44. THE GOOD AS “DESIRABLE” AND AS “SUITABLE”.—The notion of the _good_
(L. _bonum_; Gr. ἀγαθόν) is one of the most familiar of all notions. But
like all other transcendental or widely generic concepts, the analysis of
it opens up some fundamental questions. The princes of ancient Greek
philosophy, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, gave much anxious thought to
its elucidation. The tentative gropings of Socrates involved an ambiguity
which issued in the conflicting philosophies of Stoicism and Epicureanism.
Nor did Plato succeed in bringing down from the clouds the “Idea of the
Good” which he so devotedly worshipped as the Sun of the Intellectual
World. It needed the more sober and searching analysis of the Stagyrite to
bring to light the formula so universally accepted in after ages: The Good
of beings is that which all desire: _Bonum est quod omnia appetunt_.(173)
Let us try to reach the fundamental idea underlying the terms “good,”
“goodness,” by some simple examples.
The child, deriving sensible pleasure from a sweetmeat, cries out: That is
_good_! Whatever gratifies its senses, gives it sensible delight, it
_likes_ or _loves_. Such things it _desires_, _seeks_, _yearns for_, in
their absence; and in their presence _enjoys_. At this stage the good
means simply the _pleasure-giving_. But as reason develops the human being
apprehends and describes as good not merely what is pleasure-giving, but
whatever satisfies any natural need or craving, whether purely organic, or
purely intellectual, or more widely human: food is good because it
satisfies a physical, organic craving; knowledge is good because it
satisfies a natural intellectual thirst; friendship is good because it
satisfies a wider need of the heart. Here we notice a transition from
“agreeable” in the sense of “pleasure-giving” to “agreeable” in the more
proper sense of “suitable” or useful. The good is now conceived not in the
narrow sense of what yields sensible pleasure but in the wider sense of
that which is useful or suitable for the satisfaction of a natural
tendency or need, that which is _the object of a natural tendency_.
Next, let us reflect, with Aristotle, that each of the individual persons
and things that make up the world of our direct experience has an end
towards which it naturally tends. There is a purpose in the existence of
each. Each has a nature, _i.e._ an essence which is for it a principle of
development, a source of all the functions and activities whereby it
continually adapts itself to its environment and thereby continually
fulfils the aim of its existence. By its very nature it tends towards its
end along the proper line of its development.(174) In the world of
conscious beings this natural tendency is properly called appetite: _sense
appetite_ of what is apprehended as good by sense cognition, and rational
appetite or _will_ in regard to what is apprehended as good by intellect
or reason. In the world of unconscious things this natural tendency is a
real tendency and is analogous to conscious appetite. Hence it is that
Aristotle, taking in all grades of real being, describes the good as that
which is the object of any natural tendency or “appetite” whatsoever: the
good is the “_appetibile_” or “desirable,” that which all things seek:
_bonum est quod omnia appetunt_.
45. THE GOOD AS AN “END,” “PERFECTING” THE “NATURE”.—So far, we have
analysed the notion of what is “good” _for some being_; and we have
gathered that it implies what _suits_ this being, what contributes to the
latter’s realization of its end. But we apply the term “good” to objects,
and speak of their goodness, apart from their direct and immediate
relation of helpfulness or suitability _for us_. When, for instance, we
say of a watch that it is a _good_ one, or of a soldier that he is a
_good_ soldier, what precisely do we mean by such attribution of goodness
to things or persons? A little reflection will show that it is
intelligible _only in reference to an end or purpose_. And we mean by it
that the being we describe as good has the powers, qualities, equipments,
which _fit it for its end or purpose_. A being is good whose nature is
equipped and adapted for the realization of its natural end or purpose.
Thus we see that the notion of goodness is correlative with the notion of
an end, towards which, or for which, a being has a natural tendency or
desire. Without the concept of a nature as tending to realize an end or
purpose, the notion of “the good” would be inexplicable.(175) And the two
formulæ, “The good is that which beings desire, or towards which they
naturally tend,” and “The good is that which is adapted to the ends which
beings have in their existence,” really come to the same thing; the former
statement resolving itself into the latter as the more fundamental. For
the reason why anything is desirable, why it is the object of a natural
tendency, is because it is good, and not _vice versa_. The description of
the good as that which is desirable, “_Bonum est id quod est appetibile_,”
is an _a posteriori_ description, a description of cause by reference to
effect.(176) A thing is desirable because it is good. Why then is it good,
and therefore desirable? Because it _suits_ the natural needs, and _is
adapted_ to the nature, of the being that desires it or tends towards it;
because it _helps_ this being, _agrees with_ it, by contributing towards
the realization of its end: _Bonum est id quod convenit naturæ
appetentis_: The good is that which suits the nature of the being that
desires it. The greatest good for a being is the realization of its end;
and the means towards this are also good because they contribute to this
realization.
No doubt, in beings endowed with consciousness the gradual realization of
this natural tendency, by the normal functioning and development of their
activities, is accompanied by pleasurable feeling. The latter is, in fact,
not an end of action itself, but rather the natural concomitant, the
effect and index, of the healthy and normal activity of the conscious
being: _delectatio sequitur operationem debitam_. It is the pleasure felt
in tending towards the good that reveals the good to the conscious agent:
that is, taking pleasure in its wide sense as the feeling of well-being,
of satisfaction with one’s whole condition, activities and environment.
Hence it is the anticipated pleasure, connected by past association with a
certain line of action, that stimulates the conscious being to act in that
way again. It is in the first instance because a certain operation or
tendency is felt to be _pleasing_ that it is desired, and apprehended as
_desirable_. Nor does the brute beast recognize or respond to any stimulus
of action other than pleasure. But man—endowed with reason, and reflecting
on the relation between his own nature and the activities whereby he duly
orients his life in his environment—must see that what is pleasure-giving
or “agreeable” in the ordinary sense of this term is generally so because
it is “agreeable” in the deeper sense of being “suitable to his nature,”
“adapted to his end,” and therefore “good”.
