CAMPAIGN IN THE EAST
Long before the declaration of war the German military experts had
made their plans. They recognized that in case of war with Russia,
France would come to the rescue of its ally. They hoped that Italy,
and felt sure that England, would remain neutral, but, no doubt, had
provided for the possibility that these two nations would join the
ranks of their foes. They recognized that they would be compelled to
fight against greatly superior numbers, but they had this advantage,
that they were prepared to move at once, while England was unprepared,
and Russia, with enormous numbers, was so unprovided with railroad
facilities that it would take weeks before her armies would be
dangerous.
Their plan of campaign, then, was obvious. Leaving in the East only
such forces as were necessary for a strong defense, they would throw
the bulk of their strength against the French. They anticipated an
easy march to Paris, and then with France at their mercy they would
gather together all their powers and deal with Russia. But they had
underestimated both the French power of resistance, and the Russian
weakness, and in particular they had not counted upon the check that
they were to meet with in gallant Belgium.
The Russian mobilization was quicker by far than had been anticipated.
Her armies were soon engaged with the comparatively small German
forces, and met with great success.
To understand the Russian campaign one must have some knowledge of
the geography of western Russia. Russian Poland projects as a great
quadrilateral into eastern Germany. It is bounded on the north by
East Prussia, on the south by Galicia, and the western part reaches
deep into Germany itself. The land is a broad, level plain, through
which from south to north runs the River Vistula. In the center lies
the capital, Warsaw, protected by a group of fortresses. The Russian
army, therefore, could not make a direct western advance until it had
protected its flanks by the conquest of East Prussia on the north, and
Galicia on the south.
By the beginning of the third week in August the first Russian armies
were ready. Her forces were arranged as follows: Facing East Prussia
was the Army of the Niemen, four corps strong; the Army of Poland,
consisting of fifteen army corps, occupied a wide front from Narev
on the north to the Bug Valley; a third army, the Army of Galicia,
directed its line of advance southward into the country between
Lemberg and the River Sareth. The fortresses protecting Warsaw, still
further to the east, were well garrisoned, and in front of them to
the west were troops intended to delay any German advance from Posen.
The Russian commander-in-chief was the Grand Duke Nicholas, uncle of
the late Czar, and one of the most admirable representatives of the
Russian at his best; a splendid soldier, honest, straightforward, and
patriotic, he was the idol of his men. He had with him a brilliant
staff, but the strength of his army lay in its experience. They had
learned war in the bitter school of the Manchurian campaign.
The German force on the frontier was not less than five hundred
thousand men, and they were arranged for defense. Austria, in Galicia,
had gathered nearly one million men under the auspices of Frederick.
The first movement of these armies took place in East Prussia. The Army
of the Niemen had completed its mobilization early in August, and was
under the command of General Rennenkampf, one of the Russian leaders in
Manchuria. In command of the German forces was General von François, an
officer of Huguenot descent.
The first clash of these armies took place on the German frontier near
Libau, on August 3d. Two days later, the Russians crossed the frontier,
drove in the German advance posts, and seized the railway which runs
south and east of the Masurian Lakes. The German force fell back,
burning villages and destroying roads, according to their usual plan.
On the 7th of August the main army of Rennenkampf crossed the border
at Suwalki, advancing in two main bodies: the Army of the Niemen moving
north from Suwalki, the Army of the Narev marching through the region
of the Masurian lakes. In the lake district they advanced toward Boyen,
and then directed their march toward Insterburg, the most important
town in the neighborhood.
To protect Insterburg, General von François made his first stand at
Gumbinnen, where, on the 16th of August, the first important battle of
this campaign took place. The result was the defeat and retirement of
the Germans, and von François was forced to fall back on Koenigsberg.
Meantime, the Army of the Narev, under General Samsonov, was advancing
through the country west of the Masurian Lakes. On the 20th his
vanguard came upon a German army corps, strongly entrenched at the
northwest end of the lakes. The Germans were defeated, and fled in
great disorder toward Koenigsberg, abandoning their guns and wagons.
Many prisoners were taken, and the Russians found themselves masters
of all of East Prussia except that inside the Koenigsberg line. They
then marched on Koenigsberg, and East Prussia was for a moment at the
mercy of the conqueror.
[Illustration: COSSACKS OF THE DON ATTACKING PRUSSIAN CAVALRY
In a fierce encounter near the Dneister River the Russian horsemen put
to flight the Kaiser’s best soldiers.]
