Lissa is an island of the Adriatic, thirty-three miles southwest of
Spalatro, in Dalmatia. In ancient times, four centuries before Christ,
it was settled by Greeks from Lesbos, who named it Issa, from one of
the names of their own island, in the Ægean.
During the first Punic war the Isseans, already expert seamen, helped
the Roman Duilius with their beaked ships, and the Great Republic of
antiquity in return assisted them in resisting aggression. They were
again allies against Philip of Macedon.
In the year 966 the Venetians were in possession of the island, but
the Ragusans, from the mainland, drove them out, only to return, and
to establish firmly the reign of the Doges. The principal town was
twice entirely destroyed, once by the Neapolitans, and once by the
Turks, and the present city, which rises in an amphitheatrical form
from the shores of the principal harbor, only dates from the year 1571.
During the Napoleonic wars the island was occupied by the French, and
near it, in 1810, an important naval action was fought, in which an
English squadron defeated the French. The English then seized and kept
possession of the island until the grand settlement and apportionment,
after the peace of 1815, when it became the property of Austria. The
fortifications erected by the British were only dismantled in 1870. The
island is fertile, quite mountainous, and a conspicuous landmark in the
navigation of the Adriatic.
In the course of the war between Austria and Italy, which terminated
in the entire liberation of the latter country from the dominion of
the hated “Tedeschi,” who had occupied Venice and the fairest parts of
Lombardy for so many years, Italy suffered two great defeats. One was
on land, at Custozza, where their army, though unsuccessful, came out
with honor, after proofs of courage and conduct.
The navy of Italy, then comparatively small and untried, was anxious to
redeem the Italian honor and arms, by meeting the Austrian fleet. Under
the auspices of the navy a descent was therefore made upon the Austrian
island of Lissa.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF LISSA (1866).]
On the 18th of July, 1866, the island was attacked and taken by the
fleet under Admiral Persano. But their success was short-lived, for the
Austrians came down the next day, and inflicted the terrible defeat
which, for the time, completely disorganized the Italian navy.
This fleet was composed of eleven armored vessels (including large and
small, and the ram L’Affondatore), two frigates, one corvette and three
gun-boats, each mounting two guns, five despatch vessels, and a few
smaller craft, hardly fit to enter into action.
Among the Italian vessels was the large ironclad frigate Ré d’Italia,
built during our civil war, for the Italian Government, by Webb, of New
York. This fleet was commanded by Admiral Persano, and was in three
divisions. The first, under the direct orders of Persano himself,
consisted of eight armored vessels, and some other lighter steamers;
the second division, under Vice-Admiral Albini, consisted of six screw
frigates, unarmored; the third division, under Rear-Admiral Vacca,
consisted of three ironclad vessels.
The Austrian fleet, which came down to seek the Italians, and to offer
battle, as soon as the news of the capture of Lissa was received,
consisted of twenty-two vessels. Seven of them were armored; one was
a screw ship-of-the-line, called the Kaiser, of 90 guns; four screw
frigates; four gun-boats; one corvette; and a few small craft.
In spite of the fact that the Austrian fleet would, undoubtedly, come
to dispute their conquest, the Italians seem to have been taken rather
by surprise, especially as Admiral Tegethoff approached rapidly, and
engaged very promptly. The engagement, being under steam, commenced as
soon as the guns of the opposing fleets would bear, and was, at first,
carried on with great resolution on both sides. Very soon after the
fight commenced the Ré d’Italia, one of the best ships of the Italian
fleet, was rammed by two Austrian ships, also armored, and received
fatal injuries, from which she soon sank, carrying down many of her
crew.
She had been the flag-ship; but just before she went into action
Admiral Persano had quitted her, and gone on board the iron-clad ram,
the Affondatore, without notifying the commanding officers of the
change, either by signal, or otherwise. The action was then really
fought, on the part of the Italians, without a Commander; for they
received no signals from the ship from which they had a right to look
for them; and, as the Ré d’Italia was soon sunk, many thought that
Admiral Persano had perished in her.
