About the close of the gloomy and disastrous year 1861, the Government
of the United States determined to regain control of the Mississippi,
the greater part of which, from Memphis to the Gulf, was held by the
Confederates, who were thus enabled to transport immense supplies from
the southwest to the seat of war. Moreover, the Rebels, as they were
then called, had, at New Orleans, a constantly increasing force of rams
and armored vessels, under able officers of the old Navy, with which to
defend the approaches from the Gulf, as well as from up the river.
After long consideration, Farragut was chosen as the naval officer
to command in the Gulf. The story of his southern birth, and of his
steadfast loyalty to his flag, is too well known to be here repeated.
His formal orders put him in command of the “Western Gulf Blockading
Squadron,” and these were issued in January, 1862. But confidential
instructions were also given him, by which he was especially charged
with the “reduction of the defences guarding the approaches to New
Orleans, and the taking possession of that city.”
He was to be assisted by a mortar-fleet of schooners, under Commander
D. D. Porter.
Farragut had long before expressed a belief that he could take New
Orleans, and he had little confidence in a mortar-fleet, and would
rather have dispensed with it; but since Porter had already been
ordered to prepare it, when he was detailed for the command, he
acquiesced in the arrangement.
He turned out to be right, as he generally was in such matters.
On February 2d, 1862, Farragut sailed for the Gulf, in the sloop-of-war
Hartford, which was so long to bear his flag, successfully, through
manifold dangers.
The Hartford was a wooden screw-steamer, full ship-rigged, and of
nineteen hundred tons burthen. She was of comparatively light draught,
and, therefore, well suited to the service she was called upon to
perform.
She then carried a battery of twenty-two nine-inch, smooth-bore guns,
two 20-pounder Parrotts, and her fore and main-tops had howitzers, with
a protection of boiler iron, a suggestion of Farragut’s. This battery
was afterwards increased by a rifled gun upon the forecastle. Like
Napoleon, Farragut believed in plenty of guns.
The Hartford arrived at her rendezvous, Ship Island, one hundred miles
north-northeast of the mouths of the Mississippi, on February 20th.
A military force, to co-operate with Farragut’s fleet, was sent out,
under General B. F. Butler, and arrived at Ship Island on March 25th.
Butler’s plan was to follow Farragut, and secure, by occupation,
whatever the guns of the fleet should subdue.
Let us now see a little about the scene of action.
Farragut’s son, in the “Life of Farragut,” from which we principally
quote in this article, says (quoting another person), that the Delta
of the Mississippi has been aptly described as “a long, watery arm,
gauntleted in swamps and mud, spread out into a grasping hand,” of
which the fingers are the five passes, or mouths.
At that time the mud brought down by the great river formed bars at
each pass, which bars are always shifting, and require good pilots to
keep account of their condition. In peace times the pilots are always
at work, sounding and buoying, and the chances are that all the efforts
of the “Delta Doctors” will only end in transferring the bars further
out into the Gulf.
New Orleans, on the left bank of the river, is about one hundred miles
from its mouth, and was by far the wealthiest and most important city
of the Confederacy. Loyall Farragut states that, in 1860, it had about
170,000 inhabitants; while Charleston had but about 40,000; Richmond
even a smaller population; and Mobile but 29,000 people.
Just before the war New Orleans had the largest export trade of any
city in the world; and this fact, together with the importance of its
position from a military point of view, made it the most important
object for any military expedition.
There is a great bend in the Mississippi, thirty miles above the head
of the passes, the lowest favorable locality for defence, where two
forts had been erected by the United States Government, St. Philip on
the left, or north bank, and a little further down, Fort Jackson, on
the right bank. A single fort at this point had held a British fleet in
check for nine days, in spite of a vigorous shelling by their guns and
mortars. Fort St. Philip was originally built by the Spaniards, but had
been completely reconstructed. It was a quadrangular earthwork, with a
brick scarp, and powerful batteries exteriorly, above and below. Fort
Jackson was more important, and rose twenty-five feet above the river
and swamp, while St. Philip was only nineteen feet above them.
The Confederates had taken possession of these works, and had put them
in complete order; Jackson mounted seventy-five powerful guns, and
St. Philip forty. Fourteen of Fort Jackson’s guns were in bomb-proof
casemates. The works were garrisoned by fifteen hundred men, commanded
by Brigadier General Duncan; St. Philip being commanded by Lieutenant
Colonel Edward Higgins, formerly an officer of the United States Navy.
