Since the last of the naval battles recorded in preceding chapters was
fought, the advance in ships, engines, and guns has been such that
warships of the past are considered obsolete; while the introduction of
smokeless powder and projectiles containing heavy charges of dynamite
or gun-cotton has increased the efficacy of modern ordnance.
The use of armor for ships is so recent, only dating from the time of
our civil war, that modern war-ships have been little in action. In
fact the war between England and the United States, in 1812-15, was the
last important naval war previous to the introduction of steam. The
revolution in naval tactics caused by steam was very great, but our
civil war afforded little experience in fleet actions, the important
naval affairs being for the most part attacks of fleets upon land
fortifications. The only fairly well-matched, stand-up fight of that
war between vessels was that of the Kearsarge and Alabama.
Steel has come into use for the hulls of vessels--and the invention,
by our own citizens, of nickel-steel, and of the Harvey process for
plates, has caused a revolution in the application of defensive armor.
We may instance the armor for the battle-ship _Maine_, which vessel
carried on her sides alone four hundred and seventy-five tons of
metal--Harveyized nickel steel. The plate which was tried at the Naval
Proving Ground, at Indian Head, on the Potomac, and upon the proof of
which depended the receiving of the whole quantity from the contracting
company, was thirteen feet seven inches long, seven feet wide, and
twelve inches in thickness at the top, tapering to six inches. These
measurements may give some idea of the tremendous power of the
implements employed in forging and tempering such a mass of metal.
It successfully resisted four shots from an eight-inch rifled gun,
firing, at only a few yards’ distance, the best armor-piercing shot,
breaking the latter to fragments. Then a ten-inch gun was tried upon
the same plate. Again the shot was broken up, and the plate, already
hit four times before, was cracked, but remained still capable of
affording perfect protection. It is not at all probable that any one
plate would be hit five times in the course of an action--and so
this armor is considered as near perfection as it is possible for
metallurgists to come, in the present state of knowledge. The _Maine_
and _Texas_, and the battle-ships of the _Iowa_ class, as well as the
great monitors, _Puritan_ and _Monadnock_, all of which vessels are of
the latest construction, have these plates, thereby saving much weight,
and allowing of additional armor protection to the upper works. The
heavy armor extends from one barbette to the other, in the _Iowa_ being
about 180 feet, and from four and a half feet below the water line to
three feet above it. At the level of the belt is a curving steel deck,
three inches thick, to deflect plunging shot; while the mass of coal is
so arranged in the bunkers as to protect the boilers and machinery.
The _Iowa_ carries four 12-inch rifles, mounted in pairs in two
turrets, eight 8-inch rifles, also mounted in pairs in turrets, six
rapid-fire 4-inch rifles, and an ample secondary battery of twenty
6-pounder and six 1-pounder rapid-fire guns, and two gatlings--all high
powered breech-loading guns of the best American manufacture.
In the last few years there have also been great changes and
improvements in different forms of explosives, the development of
torpedo boats and torpedo-catchers, and modes of defence against such
attacks. Almost all the large vessels have double bottoms, divided in
many separate cells like honeycombs--and packed with a preparation
of cocoa-nut fibre, which swells when in contact with water, thus
effectually stopping shot holes. There are also many transverse
bulkheads, making many compartments of the vessel’s hull; while the
engines are so cut off by them that one is independent of any injury
to the other. There are also many small engines, for various purposes,
and electric light makes the deepest part of the interior of the great
ship’s hull as plain as the upper deck, in full sunlight. Lastly, the
great increase in speed and power of engines tend to make the war-ship
a very different thing from what she was at the time spoken of in the
previous chapter.
There are, of course, limitations to the range and efficiency of the
new Navy, owing to the necessity of replenishing supplies of fuel,--a
most difficult and extremely costly process in many parts of the world.
Such modern cruisers as the _Columbia_ carry, to be sure, an immense
quantity of coal--and there are others, such as the _New York_ and the
_Olympia_, which not only possess great speed, but also carry more fuel
than most vessels of their class. They need to do so, for our coaling
stations abroad are very few.
