The Romans at this time had no ships of war; but they began the
construction of a fleet, to cope with their enemy, then the undisputed
mistress of the seas.
Just at this time a Carthaginian ship of large size was stranded
upon the Italian shores, and served as a model for the Romans, who,
with characteristic energy, in a short time put afloat a hundred
quinqueremes and twenty triremes. No particular description of these
vessels is necessary, as they were the same in general plan as those
already spoken of as in use among the Egyptians, Phenicians, and
Greeks, for centuries. Able seamen were obtained from neighboring
tributary maritime States, and bodies of landsmen were put in training,
being exercised at the oar on shore; learning to begin and cease rowing
at the signal. For this purpose platforms were erected, and benches
placed, as in a galley.
It will here be necessary to give a short account of the Roman naval
system, which was now rapidly becoming developed and established. As
has been said, they had paid no attention, before this period, to naval
affairs; and were only stirred up to do so by the necessity of meeting
the Carthaginians upon their own element.
It is true that some authorities say that the first Roman ships of war
were built upon the model of those of Antium, after the capture of that
city, A. U. C. 417; but the Romans certainly made no figure at sea
until the time of the first Punic war.
The Roman ships of war were much longer than their merchant vessels,
and were principally driven by oars, while the merchant ships relied
almost entirely upon sails.
It is a more difficult problem than one would at first sight suppose,
to explain exactly how the oars were arranged in the quadriremes and
quinqueremes of which we read. The Roman ships were substantial and
heavy, and consequently slow in evolutions, however formidable in line.
Augustus, at a much later period, was indebted to a number of fast,
light vessels from the Dalmatian coast, for his victory over Antony’s
heavy ships.
The ship of the commander of a Roman fleet was distinguished by a red
flag, and also carried a light at night. These ships of war had prows
armed with a sharp beak, of brass, usually divided into three teeth, or
points. They also carried towers of timber, which were erected before
an engagement, and whence missiles were discharged. They employed both
freemen and slaves as rowers and sailors. The citizens and the allies
of the State were obliged to furnish a certain quota of these; and
sometimes to provide them with pay and provisions; but the wages of the
men were usually provided by the State.
The regular soldiers of the Legions at first fought at sea as well as
on land; but when Rome came to maintain a permanent fleet, there was a
separate class of soldiers raised for the sea service, like the marines
of modern navies. But this service was considered less honorable than
that of the Legions, and was often performed by manumitted slaves.
The rowers, a still lower class, were occasionally armed and aided in
attack and defence, when boarding; but this was not usual.
Before a Roman fleet went to sea it was formally reviewed, like the
land army. Prayers were offered to the gods, and victims sacrificed.
The auspices were consulted, and if any unlucky omen occurred (such as
a person sneezing on the left of the Augur, or swallows alighting on
the ships), the voyage was suspended.
Fleets about to engage were arranged in a manner similar to armies
on land, with centre, right and left wings, and reserve. Sometimes
they were arranged in the form of a wedge, or forceps, but most
frequently in a half moon. The admiral sailed round the fleet, in a
light galley, and exhorted the men, while invocations and sacrifices
were again offered. They almost always fought in calm or mild weather,
and with furled sails. The red flag was the signal to engage, which
they did with trumpets sounding and the crews shouting. The combatants
endeavored to disable the enemy by striking off the banks of oars
on one side, or by striking the opposing hulls with the beak. They
also employed fire-ships, and threw pots of combustibles on board the
enemy. Many of Antony’s ships were destroyed by this means. When they
returned from a successful engagement the prows of the victors were
decorated with laurel wreaths; and it was their custom to tow the
captured vessels stern foremost, to signify their utter confusion and
helplessness. The admiral was honored with a triumph, after a signal
victory, like a General or Consul who had won a decisive land battle;
and columns were erected in their honor, which were called Rostral,
from being decorated with the beaks of ships.
And now, to return to the imposing fleet which the Romans had equipped
against the Carthaginians:--
When all was ready the Romans put to sea; at first clinging to their
own shores, and practicing in fleet tactics. They found their vessels
dull and unwieldy, and therefore resolved to board the enemy at the
first opportunity, and avoid as much as possible all manœuvring.
They therefore carried plenty of grappling-irons, and had stages, or
gangways, ingeniously arranged upon hinges, which fell on board of the
enemy, and afforded secure bridges for boarding. By this means many
victories were secured over a people who were much better seamen.
After various partial engagements with the Carthaginian fleet,
productive of no definite results, Duilius assumed command of the Roman
fleet, and steered for Mylœ, where the Carthaginians, under Hannibal,
were lying at anchor.
The latter expected an easy victory, despising the pretensions of the
Romans to seamanship, and they accordingly left their anchorage in a
straggling way, not even thinking it worth while to form line of battle
to engage landsmen.
Their one hundred and thirty quinqueremes approached in detachments,
according to their speed, and Hannibal, with about thirty of the
fastest, came in contact with the Roman line, while the rest of his
fleet was far astern. Attacked on all sides, he soon began to repent of
his rashness, and turned to fly--but the “corvi” fell, and the Roman
soldiers, advancing over the gangways, put their enemies to the sword.
