Lord Viscount Duncan, who won the decisive naval battle of Camperdown,
under rather extraordinary conditions, was born, as simple Adam Duncan,
in Dundee, Scotland, in 1731; so that he was a veteran, as well in
years as in service, when he gained the victory for which he will
always be remembered.
As a Lieutenant he had served in the expedition to America, in “the
French war;” being in the fleet which brought Braddock over to meet
well earned defeat, as well as death. He was afterwards distinguished
in the attack upon Belleisle, and in the capture of Havana. In the war
of 1778 he was actively employed under Rodney. At the first battle
of St. Vincent he was in command of a ship; the first to engage and
capture a 70-gun ship.
After participating in many other actions of importance he was made
a Rear-Admiral in 1759, a Vice-Admiral in 1793, the rank he held at
Camperdown, and finally became full Admiral in 1799.
He was a man of great and unaffected piety, and excited the wonder
and admiration of the Dutch Admiral, when a prisoner on board his
flag-ship, after Camperdown, by summoning his ship’s company, and then
going down on his knees and thanking God for the mercy vouchsafed them.
Admiral Duncan had, in 1797, the command of the North Sea English
fleet. But that fleet had been so thinned by the secession of the
disaffected ships which took part in the great mutiny of the English
fleet, in that year--called the “Mutiny of the Nore,” and the “Mutiny
at Spithead”--that, towards the end of May, he found himself at sea
with only his own ship (the Venerable, 74) and the Adamant, 50.
It is necessary here to touch upon the causes which gave rise to a
mutiny which has forever remained a disgrace to the Lords of the
British Admiralty, and to the officers of the fleet serving under them
at that time and for a long time before.
Avoiding any speculations or reflections, we will simply quote from a
well known writer on naval affairs, Admiral Ekins, of the British Navy,
who, quoting another writer in respect to the state of the British Navy
about that time says, “in 1796 and the following years, after the naval
force became so much expanded, the seamen were exceedingly deteriorated
by the introduction of a large mass of Irish rebels, and the sweepings
of all the gaols in England, on the home station; and by as large an
introduction of foreigners on the stations abroad.”
This writer seems to intend to say, as he goes on, that the Irish, many
of whom had filled offices of some kind at home, had, by plausible
ways, acted with great influence on the minds of the British seamen
whom they found on board their ships, and who were certainly suffering,
at the time, from very oppressive regulations and fraudulent practices.
[Illustration: ENGLISH FLEET, OFF TENERIFFE.]
“These men entirely overturned the whole discipline and constitutional
temperament of the navy. An honest zeal was changed for gloomy
discontent: grievances were magnified into oppressions, and the man
who had cheerfully executed his subordinate duties, in what he as
yet considered his proper sphere, now aimed at an equality with, or
superiority to, his own respected superiors. Thus arose the mutiny.”
“After the mutiny, numbers of the Irish were sent to foreign stations,
as a punishment, and disseminated the same spirit.”
The poor Irish! They have for many generations fought the battles
of the English, and of several other nations, but their case seems
more unsettled than before. Without a permanent contingent from Irish
recruits England would be badly off.
To continue with our quotation, “Patrick Little, who was Secretary to
Parker, the leader of the mutiny of the Nore, had been an attorney
in Dublin. He was sent to the West Indies, and, in a few months, was
accused of fostering mutiny there. He was not convicted of the full
offence charged, but was sent to receive six hundred lashes, did
receive two hundred and fifty, and is said to have died, soon after, of
the ‘prevailing fever.’
“The ships in the Mediterranean in 1797-’98-’99, were so short of men
that foreigners of all descriptions were received; and I have often
heard it stated that the fleet could not have gone to sea at times, if
a certain commissioner at Lisbon, about that period, had not assumed
the post of head of Police in that Metropolis, and made, occasionally,
clean sweep of all individuals on the quays and adjacent streets, who
were sent indiscriminately on board the British fleet; from whence none
returned who were serviceable.”
This British Admiral proceeds to quote, “if the battle of the Nile
had not been fought under the directing skill of such a chief, and
under _all the effects of surprise_, I have heard Sir Thomas Louis
declare that the result might have been very different. As it was,
the defence was much more obstinate than is generally imagined, and
much more protracted.” (In America we have been used to read English
accounts of the battles of those days, because they were written in our
own language.) He goes on to say, “I have understood it was certainly
not the superiority of the crews which prevailed. The Vanguard was
wretchedly manned; and but for the assistance of the Minotaur, which I
saw acknowledged in Lord Nelson’s handwriting, her fate would have been
precarious.”
These remarks are from high English cotemporary authority, we must
remember.