Above the forts lay a fleet of fifteen vessels, under Commodore J.
K. Mitchell, formerly of the United States Navy, which included the
ironclad ram Manassas, and a huge floating battery, covered with
railroad iron, called the “Louisiana.”
Just below Fort Jackson the river was obstructed by a heavy chain,
brought from the Pensacola Navy-yard. This chain was supported by
cypress logs, at short intervals; the ends made fast to great trees on
shore, and the whole kept from sagging down with the current by heavy
anchors.
This contrivance was swept away by a spring freshet, and was replaced
by smaller chains, passed over eight dismasted hulks, anchored abreast,
and partially by logs, as before. There was a battery at the end
opposite Fort Jackson.
A number of sharpshooters patrolled the banks below, to give notice of
any movements of the United States forces.
Farragut’s task was to break through the obstructions, pass the forts,
destroy or capture the Rebel fleet, and then to place New Orleans under
the guns of his own ships, and demand its surrender.
He had six sloops-of-war, sixteen gun-boats--all steam-vessels--and
twenty-one schooners, each with a 13-inch mortar, and five sailing
vessels, which were to act as magazines and store-ships. The fleet
carried over two hundred guns, and was the largest that had ever been
seen under our flag, up to that time; but was afterwards much exceeded
by that which bombarded Fort Fisher.
There was little opportunity for General Butler and his fifteen
thousand troops to co-operate in the passage of the forts; so they only
held themselves ready to hold what Farragut might capture.
Farragut hoped to have taken the Colorado, a most powerful frigate, up
the river, but she drew entirely too much water to be got over the bar.
Great difficulty was experienced in getting the Brooklyn, Mississippi,
and Pensacola into the river. The Mississippi, although lightened in
every possible way, had to be dragged through at least a foot of mud.
When the arduous labor was finished, and the time for action arrived,
Butler’s troops were embarked on the transports, and Porter’s
mortar-schooners were placed on each bank, below the forts; being
protected from the view of those in the batteries by the forest trees,
and by having great branches lashed at their mast-heads, which blended
with the foliage on the banks.
The mortars threw shells weighing two hundred and eighty-five pounds,
and their fire was guided by a careful triangulation, made by Mr.
Gerdes, of the Coast Survey. Fort Jackson received most of the shells,
of which about a thousand a day were thrown, for six days. The
Confederates had a good many killed and wounded by this means, and
much damage was done, but the forts were not silenced; and Lieutenant
Weitzel reported, after their surrender, that they were as strong as
before the first shell was fired.
[Illustration: NEW ORLEANS--FLEET PASSING FORTS JACKSON AND ST.
PHILIP.]
One schooner was sunk, and one steamer disabled by the return fire from
the fort.
In the course of the delay waiting for the result of the bombardment,
many of Farragut’s ships were damaged by collisions, caused by strong
winds and currents, and by efforts to avoid the fire-rafts which the
enemy sent down. Only one of the latter put the ships in any danger,
and that was at last turned off. These fire-rafts were flatboats piled
with dry wood, sprinkled with tar and turpentine. They were towed out
of the way by the ships’ boats.
Farragut had issued orders to his commanding officers in regard to
preparing their ships for this particular service. After providing for
the top hamper, and dispensing with many masts and spars, he says,
“Make arrangements, if possible, to mount one or two guns on the poop
and top-gallant-forecastle; in other words, be prepared to use as many
guns as possible, ahead and astern, to protect yourself against the
enemy’s gun-boats and batteries, bearing in mind that you will always
have to ride head to the current, and can only avail yourself of the
sheer of the helm to point a broadside gun more than three points
forward of the beam.
“Have a kedge in the mizzen-chains (or any convenient place) on the
quarter, with a hawser bent and leading through in the stern chock,
ready for any emergency; also grapnels in the boats, ready to hook on
to and to tow off fire-ships. Trim your vessel a few inches by the
head, so that if she touches the bottom she will not swing head down
the river. Put your boat howitzers in the fore and main tops, on the
boat carriages, and secure them for firing abeam, etc. Should any
accident occur to the machinery of the ship, making it necessary to
drop down the river, you will back and fill down under sail, or you
can drop your anchor and drift down, but in no case attempt to turn
the ship’s head down stream. You will have a spare hawser ready, and
when ordered to take in tow your next astern, do so, keeping the hawser
slack so long as the ship can maintain her own position, having a care
not to foul the propeller.
