From the 'Study of M. Renan'

The sentiments I have tried to analyze are evidently of a rare order,

and presuppose an exceptional culture. Delicate flowers will not grow in

the winds and fitful sunshine of the public road. Their perfumed

corollas expand only in the mellowed air of hot-houses. Science is a

kind of hot-house which guards superior minds from the brutalities of

real life. The author of 'Dialogues philosophiques' is an exceptional

person. He is a superior man, to me a term very strong in its

simplicity; one might say almost that he is _the_ superior man.

Moreover, a certain air of imperceptible irony and transcendental

disdain shows that he is conscious of this superiority. Disregard of

vulgar opinion is very evident in his pages. The reserved elegance of a

style which never emphasizes any special intention; the subtle arguments

which never take the imperative tone; a strength of feelings, none of

which are exaggerated for the sake of sympathy,--all would reveal his

aristocratic ideal, even if he had not often declared that there is one

domain for the initiated and another for the simple. His political work

on 'Reforme intellectuelle et morale' contains the strongest argument of

the last hundred years against the very principle of democracy, natural

equality. His two symbolic dramas--'Caliban' and 'Eau de Jouvence'--may

be summed up in this reflection of the prior of Chartreux, seated in his

stall while the organ plays alone, and the crowd presses around the

crowned Caliban: "A11 civilization is the work of aristocrats." This

truth the demagogue Caliban himself recognizes, since as soon as

possessed of the palace and power of Prospero, he assumes aristocratic

ways; and M. Renan, always desirous of correcting by a smile even his

dearest affirmations, carefully adds that the monster of the island

became a very fair prince. Prospero proclaims that material work is the

slave of spiritual work. Everything must aid him who prays,--that is,

who thinks. Democratic minds, which do not admit individual

subordination to a general achievement, consider this a

monstrous doctrine.

Finally, the 'Dialogues philosophiques,' in the part entitled 'Dreams,'

contain a complete plan for the subjection of the greatest number by a

chosen few.... Is it bold to consider his feeling for his native soil

the germ of his aristocratic ideal?

Other determining circumstances unite with it, all of which may be

summed up in the term "superior man," which seems simple enough, but

which may be decomposed into a series of complex characters. The

superior man differs from the man of genius, who may be unintelligent

enough, and from the man of talent, who is often a mere specialist, in

an ability to form general ideas about everything. If this power of

generalizing is not combined with equal creative power, the superior man

remains a critic. But if he possesses both, he is an exceptional being

and the highest conceivable type, that of conscious genius. Caesar is an

example of this in politics; Da Vinci in painting; and the great Goethe

in literature. Even if he does not reach these heights, the superior man

is one of the most useful instruments of society. For universal

comprehension usually includes a universal aptitude. Is not this

demonstrated in England, where favorable conditions have developed many

examples? What are great political characters like Disraeli and

Macaulay, who could apply an ever-ready intelligence to literary

composition and parliamentary struggles, to financial interests and

diplomatic difficulties, but superior men?

Conceive such a one thrown into the democratic current by chances of

birth, and you will realize the contrasts of environment and character

which have led M. Renan to the conception of an ideal so unusual.

Democracy seems at a first glance very favorable to talent, for it opens

all doors to all efforts. But at the same time it strengthens the hard

law of competition. Therefore it requires a greater specialization.

Then, democracy is founded upon equality, of which the logical

consequence is universal suffrage. It needs little analysis to know that

universal suffrage is hostile to the superior man. The mental attitudes

resulting from advanced study are usually--multiplicity of points of

view; a taste for nice distinctions; a disdain for absolute statement;

and search for intricate solutions;--all of which are refinements

antagonistic to the popular love of positive assertion. Therefore a

superior man finds the morals of a democracy unfavorable to his

development, while its laws hold him back from public affairs. So, many

distinguished minds in France to-day are excluded from government; or if

they have triumphed over the ostracism to which their divorce from

common passions condemns them, it is because they disguise this divorce

under professions which are void of intellectual impartiality. The

superior man exiled in what Sainte-Beuve calls "the ivory tower" watches

the drama of national life as one who sees its future possibilities. Is

it necessary to recall that one of this class of élite has shown a

veritable gift of prophecy? To cite only one example, were not the

disasters of 1870 predicted with surprising exactness in the 'France

nouvelle' of Prévost-Paradol, victim like Renan of universal suffrage?