The Italian fleet was thus without united action; and their manœuvres
were undecided and weak; while the Austrian fleet concentrated all
its efforts under the strong impulse of a skillful and very zealous
Commander, whose only thought seemed to be to win or perish. In spite
of this the Italian ships were most bravely fought, and the victory was
not either an easy or bloodless one.
Many have thought that, had there been a capable Commander, and unity
of action, they would have probably gained the battle.
The Italian iron-clad Ré di Portogallo, a sister ship of the Ré
d’Italia, especially distinguished herself by the audacity of her
movements and the ability with which she was handled. She sank two
Austrian vessels; having a long engagement with the Kaiser, sinking
this huge ship by a broadside poured into her, at a distance of only
a few yards. The Kaiser is said to have carried down with her twelve
hundred men; several hundred of whom were Tyrolese sharp-shooters.
At half-past four in the afternoon the battle ceased; having lasted for
six hours.
The Italians retired to Ancona, a safe and strongly fortified harbor
on their coast, nearly opposite to Lissa. The Austrian fleet had
received such damage and loss that they not only were unable to pursue
the Italians, but were soon obliged to desert the waters of Lissa, and
return to their naval port, Pola.
Although this was not a victory for the Austrians, in the sense of
large captures, they were most distinctly the victors, in that the
Italians deserted the field. That has always been the test of victory,
both by land and by sea. Before the end of the battle the Italians lost
a second iron-clad, the Palestro, which blew up, and all on board were
lost. On the 6th of August, following, the Affondatore, which had been
anchored outside of Ancona, on the lookout for the Austrian fleet, was
swamped by the heavy sea caused by a sudden storm. She endeavored to
take refuge inside the mole, but too late. All her crew were saved.
The whole affair was a dreadful blow to the Italian navy, and to their
cause; and was equally instrumental in advancing the _morale_ and
reputation of the Austrian navy.
A good deal of light may be thrown upon this event by a slight account
of the officer responsible for it
Admiral Count Charles Persano was born at Vercelli, in 1806. He
entered the Sardinian navy, and rose rapidly to high rank; serving
under Admiral Bruat, at the bombardment of Odessa, during the Crimean
war; and, for the remainder of that struggle, having charge of the
transportation and provisionment of the Sardinian troops which joined
the Allies; a most responsible post.
In the year 1859, as a Rear-Admiral, he had command of the Adriatic
squadron of observation, and of the blockade of Venice. The next year
he commanded the fleet at Naples, when Garibaldi seized and turned over
to him the Neapolitan fleet. Here he acted with great judgment, and
to the satisfaction of all, in distributing the Neapolitan officers
among the vessels of the national fleet, and in composing difficulties
and overcoming obstacles incident to so sudden and great a change in
government. The reputation of no one stood higher than that of Persano,
for tact, ability, and firmness of purpose.
[Illustration: AUSTRIAN MAN OF WAR, FERDINAND MAX, RAMMING THE ITALIAN
IRONCLAD, RE D’ITALIA, AT THE BATTLE OF LISSA.]
In September, 1860, upon the invasion of the Marches and Umbria, the
Admiral was sent off Ancona, where he distinguished himself, first in
the blockade, and then in forcing an entrance and taking possession of
that fine port. General Lamoricière declared that he was discomfited
not by the land force opposed to him, but by the work of the fleet; and
it was with Persano that he held a parley, and to him he surrendered
his sword. During this siege Persano gained great popularity, on
account of his consideration for the sufferings of the inhabitants.
For these actions he was made a Vice-Admiral, and was elected a deputy,
from the city of Spezia, to the first Italian Parliament, which was
convened in 1861. When the Italian navy was constituted he became the
Admiral; there being three Vice-Admirals and ten Rear-Admirals also
appointed. Soon after he became a Senator, and Minister of Marine,
under Ratazzi.
No man in Italy was more trusted and honored, and few could be said to
have had a more successful career.
