The real character of a MYSTERY, and what constitutes the Explanation of

a fact, have been greatly misconceived. The changes of view on these

points make up a chapter in the history of the education of the human

mind. Perhaps the most decisive turning point was the publication of

Locke's "Essay concerning Human Understanding," the motive of which, as

stated in the homely and forcible language of the preface, was to

ascertain what our understandings can do, what subjects they are fit to

deal with, and where they should stop. I quote a few sentences:--

"If by this inquiry into the nature of the Understanding, I can discover

the powers thereof; how far they reach; to what things they are in any

degree proportionate; and where they fail us: I suppose it may be of

use, to prevail with the busy mind of man to be more cautious in

meddling with things exceeding its comprehension; to stop when it is at

the utmost extent of its tether; and to sit down in a quiet ignorance of

those things which, upon examination, are proved to be beyond the reach

of our capacities." "The candle that is set up in us, shines bright

enough for all our purposes. The discoveries we can make with this ought

to satisfy us. And we shall then use our Understandings aright, when we

entertain all objects in that way and proportion that they are suited to

our faculties, and upon those grounds they are capable of being proposed

to us." "It is of great use for the sailor to know the length of his

line, though he cannot fathom with it all the depths of the ocean."

The course of physical science was preparing the same salutary lesson.

Locke's great contemporary and friend, Isaac Newton, was his

fellow-worker in this tutorial undertaking; nor should Bacon be

forgotten, although there is dispute as to the extent and character of

his influence. The combined operation of these great leaders of thought

was apparent in the altered views of scientific inquirers as to what is

competent in research--what is the proper aim of inquiry. There arose a

disposition to abandon the pursuit of mysterious essences and grand

pervading unities, and ascertain with precision the facts and the laws

of natural phenomena. The study of astronomy was inaugurated in

Greenwich Observatory. The experiments of Priestley and of Franklin

farther exemplified the eighteenth-century key to the secrets of the

universe.

The lesson imparted by Newton and Locke and their successors still

remains to be carried out and embodied in the subtler inquiries. The

bearing upon what constitutes a Mystery, and what constitutes

Explanation, or the accounting for appearances, may be expressed thus:--

In the first place, the Understanding can never pass out of its own

experience--its acquired knowledge, whether of body or of mind. What we

obtain by our various sensibilities to the world about us, and by our

self-consciousness, are the foundation, the ABC of everything that we

are capable of knowing. We know colours, and we know sound; we know

pleasure and pain, and the various emotions of wonder, fear, love,

anger. If there be any being endowed with senses different from ours,

with that being we can have no communion. If there be any phenomena that

escape our limited sensibilities, they transcend the possibility of our

knowledge.

It is necessary, however, to take account of the combining or

constructive aptitudes of the mind. We can go a certain length in

putting together our alphabet of sensation and experience into many

various compounds. We can imagine a paradise or a pandemonium; but only

as made up of our own knowledge of things good and evil. The limits of

this constructive power are soon reached. We are baffled to enter into

the feelings of our own kindred, when they are far removed in character

and circumstances from ourselves. The youth at twenty cannot approximate

to the feelings of men of middle age. The healthy are unable to

comprehend the life of the invalid.

[TIME AND SPACE RELATIVE TO OUR FACULTIES.]

To come to the practical applications. The great leading notions called

Time and Space are known to us only under the conditions of our own

sensibility. Time is made known by all our actions, all our senses, all

our feelings, and by the succession of our thoughts; it is experienced

as a continuance and a repetition of movement, sight, sound, fear, or

any other state of feeling, or of thinking. One motion or sensation is

continued longer than another; or it is more frequently repeated after

intermission, giving the _numerical_ estimate of time, as in the beats

of the pendulum. In these ways we form estimates of seconds, minutes,

hours, days. And our constructive faculty can be brought into play to

conceive the larger tracts of duration--a century, or a hundred

centuries. Nay, by our arithmetical powers we can put down in cipher,

or conceive _symbolically_ (which is the meagrest of all conceptions)

millions of millions of centuries; these being after all but compounds

of our alphabet of enduring or repeated sensations and thoughts. We can

suppose this arithmetical process to operate upon past duration or upon

future duration, and there is no limit to the numbers that we can write

down. But there is one thing that we cannot do; we cannot fix upon a

point when Time or succession began, or upon a point when it will cease.