The good, then, is whatever suits the nature of a being tending towards
its end: _bonum est conveniens naturæ appetentis_. In what precisely does
this suitability consist? What suits any nature _perfects_ that nature,
and suits it precisely in so far as it perfects it. But whatever perfects
a nature does so only because and in so far as it is _a realization of the
end_ towards which this nature tends. Here we reach a new notion, that of
“perfecting” or “perfection,” and one which is as essentially connected
with the notion of “end” or “purpose,” as the concept of the “good” itself
is. Let us compare these notions of “goodness,” “end,” and “perfection”.
We have said that a watch or a soldier are good when they are adapted to
their respective ends. But they are so only because the end itself is
already good. And we may ask why any such end is itself good and therefore
desirable. For example, why is the accurate indication of time good, or
the defence of one’s country? And obviously in such a series of questions
we must come to something which is good and desirable in and for itself,
for its own sake and not as leading and helping towards some remoter good.
And this something which is good in and for itself is a last or ultimate
end—an absolute, not a relative, good. There must be such an absolute
good, such an ultimate end, if goodness in things is to be made
intelligible at all. And it is only in so far as things tend towards this
absolute good, and are adapted to it, that they can be termed good. The
realization of this tendency of things towards the absolute good, or
ultimate end, is what constitutes the goodness of those things, and it
does so because it _perfects their natures_.
The end towards which any nature tends is the cause of this
tendency, its _final_ cause; and the influence of a final cause
consists precisely in its goodness, _i.e._ in its power of
actualizing and perfecting a nature. This influence of the good is
sometimes described as the “diffusive” character of goodness:
_Bonum est diffusivum sui_: Goodness tends to diffuse or
communicate itself, to multiply or reproduce itself. This
character, which we may recognize in the goodness of finite,
created things, is explained in the philosophy of theism as being
derived, with this goodness itself, from the uncreated goodness of
God who is the Ultimate End and Supreme Good of all reality. Every
creature has its own proper ultimate end and highest perfection in
its being a manifestation, an expression, a shewing forth, of the
Divine Goodness. It has its own actuality and goodness, distinct
from, but dependent on, the Divine Goodness; but inasmuch as its
goodness is an expression or imitation of the Divine Goodness, we
may, by an _extrinsic_ denomination, say that the creature is good
_by the Divine Goodness_. In a similar way, and without any
suspicion of pantheism, we may speak of the goodness of creatures
as being a _participation_ of the Divine Goodness (5).
46. THE PERFECT. ANALYSIS OF THE NOTION OF PERFECTION.—It is the
realization of the end or object or purpose of a nature that perfects the
latter, and so far formally constitutes the goodness of this nature. Now
the notion of perfection is not exactly the same as the notion of
goodness: although what is perfect is always good, what is good is not
always perfect. The term “perfect” comes from the Latin _perficere_,
_perfectum_, meaning fully made, thoroughly achieved, completed, finished.
Strictly speaking, it is only finite being, potential being, capable of
completion, that can be spoken of as _perfectible_, or, when fully
actualized, _perfect_. But by universal usage the term has been extended
to the reality of the Infinite Being: we speak of the latter as the
Infinitely _Perfect_ Being, not meaning that this Being has been
“perfected,” but that He is the purely Actual and Infinite Reality.
Applied to any finite being, the term “perfect” means that this being has
attained to the full actuality which we regard as its end, as the ideal of
its natural capacity and tendency. The finite being is subject to change;
it is not actualized all at once, but gradually; by the play of those
active and passive powers which are rooted in its nature it is gradually
actualized, and thus perfected, gaining more and more reality or being by
the process. But what directs this process and determines the line of its
tendency? The _good_ which is the _end_ of the being, the good towards
which the being by its nature tends. This good, which is the term of the
being’s natural tendency—which is, in other words, its end—is the
fundamental principle(177) which perfects the nature of the being, is the
source and explanation of the process whereby this nature is perfected:
_bonum est perfectivum_: _the good is the perfecting principle of
reality_. The end itself is “the good which perfects,” _bonum quod_; the
“perfecting” itself is the formal cause of the goodness of the being that
is perfected, _bonum quo_; the being itself which is perfected, and
therefore ameliorated or increased in goodness, is the _bonum cui_. In
proportion, therefore, to the degree in which a being actually possesses
the perfection due to its nature it is “good”; in so far as it lacks this
perfection, it is wanting in goodness, or is, as we shall see,
ontologically “bad” or “evil”.
While, then, the notion of the “good” implies a relation of the appetite
or natural tendency of a being towards its end, the notion of
“perfection,” or “perfecting,” conveys to our minds actual reality simply,
or the actualizing of reality. The term “perfection” is commonly used as
synonymous with actual reality. In so far forth as a reality is actual we
say it “has perfection”. But we do not call it “perfect” _simply_, unless
it has all the actuality we conceive to be due to its nature: so long as
it lacks any of this it is only perfect _secundum quid_, _i.e._ in
proportion to the actuality it does possess. Hence we define “the perfect”
as _that which is actually lacking in nothing that is due to its nature_.
The perfect is therefore not simply the good, but the complete or finished
good; and it is even logically distinct from the latter, inasmuch as the
actuality connoted by the former has added to it the relation to appetite
connoted by the latter. Similarly “goodness” is logically distinct from
“perfection” by adding the like relation to the latter. Although a thing
has goodness in so far as it has perfection, and _vice versa_, still its
perfection is its actuality simply, while its goodness is this actuality
considered as the term of its natural appetite or tendency.
47. GRADES OF PERFECTION. REALITY AS STANDARD OF VALUE.—We may distinguish
between stages of perfection in the changing reality of the same being, or
grades of perfection in comparing with one another different classes or
orders of being.
In one and the same being we may distinguish between what is called its
_first_ or _essential_ perfection, which means its essence or nature
considered as capable of realizing its purpose in existence by tending
effectively towards its end; what is called its _intermediate_ or
_accidental_ perfection, which consists in all the powers, faculties and
functions whereby this tendency is gradually actualized; and what is
called its _final_ or _integral_ perfection, which consists in its full
actualization by complete attainment of its end.