Some nations, especially the Italians, who have a very formidable
navy, and one far above their means, have experimented extensively
with petroleum, in its crude form, as a fuel, and, it is stated,
with a certain degree of success. But this for the most part is a
consideration for those nations which have no mines of coal under
their own control, and we must remember that, in time of war, the
supply of petroleum might be cut off even more effectually than that
of coal. But to return:--The use of steel for the hulls of vessels,
the armor, protective decks, and other purposes of construction, has
greatly multiplied the strength of those parts, while it has made the
whole much lighter, so that the same expenditure of steam will carry
the structure much farther and much faster. We have already stated
that nickel-steel is able to resist very effectually the most modern
projectiles from the latest guns. When, a few years ago, such qualities
were claimed for it by us, the English experts in such matters rather
sneered at the idea, and said that more extensive trials should be
had before they could believe in its value. The experiments were so
triumphantly successful that not only was all opposition withdrawn, but
the object then was to get hold of the process as soon as possible.
Nickel-steel is what may be called a _great fact_, and subsequent
discoveries in metallurgy will never destroy its value for certain
purposes.
The Harvey process was another thing upon which the Europeans looked
with great doubt until the perfect success of armor made in that way,
in trials against very powerful guns at short range, opened their eyes.
This process consists in the hardening of the outside surface of a
thick plate to a certain depth, leaving the back part of the plate
with the toughness of the untempered metal, so that the shot which
strikes it has to encounter obstacles of two kinds--the hardness which
breaks it up, and the toughness which prevents serious entry.
As it is, the contest between gun and armor is continually going on.
When armor is found which resists very powerful guns and the newest
explosive, a more powerful gun is built, which makes another increase
in armor necessary. At the present time there is no predicting how long
this contest may go on, for the improvements in guns and armor keep
equal pace.
New explosives have the same story to tell. They vary in name and in
effect, but most of them are based upon the same chemical principles.
Some keep better than others, and are thus best suited for preservation
in the magazines of ships, where, especially in case of faulty
construction, or of prolonged stay in hot climates, the delicate
chemical combination of which the modern explosive consists is very
much more likely to undergo change than the old-fashioned “black
power”--especially when the latter was well made.
There is, therefore, constant experimenting, and constant change in
opinion in regard to explosives.
Torpedoes are another source of trouble to experts in naval warfare;
the fact being that they have never been sufficiently tried in actual
service to settle completely their respective values. Of the mobile
torpedoes one was used with destructive effect during the Chilean War,
and some spar-torpedoes were effective during our Civil War, and during
the Russo-Turkish War, where mobile torpedoes were also used, but it is
still a matter of doubt with many naval officers of experience as to
what part the mobile torpedo is to play in any future contest.
As regards torpedo-boats, which launch their torpedoes one at a time,
and directly in the line in which the boat is pointed, the opinion is
that they will prove very useful for coast and harbor defence, but
unfit for severe weather or heavy seas, very wearing upon their crews,
liable to accidents of a serious nature, and only able to carry fuel
for short runs. Many of the accidents to this class of boats have
involved loss of life, and, while the French and English have increased
their number, other nations, such as the Italians and the Germans, have
rather decided against their increase. At one time within recent years
the Italians encouraged torpedo-boats, and in Germany one of the most
successful of all builders is the Shichau Company, which has built
boats for all the world but France, America, and England.
The “torpedo catchers,” so called, are quite different affairs from the
ordinary torpedo-boat. They are quite large and swift vessels compared
with the ordinary torpedo-boat, and are intended as “counter-miners,”
and, by speed, and ability to keep the sea better, to prevent the
swarm of ordinary torpedo-boats from doing serious damage. Sufficient
experience has not been gained in the experimental trials to know just
how much these vessels will do in case of actual warfare, but much is
expected of them. Very lately a well-known English builder of torpedo
boats and other small craft has launched a boat which is said to have
made twenty-seven knots, or about the average speed of a passenger
train on a good railroad.
