CHAPTER XV. FINAL CAUSES; UNIVERSAL ORDER.

106. TWO CONCEPTIONS OF EXPERIENCE, THE MECHANICAL AND THE

TELEOLOGICAL.—We have seen that all change in the universe demands for its

explanation certain real principles, _viz._ passive potentiality,

actualization, and active power or efficiency; in other words that it

points to material, formal and efficient causes. Do these principles

suffice to explain the course of nature to the inquiring mind? Mechanists

say, Yes; these principles explain it so far as it is capable of

explanation. Teleologists say, No; these principles do not of themselves

account for the universe of our experience: this universe reveals itself

as a _cosmos_: hence it demands for its explanation real principles or

causes of another sort, _final causes_, the existence of which implies

purpose, plan or design, and therefore also intelligence.

The problem whether or not the universe manifests the existence and

influence of final causes has been sometimes formulated in this striking

fashion: Is it that birds have wings in order to fly, or is it merely that

they fly because they have wings? Such a graphic statement of the problem

is misleading, for it suggests that the alternatives are mutually

exclusive, that we must vote either for final causes or for efficient

causes. As a matter of fact we accept both. Efficient causes account for

the course of nature; but they need to be determined by the influence of

final causes. Moreover, the question how far this influence of final

causes extends—_finality_ (_finalitas_), as it is technically termed—is a

secondary question; nor does the advocate of final causality in the

universe undertake to decide its nature and scope in every instance and

detail, any more than the physical scientist does to point out all the

physical laws embodied in an individual natural event, or the biologist to

say whether a doubtful specimen of matter is organic or inorganic, or

whether a certain sort of living cell is animal or vegetable. The

teleologist’s thesis, as against that of mechanism, is simply that _there

are final causes in the universe, that the universe does really manifest

the presence and influence of final causes_.(501)

There are two ways, however, of conceiving this influence as permeating

the universe. The conception of final causality in general is, as we shall

see, the conception of acting _for an end_, from a _motive_, with a

_purpose_, _plan_ or _design_ for the attainment of something. It implies

arrangement, ordination, adaptation of means to ends (55). Now at least

there _appears_ to be, pervading the universe everywhere and directing its

activities, such an adaptation. The admirable equilibrium of forces which

secures the regular motions of the heavenly bodies; the exact mixture of

gases which makes our atmosphere suitable for organic life; the distance

and relative positions of the sun and the earth, which secure conditions

favourable to organic life; the chemical transformations whereby inorganic

elements and compounds go to form the living substance of plants and are

thus prepared for assimilation as food by animal organisms; the

wonderfully graded hierarchy of living species in the animate world, and

the mutual interdependence of plants and animals; the endless variety of

instincts which secure the preservation and well-being of living

individuals and species; most notably the adaptability and adaptation of

other mundane creatures to human uses by man himself,—innumerable facts

such as these convince us that the things of the universe are _useful to

one another_, that they are constituted and disposed in relation to one

another _as if they had been deliberately chosen_ to suit one another, to

fit in harmoniously together in mutual co-ordination and subordination so

that by their interaction and interdependence they work out a plan or

design and _subserve as means to definite ends_. This suitability of

things _relatively to one another_, this harmony of the nature and

activity of each with the nature and activity of every other, we may

designate as _extrinsic_ finality. The Creator has willed so to arrange

and dispose all creatures in conditions of space and time that such

harmonious but purely extrinsic relations of mutual adaptation do _de

facto_ obtain and continue to prevail between them under His guidance.

But are these creatures themselves, in their own individual natures,

equally indifferent to any definite mode of action, so that the orderly

concurrence of their activities is due to an initial collocation and

impulse divinely impressed upon them from without, and not to any

purposive principle intrinsic to themselves individually? Descartes,

Leibniz and certain supporters of the theory of atomic dynamism regarding

the constitution of matter, while recognizing a relative and extrinsic

finality in the universe in the sense explained, seem to regard the

individual agencies of the universe as mere efficient causes, not of

themselves endowed with any immanent, intrinsic directive principle of

their activities, and so contributing by mere extrinsic arrangement to the

order of the universe. Scholastic philosophers, on the contrary, following

the thought of Aristotle,(502) consider that every agency in the universe

is endowed with an _intrinsic principle of finality_ which constantly

directs its activities towards the realization of a perfection which is

proper to it and which constitutes its intrinsic end (45-46). And while

each thus tends to its own proper perfection by the natural play of its

activities, each is so related to all others that they simultaneously

realize the extrinsic purpose which consists in the order and harmony of

the whole universe. Thus the extrinsic and relative finality whereby all

conspire to constitute the universe a _cosmos_ is secondary and posterior

and subordinate to the deeper, intrinsic, immanent and absolute finality

whereby each individual created nature moves by a tendency or law of its

being towards the realization of a _good_ which _perfects_ it as its

natural end.

In order to understand the nature of this intrinsic and extrinsic finality

in the universe, and to vindicate its existence against the philosophy of

Mechanism, we must next analyse the concept, and investigate the

influence, of what are called _final causes_.

107. THE CONCEPT OF FINAL CAUSE; ITS OBJECTIVE VALIDITY IN ALL NATURE.

CLASSIFICATION OF FINAL CAUSES.—When we speak of the _end_ of the year, or

the _end_ of a wall, we mean the extreme limit or ultimate point; and the

term conveys no notion of a cause. Similarly, were a person to say “I have

got to the _end_ of my work,” we should understand him to mean simply that

he had finished it. But when people act deliberately and as intelligent

beings, they usually act for some _conscious purpose_, with some _object

in view_, for the achievement or attainment of something; they continue to

act until they have attained this object; when they have attained it they

cease to act; its attainment synchronizes with the _end_ of their action,

taking this term in the sense just illustrated. Probably this is the

reason why the term _end_ has been extended from its original sense to

signify the _object_ for the attainment of which an intelligent agent

acts. This object of conscious desire _induces_ the agent to seek it; and

because it thus influences the agent to act it verifies the notion of a

_cause_: it is a _final cause_, an _end_ in the causal sense. For

instance, a young man wishes to become a medical doctor: the _art of

healing_ is the _end_ he wishes to secure. For this purpose he pursues a

course of studies and passes certain examinations; these acts whereby he

qualifies himself by obtaining a certain fund of knowledge and skill are

_means_ to the end intended by him. He need not desire these preparatory

labours _for their own sake_; but he does desire them as _useful for his

purpose_, as _means_ to his end: in so far as he wills them as means he

wills them not for their own sake but because of the end, _propter finem_.

He _apprehends_ the end as a _good_; he _intends_ its attainment; he

_elects_ or _selects_ certain acts or lines of action as means suitable

for this purpose. An end or final cause, therefore, may be defined as

_something apprehended as a good, and which, because desired as such,

influences the will to choose some action or line of action judged

necessary or useful for the attainment of this good_. Hence Aristotle’s

definition of end as τὸ οὖ ἕνεκα: id cujus gratia aliquid fit: _that for

the sake of which an agent acts_.

The end understood in this sense is a _motive_ of action; not only would

the action not take place without the agent’s intending the end, showing

the latter to be a _conditio sine qua non_; but, more than this, the end

as a good, apprehended and willed, _has a positive influence_ on the

ultimate effect or issue, so that it is really a _cause_.

Man is conscious of this “finality,” or influence of final causes on his

own deliberate actions. As an intelligent being he acts “for ends,” and

orders or regulates his actions as means to those ends; so much so that

when we see a man’s acts, his whole conduct, utterly unrelated to rational

ends, wholly at variance and out of joint with the usual ends of

intelligent human activity, we take it as an indication of loss of reason,

insanity. Furthermore, man is free; he _chooses_ the ends for which he

acts; he acts _electivé propter fines_.

But in the domain of animal life and activity is there any evidence of the

influence of final causes? Most undoubtedly. Watch the movements of

animals seeking their prey; observe the wide domain of animal instincts;

study the elaborate and intricate lines of action whereby they protect and

foster and preserve their lives, and rear their young and propagate their

species: could there be clearer or more abundant evidence that in all this

conduct they are _influenced_ by objects which they _apprehend_ and seek

as _sensible goods_? Not that they can conceive in the abstract the _ratio

bonitatis_ in these things, or freely choose them as good, for they are

incapable of abstract thought and consequent free choice; but that these

sensible objects, apprehended by them in the concrete, do really influence

or move their sense appetites to desire and seek them; and the influence

of an object on sense appetite springs from the goodness of this object

(44, 45). They tend towards _apprehended_ goods; they act _apprehensivé

propter fines_.(503)

Finally, even in the domains of unconscious agencies, of plant life and

inorganic nature, we have evidence of the influence of final causes. For

here too we witness innumerable varied, complex, ever-renewed activities,

constantly issuing in results useful to, and good for, the agents which

elicit them: operations which contribute to the _development_ and

_perfection_ of the natures of these agents (46). Now if similar effects

demand similar causes how can we refuse to recognize even in these

activities of physical nature the influence of final causes? Whenever and

wherever we find a great and complex variety of active powers, forces,

energies, issuing invariably in effects which suit and develop and perfect

the agents in question,—in a word, which are _good_ for these

agents,—whether the latter be conscious or unconscious, does not reason

itself dictate to us that all such domains of action must be subject to

the influence of final causes? Of course it would be mere unreflecting

anthropomorphism to attribute to _unconscious_ agencies a _conscious_

subjection to the attracting and directing influence of such causes. But

the recognition of such influence in this domain implies no naïve

supposition of that sort. It does, however, imply this very reasonable

view: that there must be some reason or ground in the nature or

constitution of even an inanimate agent for its acting always in a uniform

manner, conducive to its own development and perfection; that there must

be in the nature of each and every one of the vast multitude of such

agents which make up the whole physical universe a reason or ground for

each co-operating constantly and harmoniously with all the others to

secure and preserve that general order and regularity which enables us to

pronounce the universe not a _chaos_ but a _cosmos_. Now that ground or

reason in things, whereby they act in such a manner—not indifferently,

chaotically, capriciously, aimlessly, _unintelligibly_, but definitely,

regularly, reliably, purposively, _intelligibly_—is a real principle of

their natures, impressing on their natures a definite tendency, directive

of their activities towards results which, as being suited to these

natures, bear to these latter the relation of final causes. A directive

principle need not itself be conscious; the inner directive principle of

inanimate agents towards what is _good_ for them, what _perfects_ them,

what is therefore in a true and real sense their end (45, 46), is not

conscious. But in virtue of it they act as if they were conscious, nay

intelligent, _i.e._ they act _executivé propter fines_.