Again, comparing with one another the individual beings that make up our
experience, we classify them, we arrange them in a hierarchical order of
relative “perfection,” of inferiority or superiority, according to the
different grades of reality or perfection which we think we apprehend in
them. Thus, we look on living things as a higher, nobler, more perfect
order of beings than non-living things, on animal life as a higher form of
being than plant life, on intelligence as higher than instinct, on will as
superior to sense appetite, on mind or spirit as nobler than matter, and
so on. Now all such comparisons involve the apprehension of some standard
of value. An estimation of relative values, or relative grades of
perfection in things, is unintelligible except in reference to some such
standard; it involves of necessity the intuition of such a standard. We
feel sure that some at least of our appreciations are unquestionably
correct: that man, for instance, is superior to the brute beast, and the
latter superior to the plant; that the lowest manifestation of life—in the
amœba, or whatever monocellular, microscopic germ may be the lowest—is
higher on the scale of being than the highest expression of the
mechanical, chemical and physical forces of the inorganic universe. And if
we ask ourselves what is our standard of comparison, what is our test or
measure, and why are we sure of our application of it in such cases, our
only answer is that our standard of comparison is reality itself, actual
being, perfection; that we rely implicitly on our intuition of such actual
reality as manifested to us in varying grades or degrees within our
experience; that without claiming to be infallible in our judgments of
comparison, in our classifications of things, in our appreciations of
their relative perfection, we may justly assume reality itself to be as
such intelligible, and the human mind to be capable of obtaining some true
and certain insight into the nature of reality.
48. THE GOOD, THE REAL, AND THE ACTUAL.—Having compared “perfection” with
“goodness” and with “being,” let us next compare the two latter notions
with each other. We shall see presently that every actual being has its
ontological goodness, that these are in reality identical. But there is a
logical distinction between them. In the first place the term “being” is
applied _par excellence_ to substances rather than to accidents. But we do
not commonly speak of an individual substance, a person or thing, as good
in reference to essential or substantial perfection.(178) When we describe
a man, or a machine, as “good,” we mean that the man possesses those
_accidental_ perfections, those qualities and endowments, which are
suitable to his nature as a man; that the machine possesses those
properties which adapt it to its end. In the second place the notion of
being is absolute; that of the good is relative, for it implies the notion
not of reality simply but of reality as desirable, agreeable, suitable, as
perfecting the nature of a subject, as being the end, or conducive to the
end, towards which this nature tends. And since what thus _perfects_ must
be something not potential but actual, it follows that, unlike real truth,
real goodness is identical not with potential, but only with actual
reality. It is not an attribute of the abstract, possible essence, but
only of the concrete, actually existing essence.(179)
From the fact that the notion of the good is relative it follows that the
same thing can be simultaneously good and bad in different relations:
“What is one man’s meat is another man’s poison”.
49. KINDS OF GOODNESS; DIVISIONS OF THE GOOD.—(_a_) The goodness of a
being may be considered in relation to this being itself, or to other
beings. What is good for a being itself, what makes it intrinsically and
formally good, _bonum sibi_, is whatever perfects it, and in the fullest
sense the realization of its end. Hence we speak of a virtuous, upright
man, whose conduct is in keeping with his nature and conducive to the
realization of his end, as a good man. But a being may also be good to
others, _bonum alteri_, by an extrinsic, active, effective goodness,
inasmuch as by its action it may help other beings in the realization of
their ends. In this sense, a beneficent man, who wishes the well-being of
his fellow-men and helps them to realize this well-being, is called a good
man. This kind of goodness is what is often nowadays styled
_philanthropy_; in Christian ethics it is known as _charity_.
(_b_) We have described the good as the term or object of natural tendency
or appetite. In the domain of beings not endowed with the power of
conscious apprehension, determinism rules this natural tendency; this
latter is always oriented towards the _real_ good: it never acts amiss: it
is always directed by the Divine Wisdom which has given to things their
natures. But in the domain of conscious living agents this natural
tendency is consequent on apprehension: it takes the form of instinctive
animal appetite or of rational volition. And since this apprehension of
the good may be erroneous, since what is not really good but evil may be
apprehended as good, the appetite or will, which follows this
apprehension—_nil volitum nisi praecognitum_—may be borne towards evil
_sub ratione boni_. Hence the obvious distinction between _real good_ and
_apparent good_—_bonum verum_ and _bonum apparens_.
(_c_) In reference to any individual subject—a man, for instance—it is
manifest that _other_ beings can be good for him in so far as any of them
can be his end or a means to the attainment of his end. They are called in
reference to him _objective goods_, and their goodness _objective
goodness_. But it is equally clear that they are good for him only because
he can perfect his own nature by somehow identifying or uniting himself
with them, possessing, using, or enjoying them. This possession of the
objective good constitutes what has been already referred to as _formal_
or _subjective goodness_.(180)
(_d_) We have likewise already referred to the fact that in beings endowed
with consciousness and appetite proper, whether sentient or rational, the
function of possessing or attaining to what is objectively good, to what
suits and perfects the nature of the subject, has for its natural
concomitant a feeling of pleasure, satisfaction, well-being, delight,
enjoyment. And we have observed that this pleasurable feeling may then
become a stimulus to fresh desire, may indeed be desired for its own sake.
Now this subjective, pleasure-giving possession of an objective good has
been itself called by scholastics _bonum delectabile_—delectable or
delight-giving good. The objective good itself considered as an end, and
the perfecting of the subject by its attainment, have been called _bonum
honestum_—good which is really and _absolutely_ such _in itself_. While if
the good in question is really such only when considered as a means to the
attainment of an end, of something that is good in itself, the former is
called _bonum utile_—useful good.(181)
In this important triple division _bonum honestum_ is used in the wide
sense in which it embraces any _real_ good, whether physical or moral. As
applied to man it would therefore embrace whatever perfects his physical
life as well as whatever perfects his nature considered as a rational, and
therefore moral, being. But in common usage it has been restricted to the
latter, and is in this sense synonymous with _moral good_, _virtue_.(182)
Furthermore, a good which is an end, and therefore desirable for its own
sake, whether it be physical or moral, can be at the same time a means to
some higher good and desired for the sake of this latter. Hence St.
