CHAPTER IX. NATURE AND PERSON.

70. SOME DIVISIONS OF SUBSTANCES.—In the preceding chapter we discussed

the nature of substance and accident in general, and the relation between

a substance and its accidents. We must next examine the category of

substance more in detail, terminating as it does in the important concept

of personality or person. This latter conception is one which must have

its origin for all philosophers in the study of the human individual, but

which, for scholastic philosophers, is completed and perfected by the

light of Christian Revelation. We shall endeavour to show in the first

place what can be gathered from the light of reason about the constitution

of personality, and also briefly to note how Christian Revelation has

increased our insight into the perfections involved in it. As leading up

to the concept of person, we must set forth certain divisions or

classifications of substance: into _first_ and _second_ substances, and

into _complete_ and _incomplete_ substances.(277)

(_a_) The specific and generic natures of substantial entities do not

inhere, like accidents, in individual substances; they constitute the

essence of the latter, and hence these _universals_ are called substances.

But the universal as such does not really exist; it is realized only in

individuals; in the logical order it pre-supposes the individual as a

logical subject of which it is affirmed, a _subjectum attributionis seu

praedicationis_. Hence it is called a _second_ substance, while the

individual substance is called a _first_ substance. Of course we can

predicate attributes of universal substances, and use these as logical

subjects, as when we say “_Man_ is mortal”. But such propositions have no

real meaning, and give us no information about reality, except in so far

as we can refer their predicates (“mortal”), through the medium of their

universal subjects (“man”), back ultimately to the individual substances

(John, James, etc.) which alone are real, and in which alone the universal

(“man”) has its reality. Hence the individual is, in the logical order,

the ultimate and fundamental subject of all our predications. And

furthermore, the individual substance cannot be used as a logical

predicate of anything underlying itself, while the universal substance can

be so used in relation to the individual.

In the ontological order, of course, the universal substance is

individualized, and, as individual, it is the subject in which all

accidents inhere, their _subjectum inhaesionis_: the _only_ subject of

many of them, and the _remote_ or _ultimate_ subject of those of them

which inhere _immediately_ in other accidents.

Thus while in the ontological order all substances, whether we think of

them as universal or as individual, are the ultimate subjects of inhesion

for all real accidents, in the logical order it is only the individual

substance that is the ultimate subject of attribution for all logical

predicates. Hence it was that the individual substance (τόδε τί ὄν),

vindicating for itself more fully the rôle of subject, was called by

Aristotle οὐσία πρώτη, _substantia prima_, while he called the universal,

specific or generic substance, οὐσία δεύτερα, _substantia secunda_.(278)

These are, of course, two ways of regarding substance, and not two really

distinct species of substance as genus. The distinction between the

_membra dividentia_ is logical, not real.

The perfectly intelligible sense in which Aristotle and the

scholastics designate the universal a substance, the sense of

moderate realism, according to which the universal constitutes,

and is identical with, the essence of the individual “person” or

“thing,” is entirely different from the sense in which many

exponents of modern monistic idealism conceive the universal as

the substance _par excellence_, the _ens realissimum_,

determining, expressing, evolving itself in the individual

phenomena of mind and of nature, which would be merely its

manifestations.(279)

(_b_) The divisions of substance into spiritual and corporeal, of the

latter into inorganic and organic, of these again into vegetative and

animal, and finally of animal substances into brute animals and human

beings,—offer no special difficulties. All purely natural or rational

knowledge of the possibility and nature of purely spiritual substances is

based on the analogy of our knowledge of the human soul, which, though a

spiritual substance, is not a pure spirit, but is naturally allied with

matter in its mode of existence. The individual human being offers to

human experience the sole example of the sufficiently mysterious

conjunction and combination of matter and spirit, of the corporeal mode of

being and the spiritual mode of being, to form one composite substance,

partly corporeal and partly spiritual.

(_c_) This in turn suggests the division of substances into _simple_ and

_composite_. The latter are those which we understand to be constituted by

the natural and substantial union of two really distinct but incomplete

substantial principles, a formative, determining, specifying principle,

and a material, determinable, indifferent principle: such are all

corporeal substances whether inorganic, vegetative, sentient, or rational.

The former, or simple substances, are those which we understand to be

constituted by a sole and single substantial principle which determines

and specifies their essence, without the conjunction of any material,

determinable principle. We have no direct and immediate experience of any

_complete_ created substance of this kind; but each of us has such direct

experience of an _incomplete_ simple substance, _viz._ his own soul; while

we can infer from our experience the _existence_ of other incomplete

simple substances, _viz._ the formative principles of corporeal

substances, as also the _possibility_ of such complete simple substances

as pure spirits, and the actual _existence_ of the perfectly simple,

uncreated substance of the Infinite Being.

(_d_) If there are such things as composite substances, _i.e._ substances

constituted by the substantial union of two really distinct principles,

then it follows that while the composite substance itself is _complete_,

each of its substantial constitutive principles is _incomplete_. Of course

there are many philosophers nowadays who reject as mere mental fictions,

as products of mere logical distinctions, and as devoid of objective

validity, the notions of _composite_ substance and _incomplete_ substance.

Nor is this to be wondered at when we remember what a variety of

groundless and gratuitous notions are current in regard to substance

itself (64). But understanding substance in the traditional sense already

explained (62), there is nothing whatever inconsistent in the notion of a

composite substance, or of an incomplete substance,—provided these notions

are understood in the sense to be explained presently. Nay, more, not only

are these notions intrinsically possible: we must even hold them to be

objectively valid and real, to be truly expressive of the nature of

reality, unless we are prepared to hold that there is no such thing as

substantial change in the universe, and that man himself is a mere

_aggregate_ of material atoms moved according to mechanical laws and

inhabited by a conscious soul, or thinking principle, rather than an

individual being with one definite substantial nature.

What, then, are we to understand by complete and incomplete substances

respectively? A substance is regarded as complete in the fullest sense

when it is wanting in no _substantial_ principle without which it would be

incapable of _existing_ and discharging _all_ its functions in the actual

order as an individual of some definite species. Of course no created

substance exists or discharges its functions unless it is endowed with

some accidents, _e.g._ with properties, faculties, forces, etc. But there

is no question of these here. We are considering only the essential

perfections of the substance. Thus, then, any existing individual of any

species—a man, a horse, an oak—is a complete substance in this fullest

sense. It is complete _in the line of substance_, in _substantial_

perfection, “_in ordine substantialitatis_,” inasmuch as it can exist (and

does actually exist) without being conjoined or united substantially with

any other substance to form a composite substance other than itself. And

it is complete _in the line of specific perfection_, “_in ordine

speciei_,” because not only can it exist without such conjunction with any

other substantial principle, but it can discharge _all_ the functions

natural to its species, and thus tend towards its _final_ perfection (47)

without such conjunction.

But it is conceivable that a substance might be complete in the line of

substantial perfections, and thus be capable of _existing_ in the actual

order and discharging there _some_ of the functions of its species without

conjunction with any other substantial principle, and yet be incapable of

discharging _all_ the functions natural to an individual of its species

without conjunction with some other substantial principle, in which case

it would be _incomplete_ in the line of _specific_ perfection, though

complete in everything pertaining to its _substantiality_. We know of one

such substance,—the human soul. Being spiritual and immortal, it can exist

apart from the body to which it is united by nature, and in this separated

condition retain and exercise its spiritual faculties of intellect and

will; it is therefore complete as regards the distinctively substantial

perfection whereby it is “capable of existing in itself”. But being of its

nature destined for union with a material principle, constituting an

individual of the human species only by means of such union, and being

capable of discharging some of the functions of this species, _viz._ the

sentient and vegetative functions, only when so united, it has not _all_

the perfections of its species independently of the body; and it is

therefore an incomplete substance in the line of specific perfections,

though complete in those essential to its substantiality.

