255 This logical usage is applied equally to attributes of a logical
subject which is not itself a substance but an accident; it turns
solely on the point whether the concept of the logical predicate of
a judgment is or is not connected by an absolute logical connexion,
a connexion of thought, with the concept of the logical subject.
_ 256 Cf._ ST. THOMAS, _Quaest. Disp._, _De Spir. Creat._, art. 11, ad.
7.
_ 257 Cf._, however, § 68, p. 246, n. 2, _infra_.
258 St. Thomas, whose language is usually so moderate, thus expresses
his view of the doctrine afterwards propounded by Descartes when the
latter declared the essence of the soul to be thought: “Quidquid
dicatur de potentiis animae, tamen nullus unquam opinatur, nisi
insanus, quod habitus et actus animae sint ipsa ejus
essentia.”—_Quaest. Disp., De Spir. Creat._, art. 11, ad 1. For a
very convincing treatment of this question, _cf._ KLEUTGEN, _op.
cit._, §§ 625-626.
259 DE SAN, _Cosmologia_, § 323, _apud_ MERCIER, _op. cit._, § 158.
_ 260 op. cit._, § 625.
261 ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, iii., q. 17, art. 2, c.
262 Hence St. Thomas says, in regard to the Blessed Eucharist, that the
accidents of bread and wine had not an existence of their own as
long as the substance of bread and wine was there; that this is true
of accidents generally; that it is not they that exist, but rather
their subjects; that their function is to determine these subjects
to exist as characterized in a certain way, as whiteness gives snow
a white existence: “Dicendum quod accidentia panis et vini, manente
substantia panis et vini non habebant ipsa _esse_ sicut nec alia
accidentia, sed subjecta eorum habebant hujusmodi _esse_ per ea,
sicut nix est alba per albedinem.”—_Summa Theol._, iii., q. 77, art.
1, ad. 4.
263 For the arguments on both sides _cf._ MERCIER, _Ontologie_, § 156
(pp. 308 _sqq._). The indirect argument which the author derives
from the fact that the Divine _Concursus_ is necessary for the
activity of creatures, while offering an intelligible explanation of
this necessity on Thomistic principles, does not touch the
probability of other explanations.
_ 264 Cf._ URRABURU’S definition: “entitas vel realitas a subjecto
realiter distincta, cujus totum esse consistit in ultima
determinatione rei ad aliquod munus obeundum, vel ad aliquam realem
denominationem actu habendam, sine qua, saltem in individuo sumpta,
res eadem potest existere absolute”.—_op. cit._, § 120 (p. 380).
_ 265 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, § 291 (p. 854, _quarta opinio_), p. 854.
266 Whether immanent vital acts—especially of the spiritual faculties in
man: thoughts, volitions, etc.—are mere modes, or whether they are
absolute accidents, having their own proper and positive reality
which perfects their subject by affecting it, is a disputed
question. Habits, acquired by repetition of such acts, _e.g._
knowledge and virtue, belonging as they do to the category of
quality, are more than mere modalities of the human subject: they
have an absolute, positive entity, whereby they add to the total
perfection of the latter.
_ 267 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, § 121 (pp. 386 _sqq._).
268 The fact that Aristotle [_Metaph._, lib. vii. (al. vi.), ch. iii.]
seems to have placed a _real distinction_ between extension and
corporeal substance, while he could not have suspected the absolute
_separability_ of the former from the latter, would go to show that
he did not regard separability as the only test of a real
distinction. _Cf._ KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, _ibid._
269 Obviously we are not concerned herewith _all_ the attributes which
by a necessity of thought we ascribe to an essence, _e.g._ the
_corruptibility_ of a corporeal substance, or the _immortality_ of a
spiritual substance. These are not entities really distinct from the
substance, but only aspects which we recognize to be necessary
corollaries of its nature. We are concerned only with properties
which are real powers, faculties, forces, aptitudes of things.—_Cf._
KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, § 627.
_ 270 op. cit._, § 628.
271 “Tertii sunt, qui dicunt, quod potentiae animae nec adeo sunt idem
ipsi animae, sicut sunt ejus principia intrinsica et essentialia,
nec adeo diversae, ut cedant in aliud genus, sicut accidentia; sed
in genere substantiae sunt per reductionem ... et ideo quasi medium
tenentes inter utramque opinionem dicunt, quasdam animae potentias
sic differre ad invicem, ut nullo modo dici possint una potentia:
non tamen concedunt, eas simpliciter diversificari secundum
essentiam, ita ut dicantur diversae essentiae, sed differre
essentialiter in genere potentiae, ita ut dicantur diversa
instrumenta ejusdem substantiae.”—_In lib._ ii., dist. xxiv., p. 1,
art. 2, q. 1.
In the same context he explains what we are to understand by
referring anything to a certain category _per reductionem_: “Sunt
enim quaedam, quae sunt in genere _per se_, aliqua _per reductionem_
ad idem genus. Illa per se sunt in genere, quae participant
essentiam completam generis, ut species et individua; illa vero per
reductionem, quae nan dicunt completam essentiam.... Quaedam
reducuntur sicut principia ... aut essentialia, sicut sunt materia
et forma in genere substantiae; aut integrantia, sicut partes
substantiae.... Quaedam reducuntur sicut _viae_ ... aut sicut _viae
ad res_, et sic motus et mutationes, ut generatio, reducuntur ad
substantiam; aut sicut _viae a rebus_, et sic habent reduci
potentiae ad genus substantiae. Prima enim agendi potentia, quae
egressum dicitur habere ab ipsa substantia, ad idem genus reducitur,
quae non adeo elongatur ab ipsa substantia, ut dicat aliam essentiam
completam.”—_ibid._, ad. 8.
272 “Quoniam potentia creaturae arctata est, non potuit creatura habere
posse perfectum, nisi esset in ea potentiarum multitudo, ex quarum
collectione sive adunatione, una supplente defectum alterius,
resultaret unum posse completum, sicut manifeste animadverti potest
in organis humani corporis, quorum unumquodque indiget a virtute
alterius adjuvari.”—_In lib._ ii., dist. xxiv., p. 1, art. 2, q. 8.
273 The student will find in MAHER’S _Psychology_ (ch. iii.) a clear and
well-reasoned exposition of the inconsistency and groundlessness of
such attacks on the doctrine of faculties.
_ 274 Cf._ KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, § 636-637.
275 “Cum corpus hominis aut cujuslibet alterius animalis sit quoddam
totum naturale, dicit unum ex eo quod unam formam habeat qua
perficitur non solum secundum aggregationem aut compositionem, ut
accidit in domo et in aliis hujusmodi. Unde opportet quod quaelibet
pars hominis et animalis recipiat esse [_i.e._ sibi proprium] et
speciem ab anima sicut a propria forma. Unde Philosophus dicit (l.
ii. de anima, text. 9), quod recedente anima neque oculus neque caro
neque aliqua pars manet nisi aequivoce.”—ST. THOMAS, _Quaest. Disp.
de anima_, art. 10—_apud_ KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, § 632.
276 The most perfect real unity is of course that which includes all
perfection in the simplicity of its actual essence, without any
dispersion or plurality of its being, without any admixture of
accident or potentiality. Such is the unity of the Infinite Being
alone. No finite being possesses its actuality _tota simul_. And the
creature falls short of perfect unity in proportion as it attains to
this actuality only by a multiplicity of real changes, by a variety
of really distinct principles and powers, essential and accidental,
in its concrete mode of being. In proportion as created things are
higher or lower in the scale of being (47), they realize a higher or
a lower grade of unity in their mode of individual existence.
277 We are concerned here only with finite, created substances, as
distinct from the Divine Uncreated Substance on whom these depend
(64).
278 ARISTOTLE, _Categ._ ch. iii., _passim_; _Metaph._, l. v. (al. vi.),
ch. viii.; ST. THOMAS, _In Metaph._, l. v. lect. 10; KLEUTGEN, _op.
cit._, § 589-591.
_ 279 Cf._ KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, §§ 587, 602-603.
_ 280 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, §§ 277, 279.
_ 281 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., § 217 (pp. 66 _sqq._).
282 Sciendum est quod nomen naturae significat quodlibet principium
intrinsicum motus; secundum quod Philosophus dicit quod _natura est
principium motus in eo in quo est per se, et non secundum
accidens_.—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, iii., q. 2, art. 1 in c.
283 And here we are reminded of the view of many medieval scholastics of
high authority, that the same material entity can have at the same
time a plurality of formative principles or _substantial forms_ of
different grades of perfection.
_ 284 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, § 282 (p. 825).
285 For want of a more appropriate rendering we translate the Latin term
_suppositum_ (Gr. ὑπόστασις) by the phrase “subsisting thing”;
though the classical terms are really generic: _suppositum_ being a
genus of which there are two species, _suppositum irrationale_
(“_thing_” or “subsisting _thing_”) and _suppositum rationale_
(“_person_”).—_Cf._ _infra_, pp. 265-6.
286 Complete in every way: in _substantial_ and in _specific_
perfections. The separated soul, though it is an existing individual
substance, retains its essential communicability to its connatural
material principle, the body. Hence it has not “subsistence,” it is
not a “person”.—_Cf._ _infra_, p. 264.
287 “Per se agere _convenit per se existenti_. Sed per se existens
quandoque potest dici aliquid, si non sit inhærens ut accidens, vel
ut forma materialis, etiamsi sit pars. Sed proprie et per se
subsistens dicitur quod neque est praedicto modo inhærens neque est
pars. Secundum quem modum oculus aut manus non potest dici per se
subsistens, et per consequens nec per se operans. Unde et
operationes partium attribuuntur toti per partes. Dicimus enim quod
homo videt per oculum et palpat per manum.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa
Theol._, i., q. 75, art. 2, ad. 2.
_ 288 Cf._ preceding note. St. Thomas continues: “Potest igitur dici quod
anima intelligit, sicut oculus videt, sed magis proprie dicitur quod
homo intelligat per animam” (ibid.); and elsewhere he writes:
“Dicendum quod anima est pars humanae speciei [_i.e._ naturae]. Et
ideo, licet sit separata, quia tamen retinet naturam unibilitatis,
non potest dici substantia individua quae est hypostasis vel
substantia prima, sicut nec manus, nec quaecumque alia partium
hominis; et sic non competit ei neque definitio personae, neque
nomen.”—_Summa Theol._, i., q. 29, art. 1, ad. 5.
_ 289 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, i., §§ 54-5.
290 All _created_ subsisting things and persons depend, of course,
essentially on the Necessary Being for their existence and for their
activity. This Necessary Being we know from Revelation to be
_Triune_, Three in Persons, One in Nature. The subsistence of each
Divine Person of the Blessed Trinity excludes _all_ modes of
dependence.
291 “Hoc ... quod est per se agere, excellentiori modo convenit
substantiis rationalis naturae quam aliis. Nam solae substantiae
rationales habent dominium sui actus, ita quod in eis est agere et
non agere; aliae vero substantiae magis aguntur quam agunt. Et ideo
conveniens fuit ut substantia individua _rationalis_ naturae
speciale nomen haberet.”—ST. THOMAS, _Quaest. Disp. de Potentia_, q.
ix., art. 1, ad. 3.
_ 292 Cf._ BILLOT, _De Verbo Incarnato_, q. ii.—_apud_ MERCIER, _op.
cit._, § 151 (pp. 299-300).
_ 293 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, § 291, for an exhaustive list of the
authorities in favour of each of the various views propounded in
this present context.
294 “Natura singularis et integra per se consituitur in sua
independentia, non aliquo positivo addito ultra illam entitatem
positivam, qua est haec natura.”—SCOTUS, iii., Dist. i. q. 1, n. 9
and n. 11, ad. 3. _Cf._ SUAREZ, _Metaph._, Disp. xxxiv. § 2;
KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, § 616; FRANZELIN, _De verbo Incarnato_, Th.
xxix.