Thomas, following Aristotle, reduces all the moral goods which are
desirable in themselves to two kinds: that which is desirable only for
itself, which is the last end, final felicity; and those which, while good
in themselves, are also conducive to the former, and these are the
virtues.(183)
When these various kinds of goodness are examined in reference to
the nature, conduct and destiny of man, they raise a multitude of
problems which belong properly to Ethics and Natural Theology. The
fact that man has a composite nature which is the seat of various
and conflicting tendencies, of the flesh and of the spirit; that
he perceives in himself a “double law,” a higher and a lower
appetite; that he is subject to error in his apprehension of the
good; that he apprehends a distinction between pleasure and duty;
that he feels the latter to be the path to ultimate happiness,—all
this accentuates the distinction between real and apparent good,
between _bonum honestum_, _bonum utile_, and _bonum delectabile_.
The existence of God is established in Natural Theology; and in
Ethics, aided by Psychology, it is proved that no finite good can
be the last end of man, that God, the Supreme, Infinite Good, is
his last end, and that only in the possession of God by knowledge
and love can man find his complete and final felicity.
50. GOODNESS A TRANSCENDENTAL ATTRIBUTE OF BEING.—We have shown that there
is a logical distinction between the concept of “goodness” and that of
“being”. We have now to show that the distinction is not real, in other
words, that goodness is a transcendental attribute of all actual reality,
that all being, in so far forth as it is actual, has
goodness—transcendental or ontological goodness in the sense of
_appetibility_, _desirability_, _suitability_, as already explained.
When the thesis is formulated in the traditional scholastic statement,
“_Omne ens est bonum_: _All being is good_” it sounds a startling paradox.
Surely it cannot be contended that everything is good? A cancer in the
stomach is not good; lies are not good; yet these are actual realities;
cancers exist and lies are told; therefore not every reality is good. This
is unquestionably true. But it does not contradict the thesis rightly
understood. The true meaning of the thesis is, not that every being is
good in all respects, or possesses such goodness as would justify us in
describing it as “good” in the ordinary sense, but that every being
possesses some goodness: every being in so far as it has actuality has
formal, intrinsic goodness, or is, in other words, the term or object of
natural tendency or desire. This goodness, which we predicate of any and
every actual being, may be (1) the term of the natural tendency or
appetite of that being itself, _bonum sibi_, or (2) it may be conceivably
the term of the appetite of some other being, _bonum alteri_. Let us see
whether it can be shown that every actual being has goodness in one or
both of these senses.
(1) _Bonum sibi_.—Is there any intelligible sense in which it can be said
that the actuality of any and every existing being is _good for that
being_—_bonum sibi_? There is. For if we recognize in every such being, as
we must, a _nature_, a potentiality of further actualization, a tendency
towards a state of fuller actuality which is its _end_; and if,
furthermore, we recognize that every such being at any instant not merely
_is_ or exists, but is _becoming_ or _changing_, and thereby tending
effectively towards its end; we must admit not merely that the full
attainment of its end (its integral or final perfection) is “desired” by,
and “perfects,” and is “good” for, that being’s nature; but also that the
partial realization of its end, or, in other words, the actuality it has
at any instant in its changing condition of existence (its accidental or
intermediate perfection) is similarly “good” for it; and even that its
actual existence as compared with its mere possibility (its first or
essential perfection) is “desirable” and “good” for its nature. Actually
existing beings are intelligible only because they exist for some end or
purpose, which, by their very existence, activities, operations, conduct,
they tend to realize. If this be admitted we cannot deny that the full
attainment of this end or purpose is “good” for them—suitable, desirable,
agreeable, perfecting them. In so far as they fail in this purpose they
are wanting in goodness, they are bad, evil. For the realization of their
end their natures are endowed with appropriate powers, faculties, forces,
by the normal functioning of which they gradually develop and grow in
actuality. No real being is by nature inert or aimless; no real being is
without its connatural faculties, forces and functions. But the natural
result of all operation, of all action and interaction among things, is
_actualization_ of the potential, amelioration, development, growth in
perfection and goodness by gradual realization of ends. If by accident any
of these powers is wanting, or acts amiss by failing to contribute its due
perfection to the nature, there is in the being a proportionate want of
goodness—it is so far bad, evil. But, even so, the nature of the thing
preserves its fundamental orientation towards its end, towards the
perfection natural to it, and struggles as it were against the evil—tries
to make good the deficiency. A cancer in the stomach is never good _for
the stomach_, or _for the living subject_ of which the stomach is an
organ. For the living being the cancer is an evil, a _failure_ of one of
the organs to discharge its functions normally, _an absence of a good_,
_viz._ the healthy functioning of an organ. But the cancerous growth,
considered in itself and for itself, biologically and chemically, has its
own nature, purpose, tendencies, laws; nor can we deny that its
development according to these laws is “good” for its specific
nature,(184) _bonum sibi_.
It may be asked how can the _first_ or _essential_ perfection of an
existing substance, which is nothing else than the actual existence of the
nature itself, be conceived as “good” for this nature? It is so inasmuch
as the actual existence of the substance is the first stage in the process
by which the nature tends towards its end; an existing nature desires and
tends towards the conservation of its own being;(185) hence the saying,
“Self-preservation is the first law of nature”; and hence, too, the
scholastic aphorism, “_Melius est esse quam non esse_”.
The argument just outlined tends to show that every nature of which we can
have direct experience, or in other words every finite, contingent nature,
is _bonum sibi_, formally and intrinsically good for itself.
It is, of course, equally applicable to the Uncreated, Necessary Being
Himself. The Infinite Actuality of the Divine Nature is essentially the
term and end of the Divine Love. Therefore every actual being has
intrinsic, formal goodness, whereby it is _bonum sibi_, _i.e._ its
actuality is, in regard to its nature, really an object of tendency,
desire, appetite, a something that really suits and perfects this nature.
