After the fall of the forts at Mobile, Wilmington alone remained a port
where blockade-runners could enter and escape again, with their return
cargoes. Having two entrances, one north of Cape Fear, at New Inlet,
shoal and tortuous, and commanded by the extensive fortifications on
Federal Point, called Fort Fisher, and the other the main channel of
the Cape Fear River, and these two entrances requiring about sixty
miles of blockade, it was almost impossible to prevent swift vessels
from running in with important supplies for the Confederate Army, and
from getting to sea again, with cotton.
Sherman was now preparing for his march to the sea, which, if
successful, would insure the fall of Charleston and Savannah, without
further effort from the Navy.
Grant was beleaguering Lee, at Petersburg and Richmond, and the latter
was dependent upon Wilmington for many indispensable articles brought
into that port, for his army, by the English blockade-runners. Many of
these had been captured or destroyed, but the temptation was great to
try again, and greedy and desperate men, with fast steamers, took their
lives in their hands, and by audacity and good seamanship, favored by a
dark night, often succeeded.
It was certain that the principal Confederate Army remaining could not
long be kept in the field if important articles not produced in the
Confederacy could not be continuously imported from England. Indeed,
after the capture of Fort Fisher, a telegram from Lee was found there,
which declared that he could not hold Richmond if Fort Fisher should be
captured.
While Grant, therefore, was ready to follow Lee, either north or south,
and Sherman was about making his bold manœuvre, and the captured
harbors were closely held, and the lesser ports and coasts closely
watched, it seemed more than ever necessary to capture Wilmington; and
to do this, Fort Fisher must be taken.
The writer participated in both attacks upon Fort Fisher, and has
contributed a paper to the _United Service Magazine_ upon the
operations there; but for the sake of conciseness, will follow the
official report, and the account of Boynton, adding some reminiscences.
In September, 1864, the Navy Department received assurances from the
Secretary of War, that the necessary land force for the reduction of
Fort Fisher and the other Wilmington forts would be supplied in due
season, and preparations for the naval part of the expedition were
begun at once. A very powerful naval force was assembled in Hampton
Roads, and the command offered to Admiral Farragut. But the Admiral’s
health had been much impaired by the anxieties, and exposures, and
constant strain upon his nervous system, in consequence of his service
of two years in a climate not very favorable to health. He, therefore,
declined the command, to the great regret of the public, as well as the
Navy Department.
The Secretary of the Navy then naturally turned to Admiral Porter, who
had shown, in the very trying service on the Western rivers, great
energy and skill. He accepted, with alacrity, and was at once put in
command of the largest fleet which ever sailed under the American flag.
Causes into which it is now not worth while to enter delayed the
expedition, as the co-operating land force was not at once forthcoming,
and a bombarding force of thirty-seven vessels, and a reserve squadron
of nineteen, lay in Hampton Roads, awaiting orders to proceed.
The season was almost over when fine weather might be expected, and the
time was near when those storms which had given the name to Cape Fear
might be expected in that locality. Before the war it was considered
foolhardy to dally in that vicinity at all, and yet our blockaders
staid there, night and day, winter and summer, shine or storm, for
nearly four years, and even our monitors laid out gales there, at
anchor, with the whole Atlantic ocean to the eastward of them.
The Secretary of the Navy became anxious at the delay in the movements
of the military part of the expedition, and addressed a letter to
President Lincoln, which was as follows:--
“NAVY DEPARTMENT,
October 28th, 1864.
“SIR:--You are aware that, owing to shoal water at the mouth of the
Cape Fear River, a purely naval attack cannot be undertaken against
Wilmington. Had there been water enough for our broadside ships, of
the Hartford class, the naval attacks of New Orleans, Mobile, and
Port Royal would have been repeated there. I have, as you are aware,
often pressed upon the War Department the importance of capturing
Wilmington, and urged upon the Military authorities the necessity
of undertaking a joint operation against the defences of Cape Fear
River; but until recently there never seems to have been a period
when the Department was in a condition to entertain the subject.
