the Peace, in and for the said county and State aforesaid, Franklin
J. Mixon, who makes oath in due form of law, and on oath says that
Bentonville Taylor stole from this affiant a bridle and girth, while
this affiant resided in Jones county, Mississpipi, at, or near,
Hoskin’s ferry in said Jones county, in the month of March or April,
1858.
Sworn to, and subscribed before me this twelfth day of April, 1859.
A. L. FAIRLY, J. P., P. C.
Signed, F. J. MIXON.
* * * * *
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, }
PERRY COUNTY. }
I, James Carpenter, Clerk of the Probate Court of said county, certify
that A. L. Fairly, whose name is signed to the above affidavit, was at
the time of signing the same, a Justice of the Peace, in and for said
county, and that full faith and credit are due all his official acts as
such.
Given under my hand and seal of said court, this sixteenth day of
April, 1859.
JAMES CARPENTER,
_Clerk Probate Court, Perry Co., Miss._
* * * * *
ELLISVILLE, JONES COUNTY, }
MISSISSIPPI. }
We, the undersigned citizens of said county and State aforesaid, do
hereby certify that we are well acquainted with Bentonville Taylor, and
know him to be a man of no moral worth as a citizen, no character as a
lawyer, nor school teacher, and a man to whose word we could not give
any credence for truth and veracity.
J. L. Owen, Att’y at Law, Ellisville, Miss.
J. A. Easterling.
Norval Cooper.
S. E. Nettles, Treas. of Jones county.
F. K. Willoughby, Justice of the Peace.
Hiram Mathas.
Isaac Anderson.
M. H. Owen.
Amos J. Spears.
Richmond Anderson.
Thos. D. Dyess.
John H. Walters.
H. D. Dossett, Ex-Sheriff of said county.
* * * * *
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, }
JONES COUNTY. }
I, D. M. Shows, Clerk of the Circuit and Probate Courts of said county,
do hereby certify that I believe the men whose names appear to the
foregoing annexed certificate, are men of truth and veracity.
Given under my hand and seal of office this second day of April, 1859.
D. M. SHOWS, Clerk of C & P. C.
* * * * *
ELLISVILLE, MISSISSIPPI, }
JONES COUNTY. }
I, E. M. Devall, Sheriff of said county and State aforesaid, do certify
that I believe that the men whose names appear to the foregoing annexed
certificate are men of truth and veracity.
Given under my hand and seal this 2d day of April, 1859.
E. M. DEVALL, Sheriff Jones county.
* * * * *
After Bentonville Taylor returned from Mobile, I saw him and told him
of the rumor that was in circulation relative to his going to Mobile
as a witness against Col. J. R. S. Pitts, and he denied emphatically
to me of having any share in the transaction, and also stated that the
aforesaid rumor was false.
[Signed.] EDWARD W. GOFF.
The next question to be dealt with is the miserable plea of insanity,
and forged names in the confessions.
First, let the report from the inquisition jury be read, which will be
found on page 113 of this work. Again, it is well known by those who
visited Copeland in person, that there was a keenness and shrewdness
about him which distinguished him from ordinary men; and all the
promptings given to feign insanity did not amount to anything but
deserving failure. And as to the gratuitous charge of forging names,
the defendant did not know anything about them previous to being
given by Copeland. He did not know that such names were in existence
before, and of course could not forge in the absence of all knowledge
appertaining; but the conduct of the prosecution, with hundreds of
living witnesses, go, as quoted from the letter just referred to, “to
nail to the cross forever the truth of Copeland’s confessions.”
So much for the trial in Mobile in the first case, and now for the
necessary comments to further enable the reader to comprehend the whole.
There were two other cases on the same docket of precisely a similar
nature to the first against the defendant. For two or three years
afterward he was in regular attendance, and always ready for trial; but
the prosecution would not allow either case to come on until known that
his presence was required in the army during the war; and then it had
the cases called up, and the bonds declared forfeited. The two cases
were ordered dismissed, and, some several years afterward, the bondsmen
were finally released by the “Commissioners of Revenue” without injury.