Thus understood, the thesis formulates no mere tautology. It makes a real
assertion about real being; nor can the truth of this assertion be proved
otherwise than by an argument based, as ours is, on the recognition of
purpose, of final causality, of adaptation of means to ends, in the actual
universe of our experience.
Notwithstanding all that has been said, it may still be asked why should
those individual beings, whose existence we have claimed to be good for
them, exist at all. It will be objected that there exist multitudes of
beings whose existence is manifestly _not_ good for them. Take, for
instance, the case of the reprobate. If they wish their total
annihilation, if they desire the total cessation of their being, rather
than an existence of eternal punishment, they undoubtedly wish it _as a
good_. Is annihilation or absolute non-existence _really_ a good _for
them_? _De facto_ it is _for them_, considered _in their actual condition_
which is _accidental to their nature_. Christ said of the scandal-giver
what is surely true of the reprobate: “It were better for that man had he
never been born”. We may admit, therefore, that for the reprobate
themselves simple non-existence is more desirable, and better, than their
actual concrete state of existence as reprobate: because simple
non-existence is for them the simple _negation_ of their reality, whereas
the absolute and irreparable loss of their last end, the total frustration
of the purpose for which they came into being, is for them the greatest
conceivable _privation_. But this condition of the reprobate is accidental
to their nature, alien to the purpose of their being, a self-incurred
failure, a deliberate thwarting of their natural tendency. It remains
true, therefore, that their nature is good though incapable of progress,
its purpose is good though frustrated. In so far as they have actual
reality they have “essential” goodness. Their _natures_ still tend towards
self-conservation and the realization of their end. They form no _real_
exception to the general truth that “it is better to be than not to be:
_melius est esse quam non esse_”. It is not annihilation as such that is
desired by them, but only as a less evil alternative than the eternal
privation of their last end.(186) If the evils accidentally and actually
attaching to a certain state of existence make the continuance of _this
state_ undesirable for a being, it by no means follows that the
continuance of this being in existence, simply and in itself, is less
desirable than non-existence.
(2) BONUM ALTERI.—Even, however, if it were granted that the actual
existence of some beings is not good for _themselves_, might it not
nevertheless be good for _other beings_, and in relation to the general
scheme of things? Is there not an intelligible sense in which _every_
actual being is _bonum alteri_, good for other things? Here again the same
experience of actual reality, which teaches us that each individual being
has a nature whereby it tends to its own good as a particular end, also
teaches us that in the general scheme of reality things are helpful to one
another, nay, are intended by their interaction and co-operation with one
another to subserve the wider end which is the good of the whole system of
reality. There is little use in puzzling, as people sometimes do, over the
_raison d’être_ of individual things or classes of things in human
experience, over the good or the evil of the existence of these things,
over the question whether or not it would be better that these things
should never have existed, until we have consulted not any isolated
portion of human experience but _this experience as a whole_. In this we
can find sufficient evidence for the prevalence of a beneficent purpose
everywhere. Not that we can read this purpose in every detail of reality.
Even when we have convinced ourselves that all creation is the work of a
Supreme Being who is Infinite Goodness Itself, we cannot gain that full
insight into the secret designs of His Providence, which would be needed
in order to “justify His ways” in all things. But when we have convinced
ourselves that the created universe exists because God wills it, we can
understand that every actual reality in it must be “good,” as being an
object or term of the Divine Will. Every created reality is thus _bonum
alteri_ inasmuch as it is good for God, not, of course, in the impossible
sense of perfecting Him, but as an imitation and expression of the
Goodness of the Divine Nature Itself. The experience which enables us to
reach a knowledge of the existence and nature of God, the Creator,
Conserver, and Providence of the actual universe, also teaches us that
this universe can have no other ultimate end or good than God Himself,
_i.e._ God’s will to manifest His goodness by the extrinsic glory which
consists in the knowledge and love of Him by His rational creatures. The
omnipotence of the Creator, His freedom in creating, and our knowledge of
the universe He has actually chosen to create from among indefinite
possible worlds, all alike convince us that the actual world is neither
the best possible nor the worst possible, _absolutely_ speaking. But our
knowledge of His wisdom and power also convinces us that for the purpose
of manifesting His glory in the measure and degree in which He has
actually chosen to manifest it by creating the existing universe, and
_relatively_ to the attainment of this specific purpose, the existing
universe is the best possible.
51. OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM.—Those few outlines of the philosophy of
theism—theses established in Natural Theology—will reveal to us the place
of theism in relation to “optimist” and “pessimist” systems of philosophy.
Pessimism, as an outcome of philosophical speculation, is the proclamation
in some form or other of the conviction that human existence, nay,
existence in general, is a failure, an evil. It is the analogue, in
relation to will, of what scepticism is in relation to intellect; and it
is no less self-contradictory than the latter. While the latter points to
total paralysis of thought, the former involves a like paralysis of all
will, all effort, all purpose in existence—a philosophy of despair,
despondency, gloom. Both are equally erroneous, equally indicative of
philosophical failure, equally repugnant to the normal, healthy mind.
Optimism on the other hand is expressive of the conviction that good
predominates in all existence: _melius est esse quam non esse_; that at
the root of all reality there is a beneficent purpose which is ever being
realized; that there is in things not merely a truth that can be known but
a goodness that can be loved. Existence is not an evil, life is not a
failure. This is a philosophy of hope, buoyancy, effort and attainment.
But is it true, or is it an empty illusion? Well, to maintain that the
actual universe is the best absolutely, would, of course, be absurd. If
Leibniz’s “Principle of Sufficient Reason” obliged him to contend, in face
of the painfully palpable facts of physical and moral evil in the
universe, that this universe is the best absolutely possible, the best
that God could create, we can only say: so much the worse for his
“Principle”. The true optimism is that of the theist who, admitting the
prevalence of evil in the universe, in the sense to be explained
presently, at the same time holds that throughout creation the good
predominates, that God’s beneficent purpose in regard to individuals does
in the main prevail, and that His glory is manifested in giving to
rational creatures the perfection and felicity of knowing and loving
Himself. For the theist, then, the problem of the existence of evil in the
universe assumes the general form of reconciling the fact of evil in God’s
creation with the fact of God’s infinite power and goodness. This is a
problem for Natural Theology. Here we have merely to indicate some general
principles arising from the consideration of evil as the correlative and
antithesis of goodness.
