CONVERSATIONS.

_Paris, May_ 9,1853.--I drank tea with the Tocquevilles. Neither of them

is well.

In February they were caught, on their journey from Tocqueville to Paris,

by the bitter weather of the beginning of that month. It produced

rheumatism and then pleurisy with him, and inflammation of the bowels

with her; and both are still suffering from the effects either of the

disorder or of the remedies.

In the summer Paris will be too hot and Tocqueville too damp. So they

have taken a small house at St. Cyr, about a mile from Tours, where they

hope for a tolerable climate, easy access to Paris, and the use of the

fine library of the cathedral. He entered eagerly on the Eastern

question, and agreed on all points with Faucher; admitted the folly and

rashness of the French, but deplored the over-caution which had led us to

refuse interference, at least effectual interference, and to allow

Turkey to sink into virtual subservience to Russia.

_Paris, Tuesday, May_ 17.--Tocqueville and I stood on my balcony, and

looked along the Rue de Rivoli and the Place de la Concorde, swarming

with equipages, and on the well-dressed crowds in the gardens below. From

the height in which we were placed all those apparently small objects, in

incessant movement, looked like a gigantic ant-hill disturbed.

'I never,' said Tocqueville, 'have known Paris so animated or apparently

so prosperous. Much is to be attributed to the saving of the four

previous years. The parsimony of the Parisians ended in 1850; but the

parsimony of the provinces, always great, and in unsettled times carried

to actual avarice, lasted during the whole of the Republic. Commercial

persons tell me that the arrival of capital which comes up for investment

from the provinces deranges all their calculations. It is like the sudden

burst of vegetation which you have seen during the last week. We have

passed suddenly from winter to summer.

'I own,' he continued, 'that it fills me with alarm. Among the

innumerable schemes that are afloat, some must be ill-founded, some must

be swelled beyond their proper dimensions, and some may be mere swindles.

The city of Paris and the Government are spending 150,000,000_l_. in

building in Paris. This is almost as much as the fortifications cost. It

has always been said, and I believe with truth, that the revolutionary

army of 1848 was mainly recruited from the 40,000 additional workmen whom

the fortifications attracted from the country, and left without

employment when they were finished. When this enormous extra-expenditure

is over, when the Louvre, and the new rue de Rivoli, and the Halles, and

the street that is to run from the Hôtel de Ville to the northern

boundary of Paris, are completed--that is to say, when a city has been

built out of public money in two or three years--what will become of the

mass of discharged workmen?

'What will become of those on the railways if they are suddenly stopped,

as yours were in 1846? What will be the shock if the Crédit Foncier or

the Crédit Mobilier fail, after having borrowed each its milliard?

Everything seems to me to be preparing for one of your panics, and the

Government has so identified itself with the state of prosperity and

state of credit of the country that a panic must produce a revolution.

The Government claims the merit of all that is good, and of course is

held responsible for all that is bad. If we were to have a bad harvest,

it would be laid to the charge of the Emperor.

'Of course,' he continued, 'I do not desire the perpetuation of the

present tyranny. Its duration as a dynasty I believe to be absolutely

impossible, except in one improbable contingency--a successful war.

'But though, I repeat, I do not desire or expect the permanence of the

Empire, I do not wish for its immediate destruction, before we are

prepared with a substitute. The agents which are undermining it are

sufficiently powerful and sufficiently active to occasion its fall quite

as soon as we ought to wish for that fall.'

'And what,' I said, 'are those agents?'

'The principal agents,' he answered, 'are violence in the provinces and

corruption in Paris. Since the first outbreak there has not been much

violence in Paris. You must have observed that freedom of speech is

universal. In every private society, and even in every _café_ hatred or

contempt of the Government are the main topics of conversation. We are

too numerous to be attacked. But in the provinces you will find perfect

silence. Anyone who whispers a word against the Emperor may be

imprisoned, or perhaps transported. The prefects are empowered by one of

the decrees made immediately after the _coup d'état_ to dissolve any

Conseil communal in which there is the least appearance of disaffection,

and to nominate three persons to administer the commune. In many cases

this has been done, and I could point out to you several communes

governed by the prefect's nominees who cannot read. In time, of course,

tyranny will produce corruption; but it has not yet prevailed extensively

in the country, and the cause which now tends to depopularise him _there_

is arbitrary violence exercised against those whom his agents suppose to

be their enemies.

'On the other hand, what is ruining him in Paris is not violence, but

corruption.