Nothing is plainer than of the prosecution being glad of any plausible
pretext for dismissing the cases—anything in the shape of a convenient
opportunity for relief in the awkward situation in which it stood. Why
so determined and successful to bring on instanter the first case in
spite of the most powerful reasons for a temporary continuance? And
why, when this was over, was it equally determined and successful to
ward off the two remaining cases? Is it not evident, notwithstanding
all the prostituted forces at command, that it was unwilling to make
a second experiment? But how stands the presiding Judge affected in
this slimy affair? In the first case, in defiance of the most powerful
cause assigned in favor, he would not allow one hour of continuance
of the case; but from term to term, from year to year, he allowed the
prosecution all it wanted, regardless of all the urgent efforts of the
defendant for the remaining trials to be proceeded with to save entire
ruin from excessive and repeated expenses. But when the defendant’s
absence was compelled by demands made from the War Department, then did
this Judge allow the case to be pressed forward by the prosecution, and
the bonds declared forfeited! If this junta, or combination of Judge
with the prosecution did not exist, the plainest of all circumstantial
demonstrations are not worthy of any notice whatever. But this is only
one instance out of a number, which will be given of this Judge’s
partiality—of his palpable efforts to do violence to justice.
Again, mark his conduct in endeavoring to obtain a forced and unnatural
verdict. After twenty-four hours of close confinement, the jury
returned with the report that there was no earthly chance of coming
to an agreement. The Judge bid them, contrary to all custom, to again
retire, with a declaration that he would hold it in confinement until
the verdict could be made up, even though an indefinite period were
required to accomplish the object.
Had he before been in consultation with the prosecution? Did he know
the whole arrangement? Did he know that some one or more, perhaps
influenced by gold, were resolved to hold out to the bitter end?
And that one by one of the opposition, under the tortures of long
confinement, must keep falling in to avoid further suffering, and more
especially when the cunning device was resorted to for the purpose
of deceiving the opposition by inducements to the effect that it was
hardly worth while holding out when all could be so easily avoided by a
few dollars of fine in the way of damages, which would not at all hurt
the defendant? What was the meaning of the sham in his appearing, in
the first part of his instructions, to lean to the defendant by telling
the jury that if there was a doubt existing with it, the defendant was
entitled to the benefit of said doubt; and then, in the last hours of
worn out confinement, came squarely out in conflict, and positively
told the jury that it was bound to find a verdict of guilty from the
law and evidence before it? What was the meaning of packages and
writing being conveyed to the jury by outsiders during the latter part
of its retirement, or, at least, to that part of it in favor of the
prosecution?
Notwithstanding the most justifiable and potent of all reasons in favor
of the petition got up and signed by six hundred of the best and most
respectable citizens of Mobile to be forwarded to the Governor for the
release of the defendant, the Judge hearing of the same, emphatically
declared, before being asked, that he would not sign it; and the
Governor, because of this omission, refused to grant the prayer. Did
the prosecution influence both Governor and Judge, so that the whole
formed one compact ring to defeat justice? What says the learned Dr.
Bevell on this subject—the very man who sat on this jury and witnessed
all:
“We have made an effort to limit his imprisonment through the pardoning
power of Governor Moore, by an article addressed him in the shape of
a petition, with about six hundred signatures of the most respectable
citizens of Mobile; but in this we have failed, and, to my deepest
regret, he will have to serve his time out. We first drew up a petition
to Judge McKinstry, signed by a respectable number of the jury, but
hearing of his negative declarations on the street, we declined
honoring him with the request.
“_Although we have failed in these efforts, the conduct of all the
opposing clique strongly indicate to my mind that the principal
stringent ruling and opposition are to gratify, and sustain, and retain
political influence._”
But the abuses committed by Judge McKinstry do not close here. A verbal
copy of Shoemake’s affidavit has just been received, the insertion of
which cannot be omitted, as it will add new light on what has already
been advanced on this subject in the commencing part of the trial, and
will go still further to demonstrate the deeply sullied conduct of the
prosecution and Judge. Let this copy be read with attention:
[COPY.]
