practicable or desirable. There is a sense in which I am myself a
convinced “Home Ruler.” I believe that a number of causes (quite
independent of Irish Jingoism) are combining to make a vast extension
of our system of local government imperative. Mr. H. G. Wells has shown
that the administrative areas of our local authorities are at present
much too small, and the authorities themselves are quickly finding this
out from practical experience. Parliament is overwhelmed with business
which intelligent local bodies could transact much better. Imperial
Federation, when it comes, will of necessity entail a large measure of
local autonomy. Altogether some scheme of provincial councils seems
less fantastic to-day than it did when Mr. Chamberlain outlined it
in the ’eighties. But there is no earthly reason for conceding to the
least trustworthy and most militantly provincial part of the United
Kingdom anything more than you give to the rest. Ireland should get
such autonomy as we might give to the north of England and no more.
Ireland is no more a Nation than Yorkshire, but there is every reason
why both Ireland and Yorkshire should be taught to manage their purely
internal affairs to the best of their ability.
But, if exclusive Nationalism is essentially unsocialistic, what are
we to say of Imperialism? The answer is that there is nothing wrong
with Imperialism except the name which suggests Louis Bonaparte and
the dragooning of subject peoples. With the thing, in its British
sense, Socialists have no kind of quarrel. Indeed if Socialists would
only give up their vague invectives against “Empire,” which lead in
the long run to nothing more than the unmeaning backing of the effete
anti-imperialist, anti-socialist, anti-Church-and-State Radicalism
current fifty years ago, and seriously face the problems raised by
British expansion from an unswervingly Socialist standpoint, we might
get on a good deal faster. The problem of Imperialism (“Federationism”
would be a better word) may be briefly stated thus:--How can we
consolidate the widely scattered and variegated dominions which fly the
British flag into one vast Commonwealth of practically international
extent? Have Socialists any answer to this question? Or are they to be
content with the old Radical answer that this cannot or should not be
done?
That any Socialist should return such answer is to me I confess
astounding. To say that such a practically international commonwealth
is impossible is to say that _a fortiori_ the international
commonwealth of which Marx and Lassalles dreamed is impossible.
If the proletarians of England and Ireland, Australia and South Africa,
India and Canada cannot unite, what hope is there that those of France
and Germany, Russia and Japan will do so. Surely it is a curious way
of showing your enthusiasm for the Federation of the World to break
up all existing federations into smaller and smaller divisions. The
practical Socialist policy in relation to the Empire is clearly not to
destroy it, but to socialize it--that is to prevent its exploitation by
capitalist cliques and financial conspiracies, to organise it in the
interests of its inhabitants as a whole, and to use its power to check
the evil force and cunning of cosmopolitan finance.
For indeed the dark of deeds such finance can only, as we Socialists
believe, be checked by the political force of the community. And in
order to check it at all effectively the community must be operative
on a scale as large as its own. That is why the older Socialists were
internationalists; that is why so many of the more thoughtful of
modern Socialists are imperialists. Mr. Wells has pointed out at what
a serious disadvantage municipalities find themselves in dealing with
private monopolies since the latter can operate over any area that is
convenient to them, while the operations of the former are confined
within the narrow and arbitrary frontiers drawn by Acts of Parliament.
Exactly the same is true in international affairs. Mr. Beit and Mr.
Eckstein can safely snap their fingers at small nationalities, however
progressive. Against a Socialistic British Empire they would be utterly
powerless.
And as the organization of the Empire can be made the most powerful of
Socialist weapons if we can once get control of it, so the popular
sentiment of Imperialism can be used for the purposes of Socialist
propaganda if we know how to turn it to account. For we Socialists
alone possess the key to the problem--the key for which nonsocialist
Imperialists are looking. It is to be noted that as soon as the
ordinary Imperialist gets anywhere near the solution of an imperial
question he gets unconsciously on to the Socialist track, as for
instance in the growing demand for the imperialisation of our great
carrying lines. Even Mr. Chamberlain’s propaganda, though Socialists
cannot think it sufficient, is a sort of groping after the socialist
solution, an admission of the necessity of intervention by the
united British Commonwealth to check and regulate the disintegrating
anarchy of commercial competition. In fact our word to the stupid and
thoughtless Imperialism of the streets is in reality the word of St.