In expectation of the approaching struggle with Austria for the
possession of the Venetian provinces, the Italian government had, at
immense sacrifices, devoted some years to the development of its navy;
which, much superior to that of Austria, was to secure to the Italian
flag the dominion of the Adriatic. In the event of war the command of
the fleet fell naturally to the naval officer of highest rank, and so,
in March, 1866, Admiral Persano was named to the command of the strong
fleet collected at Tarento. But the results accomplished by this naval
force fell far below the hopes of those who had conceived and formed it.
Persano began by delaying for a long time the departure of his fleet
from Tarento. Then, when he did enter the Adriatic, he refused,
although far superior in numbers, and with crews filled with enthusiasm
for the cause, to accept the battle offered him by the Austrian fleet,
composed of fourteen ships only; and he remained idle, at Ancona, until
July 8th.
Only upon repeated and decided orders of the Minister of Marine did
he finally leave port, but then only for a few days’ cruise in the
Adriatic, during which he avoided the Austrian fleet and coast. Another
formal order was needed, from the highest authority, to force him
to leave Ancona again, and to proceed to the Island of Lissa. Upon
the taking of this island partly depended the success of the naval
operations in the Adriatic.
After a rather feeble bombardment of the Austrian works, Persano,
although he had certain information that Admiral Tegethoff was
hastening to the relief of Lissa, gave the order for landing, and
pursuing operations on shore. This ill-conceived proceeding of landing
a portion of his men, at a time when he was liable at any moment to be
attacked by sea, has been attributed to various motives; none of them
worthy ones. At any rate, when the Austrians did appear, coming down
from the north, the Italian ships were not ready to meet them, and
those of the crews who had been landed had to re-embark, in haste and
confusion. Moreover, in presence of the enemy, and while dispositions
for battle were actually going on, Persano left the Ré d’Italia, his
flag-ship, and went on board the Affondatore, an inconspicuous and
untried vessel, built for a ram. His motive in doing so was never
explained satisfactorily by him, and is left to conjecture. By his
action he delayed the formation of the line-of-battle, and deprived
himself of the ability to direct the movements of the fleet, as the
officers had not been informed of the change; and, moreover, by his
presence, prevented the ram from taking the part in the battle for
which she was designed especially. Such being the state of things, it
is no wonder that the action, in spite of individual exertions and
gallantry, resulted disastrously for the Italians.
This defeat, or disaster, was so mortifying, and so confounded the
designs of the Italian government, that a storm of public indignation
was aroused against Persano, and the King was forced to order a court
of inquiry upon his actions. It is said that the Admiral himself
demanded one, but this does not clearly appear.
The court examined very many witnesses, and the proceedings were
very much protracted; so that it was the end of 1867 before their
proceedings were reported to the Italian Senate. The Senate then
proceeded to give judgment. Persano was acquitted of the charge of
cowardice by a small majority, but he was found guilty of disobedience
of orders, and negligence in the performance of duty, by a large
majority. The Ministry had intended to prosecute him for high treason;
but, for some reason, this was abandoned, and he was released from
arrest, and suffered to slink into retirement and obscurity, a
disgraced man.
By a vote of the Senate, he was required to pay the expenses of the
court of inquiry, which had been very heavy, and was dismissed from
the navy, and from all his other offices. It was generally thought, in
Italy, that the Senate had been very lenient in thus dealing with him;
and that he should have suffered death.
The whole of the facts of the case are not accessible in this country,
and perhaps would not be, even in Italy.
* * * * *
William, Baron Tegethoff, the Austrian Commander at the battle of
Lissa, was a native of Styria, being born in 1827. After passing
through the Venetian Naval College, he entered the Imperial Navy, in
1845, and in twelve years became a Commander, serving on the coast of
Egypt, the Red Sea, the east coast of Africa, and in the Mediterranean.
After this he accompanied the Archduke Maximilian, as Aide-de-Camp, in
his voyage to Brazil. In 1861 he had command of the Austrian squadron
in Greece, during the unsettled and exciting period which terminated
in Otho’s leaving the Greek throne.
