The year 1805 was a momentous period in the history of Europe. Napoleon
had long meditated the invasion of England, saying “Let us be masters
of the Channel for six hours, and we are masters of the world.” A
skillfully combined plan, by which the British fleet would have been
divided, while the whole French navy was concentrated in the Channel,
was delayed by the death of the Admiral designated to execute it.
But an alliance with Spain placed the Spanish fleet at Bonaparte’s
disposal, in 1805, and he formed a fresh scheme for its union with that
of France, the crushing of the fleet under Cornwallis, which blocked
the Channel ports, before Admiral Nelson could come to its support, and
a crossing of the vast armament so protected to the British shores. The
plan was to draw Nelson away in pursuit of the French fleet, which was
then suddenly to return and crush the English Channel squadron.
Nelson, now in command of the Mediterranean and Cadiz fleet, had
been searching diligently for the French Toulon fleet, and was much
concerned that he could not find it.
In February, 1805 he had been down as far as Egypt, but found nothing
there, and, half distracted with anxiety, steered for Malta. Soon after
arriving there he received from Naples intelligence of what had, in
reality, become of the French fleet.
At that time he wrote to the Admiralty, to say “I have consulted no
man, therefore the whole blame of ignorance in forming my judgment
must rest with me. I would allow no man to take from me an atom of
my glory had I fallen in with the French fleet, nor do I desire any
man to partake of any of the responsibility. All is mine, right or
wrong.” * * * * “I consider the character of Bonaparte, and that the
orders given by him on the banks of the Seine would not take into
consideration wind or weather.”
In a letter to Captain Ball, at Malta, of April 19, 1805, when the
fleet, going to the westward, was buffeting with head winds, he says,
“My good fortune, my dear Ball, seems flown away. I cannot get a fair
wind, or even a side wind--dead foul! dead foul! but my mind is fully
made up what to do when I leave the Straits, supposing there is no
certain information of the enemy’s destination. I believe this ill luck
will go near to kill me; but, as these are times for exertion, I must
not be cast down, whatever I feel.”
At this very time Nelson had before him a letter from the Physician of
the fleet, enforcing his return to England before the hot months, such
was his bad state of health.
“Therefore,” he writes, in spite of this, “notwithstanding, I shall
pursue the enemy to the West or East Indies, if I know that to have
been their destination; yet, if the Mediterranean fleet joins the
Channel, I shall request, with that order (from the Physician),
permission to go on shore.”
On April 8th, 1805, the French fleet passed the Straits of Gibraltar,
and the same afternoon entered Cadiz, driving off the small British
squadron then there, under Sir John Orde.
Here a number of Spanish men-of-war joined the French Admiral;
and on the 9th the combined fleet--five Spanish and twelve French
ships-of-the-line, seven frigates, a corvette and three brigs, stood to
the westward, to rendezvous in the West Indies, at Martinique, at which
island they arrived on May 12th.
On the 4th of May, Nelson was watering and provisioning his fleet
at Mazari Bay, on the Barbary coast, and, the wind coming east, was
enabled to proceed to the westward; but he did not get through the
Straits of Gibraltar till the night of the 7th, when his enemy was
almost at Martinique. He had supposed that the Allied fleet was bound
to the Irish coast; but received certain information, at this time,
from a Scotch officer, named Campbell, in the Portuguese service, that
they had gone to the West Indies. Campbell was afterwards complained
against by the French Ambassador, for giving this information, and his
career ruined.
Nelson determined to follow the enemy, without orders, and at the risk
of professional censure, for to do so he must abandon his station
without leave. He went into Lagos Bay, and having received five months’
provisions, sailed, on May 11th, and, at Cape St. Vincent, detached a
line-of-battle ship to escort some transports and 5000 troops through
the Straits. With ten sail-of-the-line and three frigates, Nelson then
crowded sail to the westward, in pursuit of his enemy’s fleet, which he
knew consisted of eighteen sail-of-the-line, at the least, besides nine
frigates.
Nelson was now Vice-Admiral of the White, in the 100-gun ship Victory,
Captain Hardy. He had one 80, the Canopus, Rear-Admiral Louis, and
Captain Austen, and eight 74’s, with three-frigates. Lord Nelson has
been accused of rashness in seeking to engage a force nearly double his
own, but he expected to be joined by six sail-of-the-line at Barbadoes.