“No vessel must withdraw from battle, under any circumstances, without
the consent of the flag-officer. You will see that force and other
pumps and engine hose are in good order, and men stationed by them, and
your men will be drilled to the extinguishing of fires.
“Have light Jacob-ladders made to throw over the side, for the use of
the carpenters in stopping shot-holes, who are to be supplied with
pieces of inch board lined with felt, and ordinary nails, and see that
the ports are marked, in accordance with the ‘ordnance instructions,’
on the berth deck, to show the locality of the shot-holes.
“Have many tubs of water about the decks, both for the purpose of
extinguishing fire and for drinking. Have a heavy kedge in the port
main-chains, and a whip on the main-yard, ready to run it up and let
fall on the deck of any vessel you may run alongside of, in order to
secure her for boarding.
“You will be careful to have lanyards on the lever of the screw, so as
to secure the gun at the proper elevation, and prevent it from running
down at each fire. I wish you to understand that the day is at hand
when you will be called upon to meet the enemy in the worst form for
our profession. You must be prepared to execute all those duties to
which you have been so long trained in the Navy without having the
opportunity of practicing. I expect every vessel’s crew to be well
exercised at their guns, because it is required by the regulations of
the service, and it is usually the first object of our attention;
but they must be equally well trained for stopping shot-holes and
extinguishing fire. Hot and cold shot will, no doubt, be freely dealt
to us, and there must be stout hearts and quick hands to extinguish the
one and stop the holes of the other.
“I shall expect the most prompt attention to signals and verbal orders,
either from myself or the Captain of the fleet, who, it will be
understood, in all cases, acts by my authority.”
After the bombardment had continued three days Farragut, who had made
up his mind to attempt the passage of the forts in any event, called a
council of his Captains, to obtain their opinion as to the best manner
of doing so.
Immediately after the council Farragut issued the following general
order:--
“UNITED STATES FLAG-SHIP HARTFORD,
MISSISSIPPI RIVER, April 20th, 1862.
“The Flag-Officer, having heard all the opinions expressed by the
different commanders, is of the opinion that whatever is to be
done will have to be done quickly, or we shall be again reduced
to a blockading squadron, without the means of carrying on the
bombardment, as we have nearly expended all the shells and fuses and
material for making cartridges. He has always entertained the same
opinions which are expressed by Commander Porter; that is, there
are three modes of attack; and the question is, which is the one to
be adopted? his own opinion is, that a combination of two should
be made; viz., the forts should be run, and when a force is once
above the forts, to protect the troops, they should be landed at
quarantine, from the Gulf side, by bringing them through the bayou,
and then our forces should move up the river, mutually aiding each
other as it can be done to advantage.
“When, in the opinion of the Flag-Officer, the propitious time
has arrived, the signal will be made to weigh and advance to the
conflict. If, in his opinion, at the time of arriving at the
respective positions of the different divisions of the fleet, we have
the advantage, he will make the signal for close action, number 8,
and abide the result, conquer, or be conquered, drop anchor or keep
under way, as in his opinion is best.
“Unless the signal above mentioned is made, it will be understood
that the first order of sailing will be formed after leaving Fort
St. Philip, and we will proceed up the river in accordance with the
original opinion expressed.
“The programme of the order of sailing accompanies this general
order, and the commanders will hold themselves in readiness for the
service as indicated.
“D. G. FARRAGUT,
“_Flag-Officer Western Gulf Blockading Squadron._”
Having decided to run by the forts, he confided to Fleet-Captain Bell
the dangerous mission of proceeding, with the gunboats Pinola and
Itasca, to make a passage for his fleet through the chain obstructions.
Lieutenant Caldwell, of the Itasca, and his party, with great coolness
and bravery, boarded one of the hulks, and succeeded in detaching
the chains. They were accompanied by the inventor of a new submarine
petard, which he placed under one of the hulks. But a movement of the
Pinola in the swift current snapped the wires, and it could not be
exploded. In spite of a very heavy fire directed upon them, the party
at last succeeded in making a sufficient opening for the fleet to pass
through.
