By Henry B. Carrington, U.S.A., LL.D.
[The siege of Boston gave to the Continental Army that instruction in
military engineering, and that contact with a disciplined foe, which
prepared it for the immediate operations at New York and in New Jersey.
(See The Bay State Monthly, January, 1884, pages 37-44.)
The occupation and defence of New York and Brooklyn, so promptly made,
was a strategic necessity, fully warranted by existing conditions,
although temporary.]
It is not easy to reconcile the views which we take, in turn, through
the eye and object lenses of a field-glass, so that the real subject of
examination will not be distorted by too great nearness or remoteness.
If we bring back to this hour the events of one hundred years ago, it is
certain that the small armies and the smaller appliances of force then
in use will seem trifling, in contrast with those which have so recently
wearied science and have tasked invention in the work and waste of war.
If we thrust them back to their proper place behind the memory of all
living men, we only see a scattered people, poorly armed, but engaged in
hopeful conflict with Great Britain, then mistress of the seas, proudly
challenging the world to arms, and boldly vindicating her challenge.
In an effort to reproduce that period and so balance the opposing
factors that the siege of Boston and the deliverance of Washington at
Brooklyn and New York shall have fair co-relation and full bearing upon
the resulting struggle for National Independence, there must be some
exact standard for the test j and this will be found by grouping such
data as illustrate the governing laws of military art.
It has never been claimed that the siege of Boston was not the
legitimate result of British blunder and American pluck. In a previous
paper, the siege itself has been presented as that opportunity and
training-school exercise which projected its experience into the entire
war, and assured final triumph. It has not been as generally accepted,
as both philosophical and necessary, that the fortification and defence
of Brooklyn became the wise and inevitable sequence to that siege.
Let us drop a century and handle the old records.
If Great Britain had not called continental auxiliaries to her aid in
1776, her disposable force for colonial service would have been less
than half of the army of Washington.
Until the fortification of Brooklyn and New York had been well advanced,
the British ministry had not been able to assign even fifteen thousand
men for that service. General Clinton did, indeed, anchor at the New
York Narrows, just when General Charles Lee reached that city for its
defence, but did not risk a landing, and sailed for South Carolina, only
to be repulsed.
The British Crown had no alternative but to seek foreign aid. The appeal
to Catharine of Russia for twenty thousand men was met by the laconic
response, "There are other ways of settling this dispute than by resort
to arms." The Duke of Richmond prophetically declared, "The colonies
themselves, after our example, will apply to strangers for assistance."
The opposition to hiring foreign troops was so intense, that, for many
weeks, there was no practical advance in preparations for a really
effective blow at the rebels, while the rebellion itself was daily
gaining head and spirit.
The British army, just before the battle of Long Island, including
Hessians, Brunswickers, and Waldeckers, was but a little larger than
that which the American Congress, as early as October 4, 1775, had
officially assigned to the siege operations before Boston. That force
was fixed at twenty-three thousand, three hundred and seventy-two men.
General Howe landed about twenty thousand men. With the sick, the
reserves on Staten Island, all officers and supernumeraries included,
his entire force exhibited a paper strength of thirty-one thousand, six
hundred and twenty-five men. It is true that General Howe claimed, after
the battle of Long Island, that his entire force (Hessians included) was
only twenty four thousand men, and that Washington opposed the advance
of his division with twenty thousand men. The British muster rolls, as
exhibited before the British Parliament, accord with the statement
already made. The actual force of the American army at Brooklyn was not
far from nine thousand men, instead of twenty thousand, and the
effective force (New York included) was only about twenty thousand men.
As the British regiments brought but six, instead of eight, companies to
a battalion, there is evidence that Washington himself occasionally
over-estimated the British force proper; but the foreign battalions
realized their full force, and they were paid accordingly, upon their
muster rolls. Nearly three fifths of General Howe's army was made up
from continental mercenaries. These troops arrived in detachments, to
supplement the army which otherwise would have been entirely unequal to
the conquest of New York, if the city were fairly defended.