Again, if it be true that just as man is composed of two substantial

principles, soul and body, so every living thing is composed of a

substantial vital principle and a substantial material principle, and that

every inorganic individual thing is likewise composed of two really

distinct substantial principles, a formative and a passive or material

principle; and if, furthermore, it be true that apart from the spiritual

principle in man every other vital or formative principle of the composite

“things” of our experience is of such a nature that it cannot actually

exist except in union with some material principle, and _vice versa_,—then

it follows necessarily that all such substantial principles of these

complete composite substances are themselves _incomplete_ substances: and

incomplete not only in regard to perfections which would make them

subsisting individuals of a species, but (unlike the human soul)

incomplete even in the line of substantiality itself, inasmuch as no one

of them is capable of actually existing at all except in union with its

connatural and correlative principle.

Thus we arrive at the notion of substances that are _incomplete_ in the

line of specific perfections, or in that of substantial perfections, or

even in both lines. An incomplete substance, therefore, is not one which

verifies the definition of substance only in part. The incomplete

substance _fully_ verifies the definition of a substance.(280) It is

conjoined, no doubt, _with another_ to form a complete substance; but it

does not exist _in the other_, or in the composite substance, as accidents

do. It is _a substantial_ principle of the composite substance, not an

_accidental_ determination of the latter, or of the other substantial

principle with which it is conjoined. It thus verifies the notion of

substance as a mode of being which naturally exists in itself; and united

with its correlative substantial principle it discharges the function of

supporting all accidental determinations which affect the composite

substantial essence. Since, however, it does not exist itself

independently as an individual of a species, but only forms the complete

individual substance by union with its correlative substantial principle,

it may be, and has been, accurately described as not belonging to the

category of substance _formally_, but only _referentially_, “_reductivé_”.

The concepts of composite substance, of complete and incomplete

substances, understood as we have just explained them, are therefore

perfectly intelligible in themselves. And this is all we are concerned to

show in the present context. This is not the place to establish the theses

of psychology and cosmology from which they are borrowed. That the human

soul is spiritual and immortal; that its union with a really distinct

material principle to form the individual human substance or nature is a

substantial union; that all living organisms and all inorganic bodies are

really composite substances and subject to substantial change: these

various theses of scholastic philosophy we here assume to be true. And if

they are true the conception of incomplete substances naturally united to

form a complete composite substance is not only intelligible as an

hypothesis but is objectively true and valid as a thesis; and thus the

notion of an incomplete substance is not only a consistent and legitimate

notion, but is also a notion which gives mental expression to an objective

reality.

We may add this consideration: The concept of an accident really distinct

from its substance involves no intrinsic repugnance. Yet an accident is a

mode of being which is so weak and wanting in reality, if we may speak in

such terms, that it cannot naturally exist except by inhering, mediately

or immediately, in the stronger and more real mode of being which is

substance. But an incomplete substance is a higher grade of reality than

any accident. Therefore if accidents can be real, _a fortiori_ incomplete

substances can be real.

71. SUBSTANCE AND NATURE.—We have already pointed out (13) that the terms

“essence,” “substance,” and “nature” denote what is really the same thing,

regarded under different aspects. The term “essence” is somewhat wider

than “substance,” inasmuch as it means “what a thing is,” whether the

thing be a substance, an accident, or a concrete existing individual

including substance and accidents.

The traditional meaning of the term “nature” in Aristotelian and

scholastic philosophy is unmistakable. It means the essence or substance

of an individual person or thing, regarded as _the fundamental principle

of the latter’s activities_. Every finite individual comes into existence

incomplete, having no doubt its _essential_ perfections and properties

_actually_, but its _intermediate_ and _final_ perfections only

_potentially_ (47). These it realizes gradually, through the exercise of

its connatural activities. Every being is essentially intended for

activity of some sort: “Omne ens est propter suam operationem,” says St.

Thomas. And by the constant interplay of their activities these beings

realize and sustain the universal order which makes the world a _cosmos_.

There is in all things an immanent purpose or finality which enables us to

speak of the whole system which they form as “Universal _Nature_”.(281)

Therefore what we call a _substance_ or _essence_ from the _static_ point

of view we call a _nature_ when we consider it from the _dynamic_

standpoint, or as an agent.(282) No doubt the forces, faculties and

powers, the active and passive accidental principles, whereby such an

agent exerts and undergoes action, are the _proximate_ principles of all

this action and change, but the _remote_ and fundamental principle of the

latter is the essence or substance of the agent itself, in other words its

_nature_.

Not all modern scholastics, however, are willing thus to identify

nature with substance. We have no intuitive insight into what any

real essence or substance is; our knowledge of it is discursive,

derived by inference from the phenomena, the operations, the

conduct of things, in accordance with the principle, _Operari

sequitur esse_. Moreover, the actually existing, concrete

individual—a man, for instance—has a great variety of activities,

spiritual, sentient, vegetative, and inorganic; he has, moreover,

in the constitution of his body a variety of distinct organs and

members; he assimilates into his body a variety of inorganic

substances; the tissues of his body _appear_ to be different _in

kind_; the vital functions which subserve nutrition, growth and

reproduction are at least analogous to mechanical, physical and

chemical changes, if indeed they are not really and simply such;

it may be, therefore, that the _ultimate material_ constituents of

his body remain _substantially unaltered_ in their passage into,

and through, and out of the cycle of his vegetative life; that

they retain their elemental _substantial forms_ while they assume

a _new nature_ by becoming parts of the one organic whole, whose

higher directive principle dominates and co-ordinates all their

various energies.(283) If this be so there is in the same

individual a multiplicity of really and actually distinct

substances; each of these, moreover, has its own existence

proportionate to its essence, since the existence of a created

reality is not really distinct from its essence; nor is there any

reason for saying that any of these substances is incomplete; what

we have a right to say is that no one of them separately is a

complete _nature_, that each being an _incomplete nature_ unites

with all the others to form one _complete nature_: inasmuch as no

one of them separately is an adequate intrinsic principle of all

the functions which it can discharge, and is naturally destined to

discharge, by its natural union with the others, whereas there

results from their union a _new fundamental principle_ of a

co-ordinated and harmonized system of operations—in a word, a _new

nature_.

This line of thought implies among other things (_a_) the view

that whereas there is no ground for admitting the existence of

_incomplete substances_, there is ground for distinguishing

between _complete and incomplete natures_; (_b_) the view that

from the union or conjunction of an actual multiplicity of

substances, each remaining unaltered and persisting in its

existence actually distinct from the others, there _can_ arise one

single complete nature—a nature which will be _one being_ simply

and really, _unum ens per se et simpliciter_, and not merely an

aggregate of beings or an accidental unity, _unum per

accidens_,—and there _does_ arise such a nature whenever the

component substances not merely co-operate to discharge certain

functions which none of them could discharge separately (which

indeed is true of an accidental union, as of two horses drawing a

load which neither could draw by itself), but when they unite in a

more permanent and intimate way according to what we call “natural

laws” or “laws of nature,” so as to form a new fundamental

principle of such functions.(284) These views undoubtedly owe

their origin to the belief that certain facts brought to light by

the physical and biological sciences in modern times afford strong

evidence that the elementary material constituents of bodies,

whether inorganic or living, remain _substantially unaltered_

while combining to form the multitudinous _natural kinds_ or

_natures_ of those living or non-living material things. It was to

reconcile this supposed _plurality_ of _actually distinct_ and

_diverse_ substances in the individual with the indubitable _real

unity_ of the latter, that these philosophers distinguished

between substance and nature. But it is not clear that the facts

alleged afford any such evidence. Of course if the philosopher

approaches the consideration of it with what we may call the

atomic preconception of material substances as permanent,

unchangeable entities, this view will preclude all recognition of

_substantial_ change in the universe; it will therefore force him

to conclude that each individual, composite agent has a unity

which must be _less_ than substantial, and which, because he feels

it to be _more_ than a mere accidental or artificial unity, he

will describe as _natural_, as a union to form _one nature_. But

if he approach the evidence in question with the view that

substantial change is possible, this view, involving the

recognition of incomplete substances as real, will remove all

necessity for distinguishing between substance and nature, and

will enable him to conclude that however various and manifold be

the activities of the individual, their co-ordination and

unification, as proceeding from the individual, point to a

_substantial_ unity in the latter as their fundamental principle,

a unity resulting from the _union of incomplete substances_.

