In the summer of 1827, an English squadron, under Vice Admiral Sir
Edward Codrington, acting in concert with a division of French ships,
under Rear-Admiral De Rigny, and a Russian squadron, under Rear-Admiral
Count Heiden, assembled in the Mediterranean.
The object this allied fleet had in view was the enforcement of a
protocol, signed at St. Petersburg, on April 4th, 1826, for the
protection of the inhabitants of the Morea from the cruelties practiced
upon them by the Turks, under Ibrahim Pacha. Russia would probably have
interfered alone, and England and France were, no doubt, fearful of
the possible consequences of allowing Russia to do so, in the war then
being carried on between the Greeks and their Turkish oppressors.
A further agreement between the three powers was come to in London,
July 6th, 1827, and they insisted, in the first place, upon an
armistice between Turkey and Greece. This was agreed to by the
belligerents, but was violated by Turkey almost as soon as her assent
was given. This conduct on the part of the Porte led directly to the
short but very terrible naval battle of Navarino, on the 20th of
October, in the same year.
On the 3d of September an Egyptian fleet, with troops, entered the
harbor of Navarino, where they were closely watched by the combined
squadrons. On the 19th, finding that the British squadron alone
remained off the port, Ibrahim Pacha, wishing to send relief to Patras,
ordered out a division of his fleet, but finding their movements
watched, they returned to Navarino.
Rear-Admiral De Rigny having rejoined the blockading squadron, a
conference took place on the 25th, in the tent of Ibrahim, who then
agreed to suspend hostilities against the Greeks until an answer could
be obtained from Constantinople, and that, in the meantime, his fleet
should not quit the harbor. Upon the faith of this assurance, nearly
all the Allied ships were withdrawn from before Navarino. Part of
the squadron was sent to Malta, to refit; the British Admiral went
to Zante, and the French to Milo, for provisions. The Dartmouth and
Armide, frigates, alone remained off the port.
Scarcely had the English Admiral anchored at Zante when the Dartmouth
hove in sight, with the signal flying that the Turks had put to sea;
and the Armide, proceeding towards Milo, overtook the French Admiral
before he reached that place. Sir Edward Codrington, having with him
a frigate and two corvettes only, intercepted the Turkish squadron,
consisting of seven frigates, nine corvettes, two brigs, and nineteen
transports; which, on his firm remonstrance, all put back. A second
division, of six Egyptian frigates and eight brigs, had likewise put
to sea, but they also returned, and the whole re-entered Navarino on
the 4th of October. By the 15th the different Allied squadrons were
again assembled off Navarino; and Ibrahim, thus blocked up, continued
his tyrannical proceedings inland. Various attempts were made to
communicate with him, but without success; and a final conference
was called, on the 18th of October, on board Codrington’s flag-ship,
the Asia; at which it was decided to enter the harbor of Navarino,
and from thence renew the negotiations. On the evening of the 19th
Vice Admiral Codrington issued full instructions to the whole force,
pointing out the position for anchoring each division, but concluding
with the well known advice of Lord Nelson, “If a general action should
take place, no Captain can be better placed than when his vessel is
alongside one of the enemy.”
The harbor of Navarino was the scene, four hundred and twenty-five
years before Christ, of a great naval battle between Athens and Sparta,
in which the latter suffered an overwhelming defeat.
The harbor is about six miles in circumference. The mainland bends
round three sides of it, almost in a horseshoe, and the island of
Sphacteria, two miles in length, and a quarter of a mile in breadth,
stretches across from one headland to the other. The only available
passage into Navarino is at the southern end of the island, and is
about six hundred yards in width. On entering the passage there appears
at the right a bold promontory dominated by a fort, originally built by
the Venetians, and under the fort the small walled town of Navarino,
near which Ibrahim’s army was encamped.
On the southern extremity of the island, almost opposite to the
fortress on the promontory, another fort was placed. The first fortress
was very formidable, mounting 125 guns, and, with that on the island,
was well placed to defend the entrance of the harbor, as well as to
command the anchorage within. At the northern end of the island was a
third battery, which also commanded the harbor.
At about half-past one P. M., on the 20th of October, the signal was
made by the Asia to prepare for action, and the combined fleet weighed
anchor, and stood into the harbor. The British and French formed the
weather or starboard column, and the Russians the lee line.
The following were the vessels composing the allied fleet; The Asia, of
80 guns, Vice-Admiral Codrington’s flag-ship; two 74s, the Genoa and
Albion; four frigates of various force, from 50 to 28 guns; and one
corvette, three brigs, and a cutter.
The French had two 80-gun ships, the Trident and Breslau; one 78, the
Scipion; one 60, the Sirène, flag-ship; the Armide frigate, 46 guns,
and two corvettes.
The Russian squadron consisted of the Azoff, 80; the Gargoute, Ezekiel,
and Newsky, 76; three 46-gun frigates, and one 48.
