Paul Jones had obtained so much celebrity for his cruise in the Ranger,
that, after that ship departed for America he remained in France, in
the hope of receiving a more important command.
During the years 1778-9 various projects were discussed, in which he
was to have a part. One idea was to make a descent upon Liverpool, with
a body of troops to be commanded by La Fayette. These plans all came
to nothing, and his offers of service were repulsed; until at last a
singular arrangement was proposed to him.
M. de Sartine, French Minister of Marine, in a letter of February,
14th, 1779, states that the King of France had decided to purchase, and
put at the disposition of Captain Jones, the Duras--an old Indiaman
of some size, then at l’Orient. To this vessel were added three
more, procured by means of M. le Ray de Chaumont, a banker who had
connections with the French Ministry.
Dr. Franklin, who, as Minister of the United States, was supposed, in
a legal sense, to direct the whole affair, added the Alliance, 32, by
virtue of authority from Congress.
The vessels thus procured formed a little squadron, composed of the
Bonhomme Richard, Alliance, Pallas, Cerf, and Vengeance. The Pallas was
a purchased merchantman; the Vengeance a small purchased brig; the Cerf
was a large cutter, and, with the exception of the Alliance, the only
vessel of the squadron built for war purposes. All but the Alliance
were French built, and they were placed under the American flag by
the following arrangement: the officers received appointments, which
were to remain valid for a limited period only, from Dr. Franklin, who
had been furnished blank commissions, to fill at his own discretion,
ever since he had arrived in Europe. The vessels were to show the
American ensign and no other. In short, the French ships were to be
considered as American ships during this particular service: and when
it was terminated they were to revert to their former owners. The laws
and provisions made for the American navy were to govern, and command
was to be exercised, and to descend, according to its usages. Such
officers as already had rank in the American Navy took precedence,
agreeably to dates of commission, and new appointments were regulated
by priority of appointment.
[Illustration: ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN THE SERAPIS AND BONHOMME RICHARD.]
By especial provision, Captain Jones was to be Commander-in-chief, a
post which his original commission entitled him to fill, as Captain
Landais, the only other regular captain in the squadron, was his
junior. The joint right of the American Minister and of the French
Government to direct the movements of the squadron was recognized.
It is not exactly known from what source the money was obtained to
fit out this squadron; and it is likely that it never will be known,
especially as the French Revolution destroyed so many records, public
and private. Although the name of the King was used, it is possible
that private adventure was at the bottom of the enterprise, although
the French Government furnished vessels and the use of its stores.
Dr. Franklin expressly stated that he made no advances for the ships
employed.
As everything connected with this remarkable expedition has interest
for us, it is as well to go a little further into the composition of
the force fitted out by Jones.
After many delays, the Bonhomme Richard was equipped and manned. It
was intended to cast 18-pounders for her, but as that would take too
much time, old 12’s were substituted. With this change in armament, the
Richard, as she was called by the sailors, got ready for sea.
She was, properly, a single-decked ship, that is, carrying her armament
on one gun-deck, with the usual additions on the quarter-deck and
forecastle.
But Commodore Jones, with a view to attacking the enemy’s large
convoys, caused twelve ports to be cut in the gun-room, below, where
six old 18-pounders were mounted, with the intention of fighting all of
them on the same side, in smooth water. It was foreseen that these guns
could only be of use in moderate weather, or when engaged to leeward,
but the ship’s height admitted of them, and it was done.
On her gun-deck proper the ship had twenty-eight ports, the regular
construction of an English 38-gun ship at that time. Here the
12-pounders were placed. On her quarter-deck and forecastle were
mounted eight 9’s; making, in all, a mixed armament, rather light, to
be sure, of 42 guns. If the six 18’s were taken away, the ship would
have been what was called a 32-gun frigate.
She was a clumsy vessel, built many years before, with the high,
old-fashioned poop, which resembled a tower.
With a vessel of this singular armament and unwieldy construction,
Jones was compelled to receive on board a crew of very doubtful
composition. A few Americans filled officers’ positions; but the crew
embraced representatives of more than twelve nationalities. To keep
this motley crew in order, one hundred and thirty-five marines, or
soldiers, were put on board. These were nearly as much mixed, as to
nationalities, as the sailors.
Just as the squadron was about to sail M. le Ray de Chaumont
appeared at l’Orient, and presented a _concordat_ or agreement, for
the signature of all the commanders. This looked very much like a
partnership in a privateering expedition, and was the cause of much
after disobedience among Jones’ captains.