Of course the existence of this principle in inanimate agencies

necessarily _implies_ intelligence: this indeed is our very

contention against the whole philosophy of mechanism, positivism

and agnosticism. But is this intelligence really identical with

the agencies of nature, so that all the phenomena of experience,

which constitute the _cosmos_ or universe, are but phases in the

evolution of One Sole Reality which is continually manifesting

itself under the distinct aspects of nature and mind? Or is this

intelligence, though _virtually immanent_ in the universe, really

distinct from it—_really transcendent_,—a Supreme Intelligence

which has created and continues to conserve this universe and

govern all its activities? This is a distinct question: it is the

question of Monism or Theism as an ultimate interpretation of

human experience.

We conclude then that what we call _finality_, or the influence of final

causes, pervades the whole universe; that in the domain of conscious

agents it is _conscious_, _instinctive_ when it solicits _sense appetite_,

_voluntary_ when it solicits _intelligent will_; that in the domain of

unconscious agencies it is not conscious but “_natural_” or “_physical_”

soliciting the “_nature_” or “_appetitus naturalis_” of these agencies.

Before inquiring into the nature of final causality we may indicate

briefly the main divisions of final causes: some of these concern the

domain of human activity and are of importance to Ethics rather than to

Ontology.

(_a_) We have already distinguished between _intrinsic_ and _extrinsic_

finality. An intrinsic final cause is an end or object which perfects the

nature itself of the agent which tends towards it: nourishment, for

instance, is an intrinsic end in relation to the living organism. An

extrinsic final cause is not one towards which the nature of the agent

immediately tends, but one which, intended by some other agent, is _de

facto_ realized by the tendency of the former towards its own intrinsic

end. Thus, the general order of the universe is an extrinsic end in

relation to each individual agency in the universe: it is an end intended

by the Creator and _de facto_ realized by each individual agency acting in

accordance with its own particular nature.

(_b_) Very similar to this is the familiar distinction between the _finis

operis_ and the _finis operantis_. The former is the end necessarily and

_de facto_ realized by the act itself, by its very nature, independently

of any other end the agent may have expressly intended to attain by means

of it. The latter is the end expressly intended by the agent, and which

may vary for one and the same kind of act. For instance, the _finis

operis_ of an act of almsgiving is the actual aiding of the mendicant; the

_finis operantis_ may be charity, or self-denial, or vanity, or whatever

other motive influences the giver.

(_c_) Akin to those also is the distinction between an unconscious, or

physical, or “natural” end, and a conscious, or mental, or “intentional”

end. The former is that towards which the nature or “_appetitus

naturalis_” of unconscious agencies tends; the latter is an end

apprehended by a conscious agent.

(_d_) An end may be either _ultimate_ or _proximate_ or _intermediate_. An

ultimate end is one which is sought for its own sake, as contrasted with

an intermediate end which is willed rather as a means to the former, and

with a proximate end which is intended last and sought first as a means to

realizing the others. It should be noted that proximate and intermediate

ends, in so far as they are sought for the sake of some ulterior end, are

not ends at all but rather means; only in so far as they present some good

desirable for its own sake, are they properly ends, or final causes.

Furthermore, an ultimate end may be such absolutely or relatively:

absolutely if it cannot possibly be subordinated or referred to any

ulterior or higher good; relatively if, though ultimate in a particular

order as compared with means leading up to it, it is nevertheless capable

of being subordinated to a higher good, though not actually referred to

this latter by any explicit volition of the agent that seeks it.

(_e_) We can regard the end for which an agent acts either

_objectively_,—_finis_ “_objectivus_,”—or _formally_,—_finis_

“_formalis_”. The former is the objective good itself which the agent

wishes to realize, possess or enjoy; the latter is the act whereby the

agent formally secures, appropriates, unites himself with, this objective

good. Thus, God Himself is the objective happiness (_beatitudo objectiva_)

of man, while man’s actual possession of, or union with, God, by knowledge

and love, is man’s formal happiness (_beatitudo formalis_).

(_f_) We may distinguish also between the _real_ end (_finis_ “_qui_” or

“_cujus_”, and the _personal_ end (_finis_ “_cui_”). The former is the

good _which_ the agent desires, the good for the sake of _which_ “_cujus_”

_gratia_) he acts. The latter is the subject or person _to whom_ he wishes

this good, or _for whom_ he wishes to procure it. Thus, a labourer may

work to earn _a sustenance_ for _himself_ or also for _his family_. The

real and the personal end are never willed separately, but always as one

concrete good.

(_g_) The distinction between a _principal_ end and an _accessory_ end

(motivum “_impulsivum_”) is obvious. The former can move to act of itself

without the latter, but the latter strengthens the influence of the

former. A really charitable person, while efficaciously moved to give alms

by sympathy with the poor, may not be uninfluenced by vanity to let others

know of his charity.

(_h_) Finally we may note the theological distinction between the

_natural_ end, and the _supernatural_ end, of man as a rational

and moral agent. The former is the end _due_ to man’s nature, the

latter is an end which is gratuitous and undue to his nature. God

might not have created the world or man, and in this sense even

the natural end of man is a gratuitous gift of God; but granted

that God did decree to create the world and man, an end

corresponding to man’s nature and powers was due to him: the

knowledge, service and love of God as known to man by the light of

natural reason. But as a matter of fact God, in His actual

providence, has decreed for man an incomparably higher and purely

gratuitous end, an end revealed to man by God Himself, an end

entirely undue not only to man but to any and every possible

creature: the Beatific Vision of the Divine Essence for ever in

heaven.

108. CAUSALITY OF THE FINAL CAUSE; RELATION OF THE LATTER TO EFFICIENT,

FORMAL, AND MATERIAL CAUSES.—We can best analyse the influence of the

final cause by studying this influence as exerted on conscious and

intelligent agents. The final cause has a positive influence of some sort

on the production, happening, actualization of effects. What is the nature

of this influence? The final cause exerts its influence by being _a __

good_, an apprehended good; it exerts this influence on the appetite of

the agent, soliciting the latter to perform certain acts for the

realization, attainment, possession, or enjoyment of this good. But it

must not be conceived as the _efficient cause_ of this movement of the

appetite, nor may its influence be conceived as _action_. An efficient

cause must actually exist in order to act; but when the final cause, as an

apprehended good, exerts its influence on the appetite _it is not yet

actual_: not until the agent, by his action, has realized the end and

actually attained it, does the end, as a good, actually exist. We must

distinguish between the end _as attained_ and the end _as intended_,

between the _finis in executione_ and the _finis in intentione_. It is not

the end as attained that is a final cause; as attained it is an effect

pure and simple. It is the end as intended that is a final cause; and as

intended it does not yet actually exist: hence its influence cannot be by

way of _action_. Perhaps it is the _idea_ or _cognition_ of the intended

end that exerts the peculiar influence of final cause? No; the _idea_ or

_cognition_ of the end actually exists, no doubt, in the conscious agent,

but this is only a condition, a _conditio sine qua non_, for the

apprehended good, the final cause, to exert its influence: _nil volitum

nisi praecognitum_. It is not the cognition of the good, however, that

moves the agent to act, it is not the idea of the good that the agent

desires or strives for, but the good itself. It is the good itself, the

known good, that exerts the influence, and this influence consists in the

_passive inclination_ or _attraction_ or _tendency_ of the appetite

towards the good: a tendency which necessarily results from the very

presence of the good (not really or physically of course, but

representatively, mentally, “_intentionally_,” by “_esse intentionale_”;

cf. 4) in the agent’s consciousness, and which is formally the

actualization of the causal power or influence of the final cause. “Just

as the efficient cause influences by acting,” says St. Thomas,(504) “so

the final cause influences by being yearned for and desired”.

Looked at from the side of the agent that undergoes it, this influence is

a _passive yielding_: this next becomes an _active_ motion of appetite;

and in the case of free will a deliberate act of intending the end,

followed by acts of choosing means, and finally by acts commanding the

executive faculties to employ these means.

Looked at from the side of the final cause, the influence consists in an

_attraction_ of appetite towards union with itself as a good. The matter

cannot be analysed much further; nor will imagination images help us here

any more than in the case of efficient causality. It must be noted,

however, that the influence of the final cause is the influence not of a

reality as actual, or in its _esse actuale_, but of a reality as present

to a perceiving mind, or in its _esse intentionale_. At the same time it

would be a mistake to infer from this that the influence of the final

cause is not _real_. It is sometimes described as “intentional” causality,

“_causalitas intentionalis_”; but this must not be taken to mean that it

is not real: for it is not the “_esse intentionale_” of the good, _i.e._

the cognition of the good, its presence in the mind or consciousness of

the agent, that moves the latter’s appetite: it is the apprehended good,

apprehended _as real_, as possible of actual attainment, that moves the

agent to act. The influence may not be _physical_ in the sense of being

productive of, or interchangeable with, or measurable by, corporeal

energy, or in terms of mechanical work; nor is it; but it is none the less

real.