Paul to the Athenians:--“What ye ignorantly worship that declare we
unto you!”
The same general line of thought has its application to the problems
of foreign policy. The old Cobdenite doctrine of non-intervention in
the affairs of other nations had its origin in Cobden’s general view
of diplomacy as existing only to promote the interests of trade--by
which of course he meant the interests of the merchant, manufacturer
and capitalist. That cannot possibly be our view. For Socialists to
accept the Liberal doctrine of non-intervention would amount to a
denial of that human solidarity of which they have always considered
themselves the especial champions. In point of fact Palmerston is a
much better model for Socialists in regard to continental affairs
than Cobden or Bright or even Gladstone. For, though Gladstone was
certainly not a non-interventionist, his anti-Turkish monomania made
him blind to the evil power of Russia, whose existence is a standing
menace to liberty and progress, and whose power and vast resources
make her a more formidable enemy of all that we value than Turkey
could ever be if she tried. Socialists should press not merely for
the protection of our “proletarian” fishermen against the freaks of
tipsy or panic-stricken Russian admirals, but for a steady policy of
opposition to Russia all over the world and the support of any or every
nation, Japs, Finns, Poles, Afghans and even the “unspeakable” Turk
against her. During the perilous days through which we have recently
passed, it must have occurred to many that our position would have
been much stronger if we could have counted on the support of Turkey,
as we could have done had we never abandoned, in deference to Mr.
Gladstone’s theological animosities, the policy of Palmerston and Lord
Stratford de Redcliffe--the policy of first reforming Turkish rule and
then guaranteeing it against Muscovite aggression. The only difference
between our policy and Palmerston’s should be this, that while
Palmerston confined himself to the encouragement of political liberty,
we ought to aim at the promotion of economic liberty also. We should in
fact try to put England at the head of the Labour interest throughout
the world as Cromwell put her at the head of the Protestant interest,
and Palmerston of the Liberal interest. And in doing this we should be
prepared to make full use of those weapons which neither Cromwell nor
Palmerston would ever have hesitated to employ.
“MILITARISM AND AGGRESSION”
We are continually being told by Socialists of the hazier sort that
Labour has no concern with the question of national defence. We have
had recently a considerable ebullition of this particular form of
imbecility provoked by the efforts of one who has always seemed to
me quite the sanest and most far-sighted of English Socialists, Mr.
Robert Blatchford, to draw general attention to the importance of the
subject. Mr. Blatchford is in controversy very well able to take care
of himself, and in this instance he has overwhelmed his critics with
such a cannonade of satire, eloquence, indisputable logic and inspired
common-sense that it would be quite impertinent of me to offer him my
support. But the episode is so very typical of the ineffable silliness
of “advanced” persons that I cannot pass it by without comment.
As to the contention so much favoured by those who have been assailing
Mr. Blatchford’s “militarism” that England is not worth defending and
that a foreign invasion would be no evil to the bulk of the people,
the position has been so thoroughly dismantled by “Nunquam’s” heavy
artillery that I need hardly trouble about it here. As Mr. Blatchford
says, a few weeks of Prussian or Muscovite rule would probably be the
best cure for reformers of this type. But the whole argument is on the
face of it absurd. That your country is badly governed is an excellent
reason for changing your present rulers. But it is no reason at all for
welcoming (patriotism being for the moment set on one side) a cataclysm
which would destroy good and bad alike--the good more completely than
the bad--and would inevitably throw back all hope of reform for
at least a century. As well might a man say that, since London was
admittedly in many ways an ugly and horrible place, he proposed to vote
for the abolition of the fire-brigade.