Farragut wrote, the next day: “* * * Captain Bell went last night to
cut the chain across the river. I never felt such anxiety in my life,
as I did until his return. One of his vessels got on shore, and I was
fearful she would be captured. They kept up a tremendous fire on him;
but Porter diverted their fire with a heavy cannonade. * * * * Bell
would have burned the hulks, but the illumination would have given the
enemy a chance to destroy his gunboat, which got aground. However, the
chain was divided, and it gives us space enough to go through. I was as
glad to see Bell, on his return, as if he had been my boy. I was up all
night, and could not sleep until he got back to the ship.”
Farragut had determined to run by the forts at the end of five days’
bombardment; but he was detained for twenty-four hours by the necessity
of repairing damages to two of his vessels. At first he had determined
to lead, in the Hartford, but was dissuaded from that, and appointed
Captain Bailey, whose ship, the Colorado, drew too much water to get
up, to lead the column, in the gun-boat Cayuga, Lieutenant Commanding
N. B. Harrison.
Long before this--on the 6th of April--Farragut had himself
reconnoitred the forts, by daylight, going up in the gun-boat Kennebec
in whose cross-trees he sat, glass in hand, until the gunners in the
fort began to get his range.
On the night of the passage, April 23-24, the moon would rise about
half-past three in the morning, and the fleet was ordered to be ready
to start about two.
In this, as in most other important operations during the war, the
enemy were mysteriously apprised of what was to be done.
At sunset there was a light southerly breeze, and a haze upon the
water. Caldwell was sent up, in the Itasca, to see if the passage made
in the obstructions was still open. At eleven at night he signalled
that it was, and just at that time the enemy opened fire upon him, sent
down burning rafts, and lighted immense piles of wood which they had
prepared on shore, near the ends of the chain.
Soon after midnight the hammocks of the fleet were quietly stowed, and
the ships cleared for action.
At five minutes before two, two ordinary red lights were shown at
the peak of the flag-ship, the signal to get under way, but it was
half-past three before all was ready. This was the time for the moon to
rise, but that made little difference, with the light of the blazing
rafts and bonfires.
The mortar-boats and the sailing sloop Portsmouth moved further up
stream, to engage the water battery, as the ships were going by. This
they promptly did, and then Captain Bailey led off, with his division
of eight vessels, whose objective point was Fort St. Philip. All of
these passed safely through the opening in the cable.
The forts opened on them promptly, but in five minutes they had reached
St. Philip, and were pouring grape and canister into that work.
In ten minutes more the Cayuga had passed beyond range of the fort,
to find herself surrounded by eleven Rebel gun-boats. Three of these
attempted to board her at once. An 11-inch shot was sent through one of
them, at a range of about thirty yards, and she was at once run ashore
and burned up.
The Parrott gun on the Cayuga’s forecastle drove off another; and she
was preparing to close with the third, when the Oneida and Varuna,
which had run in close to St. Philip, thus avoiding the elevated guns
of that fort, while they swept its bastions with grape and shrapnel,
came to the assistance of the Cayuga. S. P. Lee, in the Oneida, ran
full speed into one of the enemy’s vessels, cut her nearly in two, and
left her floating down the current, a helpless wreck.
She fired right and left into two others, and then went to the
assistance of the Varuna, which had got ashore on the left bank,
hard pressed by two Rebel gun-boats, one of which was said to be the
Manassas. The Varuna was rammed by both of them, and fifteen minutes
after, she sunk. In that time she had put three 8-inch shells into
the Governor Moore, besides so crippling her with solid shot that she
surrendered to the Oneida. She also forced another to take to the
bank by her 8-inch shell. The Varuna was commanded by Commander (now
Admiral) C. S. Boggs. It is said that, before sinking, he also exploded
the boiler of another small steamer.
The Pensacola steamed slowly and steadily by, firing her powerful
battery with great deliberation, and doing especial execution with her
11-inch pivot gun and her rifled eighty-pounder. In return she received
a heavy fire, and lost thirty-seven in killed and wounded; the greatest
number of any of the fleet. Her boats were lowered, and sent to assist
the sinking Varuna.