52. EVIL: ITS NATURE AND CAUSES. MANICHEISM.—Admitting the existence of
evil in the universe, the scholastic apparently withdraws the admission
forthwith by denying the reality of evil. The paradox explains itself by
comparing the notions of good and evil, and thus trying to arrive at a
proper conception of the latter.
If ontological goodness is really identical with actual being, if being is
good in so far as it is actual, then it would appear that ontological evil
must be identical with non-being, nothingness. And so it is, in the sense
that no evil is a positive, actual reality, that all evil is an absence of
reality. But just as the good, though really identical with the actual, is
nevertheless logically distinct from the latter, so is evil logically
distinct from nothingness, or the absence of reality. As we have seen, the
good is that which perfects a nature, that which is due to a nature as the
realization of the end of the latter. So, too, is evil the _privation_ of
any perfection due to a nature, the absence of something positive and
something which ought to be present. Evil, therefore, is not a mere
negation or absence of being; it is the absence of a good, or in other
words the absence of a reality that should be present. All privation is
negation, but not _vice versa_; for privation is the negation of something
_due_: the absence of virtue is a mere negation in an animal, in man it is
a privation. Hence the commonly accepted definition of evil: _Malum est
privatio boni debiti_: _Evil is the privation of the goodness due to a
thing_.(187) Evil is always, therefore, a defect, a deficiency. The notion
of evil is a relative, not an absolute notion. As goodness is the right
relation of a nature to its proper end, so is evil a failure, a defect in
this relation: _Malum est privatio ordinis ad finem debitum_.(188)
The very finiteness of a finite being is the absence of further reality in
this being; but as this further reality is not due to such a being, its
absence, which has sometimes been improperly described as “metaphysical
evil,” is not rightly regarded as evil at all: except, indeed, we were to
conceive it as happening to the Infinite Being Himself, which would be a
contradiction in thought.
Evil, then, in its formal concept is nothing positive; it is essentially
negative, or rather privative. For this very reason, when we consider evil
in the concrete, _i.e._ as affecting actual things, as occurring in the
actual universe—we can scarcely speak of it with propriety as
“existing,”—we see that it essentially involves some positive, real
subject which it affects, some nature which, by affecting, it renders so
far evil. Cancer in the stomach is a real evil of the stomach, a defect, a
deficiency, a failure, in the adaptation of the stomach to its proper end.
It is not itself a positive, absolute, _evil entity_. In so far as it is
itself a positive, physical reality, a growth of living cells, it has its
own nature, its natural tendency, its development towards an end in
accordance with biological laws: in all of which it verifies the
definition of ontological goodness. But the existence of such a growth in
the stomach is pathological, _i.e._ a disease of the stomach, a prevention
of the natural, normal function of the stomach, a _failure of the latter’s
adaptation to its end_, and hence an _evil for the stomach_. Lying, too,
is an evil, a moral evil of man as a moral subject. But this does not mean
that the whole physical process of thinking, judging, speaking, whereby a
man lies, is itself a positive evil entity. The thinking is itself good as
a physical act. So is the speaking in itself good as a physical act.
Whatever of positive reality there is in the whole process is good,
ontologically good. But there is a _want of conformity_ of the language
with the thought, entailing a _privation_ or _failure of adaptation_ of
the man as a moral subject with his end, with his real good; and in this
failure of adaptation, this privation of goodness, lies the moral evil of
lying.
Evil, then, has a _material_ or subjective cause, _viz._ some positive,
actual reality, which is good in so far forth as it is actual, but which
is evil, or wanting in something due to it, in so far as the privation
which we have called evil affects it.
But evil has no _formal_ cause: formally it is not a reality but a
privation: “evil has no formal cause, but is rather the privation of a
form”.(189)
Nor has evil any _final_ cause, for it consists precisely in the failure
of a being’s natural tendency towards its end, in the want of adaptation
of a nature to its end: “nor has evil a final cause, but is rather the
privation of a being’s due relation to its natural end”.(190) Evil cannot
be the natural result of a being’s tendency towards its end, or a means to
the attainment of this end. For that which is really an end must be good,
and a means derives its goodness from the end to which it is a means. The
good, because it is an end, or a means to an end, is desirable; and so,
too, might evil be defined _a posteriori_ as that which is the object of
no natural tendency or desire, that from which all things are averse:
_malum est quod nullum ens appetit, vel a quo omnia aversantur_. Nor can
evil be itself an end, or be as such desired or desirable. Real evil is no
doubt often sought and desired by conscious beings, sometimes physical
evil, sometimes moral evil. But it is always desired and embraced as a
good, _sub specie boni_, _i.e._ when apprehended as here and now good in
the sense of gratifying, pleasure-giving, _bonum delectabile_. This is
possible because _pleasure_, especially organic, sensible pleasure, as
distinct from the state of real well-being which characterizes true
_happiness_, is not the exclusive concomitant of seeking and possessing a
_real_ good: it often accompanies the seeking and possessing of a merely
apparent good: and in such cases it is itself a merely apparent good, and
in reality evil. The unfortunate man who commits suicide does not embrace
evil as such. He wrongly judges death to be good, as being in his view a
lesser evil than the miseries of his existence, and under this aspect of
goodness he embraces death.
Finally we have to inquire whether evil has an _efficient_ cause. Seeing
that it is not merely a logical figment, seeing that it really affects
actual things, that it really occurs in the actual universe, it must have
a real source among the efficient causes of these actual things that make
up the universe. It is undoubtedly due to the action of efficient causes,
_i.e._ to the _failure_, the _defective_ action, of efficient causes. But
being itself something negative, a privation, it cannot properly be said
to have an “efficient” cause; for the influence of an efficient cause is
positive action, which in turn must have for its term something positive,
something real, and therefore good. Hence St. Augustine very properly says
that evil should be described as having a “_deficient_” cause rather than
an “efficient” cause.(191) In other words, evil is not the direct, natural
or normal result of the activity of efficient causes; for this result is
always good. It must therefore be always an indirect, abnormal, accidental
consequence of their activity. Let us see how this can be—firstly in
regard to physical evil, then in regard to moral evil.