In a note, Admiral Ekins says, “at the conclusion of the war in
1802, the Victorious, of 74 guns, returned to Europe after serving
a considerable time in the East Indies; but, being in a bad state,
from length of service, reached no further than Lisbon. She was there
broken up. Part of her crew were put on board the Amazon, to be taken
to England to receive their wages and return to their homes. But,
unfortunately for them, poor fellows, before they arrived at Spithead,
war had again declared itself, and they learned, with tears streaming
from their eyes, that they were to be detained to serve another
war. They remained nine or ten years in the Amazon, and were then
distributed (the Amazon being worn out) to other ships. A few of them
were afterwards killed serving in the boats of the Bacchante, in the
Mediterranean. Perhaps the whole, certainly the greatest part, of these
men were originally impressed against their will.”
These are only some authentic instances of the state of the personnel
of the British Navy at this time; and the wonder is that the officers
did so well with such material. Men were often nine or ten years
without setting foot on shore.
And now to return to Admiral Duncan and his operations. Having, as
we have said, been left with only the Venerable, his flag-ship (a
name which reminds us of H. M. S. Pinafore), and the Adamant, he
nevertheless proceeded to his station, off the Texel, to watch the
Dutch, with whom they were then at war.
In the Texel lay at anchor the Dutch fleet of fifteen sail of the line
(including 56s), under the command of Vice Admiral De Winter.
In order to detain the latter in port until a reinforcement should
arrive, Admiral Duncan caused repeated signals to be made, as if to the
main body of his fleet in the offing. This stratagem, it was supposed,
had the desired effect. At length, about the middle of June, several
line-of-battle-ships, in detached portions, joined the British Admiral,
and the two fleets were again placed on an equal footing.
The Venerable, having been nearly five months at sea, and during a part
of the time exposed to very boisterous weather, was in want of almost
every description of stores. Others of the ships had also suffered
by the recent gales of wind, and were short of provisions. Thus
circumstanced, the Admiral, on the 3d of October, put into Yarmouth
roads, to refit and re-victual, leaving off the Dutch coast a small
squadron of observation, under the orders of Captain Trollope, of the
Russell.
Early on the morning of October 9th an armed lugger, hired as a
despatch vessel, came into the back of Yarmouth sands, with the signal
flying for an enemy.
After great bustle and hurried preparations, Admiral Duncan put to sea,
a little before noon, with eleven sail-of-the-line. With a fair wind
he steered straight for his old station. On the following day three
more ships joined him; so that he had seven 74s, and seven 64s, and two
50-gun frigates. There were also the Beaulieu, 40; the Circe, 28; and
the Martin, sloop.
On the afternoon of the 11th the advanced ships were near enough to
count twenty-two sail of square-rigged vessels, chiefly merchantmen, at
anchor in the Texel.
Admiral Duncan, having received from Captain Trollope information of
what course the enemy’s fleet was steering, now stood along shore to
the southward.
At about seven on the following morning, the Russell, Adamant and
Beaulieu were made out in the southwest, bearing at their mast-heads
the signals for an enemy in sight, to leeward; and at about half-past
eight a strange fleet, consisting of twenty-one ships and four brigs,
made its appearance in that quarter.
The Dutch fleet consisted of four 74s, seven 64s, four 50s and
two 44-gun ships, with two 32-gun frigates, two corvettes, four
brig-sloops, and two advice-boats. Some accounts give more ships than
this. Probably there were more.
These vessels, under the command of Vice-Admiral De Winter, had quitted
the Texel at ten o’clock on the morning of the 10th of October, with a
light breeze at about east by north. On the night of that day, the wind
being then southwest, Captain Trollope’s squadron was discovered by
them, to windward, and immediately chased; but the Dutch ships, being
dull sailers, did not come near him. The Dutch fleet then stretched out
toward the Meuse flat, where Admiral De Winter expected to be joined by
a 64-gun ship. Not meeting her, he stood on to the westward, followed,
or rather, as the wind was, preceded, by Captain Trollope’s squadron.
The wind continued westerly during the three succeeding days, and
prevented the Dutch fleet from getting abreast of Lowestoffe until the
evening of the 10th. The extreme darkness of that night induced Admiral
De Winter to detach a few of his best sailing ships, in hopes that they
would be enabled, by daybreak, to get to windward of, and capture or
chase away, Captain Trollope’s squadron, which had followed them with
great pertinacity. Just as the ships had made sail for that purpose
some friendly merchant ships came into the fleet, and informed Admiral
De Winter that the English fleet was within thirty miles of him, in the
north-northwest, and steering east by south. The detached ships were
instantly recalled; and the Dutch fleet, as soon as formed in compact
order, edged away, with the wind northwest, towards Camperdown, the
appointed place of rendezvous.