On the passage to the West Indies, Nelson prepared an elaborate plan
of battle, the most striking feature in which was, “The business of
an English Commander-in-chief being first to bring an enemy’s fleet
to battle, on the most advantageous terms to himself (I mean, that of
laying his ships close on board those of the enemy as expeditiously as
possible, and, secondly, to continue them there until the business is
decided),” etc., etc.
On May 15th Nelson’s fleet reached Madeira, and a frigate was sent on
to Barbadoes, to have Admiral Cochrane’s vessels ready for a junction.
He, himself, with the main fleet, did not arrive at Barbadoes until
June 4th. All this time he had many qualms about his course in leaving
his station, and, upon his arrival, was met by many conflicting reports.
But he soon learned that the French had gone north again. (At this time
he was thought by Napoleon and the French authorities to be still in
European waters.) Nelson’s swift movements had quite outstripped the
Emperor’s calculations.
Nelson left the West Indies again, with eleven sail-of-the line, and
cautiously pursued the large fleet in advance of him, in hopes that
better tactics would enable him to reach the shores of Europe before
them; and, at any rate, by his presence there he had stopped the career
of victory of the French, in the West Indies. He said to his Captains,
“My object is partly gained. * * * * We won’t part without a battle.
I think they will be glad to let me alone, if I will let them alone;
which I will do, either till we approach the shores of Europe, or they
give me an advantage too tempting to be resisted.”
The French Admiral Villeneuve’s orders as to his proceedings in the
West Indies are interesting, as well as the events which followed his
arrival there, but he was ordered to return soon, and to carry out a
project, as the ultimate object of the assembling of his allied fleet,
which was, in the eyes of Napoleon, infinitely more important than the
capture and pillage of the English West India Islands. In returning
to Europe Villeneuve was only obeying the Emperor’s orders, although
the latter blamed Villeneuve for not carrying out his orders in full,
attributing his hasty leaving the islands, to fright.
Afterwards, at St. Helena, he acknowledged that Villeneuve was a brave
man.
On the way to Europe the French fleet made one or two important
captures and re-captures, and came off Cape Finisterre about the latter
part of July.
And now let us follow Lord Nelson for a time.
He quitted Antigua on June 13th, having received information that the
enemy’s fleet was seen steering north, but he had no very definite
information, and had to rely on his own intuition. On July 17th he
sighted Cape St. Vincent, having sailed about 3500 miles on this one
passage.
There seems to be no doubt that Napoleon intended to attack Ireland, or
at least effect a landing there, and the best military and naval minds
considered that Villeneuve’s voyage to the West Indies was principally
intended to draw off the British naval force from the Channel, to admit
of an attack upon Ireland, a preliminary step in Napoleon’s plan.
[Illustration: NELSON’S VICTORY AT TRAFALGAR.]
On July 19th, 1805, the English fleet anchored in Gibraltar, and on
the 20th Lord Nelson says, in his diary, “I went on shore for the
first time since June 16th, 1803, and, from having my foot out of the
Victory, two years, wanting ten days.”
He remained only three days on shore at Gibraltar, and then received
information that the allied fleet had been seen, five weeks before,
steering N. N. west, in latitude 33°, longitude 58° west. This was
stale news, but the earliest, of a positive nature, which he had
received. He, therefore, passed the Straits of Gibraltar, and at first
went to the westward, but afterwards he went off Cape St. Vincent, to
be ready to steer in any direction that circumstances might direct. On
the third day of August the English fleet was in 39° north, and 16°
west longitude.
Here Lord Nelson got some information from an American merchant ship,
which had taken the log of a vessel which had been set on fire and
abandoned, but not destroyed, and, from a scrap of paper containing a
reckoning, he derived the fact that the vessel had been taken by the
French fleet.
Nelson then proceeded north, but finding no news, either from Admiral
Cornwallis, off Ushant, or the Channel fleet, proceeded, with the
Victory, and another ship, to Portsmouth, leaving the rest of his fleet
as a reinforcement to the Channel fleet.