Submarine torpedo-boats have received much attention of late years,
when improvements and inventions, especially in electricity, have
rendered them comparatively easy to handle. In France and Spain,
especially, very successful boats have been experimented with. In our
own country, where the idea originated early in the century, there have
been several submarine boats built which have remained for a long time
under water, being directed by the crew in any wished-for course. Not
long ago Congress appropriated a large sum for building a sub-marine
torpedo boat; but experiments conducted to show whether an explosion
effected by such means would not be also fatal to the boat herself, led
to hesitation on the part of the authorities as to expending the money
in that way, and to a proposal to build surface torpedo boats instead.
_Speed_ is becoming more and more a factor in naval problems. Speed,
fuel capacity, a powerful battery, and protection, especially to the
vital parts and to the crew, are now recognized as the requisites which
go to make a fine, or capable ship, and one most likely to be generally
useful in war. Among such vessels may be mentioned the _New York_,
_Olympia_, and the _Columbia_, of our own navy. The _battle-ships_, so
called, come under a different category--being heavily armored, and
supposed to be able to resist heavy projectiles at close quarters. We
have a few of these under construction, but none of the great size
which we see in some foreign navies, principally for the reason that
many of our ports will not admit vessels of such great draught of
water--and that our authorities consider smaller vessels capable of
being more readily manœuvered. The largest battle-ships we are building
will only measure 10,200 tons, while in foreign navies they have them
of 15,000 tons. But the best naval opinion is that the latter are too
large; and experts are advocating a return to smaller size and greater
number--just as a reaction has taken place against 110-ton guns.
The latest completed battle-ships are the _Iowa_, _Indiana_,
_Massachusetts_ and _Oregon_, all of 10,200 tons, with twin screws, and
carrying sixteen guns in the main battery, beside smaller ones of the
most modern type.
The _Maine_ and _Texas_ are battle-ships of the second class--of about
9000 tons, with twin screws, and carrying about ten guns in the main
battery, and a proportion of rapid-fire smaller guns.
Such great battle-ships as these have never been tried in a close
general engagement, and, though viewed with some distrust--especially
since the accidental sinking by collision of the Victoria--nations go
on building them in rivalry, and the end is not yet. In case of a grand
battle between fleets of these giant ships, the force being anywhere
near equal, the chances would be in favor of the fleet which is best
handled. That is all that anyone can say at present. It may give the
reader some idea of these great armaments to say that, in 1894, England
had in her Mediterranean fleet twenty-four vessels of the first class,
none less than 7350, and most of them above 10,000 tons. Thirteen of
these were battle-ships, and eleven protected cruisers.
France and Russia, combined, had at the same period in those parts
thirty-three ships, none of which were below 4000 tons, and most of
which were of 10,000 tons or more.
In addition to this we must count numerous torpedo-boats, despatch
vessels and gunboats in such fleets.
The Italian navy is now a very powerful one, and contains in its list
some of the largest men-of-war afloat; and the German navy has made
great strides in advance. The Spaniards have some fine ships, but
mostly of the fast cruiser class, armed with powerful guns.
We have heard very much of late regarding the Chinese and Japanese
navies. The vessels which compose these forces have mostly been
constructed in France and England--and a few, of moderate size, have
been built at home. The Chinese have a very fine gun-factory, as well
as shops for repairs, but many of their vessels, especially in what
has been called their Southern fleet, are in very bad condition as
to hulls, engines--and especially as to the discipline of the crews.
This has become much worse since they dispensed with the services of
European officers. Their Northern fleet is in much better condition,
but time alone can prove what it is worth. Neither China nor Japan
have any vessels above 8000 tons displacement, and many are much
smaller. Their important fighting craft consist of what are called
cruisers--protected and unprotected--but armed with excellent modern
high-powered guns, and torpedoes of the latest model.