Troops were left to invest Koenigsberg, and East Prussia was overrun
with the enemy. The report as to the behavior of these troops met with
great indignation in Germany; but better information insists that they
behaved with decorum and discretion. The peasantry of East Prussia,
remembering wild tales of the Cossacks of a hundred years before, fled
in confusion with stories of burning and slaughter and outrage.
Germany became aroused. To thoroughly understand the effect of the
Russian invasion of east Prussia, one must know something of the
relations of that district with the German Empire. Historically, this
was the cradle of the Prussian aristocracy, whose dangerous policies
had alarmed Europe for so many decades. The Prussian aristocracy
originated in a mixture of certain west German and Christian knights,
with a pagan population of the eastern Baltic plain. The district was
separate from Poland and never fell under the Polish influence. It
was held by the Teutonic knights who conquered it in a sort of savage
independence. The Christian faith, which the Teutonic knights professed
to inculcate, took little root, but such civilization as Germany itself
had absorbed did filter in. The chief noble of Borussia, the governing
Duke, acquired in time the title of King, and it was here, not in
Berlin, nor in Brandenburg, that the Hohenzollern power originated.
East Prussia, therefore, had a sentimental importance in the eyes of
the Prussian nobility. The Prussian Royal House, in particular, had
toward this country an especial regard. Moreover, it was regarded by
the Germans as a whole as their rampart against the Slav, a proof of
the German power to withstand the dreaded Russian. That this sacred
soil should now be in the hands of a Cossack army was not to be borne.
The Kaiser acted at once.
[Illustration: THE EASTERN FIGHTING ZONE]
Large forces were detached from the west and sent to the aid of the
eastern army. A new commander was appointed. He was General von
Hindenburg, a veteran of the Franco-Prussian War who had been for some
years retired. After his retirement he devoted his time to the study
of East Prussia, especially the ground around the Masurian Lakes. He
became more familiar with its roads, its fields, its marshes, its bogs
than any of the peasants who spent their lives in the neighborhood of
the lakes. Before his retirement, in the annual maneuvers, he had often
rehearsed his defense against Russian invaders. Indeed report, perhaps
unfounded, described his retirement to the displeasure of the Emperor
William at being badly worsted in one of these mimic combats. He had
prevented the country from being cleared and the swamps from being
drained, arguing that they were worth more to Germany than a dozen
fortresses. A man of rugged strength, his face suggesting power and
tenacity, he was to become the idol of the German people.
His chance had come. His army consisted of remnants of the forces
of von François and large reinforcements sent him from the west. In
all, perhaps, he had with him 150,000 men, and he had behind him an
admirable system of strategic railways.
The Russian High Command was full of confidence. Rennenkampf had
advanced with the army of the Niemen toward Koenigsberg, whose fall
was reported from time to time, without foundation. Koenigsberg was in
fact impregnable to armies no stronger than those under Rennenkampf’s
command. Samsonov with the Army of the Narev, had pushed on to the
northeastern point of the lakes, and defeated the German army corps
at Frankenau. Misled by his success, he decided to continue his
advance through the lake region toward Allenstein. He marched first
toward Osterode, in the wilderness of forest, lake and marsh, between
Allenstein and the Lower Vistula. His force numbered 200,000 men, but
the swamps made it impossible to proceed in mass. His column had to be
temporarily divided, nor was he well informed as to the strength of
his enemy. On Wednesday, the 26th of August, his advance guards were
everywhere driven in. As he pushed on he discovered the enemy in great
numbers, and late in the day realized that he was facing a great army.
Von Hindenburg had taken a position astride the railway from Allenstein
to Soldau, and all access to his front was barred by lakes and swamps.
He was safe from frontal attack, and could reinforce each wing at
pleasure. From his right ran the only two good roads in the region, and
at his left was the Osterode railway. On the first day he stood on the
defensive, while the Russians, confident of victory, attacked again and
again. Some ground was won and prisoners captured, and the news of a
second victory was sent to western Europe.
The battle continued, however, until the last day of August and is
known as the battle of Tannenberg, from a village of that name near the
marshes. Having worn down his enemy, von Hindenburg counter-attacked.
His first movement was on his right. This not only deceived Samsonov
and led him to reinforce his left, but also enabled von Hindenburg to
seize the only good road that would give the Russian army a chance of
retreat. Meanwhile the German general was hurrying masses of troops
northeastward to outflank the Russian right. While the Russians were
reinforcing one flank, he was concentrating every man he could upon the
other. Then his left swept southward, driving in and enveloping the
Russian right, and Samsonov was driven into a country full of swamps
and almost without roads.