That is an operation not in keeping with our faculties; the very

supposition is impracticable. We cannot entertain the notion of a state

of things wherein the fact of continuance had no place; the effort

belies itself. Time is inseparable from our mental nature; whatever we

imagine, we must imagine as enduring. Some philosophers have supposed

that we must be endowed by nature with the conception of Time, before we

begin to exercise our senses; but the difficulty would be to deprive us

of that adjunct without extinguishing our mental nature. Give us

sensibility, and you cannot withhold the element of Time. The

supposition of Kant and others, that it is implanted in us as an empty

form, before we begin to employ our senses upon things, is needless; for

as soon as we move, see, hear, think, are pleased or pained, we create

time. And our notion of Time in general is exactly what these

sensibilities make it, only enlarged by our constructive power already

spoken of.

[MATTER AND VOID SUPPLEMENTARY.]

While all our senses and feelings give us time, it is our experience of

Motion and Resistance,--the energetic or active side of our nature

alone,--that gives us Space. The simplest feature of Space is the

alternation of Resistance and Non-Resistance, of obstructed motion and

freedom to move. The hand presses dead upon an obstacle; the obstacle

gives way and allows free motion; these two contrasting experiences are

the elements of the two contrasting facts--Matter and Space. By none of

the five senses, in their pure and proper character as senses, can we

obtain these experiences; and hence at an earlier stage of inquiry into

the mind, when our knowledge-giving sensibilities were referred to the

five senses, there was no adequate account of the notion of Space or

Extension. Space includes more than this simple contrast of the

resisting and the non-resisting; it includes what we call the

Co-existing or Contemporaneous, the great aggregate of the outspread

world, as existing at any moment, a somewhat complicated attainment,

which I am not now specially concerned with. It sufficiently illustrates

the limitation of our knowledge by our sensibilities, from the nature of

space, to fasten attention on the double and mutually supplementing

experience of Matter and Void; the one resisting movement, and giving

the consciousness of resistance, or dead strain, the other permitting

movement, and giving the consciousness of the unobstructed sweep of the

limbs or members. Whatever else may be in space, this freedom to move,

to soar, to expatiate (in contrast to being hemmed in, obstructed, held

fast), is an essential part of the conception, and is formed out of our

active or moving sensibilities. Now, as far as movement is concerned, we

must be in one of two states;--we must be putting forth energy without

effecting movement, being met by obstacles called matter; or we must be

putting forth energy unresisted and effecting movement, which is what we

mean by empty space. There is no third position in the matter of putting

forth our active energy. Where resistance ends and freedom begins, there

is space; where freedom ends, and obstruction begins, there is matter.

We find our sentient life to be made up, as regards movement, of a

certain number and range of these two alternations; in other words, free

spaces and resisting barriers. And we can, by the constructive power

already mentioned, imagine other proportions of the two experiences; we

can imagine the scope for movement, the absence of obstruction, to be

enlarged more and more, to be counted by thousands and millions of

miles; but the only terminus or boundary that we can imagine is

resistance, a dead obstacle. We are able to conceive the starry spaces

widened and prolonged from galaxy to galaxy through enormous strides of

increasing amplitude, but when we try to think an end to this career, we

can think only of a dead wall. There is no other end of space within the

grasp of our faculties; and that termination is not an end of extension;

for we know that solid matter, viewed in other ways than as obstructing

movement, has the same property of the extended belonging to the empty

void. The inference is, that the limitation of our means of knowledge

renders altogether incompetent the imagination of an end to either Time

or Space. The greatest efforts of our combining faculty cannot exceed

the elements presented to it, and these elements contain nothing that

would set forth the situation of space ending, and obstruction not

beginning.

