold that the formation of animals and the relation between the

soul and the body are something as natural now as the other most ordinary

operations of Nature. A close parallel is afforded by people's ordinary

thinking about the instinct and the marvellous behaviour of brutes. One

recognizes reason there not in the brutes but in him who created them. I

am, then, of the general opinion in this respect; but I hope that my

explanation will have added clearness and lucidity, and even a more ample

range, to that opinion.

Now when preparing to justify my system in face of the new difficulties of

M. Bayle, I purposed at the same time to communicate to him the ideas which

I had had for some time already, on the difficulties put forward by him[67]

in opposition to those who endeavour to reconcile reason with faith in

regard to the existence of evil. Indeed, there are perhaps few persons who

have toiled more than I in this matter. Hardly had I gained some tolerable

understanding of Latin writings when I had an opportunity of turning over

books in a library. I flitted from book to book, and since subjects for

meditation pleased me as much as histories and fables, I was charmed by the

work of Laurentius Valla against Boethius and by that of Luther against

Erasmus, although I was well aware that they had need of some mitigation. I

did not omit books of controversy, and amongst other writings of this

nature the records of the Montbéliard Conversation, which had revived the

dispute, appeared to me instructive. Nor did I neglect the teachings of our

theologians: and the study of their opponents, far from disturbing me,

served to strengthen me in the moderate opinions of the Churches of the

Augsburg Confession. I had opportunity on my journeys to confer with some

excellent men of different parties, for instance with Bishop Peter von

Wallenburg, Suffragan of Mainz, with Herr Johann Ludwig Fabricius, premier

theologian of Heidelberg, and finally with the celebrated M. Arnauld. To

him I even tendered a Latin Dialogue of my own composition upon this

subject, about the year 1673, wherein already I laid it down that God,

having chosen the most perfect of all possible worlds, had been prompted by

his wisdom to permit the evil which was bound up with it, but which still

did not prevent this world from being, all things considered, the best that

could be chosen. I have also since read many and various good authors on

these subjects, and I have endeavoured to make progress in the knowledge

that seems to me proper for banishing all that could have obscured the idea

of supreme perfection which must be acknowledged in God. I have not

neglected to examine the most rigorous authors, who have extended furthest

the doctrine of the necessity of things, as for instance Hobbes and

Spinoza, of whom the former advocated this absolute necessity not only in

his _Physical Elements_ and elsewhere, but also in a special book against

Bishop Bramhall. And Spinoza insists more or less (like an ancient

Peripatetic philosopher named Strato) that all has come from the first

cause or from primitive Nature by a blind and geometrical necessity, with

complete absence of capacity for choice, for goodness and for understanding

in this first source of things.

[68]

I have found the means, so it seems to me, of demonstrating the contrary in

a way that gives one a clear insight into the inward essence of the matter.

For having made new discoveries on the nature of active force and the laws

of motion, I have shown that they have no geometrical necessity, as Spinoza

appears to have believed they had. Neither, as I have made plain, are they

purely arbitrary, even though this be the opinion of M. Bayle and of some

modern philosophers: but they are dependent upon the fitness of things as I

have already pointed out above, or upon that which I call the 'principle of

the best'. Moreover one recognizes therein, as in every other thing, the

marks of the first substance, whose productions bear the stamp of a supreme

wisdom and make the most perfect of harmonies. I have shown also that this

harmony connects both the future with the past and the present with the

absent. The first kind of connexion unites times, and the other places.

This second connexion is displayed in the union of the soul with the body,

and in general in the communication of true substances with one another and

with material phenomena. But the first takes place in the preformation of

organic bodies, or rather of all bodies, since there is organism

everywhere, although all masses do not compose organic bodies. So a pond

may very well be full of fish or of other organic bodies, although it is

not itself an animal or organic body, but only a mass that contains them.