But if the influence of a final cause really reaches to the effect of the

agent’s actions only through the medium of the latter’s appetite, and

therefore through a link of “intentional” causality, does it not at once

follow that the attribution of final causality to the domain of

unconscious and inorganic activities, can be at best merely metaphorical?

The attribution to such agencies of an “_appetitus naturalis_” is

intelligible indeed as a striking and perhaps not unpoetic metaphor. But

to contend that it is anything more than a metaphor, to claim seriously

that inanimate agencies are swayed and influenced by “ends,”—is not this

really to substitute mysticism and mystery for rational speculation and

analysis?

Mechanists are wont to dismiss the doctrine of final causes in the

physical universe with offhand charges of this kind. They are but too

ready to attribute it to a mystical attitude of mind. Final causes, they

say, are not discovered in inanimate nature by the cold, calculating,

unemotional analysis to which reason submits its activities, but are read

into it by minds which allow themselves to be prompted by the imagination

and emotions to personify and anthropomorphize inanimate agencies. The

accusation is as plausible as it is unjust. It is plausible because the

attribution of final causes to inanimate nature, and of an “appetitus

_naturalis_” to its agencies, _seems_ to imply the recognition of

conscious, mental, “intentional” influence in this domain. But it really

implies nothing of the sort; and hence the injustice of the charge. What

it does imply is the existence of a genuine _analogy_ between the nature

and natural activities of physical agencies on the one hand and the

appetite and appetitive activities of conscious agencies on the other. The

existence of this analogy is absolutely undeniable. The orderly,

invariable and uniformly suitable character of physical activities, simply

forces our reason to recognize in physical agencies _natures_ which tend

towards their development, and which by their activities attain to what is

_good_ for them, to what _perfects_ them. In other words we have to

recognize that each by its natural line of activity attains to results

that are good and useful to it _just as if_ it apprehended them as such

and consciously tended towards them. The analogy is there; and the

recognition of it, so far from being a “mystic” interpretation of facts,

is an elementary logical exercise of our reasoning faculty. The

scholastics emphasized their recognition of the analogy by calling the

_nature_ of an unconscious agent,—the principle of its active tendencies

towards the realization of its own perfection—an “_appetitus naturalis_”:

an expression into which no one familiar with scholastic terminology would

venture to read any element of mysticism.(505)

Every separate agency in nature has a uniform mode of activity; by

following out this line of action each co-operates with all the others in

maintaining the orderly course of nature. These are facts which call for

explanation. They are not explained by the supposition of mechanists that

these agencies are mere efficient causes: efficient causality does not

account for order, it has got simply nothing to do with order or

regularity. Consequently the last word of the mechanical philosophy on the

fact of order in the universe is—Agnosticism. In opposition to this

attitude we are far from contending that there is no mystery, or that all

is clear either in regard to the fact of _change_ or the fact of

_regularity_. Just as we cannot explain everything in _efficient_

causality, so neither can we explain everything in _final_ causality. But

we do contend that the element of order, development, evolution, even in

the physical universe, can be partially explained by recognizing in its

several agencies a _nature_, a principle of development, a passive

inclination implanted in the very being of these agencies by the

Intelligent Author of their being.

In conscious agencies this inclination or tendency to actions conformable

or _connatural_ to their being is not always in act; it is aroused by

conscious cognition, perception, or imagination of a _good_, and operates

intermittently. In unconscious agencies it is congenital and constantly in

act, _i.e._ as a tendency, not as actually operative: for its actual

development due conditions of environment are required: the seed will not

grow without a suitable soil, temperature, moisture, etc. In conscious

agencies the tendency, considered entitatively or as a reality in them, is

an _accidental form_; in unconscious agencies it is their _forma

substantialis_, the formative substantial principle, which determines the

specific type to which their nature belongs.(506)

In all agencies the inclination or appetite or tendency to action arises

from a form; an elicited appetite from an “intentional” form, a natural

appetite from a “natural” form: _Omnis inclinatio seu appetitus

consequitur formam; appetitus elicitus formam intentionalem, appetitus

naturalis formam naturalem_. The scholastic view that final causality

pervades all things is expressed in the aphorism, _Omne agens agit propter

finem_: Every agency acts for an end.

From our analysis of final causality it will be seen that the “end”

becomes a cause by exercising its influence on the agent or efficient

cause, and thus initiating the action of the latter. We have seen already

that material and formal causes exercise their causality dependently on

the efficient cause of the change or effect produced by the latter. We now

see that the final cause, the end as _intended_, determines the action of

the efficient cause; hence its causality holds the primacy as compared

with that of the other causes: it is in this sense the cause of causes,

_causa causarum_.(507) But while the end _as intended_ is the starting

point of the whole process, the end _as attained_ is the ultimate term of

the latter. Hence the scholastic aphorism: _Finis est primus in intentione

et ultimus in executione_. And this is true where the process involves a

series of acts attaining to means subordinate to an end: this latter is

the first thing intended and the last attained.

The final cause, the end as intended, is extrinsic to the effect. It is

intrinsic to the efficient cause. It is a “_forma_” or determinative

principle of the latter: a _forma intentionalis_ in conscious agents, a

_forma naturalis_ in unconscious agents.

109. NATURE AND THE LAWS OF NATURE. CHARACTER AND GROUNDS OF THEIR

NECESSITY AND UNIVERSALITY. SCIENTIFIC DETERMINISM AND PHILOSOPHIC

FATALISM.—By the term _nature_ we have seen that Aristotle and the

scholastics meant the essence or substance of an agent regarded as inner

principle of the latter’s normal activities, as determining the bent or

inclination of these, and therefore as in a real sense their final cause.

Hence Aristotle’s definition of _nature_ as _a certain principle or cause

of the motion and rest of the thing in which that principle is rooted

fundamentally and essentially and not merely accidentally_.(508) The

scholastics, recognizing that this _intentio naturae_, this subjection to

finality, in _unconscious_ agencies must be the work and the index of

intelligence, in other words that this _analogical_ finality in inanimate

things must connote a _proper_ finality, a properly purposive mode of

action, in the author of these things, conceived this _nature_ or

_intentio naturae_ as the impression of a divine art or plan upon the very

being of all creatures by the Creator Himself. Hence St. Thomas’s profound

and well-known description of _nature_ as “_the principle of a divine art

impressed upon things, in virtue of which they move towards determinate

ends_”. Defining _art_ as _the just conception __ of external works to be

accomplished_,(509) he observes that nature is a sort of art: “as if a

ship-builder were to endow his materials with the power of moving and

adapting themselves so as to form or construct a ship”.(510) And elsewhere

he remarks that nature differs from art only in this that the former is an

intrinsic, the latter an extrinsic, principle of the work which is

accomplished through its influence: so that if the art whereby a ship is

constructed were intrinsic to the materials, the ship would be constructed

by nature as it actually is by art.(511)

Such, then, is the teleological conception of the nature of each

individual agency in the universe. When we speak of “universal _nature_,”

“external _nature_,” “physical _nature_,” “the course of _nature_,” “the

laws of _nature_,” etc. we are using the term in a collective sense to

signify the sum-total of all the agencies which constitute the whole

physical universe; and furthermore in all such contexts we usually

understand by _nature_ the world of _corporeal_ things as distinct from

the domain of _mind_ or _spirit_.

The proof of this view,—that the agencies of the physical universe are not

merely efficient causes, but that they act under the influence of ends;

that they have definite lines of action which are natural to them, and

whereby they realize their own individual development and the maintenance

of the universe as a _cosmos_; that by doing so they reveal the influence

of _intelligent purpose_,—the proof of this view lies, as we have seen, in

the fact that their activities are regular, uniform, and mutually useful,

or, in other words, that they are productive of _order_ (110). Bearing

this in mind let us inquire into the various meanings discernible in the

very familiar expressions, “laws of nature,” “physical laws,” “natural

laws”.(512)

We may understand firstly by a law of nature this innate tendency we have

been describing as impressed upon the very being of all created things by

the Creator. It is in this sense we speak of a thing acting “naturally,”

or “according to the _law_ of its nature,” or “according to its nature,”

when we see it acting according to what we conceive to be the end intended

for it, acting in a manner conducive to the development of its own

individuality, the preservation of its specific type or kind, and the

fulfilment of its rôle in the general scheme of things. What this

“natural” mode of action is for this particular kind of thing, we gather

from our experience of the regular or normal activity of things of its

kind. Thus, we say it is a _law_ of oxygen and hydrogen to combine in

definite proportions, under suitable conditions, to form water; a _law_ of

all particles of matter in the universe to tend to move towards one

another with a definite acceleration; a _law_ of living organisms to

reproduce their kind. This usage comes nearest to the original meaning of

the term _law_: a precept or command imposed on intelligent agents by a

superior. For we conceive this natural tendency impressed on physical

agencies by the Creator after the analogy of a precept or command. And we

have good reason to do so: because _uniformity of conduct_ in intelligent

agents is the normal result of their obedience to a law imposed upon them;

and we see in the activities of the physical universe an _all-pervading

feature of regularity_.

Secondly, we transfer the term _law_ to _this result itself_ of the

natural tendency of the being, of the convergence of its activities

towards its end. That is to say, we call _the uniform mode of action_ of

an agent a _law of nature_, a _natural_ or _physical law_. This usage,

which is common in the positive sciences, implies a less profound, a more

superficial, but a perfectly legitimate mode of apprehending and studying

the changes and phenomena of the physical universe.