This latter is undoubtedly the view of St. Thomas, of practically

all the medieval scholastics, and of most scholastics in modern

times. Nor do we see any sufficient reason for receding from it,

or admitting the modern distinction between substance and nature.

And if it be objected that the view which admits the reality of

incomplete substances and substantial change is as much a

preconception as what we have called the atomic view of substance,

our answer is, once more, that since we have no intellectual

intuition into the real constitution of the substances which

constitute the universe, since we can argue to this only by

observing and reasoning from their activities on the principle

_Operari requitur esse_, the evidence alone must decide which view

of these substances is the correct one. Does the evidence afforded

us by a scientific analysis of all the functions, inorganic,

vegetative, sentient and rational, of an individual man, forbid us

to conclude that he is one complete substance, resulting from the

union of two incomplete substantial principles, a spiritual soul

and a material principle? and at the same time compel us to infer

that he is one complete nature resulting from the union of a

plurality of principles supposed to be complete as substances and

incomplete as natures? We believe that it does not; nor can we see

that any really useful purpose is served by thus setting up a real

distinction between substance and nature. From the evidence to

hand it is neither more nor less difficult to infer unity of

substance than unity of nature in the individual. The inference in

question is an inference from facts in the phenomenal order, in

the domain of the senses, to what must be actually there in the

noumenal order, in the domain of nature or substance, a domain

which cannot be reached by the senses but only by intellect. Nor

will any imagination images which picture for us the physical

fusion or coalescence of material things in the domain of the

senses help us in the least to conceive in any positive way the

mode in which incomplete natures or substances unite to form a

complete nature or substance. For these latter facts belong to the

domain which the senses cannot reach at all, and which intellect

can reach only inferentially and not by direct insight.

Hence we consider the view which regards real unity of nature as

compatible with real and actual plurality of complete substances

in the individual, as improbable. At the same time we do not

believe that this view is a necessary corollary from the real

identification of essence with existence in created things. We

have seen that even if accidents have their own existence in so

far as they have their own essence—as they have if essence and

existence be really identical—nevertheless the concrete substance

as determined by its accidents can have a really unitary

existence, _unum esse_ corresponding to and identical with its

composite constitution (67). Similarly, if the existence of each

incomplete substance is identical with its incomplete essence,

this is no obstacle to the complete substance—which results from

the union of two such incomplete substantial principles—having one

complete unitary existence identical with its composite essence.

Hence it is useless to argue against the view that a plurality of

actually distinct and complete substances can unite to form a

complete nature which will be really _one being_, on the ground

that each complete substance has already its own existence and

that things which have and preserve their own existence cannot

form _one being_. Such an argument is inconclusive; for although

_one being_ has of course only one existence, it has not been

proved that this one existence cannot result from the union of

many incomplete existences: especially if these existences be

identical with the incomplete essences which are admittedly

capable of uniting to form one complete essence.

It may, however, be reasonably urged against the opinion under

criticism that, since the complete substances are supposed to

remain complete and unchanged in their state of combination, it is

difficult to see how this combination can be a real union and not

merely an extrinsic juxtaposition,—one which remains in reality a

merely accidental conjunction, even though we may dignify it with

the title of a “natural union”.

And finally it may be pointed out that in this view the operations

of the individual have not really _one ultimate_ intrinsic

principle at all, since behind the supposed unity of nature there

is a more fundamental plurality of actually distinct substances.

72. SUBSISTENCE AND PERSONALITY.—We have already examined the relation

between the individual and the universal, between _first_ and _second_

substances, in connexion with the doctrine of Individuation (31-3). And we

then saw that whatever it be that individuates the universal nature, it is

at all events not to be regarded as anything extrinsic and superadded to

this nature in the individual, as anything really distinct from this

nature: that, for instance, what makes Plato’s human nature to be Plato’s

is not anything really distinct from the human nature that is in Plato. We

have now to fix our attention on the nature as individualized. We have to

consider the complete individual nature or substance itself in actually

existing individual “things” or “persons”.

We must remember that scholastics are not agreed as to whether there is a

real distinction or only a virtual distinction between the actual

existence and the complete individual essence or substance or nature of

created individual beings (21-4). Furthermore we have seen that

philosophers who study the metaphysics of the inorganic world and of the

lower forms of life are unable to say with certainty what is the

individual in these domains: whether it is the chemical molecule or the

chemical atom or the electron; whether it is the single living cell or the

living mass consisting of a plurality of such cells (31). But we have also

seen that as we ascend the scale of living things all difficulty in

designating the genuine individual disappears: that a man, a horse, an oak

tree, are undoubtedly individual beings.

Bearing these things in mind we have now to inquire into what has been

called the _subsistence_ or _personality_ of the complete individual

substance or nature: that perfection which enables us formally to

designate the latter a “subsisting thing”(285) or a “person”. By

personality we mean the subsistence of a complete individual _rational_

nature. We shall therefore inquire into the meaning of the generic term

_subsistentia_ (or _suppositalitas_), _subsistence_, in the abstract. But

let us look at it first in the concrete.

A complete individual nature or substance, when it exists in the actual

order, really distinct and separate in its own complete entity from every

other existing being, exercising its powers and discharging its functions

of its own right and according to the laws of its own being, is said to

_subsist_, or to have the perfection of _subsistence_. In this state it

not only _exists in itself_ as every substance does; it is not only

_incommunicable_ to any other being as every individual is, in

contradistinction with _second_ or _universal_ substances which are, as

such, indefinitely communicable to individuals; but it is also a complete

whole, incommunicable _as a mere integral or essential part_ to some other

whole, unlike the incomplete substantial constituents, or integral parts,

members or organs of, say, an individual organic body; and finally it is

incommunicable in the sense that it is not capable of being assumed into

the subsisting unity of some other superior “suppositum” or “person”. All

those characteristics we find in the individual “subsisting thing” or

“person”. It “exists in itself” and is not communicable to another

substance _as an accident_, because it is itself a substance. It is not

communicable _to individuals as a universal_, because it is itself an

individual. It is not communicable _as an integral or essential part to a

whole_, because it is itself a complete substance and nature.(286) Finally

it is not communicable to, and cannot be assumed into, the unity of a

higher personality so as to subsist by virtue of the latter’s subsistence,

because it has a perfection incompatible with such assumption, _viz._ its

own proper subsistence, whereby it is already an actually subsisting thing

or person in its own right, or _sui juris_, so to speak.

The mention of this last sort of incommunicability would be

superfluous, and indeed unintelligible, did we not know from

Divine Revelation that the human nature of our Divine Lord and

Saviour, Jesus Christ, though it is a complete and most perfect

individual nature, is nevertheless _not a person_, because It is

assumed into the Personality of the Second Person of the Divine

Trinity, and, united hypostatically or personally with this Divine

Person, subsists by virtue of the Divine Subsistence of the

latter.

We see, therefore, what subsistence does for a complete individual nature

in the _static_ order. It makes this nature _sui juris_, incommunicable,

and entirely independent in the mode of its actual being: leaving

untouched, of course, the essential dependence of the created “subsisting

thing” or “person” on the Creator. In the _dynamic_ order, the order of

activity and development, subsistence makes the complete individual nature

not only the ultimate principle _by which_ all the functions of the

individual are discharged, but also the ultimate principle or agent

_which_ exercises these functions: while the nature _as such_ is the

ultimate _principium_ QUO, the nature _as subsisting_ is the ultimate

_principium_ QUOD, in regard to all actions emanating from this nature.

