of the _times_, what the state of the _places_ in which we live, may
require of us. I do not mean that religion is a matter of _policy_; or
that virtue is a mere _local_ consideration. But when the question
is, how we may do the _most_ good by our religious or moral conduct,
a prudent accommodation of ourselves to time and place will be very
necessary[121]. The primitive Christians were not _wise unto that which
is good_, when they provoked the cruelty of their enemies, and offered
themselves without cause to the racks and fires of persecution. Nor
would _they_ be less blameable, who, in a careless, prophane age, when
_silence_ would be readily taken for _assent_: when, not to profess the
faith would be construed to renounce it, should, from a too scrupulous
fear of giving offence, forbear to make an open confession of their
religion. The exigencies of _times_, we see, are very different. A
wise man would have endeavoured to moderate the excessive zeal, which
prevailed in the _former_ of these periods: he would apply himself to
raise and quicken it, were he to find himself in the circumstances
described in the _latter_. Or, to explain myself by a case which may
still more nearly affect us. There was a _time_, when the religion of
our country consisted too much in a zeal for unintelligible articles
and superstitious ceremonies; when Popery had enslaved both mind and
body, had bent the _one_ to an implicit acquiescence in the doctrines
of the Church, and burthened the _other_ with a constant unprofitable
exercise of its worship. How then was the _wisdom_ of a good man to
express itself in these circumstances? In dispelling, it will surely be
said, the gloom of superstition; in asserting the great privileges of
natural reason, and in pressing the obligation and necessity of a good
life, as of more worth than all ceremonial observances.
This _was_ the service rendered by the best men of those days to true
Religion; and _we_ have reason to bless and revere their memories
for it. But should the liberty into which we are called, degenerate
into licentiousness; should it ever be common for men, in the fear of
_believing_ too much, not to believe what the Scriptures themselves
plainly require of them; and from the apprehension of relapsing into
their old superstitious practices, to give little or no regard to
the duties of external worship: should this at any time be the case,
those truly wise men, who laboured so profitably to check the _other_
extreme, would certainly, in this different state of things, apply
themselves with equal earnestness to correct _this_. Not that their
former practice was not good in itself, but that, by a change in the
disposition of the times, it was now become less _seasonable_.
3. We are, lastly, to have a regard to the _conditions_, _characters_,
and _persons_ of those with whom we converse; this attention being
especially requisite to render our virtues _attractive and efficacious_.
The philosopher that took upon him to discourse on the science of war,
did not enough consider his own _character_. If he chose to do this in
an age which wanted no such instructions, his conduct was certainly
_unseasonable_. But when he presumed to instruct the greatest general
and commander in the world, he deserved the censure which has disgraced
him with all posterity[122]. A decorum like this is required in our
attempts to promote truth and virtue. To dictate in such matters to
persons wiser than ourselves, or to persons, who by their stations and
characters should, in all reason, be supposed wiser, is a manifest
indiscretion, and can never be attended with any good consequences.
Were _we_ ever so able to instruct, or were _they_ ever so much in want
of instruction, _prudence_ would suggest a very different conduct. It
would recommend to us all the honest arts of insinuation and address;
it would oblige us to watch the fittest seasons and opportunities;
or, perhaps, to content ourselves with the silent admonition of a
good example. Or, were there nothing in the _rank and condition_ of
those we would work upon, to restrain us to this caution, we might
even be required to shew a condescension to their very _prejudices
and humours_. The errors of men may sometimes be removed by arguing
with them on their own mistaken principles; by allowing all that
truth and reason will warrant to their opinions; by putting the
fairest construction upon their designs; by hinting objections to
their wrong tenets, instead of fiercely declaiming against them;
above all, by testifying a sincere disposition to advance truth and
goodness, without any indirect views to our own interest. Or, were all
other considerations out of the case, we could never be excused from
proceeding in the way of gentleness and civility, from treating them
with due respect, and expressing the sincerest good-will to their
_persons_. Be their _moral_ or _religious_ defects what they will, we
should hardly be _wise_; that is, we should take very improper methods
of reclaiming them from _either_, if we reproved with bitterness,
advised with insolence, or condemned with passion. In all addresses to
mistaken or bad men, where our purpose is to inform or amend them, the
gentlest _applications_ are surely the best, because _these_ excite no
passion to counteract their _virtue_.