If, on the other hand, Washington had secured the force which he
demanded from Congress, namely, fifty-eight thousand men, which was,
indeed (but too tardily), authorized, he could have met General Howe
upon terms of numerical equality, backed by breast-works, and have held
New York with an equal force.
This estimate, by Washington himself, of the contingencies of the
campaign, will have the greater significance when reference is made to
the details of British preparations in England.
While Congress did, indeed, as early as June, assign thirteen thousand
additional troops for the defence of New York, the peremptory detachment
of ten battalions to Canada, in addition to previous details,
persistently foiled every preparation to meet Howe with an adequate
force. Regiments from Connecticut and from other colonies reported with
a strength of only three hundred and sixty men. While the "paper
strength" of the army was far beyond its effective force, even the
"paper strength" was but one half of the force which the
Commander-in-chief had the right to assume as at his disposal.
Other facts fall in line just here.
At no later period of the war did either commander have under his
immediate control so large a nominal force as then. During but one year
of the succeeding struggle did the entire British army, from Halifax to
the West Indies inclusive (including foreign and provincial
auxiliaries), exceed, by more than seven thousand men, the force which
occupied both sides of the New York Narrows in 1776. The British Army at
that time, without its foreign contingent, would have been as inferior
to the force which had been ordered by Congress (and should have been
available) as the depleted American army of 1781 would have been
inferior to the British without the French contingent.
The largest continental force under arms, in any one year of the war,
did not greatly exceed forty thousand men, and the largest British
force, as late as 1781, including all arrivals, numbered, all told, but
forty-two thousand and seventy-five men.
The annual British average, including provincials, ranged from
thirty-three to thirty-eight thousand men. The physical agencies which
Great Britain employed were;, therefore, far beneath the prestige of her
accredited position among the nations; and the disparity between the
contending forces was mainly in discipline and equipment, with the
advantage to Great Britain in naval strength, until that was supplanted
by that of France.
To free the question from a popular fallacy which treats oldtime
operations as insignificant, in view of large modern armies and
campaigns, it is pertinent to state, just here, that the issues of the
battle-field for all time, up to the latest hour, have not been
determined by the size of armies, or by improvements in weapons of war,
except relatively, in proportion as civilized peoples fought those of
less civilization; or where some precocity of race or invention more
quickly matured the operations of the winning side.
If the maxims of Napoleon are but a terse restatement of those of
Caesar, and the skill of Hannibal at Cannae still holds place as a model
for the concave formation of a battle-line, so have all the decisive
battles of history taken shape from the timely handling of men, in the
exercise of that sound judgment which adapts means to ends, in every
work of life. Thus it is that equally great battles, those in the
highest sense great, have become memorial, although numbers did not
impart value to the struggle; but they were the expression of that skill
and wisdom which would have ensured success, if the opposing armies had
been greater or less.
If a timely fog did aid the retreat of Washington from Brooklyn, in
1776, so did a petty stream, filled to the brim by a midnight shower,
make altogether desperate, if it did not, alone, change, the fortunes of
Napoleon at Waterloo.
If, also, the siege of Yorktown, in 1781, was conducted by few against
few, as compared with modern armies, it is well to note the historical
fact that, at the second siege, in 1861, the same ravine was used by
General Poe (United States Engineers) to connect "parallels," and
thereby save a "regular approach." Numbers did not change relations, but
simply augmented the physical force employed and imperilled.
He who can seize the local, incidental, and seemingly immaterial
elements which enter into all human plans, and convert them into
determining factors, is to be honored; but the man who can so anticipate
the possibilities and risks which lie ahead, that the world counts as a
miracle, or, at least, as marvelous, that which is only the legitimate
result of faith, courage, and skill, is truly great. Washington did it.
His retreat from Long Island was deliberately planned before he had a
conference with his subordinates; and the entire policy and conduct of
his operations at and near New York will defy criticism. To hold the
facts of the issue discussed, right under the light on that military
science (that is, that mental philosophy which does not change with
physical modes and appliances), is simply to bring out clearly the
necessity for the occupation of New York and Brooklyn by Washington in
1776.