Hence the scholastic aphorism: _Actiones sunt suppositorum_. That is, all

actions emanating from a complete individual nature are always ascribed

and attributed to the latter _as subsisting_, to the “subsisting thing” or

“person”. In regard to an individual human person, for instance, whether

his intellect thinks, or his will resolves, or his imagination pictures

things, or his eyes see, or his hand writes, or his stomach digests, or

his lungs breathe, or his head aches, it is the _man_, the _person_,

properly, that discharges or suffers all these functions, though by means

of different faculties, organs and members; and it is to him properly that

we ascribe all of them.(287)

Now the individual human person is neither his soul, nor his body, nor

even both conceived as two; he is _one_ being, one complete substance or

nature composed partly of a spiritual principle or soul and partly of a

material principle which the soul “informs” and so constitutes a living

human body. Hence the human soul itself, whether we consider it as united

to the material principle in the living human person, or as disembodied

and separate from its connatural material principle, is not a complete

substance, is not capable of _subsisting_ and having its human activities

referred ultimately to itself as the subsisting, personal principle which

elicits these activities. No doubt the disembodied soul has actual

_existence_, but it has not the perfection of _subsistence_ or

_personality_: it is not a complete individual of the human species to

which it belongs, and therefore it cannot be properly called a human

person, a complete subsisting individual of the human species.(288)

Furthermore, even though an individual nature be complete as a

nature, endowed with all the substantial and specific perfections

which constitute it a complete individual of the species to which

it belongs, nevertheless if it is assumed into the personality of

another and higher nature, and subsists in personal union with the

latter and by virtue of the latter’s subsistence, then that

nature, not having its own proper and connatural subsistence, is

not itself a person. Nor can the actions which are elicited by

means of it be ascribed ultimately to it; they must be ascribed to

the person by whose subsistence it subsists and into whose

personality it has been assumed. If an individual human nature be

thus hypostatically or personally assumed into, and united with, a

higher Divine Personality, and subsists only by this Personality,

such a human nature will be really and truly an individual nature

of the human species; the actions elicited through it and

performed by means of it will be really and truly human actions;

but it will not be a human person; while its actions will be

really and truly the actions of the Divine Person, and will

therefore be also really and truly divine: they will be the

actions of the God-Man, divine and human, _theandric_. All this we

know only from Divine Revelation concerning the hypostatic union

of the human nature of Christ with the Person of the Divine Word;

nor could we know it otherwise. But all this does not modify, it

only supplements and completes, what the light of reason discloses

to us regarding the subsistence or personality of any complete

individual nature.

We are now in a position to give nominal definitions of subsistence and

personality both in the abstract and in the concrete, _i.e._ definitions

which will indicate to us what exactly it is that these terms denote,(289)

and which will thus enable us to inquire into their connotation, or in

other words to ask what is it precisely that constitutes subsistence or

personality.

By “_subsistence_” (“_subsistentia_,” “_suppositalitas_”) we mean that

perfection whereby a fully complete individual nature is rendered in every

way, in its being and in its actions, distinct from and incommunicable to

any and every other being, so that it exists and acts _sui juris_,

autonomously, independently of every other being save the Creator.(290)

By a “_subsisting being_” in the concrete (ὑπόστασις, “_suppositum_,”

_hypostasis_), we mean a being endowed with this perfection of

subsistence; in other words, a being that is a complete individual nature

existing and acting in every way distinct from and incommunicable to any

other being, so that it exists and acts _sui juris_, autonomously.

“_Personality_” is simply the subsistence of a complete individual nature

that is _rational_, _intelligent_.

A “_person_” is simply a _subsisting_ nature that is _rational_,

_intelligent_: _Persona est suppositum rationale_. The definition given by

Boëtius is classic: “_Persona est substantia individua_ RATIONALIS

_naturae_”: “the individual substance of a rational nature,”—where the

term _individual_ is understood to imply _actually existing and

subsisting_.

The special name which has thus been traditionally applied to _rational_

or _intelligent_ subsisting beings (as distinct from animals, plants, and

material “things”)—the term “person” (“_persona_,” a mask: _per-sonus_;

_cf._ Gr. προσωπέιον, from προσώπον, the face, countenance)—originally

meaning a rôle or character in a drama, came to be applied to the

subsisting human individual, and to connote a certain dignity of the

latter as compared with the lower or non-rational beings of the universe.

And in fact the ascription of its actions to the subsisting being is more

deeply grounded in the subsistence of rational, intelligent beings, who,

as free agents, can more properly direct and control these actions.(291)

73. DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE INDIVIDUAL NATURE AND ITS SUBSISTENCE. WHAT

CONSTITUTES PERSONALITY?—Knowing now what we mean by the terms

“subsistence,” “suppositum,” “person,” and “personality,” we have next to

inquire in what precisely does subsistence consist. What is it that

constitutes a complete individual nature a “subsisting being,” or if the

nature be rational, a “person”? Subsistence connotes, over and above the

mode of “existing in itself” which characterizes all substance, the notion

that the substance or nature is individual, that it is complete, that it

is in every way incommunicable, that it is _sui juris_ or autonomous in

its existence and activities. These notions are all positive; they imply

positive perfections: even incommunicability is really a positive

perfection though the term is negative. But is any one of the positive

perfections, thus contained in the notion of subsistence, a positive

something _over and above_, and _really distinct from_, the perfection

already implied in the concept of _a complete individual nature as such_?

Some of those philosophers who regard the distinction between essence and

existence in creatures as a real distinction, identify the _subsistence_

of the complete individual nature with its _actual existence_, thus

placing a real distinction between nature and subsistence or

personality.(292) Apart from these, however, it is not likely that any

philosophers, guided by the light of reason alone, would ever have held,

or even suspected, that the subsistence of an actually existing individual

nature is a positive perfection really distinct from, and superadded to,

the latter. For we never, in our natural experience, encounter an existing

individual substance, or nature, or agent, that is not distinct,

autonomous, independent, _sui juris_, and incommunicable in its mode of

being and acting.

Rigorously, however, this would only prove that subsistence is a

perfection _naturally inseparable_ from the complete individual

nature; _conceivably_ it _might_ still be _really_ distinct from

the latter. But whether or not such real distinction could be

suspected by the unaided light of reason working on natural

experience, at all events what we know from Divine Revelation

concerning the hypostatic union of the human nature of our Lord

Jesus Christ with the Person of the Divine Word, enables us to

realize that there _can_ be, in the actual order of things, a

complete individual nature which is not a “subsisting being” or

“person”; for the human nature of our Lord is _de facto_ such a

nature,—and _ab actu ad posse valet consecutio_. This information,

however, is not decisive in determining the character of the

distinction between the individual substance or nature and its

subsistence.

It may be that the complete individual nature is _eo ipso_ and identically

a “subsisting being” or “person,” that it is always independent,

autonomous, _sui juris_, by the very fact that it is a complete individual

nature, _unless it is_ DE FACTO _assumed into the personality of a higher

nature_, so that in this intercommunication with the latter, in the unity

of the latter’s personality, it is not independent, autonomous, _sui

juris_, but dependent, subordinate, and _alterius juris_. In this

condition, it loses nothing positive by the fact that it is not now a

person and has not its own subsistence; nor does it gain any _natural_

perfection, for it was _ex hypothesi_ complete and perfect _as a nature_;

but it gains something _supernatural_ inasmuch as it now subsists in a

manner wholly undue to it.(293) According to this view, therefore,

subsistence would not be a perfection really distinct from the complete

individual nature; it would be a mentally distinct aspect of the latter, a

positive aspect, however, consisting in this nature’s completeness, its

self-sufficing, autonomous character, and consequent

incommunicability.(294)

The principal difficulty against this view is a theological

difficulty. As formulated by Urraburu,(295) it appears to involve

an ambiguity in the expression “substantial union”. It is briefly

this: If the subsistence proper to a complete individual nature

adds no positive perfection to the latter, so that the latter

necessarily subsists and is a person unless it is actually assumed

into a higher personality, and by the very fact that it is not

actually so assumed, then the human nature of Christ “is as

complete in every way and in every line of substantial perfection,

by virtue of its own proper entity, when actually united with the

Divine Person, as it would be were it not so united, or as the

person of Peter, or Paul, or any other human person is”. But this

implies that there are in Christ “two substances complete in every

respect”. Now between two such substances “there cannot be a

substantial union,” a union which would constitute “one being,”

“unum per se ens”. Hence the view in question would appear to be

inadmissible.