On June 19th, 1779, the ships sailed, bound south, with a small convoy
of vessels. These they escorted safely into the Garonne, and other
ports; but not without repeated exhibition, thus early, of disobedience
of orders, and unseamanlike conduct, which marked the whole career of
this squadron, so ill assorted and manned.
While lying to, off the coast, the Alliance, by lubberly handling,
got foul of the Richard, and lost her mizzen-mast; carrying away, at
the same time, the head, cutwater and jib-boom of the Richard. This
necessitated a return to port, to refit.
When at sea again, and steering to the northward, the Cerf cutter was
sent in chase of a strange sail, and parted company.
The next morning she engaged a small English cruiser, of 14 guns, and
caused her to strike, after a sharp fight of an hour; but she was
forced to abandon her prize by the approach of an enemy’s vessel of
superior force. The Cerf went into l’Orient again.
On the 23d three enemy’s vessels-of-war were seen by the squadron; and,
having the wind, they ran down in a line abreast, when, most probably
deceived by the height and general appearance of the Richard, they
hauled up and escaped under a press of sail. On the 26th the Alliance
and Pallas parted company with the Richard, leaving that ship with the
Vengeance brig only, for consort. On reaching the Penmarks, a headland
of Finisterre, the designated rendezvous, the missing vessels did not
appear. On the 29th, the Vengeance having gone, by permission, into
Groix Roads, the Richard fell in with two more of the English cruisers,
which, after some hesitation, also ran, evidently under the impression
that the Richard was a two-decker.
Jones had reason to be satisfied with the spirit of his crew on this
occasion, the people manifesting a strong disposition to engage.
At last, on the 30th, the Richard ran into Isle Groix, off l’Orient;
and about the same time the Pallas and Alliance came in.
Then another delay occurred. A court was convened to inquire into the
conduct of Captain Landais, of the Alliance, in running foul of the
Richard. Both ships also had to undergo repairs. Luckily, just then a
cartel arrived from England, bringing more than one hundred exchanged
American seamen, most of whom joined the squadron.
This was a most important accession to the crew of the Richard, and
that of the Alliance. Neither of these ships had had many Americans
among their crews. Among those who came from the English prisons was
Mr. Richard Dale, who had been captured as a Master’s Mate, in the
Lexington, 14.
This young officer did not reach France in the cartel, however, but had
previously escaped, came to l’Orient, and joined the Richard. Jones
soon learned his worth, and, in reorganizing his ship, had made him
First Lieutenant.
The Richard had now nearly one hundred American seamen on board, and
all the officers were native Americans, but the commander and one
midshipman. Many of the petty officers were Americans also. In a letter
of August 11th, Jones states that the crew of the Richard consisted of
380 souls, including 137 soldiers, or marines.
On the 14th of August the squadron sailed a second time, from Groix
Roads; having the French privateers Monsieur and Granville in company,
and under Jones’ orders. The first parted company almost immediately,
on account of differences concerning a valuable prize; and another was
taken the day she left.
On the 23d the ships were off Cape Clear, and while towing the
Richard’s head round, in a calm, the crew of the boat, which happened
to be manned by Englishmen, cut the tow-line, and escaped. Mr. Lunt,
the sailing-master, manned another boat, and taking four marines,
pursued the fugitives. A fog came on, and Mr. Lunt not being able to
find the ships again, fell into the hands of the enemy. Through this
desertion, and its immediate consequences, the Richard lost twenty of
her best men.
The day after this escape the Cerf cutter was sent close in, to
reconnoitre, and to look for the missing people; and, for some
unexplained reason this useful vessel never rejoined the squadron.
There appeared to have been no suspicion of any treachery on her part,
and we are left to conjecture the cause of her disappearance.
A gale of wind followed, during which the Alliance and Pallas
separated, and the Granville parted company, by order, with a prize.
The separation of the Pallas was caused by the breaking of her tiller;
but that of the Alliance was due to the unofficerlike and unseamanlike
conduct of her commander.
On the morning of the 27th the brig Vengeance was the only vessel in
company with the Commodore.
On August 31st the Bonhomme Richard, being off Cape Wrath,
the northwest extremity of Scotland, captured a large English
letter-of-marque, bound from London to Quebec; a circumstance which
proves the expedients to which their ship-masters were then driven
to avoid capture, this vessel having gone north about, to escape the
cruisers on the ordinary track. While in chase of the letter-of-marque,
the Alliance hove in sight, having another London ship, from Jamaica,
as a prize.
