THE FIRST BATTLE OF THE MARNE
France and civilization were saved by Joffre and Foch at the first
battle of the Marne in August, 1914.
Autocracy was destroyed by Foch at the second battle of the Marne, 1918.
This in a nutshell embraces the dramatic opening and closing episodes
of the World War on the soil of France. Bracketed between these two
glorious victories were the agonies of martyred France, the deaths and
life-long cripplings of millions of men, the up-rooting of arrogant
militarism, the liberation of captive nations.
The first battle of the Marne was wholly a French operation. The
British were close at hand, but had no share in the victory. Generals
Gallieni and Manoury, acting under instructions from Marshal Joffre,
were driven by automobile to the headquarters of the British
commander, Sir John French, in the village of Melun. They explained in
detail General Joffre’s plan of attack upon the advancing German army.
An urgent request was made that the British army halt its retreat, face
about, and attack the two corps of von Kluck’s army then confronting
the British. Simultaneously with this attack General Manoury’s forces
were to fall upon the flank and the rear guard of von Kluck along the
River Ourcq. This operation was planned for the next day, September
5th. Sir John French replied that he could not get his tired army in
readiness for battle within forty-eight hours. This would delay the
British attack in all probability until September 7th.
Joffre’s plan of battle, however, would admit of no delay. The case
was urgent; there was grave danger of a union between the great forces
headed by the Crown Prince and those under von Kluck. He resolved to go
ahead without the British, and ordered Manoury to strike as had been
planned.
He fixed as an extreme limit for the movement of retreat, which
was still going on, the line of Bray-sur-Seine, Nogent-sur-Seine,
Arcis-sur-Aube, Vitry-le-François, and the region to the north of
Bar-le-Duc. This line might be reached if the troops were compelled
to go back so far. They would attack before reaching it, as soon as
there was a possibility of bringing about an offensive disposition,
permitting the co-operation of the whole of the French forces.
On September 5 it appeared that this desired situation existed.
The First German army, carrying audacity to temerity, had continued its
endeavor to envelop the French left, had crossed the Grand Morin, and
reached the region of Chauffry, to the south of Rebais and of Esternay.
It aimed then at cutting Joffre off from Paris, in order to begin the
investment of the capital.
The Second army had its head on the line Champaubert, Etoges, Bergères,
and Vertus.
The Third and Fourth armies reached to Châlons-sur-Marne and
Bussy-le-Répos. The Fifth army was advancing on one side and the other
from the Argonne as far as Triaucourt-les-Islettes and Juivecourt. The
Sixth and Seventh armies were attacking more to the east.
[Illustration: THE FIRST GERMAN DASH FOR PARIS]
The French left army had been able to occupy the line Sezanne,
Villers-St. Georges and Courchamps. This was precisely the disposition
which the General-in-Chief had wished to see achieved. On the 4th he
decided to take advantage of it, and ordered all the armies to hold
themselves ready. He had taken from his right two new army corps,
two divisions of infantry, and two divisions of cavalry, which were
distributed between his left and his center.
[Illustration: © _Underwood and Underwood, N. Y._
GENERAL PERSHING AND MARSHAL JOFFRE
The Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces chatting
with the veteran Marshal of France, the hero of the first battle of
the Marne.]
On the evening of the 5th he addressed to all the commanders of armies
a message ordering them to attack.
“The hour has come,” he wrote, “to advance at all costs, and to die
where you stand rather than give way.”
If one examines the map, it will be seen that by his inflection toward
Meaux and Coulommiers General von Kluck was exposing his right to the
offensive action of the French left. This is the starting point of the
victory of the Marne.
On the evening of September 5th the French left army had reached the
front Penchard-Saint-Souflet-Ver. On the 6th and 7th it continued
its attacks vigorously with the Ourcq as objective. On the evening
of the 7th it was some kilometers from the Ourcq, on the front
Chambry-Marcilly-Lisieux-Acy-en-Multien. On the 8th, the Germans, who
had in great haste reinforced their right by bringing their Second
and Fourth army corps back to the north, obtained some successes by
attacks of extreme violence. But in spite of this pressure the French
held their ground. In a brilliant action they took three standards, and
being reinforced prepared a new attack for the 10th. At the moment that
this attack was about to begin the enemy was already in retreat toward
the north. The attack became a pursuit, and on the 12th the French
established themselves on the Aisne.
Why did the German forces which were confronting the French, and on
the evening before attacking so furiously, retreat on the morning of
the 10th? Because in bringing back on the 6th several army corps from
the south to the north to face the French left, the enemy had exposed
his left to the attacks of the now rested British, who had immediately
faced around toward the north, and to those of the French armies which
were prolonging the English lines to the right. This is what the
French command had sought to bring about. This is what happened on
September 8th and allowed the development and rehabilitation which it
was to effect.