The mere statement of the British forces which were available in 1776
will show that if Washington knew, in advance, exactly what he had to
meet, then he had a right to anticipate a successful resistance. As
early as July, 1775, he demanded that the army should be enlisted "for
the war." In a previous article, the policy of the Commander-in-chief
and of General Greene was noticed, and the formulated proposition, then
accepted by both, gave vitality and hope to the struggle. When the issue
ripened at New York, and, swiftly as possible, the besieging force
before Boston became the resisting force at New York, there was one man
who understood the exact issue. The temper of the British press, and
that of the British House of Commons, was fully appreciated by the
American Commander-in-chief. He knew that General Gage had urged that
"thirty thousand men, promptly sent to America, would be the quickest
way to save blood and end the war." He also knew that when John Wesley
predicted that "neither twenty, forty, nor sixty thousand men would
suppress the rebellion," the British Cabinet had placed before
Parliament a careful statement of the entire resources which were deemed
available for military purposes abroad. As early as May, 1776,
Washington was advised of the following facts:--
First, That the contracts at that time made with continental States,
including that with Hesse and Brunswick, would place at British disposal
a nominal strength of fifty-five thousand men.
Second, That, with all due allowance for deficiencies, the effective
force, as claimed by the ministry, could not exceed, but might fall
below, forty thousand men.
The debate in Parliament was so sharp, and the details of the proposed
operations were so closely defined and analyzed, that Washington had
full right to assume, as known, the strength of his adversary.
When, during May, 1776, the American Congress sent troops from New York
to Canada, he sharply protested, thus: "This diversion of forces will
endanger both enterprises; for Great Britain will attempt to capture New
York as well as Canada, if they have the men." He did not believe that
they would capture New York, if he could acquire and retain the force
which he demanded.
The point to be made emphatic, is this: That, from the date of the call
of Massachusetts, early in 1775, for thirty thousand men, up to the
occupation of New York, the force which he had the right to assume as at
his own disposal was equal to the contingencies of the conflict; and
that, when he did occupy New York, and begin its exterior defences at
Brooklyn, the British ministry had admitted its inability to send to
America a force sufficiently strong to capture the city. The maximum
force proposed was less than that which Congress could easily supply for
resistance. In other words, Washington would not have to fight Great
Britain, but a specific force; namely, all that Great Britain could
spare for that service; so that the issue was not between the new
Republic and England, but between the Republic and a single army, of
known elements and numbers. In fact, the opinion that France had already
made war upon England had so early gained credit, that Washington, while
still in New York, was forced to issue an order correcting the rumor,
and thus prevent undue confidence and its corresponding neglect to meet
the demands of the crisis.
Thus far, it is clear that there was nothing extravagant in the American
claim to independence; nor in the readiness of Washington to seize and
hold New York; nor in his belief that the colonial resources were equal
to the contest.
One other element is of determining value as to the necessity for his
occupation and defence of Brooklyn Heights. New York was the only base
from which Great Britain could operate against the colonies as an
organized State. By Long Island Sound and the Hudson River, her right
hand would hold New England under the guns of her warships, and by quick
occupation of Chesapeake and Delaware Bays and their tributary streams,
her left hand would cut off the South.
If the views of Lord Dartmouth had prevailed, in 1775, there would have
been no siege of Boston; but New York would have had a garrison fully
equal to its defence, while sparing troops for operations outside. But
the prompt occupation of New York, as the headquarters of revolution,
was a clear declaration to the world, and to the scattered people of the
colonies, that a new nation was asserting life, and that its soil was
free from a hostile garrison. The occupation of New York centralized, at
the social, commercial, and natural capital of the Republic, all
interests and resources, and gave to the struggle real force,
inspiration, and dignity.
Just as the men at Bunker Hill fought so long as powder and ball held
out, but could not have been led to assail, in open field, the veterans
whom they did, in fact, so effectively resist; and, as very often, a
patriotic band has bravely defended, when unequal to aggressive
action,--so the possession, defence, and even the loss, of New York, as
an incident of a campaign, were very different from an effort to wrest
the city from the grasp of a British garrison, under cover of yawning
broadsides.