_ 295 op. cit._, § 293 (p. 861).
296 Neither is it a _natural_ union in the sense of being _due_ to the
human nature; it is wholly _undue_ to the latter, and is in this
sense _supernatural_.
_ 297 op. cit._, § 293 (p. 861).
_ 298 ibid._ Farther on (p. 863) he says it is certain that the Divine
Nature of the Word is _substantially_ united with humanity in a
unity of person or subsistence: “certum est eamdem [naturam divinam]
substantialiter uniri cum humanitate in unitate suppositi;” and for
this he considers that the human nature must be incomplete “in
ratione personae”. But this proves nothing; for of course the human
nature must be wanting in personality. But it is complete _as a
nature_. Nor does the aphorism he quotes—“Quidquid substantiae in
sua specie completae accedit, accidens est,”—apply to subsistence or
personality supervening on a complete substance.
299 “Humanitas illa [_scil._ Christi], quamvis completa in _esse_
naturae, non tamen habet ultimum complementum in genere substantiae
cum in se non subsistat.”—_ibid._, § 296 (p. 866).
300 This view, which has many supporters, is clearly explained and ably
defended by MERCIER in his _Ontologie_, § 151 (pp. 298-302), § 52
(pp. 134-5), § 49 (p. 127, n. 1).
_ 301 Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, § 49 (p. 127, n. 1).
302 Hence Urraburu gives this _real_ definition of subsistence: _ultimus
naturae terminus in ordine substantiali_ sive in ratione existentis
per se: the ultimate term (or determination) of a nature in the
order of substantiality or of “existing by itself”—_op. cit._, § 296
(p. 866).
303 “Sicut enim modus accidentalis figurae terminat quantitatem, et
modus ubicationis constituit rem hic et non alibi, ita modus
substantialis personalitatis terminans naturam reddit illam
incommunicabilem alieno supposito.”—URRABURU, _op. cit._, § 291 (p.
854).
304 The terms “Self,” “_Ego_,” and “Person” we take to be identical in
reference to the human individual. The _mind_ is not the _Ego_,
self, or person, but only a part of it.—_Cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_,
ch. vi., p. 104.
_ 305 Cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_, ch. xvii.
_ 306 ibid._, p. 365.
_ 307 Cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_, p. 363.
_ 308 Cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_, p. 365 (italics in last sentence ours).
_ 309 Cf._ RICKABY, _First Principles_, p. 370.
_ 310 Cf._ MAHER, _ibid._, pp. 487-92; MERCIER, _Psychologie_, ii., pp.
197-224 (6th edit.); _Ontologie_, § 153 (p. 304).
311 There are cogent theological reasons also against the view that
consciousness constitutes personality. For instance, the human
nature of our Divine Lord has its own proper consciousness, which,
nevertheless, does not constitute this nature a person.
_ 312 Essay Concerning Human Understanding_, bk. ii., ch. xxvii.
313 “That being then one plant which has such an organization of parts
in one coherent body partaking of one common life, it continues to
be the same plant as long as it continues to partake of the same
life, though that life be communicated to different particles of
matter vitally united to the living plant, in a like continued
organization conformable to that sort of plants....
“The case is not so much different in brutes, but that anyone may
hence see what makes an animal and continues it the same....
“This also shows wherein the identity of the same man consists:
_viz._ in nothing but a participation of the same continued life, by
constantly fleeting particles of matter, in succession vitally
united to the same organized body.... For if the identity of soul
alone makes the same man, and there be nothing in the nature of
matter why the same individual spirit may be united [_i.e._
successively] to different bodies, it will be possible that ... men
living in distant ages, and of different tempers, may have been the
same man....”—_Essay Concerning Human Understanding_, bk. ii. ch.
xxvii. § 4-6. Yet though “identity of soul” does not make “the same
man,” Locke goes on immediately to assert that identity of
_consciousness_, which is but a function of the soul, makes _the
same person_.
_ 314 Essay Concerning Human Understanding_, bk. ii., ch. xxvii., § 7.
Names do not stand for ideas or concepts but for _conceived_
realities; and the question here is: What is the conceived reality
(in the existing human individual) for which the term “person”
stands?
_ 315 ibid._, § 9.
_ 316 Essay Concerning Human Understanding_, bk. ii., ch. xxvii., §§ 13,
14.
_ 317 Essay Concerning Human Understanding_, bk. ii., ch. xxvii., § 13.
318 For a searching criticism of such theories of the Ego or human
person, _cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_, ch. xxii.
_ 319 ibid._, § 19.
320 p. 276.
_ 321 Cf._ MAHER’S criticism of Professor James’ theory on double
personality (_op. cit._, ch. xxii., pp. 491-2): “Professor James
devotes much space to these ’mutations’ of the Ego, yet overlooks
the fact that they are peculiarly fatal, not to his adversaries, but
to his own theory that ‘the present thought is the only thinker,’
and that seeming identity is sufficiently preserved by each thought
’appropriating’ and ‘inheriting’ the contents of its predecessor.
The difficulties presented to this process of inheritance by such
facts as sleep and swooning have been already dwelt upon [_cf._
_ibid._, p. 480 (c)]; but here they are if possible increased. The
last conscious thought of, say, Felida 2 has to transmit its
gathered experience not to its _proximate_ conscious successor,
which is Felida 1, but across seven months of vacuum until on the
extinction of Felida 1 the next conscious thought which constitutes
Felida 2 is born into existence. If the single personality is hard
for Mr. James to explain, ‘double-personality’ at least doubles his
difficulties.”
_ 322 Cf._ _infra_, § 82.
323 Ποιότητα δὲ λέγω, καθ᾽ ἤν ποιοί τινες εἰναι λέγονται.—_Categ._, ch.
iv. _Cf._ ST. THOMAS: “Haec est ratio formalis qualitatis, per quam
respondemus interroganti qualis res sit.”
324 The other accidents, _e.g._ _actio_ and _passio_, in so far as they
change the perfection of the substance, do so only by producing
qualities in it. Quantity, which is the connatural accident of all
corporeal substance, adds of itself no special complement or degree
of accidental perfection to the latter, in the sense of disposing
(or indisposing) the latter for the attainment of the full and final
perfection due to its specific nature; but only in the sense that it
supposes more or less of that kind of substance to exist, or in the
sense in which it is understood to include the _qualities_ of which
it may be the _immediate_ subject.—_Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, §
326.
_ 325 In Praedicamenta_, ch. i.
_ 326 Cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_, ch. xii, xiii, xxiii, xxv. BERGSON
rightly recognizes the irreducibility of quality to quantity (_Essai
sur les données immediates de la conscience, passim_). But he
wrongly infers from this “fundamental antinomy,” as he calls it, the
existence, in each human individual, of a two-fold _Ego_, a deeper
self where all is quality, and a superficial self which projects
conscious states, in static and numerical isolation from one
another, into a homogeneous space where all is quantitative,
mathematical. The reasonable inference is merely that the human mind
recognizes in the data of its experience a certain richness and
variety of modes of real being.
_ 327 Metaph._ V., ch. xiv., where the four groups are finally reduced to
two.
_ 328 Summa Theol._, ia, iiae, q. 49, art. 2.
329 To be distinguished from the _passio_ which is correlative of
_actio_ and which consists in the actual undergoing of the latter,
the actual reception of the accidental form which is the term of the
latter.
330 “Inter omnes qualitates, figurae maxime sequuntur et demonstrant
speciem rerum. Quod maxime in plantis et animalibus patet, in quibus
nullo certiori indicio diversitas specierum dijudicari potest, quam
diversitate figurae.”—ST. THOMAS, _In_ VII. _Physic_, lect. 5.
331 Every natural habit, as we have just seen, has an essential relation
to _activity_. Every such habit inheres immediately in some
operative faculty, as science in the intellect, or justice in the
will. All natural habits are _operative_. There is, however, as we
know from Divine Revelation, an “entitative” habit, a _habitus
entitativus_, which affects the substance itself of the human soul,
ennobling its natural mode of being and so perfecting it as to raise
it to a higher or supernatural plane of being, to an order of
existence altogether undue to its nature: the _supernaturally
infused_ habit of _sanctifying grace_.
_ 332 Eth. Eud._, ii., 2.
333 “Vires naturales non agunt operationes suas mediantibus aliquibus
habitibus, quia secundum seipsas sunt determinatae ad unum.”—_Summa
Theol._, ia iiæ, q. 49, art. 4, ad 2.
334 “Intellectus ... est subjectum habitus. Illi enim competit esse
subjectum habitus quod est in potentia ad multa; et hoc maxime
competit intellectui....”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, ia, iie, q.
50, art. 4, ad. 1. “Omnis potentia quae diversimode potest ordinari
ad agendum, indiget habitu, quo bene disponatur ad suum actum.
Voluntas autem cum sit potentia rationalis, diversimode potest ad
agendum ordinari: et ideo oportet in voluntate aliquem habitum
ponere, quo bene disponatur ad suum actum ...,”—_ibid._ art. 5, in
c.
335 “Habitualis dispositio requiritur ubi subjectum est in potentia ad
multa. Operationes vero quae sunt ab anima per corpus, principaliter
quidem sunt ipsius animae, secundario vero ipsius corporis. Habitus
autem proportionantur operationibus; unde ex similibus actibus
similes habitus causantur, ut dicitur in 2 Ethic., cap. 1 et 2; in
corpore vero possunt esse secundario, inquantum scilicet corpus
disponitur et habilitatur ad prompte deserviendum operationibus
animae.”—_Summa Theol._, ia iiæ, q. 49, art. 1, in c.
_ 336 Cf._ ST. THOMAS, _ibid._, q. 50, art. 1.—MERCIER, _Ontologie_, §
164.
337 According to the scholastic theory of matter and form the matter
must be predisposed by certain qualities for the reception of a
given substantial form. The chemical elements which form a compound
will not do so in any and every condition, but only when definitely
disposed and brought together under favourable conditions. These
elementary qualities, considered in themselves, are not habits or
dispositions: “Unde qualitates simplices elementorum, quae secundum
unum modum determinatum naturis elementorum conveniunt, non dicimus
_dispositiones_ vel _habitus_, sed _simplices qualitates_.”—ST.
THOMAS, _ibid._, q. 49, art. 4, in C. They are natural qualities and
not dispositions produced by disposing causes.
338 St. Thomas regards the distinction between _habits_ and mere
dispositions as a distinction not of _degree_ but of _kind_:
“Dispositio et habitus possunt distingui sicut diversae species
unius generis subalterni, ut dicantur _dispositiones_ illae
qualitates primae speciei quibus convenit secundum propriam rationem
ut de facili amittantur, quia habent causas mutabiles, ut aegritudo
et sanitas; _habitus_ vero dicantur illae qualitates quae secundum
suam rationem habent quod non de facili transmutentur quia habent
causas immobiles; sicut scientia et virtutes; et secundum hoc
disposito non fit habitus.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, ia, iiæ, q.
49, art. 2, ad. 3.
339 “Vires sensitivae _dupliciter_ possunt considerari: _uno modo_,
secundum quod operanter ex instinctu naturae; _alio modo_, secundum
quod operantur ex imperio rationis. Secundum igitur quod operantur
ex instinctu naturae, sic ordinantur ad unum, sicut et natura; et
ideo sicut in potentiis naturalibus non sunt aliqui habitus, ta
etiam nec in potentiis sensitivis, secundum quod ex instinctu
naturae operantur. Secundum vero quod operantur ex imperio rationis,
sic ad diversa ordinari possunt: et sic possunt esse in eis aliqui
habitus, quibus bene aut male ad aliquid disponuntur.”—ST. THOMAS,
_ibid._, q. 50, art. 3, in c. In this context the angelic doctor,
following Aristotle, places the virtues of temperance and fortitude
in the sense _appetite_ as controlled by the rational will. For the
same reason he admits the possibility of habits in the faculties of
_internal_ sense perception, though not in the _external_ senses
(_ibid._, ad. 3).