During the Schleswig-Holstein War he commanded the Austrian squadron in
the North Sea; and, in conjunction with some Prussian vessels, fought,
with the Danish fleet, the spirited and bloody, but inconclusive,
action of Heligoland.
For this he was made a Rear-Admiral, from May 9th, 1864, and two years
later, was made Vice-Admiral, for the action of Lissa.
After Maximilian’s death, in Mexico, he was deputed to proceed to Vera
Cruz and obtain the remains of that Prince. After three months’ delay
and considerable diplomacy he obtained them, and returned to Trieste,
in January 1868. In March of that year he was made Commander-in-Chief
of the Austrian Navy, being then only forty-one years of age.
Tegethoff is looked upon as the creator of the effective Austrian Navy,
which, before his time, was undisciplined and inefficient. At his
death, which occurred in 1871, from chronic dysentery, contracted in
Mexico, the Austrian Navy numbered sixteen efficient iron-clad ships,
besides wooden vessels.
The Austrian Government has ordered that a ship of their Navy shall
always bear his name.
SOME NAVAL ACTIONS BETWEEN BRAZIL, THE ARGENTINE CONFEDERATION AND
PARAGUAY. 1865-68.
The first naval event of importance in this long and deadly struggle
(which began, as all the later South American wars have begun, about a
question of boundary), was the battle of the Riachuelo.
The river Parana, the southern boundary of Paraguay, enters the river
Paraguay between the Paraguayan fort of Humáitá, and the town of
Corrientes, in the Argentine Confederation; and just below Corrientes
is the Riachuelo, which has given its name to this battle.
Riachuelo means a streamlet or brook. The channel of the main river is
here about five hundred yards wide. It is much broader both above and
below. The Paraguayans had invaded the territory of Entre-Rios, and
just north of the “streamlet” had established a position, where they
had a strong battery of flying artillery, upon the bank of the main
river.
In April, 1865, the first Brazilian naval division ascended the river,
towards Corrientes. The Brazilian Admiral, Tamandaré, did not come with
them, being occupied in Buenos Ayres, as was notorious, in imitating
the conduct of Nelson at Naples, and of Marc Antony at Alexandria. The
fleet was under the command of Commandante Gomensoro, who was soon
afterwards superseded by Vice-Admiral Barroso.
The fleet anchored almost in sight of Corrientes, on the Chaco, or
western bank. It consisted of nine steamers, all sea-going. They
were the Amazonas (flag-ship), a heavy paddle-ship, of six guns; the
Jequitinhonha, Belmonte, Mearim, and Beberibe, each of eight guns; the
Paranahyba, of six guns; Iparanga, seven; Iguatème, of five, and the
Araguay, of three guns, fifty-nine in all.
Lopez, the President and absolute Dictator of Paraguay, determined to
try to capture this fleet.
His soldiers all were devoted to him, and those of the higher classes
who were not so, he kept under, by a system of terrorism worthy of his
father’s predecessor, Dr. Francia. Anything which he determined should
be done had to be done, or the offender suffered imprisonment and
torture, followed by death. Driven in this way by fear, his officers
accomplished wonderful things. He seldom conferred upon any one a
higher rank than that of Captain, and officers of that grade frequently
commanded regiments and brigades. The men were brave and patient,
and satisfied with the scantiest food and clothing. They despised
the Brazilians, many of whom were negroes or mulattoes, calling them
“cambas” and “macacos”--niggers and monkeys. Some of the most wonderful
instances of daring, devotion, and calm courage were exhibited by these
Indians during this long war; and when it closed, nearly all the men in
the country, and many of the boys, were dead, killed in battle.
As an instance of their heroic devotion we may mention that of a
Paraguayan soldier, solitary and alone, and surrounded by overwhelming
numbers of armed enemies. Being called upon to surrender, he coolly
replied, “No tengo orden”--I have no orders--and continued to fight
until pinned to the ground by a dozen bayonets. Nor was this by any
means a solitary case.
