IN THE GERMAN IMPERIAL DIET, FEBRUARY 6TH, 1888

When I say that we must constantly endeavor to be equal to all

contingencies, I mean by that to claim that we must make greater

exertions than other powers in order to attain the same result, because

of our geographical position. We are situated in the middle of Europe.

We have at least three fronts of attack. France has only its eastern

frontier, Russia only its western frontier, on which it can be attacked.

We are, moreover, in consequence of the whole development of the world's

history, in consequence of our geographical position, and perhaps in

consequence of the slighter degree of internal cohesion which the German

nation as compared with others has thus far possessed, more exposed than

any other people to the risk of a coalition. God has placed us in a

situation in which we are prevented by our neighbors from sinking into

any sort of indolence or stagnation. He has set at our side the most

war-like and the most restless of nations, the French; and he has

permitted warlike inclinations, which in former centuries existed in no

such degree, to grow strong in Russia. Thus we get a certain amount of

spurring on both sides, and are forced into exertions which otherwise

perhaps we should not make. The pikes in the European carp-pond prevent

us from becoming carps, by letting us feel their prickles on both our

flanks; they constrain us to exertions which perhaps we should not

voluntarily make; they constrain us Germans also to a harmony among

ourselves that is repugnant to our inmost nature: but for them, our

tendency would rather be to separate. But the Franco-Russian press in

which we are caught forces us to hold together, and by its pressure it

will greatly increase our capacity for cohesion, so that we shall reach

in the end that state of inseparableness which characterizes nearly all

other nations, and which we still lack. But we must adapt ourselves to

this decree of Providence by making ourselves so strong that the pikes

can do no more than enliven us....

The bill gives us an increase in troops trained to arms--a possible

increase: if we do not need it, we need not call for it; we can leave it

at home. But if we have this increase at our disposal, and if we have

the weapons for it, ... then this new law constitutes a reinforcement

of the guarantees of peace, a reinforcement of the league of peace, that

is precisely as strong as if a fourth great power with an army of

700,000 men--and this was formerly the greatest strength that

existed--had joined the alliance. This powerful reinforcement will also,

I believe, have a quieting effect upon our own countrymen, and lessen in

some degree the nervousness of our public opinion, our stock-market, and

our press. I hope it will act upon them as a sedative when they clearly

comprehend that from the moment at which this law is signed and

published the men are there. The armament too may be said to be ready,

in the shape of what is absolutely necessary: but we must procure a

better, for if we form an army of triarians of the best human material

that we have,--of the men above thirty, the husbands and fathers,--we

must have for them the best weapons there are. We must not send them

into the fight with an outfit that we do not regard as good enough for

our young troops of the line. The solid men, the heads of families,

these stalwart figures that we can still remember from the time that

they held the bridge of Versailles,--these men must have the best rifles

on their shoulders, the completest armament, and the amplest clothing to

protect them from wind and weather. We ought not to economize

there.--But I hope it will tranquilize our fellow-citizens, if they are

really thinking of the contingency (which I do not expect to occur) of

our being attacked simultaneously on two sides,--of course, as I have

pointed out in reviewing the events of the last forty years, there is

always the possibility of any sort of coalition,--I hope it will

tranquillize them to remember that if this happens, we can have a

million good soldiers to defend each of our frontiers. At the same time

we can keep in the rear reserves of half a million and more, of a

million even, and we can push these forward as they are needed. I have

been told, "That will only result in the others going still higher." But

they cannot. They have long ago reached their limits.... In numbers they

have gone as high as we, but in quality they cannot compete with us.

Bravery, of course, is equal among all civilized nations; the Russian

and the Frenchman fight as bravely as the German: but our men, our

700,000 new men, have seen service; they are soldiers who have served

their time, and who have not yet forgotten their training. Besides--and

this is a point in which no people in the world can compete with us--we

have the material for officers and under-officers to command this

enormous army. It is here that competition is excluded, because it

involves a peculiarly broad extension of popular culture, such as exists

in Germany and in no other country....