340 “Quia bruta animalia a ratione hominis per quandam consuetudinem
disponuntur ad aliquid operandum sic, vel aliter, hoc modo in brutis
animalibus habitus quodammodo poni possunt.... Deficit tamen ratio
habitus quantum ad usum voluntatis quia non habent dominium utendi
vel non utendi, quod videtur ad rationem habitus pertinere; et ideo,
proprie loquendo, in eis habitus esse non possunt.”—_ibid._, ad. 2.
341 It must not be forgotten that habit is an _accident_, an accidental
perfection of the substance or nature of an individual agent; it
immediately affects the operative power of the agent, which
operative power is itself an accident of this agent’s nature
(constituting the second sub-class of the accident, _Quality_).
Habit is thus at once an _actuality_ or actualization of the
operative power and a _potentiality_ of further and more perfect
acts. It is intermediate between the operative power and the
complete actualization which the power receives by the acts that
spring from the latter as perfected by the habit. Faculty and habit
form one complete proximate principle of those acts: a principle
which is at once a partial actualization of the individual agent’s
nature and a potentiality of further actualization of this nature.
342 “Si potentiae animae non sunt ipsa essentia animae, sequitur quod
sint accidentia in aliquo novem generum contenta. Sunt enim in
secunda specie qualitatis, quæ dicitur potentia vel impotentia
naturalis.”—_Q. Disp. de Spir. Creat._, art. 11, in c.
_ 343 Cf._ ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. 76, art. 1, in c.—“Cum
potentia et actus dividant ens, et quodlibet genus entis, opportet
quod ad idem genus referatur potentia et actus; et ideo si actus non
est in genere substantiae, potentia, quæ dicitur ad illum actum, non
potest esse in genere substantiae. Operatio autem animae non est in
genere substantiae, sed in solo Deo, cujus operatio est ejus
substantia.”—_Cf._ ZIGLIARA, _Ontologia_ (9), xi.: “Actus et
potentia essentialiter ad illum actum ordinata sunt in eodem genere
supremo.”
344 “Nec in angelo, nec in aliqua creatura, virtus vel potentia
operativa est idem quod sua essentia.... Actus ad quem comparatur
potentia operativa est operatio. In angelo autem non est idem
intelligere et esse; nec aliqua alia operatio, aut in ipso aut in
quocunque alio creato, est idem quod ejus esse. Unde essentia angeli
non est ejus potentia intellectiva, nec alicujus creati essentia est
ejus operativa potentia.”—_ibid._, q. 54, art 3.
345 As we shall see later, action as such does not perfect or change the
_agens_, unless when, as in immanent action, the _agens_ is
identical with the _patiens_. Action formally actualizes or perfects
the _patiens_: _actio fit in passo_. But the exercise of any
activity by an agent undoubtedly connotes or implies a perfection of
this agent. It is not, however, that the actual operation as such
(unless it is immanent) adds a new perfection to the agent. Rather
the agent’s _power_ of acting, revealed to us in its exercise, is
for us a measure of the actual perfection of the agent. But the
question remains: Is this power or perfection, so far as we know it,
a _substantial_ perfection? Is it _the very perfection itself of the
agent’s substance or nature_ as known to us? Or is it an
_accidental_ perfection which is for us an index of a corresponding
degree of substantial perfection? In getting our knowledge of the
nature of a substance from a consideration of its _sensible_
accidents, its _phenomena_, its _operations_—according to the rule,
_Operari sequitur esse: qualis est operatio talis est natura_—can we
use a _single_ inference, from _action_ to _nature_, or must we use
a _double_ inference, from action to power, and from power to
nature? But even if we have to make the double inference, this _of
itself_ does not prove any more than a conceptual distinction
between _power_ and _nature_.
_ 346 Cf._. ST. THOMAS, _Q. Disp. de spir. creat._, art. 11, in c.—MAHER,
_Psychology_ ch. iii.
_ 347 Cf._ MERCIER, _Ontologie_, § 168.
_ 348 Cf._ _ibid._, _op. cit._, § 169; MAHER, _Psychology_, ch. iii. (p.
29, n. 3.)
349 Of course all accidents are “forms” in the sense of being
_determining principles_ of their subjects, these being considered
as _determinable_ or _receptive_ principles. Even quantity is a form
in this sense. But quantity itself does not appear to be a “simple”
principle in the sense of being “indivisible”: its very function is
to make the corporeal substance divisible into integral parts. What
then of all those qualities which inhere _immediately_ in the
quantity of corporeal substances? They are determinations or
affections of a composite, extended, divisible subject. Conceived in
the abstract they have, of course, the attributes of indivisibility,
immutability, etc., characteristic of all _abstract_ essences (14).
But in their physical actuality in what intelligible sense can they
be said to be simple, indivisible entities?
_ 350 Summa Theol._, ia, iiae, q. 52, art. 2; iia, iiae, q. 24, art. 4,
5.—_Q. Disp. de Virtutibus in communi_, q. i, art. 11, in c.—I. _In
Sentent._, _Dist._, 17, q. 2, art. 2.—_Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, §§
329-332, for arguments and authorities. The author himself defends
the former view, according to which alteration takes place by a real
addition or substraction of grades of the same quality.
351 I. _In Sentent._, _Dist._, 17, q. 2, art. 2.
352 iia, iiae, q. 24, art. 4, ad. 3.
_ 353 Q. Disp. de Virtut._, q. 1, art. 11, in c.
354 The scientific concept of “volume” is identical with the common and
philosophical concept of “external, actual, local, or spatial
extension”. The functions ascribed by physics and mechanics to the
“mass” of a body have no other source, in the body, than what
philosophers understand by the “internal extension” or “quantity” of
the body.—_Cf._ Nys, _Cosmologie_ (Louvain, 1903), §§ 192-203.
355 The terms _quantity_ and _extension_ are commonly taken as
synonymous; but _quantity_ is more properly applied to the internal
plurality of integral parts of the substance itself, _extension_ to
the dispersion of these parts outside one another in space.
356 Hence Aristotle’s definition in _Metaph._, iv.: “Quantum dicitur,
quod [est] in insita divisibile, quorum utrumque aut singula unum
quid et hoc quid apta sunt esse”: a quantified substance is one
which is divisible into parts that are really in it [_i.e._ _partes
integrantes_], parts each of which is capable of becoming a distinct
subsisting individual thing.—_Cf._ NYS, _Cosmologie_, § 154.
357 “Longitudo, latitudo et profunditas quantitates quaedam, sed non
substantiae sunt. Quantitas enim non est substantia, sed magis cui
haec ipsa primo insunt illud est substantia.”—_Metaph._, L. vii.,
ch. iii.
_ 358 Physic_, L. i., ch. ii.
359 L. ii., ch. iv.
_ 360 Cf._ § 62 _supra_.
361 “Propria ... totalitas substantiae continetur indifferenter in parva
vel magna quantitate; sicut ... tota natura hominis in magno, vel
parvo homine.”—_Summa Theol._, iii., q. 76, art. 1, ad. 3.
362 No argument in favour of this view can be based on the use of the
term _species_ (“_manentibus dumtaxat speciebus panis et vini_”) by
the Fathers of the Council of Trent. For them, as for all Catholic
philosophers and theologians of the time, the scholastic term
_species_, used in such a context, meant simply the objective,
perceptible accidents of the substance. _Cf._ NYS, _op. cit._, §
175.
363 Hence the significance of the lines in ST. THOMAS’ hymn, _Adoro Te
devote_:—
_Visus, tactus, gustus_ in te fallitur,
Sed _auditu_ solo tuto creditur.
364 and neither does Revelation. The Body of our Blessed Lord exists in
the Eucharist without its connatural external extension and
consequent impenetrability. But according to the common teaching of
Catholic theologians it has its _internal quantity_, its distinct
integral parts, organs and members—really distinct from one another,
though interpenetrating and not spatially external to one another.
Its mode of existence in the space occupied by the sacramental
species is thus analogous to the mode in which the soul is in the
body, or a pure spirit in space.
365 We know from Revelation that the Body of our Lord exists in this way
in the Eucharist. We know, too, from Revelation that after the
general resurrection the glorified bodies of the just will be _real_
bodies, real _corporeal substances_, and nevertheless that they will
be endowed with properties very different from those which they
possess in the present state: that they will be immortal,
incorruptible, impassible, “spiritual” (_cf._ 1 Cor. xv.). The
Catholic philosopher who adds those scattered rays of revealed light
to what his own rational analysis of experience tells him about
matter and spirit, will understand the possibility of such a kinship
between the latter as will make the fact of their union in his own
nature and person not perhaps any less wonderful, but at any rate a
little less surprising and inscrutable: and this without committing
himself to the objective idealism whereby Berkeley, while
endeavouring to show the utter unreality of matter, only succeeded
in persuading himself that its reality was not independent of all
mind.
366 “Ὥστε τὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος πέρας ἀκίνητον πρῶτον, τουτ᾽ ἔστιν ὁ
τόπος.”—_Physic_, L. iv., ch. iv. (6).
367 The category _Situs_ is commonly interpreted to signify the _mutual_
spatial relations or dispositions of the various parts of a body in
the place actually occupied by the latter.
368 A body deprived of its connatural extension exists in space in a
manner analogous to that in which the soul is in the body. The Body
of our Divine Lord is in the Eucharist in this
manner—“_sacramentaliter_”.
_ 369 Cf._ KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, § 624.
_ 370 Cf._ ZIGLIARA, _Ontologia_ (35), iv.
_ 371 Cf._ NYS, _La Notion d’Espace_ (Louvain, 1901), pp. 95 _sqq._—_La
Notion de Temps_ (Louvain, 1898), pp. 123 _sqq._
372 “Quid est ergo tempus? Si nemo ex me quaerat, scio; si quaerenti
explicare velim, nescio.”—_Confess_. L. xi., ch. xiv.
373 “Cum enim intelligimus extrema diversa alicujus medii, et anima
dicat, illa esse duo _nunc_, hoc _prius_, illud _posterius_ quasi
numerando _prius_ et _posterius_ in motu, tunc hoc dicimus esse
tempus.”—ST. THOMAS, in _Phys._, L. iv. lect. 17a.
_ 374 Sentent._, Dist. xix., q. ii., art. 1.—_Cf._ Lect. xxiii. in iv.
_Physic._
_ 375 Physic._, iv., ch. xi.—_Cf._ ST. THOMAS _in loc_.
376 “The conception of variation united with sameness is not, however,
the whole cognition of time. For this the mind must be able to
combine in thought two different movements or pulsations of
consciousness, so as to represent an interval between them. It must
hold together two _nows_, conceiving them, in succession, yet
uniting them through that intellectual synthetic activity by which
we _enumerate_ a collection of objects—a process or act which
carries concomitantly the consciousness of its own continuous
unity.”—MAHER, _Psychology_, ch. xvii.
377 That is, provided we abstract from all comparison of this internal
time duration with that of any other current of conscious
experiences in the estimating mind. As a matter of fact we always
and necessarily compare the time duration of any particular
experienced change with that of the remaining portion of the whole
current of successive conscious states which make up our mental
life. And thus we feel, not that the four-mile walk had a longer
time duration than the three-mile walk, but rather that it took
place at a quicker _rate_, more rapidly, than the latter. But if a
mind which had no other consciousness of change whatsoever than,
_e.g._ that of the two walks experienced successively, no other
standard change with which to compare each of them as it occurred—if
such a mind experienced each in this way, would it pronounce the
four-mile walk to have occupied a longer time than the three-mile
walk?—_Cf._ _infra_, p. 327.