“Two months ago it was arranged that an attack should be made on
the 1st of October, but subsequently postponed to the 15th, and the
naval force has been ready since the 15th instant, in accordance with
that agreement. One hundred and fifty vessels of war now form the
North Atlantic Squadron. The command, first offered to Rear-Admiral
Farragut, but declined by him, has been given to Rear-Admiral Porter.
“Every other squadron has been depleted, and vessels detached
from other duty to strengthen this expedition. The vessels are
concentrated at Hampton Roads and Beaufort, where they remain, an
immense force lying idle, awaiting the movements of the army. The
detention of so many vessels from blockade and cruising duty is a
most serious injury to the public service; and if the expedition
cannot go forward for want of troops, I desire to be notified, so
that the ships may be relieved and dispersed for other service.
“The importance of closing Wilmington is so well understood by you
that I refrain from presenting any new arguments. I am aware of the
anxiety of yourself, and of the disposition of the War Department to
render all the aid in its power. The cause of the delay is not from
the want of a proper conception of the importance of the subject; but
the season for naval coast operations will soon be gone.
“General Bragg has been sent from Richmond to Wilmington, to prepare
for the attack; and the autumn weather, so favorable for such an
expedition, is fast passing away. The public expect this attack, and
the country will be distressed if it be not made. To procrastinate
much longer will be to peril its success.
[Illustration: MONITOR FLEET IN A GALE, OFF FORT FISHER, N. C.]
“Of the obstacles which delay or prevent military co-operation
at once I cannot judge; but the delay is becoming exceedingly
embarrassing to this Department, and the importance of having the
military authorities impressed with the necessity of speedy action
has prompted this communication to you.
“I have the honor to be, etc., etc.,
THE PRESIDENT.
“_Gideon Welles_.”
At length the War Department supplied the much needed land force.
General Butler was placed in command of it, and General Weitzel, an
engineer officer, was sent with him.
The long delay had enabled the enemy to gain information of the object
of all this preparation, and they placed additional troops within
supporting distance of the forts.
Fort Fisher is situated on a neck of land between the ocean and the
Cape Fear River, called Federal Point. The plan was to land the troops
some distance above the fort, and intrench across the Point to Cape
Fear River, so as to prevent reinforcements being sent from Wilmington,
and then to attack both by land and water.
The fort and its connected batteries mounted about seventy-five guns,
while the armament of all the works erected for the purpose of guarding
the approaches to Wilmington was about one hundred and sixty guns, many
of them of the largest calibre then used in forts. Among them were some
150-pounder Armstrongs. Admiral Porter, who had been at Sebastopol,
says, in an official report, “that Fort Fisher was much stronger than
the famous Malakoff.”
A novel idea was to be carried out in this attack, which was popularly
attributed to General Butler.
A vessel with a very large quantity of powder on board was arranged as
a huge torpedo, to be carried in as close as possible to the fort, and
then exploded. It was supposed that it would level the walls, explode
the magazine, and kill or stun the garrison.
The explosion produced no result of importance, as we shall see
hereafter.
The attack was decided upon for the 24th of December, although General
Butler had not arrived with his troops. The larger vessels of the
fleet and the ironclads had anchored twenty miles east of New Inlet,
literally at sea, and in a position where it would have been thought
foolhardy, in peace times, to have remained at that season. Here they
rode out some heavy weather, the monitors, at times, being completely
submerged by the huge seas, with only the tops of the smoke-stacks and
turrets visible.
The powder boat was a purchased gun-boat, called the Louisiana. She
had about two hundred tons of powder on board, and was commanded by
Commander A. C. Rhind. The vessel was painted lead color, and she had a
false smoke-stack erected abaft the real one, and in general appearance
and color resembled the ordinary blockade-runners. She was sent in
on the night of the 23d, or rather, at two o’clock on the morning of
the 24th. So little was the explosion considered an act of war by the
garrison that they supposed it a blockade-runner which had been chased
ashore and blown up, to prevent her from falling into the blockaders’
hands.