But it is not proved that the union of “two substances complete in

every respect” cannot result in the constitution of a being that

is really and genuinely one—“unum per se ens”—_in the case in

which the union is a personal union_. The hypostatic union of the

human nature of Christ with the Divine Person is primarily a

_personal_ union whereby the former nature subsists by and in the

Divine Personality. It has the effect of constituting the united

terms “one subsisting being,” and therefore has supereminently, if

not formally, the effect of a “substantial union”. Nay, it is a

“substantial” union in the sense that it is a union of two

substances, not of a substance and accidents; and also in the

sense that it is not a mere accidental aggregation or artificial

juxtaposition of substances, resulting merely in the constitution

of collective or artificial unity, a _unum per accidens_. But is

it a “substantial” union in the sense that it is such a union of

substances as results in one “nature”? Most certainly not; for

this was the heresy of the Monophysites: that in Christ there is

only one nature resulting from the union of the human nature with

the Divine. If then, with Urraburu, we mean by “nature” simply

“substance regarded as a principle of action” (71), and if,

furthermore, the hypostatic union does not result in one “nature,”

neither does it result in one “substance,” nor can it be a

“substantial” or “natural” union in this sense.(296) He does not

say, of course, that the hypostatic union is a “substantial union”

which results in “one nature,” or even explicitly that it results

in “one substance,” but he says that the two substances are

“substantially conjoined,” “substantialiter conjunguntur”; and he

continues, “a substantial union is such a conjunction of two

substantial realities that there results from it one substantial

something, which is truly and properly one”—“unio enim

substantialis, est talis duarum rerum substantialium conjunctio,

per quam resultat unum aliquid substantiale quod vere et proprie

sit unum,”(297)—and he concludes that “there is something

substantial wanting in the human nature of Christ, _viz._

personality, which, of course, is most abundantly supplied in the

hypostatic union by the Divine Person”—“reliquum est, ut naturae

humanae in Christo aliquid desit substantiale, nempe personalitas,

quod per unionem hypostaticam cumulatissime suppleatur a

Verbo.”(298) Now, this “aliquid substantiale” cannot be “aliquid

naturale” in the sense that it is something _constitutive_ of the

human substance or nature; for the human substance or nature of

Christ is certainly complete and perfect as a substance or nature.

It must be some complement or mode, that is naturally due to it,

but supernaturally supplied by the Person of the Divine Word.(299)

This brings us to the view that subsistence is a something

positive, distinct in some real way, and not merely in our

concepts, from the complete individual substance.

According to the more common view of catholic philosophers (and

theologians) subsistence is some positive perfection really distinct from

the complete individual nature. But the supporters of this general view

explain it in different ways. We have already referred to the view of

certain Thomists who, identifying _subsistence_ with the _actual

existence_ of the complete substance or nature, place a real distinction

between the existence and the substance or nature. Other Thomists, while

defending the latter distinction, point out that actual existence confers

no real perfection, but only actualizes the real; they hold, therefore,

that subsistence is not existence, but is rather a perfection of the real,

essential, or substantial order, as distinct from the existential order—a

perfection presupposed by actual existence, and whose proper function is

to _unify_ all the substantial constituents and accidental determinations

of the individual substance or nature, thus making it a really unitary

being—“unum ens per se”—proximately capable of being actualized by the

simple existential act: which latter is the ultimate actuality of the real

being: _esse est ultimus actus_.(300)

The concrete individual nature, containing as it does a plurality of

really distinct principles, substantial and accidental, needs some

unifying principle to make these one incommunicable reality, proximately

capable of receiving a corresponding unitary existential act: without such

a principle, they say, each of the substantial and accidental principles

in the concrete individual nature would have its own existence: so that

the result would be not _really_ one being, but a being really _manifold_

and only accidentally one—“unum per accidens”. This principle is

_subsistence_.

The human nature of our Divine Lord has not its own connatural

subsistence; this is supplied by the subsistence of the Divine

Person. Moreover, since the human nature in question has not its

own subsistence, neither has it its own existence; existence is

the actuality of the subsisting being; therefore there is in

Christ but one existence, that of the Divine Person, whereby also

the human nature of Christ exists.(301)

Of those who deny that the distinction between the existence and the

essence of any created nature is a real distinction, some hold in the

present matter the Scotist view that subsistence is not a positive

perfection really distinct from the complete individual nature. Others,

however, hold what we have ventured to regard as the more common view:

that personality is something positive and really distinct from nature.

But they explain what they conceive subsistence to be without any

reference to existence, and without distinguishing between the essential

and the existential order of reality.

The most common explanation seems to be that subsistence is a unifying

principle of the concrete individual nature, as stated above. Thus

conceived, it is not an _absolute_ reality; nor is the distinction between

it and the nature a _major_ real distinction. It is a _substantial mode_

(68), naturally superadded to the substance and modally distinct from the

latter. It so completes and determines the substance or nature that the

latter not only exists in itself but is also, by virtue of this mode,

incommunicable in every way and _sui juris_.(302) It gives to the

substance that ultimate determinateness which an accidental mode such as a

definite shape or location gives to the accident of quantity.(303)

This mode is absent (supernaturally) from the human nature of our

Divine Lord; this nature is therefore communicable; and the

Personality of the Divine Word supernaturally supplies the

function of this absent natural mode.

It must be confessed that it is not easy to understand how this or any

other _substantial_ mode can be _really_ distinct from the substance it

modifies. And in truth the distinction is not real in the full sense: it

is not between _thing_ and _thing_, _inter rem et rem_. All that is

claimed for it is that it is not merely mental; that it is not merely an

_ens rationis_ which the mind projects into the reality; that it is a

positive perfection of the nature or substance, a perfection which, though

naturally inseparable from the latter, is not absolutely inseparable, and

which, therefore, is _de facto_ supernaturally absent from the human

nature and replaced by the Divine Personality in the case of the

hypostatic union.

It belongs, moreover, to the order of substance, not to that of accidents:

the substantial mode differs from the accidental mode, or modal accident,

in this, that it gives to the substance some ultimate determining

perfection which appertains to the substance as such, and whereby the

substance is completed in the order of “existing in itself”. Subsistence

is not an accident, even though it supervenes on the complete nature, for

it determines the substance of the latter, not in relation to any line of

accidental activity, as a power or faculty, nor as something modifying it

accidentally, but as a mode which ultimately determines and perfects it in

the order of substantial reality itself, in the order of “existing in

itself” in such a full and perfect manner as to be _sui juris_ and

incommunicable.

The main difficulty against this view is also theological: If

subsistence is a positive perfection it either belongs to the

complete individual nature or it does not; in the former case the

humanity of Christ, assumed by the Divine Word, was not a complete

human nature; in the latter case the individual human nature can

exist without it: and both consequences are equally inadmissable.

But it may be replied that, granting the first member of the

disjunctive, the consequence inferred from it does not really

follow: subsistence belongs to the complete individual nature as

an ultimate natural complement; but when it is absent and supplied

supernaturally by the Divine Personality the nature is still

complete as a nature: it is wanting in no absolute or entitative

perfection, but only in a modality which is supereminently

supplied by the Divine Personality. Neither is the consequence

from the second member of the disjunctive a valid inference. For

though personality as a mode does not belong to the essence of an

individual human nature, no such individual nature can exist

without _some_ personality, either its own or another: just as

extension cannot exist without _some_ shape, though any particular

shape is not essential to it.

To sum up, then, the doctrine of the two preceding sections: What are we

to understand by a _person_, and by _personality_? Unquestionably our

conception of person and personality (concrete and abstract) is mainly

determined, and very rightly so, by an analysis of what constitutes the

actually existing individual of the human species. Whatever our concept

be, it must certainly be realized and verified in all human individuals:

these, before all other beings, must be included in the denotation of our

concept of person. In fact, for the philosopher, guided by the natural

light of reason alone, the term can have hardly any other connotation. He

will, no doubt, ascribe personality, as the highest mode of being he knows

of, to the Supreme Being; but he will here ascribe it only in an

analogical and supereminent way; and only from Divine Revelation can he

know that this Supreme Being has not a single but a threefold Personality.

