withdraw the garrison, strike the flag, and cease to keep up a useless
source of irritation in the midst of the Southern Confederation? The
answer to these questions is: These forts are Federal property. The
Government does not acknowledge the existence of any right on the part
of the people of the States to seize them as appertaining to individual
States. The forts are protests against the acts of violence to which the
Federal authority has yielded elsewhere. They are, moreover, the _points
d’appui,_ small as they are, on which the Federal Government can rest
its resistance to the claims of the Southern Confederation to be
acknowledged as an independent republic. If they were surrendered
without attack, or without the existence of any pressure arising from
the refusal of the Southern authorities to permit them to get supplies,
which is an act of war, the case of the United States Government would
be, they consider, materially weakened. If it be observed that these
forts have no strategic value, it may readily be replied that their
political value is very great. But, serious as these considerations may
be, or may be thought to be, with respect to foreign relations, there
are in reference to domestic politics still more weighty inducements to
hold them. The effect produced in the North and Northwest by an attack
on the forts while the United States flag is floating over them, would
be as useful to the Government at Washington as the effect of abandoning
the forts or tamely surrendering them would be hurtful to them in the
estimation of the extreme Republicans. A desperate attack, a gallant
defense, the shedding of the blood of gallant men, whose duty it was to
defend that intrusted to their keeping, and who yielded only to
numbers--the outrage on the United States flag--would create an
excitement in the Union which the South, with all its determination and
courage, is unwilling to provoke, but which the Government would be
forced to use in its own service. Such an event must lead to war, a very
terrible and merciless war, and both parties pause before they resort to
that court of arms. Unless the Border States join the South, Mr.
Jefferson Davis could scarcely hope to carry out the grand projects
which are attributed to his military genius of marching northward, and
dictating terms on their own soil to the Republicans. He could scarcely
venture to leave the negro population unguarded in his rear, and his
flanks menaced by the sea-born northerners on the one side, and by such
operations as the water-sheds significantly indicate on the other. It is
idle to speculate on the incidents of that which may never occur, and
which, occurring, may assume the insignificant aspect of border
skirmishes, or the tremendous proportions of a war of races and creeds,
intensified by the worst elements of servile and civil conflict. The
Government of Mr. Lincoln hope and believe that the contest may be
averted. The Commissioners of the South are inclined to think, also,
there will be a peaceful solution, obtained, of course, by full
concession and recognition. But inaction cannot last on the part of the
South. Already they have begun the system of coercion. The supplies of
the garrison at Sumter will be cut off henceforth, if they are not
already forbidden. They do not fear the moral effect of this act, for
some of their leading men actually believe that nothing can stop the
progress of a movement which will, they fondly think, absorb all the
other States of the Union, and leave the New England States to form an
insignificant republic of its own, with a possible larger destiny in
Canada. Their opponents in the North are as fully satisfied that the
direst Nemesis will fall on the Montgomery Government in the utter ruin
of all their States the moment they are left to themselves.
The Government is elated at the success of the loan, and Mr. Chase has
taken high ground in refusing offers made to him yesterday, and in
resolving to issue Government securities for the balance of the amount
required to complete the amount. Mr. Forsyth, one of the Southern
Commissioners, who has just returned from New York here, is equally
satisfied with the temper of parties in that city, and seems to think
that the New Yorkers are preparing for a secession. But, though States
may be sovereign, it has never been ascertained that cities or portions
of States are so, and in the western and northern portions of the State
of New York there is a large agricultural population, which, with the
aid of Government, would speedily suppress any attempt to secede on the
part of the city, if men are to be believed who say they know the
circumstances of the case. Virginia is claimed by both sides, but
accounts this morning are to the effect that the Secessionists have been
defeated on a division by a vote of two to one in favor of the Union;
and although General Houston appears to be forced to accept the
situation for a time, there are many who think he will organize a strong
reaction against the dominant Secessionists.
Whatever may be these result of all the diverse actions, the Great
Republic is gone! The shape of the fragments is not yet determined any
more than their fate. They may reunite, but the cohesion can never be
perfect. The ship of the State was built of too many “platforms,” there
were too many officers on board, perhaps the principles of construction
were erroneous, the rigid cast-iron old constitution guns burst
violently when tried with new projectiles--any way, those who adhere
with most devotion to the vessel, admit that it is parted right
amidships, and that its _prestige_ has vanished. The more desperate of
these would gladly see an enemy, or go out of their way to find one, in
the hope of a common bond of union being discovered in a common
animosity and danger.