So also with the very popular platitude which asserts that a peaceful
and unaggressive people need not fear attack, and that, if we refrain
from injuring our neighbours they will refrain from injuring us,
(unless presumably we happen to be North Sea fishermen). The obvious
controversial retort is that the people who maintain this doctrine
are for the most part the very same who a little while ago were never
tired of maintaining that the Boers were peaceful and unaggressive and
lamenting that in spite of this their country was attacked, conquered
and annexed by a powerful neighbour. Of course I do not accept this
account of the Boers, whom indeed I respect far too much to accuse
of Tolstoian proclivities. But the point is plainly unanswerable
for those who do accept it. In any case the whole of the above lofty
generalization is flatly contradicted by history and experience.
Indeed, if the strong will not wantonly attack the weak, then is our
preaching vain! Why are we Socialists? What is the good of Trade
Unionism? The humane capitalists will not attack us if we remain
“peaceful and unaggressive.” Perhaps not. As Mr. Hyndman (I think) once
said:--One does not muzzle sheep! But, if there is anything which the
whole history of human institutions proves, it is this, that the people
that does not know how to defend its liberties will lose them, and that
it is not the strong and aggressive nation but the weak and defenceless
nation that has cause to dread aggression from its neighbours.
In a word the doctrine of non-resistance and its consequence, the
abolition of armaments, is good Anarchism and may therefore in a sense
be called good Liberalism. But Socialism it is not and cannot be.
There is however, a position sometimes maintained by controversialists
rather saner than those dealt with above. It is suggested that, while
it may be admitted that an army of some sort is necessary, there
are plenty of people already concerned with the promotion of its
efficiency, and that Socialists, having other and more important work
to do, had much better leave the question alone, intervening only to
restrain the militarists when their demands become excessive.
Now to this contention there are as it seems to me three complete
answers. By far the most important objection to such a policy is
that it would make it permanently impossible for us to gain the
confidence of the electorate. The people of Great Britain (especially
the working classes) will always demand as the first condition of
supporting any government that it shall be able and willing to defend
the country against foreign aggression. No party which was not
thought to fulfil this condition would find it possible to achieve
or retain administrative power. And those of us whose desire is not
to sit in arm chairs and read Tolstoi and congratulate ourselves
on the non-conformity of our consciences, but to get some sort of
socialism put into bricks and mortar, must feel the urgent necessity of
convincing the voters that we are trustworthy in this respect.
Moreover if you leave the discussion of army reform to the
representatives of the landed and capitalist classes, such reforms
as we get will be carried out exclusively in the interests of those
classes. At present our military and naval forces are officered and
controlled by one class; they are an appendage of that class and will
always, so long as this is so, be employed successfully to protect its
interests. So long as the English people are asked to choose between
such class army and the risk of a German invasion, they will choose
the former, but it by no means follows that they would do so were a
practicable alternative placed before them.
And this brings me to my third point. It so happens that for
the purpose of formulating an alternative, Socialists are in an
exceptionally favoured position. Our army has by common consent
broken down. It is not even effective for the purposes for which the
capitalist classes want it. It is not only, as foolish people suppose,
the War Office that is decadent and inefficient; the army is decadent
and inefficient. Our soldiers are perhaps the best raw material in
the world, but the whole machinery of war and defence is eaten up by
a corruption which is all the worse for being largely careless and
unconscious. The two worst enemies of the British Army are the power of
money and the power of caste. These are our enemies also. We Socialists
alone are in a position to see what is really wrong. Would it not be
worth our while to bring our best brains to bear upon the subject and
see whether our Socialism cannot provide us with a remedy.