Captain Landais, of the Alliance, was an officer who had been obliged
to quit the French Navy on account of his unfortunate temper. He now
began to show a disorganizing and mutinous spirit; pretending, as his
ship was the only real American vessel in the squadron, that that fact
rendered him superior to Jones, and that he should do as he pleased
with his ship.
That afternoon a strange sail was made, and the Richard showed the
Alliance’s number, with an order to close. Instead of obeying the
signal, Captain Landais wore, and laid the head of his ship in the
opposite direction. Other signals were disobeyed; and the control
of Commodore Jones over the ship, which ought to have been the most
efficient of the squadron, may be said to have ceased.
Jones now shaped his course for the rendezvous he had appointed, in
hopes of meeting the missing ships, and the Pallas rejoined him, having
captured nothing.
From then until the 13th of September the squadron continued its course
round Scotland; the ships separating and rejoining constantly, and
Captain Landais assuming power over the prizes, as well as over his own
vessel, that was altogether opposed to discipline and to marine usage.
On the 13th of September the Cheviot Hills were in sight from the
ships. Understanding that a 20-gun ship, with two or three man-of-war
cutters, were lying at anchor off Leith, in the Frith of Forth,
Commodore Jones planned a descent upon that town. At this time the
Alliance was absent, and the Pallas and Vengeance having chased to the
southward, the necessity of communicating with those vessels caused a
fatal delay, and ruined a promising project. The attempt was at last
made, but when the men were actually in the boats the ships were driven
out of the Frith by a heavy blow; and when in the North Sea one of
their prizes actually foundered.
The design was so audacious that it is probable the English would have
been taken by surprise; and no doubt much damage would have been done
to them, but for the gale. Dale, a modest and prudent man, thought so.
After this bold project was abandoned, Jones appears to have meditated
another still more daring; but his _colleagues_, as he bitterly styles
his captains, refused to join in it. We do not know what it was; but
only that the officers of Jones’ own ship heartily approved it. Jones
had much respect for the judgment of Captain Cottineau, of the Pallas,
and as he disapproved of it, it was dropped.
The Pallas and Vengeance even left the Richard--probably with a view to
prevent the attempt to execute this nameless scheme; and the Commodore
was compelled to follow his captains to the southward or lose them
altogether.
Off Whitby they came together again, and on Sept. 21st the Richard
chased a collier ashore, near Flamborough Head.
The next day she was at the mouth of the Humber, the Vengeance being
in company, and several vessels were taken or destroyed. Pilots were
enticed on board, and a knowledge of the state of things inshore
obtained. It appeared that the whole coast was alarmed, and that many
persons were burying their plate. By this time about a dozen vessels
had been taken, and rumor increased the number. No vessels had ever
before excited such local alarm on British shores, for centuries.
Under the circumstances Commodore Jones did not think it prudent to
remain so close in with the land, and he accordingly stood out under
Flamborough Head. Here he was joined, next day, by the Pallas and
Alliance. This was on the 23d of September.
The wind was light from the southward, the water smooth, and many
vessels in sight, steering in different directions. About noon the
squadron, with the exception of the Cerf and the two privateers, being
all in company, Jones manned one of the pilot-boats he had detained,
and sent her in chase of a brig, which was lying to, to windward. On
board the little vessel were Mr. Lunt, the Second Lieutenant, and
fifteen men, all of whom were absent from the ship for the rest of the
day.
In consequence of the loss of the two boats off Cape Clear, the absence
of the party in the pilot-boat, and the number of men that had been
put in prizes, the Richard was now left with only one lieutenant, and
with but little more than three hundred souls on board, exclusive of
prisoners. Of the latter there were about one hundred and fifty in the
Richard.
The pilot-boat had hardly left the Richard when the leading ships of a
fleet of more than forty sails were seen stretching out on a bowline
from behind Flamborough Head, turning down to the south. From previous
intelligence this fleet was immediately known to be the Baltic ships,
under the convoy of the Serapis, 44, Captain Richard Pearson, and
a hired ship that had been put into the King’s service, called the
Countess of Scarborough. The latter was commanded by Captain Piercy,
and mounted 22 guns.
As the interest of the succeeding details will principally centre in
the two ships, the Serapis and Bonhomme Richard, it may be well to give
a more minute account of the actual force of the former. At that period
44’s were usually built on two decks; and such was the construction of
this ship, which was new, and was reputed to be a fast vessel. On her
lower gun-deck she mounted 20 18-pound guns; and on her upper gun-deck
20 9-pound guns; and on her quarter-deck and forecastle ten 6-pound
guns; making an armament of fifty guns.
She had a regularly trained man-of-war’s crew of 320 souls, of whom
fifteen are said to have been Lascars.