STATE OF ALABAMA, }
MOBILE COUNTY. }
Before ——, personally came S. S. Sheumack, who on oath saith that
one J. R. S. Pitts did, within the last six months, in the county
aforesaid, unlawfully, wickedly and maliciously, with intent to injure,
defame, villify, and prejudice this deponent, and to bring him into
contempt, scandal, and disgrace, publish and circulate in said county a
printed pamphlet entitled, “The Life and Career of James Copeland, the
Great Southern Land Pirate, who was executed at Augusta, Mississippi,
October 30th, 1857; together with the exploits of the Wages’ clan in
Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida.”
In said pamphlet, said Copeland is described as one of the leaders of a
gang of robbers, murderers, highwaymen, and the deponent is represented
therein by the name of “S. S. Shonesmak,” as a member of said clan, or
gang of robbers, murderers, and thieves; which pamphlet containing the
aforesaid statement, referring to this deponent, is a defamatory libel,
and is utterly and wholly false.
S. S. SHEUMACK.
Subscribed and sworn to, this 17th day of January, 1859, before me,
ALEX. MCKINSTRY, Judge.
* * * * *
TO ANY SHERIFF OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA:
You are hereby commanded to arrest the body of J. R. S. Pitts, charged
by affidavit made with the offense of “Libel,” by one S. S. Sheumack,
and hold him in custody until discharged by due course of law, which
may be done by any examining magistrate.
Witness my hand and seal,
Mobile, January 17, 1859. ALEX. MCKINSTRY, Judge.
Received January 17, 1859, and on the same day I executed the within
writ on J. R. S. Pitts, and have now in jail.
JAMES T. SHELTON, Sheriff. M. C.
* * * * *
THE STATE OF ALABAMA, }
MOBILE COUNTY. }
I, P. LaVergy, Clerk of the City Court of Mobile, hereby certify, that
the foregoing is a true copy of the affidavit signed by S. S. Sheumack,
as also of the writ of arrest, and Sheriff’s return, in a case of the
State vs. J. R. S. Pitts, as the same on file in my office.
Witness my hand, this 19th day of July, A. D., 1874.
P. LAVERGY, Clerk.
THE CHARACTER OF THE PROSECUTION.
Scheumack or Shoemake, all the while a citizen of Mississippi, the
defendant a citizen of Mississippi, yet, he goes to the City of Mobile,
in another State, among his friends and brethren, for process of law.
This was changing of venue with a vengeance. With equal propriety, as
far as law is concerned, might he not have gone to New York—not one
whit more unnatural.
Sheumack, the “big dog” among the clan; the man, above all others,
steeped the deepest in blood, and crime, and dissimulation; the man
who brought counterfeit documents pretending to come from the Probate
Judge of Kemper county; the man who denied writing the John R. Garland
letter on the witness stand, and whose oath was there invalidated to
the satisfaction of all; the man who bore the requisition from the
Governor of Alabama to the Governor of Mississippi for the arrest of
the defendant; this is the man to whom Judge McKinstry granted his writ
to serve the purposes as specified in the affidavit.
This affidavit charges with “unlawfully, wickedly, and maliciously,
with intent to injury, defame, villify, and prejudice the deponent:”
and again “this deponent is represented by the name of Shonesmak, as
a member of a clan or gang of robbers, murderers, and thieves, which
statement, referring to the deponent, is a defamatory libel, and
utterly and wholly untrue.”
In answer, will any one deny that such a “clan” existed? Will any
one deny that its whole object was robbery, murder, and theft? It is
presumed that none will have the effrontery to make such a denial in
the face of such overwhelming testimony almost everywhere to be found.
The next thing to be considered is, did the defendant publish and
circulate, with an intent to defame, villify, and prejudice, etc., one
represented by the name of Shouesmack, as belonging to the said clan?
Is there one disinterested and unprejudiced being in existence who
can believe that the defendant could have any motive for “wickedly,
maliciously.” etc., assailing somebody he before knew nothing about,
either good or bad—not even before knowing that such a creature was in
existence? Up to that time, unacquainted with a single act of his life,
can any one believe that the defendant published and circulated with a
wicked and malicious intent to defame and prejudice somebody he neither
knew by person or reputation before? Maliciousness can not exist while
unconscious of any cause for the same. So much then for the unlawful,
wicked and malicious attempt to injure the _fair fame_ of Scheumack.