In the action of physical causes we may distinguish between the operative
agencies themselves and the subjects in which the effects of these
operations are produced. Sometimes the effect is wanting in due
perfection, or is in other words imperfect, physically evil, because of
some defect in the agencies: the statue may be defective because the
sculptor is unskilled, or his instruments bad; offspring may be weak or
malformed owing to some congenital or accidental weakness or unfitness in
the parents. Sometimes the evil in the effect is traceable not to the
agents but to the materials on which they have to work: the sculptor and
his instruments may be perfect, but if there be a flaw in the marble the
statue will be a failure; the educator may be efficient, but if the pupil
be wanting in aptitude or application the results cannot be “good”.
All this, however, does not carry us very far, for we must still inquire
_why_ are the agencies, or the materials, themselves defective. Moreover,
physical evil sometimes occurs without any defect either in the agencies
or in the materials. The effect produced may be incompatible with some
minor perfection already in the subject; it can then be produced only at
the sacrifice of this minor perfection: which sacrifice is for the subject
_pro tanto_ an evil. It is in the natural order of things that the
production of a new “form” or perfection excludes the actuality of a
pre-existing form or perfection. All nature is subject to change, and we
have seen that all change is ruled by the law: _Generatio unius est
corruptio alterius_. It might perhaps be said that this privation or
supplanting of perfections in things by the actualization in these things
of incompatible perfections, is inherent in the nature of things and
essential to their finiteness—at least, if we regard the things not
individually but as parts of a whole, as members of a system, as
subserving a general scheme;—and that therefore such privation should not
be regarded as physical evil proper, but rather as “metaphysical” evil,
improperly so called. However we regard it, it can have no other first
source than the Will of the Creator decreeing the actual order of the
existing universe. And the same must be said of the physical evils proper
that are incident to the actual order of things. These evils are
“accidental” when considered in relation to the individual natures of the
created agencies and materials. They are defects or failures of natural
tendencies: were these natural tendencies always realized there would be
no such evils. But they are not realized; and their “failure” or “evil” is
not “accidental” in regard to God; for God has willed and created these
agencies with natural tendencies which He has destined to be fulfilled not
always and in every detail, but in such measure as will secure the actual
order of the universe and show forth His perfections in the finite degree
in which He has freely chosen to manifest these perfections. The world He
has chosen to create is not the best absolutely possible: there are
physical evils in it; but it is the best for the exact purpose for which
He created it.
There is also moral evil in the universe. In comparison with moral evil,
the physical defects in God’s creation—physical pain and suffering,
material privations and hardships, decay and death of living things—are
not properly evils at all. At least they are not evils in the same
profound sense as the deliberate turning away of the moral agent from God,
his Last End and Ultimate Good, is an evil. For the physical evils
incident to individual beings in the universe can be not only foreseen by
God but accepted and approved, so to speak, by His Will, as subserving the
realization of the total physical good which He wills in the universe; and
as subordinate to, and instrumental in the realization of, the moral good
of mankind: for it is obvious that in the all-wise designs of Providence
physical evils such as pain, suffering, poverty, hunger, etc., may be the
means of realizing moral goodness. But moral evil, on the contrary, or, in
the language of Christian ethics, _Sin_—the conscious and deliberate
rejection, by the free agent, of God who is his true good—though
necessarily foreseen by God in the universe He has actually chosen to
create, and therefore necessarily permitted by the Will of God
consequently on this foresight, cannot have been and cannot be intended or
approved by Him. Having created man an intelligent and free being, God
could not will or decree the revolt of the latter from Himself. He loves
essentially His own Infinite Goodness: were He to identify His Will with
that of the sinning creature He would at the same time be turning away
from His Goodness: which is a contradiction in terms. God, therefore, does
not will moral evil. Nevertheless He permits it: otherwise it would not
occur, for nothing can happen “against His will”. He has permitted it by
freely choosing to create this actual universe of rational and free
creatures, foreseeing that they would sin. He could have created instead a
universe of such beings, in which there would be no moral evil: for He is
omnipotent. Into the secrets of His election it is not given to finite
minds to penetrate. Acknowledging His Infinite Power, Wisdom and Goodness,
realizing at the same time the finiteness of our faculties, we see how
rational it is to bow down our minds with St. Paul and to exclaim in
admiration: “O, the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge
of God! How incomprehensible are His judgments, and how unsearchable His
ways!”(192)
If it be objected that God’s permission of moral evil in the universe is
really the cause of this evil, and makes God Himself responsible for sin
and its consequences, a satisfactory answer is not far to seek. It is
absolutely incompatible with God’s Infinite Sanctity that He be
responsible for sin and its consequences. For these the free will of the
creature is _alone_ responsible. The creation of intelligent beings,
endowed with the power _freely_ to love, honour and serve God, is the most
marvellous of all God’s works. Free will is the noblest endowment of a
creature of God, as it is also the most mysterious. Man, who by his
intelligence has the power to know God as his Supreme Good, has by his
will the power _freely_ to tend towards God and attain to the possession
of God as his Last End. In so far as man sins, _i.e._ knowingly,
deliberately, and freely violates the tendency of his nature towards God
by turning away from Him, he and he alone is responsible for the
consequences, because he has the power to accomplish what he knows to be
God’s design in his regard, and to be his true destiny and path to
happiness—_viz._ that he tend towards union with God and the possession of
God—and he deliberately fails to make use of this power. Such failure and
its consequences are, therefore, his own; they leave absolutely untouched
and unassailed the Infinite Goodness and Benevolence of God’s eternal
design in his regard.