The naval preparations, of which you will hear a good deal, are intended
to make good existing deficiencies and to meet contingencies. At any
other time the action of Spain in St. Domingo would create a cry for
war. Now all the Federal Government can do is to demand and receive
explanations. In reply to Mr. Seward’s inquiries, the Spanish Minister
has possibly stated that the recent events in St. Domingo have been
caused by the acts and threats of Hayti, which forced the Dominicans to
call in the aid and claim the protection of Spain. There have been
several attempts from time to time to induce France to assume the
dominion of its former possession, and it is not unlikely that an
excellent understanding exists between the Court of Madrid and the
Emperor Napoleon in reference to the subject. The report that the
Mexicans have made, or contemplate making, an attack on Texas, is
scarcely worthy of credence.
As to the Morrill tariff, I can only repeat what I have already said. It
must be borne till results show that it cannot be persisted in. Then
only will it be repealed or modified. The theory of the Government is,
that the United States always takes far more from Europe than it can pay
for. “If the revenue is collected, there is no ground for complaint. The
English and French manufacturer will be satisfied, as well as the
northern population. If the revenue is not collected, then the tariff
must be repealed, and that will be done within the year, if the mischief
is serious.” Birmingham, Wolverhampton, and Manchester must make the
best they can out of the doctrine.
LETTER III.
WASHINGTON, April 9, 1861.
THE critical position of the Federal Government has compelled its
members to preserve secrecy. Never before under any Administration was
so little of the councils of the Cabinet known to the public, or to
those who are supposed to be acquainted with the opinions of the
statesmen in office. Mr. Seward has issued the most stringent orders to
the officers and clerks in his department to observe the rules, which
heretofore have been much disregarded, in reference to the confidential
character of State papers in their charge. The sources of the fountain
of knowledge from which friendly journalists drew so freely are thus
stopped without fear, favor, or affection, toward any. The result has
been much irritation in quarters where such “interference” is regarded
as unwarrantable, or, at least, as very injurious. The newspapers which
enjoyed the privilege of free access to despatches are hatching
_canards_, which they let fly along the telegraph wires with amazing
productiveness and fertility of conception and incubation. Hence the
monstrous and ridiculous rumors which harden into type everyday--hence
the clamors for “a policy,” and hence the contending accusations that
the Government is doing nothing, and that it is also preparing to plunge
the country into civil war. Each member of the Cabinet has become a
Burleigh, every shake of whose head perplexes New York with a fear of
change; every Senator is watched by private reporters, who trace “the
day’s disasters in his morning’s face.” If a weak company of artillery
is marched on board a ship, its movements are chronicled in columns of
vivid description, and its footsteps are made to sound like the march of
a vast army. The telegraph from Washington has learnt its daily message
about Fort Sumter and Fort Pickens by heart, and the world has been
soothed daily by the assurance that General Braxton Bragg is ready, and
that the South Carolinians can no longer be restrained. But there is
always a secret understanding that Generals Bragg and Beauregard will be
more ready still the next day, and that the people will be more
unrestrainable by next telegram. When I landed in New York, the first
news I learnt was that Fort Sumter would be evacuated next day; and if
not, that the supplies would be cut off, and that the garrison would be
starved out. I have learnt how to distrust prophecy, and I am going
South in the hope that the end is not yet. The Southern Commissioners
state that the Government here has promised them that no efforts shall
be made to reënforce Fort Pickens without previous notice to them--a
very singular promise. The Government, however, denies that it has been
in communication with them. Fort Sumter must be considered as gone, for
there is no disposition, apparently, on the part of the Government to
hazard the loss of life and great risk which must inevitably attend any
attempt to relieve or carry off the garrison, now that the channels are
under the fire of numerous heavily armed batteries, which the people of
South Carolina were permitted to throw up without molestation. The
operations of a relieving force would have to be conducted on a very
large scale by troops disembarking on the shores and taking the
batteries in reverse, in conjunction with an attack from the sea; and,
after all, such an expedition would be futile, unless it were intended
to occupy Charleston, and try the fortune of war in South Carolina--an
intention quite opposed to the expressions and, I believe, the feelings
of the Cabinet of Washington, not to speak of the people of the Border
States and of large remnants of the Union. From your correspondent at
New York you will receive full particulars of the movements of troops,
and of the naval preparations which are reported in the papers, which
create more curiosity than excitement among the people I meet. My task
must be to describe what I see around me.