The Turco-Egyptian fleet consisted of three ships-of-the-line, one
razee, sixteen frigates, twenty-seven corvettes, and twenty-seven
brigs, with six fire-ships. To these must be added the guns in the
forts, on shore, in number about 200, and some armed transports, which
brought the number of Turkish guns up to about 2000.
About 2 P. M. the Asia, leading, arrived at the mouth of the harbor,
and passed unmolested within pistol-shot of the heavy battery on
the starboard hand. The Turks and Egyptians were moored in the form
of a crescent, the larger ones presenting their broadsides towards
the centre, and the smaller ones inside, filling up the intervals.
The Asia anchored close alongside a ship-of-the-line bearing the
flag of the Capitan Bey, and on the port or inner quarter of a large
double-banked frigate with the flag of Moharem Bey, Commander-in-chief
of the Egyptian squadron. The Genoa followed within one hundred yards
of her leader, and brought up abreast of a large frigate astern of the
Admiral; the Albion, in turn, anchored astern of the Genoa. The Russian
Admiral was to look out for four ships which were to windward, part
of the Egyptian squadron, and those to leeward, in the bight of the
crescent, were to mark the stations of the whole Russian squadron, the
ships of their line closing with the English.
The French frigate Armide was to take her station alongside the
outermost frigate on the left, in entering the harbor, and three
English frigates next to her. The smaller English vessels were to watch
the movements of the fire-ships.
Strict orders were given by Admiral Codrington that not a gun should be
fired unless the Allied squadrons were first attacked by the Turks, and
these orders were rigidly observed.
The entry of the Allied fleets was silently permitted by the Turks, who
did not call to quarters, either with drum or trumpet, and an ominous
silence was preserved throughout their line; so it was difficult to
suppose that a most bloody battle was about to take place.
The Turkish fleet and batteries were prepared for action, however;
and it so proved when the Dartmouth frigate, which had anchored close
to the fire-ships, and whose Captain, perceiving certain movements on
board of them which induced him to believe that the Turks were about
to act on the offensive, sent a boat, under command of a lieutenant,
to request that the fire-ships should quit the anchorage occupied by
the Allies. Upon the boat’s proceeding alongside the fire-ship, a fire
of musketry was opened upon her, and the lieutenant and several of the
crew were killed. The fire was replied to from the boat, and the sharp
report of small arms, echoing from the surrounding rocky eminences,
seemed to awake the Turks from a torpor.
Just at this critical moment the French flag-ship, the Sirène, which
was close alongside the Egyptian frigate Esnina, hailed, to say that
she should not fire if the Esnina did not. The words had hardly passed
the French Captain’s lips when the Egyptian fired her broadside slap
into the Sirène. So quickly that it seemed an echo, the formidable
broadside of the Sirène was heard in reply, delivered point blank into
the Esnina. At the same moment the Turkish Admiral fired a shot, and
upon this the whole Allied fleet in a position to do so opened fire
upon the Turks.
The Asia, though abreast of the ship of the Capitan Bey, was nearer
to that of Moharem Bey; and as the latter did not fire at the Asia,
the English flag-ship did not fire at her. A messenger was sent to
the Asia by Moharem Bey, to say that he did not intend to fire, and
Admiral Codrington, still unwilling to believe a serious engagement
possible, sent a boat with a Mr. Mitchell, who was acting as pilot and
interpreter, to assure Moharem of his desire to avoid bloodshed.
But Mitchell was treacherously shot dead when descending the side
of the Egyptian ship. Soon after the Egyptian opened fire, and as
Admiral Codrington says, in his dispatch, “was consequently effectually
destroyed by the Asia’s fire, sharing the same fate as his brother
Admiral on the starboard side, and falling to leeward, a complete
wreck.” The action then became general; and the ships were soon
enveloped in dense clouds of powder smoke, only lighted by the rapid
flashes of the guns; and very soon these lurid flashes became the only
guides by which the gunners could sight their pieces. In this dreadful
turmoil the drill, discipline and experience of the Europeans gave them
the advantage. As their shot told more truly than those of the Turks,
each broadside of the Allies tore through the hulls, swept the decks,
and wrecked the masts and rigging of the Ottoman fleet.
The Turks, raging, furious and desperate, fought with blind and
ill-directed courage. In working their guns they seemed only anxious to
fire rapidly, without taking time to point their pieces. Less carried
away by rage, and a little more skillful, they should have overwhelmed
the Allies, for they had treble the number of guns. In the meantime the
Allies kept up a close, cool and accurate fire, and the Turkish losses
soon became frightful.
Two fire-ships were soon in flames, and a third blew up, while a
fourth was sunk by shot. The forts opened upon the Allies, and that of
Navarino, especially, committed much havoc; but almost as much among
friends as foes.