Thirdly, since the several agencies of the universe co-exist in time and

space, since they constantly interact on one another, since for the

exercise of the natural activities of each _certain extrinsic conditions

of relationship with its environment_ must be fulfilled, an accurate

knowledge and exact formulation of these relations are obviously requisite

for a scientific and practical insight into the mode of activity of any

natural agency. In fact the physical scientist may and does take for

granted the natural tendency and the uniformity of action resulting

therefrom, and confines himself to _discovering and formulating the

relations between any given kind of action and the extrinsic conditions

requisite for its exercise_. Such, for instance, would be any chemical

“law” setting forth the measure, and the conditions of temperature,

pressure, etc., in which certain chemical elements combine to form a

certain chemical compound. To all such formulae scientists give the title

of _physical laws_, or _laws of physical nature_. These formulae,

descriptive of the manner in which a phenomenon takes place, setting forth

with the greatest possible quantitative exactness the phenomenal

factors(513) that enter into and precede and accompany it, are laws in a

still more superficial and still less philosophical sense, but a sense

which is most commonly—and justly—accepted in the positive or physical

sciences.

Before examining the feature and characteristic of _necessity and

universality_ which enters into all these various conceptions of a

“physical law” we have here to observe that it would make for

clearness, and for a better understanding between physics and

metaphysics, between science and philosophy, between the

investigator who seeks by observation and experiment for the

proximate phenomenal conditions and “physical” causes of

phenomena, and the investigator who seeks for the ultimate real

ground and explanation of these latter by speculative analysis of

them, and by reasoning from the scientist’s discoveries about

them,—if it were understood and agreed that investigation into the

scope and significance and ultimate ground of this feature of

stability in the laws of physical nature belongs to the

philosopher rather than to the scientist. We have already called

attention to the fact that the propriety of such an obviously

reasonable and intelligible division of labour is almost

universally admitted in theory both by scientists and by

philosophers; though, unfortunately, it is not always remembered

in practice (100).

In theory the scientist assumes, and very properly assumes, that

the agencies with which he deals are not capricious, unreliable,

irregular, but stable, reliable, regular in their mode of action,

that in similar sets of conditions and circumstances they will act

uniformly. Without inquiring into the ultimate grounds of this

assumption he premises that all his conclusions, all his inductive

generalizations about the activity of these agencies, will hold

good of these latter just in so far as they do act according to

his general postulate as to their regularity. He then proceeds, by

the inductive processes of hypothesis and experimental

verification, to determine what agencies produce such or such an

event, under what conditions they bring this about, what are all

the phenomenal conditions, positive and negative, antecedent and

concomitant, in the absence of any one of which this event will

not happen, and in the presence of all of which it will happen.

These are, in accordance with his assumption, _determining_ causes

of the event; the knowledge of them is from the speculative point

of view extremely important, and from the practical standpoint of

invention and applied science extremely useful. As a scientist he

has no other knowledge in view: he aims at discovering the “how,”

the _quomodo_, of natural phenomena,—how, for instance, under what

conditions and in what measure, water is produced from oxygen and

hydrogen. When he has discovered all these positive and negative

conditions his _scientific_ knowledge of the formation of water is

complete.

But there are other questions in regard to natural phenomena to

which the experimental methods of the positive sciences can offer

no reply. They can tell us nothing about the _wider_ “how” which

resolves itself into a “why.” They can give no information about

the ultimate causes, origins, reasons, or essences, of those

phenomena. As Pasteur and other equally illustrious scientists

have proclaimed, experimental science is essentially positive,

_i.e._ confined to the proximate phenomenal conditions and causes

of things; it has nothing to say, nor has it any need or any right

to say anything, about the ultimate nature, or first origin, or

final destiny, of the things and events of the universe.

Yet such questions arise, and clamour insistently for solution.

_How_ is it, or _why_ is it, that natural phenomena are uniformly

linked to certain other phenomenal antecedents or “physical”

causes? Is it absolutely impossible, inconceivable, that this

sequence should be found not to obtain in even a single individual

instance? Why should there be such uniform “sequences” or “laws”

at all? Are there exceptions, or can there be exceptions to these

“laws of physical nature”? What is the character and what are the

grounds of the _necessity_ of these laws? Every living organism

comes from a living cell—not from _any_ living cell, but from

_some particular kind_ of living cell. But _why_ are there such

kinds of cells? Why are there living cells at all? Whence their

first origin? Again, granted that there are different kinds or

types of living cells, _why_ should a particular kind of cell give

rise, by division and evolution, to an organism of the same kind

or type as the parent organisms? Why does it not _always_ do so?

Why are what biologists describe as “monsters” in the organic

kingdom possible? And why, since they are possible, are they not

as numerous as what are recognized as the normal types or kinds of

living organisms?

Now these are questions in regard to which not only every

professing physical scientist and every professing metaphysician,

but every thinking man, _must_ take up some attitude or other. A

refusal to consider them, on the plea that they are insoluble, is

just as definite an attitude as any other; nor by assuming this

attitude does any man, even though he be a specialist in some

department of the positive or physical sciences, escape being a

“metaphysician” or a “philosopher,” however much he may deprecate

such titles; for he is taking up a reasoned attitude—we presume it

is such, and not the outcome of mere prejudice—on ultimate

questions. And this is philosophy; this is metaphysics. When,

therefore, a physical scientist either avows or insinuates that

_because_ the methods of physical science, which are suitable for

the discovery of the _proximate_ causes of phenomena, can tell him

nothing about _ultimate_ questions concerning these phenomena,

_therefore_ there is nothing to be known about these questions, he

is not only committing himself, _nolens volens_, to definite

philosophical views, but he is doing a serious disservice to

physical science itself by misconceiving and mis-stating its

rightful scope and limits. He has just an equal right with any

other man to utilize the established truths of physical science to

help him in answering ultimate questions. Nay, he may even use the

unverified hypotheses and systematic conceptions(514) of physical

science for what they are worth in helping him to determine his

general world-view. But his competence as a specialist in physical

science does not confer upon him any _special_ qualification for

estimating the value of these truths and hypotheses as evidence in

the domain of ultimate problems. Nor can he, because he is a

scientist, or even because he may go so far as to assert the right

of speaking in the name of “science,” claim for his particular

interpretation the privilege of exemption from criticism; and this

is true no matter what his interpretation may be—whether it be

agnosticism, mechanism, teleologism, monism, or theism. These

observations may appear elementary and obvious; but the

insinuation of positivism and phenomenism, that whatever is not

itself phenomenal and verifiable by the experimental methods of

the physical sciences is in no wise knowable, and the insinuation

of mechanists that their world-view is the only one compatible

with the truths of science and therefore the only “scientific”

philosophy, justify us in reiterating and emphasizing even such

obvious methodological considerations. Bearing them in mind, let

us now examine the uniformity and necessity of the laws of

physical nature.

Understanding by natural law the natural inclination or tendency of the

creature to a definite line of activity, this law is of itself determining

or necessitating. Moreover, it is absolutely inseparable from the essence

of the creature. Granted that the creature exists, it has this tendency to

exert and direct all its forces and energies in a definite, normal way,

for the realization of its end. This _nisus naturae_ is never absent; it

is observable even where, as in the generation of “monsters” by living

organisms, it partially fails to attain its end. A law of nature, taken in

this sense, is absolutely necessary to, and inseparable from, the created

agent; it admits of no exceptions; no agent can exist without it; for it

is identical with the very being of the agent

But the uniformity of action resulting from this natural tendency, the

uniform series of normal operations whereby it realizes its end, is not

absolutely necessary, inviolable, unexceptional. In the first place the

Author of Nature can, for a higher or moral purpose, prevent any created

agency supernaturally, miraculously, from actually exercising its active

powers in accordance with its nature for the prosecution of its natural

end. But apart altogether from this, abstracting from all special

interference of the First Cause, and confining our attention to the

natural order itself, we have to consider that for any physical agency to

act in its natural or normal manner certain extrinsic conditions are

always requisite: oxygen and hydrogen, for instance, will combine to

produce water, but only under certain conditions of contact, pressure,

temperature, etc. This general requirement arises from the fact already

mentioned, that physical agencies co-exist in time and space and are

constantly interacting. These extrinsic conditions are, of course, not

expressly stated in the formulation of those uniformities and quantitative

descriptions called “laws of nature” in the second and third

interpretations of this expression as explained above. It is taken as

understood that the law applies only if and when and where all such

conditions are verified. The law, therefore, as stated categorically, does

not express an absolutely necessary, universal, and unexceptional truth.

It may admit of exceptions.

In the next place, when we come to examine these exceptions to uniformity,

these failures or frustrations of the normal or natural activities of

physical agencies, we find it possible to distinguish roughly, with

Aristotle, between two groups of such “uniformities” or “laws”. There are

firstly those which, so far as our experience goes, seem to prevail

_always_ (ἀεὶ), unexceptionally; and secondly, those which seem to prevail

_generally_, _for the most part_ (ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ), though not

unexceptionally. The former would be the outcome of active powers,

energies, forces, _de facto_ present and prevalent always and everywhere

in all physical agencies, and of such a character that the conditions

requisite for their actual operation would be always verified. Such, for

instance, would be the force of gravity in all ponderable matter; and

hence the law of gravitation is regarded as all-pervading, universal,

unexceptional. But there are other natural or normal effects which are the

outcome of powers, forces, energies, not all-pervading, but restricted to

special groups of agencies, dependent for their actual production on the

presence of a great and complex variety of extrinsic conditions, and

liable therefore to be impeded by the interfering action of numerous other

natural agencies. Such, for instance, would be the natural powers and

processes whereby living organisms propagate their kind. The law,

therefore, which states it to be a uniformity of nature that living

organisms reproduce offspring similar to themselves in kind, is a general

law, admitting exceptions.