In the meantime the combined fleet had had a most important action,
on July 22d, with Sir Robert Calder’s squadron, between Ferrol and
Finisterre, not necessary to be here gone into. It was a sort of drawn
battle, with numbers in favor of the French. Sir Robert Calder was much
blamed for the result.
Napoleon was terribly vexed that Villeneuve had not rendered a better
account of Sir Robert Calder’s fleet, to which he was superior.
Bonaparte said that “Villeneuve was one of those men who require more
spur than bridle,” and asked if it “would not be possible to find, in
the navy, an enterprising man, with cool views, as one ought to see,
either in battle, or in the manœuvres of a fleet.”
Villeneuve was ordered to go to Brest; but, in spite of that, went
to Cadiz, the details of the reasons and movements being too long
to be recounted here. The Emperor was furious, and charged him with
dereliction in duty, disobedience of orders, refusing to fight the
enemy, etc.
Part of Bonaparte’s vexation with Villeneuve no doubt arose from the
loud complaints of the Spaniards, at having lost two ships in Calder’s
action; and this was aggravated by the apparent unwillingness of the
French Admiral, even with a powerful fleet under his command, to sail
out, in the face of eleven English sail-of-the-line, cruising off
Cadiz; and so enable the Spanish squadron at Carthagena to form a
junction with Admiral Gravina, who commanded the Spanish portion of the
allied fleet.
The fact is, to quote a French authority, “Villeneuve, like others,
was impressed by the inferiority of the French marine, in comparison
with the English. The French seamen, brave enough, but inexperienced
at sea, looked with a sort of terror upon the necessity of meeting the
redoubtable victor of Aboukir, knowing well his genius and audacity,
commanding, as he did, a well prepared fleet and thoroughly drilled
and sea-hardened crews. Villeneuve’s personal courage is above
suspicion, but he lacked energy, decision, and power of organization.
Exasperated by the reply of the Emperor, who accused him of cowardice,
in consequence of his perpetual hesitations, Villeneuve replied to
the Minister of Marine, in these bitter words, “If all the French
Navy lacks is audacity, as is pretended, the Emperor will soon be
satisfied; and he may count upon brilliant successes.”
On September 17th, 1805, Napoleon directed his Minister of Marine to
order Villeneuve to sea, on a new expedition. He was to proceed off
Naples, and disembark, at some point on the coast, a number of troops,
in order that they might join the army of General St. Cyr. He was then
to proceed to Naples, and capture the English ship Excellent, and a
Russian ship-of-the-line, lying there; to do all possible injury to
English trade; to intercept an expedition bound to Malta; and then to
come to Toulon, where everything was to be ready to re-victual and
repair his ships.
Napoleon seemed to have feared the failure of Villeneuve to carry out
these orders; and had actually ordered Vice-Admiral Rosily to supercede
him. But the fact remains that Villeneuve’s written orders had always
been to avoid an engagement, and at last to bring his fleet, fresh and
entire, into the British Channel. In his movements he was, moreover,
retarded by the supineness of the Spaniards, who, when their long
voyage to the West Indies was over, felt inclined to remain snugly in
port.
In the meantime, Vice-Admiral Collingwood, off Cadiz, was joined by
four sail-of-the-line, under Rear-Admiral Sir Richard Bickerton; and
soon after by seventeen more, under Sir Robert Calder, in the Prince of
Wales.
Some of these ships were occasionally detached to Gibraltar, for water
and provisions; and with the rest Collingwood continued to cruise
before Cadiz. On the 28th of September, Lord Nelson arrived, to take
command of the English fleet; having left Portsmouth in the Victory, on
the fifteenth. The Ajax and Thunderer, line-of-battle ships, had come
with him.
The Euryalus frigate had preceded him, to inform Collingwood that,
on his assuming command again, no salute should be fired, or flags
displayed, in order that the Allies should not be apprised of the
arrival of a reinforcement.
The force under Lord Nelson now consisted of twenty-seven
sail-of-the-line, twenty-two of which cruised about fifteen miles
off Cadiz; and the remaining five, under Rear-Admiral Louis, in the
Canopus, were stationed close off the harbor, watching the motions of
the combined fleet. Lord Nelson considered that if he kept the main
body of his fleet out of sight of land, the French Admiral, being
ignorant of the exact British force, might perhaps put to sea, so that
he kept the bulk of his fleet at a long distance west of Cadiz.