To thoroughly understand the plight of the Russian army one must have
some idea of the character of the Masurian Lake district. It was
probably molded by the work of ice in the past. Great glaciers, in
their progress toward the sea, have ground out hundreds of hollows,
where are found small pools and considerable lakes. From these glaciers
have been dropped patches of clay which hold the waters in wide extents
of marsh and bog. The country presents a monotonous picture of low,
rounded swells and flats, interspersed with stunted pine and birch
woods. The marshes and the lakes form a labyrinth, difficult to pass
even to those familiar with the country. The Masurian region is a great
trap for any commander who has not had unlimited acquaintance with
the place. Causeways, filled with great care, and railroads permit an
orderly advance, but in a confused retreat disaster at once threatens.
This was the ground that von Hindenburg knew so well. The Russians
resisted desperately, but their position could not be held. Disaster
awaited them. They found their guns sinking to the axle-trees in mire.
Whole regiments were driven into the lakes and drowned. On the last
day of battle, August 31st, Samsonov himself was killed, and his army
completely destroyed. Fifty thousand prisoners were taken with hundreds
of guns and quantities of supplies. Von Hindenburg had attained the
triumph of which he had so long dreamed.
It was an immensely successful example of that enveloping movement
characteristic of German warfare, a victory recalling the battle of
Sedan, and upon a scale not inferior to that battle. The news of this
great triumph reached Berlin upon the anniversary of the battle of
Sedan, and on the same day that the news came from the west that von
Kluck had reached the gates of Paris and it had a profound effect upon
the German mind. They had grown to believe that the Germans were a sort
of superman; these wonderful successes confirmed them in this belief.
No longer did they talk of a mere defense in the east; an advance on
Warsaw was demanded and von Hindenburg was acclaimed the greatest
soldier of his day. The Emperor made him Field Marshal, and placed him
in command of the Teutonic armies in the east.
But von Hindenburg was not satisfied. The remnant of the defeated army
had fled toward Narev, and without losing a moment von Hindenburg set
off in pursuit. Rennenkampf, all this time, strange to say, had made no
move, and at the news of Samsonov’s disaster he abandoned the siege
of Koenigsberg and retreated toward the Niemen. At Gumbinnen he fought
a rear-guard action with the German left, but had made up his mind
that the Niemen must be the Russian line of defense. Von Hindenburg,
following, crossed the Russian frontier and in the wide forests near
Augustovo there was much fighting.
This action, described as the first battle of Augustovo, was only a
rear-guard action, the Russians desiring merely to delay the enemy
for a day or two. German reports, however, described it as a victory
only second in importance to Tannenberg. Von Hindenburg then occupied
Suwalki. He apparently had become over confident, and hardly realized
that Rennenkampf was continually being reinforced by the Russian
mobilization.
The Russian High Command understood the situation very well. Their aim
was to keep von Hindenburg busy on the Niemen, while their armies in
the south were overwhelming the fleeing Austrians. Von Hindenburg was
deceived, and continued his advance until he got into serious trouble.
His movement had begun on September 7th; his army consisted of the
four corps with which he had won Tannenberg, and large reinforcements
from Germany, including at least one guards battalion, and a number
of Saxons and Bavarians. The country is one vast mixture of marsh and
lake and bog. The roads are few, and advance must therefore be slow and
difficult. Rennenkampf made no attempt to delay him beyond a little
rear-guard fighting. The German army reached the Niemen on September
21st, and found behind it the Russian army in prepared positions, with
large reinforcements from Vilna.
The river at this point was wide and deep, and hard to cross. The
battle of the Niemen Crossings was an artillery duel. The Russians
quietly waited in their trenches to watch the Germans build their
pontoon bridges. Then their guns blew the bridges to pieces. Thereupon
von Hindenburg bombarded the Russian lines hoping to destroy the
Russian guns. On Friday, the 26th, his guns boomed all day; the
Russians made no reply. So on the morning of the 27th he built bridges
again, and again the Russians blew them to pieces. Moreover the marshy
ground made maneuvering almost impossible. On the 28th he gave the
order for retreat.
He realized that the game wasn’t worth the candle; he might easily be
kept fighting on the Niemen for months, while the main armies of the
Russians were crossing Austria. Von Hindenburg conducted the retreat
with a skill which came to him naturally from his knowledge of the
marshes.