It is evident that a strange melancholy oppresses these lofty minds,

weighed down under the conviction of their ideal strength and their real

weakness. The insolent triumph of the mediocre adds to this sadness. But

it is not quite without sweetness. It has something of the pleasure

extolled by Lucretius in the famous verses on those temples of the calm

faith from which the sage regards the wild struggle of the passions. But

the superior man of to-day will never know the full enjoyment which the

nervous systems of the ancients permitted them. The mind can do a great

deal, but it is powerless to remodel our native faculties. Whether we

hate or venerate the democracy, we are its sons and inherit its

imperious need of combat. The obscure and revolutionary nineteenth

century is in our blood, and prohibits the inner immobility, the mental

quiet, celebrated by the Epicureans of Greece and Rome. There is

agitation in our serenities, as in our submissions. Catholics or

atheists, monarchists or republicans, all the offspring of this age of

anguish have the anxious look, the quaking heart, the trembling hands of

the great battle of the time. Even those who try to stand aloof share

the common anxiety. They too are revolutionists like the others, but

they oppose human stupidity, and their mute rebellion is called disdain.

It would be interesting to study among contemporary scholars the

different forms of this disdain. Does not the exaggeration of technical

beauties, which is a feature of the school of poets ironically called

Parnassians, proceed from this sentiment of _Odi profanum vulgus_? Did

not Gustave Flaubert compose 'Bouvard et Péchuchet' under this

inspiration? Would Taine have undertaken his 'Histoire des origines de

la France contemporaine' if he had not been tormented by a longing to

understand the democratic tide which was sweeping him away? But no

writer has felt more strongly than M. Renan the antithesis of the

superior man and democracy. One must read and re-read those pages of the

'Dialogues' where Theoctiste imagines the victory of a future oligarchy,

to appreciate the intensity of passion employed in the examination of

these problems. He conceives that the learned will secure formidable

destructive agents, requiring the most delicate calculations and much

abstract knowledge. Then, exulting in their power, the dreamer

exclaims:--"Thus the forces of humanity would some day be held in a few

hands, and would be possessed by a league which could rule the existence

of the planet and terrorize the whole world. If those most endowed with

reason had ability to destroy the planet, their sovereignty would be

established. The privileged class would reign by absolute terror, since

they would have the existence of all in their hands. They would be

almost gods, and then would be realized the theological state dreamed by

the poet for primitive humanity: 'Primus in orbe Deos fecit timor.'" We

must not attach more reality to this tragic fancy than the author

intended, but it shows an incurably wounded heart; and proves that the

scholar who drew this gloomy picture has no great tenderness for the

favorite Utopias of the age.

An open break is possible between democracy and science, the two great

forces of modern society. Certainly while the tendency of the first is

to level, that of the second is to create differences. "Knowledge is

power," said the inductive philosopher. To know ten times as much as

another is to be ten times as capable; and as intellectual inequality

forbids a uniform degree of information, there is increasing opposition

between democratic tendencies and the social results of science. There

are several solutions, as in nearly all the complicated problems as to

the future. In formulating the hypothesis of the 'Dialogues,' M. Renan

indicates one of them. Another may be simply an application of science

to the organization of societies. An unprejudiced consideration of the

principles upon which our nineteenth-century society is founded proves

their Cartesian character, very different already from modern

philosophy. But there is a secret movement of minds. The conceptions of

Darwin and Herbert Spencer permeate the new ones. We must have faith in

the worth of the doctrines which will eventually overthrow politics, as

well as natural science and literature. A time is coming when a society

will not seem to the philosophers of evolution as it did to the last

inheritors of the classic spirit. It will appear, not the operation of a

logical contract, but the action of a confederation of organisms of

which the cell is the unit. This is very different from the reigning

idea. It is exclusive of any difference between democrat and aristocrat,

for such difference means an arbitrary classification of the different

social elements. If this consoling vision is not a simple chimera, it

may be remembered that the great scorners like M. Renan are active

workmen for its accomplishment, in that they formulate it very exactly,

and face the coming conflict with sorrowfully keen relief.

These summary notes upon one of our most remarkable men only indicate

the three or four states of conscience which he represents to the young

people who read his books and meditate upon their eloquent, disquieting

pages. No other author offers more that is fresh in thought and feeling,

for no other employs greater sincerity in thought and in exposition of

sentiment. Whoever studies the springs of moral life in the rising

generation, meets everywhere his influence. Not before a hundred years

hence can his achievement be measured. If there are any who do not

worship sincerity and reverence, they should devote themselves to the

books of M. Renan; for no one has practiced these qualities with greater

constancy than he, who on the first page of his 'Vie de Jésus' invokes

the pure spirit of the venerated Dead, and who prayed to him in a

melancholy petition to the unattainable--"O good Genius, reveal to me

whom you love, the truths which govern death, keep one from fearing and

make one almost love it!"

Library of the World's Best Literature, Ancient and Modern — Volume 05 · 第 234 / 273 题