The attacking fleet carried nearly five hundred guns. Among these
were some of the largest guns then in use. The three monitors mounted
15-inch guns; the battery of the New Ironsides was of 11-inch guns;
there were many 11-inch guns, and 100- and 150-pounder Parrott rifles
on board the smaller vessels while the heavy frigates, Minnesota,
Wabash and Colorado, mounted each forty 9-inch guns. No such armament
had ever been brought to bear upon a fort; and probably no fort was
better able to resist it, for it was an immense bank of earth, with the
guns far apart, and huge traverses of earth built up between them. This
arrangement had a double advantage; for it was more difficult to reduce
the work than if the guns had been contained in a smaller space, while
their fire, thus distributed, was more effective against ships.
But, extensive and formidable as these great earthworks were, they were
overmatched by the guns afloat. No men could stand to guns, and no guns
could long continue serviceable, under such a storm of shot and shell
as was poured upon them.
On the 24th of December, early in the morning, the ships stood in,
the grim and ponderous Ironsides leading the way, followed by the
monitors. They took position about three-quarters of a mile from the
fort, opening fire as soon as in station. Then came the great frigates,
sloops and gun-boats, and all opened a most rapid and terrible fire.
In about an hour the fort was silenced, the garrison being driven
to cover. There were one or two explosions of magazines, and some
buildings were set on fire. Unfortunately, during this day no less than
six of the 100-pounder rifles burst, killing and wounding more men than
the guns of the enemy, and destroying confidence in these pieces, which
had hitherto done good work, and had been rather favorites. The ships
sustained very little damage.
On the next day, Christmas, the transports arrived with the troops,
and the latter were landed about five miles above the fort, under
cover of the gun-boats, while the ironclads and other vessels renewed
their fire upon the fort, but more deliberately than the day before.
General Weitzel reconnoitred the fort, and some soldiers actually
entered a part of it, but the General reported a successful assault
impracticable, and the troops were re-embarked. The Navy was naturally
indignant at this, but there was no help for it. The commentary upon
the opinion of the Engineer is that the fort _was_ taken by assault, a
fortnight afterwards.
On December 29th, the Secretary of the Navy, after consultation with
the President, sent a telegram to General Grant, at Petersburg, stating
his belief that the works could be taken by a suitable land force, to
co-operate with the Navy, and asking for the necessary troops. General
Grant sent about eight thousand men, under General Terry, and they
reached the neighborhood of Fort Fisher on January 13th.
In the meantime the fleet had ridden out some very bad weather and one
severe southeast gale, most of the large vessels lying in the bight
under Cape Lookout.
On January 12th the fleet, with the transports with troops in close
company, sailed again for New Inlet, all being in fair fighting
condition, and not damaged or dispersed by the gale, as the enemy had
hoped.
On the 13th the fleet was pounding away at the earthworks again, the
Ironsides being within one thousand yards of the northeast angle, and
the monitors much closer, as they drew less water. The wind was off
shore, and light, and the water smooth, or they could not have gone in
so close, there being but a few inches of water under the keels of the
ironclads. The fire was continued all that day, and at intervals during
the night.
The fire of the ironclads was directed, during the whole of the second
bombardment, at the land face of the main fort, where the assault by
the troops was to be made; and although they were nearly concealed by
the high traverses, which made an angle with the line of fire, it was
seen that many guns were struck and disabled, but the full extent of
the damage was not known till after the surrender. Then it was found
that every gun on that face of the fort had been disabled, principally
by the heavy shot and shell of the ironclads, which lay so near the
fort, and fired deliberately, and in perfect security.
It was the northeastern face which was to be assaulted by the troops
of General Terry. The sea front had been under the fire of the wooden
ships, which had to lie further off, and their fire was less effective,
and the face less injured. It was decided to assault this face with the
sailors and marines of the fleet. There were seventeen guns on the land
face, with immense hills for traverses, extending a third of a mile.
The other face, that to be assaulted by the sailors and marines, was
about one mile in length, terminating on the right flank in a mound
fifty-three feet high, mounted with two very heavy guns.
The arrangement of guns and traverses was such that, in an assault,
each would have to be taken separately.