And now, at length, should it be asked who is that WISE CHRISTIAN
whom the text designs and recommends to our imitation, we are able to
furnish, at least, the outline of his character.
“HE is one who sets before him the great END and prize of his _high
calling_; who, in his progress through the various stages of _this_
life, keeps in constant view the immortal happiness which his religion
holds out in prospect to him in _another_: who, in humble adoration
of his God and Saviour, is content to wait the appointed season which
is to crown his hopes and expectations; and, for the present, is
sollicitous to _work out his salvation with fear_ and reverence, by
an earnest application of his time and pains to those _subservient
duties_, which are to qualify him for the enjoyment of Heaven; who
subjects all the towering conceits of his _understanding_, to the
_doctrines_ of the Gospel, and the impetuous sallies of his _will_, to
the _precepts_ of it; who makes no audacious separation of what the
wisdom of God hath joined together; but, whilst he adores the mysteries
of his holy FAITH, walks on in the plain and humble path of moral
OBEDIENCE. He is _one_, who thinks it not enough to rest in the mere
MATTER of his duty, but performs it in such a MANNER as will render it
most exemplary and efficacious. He knows it to be a great precept of
his religion, to see, _that his good be not evil spoken of_. He would
not disgrace the _best_ cause in the world by the neglect of those
decencies, which, as he observes, have sometimes the strange power to
recommend the _worst_. The good he intends, therefore, is attempted in
such a way, as is most BECOMING of himself; most SEASONABLE in respect
of the opportunities which are offered to him; and most agreeable and
PERSUASIVE to other men. In short, HE is one who, taking _Prudence_ for
his guide, and _Innocence_ for his companion, thinks himself secure in
these attendants; and therefore neglects no _decorum_, which the best
philosophy prescribes; no _art_, which the soundest policy suggests;
and no _address_, which the politest manners recommend: and so, in the
high emphatic sense of the words, approves himself a WISE MAN; _wise
unto that which is good_, to all purposes in _this_ world, as well as
in a _better_.”
SERMON XVI.
PREACHED DECEMBER 1, 1765.
ROM. xvi. 19.
_I would have you wise unto that which is good, and simple concerning
evil._
In considering the first part of this precept, I endeavoured to give
some general description of Religious or CHRISTIAN WISDOM; both in
respect of the END it has in view, and of the MEANS employed by it:
I further exemplified some of those subordinate WAYS, in which the
prudent application even of those _means_ is seen and expressed: And
all this, for the sake of those sincere, but over-zealous persons, who
are apt to think that _wisdom_ hath little to do in the prosecution of
honest and upright purposes.
It now remains to treat that other part of the text, which requires
us to be INNOCENT, as well as _wise_, to be SIMPLE CONCERNING EVIL.
And this, perhaps, will be thought the more important branch of the
subject. For, generally speaking, the ways of _wisdom_, when our
purposes are the very best, are not only the most effectual, but
the safest and most convenient. So that _prudence_ is likely to be
a favourite virtue with us. But the case is different with regard
to _simplicity concerning evil_; which is often found a hard and
disagreeable injunction; as it may happen to cross our passions and the
more immediate views of self-interest. So that this SIMPLICITY will
sometimes seem, what the world is ready enough to call it, _folly_: and
therefore, for the credit of our _sense_, as well as virtue, we should
be well apprized of the worth and excellence of this Christian duty.
The virtue of SIMPLICITY consists, in general, in following the plain
ingenuous sense of the mind; in taking our measures according to the
dictates of conscience, and acting, on all occasions, without reserve,
duplicity, or self-imposture, up to our notions of obligation. It is
the office of WISDOM to see that our conscience be rightly informed:
But our INTEGRITY is shewn in doing that which conscience, be it
erroneously informed or no, requires of us. It consists, in a word,
in whatever we understand by an _honesty of nature_; in observing,
universally, that which we believe to be _right_, and avoiding what we
know, or but suspect[123] to be _wrong_.