At daylight on the 11th the Dutch fleet was about thirty miles off
the village of Scheveningen, in loose order, and speaking a friendly
convoy, from which additional information was obtained.
At this time the English squadron of observation was seen to windward,
with numerous signals flying, which convinced Admiral De Winter that
the English fleet was in sight. He accordingly ordered his ships to
their stations, and to facilitate the junction of the ships most to
leeward, stood towards the land. The Wykerdens bearing east, about
twenty miles off, the Dutch fleet hauled to the wind, on the starboard
tack, and shortly afterwards discovered Admiral Duncan’s fleet in the
north-northwest. The Dutch fleet then tacked, and, as soon as a close
line was formed in the direction of northeast and southwest, the Dutch
ships, throwing their main top-sails aback, resolutely awaited the
approach of the British fleet.
Owing chiefly to inequality in point of sailing among the British
ships, their fleet, when that of the Dutch appeared in sight, was in
very loose order. To enable the dull sailers to take their proper
stations, Admiral Duncan, at about eleven A.M., brought to, on the
starboard tack; but soon afterwards observing that the Dutch ships
were drawing fast inshore, he made signal for each ship to engage her
opponent in the enemy’s line; then to bear up; and, lastly, for the van
to attack the enemy’s rear. At about half-past eleven, the centre of
the Dutch line then bearing southeast, distant four or five miles, the
British fleet bore down, but, owing to some of the ships not yet being
up, in no regular order of battle. Some were stretching across to get
into their stations; others seemed in doubt where to go; and others,
again, were pushing for the thickest of the enemy, without regard to
stations.
A little before noon Admiral Duncan made signal that he should pass
through the enemy’s line and engage him to leeward. This signal appears
to have been kept flying but a short time, and the weather was so
thick that the ships generally did not make it out. It was replaced by
one for close action, which was kept flying for an hour and a half;
till, indeed, it was shot away. About half-past twelve Vice-Admiral
Onslow, whose ship, the Monarch, was leading the advanced or port
division of the British fleet, cut through the Dutch line, between the
Haerlem, 64, and the Jupiter, 74; pouring into each, in passing, a
well-directed broadside. Then the Monarch, leaving the Haerlem to the
Powerful, which followed her, luffed up close alongside the Jupiter,
and these two ships became warmly engaged. The Jupiter carried the flag
of Vice-Admiral Reyntjes. The rounding to of the Monarch afforded the
Dutch Monnikendam frigate and Atalanta brig, which were in shore and
in the rear, an opportunity to rake the English ship several times;
and the very plucky little brig, in particular, did not retire until
she had been much damaged by the Monarch’s shot. It was supposed she
had been sunk by the 74, but she arrived safely, after the battle,
in a Dutch port. The remaining ships of the English port division,
especially the Monmouth, 64, and the Russell, 74, were soon in action
with the Dutch rear-ships; among the last of which to surrender was the
Jupiter, 74, the first to be engaged.
About twenty minutes after the Monarch, with Vice-Admiral Onslow’s
flag, had broken the Dutch line, Duncan’s flag-ship, the Venerable,
frustrated in an attempt to pass astern of the Vryheid, 74, De Winter’s
flag-ship, by the great promptness of the States-General, 74, in
closing the interval, ran under the stern of the latter, and soon
compelled her to bear up; and the Triumph, the Venerable’s second
astern, found herself closely engaged with the Wassenaer, the second
astern to the States-General. Meanwhile the Venerable had ranged up
close on the lee side of her first intended antagonist, the Vryheid,
with whom, on the other side, the Ardent was also warmly engaged, and
in front, the Belford, as she cut through the line astern of the Dutch
Gelykheid, 64. The Dutch ships Brutus, 74, Rear-Admiral Bloys, and the
Leyden, 64, and Mars, 44, not being pressed upon by opponents, advanced
to the succor of their closely beset Admiral, and did considerable
damage to the Venerable, as well as the Ardent, and others of the
British van ships. Just at this critical period the Hercules, 64,
which ship had caught fire on the poop, bore up and fell out of line,
drifting down very near the Venerable.
Although, to the surprise of every one, the Dutch crew managed to
extinguish the flames, yet, having thrown overboard their powder,
they were obliged to surrender the ship, which had already had her
mizzen-mast shot away, to the first opponent which challenged her. The
serious damages which the Venerable had sustained obliged her to haul
off and wear round on the starboard tack. Seeing this, the Triumph,
which had compelled the Wassenaer to strike, approached to help finish
the Vryheid; but that very gallant ship still made a good defence.
