your debates, overhaul portions or chapters of systematic logic, with a
view to present the difficulties in their natural position in the
subject. You might, for example, take up the question as to the Province
of logic, with its divisions, parts, and order--all which admit of many
various views--and bring forward the vexed controversies under lights
favourable to their resolution. Regarding logic as an aid to the
faculties in tackling whatever is abstruse, you should endeavour to
cultivate and enhance its powers, in this particular, by detailed
exposition and criticism of all its canons and prescriptions. The
department of Classification is a good instance; a region full of
delicate subtleties as well as "bread-and-butter" applications.
It is in this last view of logic that we can canvass philosophical
systems upon the ground of their method or procedure alone. Looking at
the absence, in any given system, of the arts and precautions that are
indispensable to the establishment of truth in the special case, we may
pronounce against it, _à priori_; we know that such a system can be true
only by accident, or else by miracle. We may reasonably demand of a
system-builder--Is he in the narrow way that leadeth to truth, or in the
broad way that leadeth somewhere else?
I have said that I consider the connection between Logic and Psychology
to be but slender, although not unimportant. The amount and nature of
this connection would reward a careful consideration. There would be
considerable difficulty in seeing any connection at all between the
Aristotelian Syllogism and psychology, but for the high-sounding
designations appended to the notion and the proposition--simple
apprehension and judgment--of which I fail to discover the propriety or
relevance. I know that Grote gave a very profound turn to the employment
of the term "judgment" by Aristotle, as being a recognition of the
relativity of knowledge to the affirming mind. I am not to say,
absolutely, "Ice is cold"; I am to say that, to the best of my judgment
or belief, or in so far as I am concerned, ice is cold. This, however,
has little to do with the logic of the syllogism, and not much with any
logic. So, when we speak of a "notion," we must understand it as
apprehended by some mind; but for nearly all purposes, this is assumed
tacitly; it need not appear in a formal designation, which, not being
wanted, is calculated to mislead.
* * * * *
[APPLIED OR DERIVATIVE SCIENCES.]
With these remarks on the two fundamental sciences of our group, I now
turn to the _applied_ or _derivative_ sciences, wherein the great
controversies stand out most conspicuous, which, in fact, exist for the
purpose of contention--Ontology and Ethics. These branches were in
request long before the mother sciences--psychology and logic--came into
being at all. They had occupied their chief positions without consulting
the others, partly because these were not there to consult, and partly
because they were not inclined to consult any extraneous authority. By
Ontology we may designate the standing controversies of the intellectual
powers--perception, innate ideas, nominalism _versus_ realism, and
noumenon _versus_ phenomenon. I am not going to pronounce upon these
questions; I have already recommended the alternative mode of
approaching them under systematic psychology and logic; and I will now
regard them as constituents of the fourfold enumeration of the
metaphysical sciences.
The Germans may be credited for teaching us, or trying to teach us, to
distinguish "bread and butter" from what passes beyond, transcends bread
and butter. With them the distinction is thoroughly ingrained, and comes
to hand at a moment's notice. If I am to review in detail what may be
considered the practical or applied departments of logic and psychology,
I am in danger of trenching on their "bread-and-butter" region. Before
descending, therefore, into the larder, let us first spend a few seconds
in considering psychology as the pursuit of _truth_ in all that relates
to our mental constitution. If difficulty be a stimulus to the human
exertions, it may be found here. To ascertain, fix, and embody the
precise truth in regard to the facts of the mind is about as hard an
undertaking as could be prescribed to a man. But this is another way of
saying that psychology is not a very advanced science; is not well
stored with clear and certain doctrines; and is unable, therefore, to
confer any very great precision on its dependent branches, whether
purely speculative or practical. In a word, the greatest modesty or
humility is the deportment most becoming to all that engage in this
field of labour, even when doing their best; while the same virtues in
even greater measure are due from those engaging in it without doing
their best.
It must be admitted, however, that the highest evidence and safeguard of
truth is application. In every other science, the utility test is final.
The great parent sciences--mathematics, physics, chemistry,
physiology--have each a host of filial dependents, in close contact with
the supply of human wants; and the success of the applications is the
testimony to the truth of the sciences applied. Thus, although we may
not narrow the sphere of truth to bread and butter, yet we have no surer
test of the truth itself. Our trade requires navigation, and navigation
verifies astronomy; and, but for navigation, we may be pretty confident
that astronomy would now have very little accuracy to boast of.
To come then to the practical bearings or outgoings of psychology,
assisted by logic. My contention is that the parent sciences and the
filial sciences should be carried on together; that theses should be
extracted by turns from all; that the lights thus obtained would be
mutual. I will support the position by a review of the subjects thus
drawn into the metaphysical field.