[ARE TIME AND SPACE INFINITE?]

Under these circumstances, it is an irrevelant enquiry, to ask, Are Time

and Space finite or infinite? Many philosophers have put the question,

and even answered it. They say Time has no beginning and no end, and

Space has no boundaries; or, as otherwise expressed,--Time and Space are

Infinite: an answer of such vagueness as to mean anything, from a

harmless and proper assertion of the limits of our faculties, up to the

verge of extravagance and self-contradiction.

When, in fact, people talk of the Infinite in Time and Space, they can

point to one intelligible signification; as to the rest, this word is

not a subject for scientific propositions, and the attempt at such can

lead only to contradictions. The Infinite is a phrase most various in

its purport: it is for the most part an emotional word, expressing human

desire and aspiration; a word of poetry, imagination, and preaching, not

a word to be discussed under science; no intellectual definition would

exhibit its emotional force.

The second property of our intelligence is, that we can generalise many

facts into one. Tracing agreement among the multifarious appearances of

things, we can comprehend in one statement a vast number of details. The

single law of gravity expresses the fall of a stone, the flow of rivers,

the retention of the moon in her circuit round the earth. Now, this

generalising sweep is a real advance in our knowledge, an ascent in the

matter of intelligence, a step towards centralising the empire of

science. What is more, this is the only real meaning of EXPLANATION.

A difficulty is solved, a mystery unriddled; when it can be shown to

resemble something else; to be an example of a fact already known.

Mystery is isolation, exception, or, it may be, apparent contradiction;

the resolution of the mystery is found in assimilation, identity,

fraternity. When all things are assimilated, so far as assimilation can

go, so far as likeness holds, there is an end to explanation; there is

an end to what the mind can do, or can intelligently desire.

[GRAVITY NOT A MYSTERY.]

Thus, when Gravity was generalised, by assimilating the terrestrial

attraction seen in falling bodies with the celestial attraction of the

sun and planets; and when, by fair presumption, the same power was

extended to the remote stars; when, also, the _law_ was ascertained, so

that the movements of the various bodies could be computed and

predicted, there was nothing further to be done; explanation was

exhausted. Unless we can find some other force to fraternise with

gravity, so that the two might become a still more comprehensive unity,

we must rest in gravity as the ultimatum of our faculties. There is no

conceivable modification, or substitute, that would better our position.

Before Newton, it was a mystery what kept the moon and the planets in

their places; the assimilation with falling bodies was the solution.

But, say many persons, is not gravity itself a mystery? We say No;

gravity has passed through all the stages of legitimate and possible

explanation; it is the most highly generalised of all physical facts,

and by no assignable transformation could it be made more intelligible

than it is. It is singularly easy of comprehension; its law is exactly

known; and, excepting the details of calculation, in its more complex

workings, there is nothing to complain of, nothing to rectify, nothing

to pretend ignorance about; it is the very pattern, the model, the

consummation of knowledge. The path of science, as exhibited in modern

times, is towards generality, wider and wider, until we reach the

highest, the widest laws of every department of things; there

explanation is finished, mystery ends, perfect vision is gained.

* * * * *

What is always reckoned the mystery by pre-eminence is the union of BODY

and MIND. How, then, should we treat this Mystery according to the

spirit of modern thought, according to the modern laws of explanation?

The course is to _conceive_ the elements according to the only possible

plan, our own sensibility or consciousness; which gives us matter as one

class of facts--extension, inertness, weight, and so on; and mind as

another class of facts--pleasures, pains, volitions, ideas. The

difference between these two is total, diametrical, complete; there is

really nothing common to the experience of pleasure and the experience

of a tree; difference has here reached its _acme_; agreement is

eliminated; there is no higher genus to include these two in one; as the

ultimate, the highest elements of knowledge, they admit of 110 fusion,

no resolution, no unity. Our utmost flight of generality leaves us in

possession of a double, a _couple_ of absolutely heterogeneous elements.