This _simplicity of mind_ may be almost said to be born with us. It is
the bias of nature on our young minds; and our earliest instructions,
as well as the first efforts of reason, strengthen and confirm it. But
the impression lasts not long. We are scarcely entered into life, when
we begin to treat it as one of _those childish things_, which it is
beneath the dignity of our riper age to be amused with. The passions
put forth and grow luxuriant; and why, we say to ourselves, should this
tender apprehension of evil check their growth, and restrain their
activity? We are now in the season of _pleasure_; and can there be any
hurt in taking a little of it, out of that narrow path, which our early
prejudices have prescribed to us?
Still, as we advance in years, fresh objects arise, and other passions
engage us in the pursuit of them. Wealth and honour, or what we
improperly call our _interests_, have now an ascendant over us; and
the passion for each is rarely gratified but at the expence of some
virtue. And thus it comes to pass, that, though we set out in the world
with a warm sense of truth and honour, experience by degrees refines
us out of these principles; and our hearts, instead of retaining that
_infant_ purity, the grace and ornament of our nature, and which Christ
so especially requires[124] in the professors of his religion, are
all over stained with fraud, dissimulation, and disingenuity. We are
even proud of the acquisition, and call it a _knowledge of life_: so
dextrous are we in giving a good name to our worst qualities!
But effects follow their causes; and the vice we are now considering is
not the less operative, nor the less hurtful, for the specious terms
in which we dress it up, and present it to each other.
Of its malignity I shall give two or three instances; and, to fit them
the better for use, they shall be taken from very different quarters;
from the _cabinets of the wise, and the schools of the learned_, as
well as from the _vulgar haunts of careless and licentious men_. We
shall learn, perhaps, to reverence the Apostle’s advice, when we find
that the neglect of it has DEGRADED RELIGION; RELAXED MORALITY, and
POLLUTED COMMON LIFE.
To begin with an instance which shews how dangerous it is to depart
from this _simplicity concerning evil_, in the great concerns of
RELIGION.
I. When the priest, the sage, and the politician joined together in
the days of heathenism to propagate among the people a superstition,
which themselves condemned and detested; when they did their utmost
to support a senseless, an immoral, an irreligious worship; when they
strove, by every seducing artifice, to keep up that strong delusion,
which God, in his just indignation, had sent among them, to believe a
_lye_, (for such in its whole fabric and constitution was the old Pagan
idolatry) when these men, who _knew the truth_, were yet contented _to
hold it in unrighteousness_; they believed, no doubt, nay, they made
no scruple to boast, that they had acted with consummate prudence; and
that, in sacrificing the interests of religious truth (a small matter
in their estimation) they had most effectually provided for the public
interest. But what sentence does the Scripture pass on these men of
ancient and renowned wisdom? Why this severe and mortifying one, That
_professing themselves wise, they became fools_. And how well they
deserved this censure, we understand from their own history; where we
read, That Pagan idolatry, thus countenanced and supported, teemed
with all the vices, of which our depraved nature is capable; and that
the several contrivances of its wise advocates to keep an impious
and barefaced falshood in credit, served only to produce, _first_,
a SUSPICION, and in the _end_, an open and avowed CONTEMPT, of all
Religion.
However, the ends of _divine wisdom_ were greatly promoted by this
sad experience of _human folly_. For Christianity, which made its
appearance at this juncture, found it an easier task to establish
itself on the ruins of a fallen, or falling superstition. _Truth_,
which had for so long a time been anxiously kept out of sight, was now
the more welcome to those, who wished her appearance. And the detection
of those prophane arts, which had been so manifestly employed in that
service, disposed the most perverse or careless the more easily to
reconcile themselves to her.
And it would have been happy if the sense of this advantage, which the
_simplicity of truth_ obtained, in the first pages of the Gospel, over
all the frauds of imposture, had prevented Christians from copying
afterwards what they had so successfully contended against and exposed.
Then had a great dishonour of the Christian name been avoided. But that
_truth_, whose virtues are here magnified, must not be dissembled.