* * * * *
[PROBLEMS OF EDUCATION.]
Foremost among these applied sciences I would place EDUCATION, the
subject of the day. The priority of mention is due not so much to its
special or pre-eminent importance, as to its being the most feasible and
hopeful of the practical applications of conjoined psychology and logic.
I say this, however, with a more express eye to _intellectual_
education. I deem it quite possible to frame a practical, science
applicable to the training of the intellect that shall be precise and
definite in a very considerable measure. The elements that make up our
intellectual furniture can be stated with clearness; the laws of
intellectual growth or acquisition are almost the best ascertained
generalities of the human mind; even the most complicated studies can be
analyzed into their components, partly by psychology and partly by the
higher logic. In a word, if we cannot make a science of education, as
far as Intellect is concerned, we may abandon metaphysical study
altogether.
I do not speak with the same confidence as to _moral_ education. There
has long been in existence a respectable rule-of-thumb practice in this
region, the result of a sufficiently wide experience. There are certain
psychological laws, especially those relating to the formation of moral
habits, that have a considerable value; but to frame a theory of moral
education, on a level in a point of definiteness with the possible
theory of intellectual education, is a task that I should not like to
have imposed upon me. In point of fact, two problems are joined in one,
to the confusion of both. There is _first_ the vast question of _moral
control_, which stretches far and wide over many fields, and would have
to be tracked with immense labour: it belongs to the arts of government;
it comes under moral suasion, as exercised by the preacher and orator;
it even implicates the tact of diplomacy. I do not regard this as a
properly educational question (although it refers to an art that every
teacher must try to master); that is to say, its solution is not
connected with education processes strictly so called. The _second_
problem of moral education is the one really within the scope of the
subject--the problem of _fixing moral bents_ or habits, when the right
conduct is once initiated. On this head, some scientific insight is
attainable; and suggestions of solid value may in time accrue, although
there never can be the precision attainable in the intellectual region.
* * * * *
I will next advert to the applied science of Art or Aesthetics, long a
barren ground, so far as scientific handling was concerned, but now a
land of promise. The old thesis, "What is Beauty?" a good debating
society topic, is, I hope, past contending about. The numerous
influences that concur in works of art, or in natural beauty, present a
fine opening for delicate analysis; at the same time, they implicate the
vaguest and least advanced portion of psychology--the Emotions. The
German philosophers have usually ranked aesthetics as one of the
subjective sciences; but, it is only of late that the department has
taken shape in their country. Lessing gave a great impulse to literary
art, and originated a number of pregnant suggestions; and the German
love of music has necessarily led to theories as well as to
compositions. We are now in the way to that consummation of aesthetics
which may be described as containing (1) a reference to psychology as
the mother science, (2) a classification, comparison, and contrast of
the fine arts themselves, and (3) an induction of the principles of art
composition from the best examples. Anything like a thorough sifting of
fine-art questions would strain psychology at every point--senses,
emotions, intellect; and, if criticism is to go deep, it must ground
upon psychological reasons. Now the mere artist can never be a
psychologist; the art critic may, but seldom will; hence, as they will
not come over to us, some of us must go over to them. The Art discussion
of the greatest fountains of human feeling--love and anger--would react
with advantage upon the very difficult psychology of these emotions, so
long the sport of superficiality.
[AESTHETICS: HEDONICS.]
But I hold that aesthetics is but a corner of a larger field that is
seldom even named among the sciences of mind; I mean human happiness as
a whole, "eudaemonics," or "hedonics," or whatever you please to call
it. That the subject is neglected, I do not affirm; but it is not
cultivated in the proper place, or in the proper light-giving
connection--that is to say, under the psychology of the human feelings.
It should have at once a close reference to psychology, and an
independent construction; while either in comprehending aesthetics, or
in lying side by side with that, it would give and receive illumination.
The researches now making into the laws and limits of human sensibility,
if they have any value, ought to lead to the economy of pleasure and the
abatement of pain. The analysis of sensation and of emotion points to
this end. Whoever raises any question as to human happiness should refer
it, in the first instance, to psychology; in the next, to some general
scheme that would answer for a science of happiness; and, thirdly, to an
induction of the facts of human experience; the three distinct appeals
correcting one another. If psychology can contribute nothing to the
point, it confesses to a desideratum for future inquirers.
[HEDONICS SEPARATE FROM ETHICS.]