At length, after being pounded at by the Venerable, Triumph, Ardent
and Director, her three masts fell over the side, and disabled her
starboard guns, when the overmatched but heroic Vryheid dropped out of
the line of battle, an ungovernable hulk, and struck her colors.
A curious incident occurred in regard to the Wassenaer, 64, which, we
have just seen, was compelled by the English Triumph, 74, to strike
her colors, and fall out of the line. One of the Dutch brigs followed
her, and fired at her, persistently, until she re-hoisted her colors.
The Russel, 74, soon came up, however, and compelled the unfortunate
Wassenaer again to strike to her. With the surrender of Admiral De
Winter’s ship the action ceased, and the English found themselves
in possession of the Vryheid and Jupiter, 74s, Devries, Gelykheid,
Haerlem, Hercules and Wassenaer, 64s, Alkmaar and Delft, 50s, and the
frigates Monnikendam and Ambuscade. The first of these frigates had
been engaged by the Monmouth, 64, and was finally taken possession of
by the Beaulieu, a 40-gun frigate of the English.
The Dutch van ship, the Beschermer, 50, dreading, very naturally, so
strong an opponent as the Lancaster, 64, had early wore, and fallen
out of the line. Her example was followed, with much less reason, by
several of the other Dutch ships, which, although seen making off,
could not be pursued, on account of the nearness of the land, and the
shallowness of the water. The Venerable at this time sounded, and found
only nine fathoms, and the shore, under their lee, which was that
between Camperdown and Egmont, and about thirty miles northwest of
Amsterdam, was only about five miles off.
The British ships now hastened to secure their prizes, so that they
might, before nightfall, work clear of this dangerous coast.
The appearance of the victorious British fleet was very different from
that which generally presented itself after a battle with the French
or the Spaniards. Not a single lower mast, not even a topmast, in the
British fleet, was shot away. Nor were the sails and rigging of the
latter very much damaged.
It was at the hulls of their adversaries that the sturdy Dutchmen had
directed their shot, and they did not fire until they were so near that
no shot could well miss. All the English ships had shot sticking in
their sides; many were pierced by them in all directions, and some of
them had such dangerous wounds between wind and water that their pumps
had to be kept going briskly. The Ardent had received about one hundred
round shot in her hull; the Belliqueux, Belford, Venerable and Monarch
had nearly as many. But the latter ship was so untouched aloft, that
when her top-sail sheets, which had been shot away, were spliced and
hauled home, no one looking at her from a little distance would have
believed she had been in action.
With such fire, directed almost exclusively at the hulls, even by the
feeble guns of that day, the loss of men could not be otherwise than
severe. The British loss was 203 killed, and 622 wounded.
The captured ships were all either dismasted outright, or so injured in
their masts that most of the latter fell as soon as the wind and sea,
during the passage to England, began to act powerfully upon them. The
Dutch ships’ hulls were also terribly cut up, and were so damaged as
mostly to be brought into port to be exhibited as trophies, and then
broken up.
Their loss was proportionately severe. The Dutch Vice-Admiral and the
two Rear-Admirals were all wounded. Vice-Admiral Reyntjes died in
London soon after, not of his wound, but of a chronic disease. Captain
Holland, of the Wassenaer, was killed early in the action, which may
account, partially, for her not holding out longer. Admiral De Winter’s
captain, Van Rossem, had his thigh carried away by a round shot, and
died almost immediately.
Many other Dutch officers were killed and wounded, and their loss,
including that on board the Monnikendam frigate, which was not in the
line, was 540 killed, and 620 wounded.
The actual force of the two fleets in this battle was, according to
English accounts--not always very reliable at that time--
_British._ _Dutch._
Ships 16 16
Guns 1,150 1,034
Agg. weight of metal, lbs. 11,501 9,857
Crews 8,221 7,175
Size, tons 23,601 20,937
It is fair to say that the Dutch had several frigates and brigs abreast
the intervals in their line, which did good service, raking the English
ships as they came through and luffed up to leeward of the enemy’s line.
As it was, Admiral Duncan met and fought the Dutch fleet before a 98-
and two 74-gun ships which De Winter had expected could join him.