Matter cannot be resolved into mind; mind cannot be resolved into

matter; each has its own definition; each negatives the other.

This being the fact, we accept it, and acquiesce. There is surely

nothing to be dissatisfied with, to complain of, in the circumstance

that the elements of our experience are, in the last resort, two, and

not one. If we had been provided with fifty ultimate experiences, none

of them having a single property in common with any other; and if we had

only our present limited intellects, we might be entitled to complain

of the world's mysteriousness in the one proper acceptation of

mystery--namely, as overpowering our means of comprehension, as loading

us with unassimilable facts. As it is, matter, in its commoner aspects

and properties, is perfectly intelligible; in the great number and

variety of its endowments or properties, it is revealed to us slowly and

with much difficulty, and these subtle properties--the deep affinities

and molecular arrangements--- are the mysteries rightly so called. Mind

in itself is also intelligible; a pleasure is as intelligible as would

be any transmutation of it into the inscrutable essence that people

often desiderate. It is one of the facts of our sensibility, and has

a great many facts of its own kindred, which makes it all the more

intelligible.

The varieties of pleasure, pain, and emotion are very numerous; and to

know, remember, and classify them, is a work of labour, a _legitimate_

mystery. The subtle links of thought are also very various, although

probably all reducible to a small number; and the ascertaining and

following out of these has been a work of labour and time; they have,

therefore, been mysterious; mystery and intellectual toil being the real

correlatives. The _complications_ of matter and the _complications_ of

mind are genuine mysteries; the reducing or simplifying of these

complications, by the exertions of thinking men, is the way, and the

only way out of the darkness into light.

[UNION OF MIND AND BODY.]

But what now of the mysterious _union_ of the two great ultimate facts

of human experience? What should the followers of Newton and Locke say

to this crowning instance of deep and awful mystery? Only one answer can

be given. Accept the union, and generalise it. Find out the fewest

number of simple laws, such as will express all the phenomena of this

conjoint life. Resolve into the highest possible generalities the

connections of pleasure and pain, with all the physical stimulants of

the senses--food, tastes, odours, sounds, lights--with all the play of

feature and of gesture, and all the resulting movements and bodily

changes; and when you have done that, you have so far truly, fully,

finally explained the union of body and mind. Extend your generalities

to the course of the thoughts; determine what physical changes accompany

the memory, the reason, the imagination, and express those changes in

the most general, comprehensive laws, and you have explained the how and

the why brain causes thought, and thought works in brain. There is no

other explanation needful, no other competent, no other that would be

explanation. Instead of our being "unfortunate," as is sometimes said,

in not being able to know the essence of either matter or mind--in not

comprehending their union; our misfortune would be to have to know

anything different from what we do or may know. If there be still much

mystery attaching to this linking of the two extreme facts of our

experience, it is simply this: that we have made so little way in

ascertaining what in one goes with what in the other. We know a good

deal about the feelings and their alliances, some of which are open and

palpable to all mankind; and we have obtained some important

generalities in these alliances. Of the connections of thought with

physical changes we know very little: these connections, therefore,

are truly and properly mysterious; but they are not intrinsically or

hopelessly so. The advancing study of the physical organs, on the one

hand, and of the mental functions, on the other, may gradually abate

this mystery. And if a day arrive when the links that unite our

intellectual workings with the workings of the nervous system and the

other bodily organs shall be fully ascertained and adequately

generalised, no one thoroughly educated in the scientific spirit of the

last two centuries will call the union of mind and body any longer

inscrutable or mysterious.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 4: _Fortnightly Review_, October, 1868.]