Rennenkampf followed him closely, keeping up persistent attacks through
the woods and marshes. The path of the retreating army lay through
the forest of Augustovo, a country much like that around the Masurian
Lakes, and there the Germans suffered heavy losses. Von Hindenburg
managed, however, to get the bulk of his forces back across the
frontier and continued his retreat to the intrenchments on the Masurian
Lakes.
The Germans lost 60,000 men in killed, wounded and prisoners, and von
Hindenburg handed over the command of the German armies in East Prussia
to General von Schubert, and hastened southward to direct the movement
to relieve the Austrians at Cracow.
But quite as important as the campaign in East Prussia was the struggle
in Galicia. When the war began the Germans contemplated merely defense
in their own domain; such offense as was planned was left to the
Austrians farther south.
Galicia is a long, level country lying north of the Carpathian
Mountains, and in this country Austria-Hungary had gathered together a
force of hardly less than one million men. A quarter of these lay in
reserve near the mountains; the remaining three-quarters was divided
into two armies; the first, the northern army, being under the command
of General Dankl, the second was that of von Offenberg. The base of the
first army was Przemysl; that of the second was Lemberg.
The first army, it was planned, was to advance into Russian territory
in the direction of Lublin. The second army, stationed southeast of
the first army, was to protect it from any Russians who might strike
in upon the south. The first army, therefore, contained more picked
material than the second, which included many troops from the southern
parts of the empire, including certain disaffected contingents. The
first army made its advance as soon as possible, and entered Russian
territory on the 11th of August. It went forward with very little loss
and against very little resistance. The Russian forces which were
against it were inferior in number, and fell back towards the Bug.
The Austrians followed, turning somewhat toward the East, when their
advance was checked by news of catastrophe in their rear. On the 14th
of August the Russian army under General Ruzsky crossed the frontier,
and advanced toward the Austrian second army.
The Russian army was in far greater strength than had been expected,
and when its advance was followed by the appearance, upon the right
flank of von Offenberg’s command, of yet another Russian army, under
Brussilov, the Austrian second army found itself in great danger.
Ruzsky advanced steadily from August 14th until, on the 21st, it was
not more than one day’s advance from the outer works of Lemberg, and
the third Russian army under Brussilov was threatening von Offenberg’s
right flank.
Von Offenberg, understanding the strength of the enemy, undertook
to give battle. The first outpost actions were successful for the
Austrians, and helped them in their blunder. On the 24th of August the
two Russian armies effected a junction, and their Austrian opponents
found themselves threatened with disaster. An endeavor was made to
retreat, but the retreat turned into a rout. On the 28th Tarnopol was
captured by the Russians, and the Austrian army found itself compelled
to fall back upon defense positions to the south and east of Lemberg
itself.
The attack of the Russian armies was completely successful. The
Austrian army was driven from its positions, and on September 4th the
Austrians evacuated Lemberg and the Russian forces took possession of
the town. The Austrians fled. The population welcomed the conquerors
with the greatest enthusiasm. An immense quantity of stores of every
kind were captured by the Russians together with at least 100,000
prisoners. There was no looting, nor any kind of outrage. The Russian
policy was to make friends of the inhabitants of Galicia.
But there was no halt after Lemberg. Brussilov divided his army, and
sent his left wing into the Carpathian passes; his center and right
moved west toward Przemysl; while Ruzsky moved northwest to reinforce
the Russian army on the Bug. Meanwhile the position of Dankl’s army was
perilous in the extreme. There were two possible courses, one to fall
back and join the remnants of von Offenberg’s army, the other to attack
at once, before the first Russian army could be reinforced, and if
victorious to turn on Ruzsky.
Dankl’s army was now very strong. He had received reinforcements,
not only from Austria but from Germany. On the 4th of September he
attacked the Russian center; his attack was a failure, although he
outnumbered the Russians. The battle continued until the tenth.
Everywhere the Austrians were beaten, and driven off in ignominious
retreat. The whole Austrian force fled southward in great disorder; a
part directed its flight toward Przemysl, others still farther west
toward Cracow. Austria had been completely defeated; except for a few
German detachments near the border, Poland was clear of the enemy. The
Russian flag flew over Lemberg, while the Russian army was marching
toward Cracow. The Russian star was in the ascendant.
But the Austrian armies had not been annihilated. An army of nearly
a million men cannot be destroyed in so short a time. The Austrian
failure was due in part to the disaffection of some of the elements
of the army, and in part to the poor Austrian generalship. They had
underestimated their foe, and ventured on a most perilous plan of
campaign.