Admiral De Winter, in his official report of the action, attributed his
failure to four causes: first, the superiority of the British in large
ships; secondly, their having been together at sea for many weeks,
and hence well accustomed to work together; thirdly, the advantage
of the attack, and fourthly, the early retreat of some of his ships,
and the bad sailing of some of the others. He also expressed his
belief that, if his signals had been obeyed as promptly as Admiral
Duncan’s were, some of the English fleet would have been brought into
the Texel, instead of the Dutch ships going to England. His statement
about the English ships being so long together was not altogether
correct. Captain Williamson, of the English ship Agincourt, 64, was
court-martialed for his conduct in this action. He was accused of
disobedience of signals and failure to go into action; and also, on
a second charge, of cowardice or disaffection. The first charge was
found proved, but not the second, and Williamson received a very severe
sentence. It was proved on this trial that some of Admiral Duncan’s
fleet did not know other ships in the same fleet. In the great fleet
actions of those days, between ships-of-the-line, it was not customary
for frigates and smaller ships to fire, or to be fired at, unless they
provoked it; and the Dutch frigates, corvettes and brigs formed in
this action a second line, and fought well. The Dutch were, indeed, an
enemy not to be despised, and Admiral Duncan did full justice to the
determined way in which most of them fought.
Scarcely was the British fleet, with its prizes, pointed to the
westward, when a gale of wind came on, which scattered and endangered
the whole of them. The injured masts fell, and the vessels leaked
through shot-holes which in any ordinary weather would have been above
the reach of the water.
On the 13th, the Delft, 50, a prize, exhibited a board with the words
chalked on it “The ship is sinking.” Assistance was sent, and most
of the men removed; but several of the prize crew and many of the
prisoners perished in her, so quickly did she founder.
The Monnikendam frigate was wrecked on a shoal; but all on board were
saved; and the Ambuscade frigate, being driven on the Dutch coast, was
recaptured. One by one the rest of the scattered fleet and the prizes
reached English ports.
Admiral Duncan was made a peer, and Vice-Admiral Onslow a baronet,
for this action. Gold medals were presented to the flag-officers and
captains; and the thanks of Parliament were voted to the fleet.
We often realize more of the real spirit of a fight from private
accounts and comments than from the official reports; and we,
therefore, add a few remarks and anecdotes from such sources. In the
first place, the promptitude and decision of Admiral Duncan on meeting
the Dutch fleet is especially to be noticed. “The British Admiral soon
perceived that if he waited to form his line (the enemy drawing fast
in with the land) there would be no action.” He, therefore, hoisted
the signal to make all sail, break the line, and engage the enemy to
leeward; and for close action, which last signal flew until it was shot
away. This signal could not be mistaken, and, coupled with the gallant
Admiral’s example, superseded all former ones.
If further proof of the superior efficacy of such a mode of attack be
wanting, it is to be found not only in the declaration of the brave
Dutch Admiral, but also in the testimony of Lord Nelson, who, although
not acquainted with Lord Duncan, wrote to him, after the battle of the
Nile, to tell him how “he had profited by his example.”
The Dutch Admiral De Winter said, “Your not waiting to form a line
ruined me; if I had got nearer to the shore, and you had attacked, I
should probably have drawn both fleets on, and it would have been a
victory to me, being on my own coast.”
It is a fact that many of the vessels of Admiral Duncan’s fleet were
intended for Indiamen, and not so stoutly built as men-of-war usually
are; and many of his ships were in bad condition, and had not had
time to complete their stores when called away from Yarmouth Roads to
encounter the enemy.
Among other incidents of this action, it is recorded that, when the
main-top-gallant mast of the Venerable was shot away, a seaman named
Crawford went aloft with another flag, and hammer and nails, and nailed
the flag to the topmast-head.
Had Duncan’s fleet been of as good material as that of Lord St.
Vincent, it is probable that every Dutch ship would have been taken.
When the action ceased the English fleet were in only nine fathoms of
water, and a severe gale was nearly upon them; and the wonder is that
they saved themselves and so many of their prizes, in their battered
condition.
Captain Inglis, of the Belliqueux, of 64 guns, owing either to a long
absence from active service, or an inaptitude to the subject, sometimes
apparent in sea officers, had neglected to make himself a competent
master of the signal-book, and on the morning of the day of the
battle, when it became necessary to act with promptitude in obedience
to signals, found himself more puzzled than enlightened by it, and,
throwing it with contempt upon the deck, exclaimed, in broad Scotch:
“D--n me, up wi’ the hellum, and gang intil the middle o’t!”
In this manner he bravely anticipated the remedy in such cases provided
by Nelson, who, in his celebrated “Memorandum,” observes that, “when a
captain should be _at a loss_ he cannot do _very wrong_ if he lay his
ship alongside of the enemy.”
In strict conformity with this doctrine the Belliqueux got herself very
roughly treated by the van of the Dutch fleet.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF THE NILE.--FRENCH FLAG-SHIP L’ORIENT, 120
GUNS, ON FIRE.]