Again, his consideration of the nature of the human soul as an embodied

substance which is nevertheless spiritual and immortal will enable him to

affirm the possibility of _purely spiritual_ created beings; and these he

will of course conceive as persons. But, conceiving the human soul itself

as a constituent principle of the human individual, he will not conceive

the soul itself as a person.

The philosopher who understands the traditional Aristotelian conceptions

of substance, of individual substance (_substantia prima_), of incomplete,

complete, and composite substances, of substance considered as _nature_ or

principle of action, of substance considered as _hypostasis_, as the

actually existing individual being which is the ultimate logical subject

of all predications and the ultimate ontological subject of all real

determinations: the philosopher who understands these concepts, and who

admits them to be validly grounded in experience, and to offer as far as

they go a correct interpretation of reality, will have no difficulty in

making up his mind about what is requisite to constitute a person.

Wherever he finds an existing individual being of any species, a being

which, even if it is really composite, is nevertheless really one, such a

being he will pronounce to be a “subsisting individual being”. He may not

be able, in the inorganic world or among the lower forms of life, to

distinguish for certain what is the real individual from what may be

perhaps only an accidental, if natural, colony or group of real

individuals. As a test he will always seek for the manifestation of an

internal directive principle whereby all the vital functions of the

organized mass of matter in question are co-ordinated in such a manner as

to make for the preservation, growth and development of the whole

throughout a definite life cycle from birth to death. This formative and

directive principle is evidence of an individual unity of nature and

subsistence; and such evidence is abundantly present in “individuals” of

all the higher species in botany and zoology. The “individual subsisting

being” will therefore be a “complete individual substance or nature,

existing and acting in every way distinct from and incommunicable to any

other being, so that it exists and acts _sui juris_, autonomously”.

If such an individual nature is not merely corporeal but organic or

animate, not merely animate but sentient, and not merely sentient but

_rational_ or _intelligent_, _i.e._ constituted at least in part by a

_spiritual substantial principle_ whereby the individual is _intelligent_

and _free_, then that individual is a person. Every individual of the

human species is such. And all that is essential to his complete

individual human nature enters into and constitutes his person in the

concrete. Not merely, therefore, his intellect and will; not merely his

soul considered as “mind,” _i.e._ as the basis and principle of his whole

conscious and subconscious psychic life; or also as the principle of his

merely organic life; or also as the actualizing principle of his corporeal

nature; but no less also the corporeal principle itself of his composite

being, the body itself with all its parts and members and organs: all

these without exception belong equally to the human person; all of them

without exception go to constitute the _Ego_.(304) This, which is the

Aristotelian and scholastic view of the human person, is in perfect accord

with the common-sense view of the matter as evidenced by the ordinary

usages of language. We speak intelligibly no less than correctly when we

say that a man’s body is part of his person as well as his soul or mind.

And we make a no less accurate, intelligible, and necessary distinction,

when we distinguish between all that which _constitutes_ the human person

and that _whereby we know_ ourselves and other human individuals to be

persons. Yet this distinction is not kept clearly in mind by many modern

philosophers, who, approaching the study of personality exclusively from

the side of what the individual consciousness testifies as to the unity

and continuity (or otherwise) of mental life in the individual, are

scandalized at the assertion that the human body can have anything to do

with human personality.

74. CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE PERSONAL SELF.—In order to form the concept of

person, and to find that concept verified in the data of our experience,

it is absolutely essential that we be endowed with the _faculty of

intelligence_, the spiritual power of forming abstract concepts; and

secondly, that having formed the concept of person as a “rational or

intelligent subsisting being,” we be capable, by the exercise of _reflex

consciousness_, to find in our own mental life the data from which we can

conclude that this concept of person is verified in each and every one of

ourselves. It is because we are endowed with intelligence that we can form

all the abstract notions—of substance, individual, subsistence, existence,

etc.,—which enter into and constitute our concept of person. And it is

because we can, by means of this faculty, reflect on our own mental

operations, and infer from them that each of us is a complete individual

rational nature subsisting independently and incommunicably, that we can

know ourselves to be persons.

How the human individual forms these concepts and finds them verified in

his own “self,” how he gradually comes into conscious possession of the

knowledge of his own individual being as an _Ego_, self, or person, are

problems for Psychology.(305) It will be sufficient here to point out that

there are grounds for distinguishing between the individual’s implicit

subjective awareness of his subsistence or “selfhood”—an awareness which

accompanies all his conscious mental functions, and which becomes more

explicit and definite as the power of introspection and reflex

consciousness develops—and the “_abstract quasi-objective notion_ of his

own _personality_ habitually possessed by every human being”.(306)

The individual human being _immediately_ apprehends his own existence, and

his abiding unity or sameness throughout incessantly changing states, in

the temporal series of his conscious activities; but his knowledge of the

_nature_ of his own being can be the result only of a long and carefully

conducted analysis of his own activities, and of inferences based on the

character of these activities. The former or implicit knowledge of the

self in the concrete is direct and intuitive. The individual _Ego_

apprehends _itself_ in _its states_. This knowledge comes mainly from

within, and is subject to gradual development. Father Maher thus describes

how the child comes gradually into possession of it:—

As thoughts of pleasures and pains repeated in the past and

expected in the future grow more distinct, the dissimilarity

between these and the permanent abiding self comes to be more

fully realized. Passing emotions of fear, anger, vanity, pride, or

sympathy, accentuate the difference. But most probably it is the

dawning sense of power to resist and overcome rising impulse, and

the dim nascent consciousness of responsibility, which lead up to

the final revelation, until at last, in some reflective act of

memory or choice, or in some vague effort to understand the

oft-heard “I,” the great truth is manifested to him: the child

enters, as it were, into possession of his personality, and knows

himself as a _Self-conscious Being_. The _Ego_ does not _create_

but _discovers_ itself. In Jouffroy’s felicitous phrase, it

“breaks its shell,” and finds that it is _a Personal Agent with an

existence and individuality of its own_, standing henceforward

alone in opposition to the universe.(307)

After this stage is reached, the human individual easily distinguishes

between the “self” as the _cause_ or _subject_ of the states, and the

states as _modifications_ of the self. This distinction is implicit in the

concomitant awareness of self which accompanies all exercise of direct

cognitive consciousness. It is explicit in all deliberate acts of reflex,

introspective self-consciousness. The data from which we form the abstract

concepts of substance, nature, individual, person, self, etc., and from

which we arrive by reasoning at a philosophical knowledge of the nature

and personality of the human individual, are furnished mainly by

introspection; but also in part by external observation of the universe

around us.

Concomitantly, however, with the process by which we become implicitly but

immediately aware of the _Ego_ or self as an abiding self-identical person

in and through our own mental activity, we gradually form a

quasi-objective and historical view of our own personality as one of a

number of similar personalities around us in the universe. This view, says

Father Maher,

gathers into itself the history of my past life—the actions of my

childhood, boyhood, youth, and later years. Interwoven with them

all is the image of my bodily organism, and clustering around are

a fringe of recollections of my dispositions, habits, and

character, of my hopes and regrets, of my resolutions and

failures, along with a dim consciousness of my position in the

minds of other selves.

Under the form of a representation of this composite art, bound

together by the thread of memory, each of us ordinarily conceives

his complete abiding _personality_. This idea is necessarily

undergoing constant modification; and it is in comparing the

present form of the representation with the past, whilst adverting

to considerable alterations in my character, bodily appearance,

and the like, that I sometimes say: “I am completely changed,” “I

am quite another person,” though I am, of course, convinced that

it is the same “I” who am changed in accidental qualities. _It is

because this complex notion of my personality is an abstraction

from my remembered experiences __ that a perversion of imagination

and a rupture of memory can sometimes induce the so-called

_“illusions or alterations of personality”_._(308)

When we remember that this objective conception of the self is so

dependent on the function of memory, and that the normal exercise of this

faculty is in turn so dependent on the normal functioning of the brain and

the nervous system,(309) we can hazard an intelligible explanation of the

abnormal facts recorded by most modern psychologists concerning hypnotism,

somnambulism and “double” or “multiple” consciousness.(310) Father Maher,

ascribing these phenomena partly to dislocations of memory, partly to

unusual groupings of mental states according to the laws of mental

association—groupings that arise from peculiar physiological connexions

between the various neural functionings of the brain centres,—and partly

to semi-conscious or reflex nerve processes, emphasizes an important fact

that is sometimes lost sight of: the fact that some section at least of

the individual’s conscious mental life is common to, and present

throughout, the two or more “states” or “conditions” between which any

such abnormal individual is found to alternate. This consideration is

itself sufficient to disprove the theory—to which we shall presently

refer—that there is or may be in the individual human being a double, or

even a multiple “human personality”.