The force close in with the city was then relieved by two frigates, the
only ships left there. Beyond these, further out, and at a convenient
distance for signalling, were three or four ships-of-the-line, the
westernmost of which could communicate directly with the easternmost
ship of the main body.
The new station of the English fleet had a great advantage in case of
westerly gales, usual at that season, as they would not be forced into
the Mediterranean; in which event the combined fleet, on the first
change of wind, might easily put to sea, unmolested.
On October 1st, the Euryalus frigate reconnoitred the port of Cadiz,
and plainly discovered, at anchor in the outer harbor, and apparently
ready for sea, eighteen French, and sixteen Spanish ships-of-the-line,
frigates and two brigs.
The next day Lord Nelson sent Rear-Admiral Louis with five
sail-of-the-line, to Gibraltar, for provisions and water; and on the
same day, a Swedish ship, from Cadiz, bound to Alicante, informed the
Euryalus that the combined fleet had reëmbarked the troops a day or
two before, and intended to put to sea the first easterly wind.
Rear-Admiral Louis got this intelligence on the 3d of October, and at
once returned to the main fleet with his squadron; but Lord Nelson,
conceiving the news to be a stratagem to draw him nearer to Cadiz, so
as to obtain a knowledge of his force, ordered Louis to proceed in the
execution of his orders.
On the 4th the weather was very calm, and some Spanish gunboats pulled
out from Cadiz and attacked the two English frigates which were on duty
close in; but they soon retired again. By the 8th of October two more
line-of-battle-ships had joined the English fleet, and the same day the
Euryalus again counted thirty-four sail-of-the-line in Cadiz harbor.
The possibility that the Cadiz, Carthagena and Rochefort ships
might effect a junction, and thereby present a force of forty-six
sail-of-the-line, induced Lord Nelson to draw up and transmit to his
second in command a plan of attack in which he supposed that, by the
junction of a squadron under Sir Richard Strachan, and other ships,
from Gibraltar and elsewhere, he might be able to assemble a force of
forty sail-of-the-line.
His plan was regarded by naval men as a master-piece of naval strategy,
and agreed in principle with that pursued in the great battle then
impending. Condensed, it was as follows: Taking it for granted that
it was next to impossible to form a fleet of forty sail-of-the-line
in line of battle, with varying winds, thick weather, and other
difficulties which might arise, without so much delay that the
opportunity would probably be lost of bringing the enemy to battle in
such a manner as to render it decisive, Lord Nelson resolved to keep
the fleet in such a position that, with the exception of the first and
second in command, the order of sailing would be the order of battle.
The fleet was to be placed in two lines, of sixteen ships each, with an
advanced squadron of eight of the fastest sailing, two-decked ships,
which latter would always make, if wanted, a line of twenty-four sail,
on any line the Commander-in-chief might direct.
The second in command would, after this latter intention was made
known to him, have the entire direction of his line, and was to make
the attack, and to follow up the blow, until the enemy’s ships were
captured or destroyed.
Should the enemy’s fleet--supposed to consist of forty-six
sail-of-the-line, be seen to windward, in line of battle, and the two
British lines and the advanced squadron be able to fetch it, the ships
of the former would probably be so extended that their van could not
succor their rear.
The English second in command would then probably be signalled to lead
through, at about the twelfth ship from the enemy’s rear, or wherever
he could fetch, if not able to advance so far.
The Commander-in-chief’s line would lead through at the centre, and the
advanced squadron cut through at about three or four ships ahead of the
centre, so as to ensure getting at the enemy’s Commander-in-chief, whom
every effort should be used to capture.
The whole impression of the British fleet was to be made to overpower
from two to three ships ahead of the enemy’s Commander-in-chief
(supposed to be in the centre) to the rear of his fleet.
Admitting twenty sail of the enemy’s line to be untouched, it would be
some time before they could perform a manœuvre, so as to bring their
force compact, to attack any part of the British fleet engaged, or to
succor their companions; and this they could not do without mixing with
the ships engaged.
