THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES
The prolonged and terrible struggle which was now about to begin was
the last attempt to break through in the west on the old plan. The
immense collection of guns, ammunition, railway material, and every
kind of transport aroused high hopes. It was believed that the
bombardment prolonged throughout many days with an intensity far
greater than before the Somme would overwhelm the German resistance,
and open the way to the Flanders coast and to the submarine bases then
at the most successful height of their activity. These expectations
were disappointed. The German positions no longer consisted of
continuous trench lines, which could be reduced to shapeless masses of
earth. An organisation of great depth had taken their place. Machine
gun nests and pill-boxes scattered about were almost indistinguishable
from the sea of mud in which they were placed, and defied accurate
aerial reconnaissance. In this fortified zone the foremost lines were
weakly held, and the British troops after taking them found the main
resistance still before them, when their energies were almost
exhausted by their painful journey through the mire. The artillery had
done its work only too well in tearing the soil to pieces; but had
none the less left intact many a pill-box which would only succumb to
the direct hit of a 9.2-inch shell. The dice of success were thus
loaded heavily against the attackers, and complete victory was
rendered impossible by the incredible weather. The great storm which
raged throughout the initial attack on July 31st was succeeded by
almost unprecedented rain throughout August. The brief improvement of
September relapsed into the deluges which made the last stages of the
struggle for Passchendaele so heroic a feat of endurance. The last
month of the Somme Battle had been terrible, but the whole of the
events now to be described were fought under far worse conditions. No
trenches or dugouts were available for sheltering the troops in the
battle area, of whom only a small fraction could be accommodated in
such pill-boxes as remained intact. The corduroy paths by which alone
rations and stores could be brought up were gassed and shelled night
and day; one false step was to be engulfed sometimes beyond hope of
recovery. The artillery were in little better case, their guns were
placed almost wheel to wheel in the open, always sinking deeper into
the morass, and unable to move away from the storm of shells. The
light railways on which they depended for a regular supply of shells
often sank themselves from lack of solid foundation. Far behind,
junctions, dumps and rest camps were attacked by long-range fire and
bombs, with a violent persistency quite unprecedented until the March
days next year. The ordeal was bitterly hard, and the prize
incompletely won, but the spirit of the British Armies rose supreme
over all, and the German defence was taxed to the uttermost.
The 31st July brought the Battalion no excitements. Leaving camp soon
after midnight they crossed the Belgian frontier and moved to St. Jan
Ter Beezen, just west of Poperinghe. The flickers and rumble of the
greatest bombardment yet known in war accompanied them through the
night. The rain descended and the floods came for the next three days.
Again, as in the days of Loos and the Somme, the first expectations
and the eager hopes were disappointed. Success had been only partial;
the weather was impossible, operations were postponed. Next day the
sodden men found themselves in dripping tents, just pitched, a stage
nearer the line at Dambre Farm, in the low country west of Ypres. On
the 5th the battlefield was reached. All through the afternoon at five
minutes' interval the platoons moved up. Heavy shells followed them
all the way. At dusk the relief of the 188th Brigade in the reserve
lines south of St. Julien was completed. Water stood everywhere, the
trenches were blotted out, the pill-boxes themselves were flooded. The
shelling was incessant, and no sleep was possible that night. On the
night of the 6th-7th the 1st/4th Oxfords were relieved, and 24 hours
were spent on either side of St. Julien through which runs the
Steenbeck, foulest of streams. Next night, amidst violent thunder, the
Battalion crawled back to Dambre Camp. The four days had cost them 11
killed and 31 wounded, which might well have been increased but for
the steady discipline prevailing among all ranks.