The Mississippi came up next in line to the Pensacola, but escaped
with light loss of life. She it was that met the ram Manassas, and the
latter gave her a severe cut, below the water, on the port-quarter,
and disabled her machinery. But the Mississippi riddled her with shot,
boarded her, and set her on fire, and she drifted down below the forts
and blew up.
The Katahdin ran close to the forts, passed them rapidly, got near
the head of the line, and was engaged principally with the ironclad
Louisiana. The Kineo ran by, close under St. Philip, and then assisted
the Mississippi with the ram Manassas: but she was afterwards attacked
by three of the enemy’s gun-boats at once, and, having had her
pivot-gun-carriage injured, withdrew, and continued up stream.
The Wissahickon, the last of the eight vessels of the first division,
was less fortunate. She got ashore before she reached the forts, got
off and passed them, and ran on shore again above.
It must be remembered that these operations were carried on in the
darkness and thick smoke, lighted only by the lurid flashes of more
than two hundred guns.
The second division of the fleet was led by Farragut himself, in the
Hartford, followed by the Brooklyn and Richmond. These were three
formidable vessels. The Hartford opened fire on Fort Jackson just
before four in the morning, and received a heavy fire from both forts.
Soon after, in attempting to avoid a fire-raft, she grounded on a shoal
spot, near St. Philip. At the same time the ram Manassas pushed a
fire-raft under her port-quarter, and she at once took fire. A portion
of her crew went to fire-quarters, and soon subdued the flames, the
working of her guns being steadily continued. Soon she backed off,
into deep water; but this movement set her head down stream, and it
was with difficulty that she was turned round against the current.
When, at last, this was accomplished, she proceeded up the river,
firing into several of the enemy’s vessels as she passed. One of these
was a steamer, packed with men, apparently a boarding party. She was
making straight for the Hartford, when Captain Broome’s gun, manned by
marines, planted a shell in her, which exploded, and she disappeared.
During the critical period when she was slowly turning up river, the
Admiral stood aft, giving orders, and occasionally consulting a little
compass attached to his watch-chain. During most of the engagement,
however, he was forward, watching the progress of the fight.
The Brooklyn was also detained by getting entangled with a raft, and
running over one of the hulks which held up the chain, during which
time she was raked by Fort Jackson, and suffered somewhat from the fire
of St. Philip.
Just as she was clear, and headed up stream, she was butted by the
Manassas, which had not headway enough to damage her much, and slid
off again into the darkness. Then the Brooklyn was attacked by a large
steamer, but she gave her her port broadside, at fifty yards, and set
her on fire. Feeling her way along, in a dense cloud of smoke from
a fire-raft, she came close abreast of St. Philip, into which she
poured such tremendous broadsides that by the flashes the gunners were
seen running to shelter, and for the time the fort was silenced. The
Brooklyn then passed on, and engaged several of the enemy’s gun-boats.
One of these, the Warrior, came under her port broadside, when eleven
five-second shells were planted in her, which set her on fire, and she
was run on shore. The Brooklyn was under fire an hour and a half, but
did not lose quite so many as the Pensacola.
The Richmond, a slow ship, was the third and last of the centre
division. She came on steadily, and without accident, working her
battery with the utmost regularity. Her loss was not heavy, which
her commander attributed mainly to a complete provision of splinter
nettings.
The gun-boat Sciota, carrying Fleet-Captain Bell, led the third
division. She steamed by the forts, firing as she passed, and above
them burned two steamboats. Then she sent a boat to receive the
surrender of an armed steamboat, but the latter was found to be fast
ashore.
The Iroquois, Commander John DeCamp, had not such good fortune.
She passed so close to Fort Jackson as to escape much injury, but
received a terrible raking from St. Philip, and was also raked by
the armed steamer McCrea, with grape. She drove off the McCrea with
an eleven-inch shell and a stand of canister, and then went through a
group of the enemy’s gun-boats, giving them broadsides as she passed.
The Iroquois’ losses were heavy.
The gun-boat Pinola passed up in line, firing her eleven-inch pivot and
Parrott rifles at the flashes of the guns of the forts, which were all
that Commander Crosby could see; then she emerged from the smoke cloud,
steered towards St. Philip, and by the light of the blazing rafts,
received the discharges of its forty guns.
The Pinola was the last vessel which passed the forts, and she got up
in time to fire a few shell at the enemy’s flotilla.