[Footnote 5: We may here recall an incident highly characteristic of the

late Earl of Carlisle. Being elected on one occasion to the office of

Lord Rector of Marischal College, Aberdeen, he had to deliver an address

to the students on the usual topics of diligence and hopefulness in

their studious career. Referring for a model to the addresses of former

rectors, he found, in that of his immediate predecessor, Lord Eglinton,

the Homeric sentiment above alluded to. It grated harshly on his mind,

and he avowed the fact to the students, he could not reconcile himself

to the elevating of one man upon the humiliation of all the rest. In a

strain more befitting a civilized age, he urged upon his hearers the

pursuit of excellence as such, without involving as a necessary

accompaniment the supplanting or throwing down of other men. He probably

did not sufficiently guard himself against a fallacy of Relativity; for

excellence is purely comparative; it subsists upon inferior grades of

attainment: still, there are many modes of it shared in by a great

number, and not confined to one or a few.]

* * * * *

III.

THE CIVIL SERVICE EXAMINATIONS[6]

1. HISTORICAL SKETCH.

Up to the year 1853, the appointing of Civil Servants lay wholly in the

hands of patrons. In 1853, patronage was severely condemned and

competitive examination officially recommended, for the first time, in a

Report by Sir Stafford Northcote and Sir Charles Trevelyan; but, while

the recommendation was taken up in the following year and immediately

acted upon in the Indian Civil Service, it was not till very much later

that it was fully adopted in the Home Service. The history, indeed, of

this last is somewhat peculiar. After the Report already referred to,

came an Order of Council, of date May 21, 1855, in which we find it

"ordered that all such young men as may be proposed to be appointed to

any junior situation in any department of the Civil Service shall,

before they are admitted to probation, be examined by or under the

Directors of the said Commissioners, and shall receive from them a

Certificate of Qualification for such situation". This order was

rigorously carried out by the Commissioners, and, although its absolute

requirement was simply that the nominees should pass a certain

examination, it, nevertheless, allowed the heads of departments to

institute competition if they cared. Accordingly, we find that

competition--_but limited_--was immediately set on foot in several of

the offices, and the result led to the following remark in the Report of

1856:--

"We do not think it within our province to discuss the expediency of

adopting the principle of open competition as contra-distinguished from

examination; but we must remark that, both in the competitive

examination for clerkships in our own and in other offices, those who

have succeeded in attaining the appointments have appeared to us to

possess considerably higher attainments than those who have come in upon

simple nomination; and, we may add, that we cannot doubt that if it be

adopted as a usual course to nominate several candidates to compete for

each vacancy, the expectation of this ordeal will act most beneficially

on the education and industry of those young persons who are looking

forward to public employment."

In 1857, a near approach was made to open competition, in the case of

four clerkships awarded by the competing examination in the

Commissioners' own establishment. "The fact of the competition was not

made public, but was communicated to one or two heads of schools and

colleges, and mentioned casually to other persons at various times. The

number of competitors who presented themselves was forty-six, of which

number, forty-four were actually examined."

[BEGINNING OF OPEN COMPETITION.]

It was reserved for 1858 to see the first absolutely open competition,

in the case of eight writerships in the Office of the Secretary of State

for India; and in that year, too, a step in advance was made when the

Commissioners in their Report "pointed out the advantage which would

result from enlarging the field of competition by substituting, for the

plan of nominating three persons only to compete for each vacant

situation, the system of nominating a proportionate number of candidates

to compete for several appointments at one examination".

The year 1860 sounded the death-knell of simple pass examination. It was

then recommended by a Select Committee of the House of Commons, and the

recommendation was adopted, that the competitive method, in its limited

form, should be henceforth _universally_ applied to junior situations.

This recommendation was at once acted upon in the case of clerkships

under the control of the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, and others

by and by followed; but, as matter of fact, it was never strictly

carried out in all its scope and rigour; and as late as 1868 the

Commissioners in their Report stated that "the number of situations

filled on the competitive method has been comparatively small".

Meanwhile, competitive examination was making way in other quarters.

Practical Essays · 第 4 / 21 段