378 This is true on the assumption that the intrinsic _time-duration_ of
a successive, continuous change, its divisibility into distinct
“nows” related as “before” and “after,” is _really identical with_
the continuous, successive _states constituting the change_ itself,
and is not _a really distinct mode_ superadded to this change, a
continuous series of “_quandocationes_,” distinct from the change,
and giving the latter its temporal duration. But many philosophers
hold that in all creatures _duration_ is a mode of their existence
really distinct from the creatures themselves that have this
duration or continued existence.—_Cf._ _infra_, § 86.
_ 379 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., § 246, pp. 201 _sqq._
_ 380 op. cit._, c. xvii.
_ 381 op. cit._, c. xvii.
_ 382 Cf._ NYS, _La Notion de Temps_ (Lovain, 1898), p. 104.
383 The fact that we can perceive and estimate temporal duration only
_extrinsically_, and in ultimate analysis by comparison with the
flow of our own conscious states, and that therefore we can have no
perception or conception of the intrinsic time duration of any
change, seems to have been overlooked by DE SAN _(Cosmologia_, pp.
528-9) when he argues from our perception of different _rates_ of
motion, in favour of the view that time _duration_ is not really
identical with motion or change, but a superadded mode, really
distinct from the latter.
_ 384 Cf._ NYS, _La Notion de Temps_, pp. 85 _sqq._
_ 385 Cf._ NYS, _op. cit._, pp. 120 _sqq._, for a defence of the view
that an actually infinite multitude involves no contradiction.
_ 386 ibid._, pp. 162-9.
_ 387 De Consolatione_, L. v., _pr. ult._
_ 388 Cf._ KLEUTGEN, _op. cit._, § 624.
389 “Est ergo dicendum, quod, cum aeternitas sit mensura esse
permanentis secundum quod aliquid recedit a permanentia essendi,
secundum hoc recedit ab aeternitate. Quaedam autem sic recedunt a
permanentia essendi, quod esse eorum est subjectum transmutationis,
vel in transmutatiose consistit; et hujusmodi mensurantur _tempore_,
sicut omnis motus, et etiam esse omnium corruptibilium. Quaedam vero
recedunt minus a permanentia essendi, quia esse eorum nec in
transmutatione consistit nec est subjectum transmutationis; tamen
habent transmutationem adjunctam vel in actu vel in potentia ...
patet de angelis, quod scilicet habent esse intransmutabile cum
transmutabilitate secundum electionem, quantum ad eorum naturam
pertinet, et cum transmutabilitate intelligentiarum, et affectionum,
et locorum suo modo. Et ideo hujusmodi mensurantur _aevo_, quod est
medium inter aeternitatem et tempus. Esse autem quod mensurat
_aeternitas_, nec est mutabile nec mutabilitati adjunctum. Sic ergo
tempus habet prius et posterius, aevum non habet in se prius et
posterius, sed ei conjungi possunt; aeternitas autem non habet prius
neque posterius, neque ea compatitur.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._,
i., q. x., art. 5, in c.
390 pp. 517-57.
_ 391 Invisibilia enim ipsius a creatura mundi, per ea quae facta sunt
intellecta, conspiciuntur, sempiterna quoque ejus virtus et
divinitas, ita ut [qui veritatem Dei in injustitia detinent] sint
inexcusabiles._—Rom. ii. 20 [18].
_ 392 Cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_ (4th edit.), pp. 90-2.
393 For a clear and trenchant criticism of modern relativist theories,
_cf._ VEITCH, _Knowing and Being_, especially ch. iv., “Relation,”
pp. 129 _sqq._
_ 394 Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, §§ 179-80.
_ 395 Principles of Psychology_, P. ii., ch. iii., § 88.
_ 396 Cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_, pp. 157-9.
397 “We cannot of course _perceive_ an _unperceived_ world, nor can we
conceive a world the conception of which is not in the mind; but
there is no contradiction or absurdity in the proposition: ‘A
material world of three dimensions has existed for a time
unperceived and unthought of by any created being, and then revealed
itself to human minds’.”—MAHER, _Psychology_, p. iii, n.
398 “I do not pretend to demonstrate anything, nor do I feel much
concern, about any unknowable _noumenon_ which never reveals itself
in my consciousness. If there be in existence an inscrutable
‘transcendental Ego,’ eternally screened from my ken by this
self-asserting ‘empirical Ego,’ I confess I feel very little
interest in the nature or the welfare of the former. _The only soul
about which I care is that which immediately presents itself in its
acts, which thinks, wills, remembers, believes, loves, repents, and
hopes._”—MAHER, _op. cit._, p. 475. _Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, §
180, pp. 363.
399 Πρός τι δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ὅσα αὐτά, ἄπερ ἐστὶν, ἑτέρων εἶναι
λέγεται, ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως πρὸς ἕτερον.—_Categ._ v. 1.
400 I _Sentent._, Dist. xxvi., q. 2, art. 1.
401 “Sicut realis relatio consistit in ordine rei ad rem, ita relatio
rationis consistit in ordine intellectuum [ordination of concepts];
quod quidem dupliciter potest contingere. Uno modo secundum quod
iste ordo est adinventus per intellectum, et attributus ei, quod
relative dicitur; et hujusmodi sunt relationes quae attribuuntur ab
intellectu rebus intellectis, prout sunt intellectae, sicut relatio
generis et speciei; has enim relationes ratio adinvenit considerando
ordinem ejus, quod est in intellectu ad res, quae sunt extra, vel
etiam ordinem intellectuum ad invicem. Alio modo secundum quod
hujusmodi relationes consequuntur modum intelligendi, videlicet quod
intellectus intelligit aliquid in ordine ad aliud; licet illum
ordinem intellectus non adinveniat, sed magis ex quadam necessitate
consequatur modum intelligendi. Et hujusmodi relationes intellectus
non attribuit ei, quod est in intellectu, sed ei, quod est in re. Et
hoc quidem contingit secundum quod aliqua non habentia secundum se
ordinem, ordinate intelliguntur; licet intellectus non intelligit ea
habere ordinem, quia sic esset falsus. Ad hoc autem quod aliqua
habeant ordinem, oportet quod utrumque sit ens, et utrumque
ordinabile ad aliud. Quandoque autem intellectus accipit aliqua duo
ut entia, quorum alterum tantum vel neutrum est ens; sicut cum
accipit duo futura, vel unum praesens et aliud futurum, et
intelligit unum cum ordine ad aliud, dicit alterum esse prius
altero; unde istae relationes sunt rationis tantum, utpote modum
intelligendi consequentes. Quandoque vero accipit unum ut duo, et
intelligit ea cum quodam ordine; sicut cum dicitur aliquid esse idem
sibi: et sic talis relatio est rationis tantum. Quandoque vero
accipit aliqua duo ut ordinabilia ad invicem, inter quae non est
ordo medius, immo alterum ipsorum essentialiter est ordo; sicut cum
dicit relationem accidere subjecto; unde talis relatio relationis ad
quodcumque aliud est rationis tantum. Quandoque vero accipit aliquid
cum ordine ad aliud, inquantum est terminus ordinis alterius ad
ipsum, licet ipsum non ordinetur ad aliud: sicut accipiendo scibile
ut terminum ordinis scientiae ad ipsum.”—_De Potentia_, q. vii.,
art. 11; _cf._ _ibid._ art. 10.
“Cum relatio requirit duo extrema, tripliciter se habet ad hoc quod
sit res naturae aut rationis. Quandoque enim ex utraque parte est
res rationis tantum, quando scilicet ordo vel habitudo non potest
esse inter aliqua nisi secundum apprehensionem intellectus tantum,
utpote cum dicimus idem eidem idem. Nam secundum quod ratio
apprehendit bis aliquod unum statuit illud ut duo; et sic
apprehendit quandam habitudinem ipsius ad seipsum. Et similiter est
de omnibus relationibus quae sunt inter ens et non ens, quas format
ratio, inquantum apprehendit non ens ut quoddam extremum. Et idem
est de omnibus relationibus quae consequuntur actum rationis, ut
genus, species, et hujusmodi....”—_Summa Theol._, i., q. xiii., art.
7.
_ 402 Summa Theol._,1. q. xiii. art. 7. Elsewhere he points the
distinction in these terms: “Respectus ad aliud aliquando est in
ipsa natura rerum, utpote quando aliquae res secundum suam naturam
ad invicem ordinatae sunt, et ad invicem inclinationem habent; et
hujusmodi relationes oportet esse reales.... Aliquando vero
respectus significatus per ea, quae dicuntur _Ad aliquid_, est
tantum in ipsa apprehensione rationis conferentis unum alteri; et
tunc est relatio rationis tantum, sicut cum comparat ratio hominem
animali, ut speciem ad genus.”—_ibid._, q. xxviii., art. 1.
403 St. Thomas gives expression to it in these sentences: “Perfectio et
bonum quae sunt in rebus extra animam, non solum attenduntur
secundum aliquid absolute inhaerens rebus, sed etiam secundum
ordinem unius rei ad aliam; sicut etiam in ordine partium exercitus,
bonum exercitus consistit: huic enim ordini comparat Philosophus
[Aristot., xii. (x.) _Metaph._, Comment. 52 _sqq._] ordinem
universi. Oportet, ergo in ipsis rebus ordinem quemdam esse; hic
autem ordo relatio quaedam est.... Sic ergo oportet quod res
habentes ordinem ad aliquid, realiter referantur ad ipsum, et quod
in eis aliqua res sit relatio.”—_QQ. Disp. De Potentia_, q. vii.,
art. 9.
_ 404 Kritik der reinen Vernunft_, bk. i., Hauptst. ii., Abschn. ii., §
26.
_ 405 Logic_, bk. i., ch. iii., § 10.
_ 406 L’Idée du phénomène_, p. 181—_apud_ MERCIER, _op. cit._, § 173.
407 “Quaedam vero relationes sunt quantum ad utrumque extremum res
naturae, quando scilicet est habitudo inter aliqua duo secundum
aliquid realiter conveniens utrique; sicut patet de omnibus
relationibus quae consequuntur quantitatem, ut magnum et parvum,
duplum et dimidium, et hujusmodi; nam quantitas est in utroque
extremorum: et simile est de relationibus quae consequuntur actionem
et passionem, ut motivum et mobile, pater et filius, et
similia.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. xiii., art. 7.
408 “Quandoque vero relatio in uno extremorum est res naturae, et in
altero est res rationis tantum: et hoc contingit quandocunque duo
extrema non sunt unius ordinis; sicut sensus et scientia referuntur
ad sensibile et scibile; quae quidem, inquantum sunt res quaedam in
esse naturale existentes, sunt extra ordinem esse sensibilis et
intelligibilis. Et ideo in scientia quidem et sensu est relatio
realis, inquantum ordinantur ad sciendum vel sentiendum res; sed res
ipsae in se consideratae sunt extra ordinem hujusmodi; unde in eis
non est aliqua relatio realiter ad scientiam et sensum, sed secundum
rationem tantum, inquantum intellectus apprehendit ea ut terminos
relationum scientiae et sensus. Unde Philosophus dicit in 5 Metaph.,
text. 20, quod non dicuntur relative, eo quod ipsa referantur ad
alia, sed quia alia referantur ad ipsa.”—_ibid._
409 Being really and adequately identical with its foundation, which is
the essence of its subject, this relation does not necessarily need
the _actual_ existence of its term. Thus actual knowledge or
science, which is a habit of the mind, has a transcendental relation
to its object even though this latter be not actual but only a pure
possibility. Similarly the accident of quantity sustained without
its connatural substance in the Eucharist, retains its
transcendental relation to the latter.—_Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, §
335 (p. 997).
