On July 20th, he wrote, “The victory of the Kearsarge over the Alabama
raised me up. I would sooner have fought that fight than any ever
fought on the ocean. Only think! it was fought like a tournament,
in full view of thousands of French and English, with a perfect
confidence, on the part of all but the Union people, that we would be
whipped. People came from Paris to witness the fight. Why, my poor
little good-for-nothing Hatteras would have whipped her (the Alabama)
in fifteen minutes, but for an unlucky shot in the boiler. She struck
the Alabama two shots for one, while she floated. But the triumph of
the Kearsarge was grand. Winslow had my old First Lieutenant of the
Hartford, Thornton, in the Kearsarge. He is as brave as a lion, and as
cool as a parson. I go for Winslow’s promotion!”
On the 31st of July all the monitors sent to Farragut had arrived,
except the Tecumseh, and she was at Pensacola, to be ready in a day or
two.
The preparations for the attack upon the Mobile defences were now about
completed, and Farragut had apprised each of his Commanders of his
plans for passing into the Bay.
Generals Canby and Granger had visited the Hartford, and in this
interview it was agreed that all the troops that could be spared should
be sent to co-operate with the fleet in the attack upon Forts Morgan
and Gaines.
Subsequently Canby found he had not force sufficient to invest both
forts; so, at Farragut’s suggestion, he sent a body of troops to land
on Dauphin Island, near Fort Gaines. The Admiral appreciated the
assistance of the army in this case, and the responsibility of his
position. He was not the man to begin the attack without having taken
every precaution to insure success. He said he was ready to take the
offensive the moment the troops were ready to act with him; that there
was no doing anything with these forts so long as their back doors
were open. More than that, his communications had to be kept open for
supplies, which required a force of troops to cut off all the enemy’s
land communications with Mobile.
The 4th of August had been fixed as the day for the landing of the
troops and the entrance into the Bay, but the Tecumseh was not ready.
General Granger promptly landed his troops on Dauphin Island at that
date. As it turned out, all was for the best, for the Confederates were
busily engaged, during the 4th, in throwing troops and supplies into
Fort Gaines, all of which were captured a few days afterward.
The attack was then postponed until the 5th, and Farragut wrote a
letter to his wife that night, which is a model of its kind, and shows
he fully appreciated the desperate work before him.
For it we must refer the reader to his Life, by his son, from which
this account is principally taken.
The battle of Mobile Bay was, very properly, the crowning achievement
of Farragut’s naval career, for it was the most brilliant action in
which he ever took part.
The defences of the Bay, at the time of his attack, consisted mainly
of three forts, Morgan, Gaines and Powell. Fort Morgan was one of the
old brick forts, with a wall four feet eight inches thick. It is on the
west end of a peninsula which encloses the Bay, called Mobile Point,
and forms, with Gaines, the principal defence of the main ship channel
to the Gulf. It was armed with eighty-six guns, of various calibre,
some very heavy, and in exterior batteries were twenty-nine additional
guns. The water battery had two rifled 32s, four 10-inch Columbiads,
and one 8-inch Brookes rifle. The garrison, officers and men, numbered
six hundred and forty.
Fort Gaines is three miles northwest from Fort Morgan, at the eastern
extremity of Dauphin Island. This is also a brick fort, and mounted
thirty guns, with a garrison of forty-six officers and eight hundred
and eighteen men.
On the flats south and east of Fort Gaines innumerable piles were
driven, to obstruct the passage of vessels, and from these, two lines
of torpedoes extended towards Fort Morgan, terminating at a point a few
hundred yards from that fort, marked by a red buoy. This portion of
the passage was left open for the use of blockade-runners, and vessels
using it had to pass within easy range of the guns of the fort.
Six miles northeast of Fort Gaines is another narrow channel, only fit
for light draught vessels, called Grant’s pass. There was a redoubt
there, mounted with four very heavy guns.