Thus I had endeavoured to build upon such foundations, established in a

conclusive manner, a complete body of the main articles of knowledge that

reason pure and simple can impart to us, a body whereof all the parts were

properly connected and capable of meeting the most important difficulties

of the ancients and the moderns. I had also in consequence formed for

myself a certain system concerning the freedom of man and the cooperation

of God. This system appeared to me to be such as would in no wise offend

reason and faith; and I desired to submit it to the scrutiny of M. Bayle,

as well as of those who are in controversy with him. Now he has departed

from us, and such a loss is no small one, a writer whose learning and

acumen few have equalled. But since the subject is under consideration and

men of talent are still occupied with it, while the public also follows it

attentively, I take this to be a fitting moment for the publication of

certain of my ideas.

It will perhaps be well to add the observation, before finishing this

preface, that in denying the physical influence of the soul upon the [69]

body or of the body upon the soul, that is, an influence causing the one to

disturb the laws of the other, I by no means deny the union of the one with

the other which forms of them a suppositum; but this union is something

metaphysical, which changes nothing in the phenomena. This is what I have

already said in reply to the objection raised against me, in the _Mémoires

de Trévoux_, by the Reverend Father de Tournemine, whose wit and learning

are of no ordinary mould. And for this reason one may say also in a

metaphysical sense that the soul acts upon the body and the body upon the

soul. Moreover, it is true that the soul is the Entelechy or the active

principle, whereas the corporeal alone or the mere material contains only

the passive. Consequently the principle of action is in the soul, as I have

explained more than once in the _Leipzig Journal_. More especially does

this appear in my answer to the late Herr Sturm, philosopher and

mathematician of Altorf, where I have even demonstrated that, if bodies

contained only the passive, their different conditions would be

indistinguishable. Also I take this opportunity to say that, having heard

of some objections made by the gifted author of the book on

_Self-knowledge_, in that same book, to my System of Pre-established

Harmony, I sent a reply to Paris, showing that he has attributed to me

opinions I am far from holding. On another matter recently I met with like

treatment at the hands of an anonymous Doctor of the Sorbonne. And these

misconceptions would have become plain to the reader at the outset if my

own words, which were being taken in evidence, had been quoted.

This tendency of men to make mistakes in presenting the opinions of others

leads me to observe also, that when I said somewhere that man helps himself

in conversion through the succour of grace, I mean only that he derives

advantage from it through the cessation of the resistance overcome, but

without any cooperation on his part: just as there is no co-operation in

ice when it is broken. For conversion is purely the work of God's grace,

wherein man co-operates only by resisting it; but human resistance is more

or less great according to the persons and the occasions. Circumstances

also contribute more or less to our attention and to the motions that arise

in the soul; and the co-operation of all these things, together with the

strength of the impression and the condition of the will, determines the

operation of grace, although not rendering it necessary. I have expounded

sufficiently elsewhere that in relation to matters of salvation [70]

unregenerate man is to be considered as dead; and I greatly approve the

manner wherein the theologians of the Augsburg Confession declare

themselves on this subject. Yet this corruption of unregenerate man is, it

must be added, no hindrance to his possession of true moral virtues and his

performance of good actions in his civic life, actions which spring from a

good principle, without any evil intention and without mixture of actual

sin. Wherein I hope I shall be forgiven, if I have dared to diverge from

the opinion of St. Augustine: he was doubtless a great man, of admirable

intelligence, but inclined sometimes, as it seems, to exaggerate things,

above all in the heat of his controversies. I greatly esteem some persons

who profess to be disciples of St. Augustine, amongst others the Reverend

Father Quênel, a worthy successor of the great Arnauld in the pursuit of

controversies that have embroiled them with the most famous of Societies.

But I have found that usually in disputes between people of conspicuous

merit (of whom there are doubtless some here in both parties) there is

right on both sides, although in different points, and it is rather in the

matter of defence than attack, although the natural malevolence of the

human heart generally renders attack more agreeable to the reader than

defence. I hope that the Reverend Father Ptolemei, who does his Society

credit and is occupied in filling the gaps left by the famous Bellarmine,

will give us, concerning all of that, some explanations worthy of his

acumen and his knowledge, and I even dare to add, his moderation. And one

must believe that among the theologians of the Augsburg Confession there

will arise some new Chemnitz or some new Callixtus; even as one is

justified in thinking that men like Usserius or Daillé will again appear

among the Reformed, and that all will work more and more to remove the

misconceptions wherewith this matter is charged. For the rest I shall be

well pleased that those who shall wish to examine it closely read the

objections with the answers I have given thereto, formulated in the small

treatise I have placed at the end of the work by way of summary. I have

endeavoured to forestall some new objections. I have explained, for

instance, why I have taken the antecedent and consequent will as

preliminary and final, after the example of Thomas, of Scotus and others;