The whole of the Carthaginian van division fell into the Roman hands,
without a single ship being lost on the part of the latter. Hannibal
had fortunately made his escape in time, in a small boat, and at once
proceeded to form the rest of his fleet to resist the Roman shock. He
then passed from vessel to vessel, exhorting his men to stand firm; but
the novel mode of attack, and its great success, had demoralized the
Carthaginians, and they fled before the Roman advance; fifty more of
Hannibal’s fleet being captured.
So ended the first great naval engagement between Rome and Carthage;
bringing to the former joy and hope of future successes, and to the
latter grief and despondency.
Duilius, the Consul, had a rostral column of marble erected in his
honor, in the Roman forum, with his statue upon the top.
Hannibal was soon afterward crucified by his own seamen, in their rage
and mortification at their shameful defeat.
* * * * *
Slight skirmishes and collisions continued to occur, and both nations
became convinced that ultimate success could only be obtained by the
one which should obtain complete mastery of the Mediterranean Sea.
Both, therefore, made every effort; and the dock-yards were kept busily
at work, while provisions, arms, and naval stores were accumulated upon
a large scale.
The Romans fitted out three hundred and thirty, the Carthaginians three
hundred and fifty quinqueremes; and in the spring of the year 260 B.
C., the rivals took the sea, to fight out their quarrel to the bitter
end.
The Roman Consuls Manlius and Regulus had their fleet splendidly
equipped, and marshaled in divisions, with the first and second Legions
on board. Following was a rear division, with more soldiers, which
served as a reserve, and as a guard to the rear of the right and left
flanks.
Hamilcar, the admiral of the opposing fleet, saw that the Roman rear
was hampered by the transports which they were towing, and resolved to
try to separate the leading divisions from them; hoping to capture the
transports, and then the other divisions in detail; with this intention
he formed in four divisions. Three were in line, at right angles to the
course the Romans were steering, and the fourth in the order called
“forceps.”
The last division was a little in the rear and well to the left of the
main body.
Having made his dispositions, Hamilcar passed down the fleet in his
barge, and reminded his countrymen of their ancestral renown at sea,
and assured them that their former defeat was due, not to the nautical
ability of the Romans, but to the rash valor of the Carthaginians
against a warlike people not ever to be despised. “Avoid the prows of
the Roman galleys,” he continued, “and strike them amidships, or on the
quarter. Sink them, or disable their oars, and endeavor to render their
military machines, on which they greatly rely, wholly inoperative.”
Loud and continuous acclamations proclaimed the good disposition of
his men, and Hamilcar forthwith ordered the advance to be sounded,
signaling the vessels of the first division--which would be the first
to engage--to retreat in apparent disorder when they came down close
to the enemy. The Carthaginians obeyed his order to the letter, and,
as if terrified by the Roman array, turned in well simulated flight,
and were instantly pursued by both columns, which, as Hamilcar had
foreseen, drew rapidly away from the rest of the fleet. When they
were so far separated as to preclude the possibility of support, the
Carthaginians, at a given signal, put about, and attacked with great
ardor and resolution, making a desperate effort to force together the
two sides of the “forceps” in which the Romans were formed. But these
facing outward, and always presenting their prows to the Carthaginians,
remained immovable and unbroken. If the Carthaginians succeeded in
ramming one, those on each side of the attacked vessel came to her
assistance, and thus outnumbered, the Carthaginians did not dare to
board.
While the battle was thus progressing in the centre--without decided
results--Hanno, who commanded the Carthaginian right wing, instead
of engaging the left Roman column in flank, stretched far out to sea,
and bore down upon the Roman reserve, which carried the soldiers of
the Triarii. The Carthaginian reserve, instead of attacking the Roman
right column, as they evidently should have done, also bore down upon
the Roman reserve. Thus three distinct and separate engagements were
going on at once--all fought most valiantly. Just as the Roman reserve
was overpowered, and about to yield, they saw that the Carthaginian
centre was in full retreat, chased by the Roman van, while the Roman
second division was hastening to the assistance of their sorely pressed
reserve. This sight inspired the latter with new courage, and, although
they had had many vessels sunk, and a few captured, they continued the
fight until the arrival of their friends caused their assailant, Hanno,
to hoist the signal for retreat. The Roman third division, embarrassed
by its convoy, had been driven back until quite close to the land, and
while sharp-pointed, surf-beaten rocks appeared under their sterns, it
was attacked on both sides and in front, by the nimble Carthaginians.
Vessel by vessel it was falling into the enemy’s hands, when Manlius,
seeing its critical condition, relinquished his own pursuit, and
hastened to its relief. His presence converted defeat into victory,
and insured the complete triumph of the Roman arms; so that, while the
Carthaginians scattered in flight, the Romans, towing their prizes
stern foremost, as was their custom in victory, entered the harbor of
Heraclea.
In this sanguinary and decisive battle thirty of the Carthaginian and
twenty-four of the Roman quinqueremes were sent to the bottom, with all
on board. Not a single Roman vessel was carried off by the enemy; while
the Romans captured sixty-four ships and their crews.