Next week the attack, whose date was yet unknown, was sedulously
practised in all its details. A large scale model of the ground was
inspected by all officers and N.C.O.'s at Divisional Headquarters. On
the 15th the time for action had arrived. The march to the battle was
slow and deliberate. The men halted at midday at the camp of
Reigersberg, ate and slept. Then ate again a last hot meal before
setting out on their final journey through the darkness. All the
Companies were in position by 3.30 a.m. on the 16th. Then followed a
period of anxious inactivity, until at 4.45 the British barrage burst
forth in its awful salute to the dawn. Men began to advance against
the enemy on the whole front of 25 miles; the second act of the great
struggle had begun.
The attack was, on the whole, a complete failure, though on the left
the French made progress through the swamps towards Houthulst Forest,
and the 23rd Division took Langemarck. In the centre, where our
Division was engaged, progress was infinitesimal. The enemy troops,
hidden in their deep and inconspicuous labyrinth of defence, were
fresh and fought stoutly. Our attack was based on the support of
tanks, which, owing to the condition of the ground, could not come
into action. The forces alloted were far too weak to approach the
ambitious objectives which had been assigned to them: and were
fortunate if they succeeded in winning a few hundred yards after a
long and desperate struggle which left them crippled. Our Battalion
had a hard and disspiriting task. Assigned as Reserve to the Brigade
it had been intended to sweep through the assaulting Battalions to the
final objective. Actually their rôle was reduced to hanging about
under violent shelling, almost stationary, turning now to right, now
to left, to fill up gaps in the line, or to ward off threatened
counter-attacks, always waiting for an order to advance which never
came.
Although I have avoided criticism as far as possible in this
narrative, I cannot refrain from saying, after a careful study of the
documents available, that the staff work of the 5th Army (General
Gough) was thoroughly bad as far as our Division was concerned. Time
after time units were set impossible tasks, with inadequate support
from artillery and tanks, and with ludicrously small reserves. This
opinion is thoroughly shared by others more competent to pass judgment
than myself.
[Illustration: Map.]
The order of battle for the Brigade was as follows:--Starting from the
line of the Steenbeek the three Battalions, covering a frontage of
about 1,200 yards, were to take the fortified line of the Langemarck
road from the crossroads at Winnipeg to those just west of Keerselare.
This accomplished, their assault was to take them beyond the Pink and
Blue lines to an outpost position along the farms of Flora Hubner and
Stroppe. The 5th Gloucesters on the right joined the Ulster Division,
the Bucks Battalion was in the centre, and on the left the 4th Oxfords
touched the 12th Division. It will thus be seen that the Brigade,
unsupported, was expected to advance about a mile through the mud,
everywhere ankle-deep, taking on its way three regularly-organised
positions, to say nothing of the intermediate strong points with which
the ground bristled. The enemy was at his strongest, well-prepared and
expectant. The 7th Bavarian Regiment, which faced us, had just come
into line; it was part of a good Division, the 5th Bavarian. His
barrage descended only three minutes after our own had begun. It is
not surprising that, as a result, no impression was made even on the
line of the Langemarck road, except at one point round Springfield.
The fight swayed about round the pill-boxes, disused gun-pits and
fortified farms which studded the countryside. Each one of these had
to be taken separately; the pill-boxes in particular had to be rushed
by bombers, who crept up and threw their bombs through the loopholes,
which meanwhile were silenced by continuous machine-gun fire. One of
these structures, entirely surrounded by water except for a narrow
causeway, successfully defied all attempts at capture.
