This battle was not only remarkable for its desperate fighting and
bloody character, but for the fact that the complete and overwhelming
defeat of the Athenians was the termination of their existence as a
naval power.
An Athenian fleet had been despatched to the assistance of the small
Greek Republic of Ægesta, near the western end of Sicily, then
threatened by Syracuse.
The Athenian fleet numbered one hundred and thirty-four triremes,
25,000 seamen and soldiers, beside transports with 6000 spearmen and a
proportionate force of archers and slingers. This considerable armament
was designed to coöperate not only in the reduction of Syracuse, the
implacable enemy of the Ægestans, but also to endeavor to subdue the
whole of the large, rich and beautiful island of Sicily, at that time
the granary and vineyard of the Mediterranean.
The Greek fleet drew near its destination in fine order, and approached
and entered Syracuse with trumpets sounding and flags displayed, while
the soldiers and sailors, accustomed to a long succession of victories,
and regarding defeat as impossible, rent the air with glad shouts.
Syracuse is a large and perfect harbor; completely landlocked, and
with a narrow entrance. The Sicilians, entirely unprepared to meet
the veteran host thus suddenly precipitated upon them, looked upon
these demonstrations with gloomy forebodings. Fortunately for their
independence, they had wise and brave leaders, while the commander
of the great Athenian fleet was wanting in decision of character and
in the ability to combine his forces and move quickly; a necessity
in such an enterprise as his. It therefore happened that the tables
were turned, and the proud invaders were eventually blockaded in the
harbor of Syracuse, the people obstructing the narrow entrance so as
to prevent escape, while the country swarmed with the levies raised to
resist the invaders by land, and to cut them off from all supplies.
In the meantime the Greeks had seized a spot on the shores of the
harbor, built a dock yard, and constructed a fortified camp.
Such being the state of affairs, a prompt and energetic movement on the
part of the Athenians became necessary to save them from starvation.
Nikias, their commander-in-chief, entrusted the fleet to Demosthenes,
Menander, and Euthydemus, and prepared to fight a decisive battle.
Taught by recent partial encounters that the beaks of the Syracusan
triremes were more powerful and destructive than those of his own
vessels, he instructed his captains to avoid ramming as much as
possible, and to attack by boarding. His ships were provided with
plenty of grappling irons, so that the Sicilians could be secured as
soon as they rammed the Greek vessels, when a mass of veteran Greeks
was to be thrown on board, and the islanders overcome in a hand-to-hand
fight.
When all was ready the fleet of the Athenian triremes, reduced to one
hundred and ten in number, but fully manned, moved in three grand
divisions. Demosthenes commanded the van division, and made directly
for the mouth of the harbor, toward which the Syracusan fleet, only
seventy-five in number, was also promptly converging.
The Athenians were cutting away and removing the obstructions at
the narrow entrance, when their enemy came down rapidly, and forced
them to desist from their labors, and form line of battle. This they
did hurriedly, and as well as the narrow limits would permit. They
were soon furiously attacked, on both wings at once, by Licanus and
Agatharcus, who had moved down close to the shore, the one on the
right and the other on the left hand of the harbor. The Syracusans, by
this manœuvre, outflanked the Greeks, who, their flanks being turned,
were necessarily driven in upon their centre, which point was at this
critical moment vigorously attacked by the Corinthians, the faithful
allies of the Syracusans. The Corinthian squadron, led by Python, had
dashed down the middle of the harbor, and attacked, with loud shouts,
as if assured of victory. Great confusion now ensued among the Athenian
vessels, caught at a great disadvantage, and in each other’s way. Many
of their triremes were at once stove and sunk, and those which remained
afloat were so hemmed in by enemies that they could not use their oars.
The strong point of the Athenian fleet had consisted in its ability to
manœuvre, and they were here deprived of that advantage.
Hundreds of their drowning comrades were calling for assistance, while
their countrymen on shore, belonging to the army, witnessed their
position with despair, being unable to come to the rescue. Still,
the Athenians fought as became their old renown. They often beat off
the enemy by sheer force of arms, but without avail. The Syracusans
had covered their forecastles with raw bulls’ hides, so that the
grappling irons would not hold for boarding; but the Greeks watched
for the moment of contact, and before they could recoil, leaped boldly
on board the enemy’s triremes, sword in hand. They succeeded thus in
capturing some Sicilian vessels; but their own loss was frightful,
and, after some hours of most sanguinary contest, Demosthenes, seeing
that a continuance of it would annihilate his force, took advantage of
a temporary break in the enemy’s line to give the signal for retreat.
This was at once begun; at first in good order, but the Syracusans
pressing vigorously upon the Athenian rear, soon converted it into a
disorderly flight, each trying to secure his own safety.
In this condition the Greeks reached the fortified docks, which they
had built during their long stay, the entrance to which was securely
guarded by merchant ships, which had huge rocks triced up, called
“dolphins,” of sufficient size to sink any vessel upon which they might
be dropped. Here the pursuit ended, and the defeated and harassed
Athenians hastened to their fortified camp, where their land forces,
with loud lamentations, deplored the event of the naval battle, which
they had fondly hoped would have set them all at liberty.
The urgent question now was as to the preservation of both forces--and
that alone.
That same night Demosthenes proposed that they should man their
remaining triremes, reduced to sixty in number, and try again to force
a way out of the harbor; alleging that they were still stronger than
the enemy, who had also lost a number of ships. Nikias gave consent;
but when the sailors were ordered to embark once more, they mutinied
and flatly refused to do so; saying that their numbers were too much
reduced by battle, sickness, and bad food, and that there were no
seamen of experience left to take the helm, or rowers in sufficient
numbers for the benches. They also declared that the last had been a
soldiers’ battle, and that such were better fought on land. They then
set fire to the dock-yard and the fleet, and the Syracusan forces
appearing, in the midst of this mutiny, captured both men and ships.
Her fleet being thus totally destroyed, Athens never recovered from the
disaster, and ceased from that day to be a naval power.
The subsequent events in this connection, though interesting and
instructive, do not belong to naval history.
[Illustration: A NORSE GALLEY.]