a Law of nature, _written in the hearts of men_, will seem strange
to some, who may object, “That, if the appeal be to _action_, it may
with greater reason be inferred, there was not any such law; since
the crimes and vices of the heathen world, as terribly set forth by
St. Paul himself in the preceding chapter, were far more notorious,
than its Virtues. So that if there be any force in St. Paul’s appeal
to the virtuous lives of some heathen, as evincing a Law, _written in
their hearts_, because their practice was governed by it; the like
appeal to the vicious lives of many more heathen, should seem with
still more force to prove the non-existence of such Law, in as much as
it did _not_ govern their practice.” But the answer is obvious. For
a law may be in part, or even totally, violated by persons under a
full conviction of its existence and obligation: whereas it is hard to
imagine, that any number of men, of different times, in distant places,
and under different circumstances of age, temper, and education, should
exhibit in their lives the same tenour of action, without the guidance
of some fixed and common Rule.
This then being observed, let us turn our eyes upon the heathen
world; on that part, more especially, which is best known to us
from the authentic monuments of Greek and Roman story. For _bad_ as
that world was, it cannot be denied to have furnished many instances
of extraordinary virtue. We find there _justice_, _temperance_,
_fortitude_, and all those virtues, which their own Moralists called
_Offices_, and which the sacred page has dignified with the name of
_Graces_, exhibited in their fairest forms, and emulating, as it were,
even Christian perfection[14].
But it will be said of _both_ these people, what was long since
objected by one of them to the other, that their actions were not so
illustrious, as is pretended; that we take the accounts of them from
their own interested relaters, to whose vanity or genius we are rather
to impute the fine portraits, they have given us, of pagan virtue, than
to real fact and the undisguised truth of things[15].
Be this allowed. Still there will be ground enough to enforce the
Apostle’s conclusion. For whence, if not from the source to which he
points, could be derived those numerous corresponding instances, though
of faint, unfinished Virtue? how, but by _nature, did the heathen_,
in any degree, _the things of the Law_? and whence, the traces of
that conduct in the pagan world, which the Law itself prescribed as
_virtuous_?
Or, were the evidence from _facts_ ever so suspicious, whence those
admired portraits and pictures themselves? or, by what accountable
means has it come to pass, that their historians and panegyrists have
been able to feign so successfully? In truth, had the pagan world
afforded no _one_ instance of a virtuous people, I had almost said,
no _one_ instance of a virtuous character, yet would the projected
form of such a people, by one hand[16], and the delineation of such a
character, by another[17], have been a certain evidence of some Rule
of life and manners, _written in the heart_, if not transcribed into
practice; influencing the judgement to approve, if not the will to obey
it. But this consideration, perhaps, comes more naturally under the
second head of the Apostle’s reasoning, which is drawn,
II. _From the force of conscience in the heathen world._
To perceive the force of this argument, it must be remembered, That,
by conscience, is only meant _a man’s judgement concerning the quality
of his own actions_; which judgement, however come at, whether by
use, or institution, by reason, or instinct, equally supposes some
_Law_, or Rule of conduct, by which the nature of each action is
tried, and by which its worth is estimated. Now it is of no moment in
the present case, from which soever of these sources that judgement
is _immediately_ drawn, since it cannot but be, that some fixed
principle, common to human nature, and of equal extent with it, must
have originally given birth to such judgement. For if _use_, or
_institution_, be considered as the probable source of it, the question
will recur, whence that Use, or what the original of that Institution?
A question, which cannot be resolved, unless we conceive some _natural
law_, as working at the root, and branching out, as it were, into
_Use_, or _Institution_.