On the morning of the 15th the ships went once more into position,
and fired rapidly. The soldiers and sailors made arrangements for the
assault; throwing up breastworks and rifle-pits towards the fort. From
11 A. M. to about half-past two, a tremendous fire was kept up, and the
heavy embankments crumbled under the shot and shell, while more guns
were disabled.
Still, the garrison, of about 2300 men, lay sheltered in their
bomb-proofs, ready to come out and repel the assault as soon as the
fire of the fleet should cease.
At half-past two the naval column was ready to advance, and the fire
from the fleet, at a given signal, suddenly ceased, the quiet seeming
quite unnatural after the continuous roar of artillery.
The naval column then moved along the beach, to assault the sea-face
of the main work. This was defended by palisades, as was the land face,
and was about forty feet high, and very steep--difficult for an armed
man to climb.
As the fire from the fleet ceased, the garrison came out of the
bomb-proofs, and, manning the parapet of the sea-face, began to shoot
down the assaulting sailors and marines. Loaded pieces were handed up
to those on the parapet, so the fire was very rapid. The beach was
soon strewn with dead and wounded, many staggering into the water and
falling there.
A few of the men, with many of the officers, reached the foot of the
mound, but they could get no further, and the bulk of the naval force
retreated down the beach again, entirely exposed, and losing heavily
from the deliberate musketry fire of the garrison. Those who had
reached a place of partial shelter, about the foot of the mound, were
obliged to remain there until approaching darkness and hard fighting
on the other face gave them an opportunity to get away. The loss in
this attempted assault was very heavy, twenty-one officers of the navy
having been killed or wounded, with a proportionate number of sailors
and marines.
The lives lost were not utterly thrown away, however, for the naval
attack made a diversion, distracting attention from the movements of
the troops.
Soon after the naval advance, and about the time that it was evident
that it had failed, the veteran troops from the James River assaulted,
with the determination, steadiness and dash which they had learned at
Petersburg, Cold Harbor, Spottsylvania, and a dozen other scenes of
hard fighting. The guns on the land face were all disabled, but there
was a howitzer fire from a sally-port, which did much damage, although
it did not stay the advance of those well-dressed lines an instant.
Reaching the foot of the lofty earthworks, the pioneers’ axes soon
cleared away the palisade, and the troops entered the two western
traverses. An entirely novel and fierce combat now took place, as each
mound was captured in turn.
For more than five hours this hand-to-hand struggle, a fight to the
death, went on in those traverses. There was nothing exactly like it
during the whole war. The Ironsides fired into the traverses ahead of
our troops until this was rendered, by the darkness, as dangerous to
friend as foe. Night came, and still the struggle went on. Shouts and
yells, shrieks and groans, musket-shot and clash of bayonet, with the
flash of small arms, marked the centre of the fight. Thus traverse
after traverse was won, until about ten o’clock at night the last one,
at the mound, was taken; then was heard a tremendous peal of cheers,
and the garrison poured, pell-mell, down to Federal Point. Here they
laid down their arms and surrendered. The fact was at once telegraphed
to the fleet, by signal lanterns, and round after round of hearty
cheers went up from every ship.
The “impregnable” Fort Fisher was taken. The Cape Fear River, the great
port of the blockade runners, was closed, and the Confederacy at last
completely isolated.
The next morning the light-draught vessels at once began to work in
over the New Inlet Bar, and for some days they were busy in capturing
forts, and in sweeping the Channel for torpedoes, and removing
obstructions.
About seven o’clock in the morning there was a tremendous explosion
within the Fort, which threw masses of earth and timber, and bodies of
men, high into the air; while a dense balloon-shaped cloud of powder
smoke and dust hung in the air for a long time.
It was the main magazine which had blown up. It was never known how it
happened. Many officers and seamen of the fleet, as well as soldiers,
lost their lives by this explosion.
Upon landing from the men-of-war, to see what this celebrated place
might be like, we met, in the first place, boats conveying the wounded
of the Navy to the Hospital ship, while upon the beach parties were
collecting for burial those who had been killed, and ranging them in
rows. This beach, as well as the whole of the land front of the fort,
was strewn with an immense number of fragments of shell, muskets,
musket-balls, bayonets, cartridge boxes and belts, articles of clothing
and dead bodies.