_ 410 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, § 336 (p. 990).
_ 411 Metaph._, L. v., ch. xv. _Cf._ ST. THOMAS, _in loc._, lect. 17,
where, approving of this triple division, he writes: “Cum enim
relatio quae est in rebus, consistat in ordine unius rei ad aliam,
oportet tot modis hujusmodi relationes esse, quot modis contingit
unam rem ad aliam ordinari. Ordinatur autem una res ad aliam, vel
secundum esse, prout esse unius rei dependet ab alia, et sic est
tertius modus. Vel secundum virtutem activam et passivam, secundum
quod una res ab alia recipit, vel alteri confert aliquid; et sic est
secundus modus. Vel secundum quod quantitas unius rei potest
mensurari per aliam; et sic est primus modus.”
_ 412 Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, § 175. For transcendental and
predicamental unity, _cf._ _supra_, §§ 26, 28.
_ 413 Cf._ _infra_, p. 355. Some authors hold that the relation in
question is predicamental. _Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, p. 987. The
nature or essence of any individual would seem to imply in its very
concept a transcendental relation of specific identity with all
other actual and possible individual embodiments of this essence.
The point is one of secondary importance.
414 Even virtually, though not formally. The creative act is not
formally transitive; it is virtually so: and in the creature it
grounds the latter’s relation of real dependence on the Creator.
415 Cf. URRABURU, _op. cit._, § 336 (p. 989), § 341 (p. 1011); ST.
THOMAS, iii. _Sentent._, Dist., viii., q. i., art. 5.
416 MERCIER, _op. cit._, § 175.
417 MERCIER, _ibid._
418 “Cum igitur Deus sit extra totum ordinem creaturae, et omnes
creaturae ordinentur ad ipsum et non e converso; manifestum est quod
creaturae realiter, referuntur ad ipsum Deum; sed in Deo non est
aliqua realis relatio ejus ad creaturas, sed secundum rationem
tantum, inquantum creaturae referantur ad ipsum.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa
Theol._, i., q. xiii., art. 7.
419 Among others Cajetan, Ferriariensis, Capreolus, Bañez, Joannes a St.
Thoma. _Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, § 338 (p. 994); MERCIER, _op.
cit._, § 174. It would be interesting to know how precisely those
authors conceived this “relative” entity, this “_esse ad_” as a
reality independent of their own thought-activity. _Cf._ art. by the
present writer in the _Irish Theological Quarterly_ (vol. vii.,
April, 1912: “Reflections on some Forms of Monism,” pp. 167-8): “The
whole universe of direct experience displays a unity of order or
design which pervades it through and through; it is a revelation of
intelligent purpose. Now a _Cosmos_, an orderly universe—which is
intelligible only as the expression of intelligent purpose, and not
otherwise—is a system of _interrelated_ factors. But _relating_ is
unintelligible except as an expression of the activity of mind or
spirit, that is, of something at least analogous to our mental
activity of comparing and judging. Scholastic philosophers, as we
know, discuss the question whether or how far the exact object of
our ‘relation’ concept is real; that is, whether this object is, in
itself and apart from the terms related [and the foundation], a mere
_ens rationis_, a product of our thought, or whether it is in itself
something more than this; and some of them hold that there are
relations which, in themselves and formally as relations, _are_
something more than mere products of our thought. Now if there be
such relations, since they are not products of _our_ thought, we may
fairly ask: Must they be the product of _some_ thought? And from our
analysis of our very notion of what a relation is, it would seem
that they must be in some sort or other a product or expression of
some thought-activity: even relations between _material_ things. It
is in determining how precisely this is, or can be, that the theist
and the monist differ. The theist regards all material things, with
their real relations—and all our finite human minds, which apprehend
the material world and its relations and themselves and one
another—as being indeed in a true sense terms or objects of the
Thought of God; not, however, as therefore identical or
consubstantial with the Divine Spirit, but as distinct from It
though dependent on It: inasmuch as he holds the Divine Thought to
be creative, and regards all these things as its _created_ terms.
The kinship he detects between matter and spirit lies precisely in
this, that matter is for him a created term of the Divine Thought.
For him too, therefore, matter can have no existence except as a
term of thought—the creative Thought of God.” Not that “the
intelligible relations apprehended by us in matter are ... identical
in reality with the thought-activity of the Divine Mind,” as
Ontologists have taught [_cf._ _supra_, 14, 18, 19]; nor that we can
directly infer the existence of a Supreme Spirit from the existence
of matter, as Berkeley tried to do by erroneously regarding the
latter merely as an essentially mind-dependent phenomenon; because
“for the orthodox theist matter is in its own proper nature not
spiritual, mental, psychical; not anything after the manner of a
thought-process, or endowed with the spirit-mode of being”. If
predicamental relations, such as _quality_ or _similarity_ of
material things, are, as those medieval scholastics contended, real
entities, “relative” in their nature, and really distinct from their
extremes and foundations, did those scholastics conceive such
“relative entities” as essentially mind-dependent entities? If they
did they would probably have conceived them in the sense of
Berkeley, as created terms of the Divine Thought, rather than in the
Ontologist sense which would identify them with the Divine Thought
itself. But it is not likely that they conceived such relative
entities as essentially thought-dependent, any more than the
absolute material realities related to one another by means of these
relative entities. On the other hand it is not easy to see how such
relative entities can be anything more than mere products of some
thought-activity or other.
420 They rely especially on this text from the _De Potentia_ (q. vii.,
art. 9): “Relatio est debilioris esse inter omnia praedicamenta;
ideo putaverunt quidam eam esse ex secundis intellectibus. Secundum
ergo hanc positionem sequeretur quod relatio non sit in rebus extra
animam sed in solo intellectu, sicut intentio generis et speciei, et
secundarum substantiarum. Hoc autem esse non potest. In nullo enim
praedicamento ponitur aliquid nisi res praeter animam existens. Nam
ens rationis dividitur contra ens divisum per decem
praedicamenta.... Si autem relatio non est in rebus extra animam non
poneretur _ad aliquid_ unum genus praedicamenti.”
_ 421 Cf._ ST. ANSELM, _Monolog._, ch. xxvi.
422 “Relatio habet quod sit res naturae ex sua causa per quam una res
naturalem ordinem habet ad alteram.”—_Quodl._ 1, art. 2.
423 “In hoc differt _Ad Aliquid_ [_i.e._ Relation] ab aliis generibus;
quod alia genera ex propria sui ratione habent, quod aliquid sint,
sicut quantitas ex hoc ipso quod est quantitas, aliquid ponit: et
similiter est de aliis. Sed _Ad Aliquid_ ex propria sui generis
ratione non habet, quod ponat aliquid, sed ad aliquid.... Habet
autem relatio quod sit aliquid reale ex eo, quod relationem
causat.”—_Quodl._ 9, art. 4. _Cf._ _De Potentia_, q. ii., art. 5.
424 “Relatio est aliquid inhaerens _licet non ex hoc ipso quod est
relatio_.... Et ideo nihil prohibet, _quod esse desinat hujusmodi
accidens sine mutatione ejus in quo est_.”—_De Potentia_, q. vii.,
art. 9, ad. 7.
425 “Et utroque modo contingit in realibus relationibus destrui
relationem: vel per destructionem quantitatis [or other foundation],
unde ad hanc mutationem quantitatis sequitur per accidens mutatio
relationis: vel etiam secundum quod cessat respectus ad alterum,
_remoto illo ad quod referebatur_; et tunc _relatio cessat, nulla
mutatione facta in ipsa_. Unde in illis in quibus non est relatio
nisi secundum hunc respectum, _veniunt et recedunt relationes sine
aliqua mutatione ejus, quod refertur_.”—In i. _Sent._, Dist. xxvi.,
q. ii., art. 1, ad. 3.
426 “Relationes differunt in hoc ab omnibus aliis rerum generibus, quia
ea quae sunt aliorum generum, ex ipsa ratione sui generis habent,
quod sint res naturae, sicut quantitates ex ratione quantitatis, et
qualitates ex ratione qualitatis. Sed relationes non habent quod
sint res naturae ex ratione respectus ad alterum.... Sed relatio
habet quod sit res naturae ex sua causa, per quam una res naturalem
ordinem habet ad alteram, qui quidem ordo naturalis et realis est
ipsis ipsa relatio.”—_Quodl._, 1, art. 2.
_ 427 Cf._ _supra_, p. 351, n. 1; in which context we may reasonably
suppose him to be arguing that relation _considered adequately_ is
not a _mere logical entity_, “ex secundis intellectibus,” inasmuch
as, having _a real foundation_ in things outside the mind, it is in
this respect real, independently of our thought.
_ 428 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, § 341 (p. 1008).
_ 429 ibid._, p. 1007; _cf._ _supra_, p. 347.
430 In i. _Sentent._, Dist. iv., q. 1, art. 1, ad. 3.
_ 431 Cf._ URRABURU, _ibid._, pp. 1006-7: “Deinde _nullam relationem esse
substantiam_ scripsit [S. Thomas] vel quia plerumque ratio fundandi
non est substantia ... vel potius quia semper relatio, etiam cum in
substantia fundatur, aliquid addit supra substantiam cujuslibet
extremi relati singillatim sumpti, quia non identificatur cum
fundamento prout se tenet ex parte solius subjecti, vel solius
termini, sed prout se tenet ea parte utriusque. Quare relatio ...
semper exprimit denominationem contingentem et accidentaliter
supervenientem subjecto, utpote quae adesse vel abesse potest, prout
adsit vel deficiat terminus.”
432 “Illi enim [the reference is to certain medieval idealists] quamvis
agnoscerent duo alba existentia negabant dari actu in rebus formalem
similaritatem [_i.e._ even after the comparative activity of
thought], sed formalem similitudinem, et aliam quamvis relationem,
reponebant in actu intellectus unum cum alio comparantis; nos vero
ante actum intellectus agnoscimus in rebus, quidquid sufficit ad
constituendam relationem similitudinis, diversitatis, paternitatis,
etc., ita ut hujusmodi denominationes non verificentur de actu
intellectus unum cum alio comparantis, sed plenam habeant in rebus
ipsis verificationem.”—URRABURU, _op. cit._, p. 1010.
433 In what sense “extramental”?—_Cf._ _supra_, p. 350, n. 1 (end).
_ 434 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., § 218. For the concepts of “cause”
and “causality” in the inductive sciences, as well as for much that
cannot be repeated here, the student may consult with advantage vol.
ii., p. iv., ch. iii., iv. and vi. of the work referred to.
435 “Id a quo aliquid procedit quocunque modo.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa
Theol._, i., q. xxxiii., art. 1.
436 Hence Aristotle’s definition of principle, including both logical
and real principles: Πασῶν μὲν οὖν κοινὸν τῶν ἀρχῶν τὸ πρῶτον εἶναι
ὅθεν ἡ ἐστιν ἢ γίγνεται ἢ γιγνώσκεται.—_Metaph._ IV., ch. i.
437 A _cause_ must be prior _in nature_ to its effect, but not
necessarily prior _in time_. In fact the _action_ of the cause and
the _production_ of the effect must be simultaneous. _Cf._ _Science
of Logic_, ii., § 220. Considered formally as correlatives they are
_simul natura_. A _principle_ must likewise be in some sense _prior_
to what proceeds from it, not necessarily, however, by priority of
time, nor by priority of nature involving real dependence. The
Christian Revelation regarding the Blessed Trinity involves that the
First Divine Person is the “principle” from which the Second
proceeds, and the First and the Second the “principle” from which
the Third proceeds; yet here there is no dependence or inequality,
or any priority except the “relation of origin” be called priority.
_ 438 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., § 216.
_ 439 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, i., § 16; ii., §§ 214, 224 (p. 113).
_ 440 Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, § 252.