Nor is it sufficient to say, _That the manners of different people
are, and have been, widely different; and that conscience, or
self-judgement, according as different notions or practices prevail,
condemns, or approves the very same action_. Without doubt, it does;
but the consequence is not, as some sceptical writers have imagined,
that there is no common principle of nature, distinguishing between
right and wrong, or that moral action is of absolute indifference;
but that men are, and have been, careless and corrupt; that they have
either not used the light of nature, or have some way abused it. For
it holds of _Sentiment_, as of _Action_, that, though the agreement
of numbers in all times and places be a good argument _for_ the
existence of some common rule of right, as effecting such agreement
(because otherwise no tolerable account can be given of it); yet
the disagreement even of greater numbers is no proof _against_ the
existence of such Rule, as we can, without that supposition, give a
satisfactory account _of_ that disagreement. I call it _a satisfactory
account_; for it comes from St. Paul himself, who has taken care to
obviate this plausible objection. If it be said then, _That the Heathen
approved bad, and condemned good actions_, we own they sometimes did,
but answer with the Apostle, That, in such cases, _they became vain
in their imaginations_, and that _their foolish heart was darkened_;
that, as they _did not search to retain God in their knowledge_, did
not exert their faculties to acquire or preserve a right sense of God’s
nature and will, _he gave them up to an unsearching mind_, suffered
them to darken and put out the light of their understandings, and so to
_do_ [and to _approve_] _things that were not convenient_[18].
This being the true account of the diversity of human judgement, such
diversity only proves that the light of nature has been misused, not,
that it was never given. Whereas, on the other hand, if the Heathen
world can shew us, in general, a conformity of judgement in moral
matters, under their state of nature, with that of the world, under the
light of Revelation, what follows, but that they, _having not the Law,
shew the work of the Law written in their hearts_?
But now that there was, in fact, such a conformity, we conclude from
_the accounts of these times, the sense of writers, and the confessions
of persons themselves_: the only means, by which a point of this nature
can be established. The pagan historians and moralists are full of such
lessons, as we now profit by: and even their poets, on the stage itself
(where _common_ nature is drawn for the sake of _common_ instruction)
represent their characters, for the most part, as _good_ or _bad_,
according to the ideas we should now entertain of them. In writers
of all sorts, we find abundant evidence of this truth. Numberless
persons are upon record, who confess, in their own cases, and attest,
this uniform power of conscience. They applaud themselves for, what
_we_ should call, _a well-spent life_, and they condemn themselves
for, what _we_ call, _a bad one_. To touch on a topic so known as
this, is, in effect, to exhaust it. I shall then but just point to
the great _Roman patriot_[19] exulting in the memory of his _Virtues_:
and to the _Roman governour_[20], so famous in sacred writ, whom the
preaching of Paul, in concurrence with his own heart, made tremble for
his _Vices_.
III. But if men did not feel the power of conscience operating
within themselves, and declaring _a Law written in their hearts_,
yet their daily conduct towards each other, in the civil concerns of
life, would evidently proclaim it. For observe how studious men are
to repel an injurious imputation, fastened on a friend; and still
more, how they labour to assert their own innocence. What pains do
we see taken, to overthrow a _false_ evidence, and what colours of
art do we see employed to palliate or disguise a _true_ one! No man
needs be told that this is the constant practice of Christians: and
_did not the Heathens the same_? Here then is a fresh proof of the
point in question; an argument of familiar evidence arising from the
transactions of common life. For, in the altercations with each other,
in reference to _right_ and _wrong_, there is manifestly supposed some
prior Law of universal reason, to which the appeal on both sides is
directed, and by which the decision is finally to be made. And this, as
the Apostle’s argument suggests, whichever of the contending parties be
in the _wrong_: For the charging another with _wrong_ conduct, equally
implies a Rule, determining my judgement of moral action; as the
defending myself or others from such a charge, evinces my sense of it.
Thus, whether I _accuse_, or _answer for myself_, either way, I shew _a
law written in my heart_; whence I estimate the _right_ or _wrong_ of
the supposed question. Thus much might be inferred from the ordinary
topics of _conversation_: but the case is still clearer, when they come
to be debated _in courts of Justice_. More especially, therefore, the
struggles and contentions of the _Bar_ (for the terms, employed in the
text, being _forensic_, direct us chiefly to that interpretation), a
series of civil and judiciary pleadings, such as have been preserved to
us, from heathen times, in the writings of a Demosthenes, or Cicero,
are a standing, unanswerable argument for the existence of a _Rule
of Right_, or _Law of natural reason_. For how should these debates
be carried on without a Rule, to which the advocates of either party
refer? or how should these judicial differences be composed, without
a common Law, to arbitrate between them? And what though the Law,
referred to, be a _written institute_: it was first _written in the
heart_, before legislators transcribed it on brass, or paper.