It may be as well to state in the most positive terms that the reports
which have appeared in the American papers of communications between the
English Minister and the American Government on the subject of a
blockade of the Southern ports, are totally and entirely destitute of
foundation. No communication of any kind has passed between Lord Lyons,
on the part of the English Government, and Mr. Seward, or any one else,
on behalf of the Government at Washington. It would be a most offensive
proceeding to volunteer any intimation of the course to be pursued by a
European Power respecting a contingency of action on the part of the
United States; nor would it be necessary, in case a blockade were
declared, to formulate a supererogatory notice that it must be such a
blockade as the law of nations recognizes. The importance of a distinct
understanding on that point is all the greater in connection with the
stories which are afloat that the naval preparations of the hour are
intended to afford the Federal Government the means of blockading the
mouths of the Mississippi and the Southern ports, with the object of
collecting the Federal revenue. If anything is clearer than another, in
the doubt and perplexity which prevail, it is that the Government will
do nothing whatever to precipitate a conflict. It would ill become me,
in such a crisis, to hazard any authoritative statements as to the
conduct of the Administration under the very great variety of
complications which may arise hereafter. Of this, however, be assured,
not a ship, or a gun, or a man will be directed to make any attack, or
to begin an offensive movement against the Confederate States. If any
promise was made by the Buchanan Administration to inform the members of
the Southern Government or its representatives of their course of
action, it will not be considered binding on the consciences of Mr.
Lincoln’s Cabinet, composed as it is of men who look on their
predecessors as guilty of treason to the State. An attempt may be made
to reënforce Fort Pickens, and neither that nor any position occupied by
the Federal authorities will be voluntarily abandoned.
Once for all, let it be impressed on the minds of the English people
that whatever reports they hear, and however they may come--no matter
whence, or in what guise--there is no truth in them if they indicate the
smallest intention on the part of Mr. Lincoln to depart from the policy
indicated in his Inaugural Address. As strongly as words can do it, I
repeat that the forces which have been assembled are only intended for
the reënforcement of the strong places at Tortugas and Key West, which
have been left short of every necessary of occupation and defence, and
for the establishment of posts of observation, which are essential in
case of hostility and to guard against surprise or treachery. I have
dwelt in previous letters on the obvious policy of the Government of the
United States, and I beg your readers to have firm faith that there will
be no departure from it. By concentrating forces at Key West and
Tortugas very valuable political results are obtained in face of the
present disputes, and material strategical advantages in case those
disputes should lead to a rupture, which will not be initiated by the
Cabinet at Washington. These places are within a few hours’ sail of the
coast; they are healthy, and can be easily supplied, as long as the
United States fleet can keep the sea and cover the movements of its
transports. Their occupation in force cannot be taken as an act of open
war, while it is undoubtedly an alarming menace, which will keep the
Confederates in a state of constant apprehension and preparation,
leading to much internal trouble and great expense. By a confusion of
metaphor which events may justify, the eye to watch may be turned into
an arm to strike.
The Southern Commissioners are still here, but they are still unable to
procure even a semi-official recognition of their existence, and all
their correspondence has been carried on through one of their clerks.
It is, perhaps, not necessary to add that Mr. Seward has no intention of
resigning, as has been stated, and that there is no dissention in the
Cabinet.
LETTER IV.
NORFOLK, VA., April, 15, 1861.
SUMTER has fallen at last. So much may be accepted. Before many hours I
hope to stand amid the ruins of a spot which will probably become
historic, and has already made more noise in the world than its guns,
gallant as the defence may have been. The news will produce an
extraordinary impression at New York--it will disconcert stock-jobbers,
and derange the most ingenious speculations. But, considerable as may be
its results in any part of the Union, I venture to say that nowhere will
the shock cause such painful convulsions as in the Cabinet at
Washington, where there appeared to exist the most perfect conviction
that the plan for the relief of Sumter could not fail to be successful,
either through the force of the expedition provided for that object, or
through the unwillingness of the leaders at Charleston to fire the first
shot, and to compel the surrender of the place by actual hostilities.