Auxiliary to this land defence the iron-clad steamer Tennessee lay
about five hundred yards north of Fort Morgan. She was two hundred and
nine feet long and forty feet wide, with an iron prow projecting two
feet below the water line. Her sloping sides were covered with armor
varying in thickness from five to six inches. She carried six rifled
guns in casemate, two of which were pivot, and the others broadside
guns, throwing solid projectiles of one hundred and ten and ninety-five
pounds respectively. The ports, of which there were ten, were so
arranged that the pivot guns could be fought in broadside, sharp on
the bow, and in a direct line with her keel. Her great defect was in
the steering-gear, which was badly arranged and much exposed. Near her
were anchored three wooden gun-boats, the Morgan, Gaines and Selma. The
first carried one 63 cwt. eight-inch gun, and five 57 cwt. 32-pounders;
the Gaines, one eight-inch Brooke rifle and five 57 cwt. 32-pounders;
the Selma, three eight-inch Paixhans and one old-fashioned heavy
thirty-two, converted into a rifle and banded at the breech, throwing a
solid shot of about sixty pounds.
Farragut had long before issued general orders in regard to the attack,
and made no secret of his intention to attack. They were as follows:--
“Strip your vessels and prepare for the conflict. Send down all your
superfluous spars and spare rigging. Put up the splinter-nets on the
starboard side, and barricade the wheel and steers-men with sails and
hammocks. Lay chains or sand bags on the deck, over the machinery, to
resist a plunging fire. Hang the sheet chains over the side, or make
any other arrangement for security that your ingenuity may suggest.
Land your starboard boats, or lower and tow them on the port side,
and lower the port boats down to the water’s edge. Place a leadsman
and the pilot in the port quarter-boat, or the one most convenient to
the Commander.
“The vessels will run past the forts in couples, lashed side by side,
as hereinafter designated. The flag-ship will lead and steer from
Sand Island N. by E., by compass, until abreast of Fort Morgan, then
N.W., half N., until past the middle ground, then N. by W., and the
others, as designated in the drawing, will follow in due order, until
ordered to anchor; but the bow and quarter line must be preserved, to
give the chase guns a fair range, and each vessel must be kept astern
of the broadside of the next ahead; each vessel will keep a very
little on the starboard quarter of his next ahead, and when abreast
of the fort will keep directly astern, and as we pass the fort, will
take the same distance on the port quarter of the next ahead, to
enable the stern guns to fire clear of the next vessel astern.
“It will be the object of the Admiral to get as close to the fort
as possible before opening fire; the ships, however, will open fire
the moment the enemy opens upon us, with their chase and other guns,
as fast as they can be brought to bear. Use short fuses for the
shell and shrapnel, and as soon as within 300 or 400 yards, give
them grape. It is understood that heretofore we have fired too high,
but with grape-shot, it is necessary to elevate a little above the
object, as grape will dribble from the muzzle of the gun.
“If one or more of the vessels be disabled, their partners must carry
them through, if possible; but if they cannot, then the next astern
must render the required assistance; but as the Admiral contemplates
moving with the flood tide, it will only require sufficient power to
keep the crippled vessels in the channel.
“Vessels that can, must place guns upon the poop and top-gallant
forecastle, and in the tops on the starboard side. Should the enemy
fire grape, they will remove the men from the top-gallant forecastle
and the poop to the guns below, until out of grape range.
“The howitzers must keep up a constant fire from the time they can
reach with shrapnel until out of its range.” * * * * “There are
certain black buoys placed by the enemy across the channel, from
the piles on the west side of the channel towards Fort Morgan. It
being understood that there are torpedoes and other obstructions
between the buoys, the vessels will take care to pass eastward of the
easternmost buoy, which is clear of all obstructions. The Admiral
will endeavor to remove the others before the day of attack, as he
thinks they support that which will otherwise sink, and at least
to destroy them for guides to the demons who hope to explode them.
So soon as the vessel is opposite the end of the piles, it will be
best to stop the propeller of the ship, and let her run in with her
headway and the tide, and those having side-wheel gun-boats will
continue on with the aid of their paddles, which are not likely to
foul with their drag-ropes.
D. G. FARRAGUT,
_Rear-Admiral, Commander Western Gulf Squadron_.
P. S.--Carry low steam.