The practice of _lying_ for the cause of God, too soon revived, and
became too frequent in the Christian world. It is in vain to think of
diverting your minds, more especially, from that great part of it,
which has long since forgotten to be _simple concerning evil_. But
true _wisdom will ever be justified of her children_. These dishonest
arts, which could not support a bad cause, have been injurious and
disgraceful to the _best_. They have corrupted the ingenuous spirit of
the Gospel, they have adulterated the sincere word of God; and, in both
ways, have produced innumerable mischiefs, in civil and religious life.
They have helped to bring into discredit or disuse a true _Christian
temper_; and have unhappily created in the minds of many an undeserved
prejudice against the _Christian faith_.
II. But if these men have dishonoured _Religion_, others have defiled
MORALITY; yet both assume to themselves the title of _wise_ men; and
for that very reason, because they have departed as far as possible
from the virtue of _simplicity_.
And here your indignation cannot but rise more especially against a
set of men, who, applying the subtleties of school-philosophy to the
plain science of Ethics, have made as free with the _precepts_ of the
Gospel, as some others had done with its _doctrines_. These men, under
the respectable name of CASUISTS, have presumed to wind up, or let down
the obligation of moral duties to what pitch they please. Such as have
taken the STRICTER side, deserve but small thanks for perplexing the
minds of good men with needless scruples; and discouraging the rest
with those austerities, which our Religion no where commands, and the
condition of human life will not admit. But for that _looser_ sort,
who by a thousand studied evasions, qualifications, and distinctions,
dissolve the force of every moral precept; and, as the Pharisees of
old, _make the word of God of none effect_ by their impious glosses,
I know not what term of reproach you will think bitter enough for
_them_. The sacred writers thought it sufficient to deliver the rules
of life in _general_ terms[125]; leaving it, as they well might, to
common sense and common honesty, to make the application of them to
_particular_ cases, as they chanced to arise. But this officious
sophistry intervening and perverting the ingenuous sense of the mind,
instructs us how to transgress them all with impunity, and even
innocence. By the help of this magic, we may extract the sting of guilt
from every known sin; and, if we have but wit enough, may be as wicked
as we please with a safe conscience.
If the features of this corrupt casuistry have not been overcharged;
or, indeed, if there be any such thing in the world as a corrupt
casuistry, it may concern us to reflect, that this pest of society
could not have arisen but from a contempt of the Apostle’s rule, _of
being simple concerning evil_.
III. Hitherto we have exemplified the breach of this rule in the
_learned_, and the _wise_. And it may be thought that nothing but
perverted science could qualify men for so prodigious a depravity.
But there is a casuistry of _the heart_, as well as head; and we find
by woeful experience, that men may refine themselves out of that
_simplicity_ which the Gospel enjoins, without the assistance of
_unblessed knowledge_.
For I come now, in the last place, to instance in the vulgar tribes
of _libertine and careless men_. Of whom we may observe, that when
indulged passion has taught them to make light of an honest mind;
the consequence is, that they run into all excesses, and are rarely
hindered from _working all uncleanness with greediness_. It is true,
indeed, that no man becomes at once desperately and irretrievably
wicked. But it is not less true, that when this great step is taken
of prevaricating with a man’s own conscience, the other stages of
iniquity are presently passed over. And how indeed can it be otherwise?
So long as a man preserves the integrity of his natural disposition,
there is always hope that, though particular passions may prevail for
a time, reason and virtue will, in the end, regain their dominion
over him. At least, he will be constantly checked and kept back in
the career of his vices. But when this sincerity of heart is lost;
when he confounds the differences of right and wrong, palliating the
deformities of vice, or bestowing on vice itself the attractions of
virtue; then all reasonable expectation of a return is cut off; since
this perverted ingenuity tends to make him easy under his sins, and
leaves him at leisure to pursue his evil courses with security.
We see then from the excesses into which these different sorts of men
have been led, by the refinements of POLICY, of ABUSED SCIENCE, and
DELUSIVE PASSION, how dangerous it is to bid adieu to that _simplicity
concerning evil_, which the Holy Apostle requires of us.
It remains, that we cannot provide too cautiously against those evasive
PLEAS AND PRETENCES, which would incline us to part with it.