Meanwhile, our four Companies had varied experiences just behind this
all-day battle. A Company on the right, advancing over the Steenbeek
at zero, caught the full blast of the barrage. Captain Tripp (3rd East
Surreys), who was in command, was immediately killed, and the only
other officer, 2nd Lieut. Brooke, wounded. 2nd Lieut. Buck was then
sent from Headquarters to take command. During the remainder of the
day the Company, harassed continuously by shells and rifle fire (for
the enemy held positions within 300 yards of them), reduced in
strength by almost a half, succeeded in maintaining touch with the
Ulsters and the Gloucesters. Twice the enemy, pushing forward small
parties, tried to find a gap, but was arrested at once. The line
remained, curving in an arc east of St. Julien, about 200 yards beyond
the starting point. B Company also experienced great difficulty in
making their way through the barrage. Captain Norrish, who was in
command, walked up and down looking for a gap. After a while he
brought them through by the north-east corner of St. Julien. Thence,
turning right-handed in small parties, they dug in behind A Company
and the Gloucesters. For the remainder of the day they remained in
support to the latter, who were vainly endeavouring to force their way
forward to the Langemarck road. This Company seems to have lost about
40 men during the day. To C Company fell such small share of actual
fighting as came the way of the Battalion. The Bucks, on moving
forward, were held up by a large strong point at Hillock Farm, which
resisted obstinately with machine guns. Two platoons of C Company,
creeping up from the north-west, played their Lewis guns upon the
loopholes. The farm was encircled and taken, 50 of the garrison were
killed and the remainder captured. This was about 7 a.m. During the
next three hours the Bucks thrust slowly forward, losing heavily all
the way. By 10.30 they had gained a precarious footing in the Green
line on a front of about 200 yards round Springfield. Their position
was very dangerous, as both their flanks were in the air. The Oxfords,
on their left, had been completely hung up, and were barely beyond our
front line. Two platoons of C Company pushed up northwards into the
gap at 11.30, but found only small parties of the enemy, who enfiladed
them at close range from some disused gun-pits 200 yards west of the
Poelcapelle road. These snipers caused constant casualties, and when
Captain Holmes was hit at noon all the officers had been put out of
action. Under the leadership of Sergt.-Major Heath they cleared the
gun-pits and extracted six prisoners, the only trophies of the day;
there they remained until relief, losing at least 50 men. C.S.-M.
Heath obtained the M.C. D Company, contrary to their experience at
Ronssoy, had the easiest time of the four. Held back on the western
bank of the Steenbeek by the congestion at the bridges until 5.15
a.m., they crossed when the barrage, always lighter on our left, had
greatly slackened and suffered only slight loss. They dug in near the
eastern bank, and remained all day there in support of the Bucks. At
noon one platoon moved forward to the right, and securing the Bucks'
right flank, kept in connection with the posts of A Company. The
losses of this company were about 30 men. In all the casualties of the
Battalion were 35 killed (including Captain Tripp), and 138 wounded
and missing (including Captains Winslow and Holmes and 2nd Lieuts.
Brooke, Oldridge and Wood). This amounted to about a third of the
fighting strength. The remainder of the Brigade suffered more heavily,
especially the Bucks, who had clung for hours with splendid gallantry
to the exposed and practically untenable position round Springfield.
The Battalion next day was relieved by Companies at dawn and dusk, and
reassembled at Dambre Camp. The respite was short, for before many
days the Division was called again to make a fresh attempt at the same
spot. Although no general attack was found practicable until the 20th
September, it was apparently deemed essential first to gain a footing
on the low ridge of Gravenstal, which, though it rose only 60 feet
above the Steenbeek Valley, dominated the country as far as Ypres, and
gave the enemy eyes to see our preparations. The next attack was fixed
for 27th August; this time it was the turn of the 143rd and 144th
Brigades to attack, while we remained in Divisional Reserve. The front
and the objectives were almost exactly the same. On the left was the
11th Division, on the right the 61st, our second line. It was the
first time that these two had come together on the battlefield, and
the occasion was not fortunate, for both were unable to make headway
and lost severely. The plan of attack showed great lack of
imagination, and shook general confidence in the staff of the 5th
Army. The lessons of the 16th seemed to have been entirely thrown
away. The same impossible advance was expected. The ground was far
worse than before. The water lay knee-deep in the valley. As the men