You see then, the sum of the Apostle’s reasoning stands thus. The
Heathens, who had no revealed Law, DID _by nature, the things of the
Law_: their JUDGEMENT, too, of their own actions, conformed to the
judgement of _the Law_: and, lastly, their DEBATES with one another,
whether public or private, concerning _right_ and _wrong_, evidenced
their sense of some Law, which _Nature_ had prescribed to them.
And in this fine chain of argument, we may observe the peculiar art, by
which it is conducted, and the advantage, resulting from such conduct
to the main conclusion. For if the argument from WORKS should seem
of less weight (as it possibly might, after the Apostle’s own charge
upon the heathen world, and in that age of heathen corruption) yet the
evidence arising from CONSCIENCE, which was an appeal to every man’s
own breast, could hardly be resisted: or, if conscience could be laid
asleep (as it might be by vice and ill habits) it was impossible they
could deny the DEBATES among themselves, or not see the inference that
must needs be drawn from them.
It may, further, seem to have been with some propriety that the sacred
reasoner employed these topics of argument, in an address to ROMANS:
who could not but feel the weight of them the more, as well knowing the
ancient VIRTUE of their country; as knowing too, that the Roman people
had been famous for their nice sense of right and wrong, or, in other
words, a moral CONSCIENCE; and that, as having been a free people, they
had been always accustomed to DEBATES about moral action, public and
private.
Such is the force, and such the elegant disposition and address, of the
Apostle’s reasoning. The conclusion follows irresistibly, _That there
is a Law written in our hearts, or that, besides a Revealed Law, there
is a law of natural reason_.
That this conclusion is not injurious to _revealed Law_, but indeed
most friendly and propitious to it; that, in particular, it no way
derogates from the honour of the _Christian Law_, nor can serve in any
degree to lessen the value, or supersede the use and necessity of it; I
shall attempt to shew in another discourse.
SERMON IV.
PREACHED MAY 24, 1767.
GAL. iii. 19.
_Wherefore then serveth the Law?_
When the Apostle Paul had proved, in his Epistle to the Romans[21],
that if the _uncircumcision kept the righteousness of the Law, his
uncircumcision would be accounted for circumcision_; that is, if the
Gentile observed the _moral law_, which was his proper rule of life, he
would be accepted of God, as well as the Jew, who observed the _Mosaic
Law_; this generous reasoning gave offence, and he was presently asked,
WHAT ADVANTAGE THEN HATH THE JEW[22]?
In like manner, when the same Apostle had been contending, in his
Epistle to the Galatians, that _the inheritance was not of the Law,
but of Promise_[23]; that is, that all men, the Gentiles as well as
the Jews, were entitled to the blessings of the Christian covenant, in
virtue of God’s _promise_ to Abraham—_that in his seed all the nations
of the earth shall be blessed_—and not the Jews exclusively, in virtue
of the _Mosaic Law_, given to them only; the same spirit discovers
itself, as before, and he is again interrogated by his captious
disciples, WHEREFORE THEN SERVETH THE LAW? if the Gentiles may be
justified _through faith in Christ_, and so inherit the promise made to
Abraham, as well as the Jews, to what purpose was the Jewish Law then
given?
And to these questions, how unreasonable soever, the learned Apostle
has himself condescended to give an answer.
Now, the same perverseness, which gave birth to these Jewish
prejudices, seems to have operated in some Christians; who, on being
told, and even by St. Paul himself, of _a Law of Nature_, by which the
Heathen were required to govern their lives, and by the observance of
which, without their knowledge of any revealed Law, they would be
finally accepted, have been forward in their turn, to ask, WHEREFORE
THEN SERVETH THE LAW? Or, if there be a _natural Law_, according to
which the very Heathen will be judged, and may be rewarded, what are
the boasted privileges of _Revealed Law_, and, in particular, the
revealed Law _of the Gospel_?
Now to this question (having, in my last discourse, asserted the
proposition, which gives occasion to it) I shall reply, in the best
manner I can, by shewing,
I. That the supposition of a _natural moral Law_ is even necessary to
the support of REVELATION: And
II. That this supposition no way derogates from the honour of the
GOSPEL.