The vessels of the Japanese navy are kept in exceptionally good
condition in every respect, and their officers are considered the
more able, and their men, with a natural aptitude for the sea, are in
excellent training and discipline. Thus Japan should prove superior
to China, if only on account of the better _personnel_. Many of the
Japanese officers have passed through our own naval school with credit,
and others have been educated in the German service. Some of them,
thus educated, have already attained high command--and all show great
enthusiasm and military ardor.
The battle of the Yalu, between these two fleets and treated in a
subsequent chapter, was a most instructive lesson to the navies of the
world at large.
While we do not pretend to say that we need such a navy as England (the
national life of which country depends upon her ability to furnish
food and clothing from abroad for her population), it is evident to
anyone who thinks for a moment that a country like ours, with the most
extensive coast-line of any, should have a moderately large and very
effective navy, if only as a matter of sea-police for our own shores,
while the protection of our vessels and of citizens living and doing
business abroad comes under another head.
Persons, especially those living in the interior of our great country,
are apt to think, and to say, that there is little chance of our
becoming embroiled with any of the nations of whose great navies we
have just been speaking. But we have to go back a very few years to
show in what danger we have been of having our coasts invested by
hostile fleets for want of proper force to resist them. Spain was very
threatening in the troubles about Cuba in 1873. The attitude of Italy,
with her powerful vessels, at the time of the difficulty about the
New Orleans riots, was disquieting for a time, and, had her financial
condition been better, that country would have certainly made a naval
demonstration here. Then there was the still more threatening attitude
of Chili, which might have been very serious. However sure we might be
of eventually putting down that warlike little country, immense damage
might have been done by her in a naval raid on our west coast. There
is constant need for ships in China; not only for the protection of
Americans, but to assist in keeping down piracy, a very present danger
in that part of the world. Few months pass that it is not necessary to
send ships to Hayti, always on the verge of revolution, or actually
in the throes of civil war; and the same may be said of the countries
comprising Central America. Then Brazil may be added to the list of
unsettled countries, and we have a large and important trade there.
Of the troubles in Hawaii, and of the cruising against the seal
robbers in the North Pacific, the whole country has heard more than
enough, and everyone knows that without a navy we should be perfectly
helpless in such emergencies. The very establishment and maintenance of
great dock-yards and naval stations at Vancouver, Halifax and Bermuda
by England admonishes us to at least partially prepare to resist the
threats of naval coercion which was that nation’s favorite mode of
treating with us not so many years ago.
[Illustration: U. S. S. INDIANA.
_Copyright_, W. H. RAU.
Battleship. Twin screw. Main battery, four 13-inch, eight 8-inch and
four 6-inch breech loading rifles. Secondary battery, twenty 6-pounder
and six 1-pounder rapid fire guns and four Gatlings. Thickness of armor
18 inches. 36 officers, 434 men.]
The necessary police of the seas is recognized by all nations, and
all who can afford to do so should take a part in it. Frequent visits
to foreign ports by men-of-war increase the influence and materially
assist the business consideration of citizens who may reside abroad for
business purposes, and thus directly increase the national revenue;
while there is damage to our national pride when men-of-war of other
nations have to protect our citizens abroad, as has frequently happened
in times of trouble, from want of a sufficient number of ships in
our navy to permit of wide distribution. There are many persons in
our large country who would be mortified and shocked at such a thing
as the bombardment of New York or of San Francisco with long-range
guns--either of which events has been possible within the last ten
years. Such a proceeding would not only be humiliating to us as a
nation, but would probably cause more damage than a powerful fleet of
defensive ironclads would cost to build and maintain--not to speak of
such a thing as ransom-money demanded.
There is no fear of any nation making an effectual landing upon our
shores: the only danger is that some swift and sudden blow, when we
are unprepared, might cause immense damage to our great seaboard and
lake cities, which would not only cost untold millions in damage, and
in the subsequent expenditure necessary to repay the blow, but in the
injury to our national pride and _prestige_ among nations.