There is a further advantage that will result from the adoption of this

law: the very strength at which we are aiming necessarily makes us

peaceful. That sounds paradoxical, but it is true. With the powerful

machine which we are making of the German army no aggression will be

attempted. If I saw fit--assuming a different situation to exist from

that which in my conviction does exist'--to come before you here to-day

and say to you, "We are seriously menaced by France and Russia; the

prospect is that we shall be attacked: such at least is my conviction,

as a diplomatist, on the basis of the military information that we have

received; it is to our advantage to defend ourselves by anticipating the

attack, and to strike at once; an offensive war is a better one for us

to wage, and I accordingly ask the Imperial Diet for a credit of a

milliard or half a milliard, in order to undertake to-day the war

against our two neighbors,"--well, gentlemen, I do not know whether you

would have such confidence in me as to grant such a request. I hope not.

But if you did, it would not be enough for me. If we in Germany desire

to wage a war with the full effect of our national power, it must be a

war with which all who help to wage it, and all who make sacrifices for

it--with which, in a word, all the nation--must be in sympathy. It must

be a people's war; it must be a war that is carried on with the same

enthusiasm as that of 1870, when we were wickedly attacked. I remember

still the joyful shouts that rang in our ears at the Cologne station; it

was the same thing from Berlin to Cologne; it was the same thing here in

Berlin. The waves of popular approval bore us into the war, whether we

liked it or not. So it must be, if a national force like ours is to be

brought fully into operation. It will be very difficult, however, to

make it clear to the provinces, to the federal states and to their

people, that a war is inevitable, that it must come. It will be asked:

"Are you so sure of it? Who knows?" If we finally come to the point of

making the attack, all the weight of the imponderables, which weigh much

more than the material weights, will be on the side of our antagonist

whom we have attacked. "Holy Russia" will be filled with indignation at

the attack. France will glisten with weapons to the Pyrenees. The same

thing will happen everywhere. A war into which we are not borne by the

will of the people--such a war will of course be carried on, if in the

last instance the established authorities consider and have declared it

to be necessary. It will be carried on with energy and perhaps

victoriously, as soon as the men come under fire and have seen blood;

but there will not be back of it, from the start, the same dash and heat

as in a war in which we are attacked....

I do not believe--to sum up--that any disturbance of the peace is in

immediate prospect; and I ask you to deal with the law that lies before

you, independently of any such idea or apprehension, simply as a means

for making the great force which God has lodged in the German nation

completely available in the event of our needing it. If we do not need

it, we shall not call for it. We seek to avoid the chance of our needing

it. This effort on our part is still, in some degree, impeded by

threatening newspaper articles from foreign countries; and I wish to

address to foreign countries especially the admonition to discontinue

these threats. They lead to nothing. The threat which we receive, not

from the foreign government, but in the press, is really a piece of

incredible stupidity, if you think what it means--that by a certain

combination of words, by a certain threatening shape given to printer's

ink, a great and proud power like the German Empire is assumed to be

capable of intimidation. This should be discontinued; and then it would

be made easier for us to assume a more conciliatory and obliging

attitude toward our two neighbors. Every country is responsible in the

long run, somehow and at some time, for the windows broken by its press;

the bill is presented some day or other, in the ill-humor of the other

country. We can easily be influenced by love and good-will,--too easily

perhaps,--but most assuredly not by threats. We Germans fear God, but

nothing else in the world; and it is the fear of God that makes us love

and cherish peace. But whoever, despite this, breaks it, will find that

the warlike patriotism that in 1813, when Prussia was weak, small, and

exhausted by plunder, brought her whole population under her banners,

has to-day become the common heritage of the whole German nation; and

whoever attacks the German nation will find it united in arms, and in

every soldier's heart the firm faith "God will be with us."

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