Commodore Parker, of the U. S. Navy, in commenting upon this important
naval action, says, “Had Hanno and the commander of the Carthaginian
reserve done their duty faithfully and intelligently upon this
occasion, the Roman van and centre must have been doubled up and
defeated, almost instantly; after which it would have been an easy
matter to get possession of the others, with the transports. Thus the
Carthaginians would have gained a decisive victory, the effect of
which would have been, perhaps, to deter the Romans from again making
their appearance in force upon the sea; and then, with such leaders
as Hamilcar, Hasdrubal and Hannibal to shape her policy and conduct
her armaments, Carthage, instead of Rome, might have been the mistress
of the world. Such are the great issues sometimes impending over
contending armies and fleets.”
As soon as the Consuls had repaired damages they set sail from
Heraclea for Africa, where they disembarked an army under Regulus;
and most of the naval force, with the prisoners, then returned home.
Regulus, however, soon suffered a defeat, and the Roman fleet had to
be despatched to Africa again, in hot haste, to take off the scant
remnant of his army. Before taking on board the defeated Legions the
fleet had another great naval battle; and captured a Carthaginian fleet
of one hundred and fourteen vessels. With the soldiers on board, and
their prizes in tow, Marcus Emilius and Servius Fulvius, the Consuls
then in command, determined to return to Rome by the south shore of
Sicily. This was against the earnest remonstrances of the pilots, or
sailing masters, “who wisely argued that, at the dangerous season when,
the constellation of Orion being not quite past, and the Dog Star just
ready to appear, it were far safer to go North about.”
The Consuls, who had no idea of being advised by mere sailors, were
unfortunately not to be shaken in their determination; and so, when
Sicily was sighted, a course was shaped from Lylybeum to the promontory
of Pachymus. The fleet had accomplished about two-thirds of this
distance, and was just opposite a coast where there were no ports, and
where the shore was high and rocky, when, with the going down of the
sun, the north wind, which had been blowing steadily for several days,
suddenly died away, and as the Romans were engaged in furling their
flapping sails they observed that they were heavy and wet with the
falling dew, the sure precursor of the terrible “Scirocco.” Then the
pilots urged the Consuls to pull directly to the southward, that they
might have sea room sufficient to prevent them from being driven on
shore when the storm should burst upon them. But this, with the dread
of the sea natural to men unaccustomed to contend with it, they refused
to do; not comprehending that, although their quinqueremes were illy
adapted to buffet the waves, anything was better than a lee shore, with
no harbor of refuge.
The north wind sprang up again after a little, cheering the hearts of
the inexperienced, blew in fitful gusts for an hour or more, then died
nearly away, again sprang up, and finally faded out as before. The
seamen knew what this portended. “Next came a flash of lightning in the
southern sky; then a line of foam upon the southern sea; the roaring
of Heaven’s artillery in the air above, and of the breakers on the
beach below--and the tempest was upon them!” From this time all order
was lost, and the counsels and admonitions of the pilots unheeded.
The Roman fleet was completely at the mercy of the hurricane, and the
veterans who had borne themselves bravely in many a hard fought battle
with their fellow man, now, completely demoralized in the presence of
this new danger, behaved more like maniacs than reasonable beings. Some
advised one thing, some another; but nothing sensible was done--and
when the gale broke, out of four hundred and sixty-four quinqueremes
(an immense fleet) three hundred and eighty had been dashed upon the
rocks and lost.
The whole coast was covered with fragments of wreck and dead bodies;
and that which Rome had been so many years in acquiring, at the cost of
so much blood, labor, and treasure, she lost in a few hours, through
the want of experienced seamen in command.
* * * * *
During the succeeding Punic wars Rome and Carthage had many another
well contested naval engagement.
Adherbal captured ninety-four Roman vessels off Drepanum, but the
dogged courage of the Roman was usually successful.
We have few details of these engagements. What the Romans gained in
battle was often lost by them in shipwreck; so that, at the end of
the first Punic war, which lasted twenty-four years, they had lost
seven hundred quinqueremes, and the vanquished Carthaginians only five
hundred.
At the time spoken of, when the Romans were fighting the Carthaginians,
the former were a free, virtuous and patriotic people. No reverses cast
them down; no loss of life discouraged them.
After a lapse of two hundred years, Marcus Brutus and Cassius being
dead, and public virtue scoffed at and fast expiring, an arbitrary
government was in process of erection upon the ruins of the Republic.
The triumvirate had been dissolved, and Octavius and Antony, at the
head of vast armies and fleets, were preparing, on opposite sides of
the Gulf of Ambracia, to submit their old quarrel to the arbitrament
of the sword. In this emergency Antony’s old officers and soldiers,
whom he had so often led to victory, naturally hoped that, assuming
the offensive, he would draw out his legions, and, by his ability and
superior strategy, force his adversary from the field. But, bewitched
by a woman, the greatest captain of the age--now that Cæsar and Pompey
were gone--had consented to abandon a faithful and devoted army, and
to rely solely upon his fleet; which, equal to that of Octavius in
numbers, was far inferior in discipline and drill, and in experience of
actual combat.
[Illustration: ROMAN GALLEY.]