On the 6th the British army set out from the line Rozcy-Langny and that
evening reached the southward bank of the Grand Morin. On the 7th and
8th it continued its march, and on the 9th had debouched to the north
of the Marne below Château-Thierry--the town that was to become famous
for the American stand in 1918--taking in flank the German forces which
on that day were opposing, on the Ourcq, the French left army. Then it
was that these forces began to retreat, while the British army, going
in pursuit and capturing seven guns and many prisoners, reached the
Aisne between Soissons and Longueval.
The rôle of the French army, which was operating to the right of the
British army, was threefold. It had to support the British attacking
on its left. It had on its right to support the center, which, from
September 7th, had been subjected to a German attack of great
violence. Finally, its mission was to throw back the three active army
corps and the reserve corps which faced it.
On the 7th, it made a leap forward, and on the following days reached
and crossed the Marne, seizing, after desperate fighting, guns,
howitzers, mitrailleuses, and a million cartridges. On the 12th it
established itself on the north edge of the Montagne-de-Reime in
contact with the French center, which for its part had just forced the
enemy to retreat in haste.
The French center consisted of a new army created on August 29th and of
one of those which at the beginning of the campaign had been engaged in
Belgian Luxemburg. The first had retreated, on August 29th to September
5th, from the Aisne to the north of the Marne and occupied the general
front Sezanne-Mailly.
The second, more to the east, had drawn back to the south of the line
Humbauville-Château-Beauchamp-Bignicourt-Blesmes-Maurupt-le-Montoy.
The enemy, in view of his right being arrested and the defeat of
his enveloping movement, made a desperate effort from the 7th to
the 19th to pierce the French center to the west and to the east of
Fere-Champenoise. On the 8th he succeeded in forcing back the right of
the new French army, which retired as far as Gouragançon. On the 9th,
at 6 o’clock in the morning, there was a further retreat to the south
of that village, while on the left the other army corps also had to go
back to the line Allemant-Connantre.
Despite this retreat General Foch, commanding the army of the center,
ordered a general offensive for the same day. With the Morocco
division, whose behavior was heroic, he met a furious assault of the
Germans on his left toward the marshes of Saint Gond. Then with the
divisions which had just victoriously overcome the attacks of the enemy
to the north of Sezanne, and with the whole of his left army corps,
he made a flanking attack in the evening of the 9th upon the German
forces, and notably the guard, which had thrown back his right army
corps. The enemy, taken by surprise by this bold maneuver, did not
resist, and beat a hasty retreat. This marked Foch as the most daring
and brilliant strategist of the war.
On the 11th the French crossed the Marne between Tours-sur-Marne and
Sarry, driving the Germans in front of them in disorder. On the 12th
they were in contact with the enemy to the north of the Champ de
Châlons. The reserve army of the center, acting on the right of the
one just referred to, had been intrusted with the mission during the
7th, 8th, and 9th of disengaging its neighbor, and it was only on the
10th that being reinforced by an army corps from the east, it was able
to make its action effectively felt. On the 11th the Germans retired.
But, perceiving their danger, they fought desperately, with enormous
expenditure of projectiles, behind strong intrenchments. On the 12th
the result had none the less been attained, and two French center
armies were solidly established on the ground gained.
[Illustration: MARSHAL FERDINAND FOCH, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE
ALLIED ARMIES
The crushing defeat of the armies of the Central Powers is due in
large measure to the remarkable strategy and superb leadership of this
great French soldier.]
To the right of these two armies were three others. They had orders to
cover themselves to the north and to debouch toward the west on the
flank of the enemy, which was operating to the west of the Argonne.
But a wide interval in which the Germans were in force separated them
from the French center. The attack took place, nevertheless, with very
brilliant success for the French artillery, which destroyed eleven
batteries of the Sixteenth German army corps.
On the 10th inst., the Eighth and Fifteenth German army corps
counter-attacked, but were repulsed. On the 11th French progress
continued with new successes, and on the 12th the French were able to
face round toward the north in expectation of the near and inevitable
retreat of the enemy, which, in fact, took place from the 13th.
The withdrawal of the mass of the German force involved also that of
the left. From the 12th onward the forces of the enemy operating
between Nancy and the Vosges retreated in a hurry before the two French
armies of the East, which immediately occupied the positions that
the enemy had evacuated. The offensive of the French right had thus
prepared and consolidated in the most useful way the result secured by
the left and center.