Having determined to try to capture the Brazilian vessels, Lopez
adopted in part a plan formed by an English Chief Engineer in his
fleet. This man had formerly served in the Brazilian Navy, and
understood them thoroughly.
Lopez’ vessels were to run down with the current and reach the
Brazilian squadron just at daylight. Each Paraguayan vessel was to
select her antagonist, run at her, and board, with plenty of men, armed
with their favorite swords and knives.
Lopez, who was personally a coward, and who never took part in any
action himself, thought he had great military genius, and would
interfere upon this occasion, as upon many others. The plan of Watts,
the Englishman, would have caught the Brazilians asleep, and with their
fires banked, so that they could not move.
Lopez gave instructions for his vessels to run past the Brazilians,
then turn, come up stream, and board. He detailed eight hundred men, in
addition to the crews of the vessels, as boarders. These he harangued,
and told them to go and bring him back the fleet and the prisoners of
the “Cambas.” “No!” cried the Paraguayans, in reply, “What do we want
with prisoners? We will kill them all.”
Lopez smiled, distributed cigars, their one great luxury, and sent them
away.
He sent on this expedition nine steamers, river boats, about all he
had. They were the Tacuari (flag-ship), Paraguari, Igurey, Marquis
Olinda (captured early in the war), Salto-Oriental, Ipora, Peribebui,
Jejui and Ibera. These carried thirty-four guns. They were to tow down
some of the “chatas” or flat-boats used by the Paraguayans, which each
mounted one heavy gun, and carried a number of men. These boats were
very low in the water, of light draught, and very hard to hit.
Pedro Mesa was the Captain of the Paraguayan Navy. He was fat, and
sick, and old, and had no knowledge whatever of naval warfare. He tried
to decline the command of the expedition, which, as the whole navy was
in service, naturally fell to him. But Lopez would not listen to it,
and ordered him on board; and the instructions of Lopez must be obeyed,
on peril of death.
Finally the flotilla got off. But there was much delay from defective
machinery and one of the steamers, the Ibera, had to be left behind.
Owing to this it was broad daylight before they came down near the
Brazilians, and there was consequently no surprise. Mesa carried out
his orders literally, as it behooved any one to do who served Lopez,
and ran past the Brazilians a very considerable distance, having
received their fire as he passed. The latter slipped their cables
and got under way, so that it was ten o’clock in the morning before
the fleets came in contact. In spite of the bad manœuvre of going
down the stream first, the fight opened well for the Paraguayans. The
Jequitinhonha, which carried, among other guns, two 68-pounders and a
Whitworth rifle, grounded, and was abandoned, after being well peppered
by the Paraguayan battery of Bruguez, on the left bank. The Paranahyba
had her wheel shot away, and was boarded and taken; and the Belmonte,
riddled with shot, had to be run on shore, to keep her from sinking.
In this battle the difficulty was for the Paraguayans to hold on to the
Brazilian vessels after they got alongside them, for the latter, being
screws, managed to slide away from them. Strange to say, grappling
irons had been forgotten.
Colonel Thompson says that whenever the Paraguayans boarded, a portion
of the Brazilian crew would jump overboard, some of whom were drowned,
and some swam ashore, all the latter being killed as soon as they
landed.
Burton remarks that the failure to bring grappling irons on an
expedition where boarding the enemy was to be a feature, reminded
him of an English attack upon some Sikh batteries, where the English
engineers forgot to bring spikes.
The Paraguayan launches, which had been towed down below the
Brazilians, got adrift, and as they could not get up again, against the
current, were eventually captured.
At the end of the first period of the action the Brazilians had lost
three vessels in a very few minutes, and their case seemed very
doubtful.