Operations and effects which follow from the nature of their causes are

called natural (καθ᾽ ἁυτό, καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός).(515) Some causes

produce their natural effects _always_ (τὰ ἐξ ἀνάνκης καὶ ἀεὶ γιγνομένα),

others produce their natural effects _usually_, _as a general rule_ (τὰ ὡς

ἐπι πολὺ γιγνόμενα).(516) Operations and effects which are produced by the

interfering influence of extrinsic agencies (τὸ βίαιον “violent,” as

opposed to natural), and not in accordance with the nature of their

principal cause, are called by Aristotle _accidental_ (τὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός,

τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα γυγνέσθαι); and these, he remarks, people commonly describe

as due to chance (καὶ ταῦτα πάντες φασὶν εἰναι ἀπο τύχης).(517)

All are familiar with events or happenings described as “fortuitous,”

“accidental,” “exceptional,” “unexpected,” with things happening by

“chance,” by (good or bad) “luck” or “fortune”.(518) There are terms in

all languages expressive of this experience—_casus_, _sors_, _fortuna_,

τύχη, etc. The notion underlying all of them is that of something

occurring unintentionally, _praeter intentionem agentis_. Whether chance

effects result from the action of intelligent agents or from the operation

of physical causes they are not “intended,”—by the deliberate purpose of

the intelligent agent in the one case, or by the natural tendency, the

_intentio naturae_, of the mere physical agency in the other. Such an

effect, therefore, has not a _natural_ cause; hence it is considered

_exceptional_, and is always more or less unexpected. _Nature_, as

Aristotle rightly observes,(519) never produces a chance effect. His

meaning is, that whenever such an effect occurs it is not brought about in

accordance with the natural tendency of any physical agency. It results

from a collision or coincidence of two or more such agencies, each acting

according to its nature. The hunter’s act of firing at a wild fowl is an

intentional act. The boy’s act of coming into the thicket to gather wild

flowers is an intentional act. The accidental shooting of the boy is the

result of a coincidence of the two intentional acts. Similarly, each of

all the various agencies which bring about the development of an embryo in

the maternal womb has its own immediate and particular natural effect, and

only mediately contributes to the general effect of bringing the embryo to

maturity. As a rule these particular effects are favourable to the general

effect. But sometimes the immediate ends do not subserve this ulterior

purpose. The result is accidental, exceptional, a deviation from the

normal type, an anomaly, a “monster” in the domain of living organisms.

Aristotle’s analysis, correct so far, is incomplete. It assigns no

ultimate explanation of the fact that there are such encounters of

individual natural tendencies in the universe, such failures in the

subordination of particular ends to wider ulterior ends. As a matter of

fact these chance effects, although not “intended” by the natures of

individual created agencies, are not wholly and entirely unintended. They

are not wholly aimless. They enter into the general plan and scheme of

things as known and willed by the Author of Nature. They are known to His

Intelligence, and willed and ruled by His Providence. For Him there can be

no such thing as chance. Effects that are accidental in relation to

created causes, effects that run counter to the nature or _intentio

naturae_ of these, are foreseen and willed by Him and made to subserve

that wider and more general end which is the universal order of the world

that He has actually willed to create. It is only in relation to the

natures of individual agencies, and to the limited horizon of our finite

intelligences, that such phenomena can present the aspect of fortuitous or

chance occurrences.

Before passing on to deal, in our concluding section, with the great fact

of order, let us briefly compare with the foregoing explanation of nature

and its laws the attempt of mechanists to explain these without

recognizing in the physical universe any influence of final causes, or any

indication of a purposive intelligence. We have ventured to describe their

attitude as philosophic fatalism.(520) According to their view there is no

ground for the distinction between phenomena that happen “naturally” and

phenomena that happen “accidentally” or “by chance”. All alike happen by

the same kind of general necessity: the generation of a “monster” is as

“natural” as the generation of normal offspring; the former, when it

occurs, is just as inevitably the outcome of the physical forces at work

in the particular case as the latter is the outcome of the particular set

of efficient causes which do actually produce the normal result: the only

difference is that the former, occurring less frequently and as the result

of a rarer and less known conjunction of “physical” causes than the

latter, is not expected by us to occur, and is consequently regarded, when

it does occur, as exceptional. Now it is quite true that what we call

“chance” effects, or “exceptional” effects, result just as inevitably from

the set of forces operative in their case, as normal effects result from

the forces operative in theirs. But this leaves for explanation something

which the mechanist cannot explain. He regards a physical law merely as a

generalization, beyond experience, of some experienced uniformity; and he

holds that all our physical laws are provisional in the sense that a wider

and deeper knowledge of the actual conditions of interaction among the

physical forces of the universe would enable us to eliminate

exceptions—which are all apparent, not real—by restating our laws in such

a comprehensive way as to include all such cases. We may, indeed, admit

that our physical laws are open to revision and restatement in this sense,

and are _de facto_ often modified in this sense by the progress of

science. But the important point is this, that the mechanist does not

admit the existence, in physical agencies, of any law in the sense of a

_natural inclination towards an end_, or in any sense in which it would

imply intelligence, design, or purpose. On the contrary, claiming as he

does that all physical phenomena are _reducible to mechanical motions of

inert masses, atoms, or particles of matter in space_, he is obliged to

regard all physical agencies as being, so far as their nature is

concerned, wholly _indifferent_ to any particular form of activity.(521)

Committed to the indefensible view that all qualitative change is

reducible to quantitative (11), and all material differences to

differences in the location of material particles and in the velocity and

direction of the spatial motion impressed upon each by others extrinsic to

itself, he has left himself no factors wherewith to explain the actual

order and course of the universe, other than the purely _indifferent_

factors of essentially or naturally homogeneous particles of inert matter

endowed with local motion. We emphasize this feature of indifference; for

the conception of an inert particle of matter subject to mechanical motion

impressed upon it from without, is the very type of an indifferent agency.

What such an entity will do, whether or not it will move, with what

velocity and in what direction it will move—in a word, its entire conduct,

its rôle in the universe, the sum-total of its functions—nothing of all

this is dependent on itself; everything depends on agencies extrinsic to

it, and on its extrinsic time-and-space relations to these agencies; and

these latter in turn are in the same condition as itself. Now is it

conceivable that agencies of this kind, of themselves absolutely

indifferent to any particular kind of effect, suitable or unsuitable,

regular or irregular, orderly or disorderly, could actually produce and

maintain the existing order of the universe? If they were themselves

_produced by an All-Wise and All-Powerful Being_, and _definitely

arranged_ in spatial relations to one another, and _initial mechanical

motion in definite directions and velocities_ impressed on the different

parts of the system, there is no denying that Infinite Wisdom and Power

could, by Divine concurrence even with such indifferent agencies, realize

and maintain a _cosmos_, or _orderly_ universe. Such _purely extrinsic

finality_ (106) could, absolutely speaking, account for the existence of

order, uniformity, regularity, system; though all the evidence furnished

by the universe of our actual experience points to the existence of

_intrinsic finality_ also as understood by Aristotle and the scholastics.

But the mechanist will not allow even extrinsic finality; he will not

recognize in the actual universe of our experience any evidence of a

Ruling Intelligence realizing a plan or design for an intelligent purpose;

he denies the necessity of the inference from the data of human experience

to the existence of a Guiding Intelligence. And what are his alternatives?

He may choose one or other of two.

He may restate in the more scientific and imposing terminology of modern

mechanics the crude conception of the ancient Greek atomists: that the

actual order of the universe is the absolutely inevitable and fatal

outcome of a certain collocation of the moving masses of the physical

universe, a collocation favourable to order, a collocation which _just

happened to occur_ by some happy chance from the essentially aimless,

purposeless, indifferent and _chaotic_ motions of those material masses

and particles. We say “chaotic,” for _chaos_ is the absence of _cosmos_;

and _order_ is the fact that has got to be explained. In the concept of

_indifferent, inert_ atoms of matter moving through space there is

emphatically no principle of order;(522) and hence the mechanist who will

not admit the necessity of inferring an Intelligence to give these moving

masses or atoms the collocation _favourable to order_ is forced to

“explain” this supposed collocation by attributing it to pure chance—the

_concursus fortuitus atomorum_ of the ancient Greeks. When, however, we

reflect that the more numerous these atoms and the more varied and complex

their motions, the smaller is the chance of a collocation favourable to

order; that the atoms and motions are supposed actually to surpass any

assignable number; that therefore the chance of any such favourable

collocation occurring is indefinitely smaller than any measurable

proportion,—we can draw our own conclusions about the value of such a

speculation as a rational “explanation” of the existing _cosmos_. And this

apart altogether from the consideration that the fact to be explained is

not merely the _momentary_ occurrence of an orderly collocation, but the

_maintenance_ of an orderly system of cosmic phenomena _throughout the

lapse of all time_. No orderly finite system of mechanical motions

arranged by human skill can preserve its orderly motions indefinitely

without intelligent human supervision: the neglected machine will get out

of order, run down, wear out, if left to itself; and we are asked to

believe that the whole universe is one vast machine which not only goes on

without intelligent supervision, but which actually made itself by

chance!(523)

Naturally such an “explanation” of the universe does not commend itself to

any man of serious thought, whatever his difficulties may be against the

argument from the fact of order in the universe to the existence of an

Intelligent Designer. Add to this the consideration that the mechanist

theory does not even claim to account for the first origin of the

universe: it postulates the existence of matter in motion. In regard to

this supreme problem of the _first origin_ of the universe the attitude of

the mechanist is avowedly _agnostic_; and in view of what we have just

remarked about the “chance” theory as an “explanation” of the _existing

order_ of the universe, it is no matter for surprise that most mechanists

reject this theory and embrace the agnostic attitude in regard to this

latter problem also. Whether the agnostic attitude they assume be negative

or positive, _i.e._ whether they are content to say that they themselves

at least fail to find any satisfactory rational explanation of the

_origin_ and _nature_ of the _cosmos_, or contend further that no rational

solution of these problems is within the reach of the human mind, their

teaching is refuted in Natural Theology, where the theistic solution of

these problems is set forth and vindicated.