Russian generalship had been most admirable, and the Russian generals
were men of ability and experience. Brussilov had seen service in the
Turkish War of 1877. Ruzsky was a professor in the Russian War Academy.
In the Japanese war he had been chief of staff to General Kaulbars,
the commander of the Second Manchurian army. Associated with him was
General Radko Dmitrieff, an able officer with a most interesting
career. General Dmitrieff was born in Bulgaria, when it was a Turkish
province. He graduated at the Military School at Sofia, and afterwards
at the War Academy at Petrograd. On his return to Bulgaria he commanded
a regiment in the Serbian-Bulgarian war. Later he became mixed up
in the conspiracy against Prince Alexander, and was forced to leave
Bulgaria. For ten years he served in the Russian army, returning to
Bulgaria on the accession of Prince Ferdinand. Later on he became Chief
of the General Staff, and when the Balkan war broke out he commanded
one of the Bulgarian armies, won several important victories, and
became a popular hero of the war. Disgusted with the political
squabbles which followed the war, he returned to Russia as a general in
the Russian army. With men like these in command, the Russian Empire
was well served.
After the decisive defeat of the Austrian army under General Dankl,
certain changes were made in the Russian High Command. General Ruzsky
was made commander of the center, which was largely reinforced. General
Ivanov was put in command of the armies operating in Galicia with
Dmitrieff and Brussilov as his chief lieutenants. Brussilov’s business
was to seize the deep passes in the Carpathians and to threaten
Hungary. Dmitrieff’s duty was to press the Austrian retreat, and
capture the main fortresses of central Galicia.
There are two great fortresses on the River San, Jaroslav and Przemysl,
both of them controlling important railroad routes. Jaroslav on the
main line from Lemberg to Cracow, Przemysl with a line which skirts
the Carpathians, and connects with lines going south to Hungary.
Jaroslav was fortified by a strong circle of intrenchments and
was looked to by Austria for stout resistance. The Austrians were
disappointed, for Ivanov captured it in three days, on the 23d of
September. Dmitrieff found Przemysl a harder nut to crack. It held out
for many months, while operations of greater importance were being
carried on by the Russian armies. The plans of the Russian generals in
some respects were not unlike the plan previously suggested as that
of the German High Command. At the beginning of the war they had no
desire to carry on a powerful offensive against Germany. The expedition
into East Prussia was conducted more for political than for military
purposes. The real offensive at the start was to be against Austria.
The Russian movements were cautious at first, but the easy capture of
Lemberg, the fall of Jaroslav, and the demoralization of the Austrian
armies, encouraged more daring strategy. With the Germans stopped on
the north, little aid to the Austrians could come from that source.
The Grand Duke Nicholas was eager to strike a great blow before the
winter struck in, so his armies swept to the great Polish city of
Cracow. The campaign against Austria also had a political side.
Russia had determined upon a new attitude toward Poland. On August
15th the Grand Duke Nicholas, on behalf of the Czar, had issued a
proclamation offering self-government to Russian Poland. Home rule for
Poland had long been a favorite plan with the Czar. Now he promised,
not only to give Russian Poland home rule, but to add to it the Polish
peoples in Austria and Germany. This meant that Austria and Germany
would have to give up Galicia on the one hand, and Prussian Poland on
the other, if they should lose the war. In the old days Poland had
been one of the greatest kingdoms in Europe, with a proud nobility and
high civilization. She was one of the first of the great Slav peoples
to penetrate the west. Later she had protected Europe against Tartar
invasion, but internal differences had weakened her, and, surrounded
by enemies, she had first been plundered, and later on divided between
Austria, Russia and Prussia. Never had the Poles consented to this
destruction of their independence. Galicia had constantly struggled
against Austria; Prussian Poland was equally disturbing to the Prussian
peace, and Russia was only able to maintain the control of her Polish
province by the sword. Of the three the Pole was probably more inclined
to keep on friendly terms with Russia, also a Slav people. The policy
of the Czar encouraged this inclination and produced disaffection
among the Poles in Galicia and in Posen. Moreover, it gave Russia
the sympathy of the world which had long regarded the partition of
Poland as a political crime. It encouraged the Czecho-Slavs and other
dissatisfied portions of the Austrian Empire.
The results were seen immediately in the demoralization of the Austrian
armies where considerable numbers of Czecho-Slovak troops deserted to
the Russian army, and later in the loyalty to Russia of the Poles, and
their refusal, even under the greatest German pressure, to give the
German Empire aid.