When Jones made out the convoy, the men-of-war were inshore, astern,
and to leeward, probably with a view to keeping the merchantmen
together. The officials at Scarborough, perceiving the danger into
which this fleet was running, had sent a boat off to the Serapis, to
apprise her of the presence of a hostile force, and Captain Pearson
fired two guns, signaling the leading vessels to come under his lee.
These orders were disregarded, however, the headmost ships continuing
to stand out from the land.
Jones, having ascertained the character of the fleet in sight, showed
signal for a general chase; and another to recall the lieutenant in the
pilot-boat.
The Richard then crossed royal-yards. These signs of hostility alarmed
the nearer English merchant ships, which hurriedly tacked, fired alarm
guns, let fly their top-gallant-sheets, and made other signals of
the danger they found themselves in; while they now gladly availed
themselves of the presence of the men-of-war to run to leeward, or else
seek shelter close in with the land.
The Serapis, on the contrary, signaled the Scarborough to follow, and
hauled boldly out to sea, until she got far enough to windward, when
she tacked, and stood inshore again, to cover her convoy.
The Alliance being much the fastest vessel of the American squadron,
took the lead in the chase, speaking the Pallas as she passed. It has
been proved that Captain Landais told the commander of the latter
vessel, on this occasion, that if the stranger proved to be a
fifty-gun ship, they had nothing to do but to escape. His subsequent
conduct fully confirms this; for no sooner had he run down near
enough to the two English vessels-of-war to ascertain their force,
than he hauled up, and stood off from the land again. This was not
only contrary to all regular order of naval battle, but contrary to
the positive command of Jones, who had kept the signal to form line
flying; which should have brought the Alliance astern of the Bonhomme
Richard, and the Pallas in the van. Just at this time the Pallas spoke
the Richard, and inquired what station she should take, and she was
directed to fall into line.
Captain Cottineau was a brave man, who subsequently did his duty in the
action, and he had only thought that, because the Richard had suddenly
hauled up from the land, her crew had mutinied, and that she was
being run away with. Such was the want of confidence in the force so
singularly composed, and such were the disadvantages under which this
celebrated combat was fought.
So far, however, from meditating retreat or mutiny, the crew of the
Richard had gone cheerfully to their quarters, although every man on
board was conscious of the force of the enemy with whom they were about
to contend; and the spirit of the commanding officer appears to have
communicated itself to his men.
It was now quite dark, and Jones was compelled to use a night-glass,
to follow the movements of the enemy. It is probable that the darkness
added to the indecision of the captain of the Pallas, for even after
the moon rose it was thick, and objects at a distance were seen with
difficulty. The Richard continued to stand steadily on; and at about
half-past seven she came up with the Serapis; the Scarborough being a
short distance to leeward. The American ship was to windward, and, as
she slowly approached, Captain Pearson hailed. The answer returned
was purposely equivocal, and both ships delivered their broadsides at
almost the same moment.
As the water was quite smooth, Jones had relied very much upon the
eighteen-pounders which were in the Richard’s gun-room; but at this
first discharge, two of the six that were fired bursted, blowing up the
deck above, and killing or wounding many of the people stationed below.
This disaster rendered it impossible to make the men stand at the
other heavy guns, as they could have no confidence in them. It at once
reduced the broadside of the Richard to about one-third less than that
of her opponent; and the force which remained was distributed among
the light guns, in a disadvantageous manner. In short, the battle was
now between a twelve-pounder and an eighteen-pounder frigate; with the
chances almost preponderatingly in favor of the latter.
Jones himself said that after this accident his hopes rested solely
upon the twelve-pounders that were immediately under the command of his
First Lieutenant, Dale.
The Richard, having backed her top-sails, exchanged several broadsides,
when she filled again and shot ahead of the Serapis; which ship luffed
across her stern, and came up on the weather quarter of her antagonist,
taking the wind out of her sails, and, in her turn, passing ahead.
All this time, which was about half an hour, the fire was close and
furious. The Scarborough now drew near; but it is uncertain whether she
fired or not. The officers of the Richard state that she raked them at
least once; but her commander reported that, owing to the smoke and
darkness, he was afraid to discharge his guns, not being able to make
out which ship was friend and which foe.
Unwilling to lie by and be uselessly exposed to shot, Captain Piercy
edged away from the combatants, exchanging one or two broadsides, at a
great distance, with the Alliance, and shortly afterward was engaged
at close quarters by the Pallas, which ship compelled him to strike to
her, after a creditable resistance of about an hour.