110. THE ORDER OF THE UNIVERSE; A FACT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS.—The

considerations so far submitted in this chapter, as pointing to the

existence and influence of final causes in the universe, will be

strengthened and completed by a brief analysis of _order_ and its

implications.

We have seen already (55) that the apprehension of order in things implies

the recognition of _some unifying principle in what is manifold_. What, in

general, is the nature of this principle? It is the _point of view_, the

_standpoint_ from which the unifying arrangement or disposition of the

manifold is carried out; in other words it is the _end_, _object_, or

_purpose_, of the orderly arrangement. The arrangement, and the order

resulting from it, will vary according to the end in view—whether, for

instance, it be an arrangement of books in a library, of pictures in a

gallery, of materials in an edifice, of parts in a machine. Hence St.

Thomas’s definition of order as the due adaptation of means to ends:

_recta ratio rerum ad finem_. When this adaptation is the work of human

intelligence the order realized is _artificial_, when it is the work of

nature the order realized is _natural_. Art is an extrinsic principle of

order, nature implies indeed also an intelligent extrinsic principle of

order, but is itself an intrinsic principle of order: the works of nature

and those of art have this feature in common, that they manifest

adaptation of means to ends.(524)

The _subordination_ of means to ends realizes an order which has for its

unifying principle the influence of an _end_, a _final cause_. The group

of _dynamic_ relations thus revealed constitutes what is called

_teleological_ order, the order of _purpose_ or _finality_. The

realization or execution of such an order implies the simultaneous

existence of _co-ordinated_ parts or members in a system, a realized whole

with complex, co-ordinated, orderly parts, the principle of unity in this

system being the _form_ of the whole. This realized, disposed, or

constituted order, is called the _esthetic_ order (55), the order of

co-ordination, composition, constitution. In ultimate analysis, however,

these two orders, the _teleological_ and the _esthetic_, having as

respective unifying principles the _final_ cause and the _formal_ cause,

are not two really distinct orders, but rather two aspects of one and the

same order: we have seen that in the things of nature the intrinsic end or

final cause of each is identical with its _forma substantialis_ or formal

cause (108). But the final cause is naturally prior to the formal cause,

and consequently the teleological order is more fundamental than the

esthetic.

St. Augustine’s definition of order as “the arrangement of a multiplicity

of things, similar and dissimilar, according its proper place to

each,”(525) reveals the _material_ cause of order in the multiplicity of

varied elements, the _formal_ cause of order in the group of relations

resulting from the arrangement or _dispositio_, and the _efficient_ cause

of order in the agent that disposes or arranges them. The _final_ cause,

though not directly mentioned, is implied in the fact that the place of

each factor in the system is necessarily determined by the function it has

to fulfil, the part it is suited by its nature to play, in contributing to

the realization of the end or purpose of the arrangement.

If, then, order is _the right arrangement or disposition of things

according to their destination, or in the mutual relations demanded by

their ends_, it necessarily follows that the very existence of _natural_

order in the universe implies that this universe is not a work of _chance_

but a _purposive_ work, just as the existence of _artificial_ order in

products of human art implies that these products are not the result of

chance but of activity influenced by final causes.(526)

It is in fact impossible to conceive order except as resulting from the

influence of final causes. Right reason rejects as an utterly inadequate

explanation of the natural order of the universe the fantastic and

far-fetched supposition of a chance collocation of indifferent,

undetermined and aimless physical agencies.(527) If we find in the actual

physical universe difficulties against the view that this universe reveals

the influence of final causes, such difficulties do not arise from the

fact that there is order in the universe, but rather from the fact that

with this order there seems to coexist some degree of disorder also. In so

far forth as there is natural order there is _cogent_ evidence of the

influence of final causes. And so necessary is this inference that even

one single authentic instance of natural order in an otherwise chaotic

universe would oblige us to infer the existence and influence of a final

cause to account for that solitary instance. We mean by an authentic

instance one which evidences a real and sustained uniformity, regularity,

mutual co-ordination and subordination of factors in the behaviour of any

group of natural agencies; for we allow that transient momentary

collocations and concurrences of _indifferent_ agencies, acting aimlessly

and without purpose as a matter of fact, might present to our minds,

accustomed to seek for orderly and purposive phenomena, the deceptive

appearance of order.

Order, then, we take it, necessarily implies the existence and influence

of final causes. This in turn, as we have already observed, implies with

equal necessity the existence of _Intelligent Purpose_. If, then, there is

natural order in the universe, there must exist an _Intelligent Will_ to

account for this natural order.

Leaving the development of this line of argument to its proper place in

Natural Theology, there remains the simple question of fact: Is the

physical universe a _cosmos_? Does it reveal order—a natural order

distinct from the artificial order realized by the human mind in the

mechanical and fine arts, an order, therefore, realized not by the human

mind but by some other mind, by the Divine Mind? The evidences of such

order superabound. We have already referred to some of them (106), nor is

there any need to labour the matter. Two points, however, in connexion

with this universally recognized fact of order in the universe, call for a

brief mention before we conclude. They are in the nature of difficulties

against the ordinary, reasonable view of the matter, the view on which the

theistic argument from order is based.

In accordance with the Kantian theory of knowledge it is objected that the

order which we apprehend, or think we apprehend, in the universe, is not

_really in_ the universe of our experience, but is as it were _projected

into_ this universe by our own minds in the very process of cognition

itself. It is therefore not real but only apparent, not noumenal but only

phenomenal. It is simply a product of the categorizing, unifying,

systematizing activity of our minds. It is a feature of the phenomenon or

mental product, _i.e._ of the noumenal _datum_ as _invested with a

category of thought_. But whether or not it is a characteristic of the

real universe itself man’s speculative reason is by its very constitution

essentially incapable of ever discovering. The theory of knowledge on

which this difficulty is based can be shown to be unsound and erroneous.

For a criticism of the theory we must refer the reader to scholastic works

on Epistemology. It may be observed, however, apart from the merits or

demerits of the theory, that the experienced fact of order is by no means

demolished or explained away by any questions that may be raised about the

exact _location_ of the fact, if we may so express it. Order is a fact, an

undeniable, experienced fact; and it looms just as large, and cries out

just as insistently for explanation, with whichever of the imposing

adjectives “noumenal” or “phenomenal” a philosopher may choose to qualify

it; nor do we diminish its reality by calling it phenomenal one whit more

than we increase that reality by calling it noumenal.

The other difficulty arises from the existence of _disorder_ in the

universe. Pessimists of the type of Schopenhauer or Nietzsche concentrate

their attention so exclusively on the evidences of disorder, the failures

of adaptation of means to ends, the defects and excesses, the prodigality

and penury, the pain and suffering, which abound in physical nature—not to

speak of moral evil,—that they become blind to all evidences of order, and

proclaim all belief in order an illusion.

The picture of

Nature, red in tooth and claw

With ravine(528)

is, however, the product of a morbid and distraught imagination rather

than a sane view of the facts. The undeniable existence of disorder, of

physical evils, defects, failures, frustrations of natural tendency in the

universe, does not obscure or conceal from the normal, unbiassed mind the

equally undeniable evidences of a great and wide and generally prevailing

order. Nor does it conceal from such a mind the fact that the existence of

order in any measure or degree implies of necessity the existence of plan

or design, and therefore of intelligent purpose also. Inferring from this

fact of order the existence of a Supreme Intelligence, and inferring by

other lines of reasoning from the data of experience the dependence of the

universe on this Intelligence as Creator, Conserver and Ruler, the theist

is confronted with the reality of moral and physical evil (52), _i.e._ of

_disorder_ in the universe. But he does not see in this disorder anything

essentially incompatible with his established conclusion that the universe

is a finite creation of Infinite Wisdom, and a free manifestation of the

latter to man. If the actual universe is imperfect, he knows that God

created it freely and might have created a more perfect or a less perfect

one. Knowing that God is All-Powerful as He is All-Wise, he knows that the

actual universe, though imperfect _absolutely_, is perfect _relatively_,

in that it infallibly reveals the Divine Wisdom and Goodness exactly in

the measure in which God has willed to reveal Himself in His works.

Conscious on the one hand that his finite mind cannot trace in detail all

the purposes of God in nature, or assign to all individual events their

divinely appointed ends, he is confident on the other hand that the whole

universe is intelligible only as the working out of a Divine plan, and not

otherwise. To his mind as a theist these lines are a clearer expression of

rationally grounded optimism than they were perhaps even to the poet who

penned them:—

I trust in nature for the stable laws

Of beauty and utility. Spring shall plant

And Autumn garner to the end of time.