Of the other three gun-boats of the division, the Kennebec got out of
her course, became entangled in the rafts, and did not get free until
it was broad daylight, and too late to attempt a passage. The Itasca,
upon arriving in front of Fort Jackson, received a shot in her boiler,
incapacitating her, and she was obliged to drift down stream.
The Winona got astray among the hulks, and when she came within range
of Fort Jackson it was broad daylight, and the fleet had gone on. Fort
Jackson opened upon her, and she soon lost all the crew of her rifled
gun but one man. Still she kept on, to endeavor to get through, but St.
Philip opening upon her, from her lower battery, at less than point
blank range, the little Winona was forced to turn and descend the
stream.
Thus did Farragut accomplish a feat in naval warfare which had no
precedent, and which is still without a parallel, except the one
furnished by himself, at Mobile, two years later.
Starting with seventeen wooden vessels, he had passed, with all but
three of them, against the swift current of a river, there but half
a mile wide, between two powerful earthworks, which had long been
prepared for him, his course impeded by blazing rafts, and immediately
thereafter had met the enemy’s fleet of fifteen vessels, two of them
ironclad, and either captured or destroyed every one of them.
All this was done with the loss of but one vessel from his own
squadron. Probably few naval men would have believed that this work
could have been done so effectually, even with ironclads.
Captain Wilkinson, who was in this battle as executive officer of
the Confederate iron-clad Louisiana, in his “Narrative of a Blockade
Runner,” says: “Most of us belonging to that little naval fleet knew
that Admiral Farragut would dare to attempt what any man would; and,
for my part, I had not forgotten that while I was under his command,
during the Mexican war, he had proposed to Commodore Perry, then
commanding the Gulf Squadron, and urged upon him, the enterprise of
capturing the strong fort of San Juan de Ulloa, at Vera Cruz, by
_boarding_. Ladders were to be constructed, and triced up along the
attacking ships’ masts, and the ships to be towed alongside the walls
by the steamers of the squadron. Here was a much grander prize to be
fought for, and every day of delay was strengthening his adversaries.”
The magnitude of Farragut’s novel enterprise was scarcely realized at
the North when the first news was received. It was simply announced
that he “had run by the forts.” The Confederates knew too well what
resistance and difficulties he had overcome, and what a loss they
sustained in New Orleans.
An officer who was in the engagement expressed an opinion that if the
passage had been attempted by daylight the fleet would have sustained a
fearful loss.
After the fleet had passed the forts Captain Bailey, in the Cayuga,
preceded the flag-ship up the river, and at the quarantine station
captured the Chalmette regiment, encamped upon the river bank.
On the morning of the 25th, the Cayuga, still leading, encountered the
Chalmette batteries, three miles below New Orleans. The Hartford and
Brooklyn, with several others, soon joined her, and silenced these
batteries. New Orleans was now fairly under Farragut’s guns, and this
had been effected at the cost of thirty-seven killed and one hundred
and forty-seven wounded.
Farragut appointed eleven o’clock of the morning of the 26th as the
hour “for all the officers and crews of the fleet to return thanks to
Almighty God for His great goodness and mercy, in permitting us to pass
through the events of the last two days with so little loss of life and
blood.”
The ships passed up to the city, and anchored immediately in front of
it, and Captain Bailey was sent on shore to demand the surrender of
it, from the authorities, to which the Mayor replied that the city was
under martial law, and that he had no authority. General Lovell, who
was present, said he would deliver up nothing, but, in order to free
the city from embarrassment, he would restore the city authorities, and
retire with his troops, which he did.
Farragut then seized all the steamboats which had not been destroyed
and sent them down to the quarantine station, for Butler’s troops.
Among them was the Tennessee, which the blockaders had been so long
watching for, but which never got out.
The levee at New Orleans was at this time a scene of perfect
desolation, as ships, steamers, and huge piles of cotton and wool had
been set on fire by the Confederates, and an immense amount of property
was destroyed. A very powerful ironclad, called the Mississippi, was
set on fire, and drifted down past the city, in flames. Another was
sunk directly in front of the Custom House, and others which had been
begun at Algiers were destroyed.
Several miles up the river, about Carrollton, were extensive
fortifications--all taken possession of by Commander Lee--and an
immense work, supporting chains, to prevent Foote’s gun-boats from
descending the river.