In scholastic form, the objection is proposed and answered in this way:
“The cause of a cause is the cause of the latter’s effects; but God is the
cause of man, and sin is the latter’s effect; therefore God is the cause
of sin”. “That the cause of a _non-free_ cause is the cause of the
latter’s effects, we admit. That the cause of a _free_ cause is the cause
of the latter’s effects, at least in the sense of permitting, without
intending and being thereby responsible for them, we also admit; always in
the sense of intending and being responsible for them, we deny. The
_positive effects_ of a created free cause, those which the latter by
nature is intended to produce, are attributable to the first cause or
creator of the free cause, and the first cause is responsible for them.
The _failures_ of the created free cause to produce its natural and
intended effects, are not due to the first cause; they are not intended
by, nor attributable to, the first cause; nor is the latter responsible
for them: they are failures of the free cause, and of him alone; though
they are of course foreseen and permitted by the first cause or creator of
the latter. The minor premiss of the objection we may admit—noting,
however, that sin is not properly called an effect, but rather, like all
evil, a _failure_ of some cause to produce its connatural effect: it is a
defect, a deficiency, a privation of some effect, of some positive
perfection, which the cause ought naturally to have produced. The
conclusion of the objection we distinguish, according to our analysis of
the major premiss: God is the cause of sin in the proper sense of
intending it, willing it, and producing it positively, and being thereby
responsible for it, we deny; God is the cause of sin in the improper sense
of merely foreseeing and permitting it as incidental to the universe He
has actually willed and decreed to create, as occurring in this universe
by the deliberate failure of free creatures to conform themselves to His
primary benevolent intention in their regard, we may grant. And this
Divine permission of moral evil cannot be shown to be incompatible with
any attribute of the Divinity.”
In the preceding paragraphs we have barely outlined the principles on
which the philosophy of theism meets the problem of evil in the universe.
We have made assumptions which it is the proper province of Natural
Theology to establish, and to that department also we must refer the
student for a fuller treatment of the whole problem.
It has been sometimes said that the fact of evil in the universe is one of
the greatest difficulties against the philosophy of Theism. If this be
taken as an insinuation that the fact of evil can be better explained—or
even as well explained—on the assumptions of Pantheism, Monism,
Manicheism, or any other philosophy besides Theism, it is false. If it
means simply that in accounting for evil—whether on principles of Theism
or of any other philosophy—we are forced to raise some ultimate questions
in the face of which we must admit that we have come upon depths of
mystery which the plummet of our finite intellects cannot hope to fathom,
in this sense indeed the assertion may be admitted. As we have already
hinted, even with the light of the Christian Revelation to aid the natural
light of reason, there are questions about the existence and causes of
evil which we may indeed ask, but which we cannot adequately answer. And
obviously this is no reflection on Theism; while in the latter system we
have a more intelligible and more satisfactory analysis of the problem
than in any other philosophy.
Among the ancient Greek philosophers we find “matter” (ὕλη) identified
with “vacuum” or “empty space” (το κενόν) and this again with
“nothingness” or non-being (τὸ μη νὀ). Now the concept of evil is the
concept of something negative—a privation of goodness, of being or
reality. Thus the notion of evil came to be associated with the notion of
matter. But the latter notion is not really negative: it is that of a
formless, chaotic, disorderly material. When, therefore, the Manicheans
attributed a positive reality to evil—conceiving it as the principle of
all disorder, strife, discord—they naturally regarded all matter as the
expression of the Evil Principle, in opposition to soul or spirit as the
expression of the Good Principle. The Manichean philosophy of Evil, a
product of the early Christian centuries, has been perhaps the most
notable alternative or rival system encountered by the theistic philosophy
of Evil; for, notwithstanding the fantastic character of its conceptions
Manicheism has reappeared and reasserted itself repeatedly in after ages,
notably in the Middle Ages. Its prevalence has probably been due partly to
the concreteness of its conceptions and partly to a certain analogy which
they bear towards the conception of Satan and the fallen angels in
Christian theology. In both cases there is the idea of conflict, strife,
active and irreconcilable opposition, between the powers of good and the
powers of evil. But there the analogy ends. While in Christian theology
the powers of evil are presented as essentially subject to the Divine
Omnipotence, in Manicheism the _Evil Principle_, the _Summum Malum_, is
presented as a supreme, self-existent principle, essentially independent
of, as well as antagonistic to, the Divine Being, the _Summum Bonum_.
Since there is evil in the world, and since good cannot be the cause of
evil—so the Manicheans argue—there must be an essentially Evil First
Principle which is the primary source of all the evil in the universe,
just as there is an essentially Good First Principle which is the source
of all its good. Everything in the world—and especially man himself,
composed of matter and spirit—is the expression and the theatre of the
essential conflict which is being ever waged between the Good and the Evil
Principle. Everywhere throughout the universe we find this dualism:
between spirit and matter, light and darkness, order and disorder, etc.
From all that has been said in the preceding paragraphs regarding the
nature and causes of good and evil the errors of the Manichean system will
be apparent. Its fundamental error is the conception of evil as a positive
entity. Evil is not a positive entity but a privation. And this being so,
its occurrence does not demand a positive efficient cause. It can be
explained and accounted for by deficiency or failure in causes that are
good in so far forth as they are operative, but which have not all the
goodness their nature demands. And we have seen how this failure of
created causes is permitted by the First Cause, and is not incompatible
with His Infinite Goodness.
Besides, the Manichean conception of an intrinsically evil cause, a cause
that could produce only evil, is a contradiction in terms. The operation
of an efficient cause must have a positive term: in so far as the term is
positive it is good: and therefore its cause cannot have been totally
evil, but must have been in some degree good. The crucial point in the
whole debate is this, that we cannot conceive evil as a positive entity.
By doing so we render reality unintelligible; we destroy the fundamental
ground of any possible distinction between good and evil, thus rendering
both alike inconceivable. Each is correlative to the other; we cannot
understand the one without the other. If, therefore, goodness is an aspect
of real being, and identical with reality, evil must be a negation of
reality, and cannot be made intelligible otherwise.
Finally, the Manichean conception of two Supreme, Self-Existent,
Independent First Principles is obviously self-contradictory. As is shown
in Natural Theology, Being that is absolutely Supreme, Self-Existent and
Necessary, must by Its very nature be unique: there could not be two such
Beings.