I. _That a natural moral Law is required to support the authority of
Revelation_, I conclude, not merely, _because_ this supposition is
actually made in sacred Scripture, _because_ the sacred writers argue
expressly from it, and every-where refer to it, but principally and
chiefly, _because_, without admitting this prior Law of nature, we
cannot judge of any pretended Revelation, whether it be divine or no.
For, if there be no such moral Law, previously given, which our hearts
and consciences approve, and to which our common nature assents, we
can never see the fitness of any means, as conducive to _a moral end_;
we can entertain no just and clear notions of _moral action_, properly
so called; and consequently, we can have no ideas of what are called
_the moral attributes_ of God. Now, in this state of ignorance and
uncertainty, how shall any man go about to prove to us the divinity of
any Revelation, or through what medium can its truth or authenticity
be established? We have no Rule, no principles, by which to judge of
the Law, pretending to come from God: we cannot tell, whether it be
worthy of him, or not: we do not so much as know, what _worth_ or
_goodness_ is, either in ourselves, or in the Deity. Thus all _internal
arguments_ for the excellence of any Religion are at once cut off:
and yet till, from such considerations, we find that a Religion _may_
come from God, we cannot reasonably conclude, on any evidence, that it
_does_ come from him. The Religion of Mahomet may, for any thing we can
tell, if there be no moral Law for us to judge by, be as worthy of God,
as that of Jesus. Nor will any _external arguments_, even the most
unquestioned miracles, of themselves, be sufficient to confirm its
pretensions. For how shall we know, that these miracles are from God,
unless we understand what his attributes are, and whether the occasion,
for which they are wrought, be such as is consistent with them?
So that those zealous persons, who think they do honour to the revealed
will of God, by denying him to have given prior natural Law, do,
indeed, defeat their own purpose, and put it out of their power to
judge of any Revelation whatsoever. There is, then, a Law of Reason,
_written in the heart_, by which _every_ Religion, claiming to be
divine, must be tried; or we have no ground to stand upon in our
endeavours to support the credit and divinity of _any_ Religion.
What is, then, so necessary to the support of _Revelation_, in general,
cannot, we may be sure,
II. _Any way derogate from the honour of the Christian Revelation_, in
particular.
But, to put this matter out of all doubt, I shall distinctly shew, that
the supposition of a _natural moral Law_ neither discredits the USE;
nor tends, in the least, to supersede the NECESSITY, of the Gospel.
And, 1. IT DOES NOT DISCREDIT ITS USE.
For, what, if all men be endowed with those faculties, which, if
properly employed, may instruct us in the knowledge of God and
ourselves, and of the duties we, respectively, owe to him and to each
other? Is it nothing that this knowledge is rendered more easy and
familiar to us by the lights of the Gospel? Is it nothing, that those
laws, which men of thought and reflexion may deduce for themselves from
principles of natural reason, are openly declared to all: that they are
confirmed, illustrated, and enforced by express revelation? Is it of no
moment, that the plainest and busiest men are as fully instructed in
their duty, as men of science and leisure, the simplest as well as the
wisest, the mechanic and the sage, the rustic and philosopher? Is it
of no use, that men are kept steady in their knowledge and observance
of the law of nature, by this pole-star of revelation? that they are
secured from error and mistake, from the effects of their own haste, or
negligence, or infirmity, from the illusions of custom or ill example,
from the false lights of fanaticism or superstition, and from the
perverseness of their own reasonings? Look into the history of mankind,
and see what horrid idolatries have overspread the world, in spite of
what _Nature_ teaches concerning God; and what portentous immoralities
have prevailed in the wisest nations, in defiance, nay, _what is
worse_, under the countenance and sanction, of what was deemed _natural
Reason_.
Add to all this, that the moral duties, we thus easily and certainly
know, and without any danger of mistake or corruption, by means of
the evangelical Law, are enjoined by the highest authority; are set
off by the brightest examples; are recommended to us by new arguments
and considerations; are pressed upon us by the most engaging motives,
higher and more important than nature could suggest to us; and, lastly,
are sublimed and perfected by the most consummate reason.