History is replete with facts to show how hopefully men will seek to
regain lost positions, when an original capture would have been deemed
utterly hopeless. Poland wellnigh regained a smothered nationality
through an inspiration, which never could have been evoked, in a plan to
seize from the Russian domain a grand estate, upon which to establish an
original Poland.
To have held but to have lost New York, would simply show the defects of
the defence, and the margin wanting in ability to retain, while no less
suggesting how, in turn, it might be regained, at the right time, by
adequate means and methods. The occupation and defence of Brooklyn
Heights was the chief element of value in this direction. It not only
combined the general protection of the city and post, in connection with
the works upon Governor's Island, but to have neglected either would
have admitted an inability to retain either.
British troops at Brooklyn would command New York. American troops at
Brooklyn presented the young nation in the attitude of guarding the
outer doorway of its freshly-asserted independence. It put the British
to the defensive, and compelled them to risk the landing of a large
army, after a protracted ocean voyage, before they could gain a footing
and measure strength with the colonists. It does not lessen our estimate
of the skill of Washington to know that Congress failed to supply
adequate forces; but he made wise estimates, and had reason to expect a
prompt response to his requisitions.
That episode at Breed's Hill, which tested the value of even a light
cover for keen sharpshooters, had so warned Howe of the courage of his
enemy that the garrison of Bunker Hill had never worried Putnam's little
redoubt across the Charlestown Isthmus; neither had the troops at Boston
ever assailed, with success, the thin circumvallation which protected
the besiegers.
At Brooklyn, Washington established ranges for firing-parties, so that
the rifle could be intelligently and effectively used, as the British
might, in turn, approach the danger line. All these preparations,
although impaired by the illness and absence of General Greene, had been
so well devised, that even after General Howe gained the rear of
Sullivan and Stirling and captured both, he halted before the
entrenchments and resorted to regular approaches rather than venture an
assault.
If that portion of the proper garrison of New York which had been sent
to Canada, to waste from disease and fill six thousand graves, had been
available at New York, they might have made of Jamaica Ridge and
Prospect Hill a British Golgotha before the lines of Brooklyn.
If we conceive of an invasion of New York to-day, other than by some
devastating fleet, we can at once see that the whole outline of defence
as proposed by Washington, until he ordered the retreat, was
characteristic of his wisdom and his settled purpose to resist a
landing, fight at every ridge, yield only to compulsion, enure his men
to face fire, and "make every British advance as costly as possible to
the enemy."
The summary is briefly this: There was an universal revolt of the
colonies, and a fixed purpose to achieve and maintain independence.
There was, at the same time, in England, not only a vigorous opposition
to the use of force, but a clearly-defined exhibit of the maximum
military resources which its authorities could call into exercise.
Imminent European complications were already bristling for battle, both
by land and sea, and Great Britain was without a continental ally or
friend. As the British resources were thus definitely defined, so was
the military policy distinctly stated; namely, to make, as the first
objective, the recovery of New York, and its acceptance as the permanent
base for prosecution of the war. The first blow was designed to be a
fatal blow. It was for Washington to take the offensive. He did so, and
by the occupation of New York and Brooklyn put himself in the attitude
of resisting invasion, rather than as attempting the expulsion of a
rightful British garrison from the British capital of its American
colonies.
Not only did the metal of such men as he commanded stand fire on the
seventeenth of June, 1775, at Breed's Hill, but when he followed up the
expulsion of the garrison of Boston by the equally aggressive
demonstrations at New York, he gave assurance of the thoroughness of his
purpose to achieve independence, and thereby inspired confidence at home
and abroad. The failure to realize a competent field force for the issue
with Howe, and the circumstances of the retreat and evacuation, do not
impair the statement that, in view of his knowledge of British resources
and those of America, the occupation and defence of Brooklyn and New
York was a military necessity, warranted by existing conditions, and not
impaired by his disappointment in not securing a sufficient force to
meet his enemy upon terms of equality and victory. It increases our
admiration of that strategic forethought which habitually inspired him
to maintain an aggressive attitude, until the surrender at Yorktown
consummated his plans, and verified his wisdom and his faith.
* * * * *