struggled forward they could be seen pulling one another out of the
glutinous mud in which they had sunk to the waist. The tanks,
promised as before, were unable to perform. Finally, the attack
started at the singular hour of 1.55 p.m., which rendered concealment
of all the final preparations impossible, and gave the German machine
gunners deadly opportunities for dealing with the reserves who poured
up in the afternoon along the crowded tracks. The Battalion arrived at
its assembly place on the road running through St. Julien about 3.30
p.m., and, as before, waited on events. Towards dusk it became known
that the Warwicks' attack had completely failed, while further north
the 7th and 8th Worcesters succeeded after four hours' fighting in
seizing the Green line from Springfield as far as the Keerselare cross
roads. At 8 p.m. all hope of a further advance in the Warwick area had
gone, and the Battalion was ordered to relieve the shattered Brigade,
one Company taking the place of each Battalion. There was naturally
much difficulty in taking over, and next morning it was discovered
that three platoons of the 8th Warwicks, whose position was unknown to
their C.O., were still lying unrelieved round Border Farm. Meanwhile,
on the evening of the 27th, confused fighting still went on north of
Springfield, where the 1st/4th Oxfords had been brought up to try by
exploiting the success already gained to turn the Spot Farm-Winnipeg
portion of the Green line. No further ground, however, was secured;
the men were at the limits of their endurance, and by next morning it
was clear that everything had combined to render a further attack
impossible. The day was therefore, passed quietly for the exhausted
combatants; in front the stretcher-bearers bravely and indefatigably
picked up the wounded, who had lain out all night in the liquid mud.
That night two companies of the 2nd/10th London relieved us. Thus half
a Battalion held defensively the whole fighting front of a Brigade.
We returned again to Dambre Camp, which the enemy shelled viciously
with a naval gun. The Battalion may be considered fortunate in losing
only 11 killed (including Captain Norrish, 10th Middlesex), and 51
wounded (including Captain Shaw, 4th Northants).
St. Jan Ter Beezen now reharboured the Battalion, which was built up
again in strength by a succession of curious little drafts of 6 and
11. The usual training, increasing in intensity as the men recovered
from the fatigue of battle, was carried on through a spell of close
and thundery weather. The nights were more than once disturbed by a
shower of bombs. On 16th September a train journey removed us far from
the front to Audenfort, near Calais, to occupy the farms and barns of
several scattered hamlets. The attitude of the population, as
sometimes happened in the back areas, was unfriendly. The reason,
doubtless, is that the distance from the realities of war is apt to
make the inhabitants less accommodating and the troops less
well-disciplined. In this case, however, excellent relations were
established in a few days. The training during the ensuing ten days
was mainly confined to musketry, and A Company had the satisfaction of
beating all the other companies of the Division in a field practice
fired under the eyes of the G.O.C.
On the 27th September the Battalion returned to the same blighted
region, now enveloped by dense autumn mists. The great attack of 20th
September had rolled forward the tide of battle for more than a mile,
and the British, now ensconced in the demolished farms on the east
side of the Gravenstal Ridge, were preparing to carry out another
stage of that painful and bloody progress. At dawn on 4th October the
143rd Brigade attacked through us, advancing some 1,500 yards. The
Battalion spent the next three days in an uneasy reserve, changing
their quarters every 24 hours, continuously soaked by the rain, which
again fell pitilessly. On 7th October they regained the front line,
pulling one another out of the trackless mire as they crawled up
through the dripping night, plentifully sprinkled with gas on their
way. Next night was even worse; the 7th Worcesters came up to relieve
us under shell-fire; most of the guides we sent down to them were
either killed or buried and the relief was long and arduous. The 144th
Brigade attacked again on the 8th-9th October, under the worst
possible conditions; our Battalion, in Divisional Reserve, was
allotted to the Brigade, and lay out scattered by Companies until dusk
on the 9th, ready to repel counter-attacks and to lend help as
required, but was not actively engaged. The total casualties during
this period amounted to 84, of whom 16 were killed. All who took part
in these ten days' operations agree that the hardships suffered by the
men exceeded everything yet endured on active service. The exhausted
troops were taken back to Dambre Camp on the 9th by motor lorries.
This was their last experience of that tremendous and ill-conducted
battle, in which they had been engaged with but slight intermission
for 70 days.