I trust in God—the right shall be the right

And other than the wrong, while He endures;

I trust in my own soul, that can perceive

The outward and the inward, Nature’s good

And God’s.(529)

We have seen that the agencies which constitute the universal order have

each its own inner principle of finality; that these agencies are not

isolated but mutually related in such ways that the ends of each subserve

an extrinsic and remoter end which is none other than this universal order

whereby we recognize the world as a _cosmos_. The maintenance of this

order is the _intrinsic_ end of the universe as a whole: an end which is

_immanent_ in the universe, an end which is of course _a good_. But this

universal order itself is _for an end_, an _extrinsic_, _transcendent_

end, distinct from itself; and this end, too, must be _a good_. “The

universe,” says St. Thomas,(530) “has the good of order and another

distinct good.” The universal order, says Aristotle, has itself an end, a

_good_, which is _one_, and to which all else is ordained: “πρὸς ἕν ἅπαντα

συντέτακται”.(531) What can this Supreme Good be, this absolutely Ultimate

End, this Transcendent Principle of all nature, and of all nature’s

tendencies and activities? Whence comes this universal tendency of all

nature, if not from the Being who is the One, Eternal, Immutable Prime

Mover,(532) and whose moving influence is Love?(533) Such is the profound

thought of Aristotle, a thought re-echoed so sublimely by the immortal

poet of Christian philosophy in the closing line of the _Paradiso_:—

L’amor che muove il Sole e l’altre stelle.

The immediate factors of the universal order of nature, themselves devoid

of intelligence, must therefore be the work of Intelligent Will. To

arrange these factors as parts of one harmonious whole, as members of one

orderly system, Supreme Wisdom must have conceived the plan and chosen the

means to realize it. The manifestation of God’s glory by the realization

of this plan, such is the ultimate transcendent end of the whole created

universe. “The whole order of the universe,” writes St. Thomas, developing

the thought of Aristotle,(534) “is for the Prime Mover thereof; this order

has for its purpose the working out in an orderly universe of the plan

conceived and willed by the Prime Mover. And hence the Prime Mover is the

principle of this universal order.”

The truths so briefly outlined in this closing chapter on the order and

purpose of the universe have nowhere found more apt and lucid

philosophical formulation than in the monumental writings of the Angel of

the Christian Schools; nor perhaps have they ever elsewhere appeared in a

more felicitous setting of poetic imagery than in these stanzas from the

immortal epic of the Poet of the Christian Schools:—

... Le cose tutte quante

Hann’ ordine tra lora; e questa è forma

Che l’universo a Dio fa simigliante.

Qui veggion l’alte creature l’orma

Dell’eterno Valore, il quale è fine

Al quale è fatta la toccata norma.

Nell’ ordine ch’io dico sono accline

Tutte nature per diverse sorti

Più al Principio loro e men vicine;

Onde si muovono a diversi porti

Per lo gran mar dell’essere, e ciascuna

Con instinto a lei dato che la porti.

Questi ne porta il fuoco inver la Luna:

Questi ne’ cuor mortali è permotore;

Questi la terra in se stringe ed aduna.

Nè pur le creature, che son fuore

D’intelligenza, quest’ arco saetta

Ma quelle ch’ hanno intelletto ed amore.

La Providenza, che cotanto assetta,

Del suo lume fa il ciel sempre quieto,

Nel qual si volge quel ch’ha maggior fretta:

Ed ora li, com’ a sito decreto,

Cen porta la virtù di quella corda,

Che ciò che scocca drizzo in segno lieto.(535)

INDEX.

Absolute, the, 47 _sq._;

and relative, 332 _sqq._

Accidents, individuation of, 133 _sqq._;

causes of, 235-6;

divisions of, 237 _sqq._;

existence and relation to substance, 232 _sqq._, 240 _sqq._, 243, 247

_n._, 249, 313.

_Actio et passio_, _v._ causality, causes.

_Actio intentionalis_, 378.

_Actio in distans_, 395-6.

Action, immanent and transitive, 73, 369, 391-2.

Actual and potential, 52 _sqq._ and _passim_.

Actuality, goodness and perfection, 173 _sqq._

_Actus Purus_, 54, 58.

AEGIDIUS, 108 _n._

_Aeveternitas_, _aevum_, 230.

Agnosticism, 96, 97, 335, 383, 409, 414, 427.

ALBERTUS MAGNUS, 108 _n._, 201 _n._, 288.

ALEXANDER OF HALES, 110 _n._, 112 _n._

Analogy, analogical predication, 36 _sqq._, 122 _n._, 212, 240, 272, 330;

a. inference, 386-7, 391.

ANDRONICUS OF RHODES, 17.

_Anima mundi_, 284.

ANSELM, ST., 353 _n._

Anthropology, 19.

Appetite, 167 _sqq._

_Appetitus naturalis_, 409-10, 413-15.

ARISTOTLE, on philosophy, 5;

on esthetics, 13;

on theology, 15, 16;

on special sciences, 16;

on analogy, 40;

on change, 51, 56, 68 _sqq._;

on essence, 75;

on individual, 120-1;

on the good, 167 _sqq._;

on beauty, 200 _n._, 201 _n._;

on substance and accident, 209, 249;

on “first” and “second” substances, 252-3;

on quality, 287, 290-2;

on habits, 293-6;

on quantity, 311 _n._;

on place, 318;

on time, 342;

on relation, 337 _n._, 346-8;

on principles, 358 _n._;

on causes, 361 _sqq._, 367;

on final causes, 406 _sqq._;

on “nature,” 416 _sqq._, 422-4, 426;

on order of the universe, 433.

Art, and nature, 416-17.

Arts, fine and mechanical, 13, 14, 430;

and science, 194-5;

scope of, 204 _sqq._;

and morals, 205-6.

Atomism, _v._ Mechanism.

AUGUSTINE, ST., on basis of possible essences, 89 _n._, 94;

on evil, 185 _n._;

on beauty, 198, 200 _n._, 202 _n._;

on time, 322;

on order, 429.

AUREOLUS, 110 _n._

AVERROÏSM, 284.

BALMES, 89 _n._, 90 _n._, 93.

BAÑEZ, D., 108 _n._, 350 _n._

BAUMGARTEN, 192 _n._

_Beatitudo_, 175 _n._, 411.

Beauty, the Beautiful, 13, 14;

analysis of, 192 _sqq._;

definitions of, 201 _sqq._

Being, concept analysed, 32 _sqq._;

real being and logical being, 10, 42 _sqq._, 85, 140.

— and Ideal Being, 45 _sqq._, 85.

— fundamental distinction in, 46 _sqq._

— metaphysical grades of, 123 _sqq._

— potential and actual, 51 _sqq._

BERGSON, 30, 289 _n._, 303.

BERKELEY, 215, 221, 350 _n._, 400.

BIEL, G., 110 _n._

BILLOT, 266 _n._

Bilocation, 322.

BOËTIUS, 329.

BOIRAC, 343.

BONAVENTURE, ST., on distinction of soul and faculties, 247-8.

BOSSUET, 196, 360.

BROWNING, 432.

BRUNETIÈRE, 196.

BULLIAT, 130 _n._

CAJETAN, 24, 38 _n._, 108 _n._, 350 _n._

CAPREOLUS, 87 _n._, 108 _n._, 350 _n._

CARY, 434 _n._

Categories, ultimate, analysis of, 208 _sqq._;

not adequately distinct as modes, 210-11, 350;

but exhaustive, 211-12.

_Causa exemplaris_, 362.

_Causalitas_ “_intentionalis_,” 413.

Causality, causes, notion analysed, 357 _sqq._;

classification, 361 _sqq._;

principle of C., 369 _sqq._, 384-5;

“plurality” of causes, 380;

causality and uniformity, 377, 381, 382;

“physical” cause, 382, 419;

phenomenist view of, 382 _sqq._;

and inductive science, 359, 379, 381, 382 _n._;

and determinism, 377;

and creation, 391, 400-1.

Causality, efficient, as index of real distinction, 148;

classification of efficient causes, 372 _sqq._;

instrumental, 373-6;

objective validity of concept, 382 _sqq._;

origin of concept, 385 _sqq._;

analysis of, 366 _sqq._, 388 _sqq._;

erroneous theories of, 392-6;

and occasionalism, 396 _sqq._, 400 _sqq._

— final (_v._ purpose), 361, 368;

intrinsic and extrinsic finality, 404 _sqq._, 426;

all-pervading influence of, 409;

divisions of, 409 _sqq._;

analysis of, 411_sqq._;

as implying intelligence, 409, 414-15, 426.

— formal, 361, 364-5.

— material, 361, 364-6.

Chance, 423 _sqq._

Change, 61 _sqq._, 302-5;

and time, 323;

and causality, 367, 389-96.

CICERO, 1.

CLARKE, 135.

_Cognitio_ “_vulgaris_,” 2.

Composition, logical and metaphysical, 34;

essential and integral, 311, 314-16;

as index of finiteness, 248.

COMTE, 30, 334.

Conceptualism, 24, 125.

_Concursus Divinus_,66, 329, 348, 375 _n._, 388 _sqq._;

necessity of, 389-91, 401-3.

Condition, and cause, 358-9, 419.

Consciousness, and personality, 273, 277 _sqq._;

“subliminal,” 282 sqq.

Constitutive or constructive factors in thought, 45, 74, 340, 355-6.

Contingent and necessary Being, 47.

Co-operation, in philosophical studies, 30.

Correlatives, 388.

_Corruptio et generatio_, 71, 186.

Cosmology, 16, 19, 285, 309, 364, 388, 393.

COUSIN, 301, 387.

_Creatio ab aeterno_, 89, 328.

Criteriology, _v._ Knowledge, theory of.

DANTE, 434 n.

DAVID OF DINANT, 125 _n._

DE MUNNYNCK, 84 _n._, 89 _n._, 91 _n._, 94 _n._, 95 _n._

DE SAN, 241 _n._, 327 _n._, 331 _n._

DESCARTES, on basis of essences, 96, 97;

on substance, 214, 226-8, 230, 241 _n._;

on accidents, 244;

on corporeal substance, 312-13, 315, 397.