_ 441 Cf._ _Physic._, Lib. ii., cap. 3; _Metaph._, Lib. i., cap. 3; v.,
cap. 2.
_ 442 i.e._ from the effect considered _formally_ as a term of the
activity; in the case of _immanent_ activity, as, _e.g._ thought or
volition, where the effect remains within the agent (as a _verbum
mentale_ or other mental term), uniting with the concrete reality of
the latter, the effect is not adequately distinct from the agent as
affected by this term or product.
_ 443 Cf._ ST. THOMAS, _In Physic._, ii., lect. 10: “Necesse est quatuor
esse causas: quia cum causa sit, ad quam sequitur esse alterius,
esse ejus quod habet causam potest considerari dupliciter: uno modo
absolute, et sic causa essendi est forma per quam aliquid est ens in
actu; alio modo secundum quod de potentia ente fit actu ens: et quia
omne quod est in potentia, reducitur ad actum per id quod est actu
ens, ex hoc necesse est esse duas alias causas, scilicet materiam,
et agentem quod reducit materiam de potentia in actum. Actio autem
agentis ad aliquod determinatum tendit, sicut ab aliquo determinato
principio procedit; nam omne agens agit quod est sibi conveniens. Id
autem ad quod intendit actio agentis dicitur causa finalis. Sic
igitur necesse est esse causas quatuor.”
_ 444 Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, §§ 247-8.
445 Certain medieval scholastics, especially of the Franciscan School,
regarded spiritual substances as having in their constitution a
certain potential, determinable principle, which they called
“_materia_”. St. Thomas, without objecting to the designation,
insisted that such potential principle cannot be the same as the
_materia prima_ of corporeal substances (_cf._ _De Substantis
Separatis_, ch. vii.).
_ 446 Cf._ ST. THOMAS: “Actio est actus activi _et passio est actus
passivi_” (iii. _Physic._, l. 5); “_Materia_ non fit _causa in actu_
nisi _secundum quod alteratur et mutatur_” (i. _Contra Gentes_,
xvii.); “Materia est causa formae, inquantum forma non est nisi in
materia” (_De Princip. Naturae_).
_ 447 Cf._ ST. THOMAS, _De Princip. Naturae_, _ibid._: “... et similiter
forma est causa materiae, inquantum materia non habet esse in actu
nisi per formam; materia enim et forma dicuntur relative ad invicem;
dicuntur etiam relative ad compositum, sicut pars ad totum”.
448 “Materia cum sit infinitarum formarum determinatur per formam, et
per eam consequitur aliquam speciem.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._,
i., q. vii., art. 1.
449 To Special Metaphysics also belongs the controverted question
whether or not a plurality of really distinct substantial forms can
enter into the constitution of an individual corporeal substance.
When we classify corporeal things into _genera_ and _species_
according to their _natural kinds_ (_cf._ _Science of Logic_, i., §
67), these latter are determined by the _formae substantiales_ of
the things classified, and are called _infimæ species_. Numerically
distinct individuals which have (conceptually) the same _forma
substantialis_, fall into the same _infima species_; while if such
individuals have (conceptually and numerically) distinct _formae
substanialis_ they fall into distinct _infimae species_ of some
higher common genus. The wider the generic concept the larger the
group of individuals which it unifies: it is a principle of
conceptual unity, _i.e._ of universality. The objects of our
_generic_, _differential_, and _specific_ concepts, throughout this
process of classification, are only virtually distinct metaphysical
grades of being in the individuals. Now if the _forma substantialis_
which yields the unifying concept of the _species infima_ for the
individuals, and the material principle which is the ground of the
numerical distinction between these latter, were likewise regarded
by the scholastics as being merely virtually distinct metaphysical
grades of being, in each individual, then the question of a
plurality of really distinct forms in one and the same individual
would have no meaning: all “forms” in the latter would be only
virtually distinct from one another and from the material principle.
But the scholastics did not conceive that the real ground for
grouping individuals into _species infimae_ was the same as that for
grouping these latter into wider genera. They regarded the relation
between the _forma substantialis_ and the _materia prima_ in the
individual as quite different from that between the generic and
specific grades of being in the individual (_cf._ _supra_, § 38;
_Science of Logic_, i., § 44; JOSEPH, _Introduction to Logic_, pp.
93-6). While they considered the latter a relation of virtual
distinction they held the former to be one of real distinction. And
while they recognized the concept of the _species infima_ to be a
principle of conceptual unity in grouping the individuals together
mentally, St. Thomas emphasized especially the rôle of the _forma
substantialis_ (on which that concept was founded) as a principle of
_real unity_ in the individual: “Ab eodam habet res _esse_ et
_unitatem_. Manifestum est autem quod res habet esse per formam.
Unde et per formam res habet unitatem” (_Quodlib._ i., art. 6). If
we accept this doctrine of St. Thomas the arguments which he bases
on it against the possibility of a plurality of distinct substantial
forms in the same corporeal individual are unanswerable (_Cf._
MERCIER, _Ontologie_, § 215).
450 “Idem actus secundum rem est duorum secundum diversam rationem:
agentis quidem, secundum quod est ab eo, patientis autem, secundum
quod est in ipso.... Ex eo quod actio et passio sunt unus motus non
sequitur quod actio et passio, vel doctio et doctrina, sint idem;
sed quod motus cui inest utrumque eorum, sit idem. Qui quidem motus
secundum unam rationem est actio, et secundum aliam rationem est
passio; alterum enim est secundum rationem esse actus hujus, ut _in
hoc_, et esse actus hujus, ut _ab hoc_; motus autem dicitur actio
secundum quod est actus agentis ut ab hoc; dicitur autem passio
secundum quod est actus patientis ut in hoc. Et sic patet quod licet
motus sit idem moventis et moti, propter hoc quod abstrahit ab
utraque ratione: tamen actio et passio differunt propter hoc quod
diversas rationes in sua significatione habent.”—ST. THOMAS, _In
Phys._, iii. 1. 5.
451 “Solet dubium esse apud quosdam, utrum motus sit in movente, aut in
mobili.... Sed manifestum est quod actus cujuslibet est in eo cujus
est actus; actus autem motus est in mobili, cum sit actus mobilis,
causatus tamen in eo a movente ... cum motus sit actus existentis in
potentia, sequitur quod motus non sit actus alicujus inquantum est
movens, sed inquantum est mobile.”—_ibid._, 1. 4.
452 Some languages mark the distinction between these two kinds of
action: “Differt autem _facere_ et _agere_: quia _factio_ est actio
transiens in exteriorem materiam, sicut aedificare, secare et
hujusmodi; _agere_ autem est actio permanenslin ipso agente sicut
videre, velle et hujusmodi.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._ iae iia, q.
lxvii., art. 4, c.
453 Hume went even farther, at least in language; for he alleged
(whether he really believed is another question) that he could
overcome the supposed merely psychological difficulty, that he could
easily—and, presumably, without doing violence to his rational
nature—conceive a non-existent thing as coming into existence
without a cause! He proclaimed that he could achieve the feat of
thinking what the universal voice of mankind has declared to be
unthinkable: _an absolute beginning of being from nothingness_. “The
knowledge of this relation (causality) is not,” he writes, “in any
instance attained by reasonings _a priori_; but arises entirely from
experience, when we find that any particular objects are _constantly
conjoined_ with each other ”(_Works_, ed. Green and Grose, iv., 24).
“All distinct ideas are separable from each other, and, as the ideas
of cause and effect are evidently distinct, ’twill be easy for us
(!) to conceive any object as nonexistent this moment, and existent
the next, without conjoining to it the distinct idea of a cause or
producing principle” (_Treatise on Human Nature_, p. 381). On this
argument (?) even such an ardent admirer of the pan-phenomenist as
Huxley was, is forced to remark that “it is of the circular sort,
for the major premise, that all distinct ideas are separable in
thought, assumes the question at issue” (HUXLEY’S _Hume_, p. 122).
454 Thus, for instance, man, elevated by sanctifying grace, can perform
acts which merit the supernatural reward of the Beatific Vision.
_ 455 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., § 231.
_ 456 Cf._ ARISTOTLE, _Metaph._, ii., cap. 2.
_ 457 Cf._ URRABURU, _op. cit._, § 392 (p. 1123): “Unde adaequata virtus
instrumentalis videtur conflari ex naturali instrumenti virtute vel
efficacitate et ex virtute causae principalis sibi transeunter
addita, docente S. Thoma: _Instrumentum virtutem instrumentalem
acquirit dupliciter scilicet quando accipit formam instrumenti et
quando movetur a principali agente ad effectum_ (_Summa Theol._,
iii., q. xix., art. 3, ad. 2).”
458 “Ad aliquem effectum aliquid operatur dupliciter. Uno modo sicut per
se agens; et dicitur per se agere quod agit per aliquam formam sibi
inhaerentem per modum naturae completae, sive habeat illam formam a
se, sive ab alio.... Alio modo aliquid operatur ad effectum aliquem
instrumentaliter, quod quidem non operatur ad effectum per formam
sibi inhaerentem, sed solum inquantum est motum a per se agente.
Haec est ratio instrumenti, inquantum est instrumentum, ut moveat
motum; unde sicut se habet forma completa ad per se agentem, ita se
habet motus, quo movetur a principale agente, ad instrumentum, sicut
serra operatur ad scamnum. Quamvis enim serra habeat aliquam
actionem quae sibi competit secundum propriam formam, ut dividere;
tamen aliquem effectum habet qui sibi non competit, nisi inquantum
est mota ab artifice, scilicet facere rectam incisionem, et
convenientem formae artis: et sic instrumentum habet duas
operationes; unam quae competit ei secundam rationem propriam; aliam
quae competit ei secundam quod est motum a per se agente, quae
transcendit virtutem propriae formae.”—_De Veritate_, q. xxvii.,
art. 4. It is not clear, however, that St. Thomas regarded these two
“_operationes_” of the instrumental cause as really distinct, for he
says that it acts as an instrument (_i.e._ modifies the efficiency
of the principal cause) only by exercising its own proper function:
“Omne agens instrumentale exsequitur actionem principalis agentis
per aliquam operationem propriam, et connaturalem sibi, sicut calor
naturalis generat carnem dissolvendo et digerendo, et serra operatur
ad factionem scamni secando” (_Contra Gentes_, ii., ch. xxi.): from
which he goes on to argue that no creature can act even as an
instrumental cause _in creating_.—_Cf._ iv. _Sent._, Dist. i., q.
i., art. 4, sol. 2.—_De Potentia_, q. iii., art. 7.—_Summa Theol._,
iii., q. lxii., art. 1, ad. 2.
459 St. Thomas, proving the necessity of the Divine _concursus_ for all
created causes, illustrates the general distinction between a
_principal_ and an _instrumental_ cause: “Virtus naturalis quae est
rebus naturalibus in sua institutione collata, inest eis _ut quaedem
forma habens esse ratum et firmum in natura_. Sed id quod a Deo fit
in re naturali, quo actualiter agat, est ut intentio sola, habens
esse quoddam incompletum, per modum quo ... virtus artis [est] in
instrumento artificis. Sicut ergo securi per artem dari potuit
acumen, ut esset forma in ea permanens, non autem dari ei potuit
quod _vis artis_ esset in ea quasi quaedam forma permanens, _nisi
haberet intellectum_; ita rei naturali potuit conferri virtus
propria, ut forma in ipsa permanens, non autem _vis qua agit ad
esse_ ut instrumentum primae causae, _nisi daretur ei quod esset
universale essendi principium_; nec iterum virtuti naturali conferri
potuit ut moveret seipsam, nec ut conservaret se in esse: unde sicut
patet quod instrumento artificis conferri non oportuit quod
operaretur absque motu artis; ita rei naturali conferri non potuit
quod operaretur absque operatione divina.”—_QQ. DD. De. Pot._, q.
iii., art. 7.