As we approached the land face, we began to find the bodies of
soldiers, instead of those of sailors, lying in the strangest
attitudes, just as they happened to be when the death bullet struck
them. The faces of some still showed the deadly purpose of battle,
while others were as peaceful as if they had died in their beds. Many
of these bodies had rolled down the steep earthwork after being shot,
and were lying against the palisades, covered with dust and powder
grime. Upon gaining a point of view from one of the traverses, one was
struck by the great extent of the fort. Before us lay the huge smoking
crater caused by the morning’s explosion, while fatigue parties of
soldiers were engaged in collecting the wounded and the dead, and in
piling up, in great stacks, the small arms of the captured garrison,
as well as those of our own dead and wounded. Peeping into the
bomb-proofs, which were full of dead, and filthy beyond description,
from long occupation during the bombardment, the next sight was the
guns. These were, many of them, not only dismounted, but partially
buried in the earth and sand, by the terrible explosions of the eleven-
and fifteen-inch shells. In many cases the gun’s crew were buried with
them, as an occasional hand or foot, peeping out, testified.
At the northeastern angle of the fort, in two huge embrasures, were two
very heavy guns, a 68-pounder, and an 8-inch Blakeley rifle, both of
English make. These two guns had fired principally at the ironclads,
and the latter had returned the compliment. Our fire often caused
the gunners to leave them, but they generally returned at the first
slacking of the fire. Just before the assault, one of them had the
carriage disabled, and it was now slewed round with its muzzle to the
westward.
At Battery No. 4 was found an Armstrong 150-pounder, marked with the
“broad arrow,” and mounted on an elegantly made and polished carriage,
with Sir Wm. Armstrong’s name on the trunnion of the gun, in full.
This piece was said to have been presented to the Confederacy by some
English admirers. But Armstrong guns, of less calibre, were found in
all the fortifications about Cape Fear.
These latter works were evacuated by the Confederates in great
consternation and hurry; in some instances they only spiked very fine
guns.
Fort Anderson, on the right bank, held our flotilla for some time. Just
abreast of it were two lines of torpedoes, both floating and sunken,
and this fort was not evacuated until after a heavy bombardment of
thirteen hours, and an expenditure of about five thousand shell.
It was very natural for the Confederates to suppose that Fort Fisher
would come off victoriously from the second attack, as she was much
better garrisoned and armed, and prepared in every way, than at the
time of the first attack, in December.
The success in the second attack was considered to be due to the change
in the commanding officers; the troops who carried the muskets were the
same.
All the forts in the river were of the most approved and careful
construction, and they contained, in all, about 170 heavy guns; while
lines of piles, and torpedoes to be fired by electricity, filled the
approaches to them.
It was remarked by an officer high in authority, that the engineers who
built such works, at the expense of so much time and labor, must have
had an abiding faith in the Confederacy. Fort Fisher was nearly four
years in course of construction.
After the capture of the forts the armed cruiser Chickamauga, which had
already created such havoc among our coasters, and which was ready for
sea again, and watching an opportunity to slip out, was run high up the
river, and, in a small creek, destroyed by her own crew.
Even in the most eventful and tragical occurrences there are some
humorous sides.
After the capture some fine blockade-running steamers came into
Smithville, quite ignorant of the change in affairs, as they always
arrived “in the dark of the moon.” Lights were shown from the regular
stations, to guide them in, and when they anchored they were quietly
taken possession of.
They were generally from Bermuda, and loaded with arms, blankets, shoes
and medicines for the Confederate army. On board one of them were
found some English army officers, who had come over from Bermuda on a
“lark,” and to try what blockade-running was like. When the vessel was
boarded these gentry were found at supper, with champagne opened, to
toast their successful run and their escape from serious damage from
some shot which had struck the vessel as she was passing the outside
blockaders. Their disgust may be imagined at being shipped to New York,
in confinement, and thence back to Bermuda, by the first opportunity.