If it happened that the two fleets were of less force than here
contemplated, a proportionate number only of the enemy’s fleet were to
be cut off, and the British were to be one-fourth superior to the enemy
so cut off.
Lord Nelson, making due allowance for what chance might effect, looked
with confidence to a victory, before the van of the enemy could succor
his rear; and then he expected that the British ships would most of
them be ready to receive the enemy’s other twenty sail, or to pursue
them, should they endeavor to make off.
If the van of the enemy tacked, the captured ships were to run to
leeward of the British fleet; if the enemy wore, the British were to
place themselves between the enemy and the captured, as well as their
own disabled ships; and should the enemy close, his Lordship made no
doubt of the result.
The second in command was to direct the movements of his line and to
keep the ships as compact as circumstances permitted. Captains were to
look to their own line as their rallying point; but, in case signals
could neither be seen nor perfectly understood, _no captain could do
wrong who placed his ship close alongside that of an enemy_.
So far with regard to the attack from to leeward. Next followed the
plan of attack from to windward.
Supposing the enemy formed in line-of-battle to receive the British
fleet, the three divisions of the latter were to be brought nearly
within gun-shot of the enemy’s centre, when the signal would most
likely be made for the lee line to bear up together, under all sail, in
order to reach the enemy’s line as quickly as possible, and then to cut
through; beginning at the twelfth ship from the enemy’s rear.
Some ships might not get through at their exact place, but they would
always be at hand, to assist their friends; and if any British ships
were thrown round the rear of the enemy, they would, it was considered,
effectually complete the business of twelve of the enemy’s ships.
Should the enemy wear together, or bear up, and sail large, still the
twelve ships of the enemy’s rear were to be the object of attack of the
British lee line, unless otherwise directed by the Commander-in-chief,
an interference not contemplated in the plan, as the entire management
of the lee line, after the Commander-in-chief had signalized his
intentions, was to be left to the judgment of the Admiral commanding
that line.
The remainder of the English fleet were to be left to the management of
the Commander-in-chief; who, as he rather modestly expressed himself,
would endeavor to take care that the movements of the second in command
were as little as possible interrupted.
This plan and instructions have been given rather at length, because
they have always been looked upon as models, and have been copied into
foreign historical works, and adopted upon several other occasions.
Cadiz became much straightened for provisions, in consequence of
having so large a fleet to victual. To remedy this evil, especially in
regard to his own fleet, Napoleon had ordered shipments to be made to
Nantes, Bordeaux, and other ports in the Bay of Biscay. The carriers
were vessels under the Danish flag, that landed their cargoes at small
ports in the south of Spain, whence they were easily conveyed to
Cadiz. As some check to this, a vigorous blockade had been adopted by
Collingwood, and maintained by his successor who considered it a more
likely way of driving the combined fleets to sea than a bombardment of
Congreve rockets, as had at one time been contemplated. The arrival
of a number of frigates enabled Nelson to prosecute this blockade
of the coasting trade more successfully. On the 10th of October two
line-of-battle ships, and on the 13th two more, joined Nelson; and he
had now twenty-nine sail-of-the-line off Cadiz, and five at Gibraltar.
This was the highest number his fleet reached.
On the 10th the allied fleet had moved out to the entrance of
the harbor, and evinced a disposition to put to sea at the first
opportunity.
Four days after, Lord Nelson was obliged, owing to orders from England,
to send there Sir Robert Calder, in the Prince of Wales; and on the
17th was obliged to send the Donegal to Gibraltar, for water. This
done, he had twenty-seven sail-of-the-line (not all in very good order,
or well manned), four frigates, a schooner, and a cutter. There were
in his fleet three 100-gun ships; the Victory, his own flag-ship;
the Royal Sovereign, Vice-Admiral Collingwood; and the Britannia,
Rear-Admiral the Earl of Northesk. Then came four 98-gun ships; one 80,
sixteen 74s, and three 64s, which formed the line-of-battle.
On the very day on which Lord Nelson took command of the fleet a
courier had arrived at Cadiz, with the order of the French Emperor
for Villeneuve to put to sea. These orders had been issued about the
middle of September, and required that the French ships should pass the
Straits of Gibraltar, land the troops on the Neapolitan coast, sweep
the Mediterranean of all British commerce and cruisers, and then enter
Toulon, to re-fit and re-victual.