The confidence of Mr. Seward in the strength of the name and of the
resources of the United States Federal Government must have received a
rude blow; but his confidences are by no means of a weakly constitution,
and it will be long ere he can bring himself to think that all his
prophecies must be given up one after another before the inexorable
logic of facts, with which his vaticinations have been in “irrepressible
conflict.” It seems to me that Mr. Seward has all along undervalued the
spirit and the resolution of the Southern Slave States, or that he has
disguised from others the sense he entertains of their extent and vigor.
The days assigned for the life of Secession have been numbered over and
over again, and Secession has not yielded up the ghost. The “bravado” of
the South has been sustained by deeds which render retreat from its
advanced position impossible. Mr. Seward will probably find himself hard
pushed to maintain his views in the Cabinet in the face of recent
events, which will, no doubt, be used with effect and skill by Mr.
Chase, who is understood to be in favor of letting the South go as it
lists without any more trouble, convinced as he is that it is an element
of weakness in the body politic, while he would be prepared to treat as
treason any attempts in the remaining States of the Union to act on the
doctrine of secession. But the Union party must now prevail. As yet I do
not know whether the views I expressed relative to the destination of
the greater part of the troops and stores sent from the North were
correct, for it cannot be learned how many ships were off Sumter when it
surrendered; but, notwithstanding what has occurred, I reiterate the
assertion that the Washington Cabinet always said and say they had no
intention to provoke a conflict there, and that had the authorities at
Charleston continued their permission to the garrison to procure
supplies in their markets, there would have been no immediate action on
their part to precipitate the fight, though they were determined to hold
it and Fort Pickens, as well as Tortugas and Key West, and to victual
and strengthen the garrison of the former as soon as they were able.
Fate was against them. The decision and power of their opponents were
against them. But their defence will be that they could not do anything
till they got troops, and ships, and munitions of war together, and that
they did as much as they could in a month. Sumter, in fact, was a mouse
in the jaws of the cat, and the moment an attempt was made to release
the prey by external influence, the jaws were closed and the mouse
disposed of. The act will produce, I believe, in spite of what I see, a
very deep impression throughout all the States, and will tend to bring
about an immediate collision between the high-minded parties on both
sides. When Mr. Lincoln came into office it was discovered that a
promise had been made by outgoing members of the preceding government to
surrender the Southern forts. The promise was ignored by the incoming
ministry. The Southern Commissioners insist on it that, apart from the
compact of Mr. Buchanan’s Cabinet, a pledge had been given to the South
that no attempt would be made to reënforce the forts without notice to
the Government at Montgomery; and so far as can be ascertained the
authorities at Washington did cause to be conveyed to the Southern
Confederation the expression of their intention to victual Sumter: but
whether they do so in respect to their pledge, if it existed, or in
consequence of the decision at Charleston to prevent the issuing of
further supplies to the garrison, is uncertain. The withdrawal of the
permission to market was all but an act of war. If the United States
Government would act on the hypothesis that the Southern Confederation
was an independent power, it would surely have considered the proceeding
as a prelude to immediate hostility. But the course thus adopted arose
out of the preparations made by the United States Government in fitting
out expeditions, the object of which was scarcely dubious. The
Commissioners of the Southern States at Washington, never acknowledged,
at last met with a decisive rebuff just as Virginia saw her
representatives from the Convention on the way to ask Mr. Lincoln to
explain his intentions. The Commissioners were given to understand that
their presence was useless, and that the forts would be reënforced; and
on the intelligence thus furnished to the Government at Montgomery it
was resolved to act by summoning Major Anderson to surrender before
succor could arrive, and in event of refusal by compelling him to yield
in the sight of the would-be relieving squadron. As soon as the
Commissioners found that Mr. Lincoln had made his decision, they
departed in no very yielding temper, and washed their hands in a
valedictory paper of the results. It was my intention to have left
Washington early in the week, and to have reached Charleston before
these gentlemen had departed, but the heavy storms and floods which
washed away part of the railway between Washington and Richmond at the
other side of the Potomac prevented my departure, and not only arrested
the mails from the South and the journey of the Virginian delegates for
several days, but obliged the Commissioners to take the round-about
course by rail to Baltimore, thence by steamer to Norfolk, Virginia, and
then on by rail to Charleston, which I am now pursuing one day later.