Farragut had sent a party on shore to hoist the flag on the Custom
House and Mint, belonging to the General Government. The party acted
with great firmness and discretion, in spite of insults from a large
and excited crowd. At noon on the 26th, during the performance of
divine service referred to before, the officers and crews of the
vessels were startled by the discharge of a howitzer in the main-top of
the Pensacola. The lookout aloft had seen four men mount to the roof
of the Mint and tear down the United States flag, and he had instantly
fired the gun, which was trained upon the flag-staff, and loaded with
grape.
The leader of these men, a desperado and gambler, who thus imperilled
the lives and property of the whole of the citizens, was, by order of
General Butler, tried for the offence afterwards, was found guilty, and
hanged by a beam and rope thrust out of the highest window of the Mint.
When Admiral Farragut arrived at the quarantine station, after passing
the forts, he had sent Captain Boggs (whose vessel, the Varuna, was
lost) in a boat, through the bayous, to inform General Butler and
Commander Porter of his success. The Captain was twenty-six hours
in getting through. But General Butler, in the steamer Saxon, had
followed the fleet up near the forts, and had witnessed the passage of
the ships. He then hurried back to his troops, and they rendezvoused
at Sable Island, twelve miles in the rear of Fort St. Philip, whence
they were carried up in transports and landed at a point five miles
above that work. At the same time Commander Porter had sent six of his
mortar-boats to the bay behind Fort Jackson, where they arrived on the
morning of April 27th, thus making a complete investment. That night
two hundred and fifty of the garrison of Fort Jackson came out and
surrendered themselves to the Union pickets.
While Farragut was passing the forts, Porter, with his mortar-boats,
and their attendant steamers, continued the bombardment. On the 24th he
demanded a surrender, but was refused, and for the three days following
there was little or no firing. During these days the garrisons were
occupied in re-mounting some of their dismounted guns, and transferred
others to the floating battery Louisiana.
On the 28th, General Duncan, the commander of the forts, learning that
Farragut had possession of New Orleans, accepted the terms offered by
Porter. While the articles of capitulation were being drawn up and
signed, on board the Harriet Lane, and flags of truce were flying,
the Confederate naval officers, after destroying three of their four
remaining vessels, set fire to the Louisiana, and cast her adrift.
Fortunately her magazine exploded before she reached Porter’s flotilla,
or some of his vessels must have shared her fate; and, not improbably,
all of them.
After the surrender had been consummated, he went up the river, and
captured the naval officers who were supposed to have been guilty
of this perfidious and most dishonorable, and murderous act, and put
them in close confinement, to be sent North, and dealt with as the
Government might see fit. John K. Mitchell, the Commodore of the
Confederate flotilla, sent a letter to Farragut, justifying himself for
destroying his vessels, and excusing his attempt to blow up Porter’s
vessels, in this wise:--
“Lieutenant Whittle was sent in a boat with a flag of truce to inform
Commander Porter that in firing the Louisiana, her magazine had not
been effectually drowned and that, though efforts were made to drown
the charges in the guns, they may not have succeeded. This information
was given in consideration of the negotiations then pending under flag
of truce between him and Fort Jackson; but while the message was on its
way the explosion took place, a fact that does not affect the honorable
purposes intended by it.”
This letter seems almost too childish and disingenuous to receive
serious notice. It was almost the only instance during the war when
naval officers did not act in good faith.
The Confederate naval officers claimed, in justification of their
action, that they were no party to the flag of truce, nor were they
included in the terms of surrender of the forts, General Duncan
treating only for the garrisons under his command, and expressly
disclaiming all connection with the navy. The whole was a pitiful
commentary upon the jealousies and want of united conduct, which
rendered Farragut’s task a little more easy. Mitchell had always
been considered an “ill-conditioned” man, in the old navy, and the
Government was disposed to treat him, and some of his officers, pretty
rigorously; but matters were arranged, afterwards, in a correspondence
which took place, upon their being sent North, between the Secretary
of the Navy and Mitchell, that resulted in their treatment as ordinary
prisoners.
In writing to his family, after his capture of New Orleans, Farragut
said, “It is a strange thought, that I am here among my relatives, and
yet not one has dared to say, ‘I am happy to see you.’ There is a reign
of terror in this doomed city: but, although I am abused as one who
wished to kill all the women and children, I still see a feeling of
respect for me.”