Although Villeneuve’s instructions contained no mention of the
Spanish fleet, it is natural to suppose that they would be glad to
avail themselves of the exit of a formidable French fleet to effect a
junction with seven sail-of-the-line of theirs, which were blockaded
in the port of Carthagena. Every exertion was, therefore, made to fill
the complements of the fleet, which had otherwise been ready for some
time. Of the vessels which had been in Sir Robert Calder’s action,
one, the Argonauta, had been repaired and refitted, but the damage to
the other, the Terrible, proved of so serious a nature that she was
disarmed, and her crew divided among the short-manned ships.
All these details may seem tedious, but are necessary to a correct
understanding of this, the most important naval battle of the century.
To return a little. On the 10th of October, the French troops having
re-embarked, the combined fleet moved to the entrance of Cadiz harbor,
to be ready for a start at a moment’s warning. Hard westerly gales
continued until the 17th. At midnight of that date the wind shifted to
the eastward, and on the 18th of October Admiral Villeneuve informed
the Spanish Admiral Gravina of his intention to put to sea on the
following day; and had a strong line of gunboats drawn up across the
mouth of the harbor.
On October 19th the Allied fleets, by signal from the
Commander-in-chief, began getting under way, at seven o’clock in
the morning. There was a fair breeze, but light, and the British
reconnoitring frigates at once saw and reported the movement. Owing
to the light wind, only twelve ships got out, and these lay becalmed
until afternoon, when a breeze sprang up from the west-north-west,
and the twelve stood to the northward, accompanied closely by the two
English frigates on guard. At daylight the next morning the rest of the
combined fleet left Cadiz, making, with the twelve already outside,
thirty-three sail-of-the-line, five frigates, and two brigs. They had
a light southeast wind, while the ships in the offing, as is frequently
the case on this coast, had the wind south-southwest.
The French had four 80-gun ships, and fourteen 74s, with the frigates
and brigs. The Spanish had one 130-gun ship; two of 112 guns; one 100;
two 80s; eight 74s, and one 64.
Villeneuve’s flag-ship was the Bucentaure, 80, and Gravina’s the
Principe de Asturias, 112.
Scarcely had the fleet cleared the harbor when a southwest wind and
thick weather began to delay their progress. Meantime the two English
frigates carefully watched their every manœuvre.
The first effect of the thick weather was that the English ship
Agamemnon, with a merchant brig in tow, was unconsciously running into
the midst of the enemy’s ships, but was, after some difficulty, warned
off by the frigates. Then one of the English frigates was in danger of
capture by her stopping too long to examine an American ship; she was
chased and fired upon.
In the afternoon the weather cleared, and the wind shifted to
north-northwest; whereupon Admiral Villeneuve ordered his fleet to form
in five columns, in accordance with a plan previously communicated to
his Admirals and Captains.
The Allied fleet then divided itself into two parts. The first part
was of twenty-one sail, and was denominated the line-of-battle, and
this was again subdivided into three squadrons, of seven ships each;
of which the centre was commanded by Villeneuve himself; the van by
Vice-Admiral Alava; and the rear by Rear-Admiral Dumanoir.
The second part of the Allied fleet, the reserve, was divided into two
squadrons, of six ships each, the first under Admiral Gravina, and the
second under Rear-Admiral Magon.
Villeneuve’s instructions to these officers were as follows: in case
of being to windward, the line to bear down together, and each ship
to engage her opponent in the English line; to engage closely, and to
board, if possible.
If, on the contrary, the English fleet was to windward, the allied
fleet was to await attack in close order of battle.
The French Admiral said, “the enemy will not confine himself to forming
a line-of-battle parallel to ours, and engage us with his cannon, when
success often attends the most skillful, and always the most fortunate;
he will endeavor to turn our rear, to pass through our line, and will
endeavor to surround such of our ships as he succeeds in cutting off,
and reduce them with numbers of his own.”
Villeneuve adds “there is nothing to alarm us in the sight of the
English fleet; their 74-gun ships have not five hundred men on board;
their seamen are harassed by a two years’ cruise; they are not more
brave than we; and have infinitely less motives to fight well, and have
less love of country. They are skillful at manœuvring. In a month we
shall be as much so as they are. In fine, everything unites to inspire
us with hopes of the most glorious success, and of a new era for the
Imperial marine.”