'The French are not like the Americans; they have no sympathy with

smartness. Nothing so much excites their disgust as _friponnerie_. The

main cause that overthrew Louis Philippe was the belief that he and his

were _fripons_--that the representatives bought the electors, that the

Minister bought the representatives, and that the King bought the

Minister.

'Now, no corruption that ever prevailed in the worst periods of Louis

XV., nothing that was done by La Pompadour or the Du Barry resembles what

is going on now. Duchâtel, whose organs are not over-acute, tells me that

he shudders at what is forced on his notice. The perfect absence of

publicity, the silence of the press and of the tribune, and even of the

bar--for no speeches, except on the most trivial subjects, are allowed to

be reported--give full room for conversational exaggeration. Bad as

things are, they are made still worse. Now this we cannot bear. It hurts

our strongest passion--our vanity. We feel that we are _exploités_ by

Persigny, Fould, and Abbattucci, and a swarm of other adventurers. The

injury might be tolerated, but not the disgrace.

'Every Government in France has a tendency to become unpopular as it

continues. If you were to go down into the street, and inquire into the

politics of the first hundred persons whom you met, you would find some

Socialists, some Republicans, some Orleanists, &c., but you would find no

Louis Napoleonists. Not a voice would utter his name without some

expression of contempt or detestation, but principally of contempt.

'If then things take their course--if no accident, such as a fever or a

pistol-shot, cut him off--public indignation will spread from Paris to

the country, his unpopularity will extend from the people to the army,

and then the first street riot will be enough to overthrow him.'

'And what power,' I said, 'will start up in his place?'

'I trust,' answered Tocqueville, 'that the reins will be seized by the

Senate. Those who have accepted seats in it excuse themselves by saying,

"A time may come when we shall be wanted." Probably the Corps Législatif

will join them; and it seems to me clear that the course which such

bodies will take must be the proclamation of Henri V.'

'But what,' I said, 'would be the consequences of the pistol-shot or the

fever?'

'The immediate consequence,' answered Tocqueville, 'would be the

installation of his successor. Jérôme would go to the Tuileries as easily

as Charles X. did, but it would precipitate the end. We might bear Louis

Napoleon for four or five years, or Jérôme for four or five months.'

'It has been thought possible,' I said, 'that in the event of the Jérôme

dynasty being overset by a military revolution, it might be followed by a

military usurpation; that Nero might be succeeded by Galba.'

'That,' said Tocqueville, 'is one of the few things which I hold to be

impossible. Nero may be followed by another attempt at a Republic, but if

any individual is to succeed him it must be a prince. _Mere_ personal

distinction, at least such as is within the bounds of real possibility,

will not give the sceptre of France. It will be seized by no one who

cannot pretend to an hereditary claim.

'What I fear,' continued Tocqueville, 'is that when this man feels the

ground crumbling under him, he will try the resource of war. It will be a

most dangerous experiment. Defeat, or even the alternation of success and

failure, which is the ordinary course of war, would be fatal to him; but

brilliant success might, as I have said before, establish him. It would

be playing double or quits. He is by nature a gambler. His

self-confidence, his reliance, not only on himself, but on his fortune,

exceeds even that of his uncle. He believes himself to have a great

military genius. He certainly planned war a year ago. I do not believe

that he has abandoned it now, though the general feeling of the country

forces him to suspend it. That feeling, however, he might overcome; he

might so contrive as to appear to be forced into hostilities; and such is

the intoxicating effect of military glory, that the Government which

would give us _that_ would be pardoned, whatever were its defects or its

crimes.

'It is your business, and that of Belgium, to put yourselves into such a

state of defence as to force him to make his spring on Italy. There he

can do you little harm. But to us Frenchmen the consequences of war

_must_ be calamitous. If we fail, they are national loss and humiliation.

If we succeed, they are slavery.'

'Of course,' I said, 'the corruption that infects the civil service must

in time extend to the army, and make it less fit for service.

'Of course it must,' answered Tocqueville. 'It will extend still sooner

to the navy? The _matériel_ of a force is more easily injured by jobbing

than the _personnel_. And in the navy the _matériel_ is the principal.

'Our naval strength has never been in proportion to our naval

expenditure, and is likely to be less and less so every year, at least

during every year of the _règne des fripons_.'

_Tuesday, May_ 24.--I breakfasted with Sir Henry Ellis and then went to

Tocqueville's.

Correspondence & Conversations of Alexis de Tocqueville with Nassau William Senior from 1834 to 1859, Volume 2 · 第 23 / 83 题