Just then a man of ability came to the front, and saved the day. The
chief pilot of the Brazilian fleet was the son of an Italian emigrant,
named Gastavino. This man, seeing that the Brazilian commanding
officers had entirely lost their self possession, and were doing
nothing, and giving no orders, took matters into his own hands. He
drove the Amazonas at the Paraguayan flag-ship, cleared her deck with
grape, and ran her down. Next he finished the Salto and Olinda, in
the same manner; the Amazonas being so high out of water that the
Paraguayans could not board her as she came in contact with them. He
wound up by sinking the Jejui with his guns. The Marquis Olinda had
previously had a shot in her boilers, and almost all her crew were
either scalded, or killed or wounded by grape. The other Paraguayan
vessels, Tacuari, Igurey and Salto, also suffered in their boilers, and
had nearly all their crews killed or wounded.
During the height of the engagement, the Brazilian Paranahyba and the
Paraguayan Tacuari fouled. The Paraguayans boarded, sword in hand; at
sight of them, most of the crew of the Paranahyba jumped overboard.
Her decks were filled with the desperate Paraguayans, and the other
Brazilian vessels were afraid to use their guns upon her, for fear of
injuring the few of their people who were bravely resisting. These few
brave men made so good a resistance that the Paraguayan commander,
Mésa, became alarmed for his own safety, and endeavored to retire
to his cabin. In so doing he was mortally wounded by a musket ball.
The next officer in command to Mésa was hopelessly drunk, and the
Brazilians succeeded in backing the Paranahyba away, and she escaped,
after much slaughter.
The battle lasted eight hours; and at last the four remaining
Paraguayan steamers slowly and sullenly retreated up the stream.
These must also have been taken or destroyed if Vice-Admiral Barroso
had done his duty, and pursued with vigor. For his very equivocal
conduct on this occasion he was made a Baron. The pilot, who really
fought the battle, and saved the day to the Brazilians, was made a
Lieutenant.
The English Engineer, Watts, by his ability and good conduct secured
the retreat of the four Paraguayan vessels, it is confidently asserted.
For this Lopez gave him the lowest order of his Legion of Honor, and,
three years afterwards, towards the close of the war, he had him
arrested and shot, as a traitor.
Mésa died of his wound in a few hours. He would have been shot by
Lopez, if he had returned unwounded, at any rate; and not undeservedly.
Both sides claimed a victory; but the Brazilians certainly had the
best of it, and had put a stop to the offensive campaign of Lopez; as
they could now blockade the river above Corrientes, and their presence
there compelled the withdrawal of the Paraguayan advance corps in
Entre Rios, and the evacuation of Uruguayana. Had Lopez’ squadron been
successful he would have had command of the whole river, and must have
held it until the Brazilians got their iron-clads down.
The Brazilians were unable to raise their sunken vessels, being driven
off by the flying batteries of Bruguez, until such time as they were
not worth working at.
Parts of the crews of the destroyed Paraguayan vessels got on shore on
the Chaco side of the river. The Brazilians sent an armed boat to take
them off, but the Paraguayans killed all the crew, and seized the boat.
These men were in the desert Chaco for three days and a half, without
food, and at last, when the Brazilians left the river free, crossed
over safely to their own side.
Their desperate devotion was something wonderful. The Paraguayan
captain of the Olinda was wounded, and taken, a prisoner, on board
the Amazonas, where he had his arm amputated. Rather than remain a
prisoner, and thus be declared by Lopez a traitor, he tore off the
bandages and ligatures, and died.
On the thirteenth of the month the Brazilian fleet ran down the river,
past the field batteries at Riachuelo, and operations ceased for the
time.
The Brazilian officers confessed that at one time it was “touch and go”
with them.
Had the Paraguayans carried grappling irons, and gone straight
alongside at first, it is altogether probable that they would have
captured the whole Brazilian fleet. But the screw steamers, having been
allowed time to get up steam, slipped away from their opponents, who
were inexperienced as watermen, and who were baffled by the high sides
and boarding-nettings of their man-of-war-built enemies.
It is a curious fact that not one of the Brazilian 120 and 150-pounder
Whitworth shot hit a Paraguayan vessel; and the Paraguayans only knew
that they had them by afterwards finding the shot, some of them five
miles inland.
A large picture of the Amazonas at the battle of Riachuelo was
exhibited in the Brazilian department of the Centennial Exhibition, at
Philadelphia.