75. FALSE THEORIES OF PERSONALITY.—It is plain that conscious _mental

activity_ cannot _constitute_ human personality, or subconscious mental

activity either, for all activity is of the accidental mode of being, is

an _accident_, whereas a person must be a _substance_. Of course it is the

self-conscious cognitive activity of the human individual that _reveals_

to the latter his own self as a person: it is the exercise of reflex

consciousness combined with memory that gives us the feeling of personal

identity with ourselves throughout the changing events of our mental and

bodily life. Furthermore, this self-consciousness has its root in the

_rational_ nature of the human individual; and rationality of nature is

the differentiating principle which makes the subsisting individual a

“person” as distinct from a (subsisting) “thing”. But then, it is not the

feeling of personal identity that _constitutes_ the person. Actual

consciousness is neither the essence, nor the source, nor even the index

of personality; for it is only an activity, and an activity which reveals

immediately not the _person_ as such, but the _nature_ as rational;(311)

nor does the rational (substantial) principle of a composite nature

constitute the latter a person; but only the subsistence of the complete

(composite) individual nature itself.

These considerations are sufficiently obvious; they presuppose, however,

the truth of the traditional doctrine already explained in regard to the

existence, nature and cognoscibility of _substance_. Philosophers who have

misunderstood and rejected and lost this traditional doctrine of substance

have propounded many varieties of unsatisfactory and inconsistent theories

in regard to what constitutes “person” and “personality”. The main feature

of all such theories is their identification of personality with the

habitual consciousness of self, or habitual feeling of personal identity:

a feeling which, however, must be admitted to include _memory_ in some

form, while the function of memory in any shape or form cannot be

satisfactorily explained on any theory of the human _Ego_ which denies

that there is a human _substance_ persisting permanently as a unifying

principle of successive mental states (63-4).

So far as English philosophy is concerned such theories appear to have had

their origin in Locke’s teaching on person and personal identity.

Discussing the notions of identity and diversity,(312) he distinguishes

between the identity of an individual substance with itself in its

duration throughout time, and what he terms personal identity; while by

identity in general he means not abstract identity but the concrete

permanence of a thing throughout time (34). On this we have to call

attention to the fact that just as _duration_ is not essential to the

_constitution_ of a substance, so neither is it essential to the

constitution of a complete subsisting individual substance or person (64);

though it is, of course, an essential condition for all human apprehension

whether of substance or of person. Locke was wrong, therefore, in

confounding what reveals to us the abiding permanence, identity or

sameness of a subsisting thing or person (whether the “self” or any other

subsisting thing or person) throughout its duration in time, with what

constitutes the subsisting thing or person.

Furthermore, his distinction between substantial identity, _i.e._ the

sameness of an individual substance with itself throughout time, and

personal identity or sameness, was also an error. For as long as there is

_substantial_ unity, continuity, or identity of the subsisting individual

substance, so long is there unity, continuity, or identity of its

subsistence, or of its personality if it be a rational substance. The

_subsistence_ of a complete individual inorganic substance is changed as

soon as the individual undergoes _substantial_ change: we have them no

longer _the same_ subsisting individual being. So, too, the subsistence of

the organic individual is changed as soon as the latter undergoes

_substantial_ change by the dissolution of life, by the separation of its

formative and vital substantial principle from its material substantial

principle: after such dissolution we have no longer _the same_ subsisting

plant or animal. And, finally, the subsistence of an individual man is

changed, or interrupted, or ceases by death, which separates his soul, his

vital principle, from his body. We say, moreover, that in the latter case

the human _person_ ceases to exist when the identity or permanence of his

subsisting substance or nature terminates at death; for _personal

identity_ we hold to be the identity of the complete subsisting substance

or nature with itself. But Locke, who practically agrees with what we have

said regarding the abiding identity of the subsisting individual being

with itself—whether this individual be an inorganic individual, a plant, a

brute beast, or a man(313)—distinguishes at this point between identity of

the subsisting individual substance and _personal_ identity.

Of identity in general he says that “to conceive and judge of it aright,

we must consider what idea the word it is applied to stands for; it being

one thing to be the same substance, another the same man, and a third the

same person, if person, man, and substance, are three names standing for

three different ideas”.(314) And, struggling to dissociate “person” from

“substance,” he continues thus:—

To find wherein personal identity consists, we must consider what

person stands for; which, I think, is a thinking, intelligent

being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as

itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places;

which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from

thinking, and, as it seems to me, essential to it. When we see,

hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will any thing, we know

that we do so. Thus it is always as to our present sensations and

perceptions, and by this every one is to himself what he calls

self; it not being considered in this case whether the same self

be continued in the same or divers substances. For since

consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that which

makes every one to be what he calls self, and thereby

distinguishes himself from all other thinking things; in this

alone consists personal identity, _i.e._ the sameness of a

rational being: and as far as this consciousness can be extended

backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the

identity of that person; it is the same self now it was then; and

it is by the same self with this present one that now reflects on

it, that that action was done.(315)

The definition of person in this passage as “a thinking, intelligent

being,” etc., is not far removed from our own definition; but surely

conscious thought is not “that which _makes_ every one to be what he calls

self,” seeing that conscious thought is only an _activity_ or _function_

of the “rational being”. It is conscious thought, of course, including

memory, that _reveals_ the “rational being” to himself as a self, and as

the same or identical self throughout time; but unless the “rational

being,” or the “thinking, intelligent being, that has reason and

reflection,” etc.—which is Locke’s own definition of “person”—were there

all the time identical with itself, exercising those distinct and

successive acts of consciousness and memory, and unifying them, how could

these acts _even reveal_ the “person” or his “personal identity” to

himself, not to speak of their _constituting_ personality or personal

identity? It is perfectly plain that these acts _presuppose_ the “person,”

the “thinking, intelligent being,” or, as we have expressed it, the

“subsisting, rational, individual nature” _already constituted_; and it is

equally plain that the “personal identity” which they _reveal_ is

_constituted by_, and _consists simply in_, the duration or continued

existence of this same subsisting individual rational nature; nor could

these acts reveal any identity, personal or otherwise, unless they were

the acts of one and the same actually subsisting, existing and persisting

substance.

Yet Locke thinks he can divorce personal identity from identity of

substance, and account for the former independently of the latter. In face

of the obvious difficulty that actual consciousness is not continuous but

intermittent, he tries to maintain that the consciousness which links

together present states with remembered states is sufficient to constitute

personal identity even although there may have intervened between the

present and the past states a complete change of substance, so that it is

really a different substance which experiences the present states from

that which experienced the past states. The question

Whether we are the same thinking thing, _i.e._ the same substance

or no ... concerns not personal identity at all: the question

being, what makes the same person, and not whether it be the same

identical substance, which always thinks in the same person:

different substances, by the same consciousness (where they do

partake in it), being united into one person, as well as different

bodies by the same life are united into one animal, whose identity

is preserved, in that change of substances, by the unity of one

continued life ... [for] animal identity is preserved in identity

of life, and not of substance.(316)

Here the contention is that we can have “the same person” and yet not

necessarily “the same identical substance,” because _consciousness_ may

give a personal unity to distinct and successive substances in the

individual man just as _animal life_ gives an analogous unity to distinct

and successive substances in the individual animal. This is very

superficial; for it only substitutes for the problem of human personality

the similar problem of explaining the unity and sameness of subsistence in

the individual living thing: a problem which involves the fact of _memory_

in animals. For scholastic philosophers unity of life in the living thing,

involving the fact of memory in animals, is explained by the perfectly

intelligible and will-grounded teaching that there is in each individual

living thing a _formative and vital principle_ which is _substantial_, a

_forma substantialis_, which unites, in the _abiding self-identical unity

of a complete individual composite substance_, the material principle of

the corporeal substances which thus go, in the incessant process of

substantial change known as metabolism, to form partially, and to support

the substantial continuity of, the living individual. While the latter is

thus in constant process of material, or partial, substantial change, it

remains, as long as it lives, the same complete individual substance, and

this in virtue of the abiding _substantial_ formative and vital principle

which actuates and animates it. The abiding permanence or self-identity of

the _subsisting individual substance_ which feels or thinks, and

remembers, is an intelligible, and indeed the only intelligible, ground

and explanation of memory, and of our consciousness of personal identity.