In spite of the unfortunate prevalence of the sort of sentimentalism
referred to above, there have always been in the socialist movement
witnesses to the common-sense view of militarism. Here and there
throughout this volume I have been obliged to criticize the attitude
of the Social Democratic Federation; I therefore admit the more gladly
that on this question that body has indubitably led the way. Its views
are obtainable in the form of a remarkably able pamphlet[2] from
the pen of Mr. Quelch, wherein the old Liberal Quakerism is thrown
completely overboard and the institution of universal citizen service
on something like the Swiss model put forward as the socialist solution
of the problem of national defence. The Fabians followed in “Fabianism
and the Empire,”[3] adopting a suggestion of Mr. and Mrs. Sidney Webb’s
that the half-time age in factories and workshops should be raised to
21, and the time thus gained devoted to training in the use of modern
weapons. Finally there is Mr. Robert Blatchford, whose plan is too
elaborate to be detailed here--I refer my readers to his articles in
the _Clarion_ during July, August and September last year and to his
forthcoming book on the subject--but whose cardinal demand is for an
immense increase in the numbers and efficiency of the volunteers, who
are to form a citizen force of almost national dimensions. Of course
the Fabian programme and, I gather, Mr. Blatchford’s also imply the
existence of at any rate a small professional army in addition.
Now it seems to me that the one defect of the S.D.F. plan is that,
if I understand Mr. Quelch’s pamphlet rightly, it professes only to
provide a militia for the defence of these islands. That is to say it
does not provide for the defence of our possessions in different parts
of the world nor for any aggressive movement against the territory of
the power with which we chance to be at war; while even for purely
defensive purposes it is open to the grave military objections which
can always be urged against relying solely on irregular troops.
I have already discussed the question of Imperialism and I need not
go into it again. But I suppose that all but the most fanatical
Little-Englanders, whatever their views on expansion, would admit that
it is both our right and our duty to assist in the protection of our
fellow-citizens in other parts of the world against unprovoked attack.
If, for example, Germany were to make a wanton attack on Australia, or
Russia on India, or the United States on Canada, I suppose that every
sensible Englishman would admit that we ought to come to the assistance
of our fellow-countrymen. But in that case we shall want an army for
foreign service as well as for home defence.
The other point needs rather more explanation because it is constantly
misunderstood by people who will not try to comprehend the nature of
war. Such persons are always confusing aggression in the political
sense as the cause of war with aggression in the strategic sense as
a method of conducting it. A war may be waged solely for defensive
purposes, yet it may be the right course from a military point of
view to take the offensive. France found this in the wars of the
revolution; and Japan fighting (as I believe) for no other purpose than
the protection of her own independence against the lies of Russian
diplomacy and the brutalities of Russian power, has yet been obliged
to conquer Korea, invade Manchuria, and lay siege to Port Arthur.
Similarly we might easily find ourselves engaged in a purely defensive
war with France or Germany, in which it might be still the only safe
policy to raid the territory and seize the over-sea possessions and
especially the coaling-stations of our enemies.
As a matter of fact the distinction so often made between offensive and
defensive war is more theoretic than practical. It is seldom possible
to say in the case of a modern war that either side is unmistakably
attacking or defending. Which side was the aggressor in the Crimean
or Franco-German wars? Are the Japs aggressors because it was they who
actually declared war or are they only defending their country? The
real question to be asked is not which side is the aggressor, but which
nation is so situated that its triumph will be beneficial to mankind as
a whole.
Lastly there are the serious disadvantages from a military standpoint
of trusting to a citizen force alone. Experience seems to prove that
such a force is suitable only to a certain kind of warfare. The example
of the Boers to which Mr. Quelch appeals so confidently tells directly
against him. The Boers doubtless did wonders in the way of guerrilla
fighting and in the defence of strong positions, but they never
followed up their successes effectively, and they had to waste a great
deal of time, when time was of the utmost value to them, in sitting
down before Ladysmith, Kimberley and Mafeking when a professional army
of the same size would have taken all three by assault.
It seems to me that we can get an excellent military policy for
Socialists by a judicious combination of the three suggestions to which
I have referred. Taking Mr. Webb’s plan first, let us by all means by a
modification of the Factory Acts (much needed for its own sake) train
the whole youthful population in the use of modern weapons--and not
in the use of modern weapons alone but in the best physical exercises
available and above all in discipline, endurance and the military
virtues. Then, following Mr. Quelch and the S.D.F. we might keep them
in training by periodic mobilizations on the Swiss pattern without
subjecting them to long periods of barrack life. From the large citizen
force so formed we ought to be able to pick by voluntary enlistment
a professional army which need not be very large, but which should
be well-paid, efficiently organised and prepared for any emergency.