These PRETENCES are infinite: for, when the _heart_ is corrupted, the
_understanding_ is ready to pander to every lust that importunes it.
But we may know the principal of them by these signs. To be _simple
concerning evil_ is the easiest thing in the world; but we may suspect
that something _wrong_ is ready to intrude itself, “WHEN we cast about
for excuses to cover the nakedness of ingenuity; when we are driven
to distinctions and far-fetched reasoning for our justification;
when we pause a moment between the clear conviction of duty, on one
hand, and any indirect views on the other; more _particularly_, WHEN
we find the tone of our virtue relax at the consideration of what we
may chance to lose by adhering to it; when we but suspect, that a
severe unqualifying virtue looks like inhumanity; when we think our
dependencies and connexions in life have a demand upon conscience;
when we lament with the politician, that _good men are impracticable_,
and so, from a principle of public spirit, resolve not to encounter
that prejudice: Above all, when we go about to regulate morality by
what _a knowledge of the world_ teaches; when _custom_ is pleaded in
opposition to _duty_, and vice itself authorized by _fashion_[126];
when we acknowledge what we do is in itself not justifiable, but excuse
it by a pretence of the good ends we hope to serve by it; when we are
willing to plead the infirmity of nature, the power of temptation, the
prevalence of example; when we venture too securely on the confines of
immorality, and are curious to know how near we may go to vice, without
being directly vicious.”
These, and such as these, are the dangerous insinuations which attempt
our virtue. And how, you will ask, shall we secure ourselves from them?
By reason and argument? By speculation and philosophy? Shall we stay to
examine their several pretences, call these delusive pleas to account,
and shew we can confute them all, before we reject them?
Alas, I dare not advise this method; which besides its other
inconveniencies, is not, I doubt, a very safe one. Our heads may be
unequal to the task; or, which is worse, our hearts may betray us.
At the best, we shall waste much time in these ingenious inquiries,
when the business of life demands an immediate determination. St.
Paul has shewn us a shorter and _more excellent way_, when he bids us,
_Be simple concerning evil_. In virtue of this sacred admonition, a
wise man will think it sufficient to dismiss these vain insinuations
at once, without so much as spending a thought upon them. “What,”
he will say to himself, “if I cannot detect the falsehood of these
pleas, I have a _heart_, that revolts against them. I cannot, perhaps,
disentangle the sophistry of these arguments; but I _feel_ the baseness
of the conclusion, and I _see_ in others the folly of acting upon it.
It were ill with _vice_ indeed, if it had no false colours to appear
in; and _error_ would be hooted out of the world, if she did not hide
her obliquities under the garb of reason. But what are these disguises
to me, who am neither dazzled by the one, nor duped by the other? Let
the curious, if they will, inquire, wherein the imposture consists:
I have that within me, which tells me in a moment, they are but
impostures. In vain then, will such a one conclude, are these insidious
attempts on me, who take a sure refuge in the word of God, and the
integrity of my own virtue. Be the pretences what they will, the
confutation of them is no part of a Christian’s care. I may exercise my
understanding profitably in other matters. It is my duty to consider
much of the ways of _doing good_. I may be prudent and WISE here. But,
EXPERIENCE, and CONSCIENCE, and RELIGION, command me to be, SIMPLE
CONCERNING EVIL.”
SERMON XVII.
PREACHED NOVEMBER 22, 1772.
JOHN v. 44.
_How can ye believe, which receive honour one of another, and seek
not the honour that cometh of God only?_
It has been thought unfair to charge unbelief, simply and
indiscriminately, on the grosser passions. The observation, I believe,
is just: and yet it may be true, notwithstanding, that unbelief is
always owing to _some or other_ of the passions. The evidences of
revealed religion are so numerous, and upon the whole so convincing,
that one cannot easily conceive how a reasonable man should reject
them all, without the intervention of some secret prejudice, or
predominant affection.
Of these _prejudices and affections_, one of the commonest, and the
most seducing of any to the better sort of unbelievers, is that
irregular love of _praise and reputation_, which our Lord condemns in
the text—_How can ye believe, which receive honour one of another, and
seek not the honour that cometh from God only?_