But if we leave out of account this abiding continuity and self-identity

of the subsisting individual substance or nature, which is the subject,

cause and agent of these acts of memory and consciousness, how can these

latter, in and by themselves, possibly form, or even indeed reveal to us,

our personal identity? Locke felt this difficulty; and he tried in vain to

meet it: in vain, for it is insuperable. He merely suggests that “the same

consciousness ... can be transferred from one thinking substance to

another,” in which case “it will be possible that two thinking substances

may make [successively] one person”.(317) This is practically his last

word on the question,—and it is worthy of note, for it virtually

_substantializes consciousness_. It makes consciousness, which is really

only an act or a series of acts, a _something substantial and subsisting_.

We have seen already how modern phenomenists, once they reject the notion

of substance as invalid or superfluous, must by that very fact

equivalently _substantialize accidents_ (61); for substance, being a

necessary category of human thought as exercised on reality, cannot really

be dispensed with. And we see in the present context an illustration of

this fact. The abiding self-identity of the human person cannot be

explained otherwise than by the abiding self-identical subsistence of the

individual human substance.

If personal identity were constituted and determined by consciousness, by

the series of conscious states connected and unified by memory, then it

would appear that the human being in infancy, in sleep, in

unconsciousness, or in a state of insanity, is not a human person!

Philosophers who have not the hardihood to deny human personality to the

individual of the human species in these states, and who on the other hand

will not recognize the possession of a _rational nature_ or substance by

the subsisting individual as the ground of the latter’s personality and

personal identity, have recourse to the hypothesis of a _sub-conscious_,

or “_sub-liminal_” _consciousness_ in the individual, as a substitute. If

by this they merely meant an abiding _substantial_ rational principle of

all mental activities, even of those which may be semi-conscious or

sub-conscious, they would be merely calling by another name what we call

the _rational nature_ of man. And the fact that they refer to this

principle as the sub-conscious “self” or “Ego” shows how insistent is the

rational need for rooting personality and personal identity in something

which is a _substance_. But they do not and will not conceive it as a

substance; whereas if it is not this, if it is only a “process,” or a

“function,” or a “series” or “stream” of processes or functions, it can no

more constitute or explain, or even reveal, personal identity, than a

series or stream of _conscious_ states can.(318)

Unable as he was to explain how the same consciousness could persist

throughout a succession of really and adequately distinct substances

(except by virtually substantializing consciousness), Locke nevertheless

persisted in holding that consciousness and consciousness alone (including

memory, which, however, is inexplicable on any other theory than that of a

subsisting and persisting substance or nature which remembers),

constitutes personality and personal identity. We have dwelt upon his

teaching mainly because all modern phenomenists try to explain personality

on the same principles—_i.e._ independently of the doctrine of substance.

As a corollary from his doctrine he inferred that if a man

completely and irrevocably loses consciousness [or rather memory]

of his past life, though he remains the same “man” he is no longer

the same “person”: “if it be possible for the same man to have

distinct incommunicable consciousness at different times, it is

past doubt the same man would at different times make different

persons”;(319) and he goes on in this sense to give a literal

interpretation to the modes of speech we have referred to

above.(320) He likewise admitted that two or more “persons,”

_i.e._ consciousnesses, can be linked with the same individual

human being, or the same individual human soul, alternately

appearing and disappearing, giving place successively to one

another. When any one of these “personalities” or consciousnesses

ceases to be actual, it must in Locke’s view cease to be in any

sense real: so that there could not be two or more personalities

at the same time in the same individual human being. Modern

psychologists, however, of the phenomenist school, convinced that

sub-conscious mental activities are not only possible, but that

the fact of such activities is well established by a variety of

experiences, have extended Locke’s conception of personality (as

actual consciousness) to embrace groups of mental activities which

may emerge only intermittently “above the threshold of

consciousness”. Hence they explain the abnormal cases of double or

multiple consciousness already referred to, as being

manifestations of really distinct “personalities” in one and the

same human individual. In normal human beings there is, they say,

only one normally “conscious personality”. The sub-conscious

mental activities of such an individual they bulk together as

forming this individual’s “sub-liminal” or “sub-conscious” _Ego_

or “self”: presumably a distinct personality from the conscious

one. In the abnormal cases of “double-consciousness” the

subliminal self struggles for mastery over the conscious self and

is for a time successful: the two personalities thus for a time

changing places as it were. In the rarer or more abnormal cases of

treble or multiple consciousness, there are presumably three or

more “personalities” engaged in the struggle, each coming to the

surface in turn and submerging the others.

It is not the fancifulness of this theory that one might object to

so much as its utter inadequacy to explain the facts, nay, its

utter unintelligibility _on the principles of those who propound

it_. For we must not lose sight of the fact that it is propounded

by philosophers who purport to explain mental life and human

personality without recourse to a _substantial soul_, to any

_substantial_ basis of mental life, or indeed to the concept of

_substance_ at all: by philosophers who will talk of a mental

process without admitting mind or soul as a _substance_ or

_subject_ of that process, of a “series” or “stream” of mental

functions or activities without allowing any _agent_ that would

exercise those functions, or any _substantial abiding principle_

that would unify the series or stream and know it as such;

philosophers who regard the _Ego_, “self,” or “person,” as

_nothing other than_ the group or series or stream of mental

states, and not as anything of which these are the states; and,

finally, who speak of these groups of functions or activities as

“personalities”—which they describe as “struggling” with one

another—apparently oblivious of the fact that by using such

language they are _in their thought at least_ transforming these

_activities_ into _agents_, these _states_ into _subjects of

states_, in a word, these _accidents_ into _substances_; or else

they are making their language and their thought alike

unintelligible.(321)

Of course those numerous modern philosophers who, like James, try

to “find a place for all the experiential facts unencumbered by

any hypothesis [like that of an individual substantial soul,

presumably] save that of passing states of mind” [_ibid._, p.

480], do not really leave these “states” suspended in mid-air as

it were. The imperative need for admitting the reality of

substance always ultimately asserts itself: as when James

recognizes the necessity of admitting something “more than the

bare fact of co-existence of a passing thought with a passing

brain-state” [_Principles of Psychology_, i., p. 346—_apud_ MAHER,

_ibid._, p. 483]. Only his speculation as to what constitutes this

“something ‘more’ which lies behind our mental states” [_ibid._,

p. 485] is not particularly convincing: “For my own part,” he

says, “I confess that the moment I become metaphysical and try to

define the _more_, I find the notion of some sort of an _anima

mundi_ thinking in all of us to be a more promising hypothesis, in

spite of all its difficulties, than that of a lot of absolutely

individual souls” [_ibid._, p. 346—apud MAHER, _ibid._]. This

restatement of the medieval pantheistic theory known as Averroïsm,

Monopsychism, or the theory of the _intellectus separatus_ [_cf._

DE WULF, _History of Medieval Philosophy_, pp. 381 _sqq._], is a

somewhat disappointing contribution to Metaphysics from the most

brilliant of our modern psychologists. The “difficulties” of this

“more promising hypothesis” had discredited it a rather long time

before Professor James resurrected it [_cf._ criticisms—_apud_

MAHER, _ibid._].