Still we are not got to the end of our account. Consider, further,
our natural weakness, strengthened and assisted by the influences of
divine Grace; the doubts and misgivings of Nature, in the momentous
points of repentance and forgiveness of sin, cleared; the true end
and destination of moral agents, discovered; a future judgement,
ascertained; and the hopes of endless unspeakable glory, which nature
could at most but desire, and had no reason (unless that desire be,
itself, a reason) to expect, unveiled and fully confirmed to us.
This, and still more, is but a faint sketch of the advantages, which,
even in point of morals, we derive from revealed Law. Go now, then, and
say, that the light of nature, set up in your own hearts, obscures the
glory, or _discredits the use_, of the everlasting Gospel!
2. But it is a low, degrading, and unjust idea of the _Gospel_, to
regard it only, as a new code of morals, though more complete in
itself, more solemnly enacted, and more efficaciously enforced, than
the prior one of _nature_. Were the _use_ of each the same, the
honour of the Christian revelation would not be impaired, because its
NECESSITY IS NOT SUPERSEDED.
For Christianity, rightly understood, is something, vastly above what
Reason could discover or procure for us. It confirms, incidentally,
the law of nature, and appeals to it; it harmonizes, throughout, with
that and every other prior revelation of God’s will as it could not
but do, if it were indeed derived from the same eternal source of light
and truth. But, for all that, it is no more a simple _re-publication_
of the natural, than of any other divine Law. It is a new and distinct
revelation, that perfects and completes all the rest. It is the
consummation of one great providential scheme, planned before the ages,
and fully executed in due time, for the redemption of mankind from sin
and death, through the mercies of God in Christ Jesus.
Now, in this view, which is that which Christianity exhibits of its own
purpose, the scheme of the Gospel is not only of the most transcendant
_use_, as it confirms, elucidates, and enforces the moral Law, but of
the most ABSOLUTE NECESSITY: I say, _of the most absolute necessity_;
in reference to the divine wisdom, and to the condition of mankind,
both which, without doubt, if we could penetrate so far, required
this peculiar interposition of Heaven, on principles of the highest
reason, as well as goodness. But the _necessity_ is apparent even to
us, on the grounds of this very Revelation. For its declared purpose
was to rescue all men from the power of _Death_, and to bestow upon
them immortal _life_ in happiness. But, now, the same Gospel, that
tells us this, tells us, withal, that, _as in Adam all men died, so
in_ CHRIST, only, _shall all men be made alive_; and that, _without
the blood_ of CHRIST, _there could be no remission_ of the forfeiture
incurred by the transgression of Adam. You see, then, that, to argue
upon Gospel-principles (and the fair inquirer can argue upon no other)
the Christian dispensation was _necessary_ to fulfill the purposes of
God to man, and to effect that which the divine councils had decreed in
relation to him.
The consequence is, that though we admit a Law of nature, and even
suppose that Law to have been a sufficient guide in _morals_, yet the
honour of Christianity is fully secured, as it’s _necessity is not
superseded_ by the law of nature, which had not _the promise of eternal
life_, and could not have it; such promise being reserved to manifest
and illustrate the grace of God, through the Gospel.
Reason may be astonished at this representation of things, but finds
nothing to oppose to it. It looks up, in silent adoration, to that
supreme incomprehensible Power, which wills that which is best, and
orders all things with the most perfect reason.
Nor let it be any objection, that the Law of Nature points to some
just recompence of moral agents, independently of the Christian Law.
Without doubt, it does; and, if the Gospel had never been vouchsafed to
man, the judge of all the world would have done that which was fit and
right. But can reason, can our own hearts, assure us, that the best of
us could stand the scrutiny of strict justice, or be entitled to any
recompense of _reward_? Or, if our presumption answer this question
in our favour, have we the least pretence to that unspeakable reward,
solely made known and promised in the Gospel, _of everlasting life_?
Or, if mere Heathens, who are to be judged by their own Law, may be
admitted to an eternal inheritance of life and glory, are we sure that
this mercy (for mercy it is, and cannot be of right) is not vouchsafed
to them, through Christ, though they may have been ignorant of Him? or
rather, are we not certain that it must be so, since _eternal life_, on
whomsoever bestowed, _is the gift of God through Christ_[24]?