_ 460 Cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_, ch. xix.—MERCIER, _Psychologie_, ii., ch.
i. § 2.
461 For a fuller treatment of this whole subject, _cf._ _Science of
Logic_, ii., Part iv., chs. iii., iv.; Part v., ch. i.—MAHER,
_Psychology_, ch. xix., pp. 423-4.
_ 462 Cf._ NEWMAN, _Grammar of Assent_, Part i., ch. iv., § 1 (5), (6); §
2, remark 1.
_ 463 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., §§ 216, 218, 219.
_ 464 ibid._, § 216.
_ 465 ibid._, § 220.
_ 466 Introduction to Logic_, pp. 64-5.
_ 467 Cf._ what was said above (32) about the causal or extrinsic, as
distinct from the intrinsic, principle of individuation.
468 “Whenever science tries to find the cause not of a particular event,
such as the French Revolution (whose cause must be as unique as that
event itself is), but of an event of a kind, such as consumption, or
commercial crises, it looks in the last resort for a _commensurate_
cause. What is that exact state or condition of the body, given
which it must and without which it cannot be in consumption? What
are those conditions in a commercial community, given which there
must and without which there cannot be a commercial crisis?”—JOSEPH,
_op. cit._, p. 65. _Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., § 221.
_ 469 System of Logic_, iii., v., § 2.
470 For instance: (_a_) The “ontological” or “true” cause, which
“actually produces” the effect, need not necessarily be the
“ultimate” cause of the latter. (_b_) A “physical fact” can be the
cause of another in the sense of being the invariable antecedent (or
_physical_ cause) of the latter, but not “in that sense alone”; it
may also be an _efficient_ cause of the latter by exerting an active
influence on the happening of this latter. (_c_) Whether or not
efficiency is “a mysterious and most powerful tie,” at any rate it
does exist between “physical facts” in the universe. (_d_) Its
analysis reveals not a “supposed necessity of ascending ... to ...
the true cause, ... which ... produces the effect,” as if the
proximate causes did not also truly produce the latter; but a real
necessity of ascending to a First Cause as the source and support
and complement of the real efficiency of these proximate causes.
(_e_) A merely _logical_ theory of Induction does not indeed demand
any inquiry either into the efficiency of natural agencies, or into
the nature and grounds of the “invariability” or “necessity” or
“law” whereby these are connected with their effects. But a
_philosophical_ theory of Induction does imply such inquiries. And
here phenomenist writers like Mill have laid themselves open to two
accusations. For while professing merely to abstract from the
problem of _efficiency_ they have tried equivalently to deny its
existence by proclaiming it superfluous and insoluble, besides
consciously or unconsciously misrepresenting it. And similarly, in
dealing with the _invariability_ of causal sequences in the
universe, with the _necessary_ character of its physical laws, they
have misconceived this necessity as being mechanical, fatal,
absolutely inviolable; and have wrongly proclaimed its ultimate
grounds to be unknowable (Agnosticism). Cf. _infra_, § 104; _Science
of Logic_, ii., Part IV., chs. iii., iv., and v.; Part V., ch. i.
Thus, while eschewing the genuine Metaphysics, which seeks the real
nature and causes of the world of our experience, as superfluous and
futile, they have substituted for it a masked and spurious
metaphysics which they have wrongly fathered on Physical Science: a
mass of more or less superficial speculations which have not even
the merit of consistency. No philosopher, starting with their views
on the nature of the human mind, can consistently claim for the
latter any really valid or reliable knowledge of _laws_, any more
than of causes. For the knowledge of a _law_, even as a
_generalized_ fact, is a knowledge that claims to pass beyond the
limits of the individual’s present and remembered experiences. But
there can be no rational justification, whether psychological or
ontological, for the certain reliability of such a step, in the
philosophy which logically reduces all certain knowledge to the mere
awareness of a flow of successive sensations supposed to constitute
the total content of the individual consciousness and the total
reality of human experience.
_ 471 Cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_, ch. xvii., pp. 368-70.—MERCIER, _op.
cit._, § 229.
472 “When an _effort_ of attention combines two ideas, when one billiard
ball moves another, when a steam hammer flattens out a lump of solid
iron, when a blow on the head knocks a man down, in all these cases
there is something more than, and essentially different from, the
mere _sequence_ of two phenomena: there is _effective force_—_causal
action_ of an agent endowed with _real energy_.”—MAHER, _op. cit._,
_ibid._, p. 370.
_ 473 Grammar of Assent_, p. 66.
_ 474 Cf._ DOMET DE VORGES, _Cause efficiente et cause finale_, p. 39.
Volitional activity is no doubt the most prominent type of efficient
causality in our mental life. But it is not the only type; we have
direct conscious experience of intellectual effort, of the work of
the imagination, of the exercise of organic and muscular energy.
There is no warrant therefore for conceiving all efficient power or
energy, after the model of will-power, as Newman among others
appears to have done when he wrote in these terms: “Starting, then,
from experience, I consider a cause to be an effective will: and by
the doctrine of causation, I mean the notion, or first principle,
that all things come of effective will” (_ibid._, p. 68). No doubt,
all things do come ultimately from the effective will of God. This,
however, is not a first principle, but a remote philosophical
conclusion.
_ 475 ibid._, p. 66.
476 ST. THOMAS, _QQ. Disp. De Potentia_, q. iii., art. 7, in c.
477 “Nulla res per seipsam movet vel agit, nisi sit movens non motum....
Et quia natura inferior agens non agit nisi mota ... et hoc non
cessat quousque perveniatur ad Deum, sequitur de necessitate quod
Deus sit causa actionis cujuslibet rei naturalis, ut movens et
applicans virtutem ad agendum.”—ST. THOMAS, _De Potentia Dei_, q.
iii., art. 7.
478 This is the principle repeatedly expressed by ST. THOMAS: “Unde
quarto modo unum est causa alterius, sicut principale agens est
causa actionis instrumenti: et hoc modo etiam oportet dicere, quod
Deus est causa omnis actionis rei naturalis. Quanto enim aliqua
causa est altior, tanto est communior et efficacior, tanto
profundius ingreditur in effectum, et de remotiori potentia ipsum
reducit in actum. In qualibet autem re naturali invenimus _quod est
ens_ et quod est res naturalis, et quod est talis vel talis naturae.
Quorum primum est commune omnibus entibus; secundum omnibus rebus
naturalibus; tertium in una specie; et quartum, si addamus
accidentia, est proprium huic individuo. Hoc ergo individuum agendo
non potest constituere aliud in simili specie, nisi prout est
instrumentum illius causae _quae respicit totam speciem_ et ulterius
_totum esse_ naturae inferioris. Et propter hoc nihil agit in
speciem in istis inferioribus ... nec aliquid agit _ad esse_ nisi
per virtutem Dei. _Ipsum enim esse est communissimus effectus,
primus et intimior omnibus aliis effectibus; et ideo soli Deo
competit secundum virtutem propriam talis effectus_: unde etiam, ut
dicitur in _Lib. de Causis_ (prop. 9), intelligentia non dat esse,
nisi prout est in ea virtus divina. Sic ergo Deus est causa omnis
actionis prout quodlibet agens est instrumentum divinae virtutis
operantis.”—ST. THOMAS, _De Potentia Dei_, q. iii. art 7.—_Cf._
_supra_, 99 (_c_), p. 375, n. 2.
479 Why, then, is a finite cause not capable of acting uninterruptedly?
why are its powers, forces, energies, fatigued, lessened, exhausted
by exercise? Simply because its action is proportionate to its
powers, and these to its _finite_ nature.
480 “Creatio non est mutatio nisi secundum modum intelligendi tantum.
Nam de ratione mutationis est quod aliquid idem se habeat aliter
nunc et prius.... Sed in creatione, per quam producitur tota
substantia rei, non potest accipi aliquid idem aliter se habens nunc
et prius, nisi secundum intellectum tantum; sicut si intelligatur
aliqua res prius non fuisse totaliter, et postea esse. Sed cum actio
et passio conveniant in una substantia motus, et differant solum
secundum habitudines diveras ... oportet quod subtracto motu, non
remaneant nisi diversae habitudines in creante et creato. Sed quia
modus significandi sequitur modum intelligendi ... creatio
significatur per modum mutationis; et propter hoc dicitur quod
creare est ex nihilo aliquid facere; quamvis facere et fieri magis
in hoc conveniant quam mutare et mutari; quia facere et fieri
important habitudinem causae ad effectum et effectus ad causam, sed
mutationem ex consequenti.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q. xlv.,
art. 2, ad. 2.
481 “Remoto motu, actio nihil aliud importat quam ordinem originis
[effectus] secundum quod [effectus] a causa aliqua procedit.”—_op.
cit._, i. q. xli., art. 1, ad 2.
482 The act of the will is, of course, virtually transitive when it
wills or determines bodily movements.—_Cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_,
chs. x., xxiii. (pp. 517-24).
483 At the same time it must be noted that organic vital activity is
transitive in the sense that no part or member of the organism acts
upon itself, but only on other parts, in the production of the
local, quantitative and qualitative changes involved in nutrition.
It is subject to the inductively established law which seems to
regulate all _corporeal_ action: that all such action involves
_reaction_ of the _patiens_ on the _agens_. Mental activity is
outside this law. Cognitive and appetitive faculties do not react on
the objects which reduce these faculties to act, thus arousing their
immanent activity.—_Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, § 227.
_ 484 Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._
_ 485 Cf._ MAHER, _Psychology_, chs. xiii. and xiv.
_ 486 Cf._ URRABURU: “Vel, si mavis, dic causam efficientem esse causam,
a qua fit aliquid, vel a quo proprie oritur actio, intelligendo per
actionem emanationem et fluxum ac dependentiam effectus a
causa.”—_op. cit._, § 389 (p. 1112).
_ 487 Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, § 229: “L’action, l’efficience, qu’est
elle, en quoi consiste-t-elle? Est-ce une sorte d’écoulement de la
cause dans l’effet? Évidemment non. Lorsque nous voulons nous élever
à une conception métaphysique, nous nous raccrochons à une image
sensible, et nous nous persuadons volontiers, que la netteté de la
première répond à la facilité avec laquelle nous nous figurons la
seconde. Il faut se défier de cette illusion. Puisque l’action, même
corporelle, ne modifie point l’agent, la causalité efficiente ne
peut consister dans un influx physique, qui passerait de la cause
dans l’effet.”
_ 488 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., §§ 228-9.
489 We might add this other fact: that _all_ kinds of corporeal activity
and change (11) seem to involve _motion_ or local change. This does
not prove that they all _are_ motion or local change. The
significance of the fact lies probably in this, that local motion is
necessary for procuring and continuing physical contact between the
interacting physical agencies.—_Cf._ NYS, _Cosmologie_, §§ 227-9.
_ 490 Cf._ ST. THOMAS, _Contra Gentes_, iii., 69.
491 “Une cause véritable est une cause, entre laquelle et son effet
l’esprit aperçoit une liaison nécessaire: c’est ainsi que je
l’entendes. [This is ambiguous.] Or il n’y a que l’être infiniment
parfait entre la volonté duquel et les effets l’esprit aperçoive une
liaison nécessaire. Il n’y a donc que Dieu qui soit véritable cause,
et il semble même qu’il y ait contradiction à dire que les hommes
puissent l’être”—_De la récherche de la vérité_, Liv. 6me, 2e
partie, ch. iii.