The same arguments will apply with equal force to the other names as
published being the same as given by Copeland to the defendant; for to
suppose otherwise would be the height of absurdity. The next subject
for inquiry is, did Copeland, in his list of names, include Scheumack
rightfully or wrongfully?
_Shonesmack_, and not Scheumack, was given in the published list in
consequence of a typographical error. But Scheumack declared that the
published name must mean him, and the same publication was “having a
very deleterious effect against him in his own county, Kemper.” Why was
Scheumack so very sensitive? Why did he take on himself the published
name of _Shonesmack_? Why was the publication having a very deleterious
effect against him in his county, Kemper? An innocent man by the name
of _Scheumack_ would hardly have troubled himself much about Shonesmak.
A man living honestly, honorably, and respectfully in his own county
would not have taken any umbrage at all from the publication. Around
here, there are quite a number by the same, or very similar, name,
yet none of these complained against the publication having a very
deleterious effect against them. Those who foam, and rave, and curse
the hardest, are generally the object on whom suspicion falls the
heaviest.
But this is not all, immediately after the publication of the
pamphlet complained of, he wrote his John R. Garland letter, in which
he described himself with the most perfect of accuracy as being
occasionally absent for some time, and then returning with horses and
mules, and other sorts of property which nobody besides himself could
account for, etc. Let it be borne in mind that he denied writing this
letter on oath on the witness stand, when the conclusive proof came
next that he undoubtedly was the author of it. The counterfeit papers,
with feigned authority from the Probate Judge of Kemper county, his
several designs on the life of the defendant, with many other of his
actions which are more than suspicious, all go to establish the fact
that Copeland made no mistake when he gave his name and designated him
as a “big dog” among the clan.
Ye, Governors, Judges and prosecutors, learn from the old adage: “Tell
me the company you keep, and I will tell you who you are.”
But there is something left behind of a still darker and more
enigmatical character as to the mockery in processes of law belonging
to the case.
Scheumack, a resident of another State, goes to Mobile to prosecute
for libel, and Judge McKinstry grants him the writ accordingly. The
Sheriff is represented as returning the same to the effect that the
writ had been executed, and the defendant in jail on the 17th of
January, 1859. Again, the trial docket and the records show that four
bills were got against the defendant from the Grand Jury the November
term, 1858, marked cases numbers 61, 62, 63, 64, corresponding to which
are given the names of G. Y. Overall, C. F. Moulton, G. A. Cleaveland,
and S. S. Scheumack; and that the name of Scheumack disappeared
subsequently without any order being made or without any cause being
assigned for the same; and furthermore four appearance bonds given by
the defendant are found on file in the office. In these cases, there
is no record of any action being taken by either Governor of Alabama
or Mississippi, the reason for which, perhaps, may be accounted for by
the innovation and wrong being too great for Governors’ names to be
associated with on record.
Now, it is evident, from the affidavit of Scheumack, that he did not
get a bill at the time the other three did from the Grand Jury of 1858,
and it is equally evident that he never afterward got one; then why was
his case associated on the trial docket with the other three?
The writ executed and returned asserts the defendant to be in jail on
the 17th of January, 1859. What a farce! If the defendant was in jail
at that time, it so mysteriously happened that he never knew it. A
bond is found on file in the office given by the defendant to answer
the charge preferred by Scheumak. What a farce! If the defendant gave
such a bond, he never knew it—was never called on to sign it—never went
before any examining magistrate, nor never knew, until a few days ago,
that Scheumack had ever succeeded in any action of law against him.
Ye prosecutors, answer, if you can, how the records are made to show
that Scheumack got a bill from the Grand Jury of the November term,
1858, when his affidavit of January 17, 1859, shows conclusively that
he never got any such bill at all. Answer, if you can, how his name
so mysteriously disappeared from the trial docket without any order
being made, or without any cause being assigned for the same. Answer,
if you can, how the appearance bond relative to him and the defendant
is found on file in the office, when no such bond could possibly have
been given. Answer, if you can, how the defendant came to be in jail on
the 17th of January, 1859, when thousands positively know that such was
not the case. If “something rotten in Denmark” is not found here, it is
vain to seek from any other quarter.