how it is possible that there be incomparably more good in the glory of all

the saved than there is evil in the misery of all the damned, despite [71]

that there are more of the latter; how, in saying that evil has been

permitted as a _conditio sine qua non_ of good, I mean not according to the

principle of necessity, but according to the principle of the fitness of

things. Furthermore I show that the predetermination I admit is such as

always to predispose, but never to necessitate, and that God will not

refuse the requisite new light to those who have made a good use of that

which they had. Other elucidations besides I have endeavoured to give on

some difficulties which have been put before me of late. I have, moreover,

followed the advice of some friends who thought it fitting that I should

add two appendices: the one treats of the controversy carried on between

Mr. Hobbes and Bishop Bramhall touching Freedom and Necessity, the other of

the learned work on _The Origin of Evil_, published a short time ago in

England.

Finally I have endeavoured in all things to consider edification: and if I

have conceded something to curiosity, it is because I thought it necessary

to relieve a subject whose seriousness may cause discouragement. It is with

that in view that I have introduced into this dissertation the pleasing

chimera of a certain astronomical theology, having no ground for

apprehension that it will ensnare anyone and deeming that to tell it and

refute it is the same thing. Fiction for fiction, instead of imagining that

the planets were suns, one might conceive that they were masses melted in

the sun and thrown out, and that would destroy the foundation of this

hypothetical theology. The ancient error of the two principles, which the

Orientals distinguished by the names Oromasdes and Arimanius, caused me to

explain a conjecture on the primitive history of peoples. It appears indeed

probable that these were the names of two great contemporary princes, the

one monarch of a part of upper Asia, where there have since been others of

this name, the other king of the Scythian Celts who made incursions into

the states of the former, and who was also named amongst the divinities of

Germania. It seems, indeed, that Zoroaster used the names of these princes

as symbols of the invisible powers which their exploits made them resemble

in the ideas of Asiatics. Yet elsewhere, according to the accounts of Arab

authors, who in this might well be better informed than the Greeks, it

appears from detailed records of ancient oriental history, that this

Zerdust or Zoroaster, whom they make contemporary with the great Darius,

did not look upon these two principles as completely primitive and [72]

independent, but as dependent upon one supreme and single principle. They

relate that he believed, in conformity with the cosmogony of Moses, that

God, who is without an equal, created all and separated the light from the

darkness; that the light conformed with his original design, but that the

darkness came as a consequence, even as the shadow follows the body, and

that this is nothing but privation. Such a thesis would clear this ancient

author of the errors the Greeks imputed to him. His great learning caused

the Orientals to compare him with the Mercury or Hermes of the Egyptians

and Greeks; just as the northern peoples compared their Wodan or Odin to

this same Mercury. That is why Mercredi (Wednesday), or the day of Mercury,

was called Wodansdag by the northern peoples, but day of Zerdust by the

Asiatics, since it is named Zarschamba or Dsearschambe by the Turks and the

Persians, Zerda by the Hungarians from the north-east, and Sreda by the

Slavs from the heart of Great Russia, as far as the Wends of the Luneburg

region, the Slavs having learnt the name also from the Orientals. These

observations will perhaps not be displeasing to the curious. And I flatter

myself that the small dialogue ending the Essays written to oppose M. Bayle

will give some satisfaction to those who are well pleased to see difficult

but important truths set forth in an easy and familiar way. I have written

in a foreign language at the risk of making many errors in it, because that

language has been recently used by others in treating of my subject, and

because it is more generally read by those whom one would wish to benefit

by this small work. It is to be hoped that the language errors will be

pardoned: they are to be attributed not only to the printer and the

copyist, but also to the haste of the author, who has been much distracted

from his task. If, moreover, any error has crept into the ideas expressed,

the author will be the first to correct it, once he has been better

informed: he has given elsewhere such indications of his love of truth that

he hopes this declaration will not be regarded as merely an empty phrase.

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