I am not at all satisfied with the coupling of happiness with ethics, as
is usually done. Ethics is the sphere of duty; happiness is mentioned
only to be repressed and discouraged. This is not the situation for
unfolding all the blossoms of human delight, nor for studying to allay
every rising uneasiness. He would be a rare ethical philosopher that
would permit full scope to such an operation within his grounds; neither
Epicurus nor Bentham could come up to this mark. But even if the thing
were permitted, the lights are not there; it is only by combining the
parent psychology and the hedonic derivative, that the work can be done.
It is neither disrespect nor disadvantage to duty, that it is not
mentioned in the department until the very end. To cultivate happiness
is not selfishness or vice, unless you confine it to self; and the mere
act of inquiring does not so confine it. If you are in other respects a
selfish man, you will apply your knowledge for your own sole behoof; if
you are not selfish, you will apply it for the good of your fellows
also, which is another name for virtue.
But the obstacles to a science of happiness are not solely clue to the
gaps and deficiencies in our psychological knowledge; they are equally
owing to the prevailing terrorism in favour of self-denial at all hands.
Many of the maxims as to happiness would not stand examination if people
felt themselves free to discuss them. You must work yourselves into a
fervour of revolt and defiance, before you call in question Paley's
declaration that "happiness is equally distributed among all orders of
the community". I do not know whether I should wonder most at the
cheerful temperament or the complacent optimism of Adam Smith, when he
asks, "What can be added to the happiness of the man who is in health,
who is out of debt, and has a clear conscience?"[13] When the greatest
philosophers talk thus, what is to be expected from the unphilosophic
mob? The dependence of health on activity is always kept very loose, it
may be for the convenience of shutting our mouths against complaints of
being overworked. To render this dependence precise is a matter of pure
psychology.
* * * * *
[SOCIOLOGY.]
Before coming to Ethics I must, as a preparation, view another
derivative branch of psychology, the old subject of politics and
society, under its new name, SOCIOLOGY. It is obvious that all terms
used in describing social facts and their generalities are terms of
mind: command and obedience, law and right, order and progress, are
notions made up of human feelings, purposes, and thoughts.
Sociology is usually studied in its own special field, and nowhere else;
that is to say, the sociologist employs himself in observing and
comparing the operations of societies under all varieties of
circumstances, and in all historic ages. The field is essentially human
nature, and the laws arrived at are laws of human nature. A consummate
sociologist is not often to be found; the really great theorists in
society could be counted on one's fingers. Some of them have been
psychologists as well; I need mention only Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke,
Hume, the Mills. Others as Vico, Montesquieu, Millar, Condorcet, Auguste
Comte, De Tocqueville, have not independently studied the mind on the
broad psychological basis. Now the bearings on sociology of a pure
psychological preparation can be convincingly shown. The laws of
society, if not the merest empiricisms, are derivative laws of the mind;
hence a theorist cannot be trusted with the handling of a derivative
law, unless he knows, as well as can be known, the simple or constituent
laws. All the elements of human character crop up in men's social
relations; in the foreground are their self-interest or sense of
self-preservation, together with their social and anti-social
promptings; a little farther back are their active energy, their
intelligence, their artistic feelings, and their religious
susceptibilities. Now all these should be broadly examined as elements
of the mind, without an immediate reference to the political machine.
Of course, the social feelings need a social situation, and cannot be
studied without that; but there are many social situations that give
scope for examining them, besides what is contemplated in political
society; and the psychologist proper ought to avail himself of all the
opportunities of rendering the statement of these various elements
precise. For this purpose, his chief aim is the ultimate analysis of the
various faculties and feelings. This analysis nobody but himself cares
to institute; and yet a knowledge of the ultimate constitution of an
emotional tendency is one of the best aids in appreciating its mode of
working. Without a good preliminary analysis of the social and
anti-social emotions, for example, you are almost sure to be counting
the same thing twice over, or else confounding two different facts under
one designation. On the one hand, the precise relationship of the states
named love, sympathy, disinterestedness; and, on the other hand, the
common basis of domination, resentment, pride, egotism,--should be
distinctly cleared up, as is possible only in psychological study
strictly so called. The workings of the religious sentiment cannot be
shown sociologically, without a previous analysis of the constituent
emotions.
[SOCIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS.]
An allusion so very slender to so vast a subject as sociology would be a
waste of words, but for the conviction, that through sociology is the
way to the great field of Ethics. This is to reverse the traditional
arrangement--ethics, politics, or government--followed even by Bentham.