CONCLUDING SKETCH OF THE TRIAL.
Not in populous cities—not in the centres of accumulated wealth and
misdirected intelligence that integrity and the administration of
justice can be found. The highest functionaries of States have to bend
to these rings and cliques. Honor scorned, justice mocked, and shame
departed, what is there left to purify the national streams? Clans
who live by plunder and murder can, with their ill-gotten gains, find
plenty of law protection. Above all things, the Bench should be kept
pure and independent, so that the criminal, though rich, cannot escape;
and the poor and humble, if honest, can receive protection. Not as now,
when judicial decisions are measured according to political numbers and
the varied influences of wealth. If mercy is shown at all, let it be on
the side of the unfortunate and those who have had few opportunities
for improvement; and never on the side of those who have had all the
advantages of wealth and education, and who should set an example to
the subordinate classes of the community. Let the lessons cease to
be taught and children cease to learn that because a man is rich no
crime can hurt him; and if poor, though honest, he can be victimized
by a snap of the finger from some influential person at any time.
Is it any wonder at the increasing centralization of power? It is a
necessary consequence under present circumstances. The corruptions
and abominations have nearly reached the maximum height, and are at
present of such a frightful magnitude that some remedy, ere long, must
be adopted. Liberty abused must bring on reaction, sometimes for the
better, but oftener for evils as great as those desired to be remedied.
And now, in concluding this sketch of the trial, which was carried on
with so much absorbing interest and excitement, a brief recapitulation
of its paramount features may be of some utility in bringing within our
immediate view those incidents of it which are the most pregnant of
meaning as to the future consequences.
In reviewing the conduct of the then Governor of Mississippi, McWillie,
it is not charity, nor warranted by correct inductive reasoning, to
suppose that he intended to assist the Wages and Copeland Clan by
giving his approval for the rendition of the defendant as a “fugitive
from justice,” at the time he was an acting Sheriff for one of the
counties of the State. It is, perhaps, better to suspect the Governor’s
ignorance or want of the proper information, than to charge him
with evil designs. Had he known at the time the desperate character
of Shoemake, one of the clan, and the authorized agent to make the
arrest; had he known that the defendant knew nothing of the names
prior to the confessions, and, of course, could have had no interest
nor malicious motive to misrepresent, with the fact of locating the
Three Distinguished at the risk of protracted trouble and a ruinous
expense, furnishing a strong inference of the truth of all as to the
names inserted; had he known that Copeland himself, on the scaffold
in the last moments of earthly existence, acknowledged publicly and
before living witnesses the truth of the whole of his confessions; had
he known and reflected that the full publication of them must have, not
only a direct and powerful tendency to disorganize the remnant of the
clan, but also to prevent future associations of a similar character;
had he known the full extent of the horrors, for years, perpetrated
by this clan, and that numbers still living, from experience, can
vouch for many of the facts as narrated in the confessions; had he
known that an offense committed in one State or county, and the injury
sustained inflicted in another State or county, the case may be tried
in either, which gave him the right to use his discretion; had he known
and reflected that the conflict must be between prosecutors—revengeful
and experienced, wealthy and powerful, from another State, against
youth—against an humble but honest citizen of his own State; had he
known all these circumstances and maturely considered them, censure
could not be too severely applied for his approving the rendition of
the defendant as “a fugitive from justice.” Who ever before heard of
any person being dragged from one State to another as a malefactor on a
charge of _libel_?
However, if he, without design, gave assistance to the clan in the
shape of an unmerited expense and injury to the defendant, it is
nevertheless true that he also, without design, was instrumental in
laying the foundation for a more distant triumph in behalf of justice.
Many of the last observations are strictly applicable to the presiding
Judge, McKinstry. We cannot believe that he had any affiliation with
the clan, nor any sympathy for its continuance; but his reprehensible
conduct on the trial can be better accounted for in the language of the
competent gentleman who sat on the jury, and who had an opportunity of
seeing and hearing and witnessing all, thus: “His strenuous ruling,
strongly indicated to my mind, was to retain and maintain political
influence with powerful cliques.”