Such was this seven days’ battle, in which more than two millions of
men were engaged. Each army gained ground step by step, opening the
road to its neighbor, supported at once by it, taking in flank the
adversary which the day before it had attacked in front, the efforts of
one articulating closely with those of the other, a perfect unity of
intention and method animating the supreme command.
To give this victory all its meaning it is necessary to add that it was
gained by troops which for two weeks had been retreating, and which,
when the order for the offensive was given, were found to be as ardent
as on the first day. It has also to be said that these troops had to
meet the whole German army. Under their pressure the German retreat at
certain times had the appearance of a rout.
In spite of the fatigue of the poilus, in spite of the power of the
German heavy artillery, the French took colors, guns, mitrailleuses,
shells, and thousands of prisoners. One German corps lost almost the
whole of its artillery.
In that great battle the spectacular rush of General Gallieni’s army
defending Paris, was one of the dramatic surprises that decided the
issue. In that stroke Gallieni sent his entire force forty miles to
attack the right wing of the German army. In this gigantic maneuver
every motor car in Paris was utilized, and the flying force of Gallieni
became the “Army in Taxicabs,” a name that will live as long as France
exists.
General Clergerie, Chief of Staff of Gallieni, told the story for
posterity. He said:
“From August 26, 1914, the German armies had been descending upon Paris
by forced marches. On September 1st they were only three days’ march
from the advanced line of the intrenched camp, which the garrison
were laboring desperately to put into condition for defense. It was
necessary to cover with trenches a circuit of 110 miles, install
siege guns, assure the coming of supplies for them over narrow-gauge
railways, assemble the food and provisions of all kinds necessary for a
city of 4,000,000 inhabitants.
“But on September 3rd, the intelligence service, which was working
perfectly, stated about the middle of the day, that the German columns,
after heading straight for Paris, were swerving toward the southeast
and seemed to wish to avoid the fortified camp.
“General Gallieni and I then had one of those long conferences which
denoted grave events; they usually lasted from two to five minutes at
most. The fact is that the military government of Paris did little
talking--it acted. The conference reached this conclusion: ‘If they do
not come to us, we will go to them with all the force we can muster.’
Nothing remained but to make the necessary preparations. The first
thing to do was not to give the alarm to the enemy. General Manoury’s
army immediately received orders to lie low and avoid any engagement
that was not absolutely necessary.” Then care was taken to reinforce it
by every means. All was ready at the designated time.
In the night of September 3rd, knowing that the enemy would have to
leave only a rear guard on one bank of the Ourcq, General Gallieni and
General Clergerie decided to march against that rear guard, to drive
it back with all the weight of the Manoury army, to cut the enemy’s
communications, and take full advantage of his hazardous situation.
Immediately the following order was addressed to General Manoury:
Because of the movement of the German armies, which seem to be
slipping in before our front to the southeast, I intend to send your
army to attack them in the flank, that is to say, in an easterly
direction. I will indicate your line of march as soon as I learn that
of the British army. But make your arrangements now so that your
troops shall be ready to march this afternoon and to begin a general
movement east of the intrenched camp tomorrow.
At ten in the morning a consultation was held by Generals Gallieni,
Clergerie, and Manoury, and the details of the plan of operations were
immediately decided. General Joffre gave permission to attack and
announced that he would himself take the offensive on the 6th. On the
5th, at noon, the army from Paris fired the first shot; the battle of
the Ourcq, a preface to the Marne, had begun.
General Clergerie then told what a precious purveyor of information he
had found in General von der Marwitz, cavalry commander of the German
first army, who made intemperate use of the wireless telegraph and
did not even take the trouble to put into cipher his dispatches, of
which the Eiffel Tower made a careful collection. “In the evening of
September 9th,” he said, “an officer of the intelligence corps brought
me a dispatch from this same Marwitz couched in something like these
terms: ‘Tell me exactly where you are and what you are doing. Hurry
up, because XXX.’ The officer was greatly embarrassed to interpret
those three X’s. Adopting the language of the poilu, I said to him,
‘Translate it, “I am going to bolt.”’ True enough, next day we found
on the site of the German batteries, which had been precipitately
evacuated, stacks of munitions; while by the roadside we came upon
motors abandoned for the slightest breakdown, and near Betz almost the
entire outfit of a field bakery, with a great store of flour and dough
half-kneaded. Paris and France were saved.
“Von Kluck could not get over his astonishment. He has tried to explain
it by saying he was unlucky, for out of a hundred Governors not one
would have acted as Gallieni did, throwing his whole available force
nearly forty miles from his stronghold. It was downright imprudence.”