The lights of ethics are, in the first instance, psychological; its
discussions presuppose a number of definitions and distinctions that are
pure psychology. But before these have to be adduced, the subject has to
be set forth as a problem of sociology. "How is the King's government to
be carried on?" "How is society to be held together?" is the first
consideration; and the sociologist--as constitution-builder,
administrator, judge--is the person to grapple with the problem. It is
with him that law, obligation, right, command, obedience, sanction, have
their origin and their explanation. Ethics is an important supplement to
social or political law. But it is still a department of law. In any
other view it is a maze, a mystery, a hopeless embroilment.
That ethics is involved in society is of course admitted; what is not
admitted is, that ethical terms should be settled under the social
science in the first place. I may refer to the leading term "law," whose
meaning in sociology is remarkably clear; in ethics remarkably the
reverse. The confusion deepens when the moral faculty is brought
forward. In the eye of the sociologist, nothing could be simpler than
the conception of that part of our nature that is appealed to for
securing obedience. He assumes a certain effort of the intelligence for
understanding the signification of a command or a law; and, for the
motive part, he counts upon nothing but volition in its most ordinary
form--the avoidance of a pain. Intelligence and Will, in their usual and
recognised workings, are all that are required for social obedience; law
is conceived and framed exactly to suit the every-day and every-hour
manifestations of these powers. The lawgiver does not speak of an
obedience-faculty, nor even of a social-faculty. If there were in the
mind a power unique and apart, having nothing in common with our usual
intelligence, and nothing in common with our usual will or volition,
that power ought to be expressed in terms that exclude the smallest
participation of both knowledge and will; it ought to have a form
special to itself, and not the form:--"Do this, and ye shall be made to
suffer".
I am quite aware that there are elements in ethics not included in the
problem of social obedience; what I contend for is, that the ground
should be cleared by marking out the two provinces, as is actually done
by a very small number of theorists, of whom John Austin is about the
best example.
The ethical philosopher, from not building on a foregone sociology, is
obliged to extemporize, in a paragraph, the social system; just as the
physical philosopher would, if he had no regularly constructed
mathematics to fall back upon, but had to stop every now and then to
enunciate a mathematical theorem.
The question of the ethical end should first appear as the question of
the sociological end. For what purpose or purposes is society
maintained? All the ethical difficulties are here met by anticipation,
and in a form much better adapted to their solution. It is from the
point of view of the social ruler, that you learn reserve, moderation,
and sobriety in your aims; you learn to think that something much less
than the Utopias--universal happiness and universal virtue--should be
propounded; you find that a definite and limited province can be
assigned, separating what the social power is able to do, must do, and
can advantageously do, from what it is unable to do, need not do, and
cannot with advantage do; and this or a similar demarcation is
reproducible in ethics.
[PRECEPTS OF ETHICS MAINLY SOCIAL.]
The precepts of ethics are mainly the precepts of social authority; at
all events the social precepts and their sanctions have the priority
in scientific method. Some of the highest virtues are sociological;
patriotic self-sacrifice is one of the conditions of social
preservation. The inculcation of this and of many other virtues would
not appear in ethics at all, or only in a supplementary treatment, if
social science took its proper sphere, and fully occupied that sphere.
Once more. The great problem of moral control, which I would remove
entirely from a science of education, would be first dealt with in
Sociology. It there appears in the form of the choice and gradation
of punishments, in prison discipline, and in the reformation of
criminals,--all which have been made the subject of enlightened, not
to say scientific, treatment. It is in the best experience in those
subjects that I would begin to seek for lights on the comprehensive
question. I would next go to diplomacy for the arts of delicate address
in reconciling opposing interests; after which I would look to the
management of parties and conflicting interests in the State. I would
farther inquire how armies are disciplined, and subordination combined
with the enthusiasm that leads to noble deeds.
There is an abundant field for the application of pure psychology to
ethics, when it takes its own proper ground. The exact psychological
character of disinterested impulse needs to be assigned; and, if that
impulse can be fully referred to the sympathetic or social instincts and
habits, the supposed moral faculty is finally eviscerated of its
contents for all ethical purposes.
* * * * *
So far I have exemplified what seems to me real or genuine aims and
applications of metaphysical study. I now proceed to the objects that
are more or less factitious. We are here on delicate ground, and run the
risk of discrediting our pursuit, as regards the very things that in the
eyes of many people make its value.
First, then, as psychology involves all our sensibilities, pleasures,
affections, aspirations, capacities, it is thought on that ground to
have a special nobility and greatness, and a special power of evoking in
the student the feelings themselves. The mathematician, dealing with
conic sections, spirals, and differential equations, is in danger of
being ultimately resolved into a function or a co-efficient; the
metaphysician, by investigating conscience, must become conscientious;
driving fat oxen is the way to grow fat.
[MAN'S RELATIONS TO THE INFINITE.]