The most remarkable feature of the French Admiral’s plan was, that it
persisted in ordering the movements of his fleet to be conducted in
close line-of-battle, even while he admits that his enemy will adopt
a different mode of attack, that of cutting off the rear of the line,
and making it an easy conquest. Such, however, was the ancient rule of
sea-tactics, and France had not yet had a Rodney to break through them.
Shortly after the combined Fleet had formed in five columns, one of
their advanced frigates made the signal for eighteen sail of British
ships in sight. On this the fleet, still on the port tack, cleared for
action, and at about five P. M. tacked, and stood for the mouth of the
Straits of Gibraltar. They had continued so long on the other tack that
Lord Nelson thought it was Villeneuve’s intention to proceed to the
westward.
About this time the four British frigates came down to reconnoitre,
and were chased by some of the Allied fleet, which latter, however,
rejoined the main body at nightfall.
Just before dark the French ship Aigle made signal for eighteen British
ships in line-of-battle, to the southward; and shortly after the
combined fleet wore and stood to the northwest.
On the 21st, a little before daylight, the French Admiral, abandoning
his plan of forming line-of-battle of twenty-one ships (as the enemy
were now to windward, and of nearly equal force to himself), ordered
the three columns, composed of the twenty-one ships, without regard
to priority of rank among them, to form in close line-of-battle, on
the starboard tack, upon the leewardmost division of twelve ships, and
then to steer southeast. The manœuvre executed, daylight found the two
fleets fairly in sight of each other, for the first time. The centre of
the Franco-Spanish fleet bearing about east by south of the centre of
the British, and distant about ten miles.
The wind was then light, from west-northwest, and a heavy swell setting
in from the westward.
Let us now look at the movements of the British fleet during the
period just before the momentous battle now impending.
About half-past nine A. M., on the 19th, while the British fleet was
lying to, fifty miles west-southwest from Cadiz, the line-of-battle
ships which formed the cordon of communication between the fleet and
the reconnoitring frigates, inshore, repeated the signal that the enemy
was coming out of port.
Lord Nelson immediately made sail to the southeast with light breezes,
mostly from south-southwest. At three P. M. the signal was repeated,
that the enemy was at sea.
That afternoon Lord Nelson directed that the fleet should observe the
motions of his flag-ship, the Victory, during the night, and that the
best sailing ships should stand ahead, and steer for the mouth of the
Straits.
On the 20th of October, at daylight, the English found themselves near
the entrance of the Straits, but saw nothing of their enemy.
Thereupon the fleet wore, and made sail to the northwest, with a fresh
breeze at south-southwest.
At seven A. M., one of the frigates signalled the Allied fleet, bearing
north; and by noon the Victory and the English fleet were within
twenty-five miles of Cadiz, standing to the west-northwest, on the port
tack.
Early in the afternoon they were taken aback, by a breeze from the
west-northwest, and at 4 P. M. wore, and again came to, on the port
tack, steering north.
It was now telegraphed that the Allied fleet seemed determined to go to
the westward, and Lord Nelson replied that he relied on the frigates
keeping them in sight during the night. The frigates then signalled
“thirty-one sail of the enemy, bearing north-northeast.”
When night fell the British fleet wore, and stood to the southwest,
and at 4 A. M. of the 21st wore again, and steered north by east, under
easy sail.
To the general reader these details of manœuvres, (which precede any
great battle, whether on sea or land), may appear tedious, but it is
absolutely necessary to a description of this great event, and could
not be omitted by any one who tried to give an account of the battle.
At six in the morning the flag-ship Victory had a view of the combined
fleet, bearing about east by south, distant, as has been said in the
account of the manœuvres of the Franco-Spanish fleet, about ten or
twelve miles.
At this time Nelson was about twenty miles from Cape Trafalgar, which
bore east by south.
Soon after this the English fleet, by signal, formed in two columns, in
the order of sailing, and bore up to the eastward, under all sail.
This was according to Nelson’s previous orders; to avoid delay and
inconvenience of forming line-of-battle in the usual manner.