Another and larger professional army would be needed for the defence of
distant dependencies such as India.
These forces must, of course, be constituted on a basis of equality of
opportunity, efficiency and reliability and capacity to command being
the only passports to promotion and no bar being placed between the
most capable soldier, whatever his origin and the highest posts in the
army. From the purely military point of view this would be an enormous
improvement on the present system. It is worth noting that the two
armies which, organised in an incredibly short space of time out of the
rawest of materials, broke in pieces every force which could be put
into the field against them, the army of Cromwell and the army of the
First Republic, were alike based on the principle of the “career open
to talent.” So the policy which I suggest would, I sincerely believe,
convert our impossible army into one of the best fighting machines in
the world. Not only would the officers under such a system be more
capable than some of the fashionable commanders, whose glorious defeats
and magnificent surrenders we were all eulogising five years ago, but
better chances and a higher rate of pay would attract to the ranks of
the professional army the very best type of man for the purpose, which
the present system can hardly be said to do.
Beyond this we want an effective General Staff and an Intelligence
Department not only alert but strong enough to enforce its demands on
the government, as well as a complete overhauling of our war-machine
both on its civil and military side. But there is no space for details
here; Socialists could hardly do better than leave them to Mr.
Blatchford to work out.[4]
No one who thinks seriously of the consequences of such a policy can
doubt that, if it could be carried out, it would effect a greater
transference of real power to the democracy than any Reform Bill. The
objection which most reformers instinctively feel to any proposal to
increase military establishments rests, I fancy, at bottom on their
sense that such establishments are organized by a class to protect its
narrow class interests. So it is that British troops are found useful
to British governments not only in Egypt and South Africa but also
at Featherstone and Bethesda. With such a military organisation as I
have suggested this menace would disappear. Nay, the weights would
be transferred to the other scale. Nothing, I conceive, is so likely
to put a little of the fear of God into the hearts of our Liberal
and Conservative rulers as the knowledge that they have to deal with
a democratic army and a democracy trained in arms. This, I know,
will sound shockingly heterodox to idealistic persons who are fond
of repeating (in defiance of universal human experience) the foolish
maxim of John Bright, the Quaker apologist for plutocratic Anarchism,
that “force is no remedy,” and the equally unhistorical statement that
“violence always injures the cause of those who use it.” But practical
men pay little attention to such talk, knowing that nothing helps a
strike so much as a little timely rioting and that the most important
reforms of the late century were only carried when it was known that
the mob of the great towns was “up.” As a matter of fact, force is
the _only_ remedy. If Socialism comes about, as I think it probably
will in this country, in the constitutional Fabian way, this will only
mean that the Socialists will themselves have captured the control of
the army and the police and will then use them against the possessing
classes, forcing them to disgorge at the bayonet’s point. And, if it
does not superficially wear this aspect, that will merely be because
the latter, seeing how invincible is the physical force arrayed against
them, may very likely surrender position after position at discretion
until they find that they have no longer anything to defend.[5]
It may be remarked incidentally that social reform would receive a
considerable impetus from such a policy. Not only would periodic
mobilizations take the workers for a time out of the foetid atmosphere
of their slums and factories and perhaps make them less contented to
return, but the heads of the army would themselves be compelled to
become social reformers and insist on some decent minimum of housing
and factory conditions in order to keep up the physical efficiency of
the material of which they would have to make soldiers. Herr Molkenbuhr
the German Social-Democrat pointed out to the Socialist Congress at
Amsterdam this year that this had happened in Germany even under an
undemocratic and often really oppressive form of conscription. An
immense impetus given to housing and factory legislation would be
among the by-products of Army Reform, if carried out on the right
lines.