492 “Si l’on vient à considérer attentivement l’idée que l’on a de cause
ou de puissance d’agir, on ne peut en douter que cette idée ne
présente quelque chose de divin.”—_ibid._
493 “Il n’y a point d’homme qui sache seulement ce qu’il faut faire pour
remuer un de ses doigts par le moyen des esprits animaux.”—_ibid._
494 “J’ai toujours soutenue que l’âme était l’unique cause de ses actes,
c’est à dire de ses déterminations libres ou de ses actes bons ou
mauvais.... J’ai toujours soutenu que l’âme était active, mais que
ses actes ne produisaient rien de physique.”—_Réflexions sur la
prémotion physique_. “Je crois que la volonté est une _puissance
active_, qu’elle a un véritable pouvoir de se déterminer; mais son
action est _immanente_; c’est une action qui ne produit rien par son
efficace propre, pas même le mouvement de son bras.”—_Réponse à la
3__me__ lettre d’Arnauld_.
_ 495 Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, §§ 230-2; ZIGLIARA, _Ontologia_ (45);
URRABURU, _op. cit._, §§ 393 _sqq._
496 We may reasonably ask the occasionalist to suppose for the moment
that we are efficient causes of our mental processes and to tell us
what better proof of it could he demand, or what better proof could
be forthcoming, than this proof from consciousness.
497 MAHER, _Psychology_, ch. x., p. 220.
498 Should anyone doubt that consciousness does testify to this fact, we
may prove it inductively from the constant correlation between the
mental state and the bodily movement: “I will to move my arm, it
moves; I will that it remain at rest, it does not move; I will that
its movement be more or less strong and rapid, the strength and
rapidity vary with the determination of my will. What more complete
inductive proof can we have of the efficiency of our will-action on
the external world?”—MERCIER, _op. cit._, § 231.
499 “Si effectus non producuntur ex actione rerum creatarum, sed solum
ex actione Dei, impossibile est quod per effectus manifestetur
virtus alicujus causae creatae: non enim effectus ostendit virtutem
causae nisi ratione actionis, quae a virtute procedens ad effectum
terminatur. Natura autem causae non cognoscitur per effectum, nisi
inquantum per ipsum cognoscitur virtus, quae naturam consequitur. Si
igitur res creatae non habent actiones ad producendum effectum,
sequitur, quod nunquam naturam alicujus rei creatae poterit cognosci
per effectum; et sic subtrahitur nobis omnis cognitio scientiae
naturalis, in qua praecipuae demonstrationes per effectum
sequuntur.”—ST. THOMAS, _Contra Gentes_, L. iii., cap. 69.
500 “Je demeure d’accord que la foi oblige à croire qu’il y a des corps;
mais, pour l’évidence, il me semble qu’elle n’est point entière, et
que nous ne sommes point invinciblement portés à croire qu’il y ait
quelqu’autre chose que Dieu et notre esprit.”—_Récherche de la
vérite_, 6me éclaircissement.
_ 501 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., § 217.
_ 502 Metaph._, v., 17.
503 “Quaedam vero ad bonum inclinantur cum aliqua cognitione; non quidem
sic quod cognoscant ipsam rationem boni, sed cognoscunt aliquod
bonum particulare.... Inclinatio autem hanc cognitionem sequens
dicitur appetitus _sensitivus_. Quaedam vero inclinantur ad bonum
cum cognitione qua cognoscant ipsam boni rationem; et haec
inclinatio dicitur _voluntas_.”—ST. THOMAS, _Summa Theol._, i., q.
xlix., art. 1.
504 “Sicut influere causae efficientis est agere, ita influere causae
finalis est appeti et desiderari.”—_De Veritate_, q. xxii., art. 2.
505 In its modern usage the term “intention” is inseparable from the
notion of _conscious_ direction. The scholastics used the term
“_intentio_” in a _wider_ and _deeper_ sense to connote the natural
tendency of all created agencies towards their natural activities
and lines of development. And in unconscious agencies they did not
hesitate to refer to it as “_intentio naturae_” or “_appetitus
naturalis_”.
506 “Res naturalis per _formam_ qua perficitur in sua specie, habet
inclinationem in proprias operationes et proprium finem, quem per
operationes consequitur; quale enim unumquodque est, talia operatur,
et in sibi convenientia tendit.”—ST. THOMAS, _Contra Gentes_, iv.,
19.
“Omnia suo modo per appetitum inclinantur in bonum, sed diversimode.
Quaedam enim inclinantur in bonum per solam naturalem habitudinem
absque cognitione, sicut plantae et corpora inanimata; et talis
inclinatio ad bonum vocatur appetitus naturalis.”—_Summa Theol._,
i., q. xlix., art. 1.
507 “Causa efficiens et finis sibi correspondent invicem, quia efficiens
est principium motus, finis autem terminus. Et similiter materia et
forma: nam forma dat esse, materia autem recipit. Est igitur
efficiens causa finis, finis autem causa efficientis. Efficiens est
causa finis quantum ad esse, quidem, quia movendo perducit efficiens
ad hoc, quod _sit_ finis. Finis autem est causa efficientis non
quantum ad esse sed quantum ad _rationem causalitatis_. Nam
efficiens est causa in quantum agit; non autem agit nisi causa
[gratia] finis. Unde ex fine habet suam causalitatem efficiens.”—ST.
THOMAS, _In Metaph._, v., 2.
“Sciendum quod licet finis sit ultimus in esse in quibusdam, in
causalitate tamen est prior semper, unde dicitur _causa causarum_,
quia est causa causalitatis in omnibus causis. Est enim causa
causalitatis efficientis, ut jam dictum est. Efficiens autem est
causa causalitatis et materiae et formae.”—_ibid._, lect. 3.
508 Φύσις ἐστιν ἀρχὴ τὶς καὶ αἰτία του κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἠρεμεῖν ἐν ῷ ὑπάχει
πρώτως καθ᾽ αὑτο, καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. Natura est principium
quoddam et causa cur id moveatur et quiescat, in quo inest primum,
per se et non secundum accidens.—_Physic._, L. ii., cap. 1.
509 “Ars nihil aliud est quam recta ratio aliquorum operum
faciendorum.”—_Summa Theol._ ia iiae, q. lvii., art. 3.—_Cf._ _In
Post. Anal._, l. 1.
510 “Natura nihil aliud est quam ratio cujusdam artis, scilicet divinae,
indita rebus qua ipsae res moventur ad finem determinatum; sicut si
artifex factor navis posset lignis tribuere quod ex seipsis
moverentur ad navis formam inducendam.”—_In II Phys._, lect. 14.
“Omnia naturalia, in ea quae eis conveniunt, sunt inclinata,
habentia in seipsis aliquod inclinationis principium, ratione cujus
eorum inclinatio naturalis est, _ita ut quodammodo ipsa vadant, et
non solum ducantur in fines debitos_.”—_De Veritate_, q. xxii., art.
7.
511 “In nullo enim alio natura ab arte videtur differre, nisi quia
natura est principium intrinsecum, et ars est principium
extrinsicum. Si enim ars factiva navis esset intrinseca ligno, facta
fuisset navis a natura, sicut modo fit ab arte.”—_In II. Phys._,
lect. 13.
_ 512 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., § 217.
_ 513 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii, § 227.
_ 514 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., §§ 226-31.
515 ARISTOTLE, _Metaph._, iv., ch. v.
_ 516 Physic._, ii., ch. v.
_ 517 ibid._
_ 518 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., §§ 264, 268-9.
519 Οὐδὲν γὰρ ὤς ἔτυχε ποιεῖ ἡ φυσις.—_De Coelo_, ii., 8.
520 Fatalism is the view that all things happen by a blind, inevitable,
eternally foredoomed and unintelligible necessity. Thus SENECA
(_Nat. Quaest._, L. III., cap. 36) describes _fatum_ as _necessitas
omnium rerum actionumque, quam nulla vis rumpat_. This _necessitas
ineluctabilis_ is totally different from the conditional physical
necessity of the course of Nature dependently on the _Fiat_ of a
Supreme Free Will guided by Supreme Intelligence (_Cf._ _Science of
Logic_, §§ 224, 249, 253, 257). If the necessity of actual
occurrences is not ultimately traceable to the _Fiat_ of an
Intelligent Will—and mechanists deny that it can be so traced—it is
rightly described as fatalistic, blind, purposeless, unintelligible.
_ 521 Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, §§ 259, 260.
522 “Expliquer par une rencontre fortuite, la convergence d’éléments,
dont chacun a sa poussée propre, c’est rendre raison de la
_convergence_ par des principes de _divergence_.... Il est donc
contradictoire d’attribuer au hasard la raison explicative de
l’ordre.”—MERCIER, _op. cit._, § 260.
_ 523 Cf._ _Science of Logic_, ii., §§ 224, 250, and _passim_.
524 “Similiter ex prioribus pervenitur ad posteriora in arte et in
natura: unde si artificialia, ut domus, fierent a natura, hoc ordine
fierent, quo nunc fiunt per artem: scilicet prius institueretur
fundamentum, et postea erigerentur parietes, et ultimo supponeretur
tectum.... Et similiter si ea quae fiunt a natura fierent ab arte,
hoc modo fierent sicut apta nata sunt fieri a natura; ut patet in
sanitate, quam contigit fieri, et ab arte et a natura.... Unde
manifestum est quod in natura est alterum propter alterum, scilicet
priora propter posteriora, sicut et in arte.”—ST. THOMAS, _In II.
Phys._, lect. 13.—_Cf._ _supra_, p. 417, n. 3.
525 “Ordo est parium dispariumque rerum sua cuique loca tribuens
dispositio.”—_De Civ. Dei_, xix., 13.
_ 526 Cf._ MERCIER, _op. cit._, §§ 257-61.
527 “_La convergence de causes indifférentes qui réalisent d’une manière
harmonieuse et persistante un même objet ordonné, ne s’explique
point par des coincidences fortuites; elle réclame un principe
interne de convergence._”—_Ibid._, § 260.
528 TENNYSON, _In Memoriam_, lvi.
529 BROWNING, _A Soul’s Tragedy_, Act. 1.
530 “Universum habet bonum ordinis et bonum separatum.”—_In Metaph._,
xii., l. 12.
531 ARISTOTLE, _Metaph._, xi., 10. Does Aristotle teach that God moves
the universe only as its Final Cause, as the Supreme Good towards
which it tends, or also as Efficient Cause? His thought is here
obscure, and has given rise to much controversy among his
interpreters.
532 Ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ὄντων ἀκίνητον καὶ καθ᾽ ἁυτὸ καὶ κατὰ
συμβεβηκός, κινοῦν δὲ τὴν πρώτην ἀΐδιον καὶ μίαν κίνησιν.—_Ibid._,
xi., 8.
533 Κινεῖ δὲ (οὐ ἕνεκα) ὡς ἐρώμενον, κινούμενον δὲ τᾶλλα κινει.—_ibid._,
7.
534 “Totus ordo universi est propter primum moventem, ut scilicet
explicetur in universo ordinato id quod est in intellectu et
voluntate primi moventis. Et sic oportet quod a primo movente sit
tota ordinatio universi.”—_Ibid._, xii., l. 12.
535 ... Among themselves all things
Have order; and from hence the form, which makes
The universe resemble God. In this
The higher creatures see the printed steps
Of that eternal worth, which is the end
Whither the line is drawn. All natures lean
In this their order, diversely, some more,
Some less approaching to their primal source.
Thus they to different havens are moved on
Through the vast sea of being, and each one
With instinct giv’n, that bears it in its course;
This to the lunar sphere directs the fire,
This prompts the hearts of mortal animals,
This the brute earth together knits and binds.
Nor only creatures, void of intellect,
Are aim’d at by this bow; but even those
That have intelligence and love, are pierced.
That Providence, who so well orders all,
With her own light makes ever calm the heaven,
In which the substance that hath greatest speed
Is turned: and thither now, as to our seat
Predestin’d, we are carried by the force
Of that strong cord, that never looses dart,
But at fair aim and glad ...
—DANTE, _Paradiso_, Cant. i. (tr. by CARY).