The Russian ships did not reach their assigned positions until about
three o’clock, when the fire was at its height. The Asia’s fire having
disposed of her two opponents, that ship became exposed to a severe
raking fire from the Turkish inner lines, by which her mizzen-mast
was shot away, several guns disabled, and many of her crew killed and
wounded. The Master of the Asia was killed in the early part of the
action, while bringing both broadsides to bear upon the Turkish and
Egyptian Admirals. Captain Bell, of the marines, was also killed, and
Sir Edward Codrington was struck by a musket-ball, which knocked his
watch out of his pocket, and battered it to pieces. The Genoa, next
astern the English Admiral, suffered very severely, being engaged from
first to last, and doing excellent service. As the Turks fired high,
the carnage among the marines on the poops of the large vessels was
so great that it was thought best to remove them to the quarter deck,
and their loss was especially great in the Genoa. Commodore Bathurst,
of that ship, was wounded three times; the last time mortally, by a
grape-shot which passed through his body and lodged in the opposite
bulwark. The French frigate Armide sustained for a long time, and
without being disabled, the fire of five Egyptian frigates. The French
line-of-battle ship Scipion was on fire no less than four times, from
a fire-ship which lay in flames across her fore-foot. Each time the
flames were extinguished; and that without any perceptible want of
regularity in her fire. The English ship Albion, next astern of the
Genoa, was exposed to the united fire of a cluster of ships, including
one 74, and two 64-gun ships. About half an hour after the action
commenced one of the Turkish ships fell foul of the Albion, and her
crew made an attempt to board, but were repulsed with heavy loss. The
Turkish ship was in turn boarded and taken. The English were in the act
of releasing a number of Greek prisoners secured in the hold of this
ship, when she was discovered to be on fire. The English, therefore,
left her, having cut her cables, and the Turk, enveloped in flames,
drifted clear of the Albion, and, shortly after, blew up, with a
tremendous explosion.
The two remaining large Turkish ships again opened upon the Albion; but
she returned the fire so vigorously that the largest of the two was
soon in flames. The Albion was all the afternoon surrounded by blazing
ships; but at dusk she got under way, and stood clear of them.
The ships of all three of the Allies seem to have behaved with equal
gallantry; but the performance of the little cutter, the Hind, tender
to the Asia, deserves especial mention. She was of one hundred and
sixty tons, mounted eight light guns, and had a crew of thirty men.
She had been to Zante, and only returned as the Allied squadrons
were entering Navarino, and her gallant Commander determined,
notwithstanding his trifling force, to have his share in the glories
of the day. He accordingly entered with the rest, and, taking up
a raking position astern of a large frigate, at only a few yards
distance, opened upon her a sharp fire. The cutter was exposed to the
fire of several small vessels, and in about three quarters of an hour
they cut her cables, and she drifted away between a large corvette and
a brig, which she engaged until the brig caught fire and blew up. The
Hind then continued to fire into the corvette, until her remaining
cable was cut, and she drifted clear of her adversary. Still drifting,
in the hottest of the fire, the little Hind fouled a Turkish frigate;
her main-boom entering one of the main-deck ports; and the Turks were
about to board her. In this they were repeatedly repulsed; and at last
the Turks manned a large boat, to try to carry her in that way. The
Hind’s crew knocked this boat to pieces with her carronades, crammed to
the muzzle with grape and canister; and the cutter soon after drifted
clear of the frigate, just as a general cessation of fire took place.
Her loss, in all this fighting, only amounted to a Mate and three men
killed, and a Midshipman and nine men wounded.
As we have said, the French ships behaved admirably, as did the
Russians. In fact, the position of the contending ships was such that
the mutual and perfect co-operation of each ship of the Allied squadron
was absolutely necessary to bring about a favorable termination. Had
the Russians or French not taken their full share in the day’s work,
the British must have been annihilated.
The close and continued cannonade caused complete and dreadful
destruction to the Turks. About forty of their vessels, of different
rates, fell a prey to the flames, exploding their magazines in
succession, as the fire reached them, and covering the waters of the
bay with their fragments and the burned and mutilated bodies of their
crews. By five P. M. the entire first line of the Turks was destroyed,
and by seven there remained afloat, of all their formidable armament,
only a few small vessels which had been furthest in shore. These were
mostly abandoned by their crews, who had made their escape to the
neighboring hills.
Sir Edward Codrington reported that, on the morning after the battle,
“out of a fleet composed of eighty-one vessels, only one frigate and
fifteen smaller vessels are in a state ever again to put to sea.”
The allied fleets lost 177 killed and 480 wounded. The Turks were
estimated to have lost at least six thousand killed.
This action created a great sensation throughout Europe; not only
because no great naval action had been fought for some years, but
because the friends of Grecian independence saw in the battle the
probable freedom of that oppressed State. But politicians were alarmed
at what they feared would be the deplorable consequences of leaving
Turkey disarmed, in the presence of ambitious and menacing Russia,
as the battle had already, it was said, “turned the Black Sea into a
Russian lake,” and that great opportunity for Greece was lost through
the fears and vacillation of diplomatists.
[Illustration]
[Illustration: SINOPE, 1853.
(The Russians under Admiral Nachimoff Annihilating the Turkish Fleet,
in the harbor of Sinope.)]