Design, _v._ purpose and final cause.

DE WULF, 6 _n._, 27 _n._, 29 _n._, 156 _n._, 195 _n._, 284.

Disposition, _v._ habit.

_Dispositiones ad formam_, 295 n.

Disorder, fact of, 431-2.

Distinctions, doctrine of, 105 _sqq._, 139 _sqq._, 242-3, 249-51, 301-5.

DOMET DE VORGES, 387 _n._

“Double law” in man, 176.

“Double personality,” 282-4.

DRISCOLL, 89 _n._

DUPASQUIER, 99 _n._

DURANDUS, 110 _n._

Duration, 322, 325 _n._, 328 _sqq._

Education, and habits, 298.

Efficiency, concept of, _v._ cause (efficient).

Ego, _v._ person.

ELEATICS, 51, 125, 303.

End (_v._ purpose), 406.

Energies, equivalence of, 395.

_Ens a se_, _ab alio_, 47;

and _ens in se_, 230-1, 334.

_Ens rationis_, _v._ Being.

Entitative habit, 292 _n._

Epistemology, _v._ Knowledge, theory of.

_Esse_ “_intentionale_,” 45, 46, 412.

Essence, analysis of, 75 _sqq._;

and nature and substance, 79, 258.

Esthetics, 13, 14, 192 sqq.

Eternity, 328 _sqq._;

of essences, 80 _sqq._

Ether, hypothesis of, 317, 395.

Ethics, 11-12, 296-7, 428-9.

Eucharist, and substance and accidents, 223 _n._, 233, 243 _n._;

and quantity, 312-16; 319 _n._, 322, 345 _n._

EUCKEN, 28.

Evil, analysis of, 182 _sqq._

Exemplarism, 98, 100, 161-2.

Existence, and essence, 101-13;

of accidents, 243-61;

and subsistence, 266, 269;

and action, 301.

Extension, _v._ quantity.

Extrinsic denominations, 238, 239.

Faculties, 298 _sqq._;

and substance, 300 _sqq._

Faith and reason, 5.

Fatalism, 424 _n._

Figure, or form, as indicative of nature, 292-3.

_Finis_, finality, _v._ purpose and final causes.

Finite and Infinite, 47, 301-3.

FONSECA, 113 n.

“_Forma_” as essence or nature, 78-9, 130.

_Formae subsistentes_, 129.

“Formal” unity, 156.

_Formalitates_, 154.

Formative principles, simplicity of, 317-18;

plurality in the individual, 365 (_n._ 4).

FRANCIS OF VITTORIA, 113 _n._

FRANZELIN, 110 _n._, 267 _n._

Free causes, 376-7;

and occasionalism, 398.

Freedom of thought, 6.

_Generatio_, _v._ _corruptio_.

Genuensis, 98 _n._

“_Genus_” and “_differentia_” as “_materia_” and “_forma_,” 79 _n._, 365

(_n._ 4).

GEULINCX, 397.

GIOBERTI, 94.

Good, analysis of the, 167 _sqq._;

divisions of the, 175 _sqq._;

and being, 177 _sqq._;

and beauty, 193.

GOUDIN, 108 _n._

Graceful, elegant, the, 199 _n._

GREGORY OF VALENTIA, 110 _n._

Habit, analysis of, 292 _sqq._

_Haecceitas_, 125, 132.

HARPER, 99 _n._

HEGEL, Hegelianism, 30, 33, 46, 49, 67-8, 97, 208, 335.

HENRY OF GHENT, 87 _n._, 113 _n._

HERACLITUS, 51, 303.

HICKEY, 89 _n._

HOBBES, 334.

HÖFFDING, 230 _n._

HUME, 213;

on substance, 215, 217, 221;

on cause, 370 _n._, 385.

HUNLEY, 219 _n._

_Hypostasis_, 265.

Hypostatic Union, 267-71.

Idealism, 214, 334-6, 341, 343, 400.

Identity, 135 _sqq._;

and change, 139, 226, 241, 278;

personal, 276, 277 _sqq._

Immaterial, positively and negatively, 16.

Immensity, Divine, 319.

Impenetrability, 309, 322.

_Incommutabilia vera_, 89 _n._

Indiscernibles, identity of, 135.

Individuation, 120, 123 _sqq._, 148, 261.

Infinite and Finite, 47;

and categories, 212.

Infinite regress in causation, 373.

Inherence, _v._ accident.

_Intentio mentis_, 10, 43, 144 _n._, 145, 211, 339.

“_Intentio naturae_,” 414 _n._, 416, 423.

“Intentional” causality, 413.

JAMES, 30;

on personal identity, 283-4.

JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, 108 _n._, 350 _n._

JOSEPH, on meanings of “cause,” 379-80.

JOUFFROY, 275.

KANT, 21, 30, 121, 145, 201, 208, 228, 334, 335, 343, 385, 393, 394, 430.

KAPPES, M., 75 _n._

KLEUTGEN, 38, 39, 40, 43, 87 _n._, 103 _n._, 142 _n._;

on accidents, 242, 247 _n._, 267 _n._, 330 _n._

KLIMKE, 67 _n._

Knowledge, relativity of, 335 _sqq._

—scientific, 2.

—theory of, 11, 20, 23, 45, 46, 70, 108;

and doctrine of distinctions, 143-6, 151-3;

and categories of being, 207 _sqq._, 285, 289;

and category of relation, 332 _sqq._, 385;

and causality, 393;

and order, 430-1.

_Lacensis, Philosophia_, 21.

LACORDAIRE, 89 _n._

LADD, 24, 27.

LAHOUSSE, 99 _n._

LAMINNE, 60 _n._, 371 _n._

Law, of nature, 418 _sqq._

LEIBNIZ, 21, 98 _n._, 135, 182, 227, 298, 387, 406.

LEO XIII, 7, 26.

LIBERATORE, 99 _n._

LITTRÉ, 213.

LOCKE, on substance, 214, 221;

on personality, 277-84, 334.

Logic, 10.

MAHER, 223 _n._, 230 _n._, 273 _n._;

on consciousness of self, 274-6, 282 _n._;

on theories of self, 283-4, 289 _n._;

on perception of time, 324 _n._, 326-7;

on relativity of knowledge, 336 _n._;

on cause, 386 _n._

MALEBRANCHE, 397-400.

Manicheism, 182, 189-91.

MASTRIUS, 99 _n._

_Materia prima_, Aristotle on, 71-2.

_Materia signata_, 127, 129, 131, 135.

Mathematical unity, 116, 119.

Mathematics, philosophy of, 17, 25.

Matter, and evil, 190.

— divisibility of (_v._ individuation), 317;

continuity of, 317-18.

Measurement, relativity of, 325-7.

Mechanism, mechanical conception of universe, 69, 265, 289, 393-6, 404,

409, 413, 414, 424-9.

Memory, and personality, 276-84.

MENDIVE, 99 _n._

MERCIER, on division of metaphysics, 21;

on scholasticism, 26-7;

on characteristics of essences, 83, 93-4;

on analogical concept of God, 97;

on distinction, 107;

on phenomenism, 213, 224 _n._, 269 _n._;

on faculty and substance, 305 _n._;

on interaction, 391;

on efficient cause, 393 _n._;

on occasionalism, 398 _n._;

on mechanism, 426 _n._, 429 _n._

Metaphor, and analogy, 39.

Metaphysics, division of, 15 _sqq._;

etymology of, 17, 18;

scope of, 24, 25, 27;

and physics, _v._ physics.

MILL, 213, 220, 334, 343;

on causes, 382.

Modal distinction, 150, 245 _sqq._

Modes, accidental and substantial, 150-1, 239, 245 _sqq._, 270, 325 _n._,

330-1.

MOLINA, 113 _n._

Monadology, of Leibniz, 227.

Monism, 46, 97, 103, 125, 230, 284, 350 _n._, 399. 409.

Monophysites, 268.

Monopsychism, 284.

Moral cause, 377-8.

Morality and art, 205-6.

Motion (_v._ change), and efficient causality, 392-6.

Multitude, actually infinite, 321-2.

Nature and substance, 257 _sqq._;

and person, 261 _sqq._;

analysis of notion of, 461 _sqq._

Necessary and Contingent Being, 47.

Necessity of essences, 81 _sqq._

— of physical laws, 419-28.

NEWMAN, on scope of philosophy, 22, 31;

on causality, 377, 387.

NIETZSCHE, 431.

_Nisus naturae_, 421.

Nominalism, 125.

_Notas individuantes_, 124, 131.

NYS, 309 _n._, 311 _n._, 321 _n._, 327 _n._, 328 _n._, 395 _n._

Occasion, and cause, 359.

Occasionalism, 226, 387, 388;

examined, 396-403.

Ontology, 21, 23.

Ontologism, 95, 350 _n._

Optimism, 181-2, 432.

Older, static and dynamic, 199, 428;

and beauty, 194, 199, 428;

natural and artificial, 428;

and relation, 342;

and final cause, 428;

and formal cause, 429;

and intelligent purpose, 417, 429-30, 433.

Panpsychism, 250.

Pantheism, _v._ monism.

PAULSEN, 213, 226-7.

Perfection, analysis of, 171 _sqq._;

and beauty, 201;

grades of, 59, 172-3;

in substances, 134, 255;

and distinction, 142 _n._;

and habit, 297;

and relation, 342.

Person, personality, 262 _sqq._;

definition of, 265, 270 _n._;

distinction from individual nature, 266 _sqq._;

false theories of, 276 _sqq._;

“subconscious,” 283-4.